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The foundry model is a microelectronics engineering and manufacturing business model consisting of a semiconductor fabrication plant, or foundry, and an integrated circuit design operation, each belonging to separate companies or subsidiaries.[1][2][3][4] It was first conceived by Morris Chang, the founder of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC).[5]

Integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) design and manufacture integrated circuits. Many companies, known as fabless semiconductor companies, only design devices; merchant or pure play foundries only manufacture devices for other companies, without designing them. Examples of IDMs are Intel, Samsung, and Texas Instruments, examples of pure play foundries are GlobalFoundries, TSMC, and UMC, and examples of fabless companies are AMD, Nvidia, and Qualcomm.[citation needed]

Integrated circuit production facilities are expensive to build and maintain. Unless they can be kept at nearly full use, they will become a drain on the finances of the company that owns them. The foundry model uses two methods to avoid these costs: fabless companies avoid costs by not owning such facilities. Merchant foundries, on the other hand, find work from the worldwide pool of fabless companies, through careful scheduling, pricing, and contracting, keep their plants in full use.[citation needed]

History

[edit]

Companies that both designed and produced the devices were originally responsible for manufacturing microelectronic devices. These manufacturers were involved in both the research and development of manufacturing processes and the research and development of microcircuit design.

The first pure play semiconductor company is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation founded by Morris Chang, a spin-off of the government Industrial Technology Research Institute, which split its design and fabrication divisions in 1987,[6] a model advocated for by Carver Mead in the U.S., but deemed too costly to pursue. The separation of design and fabrication became known as the foundry model, with fabless manufacturing outsourcing to semiconductor foundries.[7]

Fabless semiconductor companies do not have any semiconductor fabrication capability, instead contracting with a merchant foundry for fabrication. The fabless company concentrates on the research and development of an IC-product; the foundry concentrates on manufacturing and testing the physical product. If the foundry does not have any semiconductor design capability, it is a pure-play semiconductor foundry.

An absolute separation into fabless and foundry companies is not necessary. Many companies continue to exist that perform both operations and benefit from the close coupling of their skills. Some companies manufacture some of their own designs and contract out to have others manufactured or designed, in cases where they see value or seek special skills. The foundry model is a business model that seeks to optimize productivity.

MOSIS

[edit]

The very first merchant foundries were part of the MOSIS service. The MOSIS service gave limited production access to designers with limited means, such as students, university researchers, and engineers at small startups.[8] The designer submitted designs, and these submissions were manufactured with the commercial company's extra capacity. Manufacturers could insert some wafers for a MOSIS design into a collection of their own wafers when a processing step was compatible with both operations. The commercial company (serving as foundry) was already running the process, so they were effectively being paid by MOSIS for something they were already doing. A factory with excess capacity during slow periods could also run MOSIS designs to avoid having expensive capital equipment stand idle.

Under-use of an expensive manufacturing plant could lead to the financial ruin of the owner, so selling surplus wafer capacity was a way to maximize the fab's use. Hence, economic factors created a climate where fab operators wanted to sell surplus wafer-manufacturing capacity and designers wanted to purchase manufacturing capacity rather than try to build it.

Although MOSIS opened the doors to some fabless customers, earning additional revenue for the foundry and providing inexpensive service to the customer, running a business around MOSIS production was difficult. The merchant foundries sold wafer capacity on a surplus basis, as a secondary business activity. Services to the customers were secondary to the commercial business, with little guarantee of support. The choice of merchant dictated the design, development flow, and available techniques to the fabless customer. Merchant foundries might require proprietary and non-portable preparation steps. Foundries concerned with protecting what they considered trade secrets of their methodologies might only be willing to release data to designers after an onerous nondisclosure procedure.

Dedicated foundry

[edit]

In 1987, the world's first dedicated merchant foundry opened its doors: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC).[9] The distinction of 'dedicated' is in reference to the typical merchant foundry of the era, whose primary business activity was building and selling of its own IC-products. The dedicated foundry offers several key advantages to its customers: first, it does not sell finished IC-products into the supply channel; thus a dedicated foundry will never compete directly with its fabless customers (obviating a common concern of fabless companies). Second, the dedicated foundry can scale production capacity to a customer's needs, offering low-quantity shuttle services in addition to full-scale production lines. Finally, the dedicated foundry offers a "COT-flow" (customer owned tooling) based on industry-standard EDA systems, whereas many IDM merchants required its customers to use proprietary (non-portable) development tools. The COT advantage gave the customer complete control over the design process, from concept to final design.

Foundry sales leaders by year

[edit]

2023

[edit]
As of 2023, the top semiconductor foundries were:[11]
Rank Company Foundry type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
2023 Q4 2023 Q3 2023
1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 19,660 17,249
2 Samsung Semiconductor IDM Korea 3,619 3,690
3 GlobalFoundries Pure-play United States 1,854 1,852
4 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 1,727 1,801
5 SMIC Pure-play China 1,678 1,620
6 Hua Hong Semiconductor Pure-play China 657 766
7 Tower Semiconductor Pure-play Israel 352 358
8 PowerChip IDM Taiwan 330 305
9 Nexchip Pure-play China 308 283
10 Vanguard (VIS) Pure-play Taiwan 304 333

2017

[edit]
As of 2017, the top semiconductor foundries were:[12]
Rank Company Foundry type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
2017 2017 2016
1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 32,040 29,437
2 GlobalFoundries Pure-play United States 5,407 4,999
3 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 4,898 4,587
4 Samsung Semiconductor IDM Korea 7,398 4,284
5 SMIC Pure-play China 3,099 2,914
6 TowerJazz Pure-play Israel 1,388 1,249
7 PowerChip IDM Taiwan 1,035 870
8 Vanguard (VIS) Pure-play Taiwan 817 801
9 Hua Hong Semiconductor Pure-play China 807 721
10 Dongbu HiTek Pure-play Korea 676 666

2016–2014

[edit]
As of 2016, the top pure-play semiconductor foundries were:[13][14]
Rank Company Foundry type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
2016 2015 2016 2015 2014
1 1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 29,488 25,574 25,138
2 2 GlobalFoundries Pure-play United States 5,545 5,019 4,355
3 3 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 4,582 4,464 4,331
4 4 SMIC Pure-play China 2,921 2,236 1,970
5 5 PowerChip Pure-play Taiwan 1,275 1,268 1,291
6 6 TowerJazz Pure-play Israel 1,249 961 828
8 8 Vanguard (VIS) Pure-play Taiwan 800 736 790
9 9 Hua Hong Semi Pure-play China 712 650 665
10 10 Dongbu HiTek Pure-play Korea 672 593 541
11 12 X-Fab Pure-play Germany 510 331 330
Others Pure-play 2,251 2,405 2,280

2013

[edit]
As of 2013, the top 13 semiconductor foundries were:[15]
2013 Rank 2012 Rank Company Foundry Type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million $USD)
1 1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 19,850
2 2 GlobalFoundries Pure-play United States 4,261
3 3 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 3,959
4 4 Samsung Semiconductor IDM Korea 3,950
5 5 SMIC Pure-play China 1,973
7 8 PowerChip Pure-play Taiwan 1,175
8 9 Vanguard (VIS) Pure-play Taiwan 713
9 6 Huahong Grace Pure-play China 710
10 10 Dongbu Pure-play Korea 570
11 7 TowerJazz Pure-play Israel 509
12 11 IBM IDM United States 485
13 12 MagnaChip IDM Korea 411
14 13 Win Semiconductors Pure-play Taiwan 354

2011

[edit]
As of 2011, the top 14 semiconductor foundries were:[16]
Rank Company Foundry type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 14,600
2 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 3,760
3 GlobalFoundries Pure-play United States 3,580
4 Samsung Semiconductor IDM Korea 1,975
5 SMIC Pure-play China 1,315
6 TowerJazz Pure-play Israel 610
7 Vanguard (VIS) Pure-play Taiwan 519
8 Dongbu HiTek Pure-play Korea 500
9 IBM IDM United States 445
10 MagnaChip IDM Korea 350
11 SSMC Pure-play Singapore 345
12 Hua Hong NEC Pure-play China 335
13 Win Semiconductors Pure-play Taiwan 300
14 X-Fab Pure-play Germany 285

2010

[edit]
As of 2010, the top 10 semiconductor foundries were:[17]
Rank Company Foundry Type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 13,332
2 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 3,824
3 GlobalFoundries Pure-play United States 3,520
4 SMIC Pure-play China 1,554
5 Dongbu HiTek Pure-play Korea 512
6 TowerJazz Pure-play Israel 509
7 Vanguard (VIS) Pure-play Taiwan 505
8 IBM IDM United States 500
9 MagnaChip IDM Korea 410
10 Samsung Semiconductor IDM Korea 390

2009–2007

[edit]

As of 2009, the top 17 semiconductor foundries were:[18]

Rank Company Foundry type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
2009 2009 2008 2007
1 TSMC Pure-play Taiwan 8,989 10,556 9,813
2 UMC Pure-play Taiwan 2,815 3,070 3,430
3 Chartered(1) Pure-play Singapore 1,540 1,743 1,458
4 GlobalFoundries Pure-play USA 1,101 0 0
5 SMIC Pure-play China 1,075 1,353 1,550
6 Dongbu Pure-play South Korea 395 490 510
7 Vanguard Pure-play Taiwan 382 511 486
8 IBM IDM USA 335 400 570
9 Samsung IDM South Korea 325 370 355
10 Grace Pure-play China 310 335 310
11 HeJian Pure-play China 305 345 330
12 Tower Semiconductor Pure-play Israel 292 252 231
13 HHNEC Pure-play China 290 350 335
14 SSMC Pure-play Singapore 280 340 359
15 Texas Instruments IDM USA 250 315 450
16 X-Fab Pure-play Germany 223 368 410
17 MagnaChip IDM South Korea 220 290 322

(1) Now acquired by GlobalFoundries

2008–2006

[edit]

As of 2008, the top 18 pure-play semiconductor foundries were:[19]

Rank Company Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
2008 2008 2007 2006
1 TSMC Taiwan 10,556 9,813 9,748
2 UMC Taiwan 3,400 3,755 3,670
3 Chartered Singapore 1,743 1,458 1,527
4 SMIC China 1,354 1,550 1,465
5 Vanguard Taiwan 511 486 398
6 Dongbu South Korea 490 510 456
7 X-Fab Germany 400 410 290
8 HHNEC China 350 335 315
9 HeJian China 345 330 290
10 SSMC Singapore 340 350 325
11 Grace China 335 310 227
12 Tower Semiconductor Israel 252 231 187
13 Jazz Semiconductor United States 190 182 213
14 Silterra Malaysia 175 180 155
15 ASMC China 149 155 170
16 Polar Semiconductor Japan 110 105 95
17 Mosel-Vitelic Taiwan 100 105 155
18 CR Micro (1) China - 143 114
Others 140 167 180
Total 20,980 20,575 19,940

(1) Merged with CR Logic in 2008, reclassified as an IDM foundry

2007–2005

[edit]

As of 2007, the top 14 semiconductor foundries include:[20]

Rank Company Foundry type Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD)
2007 2007 2006 2005
1 TSMC Pure-Play Taiwan 9,813 9,748 8,217
2 UMC Pure-Play Taiwan 3,755 3,670 3,259
3 SMIC Pure-Play China 1,550 1,465 1,171
4 Chartered Pure-Play Singapore 1,458 1,527 1,132
5 Texas Instruments IDM United States 610 585 540
6 IBM IDM United States 570 600 665
7 Dongbu Pure-Play South Korea 510 456 347
8 Vanguard Pure-Play Taiwan 486 398 353
9 X-Fab Pure-Play Germany 410 290 202
10 Samsung IDM South Korea 385 75 -
11 SSMC Pure-Play Singapore 350 325 280
12 HHNEC Pure-Play China 335 315 313
13 HeJian Pure-Play China 330 290 250
14 MagnaChip IDM South Korea 322 342 345

For ranking in worldwide:[21]

Rank Company Country/Territory of origin Revenue (million USD) 2006/2005 changes
2006 2005 2006 2005
6 7 TSMC Taiwan 9,748 8,217 +19%
21 22 UMC Taiwan 3,670 3,259 +13%

2004

[edit]

As of 2004, the top 10 pure-play semiconductor foundries were: [citation needed]

Rank 2004 Company Country/Territory of origin
1 TSMC Taiwan
2 UMC Taiwan
3 Chartered Singapore
4 SMIC China
5 Dongbu/Anam South Korea
6 SSMC Singapore
7 HHNEC China
8 Jazz Semiconductor United States
9 Silterra Malaysia
10 X-Fab Germany

Financial and IP issues

[edit]

Like all industries, the semiconductor industry faces upcoming challenges and obstacles.

The cost to stay on the leading edge has steadily increased with each generation of chips. The financial strain is being felt by both large merchant foundries and their fabless customers. The cost of a new foundry exceeds $1 billion. These costs must be passed on to customers. Many merchant foundries have entered into joint ventures with their competitors in an effort to split research and design expenditures and fab-maintenance expenses.

Chip design companies sometimes avoid other companies' patents simply by purchasing the products from a licensed foundry with broad cross-license agreements with the patent owner.[22]

Stolen design data is also a concern; data is rarely directly copied, because blatant copies are easily identified by distinctive features in the chip,[23] placed there either for this purpose or as a byproduct of the design process. However, the data including any procedure, process system, method of operation or concept may be sold to a competitor, who may save months or years of tedious reverse engineering.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Foundry model

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The foundry model is a business strategy in the semiconductor industry wherein a specialized fabrication company, known as a pure-play foundry, manufactures integrated circuits (ICs) and other microelectronic devices exclusively for third-party clients, without designing or marketing its own semiconductor products. This approach separates chip design from production, enabling fabless semiconductor firms—those that focus solely on design and innovation—to outsource manufacturing and reduce capital-intensive investments in fabrication facilities. Pioneered in 1987 by Dr. through the establishment of Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) as the world's first dedicated foundry, the model emerged amid economic pressures in and the growing complexity of fabrication processes during the late 1980s. Prior to this, most companies operated as integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), handling design, production, and sales in-house, which limited accessibility for smaller players and slowed industry innovation. The foundry model's rise was facilitated by advancements in process technology standardization and the increasing demand for custom chips in , , and , transforming the global . Key benefits include cost efficiencies through , as foundries amortize high fixed costs across multiple clients, and accelerated time-to-market for designers by leveraging specialized expertise in advanced nodes like 3nm and below. Major foundry operators today include , which holds approximately 70% as of Q2 2025; (UMC); ; and Samsung Foundry, with emerging competition from Intel's evolving internal foundry services aimed at external customers. This model has democratized production, fueling the explosive growth of fabless giants like , , and Apple, and underpinning the industry's shift toward and AI applications.

Overview

Definition and Core Concepts

The foundry model is a microelectronics business arrangement in the semiconductor industry wherein a fabrication plant, known as a foundry, specializes in manufacturing integrated circuits (ICs) exclusively based on designs submitted by external clients, such as fabless companies, without engaging in its own IC design or branded product sales. This model enables specialization by decoupling the capital-intensive process of chip fabrication from the innovation-driven task of design, allowing multiple parties to collaborate efficiently in producing advanced semiconductors. Core to the foundry model are distinctions between pure-play foundries, which dedicate operations solely to contract manufacturing without internal product development (exemplified by ), and hybrid foundries, which offer fabrication services alongside their own chip production for proprietary products (such as ). Foundries play a pivotal role in the semiconductor supply chain by producing advanced chips for AI companies such as , AMD, and Broadcom—which are fabless design firms focusing exclusively on IC architecture and —thereby bridging design with fabrication and subsequent assembly, testing, and packaging stages and optimizing resource allocation across the ecosystem. In contrast, integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), such as , internalize both design and fabrication within a single entity, differing fundamentally from the outsourced approach of the foundry model. The concept of the foundry model was pioneered in the 1980s by , who envisioned separating design from manufacturing to enhance efficiency and lower barriers for smaller innovators in an industry dominated by vertically integrated firms. An early precursor to this shared fabrication approach was the MOSIS program, initiated in 1981 to provide multi-project wafer services for academic and research prototyping.

Comparison to Integrated Device Manufacturers

The (IDM) model refers to companies that control the full value chain, encompassing chip design, fabrication, assembly, testing, and sales of complete products. Prominent examples include and , which operate their own fabrication plants (fabs) to produce s exclusively or primarily for internal use, enabling tight integration between design and manufacturing processes. In comparison, the foundry model promotes specialization by decoupling from fabrication, allowing fabless companies—such as those focused on system-on-chip development—to innovate without investing in expensive infrastructure, while foundries like concentrate on advancing technologies and scaling production. IDMs achieve vertical control that facilitates proprietary optimizations and security but incur substantial capital expenditures and operational risks, particularly in funding standalone fabs for evolving nodes like 3nm, where shifts demand frequent, costly upgrades. Foundries leverage economies of scale through multi-client production runs, achieving higher fab utilization rates (often exceeding 80%) and lower per-unit costs compared to IDMs, whose dedicated capacity can lead to underutilization during demand fluctuations. Conversely, IDMs benefit from in-house process tuning tailored to their product roadmaps, though this integration can hinder agility in adopting third-party intellectual property or responding to market-driven node transitions, such as the shift to gate-all-around transistors in sub-3nm processes. The primary clients of foundries are fabless firms, which outsource manufacturing to access cutting-edge capabilities without vertical integration. Since the , the foundry model's growth has reshaped the industry landscape, eroding IDM dominance in high-performance logic and leading-edge technologies such as nodes at 7nm and below, amid rising demand from AI and mobile applications as of 2025. As of 2025, this shift is accelerated by AI and demands, driving foundry revenues to grow 17-20% year-over-year.

History

Early Developments and MOSIS

In the 1960s and 1970s, the semiconductor industry was dominated by integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) such as Fairchild, Texas Instruments, and Intel, which controlled the entire process from design to fabrication within vertically integrated operations. These companies benefited from relatively lower initial fabrication facility costs—around $4 million in the late 1960s and early 1970s (equivalent to approximately $31 million in 2024 dollars)—but by the 1980s, building a state-of-the-art fab escalated to over $100 million due to increasing technological demands and equipment complexity. This escalation severely limited access for smaller firms, universities, and startups, as the capital-intensive nature of fabs favored large incumbents and stifled broader innovation in chip design. Early experiments in shared semiconductor fabrication emerged in the 1970s amid growing interest in very-large-scale integration (VLSI), with efforts at research institutions focusing on advancing wafer processing techniques and prototyping for complex circuits. These initiatives, including collaborative academic projects, began to explore cost-sharing models to support VLSI design tools and foster research beyond IDM constraints. Such experiments highlighted the potential of aggregating multiple designs to amortize fabrication expenses, influencing the development of standardized tools and enabling academic contributions to semiconductor progress. The MOSIS (MOS Implementation System) program, launched in 1981 by the U.S. in collaboration with the University of Southern California's Information Sciences Institute (USC/ISI), formalized these early ideas into a structured . MOSIS aggregated designs from multiple users—submitted via in format—onto single wafers, contracting with commercial foundries for mask-making, fabrication, and packaging, which dramatically reduced prototyping costs from tens of thousands of dollars per wafer to as low as $258 for a full chip design. This service proved essential for universities, startups, and researchers, supporting over 2,000 VLSI projects by 1983 and accelerating innovation by providing 8-10 week turnaround times. Key drivers for this transition included the rapid rise in complexity during the 1970s, where enabled VLSI chips with more than 10,000 transistors—reaching around 68,000 by the end of the decade (as in the introduced in 1979)—and created a need for neutral, accessible to decouple from production. These developments underscored the limitations of IDM exclusivity and paved the way for neutral shared fabrication, bridging to later commercial models.

Emergence of Dedicated Foundries

The emergence of dedicated foundries marked a pivotal shift in the , building on earlier prototyping efforts like the MOSIS program, which facilitated access to fabrication for researchers and helped validate the outsourced manufacturing model in the 1980s. In 1987, founded in , , establishing the world's first dedicated pure-play foundry with initial capital of $220 million, half provided by the Taiwanese to support national industrial development. initially focused on complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) processes, starting with 1-micron technology to produce logic and memory chips for external customers without designing its own products. This model separated fabrication from design, enabling fabless companies to innovate without owning expensive facilities. The 1990s saw accelerated growth in the foundry sector, coinciding with the rise of fabless semiconductor firms, exemplified by Qualcomm's founding in 1985 and a broader boom in the early driven by demand for specialized chips in computing and communications. (UMC), established in in 1980 as an , transitioned to a pure-play foundry model in 1995 by spinning off its design operations and focusing exclusively on contract manufacturing. Similarly, was founded in in 1987 as a backed by the to diversify the economy, rapidly expanding capacity to serve global clients in logic and analog processes. Key milestones in the 2000s further solidified the foundry model's global footprint. Samsung Electronics entered the dedicated foundry business in 2004, leveraging its existing fabrication expertise to offer services beyond its internal needs, targeting mobile and consumer electronics markets. In 2009, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) spun off its manufacturing operations to create GlobalFoundries, backed by investment from Abu Dhabi, allowing AMD to adopt a fabless strategy while providing a U.S.-based foundry option for various process nodes. China's Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) was established in 2000 in Shanghai with foreign expertise and state support to advance the country's semiconductor capabilities. This period witnessed a geographic shift from U.S. and dominance to broader Asian expansion, fueled by lower costs, government incentives, and proximity to design hubs in the region. By 2010, dedicated foundries had grown significantly, capturing an increasing share of global logic production and reflecting their role in enabling scalable manufacturing for diverse applications.

Business Model and Operations

Manufacturing Processes

The manufacturing processes in semiconductor foundries encompass a highly precise sequence of steps to transform raw into functional integrated circuits, divided primarily into front-end and back-end phases. The front-end , also known as , begins with a polished wafer—typically 300 mm in diameter—and involves creating the intricate structures and interconnects through repeated cycles of material deposition, patterning, and modification. Key steps include deposition, where thin films of insulating, conducting, or semiconducting materials are layered onto the wafer using techniques like (CVD); coating, applying a light-sensitive to prepare for patterning; , which projects circuit designs onto the resist using or (EUV) light through a ; , selectively removing material to define features via wet chemical or dry plasma methods; and ion (doping), bombarding the wafer with ions to alter electrical properties and form . These steps are iterated dozens of times to build multilayer structures, with each wafer potentially yielding thousands of dies after rigorous inline inspections for defects. The back-end process follows and focuses on transforming the completed wafers into usable chips, including the wafer into individual dies, assembly onto substrates with or flip-chip methods for electrical connections, testing for functionality and performance under various conditions, and final to protect the die while enabling integration into electronic systems, such as encasing it with a and lid. This phase ensures reliability and prepares chips for shipment, often taking weeks to complete due to the need for high-precision handling to avoid or damage. Foundries employ advanced technologies to push the limits of density and performance, particularly through shrinking nodes to 3 nm and 2 nm by 2025, which rely on EUV lithography systems operating at a 13.5 nm for resolutions as fine as 8 nm in high-numerical-aperture (NA) tools. These EUV systems, such as ASML's NXE for 3 nm high-volume and EXE platforms slated for 2 nm logic and nodes starting in 2025–2026, enable the precise patterning required for complex architectures like gate-all-around s. Yield optimization is critical throughout, with foundries targeting over 90% good die yields for mature nodes (e.g., 28 nm and above) through control, defect detection via AI-driven analytics, and statistical modeling to minimize variability from sources like or misalignment. To accommodate diverse client needs, foundries implement adaptations like multi-project wafer (MPW) services, where multiple customer designs are aggregated onto a single or set, sharing fabrication costs and reducing prototyping expenses by up to 90% for small-volume runs. This approach is particularly valuable for startups and research, allowing rapid validation without full-wafer commitment. Complementing this, process design kits (PDKs) provided by foundries serve as comprehensive libraries of device models, layout rules, and verification tools tailored to their specific fabrication processes, ensuring client designs are compatible and manufacturable while integrating with (EDA) software for simulation and optimization. The equipment ecosystem underpinning these processes features specialized tools from key suppliers, with a monopoly on EUV scanners essential for advanced nodes and providing dominant solutions for deposition, , and other thin-film processes. All operations occur in ultra-clean environments adhering to Class 1 cleanroom standards (ISO 3 equivalent), which limit airborne particles to no more than 1,000 per cubic meter at ≥0.1 µm size, achieved through high-efficiency particulate air () filtration, positive pressure, and stringent gowning protocols to prevent defects from even a single dust particle.

Design Support and Customer Services

Foundries provide essential design support through Process Design Kits (PDKs), which are comprehensive sets of files and models that describe a specific manufacturing process for integration with (EDA) tools from vendors such as and . These PDKs include device models, design rules, and layout parameters, enabling fabless companies to simulate and verify chip designs accurately before fabrication. For instance, Tower Semiconductor's PDKs support major EDA flows and incorporate analytical techniques for optimization and reliability analysis. Additionally, foundries offer reference designs for (IP) cores, such as analog and mixed-signal blocks, to accelerate integration and reduce time-to-market. Beyond PDKs, foundries deliver a range of verification and prototyping services, including design rule checks (DRC), layout-versus-schematic (LVS) verification, and circuit simulations tailored to their processes. These services ensure compliance with manufacturing constraints and help identify potential issues early in the design cycle. Prototyping is facilitated through multi-project (MPW) runs, where multiple customer designs share a single to lower costs—often reducing expenses by up to 90% compared to full- production. TSMC's CyberShuttle program, operational since 1998, has supported thousands of devices via MPW shuttles, providing rapid turnaround for initial validation. Similarly, ' GlobalShuttle aggregates projects for efficient prototyping of differentiated designs. Foundries foster fabless ecosystems through collaborative platforms that integrate design tools, IP, and partners. TSMC's Open Innovation Platform (OIP), for example, encompasses EDA alliances with over 20 vendors, IP partnerships, and support to minimize design barriers and enable advanced node adoption. Samsung's SAFE program similarly promotes SoC innovation by certifying components and offering joint design assistance. For capacity allocation, foundries secure volume production via long-term agreements (LTAs), which guarantee dedicated fab capacity in exchange for committed volumes; GlobalFoundries reported over 40 such LTAs by 2023, stabilizing supply for customers. Rapid prototyping options, like MPW shuttles, cater to startups and early-stage projects, contrasting with LTAs focused on high-volume scaling. Customization services distinguish foundries by offering specialty processes alongside leading-edge logic nodes. For (RF) and power applications, foundries provide tailored process options, such as Tower Semiconductor's modular platforms on 200mm or 300mm wafers, which integrate high-voltage and RF capabilities for analog, , and ICs. These specialty flows prioritize performance in niche markets like automotive and industrial, while leading-edge logic emphasizes scaling for compute-intensive designs, allowing customers to select processes aligned with application needs.

Major Companies and Market Dynamics

Leading Foundry Companies

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), founded in 1987 and headquartered in , stands as the world's leading dedicated , pioneering the pure-play model that separates from . By 2025, TSMC has solidified its dominance in advanced nodes, with its 2nm (N2) entering risk production and becoming available to customers in the second half of the year, enabling high-density, power-efficient chips for next-generation applications. Major clients such as Apple and rely on TSMC for cutting-edge fabrication, particularly for AI accelerators and graphics processing units, with approximately 60% of its market focus dedicated to AI and (HPC) segments that drive demand for these nodes. Samsung Foundry, the external manufacturing arm of South Korea's , operates a hybrid model that balances internal production for Samsung's devices with services for third-party clients, a strategy emphasized since the early when it expanded dedicated capabilities around 2004. Specializing in integrated logic with technologies, Samsung has advanced its offerings through innovations like the 3nm gate-all-around (GAA) process, which enhances density and efficiency for mobile, automotive, and server applications. This hybrid approach allows Samsung to leverage synergies between its division—dominant in DRAM and NAND—and logic services, positioning it as a key alternative to pure-play foundries for clients seeking embedded solutions. Among other established players, , founded in 2009 through a partnership between and Abu Dhabi's and based in the United States, focuses on specialty and mature process nodes (above 12nm), catering to automotive, IoT, and RF applications where reliability and customization outweigh cutting-edge scaling. (UMC), established in 1980 as Taiwan's first semiconductor firm, emphasizes cost-competitive production in mature and specialty technologies (28nm and above), serving and markets with efficient, high-volume fabrication. (SMIC), China's largest foundry founded in 2000, has made notable progress in advanced nodes despite U.S. export sanctions, achieving 7nm-class production for logic chips used in smartphones and AI edge devices. Emerging contenders include Foundry Services (IFS), launched in 2021 as part of 's strategic pivot under its IDM 2.0 model to offer external alongside internal needs, targeting foundry customers with 's 18A (1.8nm) and subsequent nodes for AI, cloud, and . However, Intel faces challenges in competing with TSMC, including manufacturing processes that lag in maturity and yields behind TSMC's advanced nodes, TSMC's established moat reinforced by key customers such as NVIDIA, AMD, and Broadcom, and the need for tens of billions in capital expenditures to bridge the competitive gap. In , Rapidus Corporation, established in 2022 with government and industry backing, is developing a 2nm-class to revitalize domestic advanced , achieving initial prototyping of GAA transistors in 2025 and aiming for mass production by 2027 through collaborations with and ASML. The global semiconductor foundry market demonstrated robust growth in 2025, with quarterly revenues reaching a record $41.7 billion in Q2, marking a 14.6% increase from the previous quarter. This surge was primarily fueled by surging demand for advanced nodes driven by (AI) applications and infrastructure expansions. In Q3 2025, reported a 6% quarter-over-quarter increase to $33.1 billion, highlighting continued momentum from AI demand. Annual revenues for 2025 are projected to reach approximately $175 billion, with the market expected to surpass $200 billion by 2030 at a (CAGR) of around 5-7%, continuing to be propelled by AI, , and emerging technologies like electric vehicles (EVs). Market share in 2025 remained heavily concentrated among a few leading players, with dominating at approximately 70-71% of the pure-play foundry segment in Q2. held about 7-8%, followed by at around 6%, at 5%, and at 5%, while smaller firms like and Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS) collectively accounted for less than 5%.
CompanyMarket Share (Q2 2025)
70-71%
7-8%
UMC~6%
SMIC5%
5%
Others<5%
The foundry sector experienced significant volatility from 2020 to 2025, beginning with a post-2020 boom spurred by demand for EV components and early AI accelerators, which drove annual growth rates exceeding 20% in 2021-2022. This was followed by a downturn in 2022-2023, where revenues declined by about 6.5% year-over-year in 2023 due to an inventory glut from overordering during the prior . Recovery accelerated in 2024-2025, with double-digit quarterly gains attributed to AI-driven orders and normalized supply chains, alongside government subsidies in that bolstered SMIC's capacity expansions and market position. Historically, the model's penetration in semiconductor manufacturing has evolved dramatically, rising from roughly 30% of overall production in 2000—when integrated device manufacturers () dominated—to over 70% for advanced nodes (below 10nm) by 2025, reflecting the shift toward fabless design strategies and specialized fabrication. This progression underscores the industry's role in enabling scalable innovation for complex chips essential to modern and connectivity.

Economic and Strategic Aspects

Financial Models and Revenue Streams

Semiconductor foundries primarily generate revenue through services, where customers pay for the production of wafers based on their designs. Pricing for advanced nodes, such as 3nm processes, typically exceeds $20,000 per 300mm , reflecting the and high yields required for cutting-edge technologies. Volume-based contracts further stabilize income, often structured as multi-year commitments that guarantee production capacity in exchange for minimum order volumes, helping foundries manage demand fluctuations. Additionally, (NRE) fees cover upfront costs for customizing processes or developing specialized technologies, which can range from several million dollars per project depending on the node and . The cost structure of foundries is dominated by substantial capital expenditures (capex) and ongoing (R&D). Building an advanced fabrication facility (fab) for nodes like 3nm requires investments of $15 billion to $20 billion or more, encompassing , equipment , and . R&D expenditures, essential for process innovation, typically account for 7-8% of annual revenue; for instance, allocated approximately $6.36 billion in 2024, representing 7.1% of its total revenue, to advance nodes like 2nm and enhance manufacturing efficiency. Foundries operate under distinct business models, with pure-play foundries like and focusing exclusively on for external clients, avoiding competition in design or sales to build trust and scale. In contrast, hybrid models adopted by integrated device manufacturers () such as combine internal production for proprietary chips with external foundry services, diversifying revenue but introducing potential conflicts. To mitigate industry volatility, both models increasingly rely on long-term supply agreements, which secure committed volumes over 5-10 years and provide pricing predictability amid disruptions. The foundry sector experiences pronounced economic cycles, characterized by boom-bust patterns driven by demand for , automotive, and . A notable downturn in 2023 stemmed from post-pandemic inventory gluts and weakened PC/ markets, leading to underutilized capacity and revenue declines across . By 2025, however, an AI-driven surge has propelled recovery, with chip sales projected to grow significantly due to expansions and generative AI applications, boosting foundry utilization rates above 90%. As of November 2025, reported year-to-date revenue of NT$2,616.15 billion, an increase of 31.8% compared to the same period in 2024. subsidies play a critical role in buffering these cycles, particularly in and ; for example, received over $2.2 billion in subsidies from the governments of the , , , and in the first half of 2025 to support advanced and global expansion.

Intellectual Property Management

In semiconductor foundries, (IP) risks primarily arise from the potential for or leakage during shared fabrication processes, where multiple clients' are produced in the same facilities, increasing exposure to unauthorized access or . To mitigate these risks, foundries implement secure process design kits (PDKs) that provide clients with essential manufacturing data while restricting access through , compartmentalized workflows, and audited employee permissions, ensuring that sensitive elements remain isolated. Foundries build client trust through non-competitive clauses in contracts, which explicitly prohibit the use of customer IP for developing their own products or sharing it with third parties, thereby preventing conflicts of interest in the pure-play foundry model. Additionally, foundries facilitate access to vetted third-party IP libraries, such as Arm processor cores, through partnerships that certify compatibility with their processes, allowing fabless companies to integrate pre-validated components without compromising proprietary designs. Legal frameworks underpin these protections, with non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) and patents forming the core of IP safeguards, supplemented by robust enforcement mechanisms. Notable disputes, such as the 2010s TSMC-Samsung litigation involving allegations of trade secret misappropriation by a former TSMC executive who joined Samsung, highlight the intensity of these battles, where courts upheld non-compete restrictions and awarded damages for leaked process technologies like 28-nm nodes. IP management also generates economic value for foundries through licensing of process-related IP and ecosystem integrations in fabless-foundry partnerships, where secure IP handling enables design innovation without manufacturing overhead. This model fosters symbiotic relationships, as fabless firms leverage foundry expertise while retaining full ownership of their designs, driving industry growth in advanced nodes.

Advantages and Challenges

Industry Benefits

The foundry model accelerates innovation in the by enabling fabless companies to concentrate on chip design and development, while pure-play foundries handle complexities. This specialization has lowered barriers for startups and allowed faster adoption of advanced process nodes, such as TSMC's 3nm and beyond technologies, which have driven rapid improvements in density and performance. For example, companies like , operating as fabless firms, have utilized foundry services to innovate in and graphics processing units, contributing to breakthroughs in AI and applications. Cost reductions represent a core benefit, as the shared infrastructure of foundries distributes the enormous capital expenses of fabrication plants—often exceeding $20 billion per advanced facility—across diverse customers, substantially lowering entry barriers for fabless designers compared to integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) that bear full fab ownership costs. This model achieves economies of scale through high equipment utilization rates, typically ranging from 75% to over 90% in leading foundries, which optimizes production efficiency and reduces per-unit manufacturing expenses. The foundry approach has expanded market opportunities by fostering diversification into emerging sectors, enabling non-traditional players to produce specialized chips like AI accelerators without in-house manufacturing. For instance, has partnered with via to develop custom AI inference chips, broadening access to advanced for software-focused firms. Moreover, the existence of multiple global foundries enhances by offering redundancy and geographic diversification, mitigating risks from regional disruptions. On a broader scale, the model has boosted industry-wide R&D investments, with U.S. firms alone spending $59.3 billion in 2023—representing 19.5% of sales—and global totals exceeding $100 billion annually as demand for advanced nodes grows. It has also driven significant job creation in , where Taiwan's sector employs over 300,000 workers, fueling in these powerhouses.

Key Risks and Limitations

The foundry model is susceptible to vulnerabilities, exemplified by the 2021 global triggered by surging demand and production constraints, which resulted in an estimated $61 billion loss in automotive sales due to insufficient chip availability. These disruptions highlight the risks of concentrated capacity and reliance on specialized , where in can cascade across downstream industries like automotive and . Overcapacity risks further compound these issues, as seen in the 2023 industry glut in mature nodes, leading to underutilized fabrication plants and financial strain on operators. Geopolitical tensions pose acute threats, particularly surrounding , where produces over 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors below 7nm, making the supply chain highly exposed to cross-strait conflicts. U.S.- export controls exacerbate this for Chinese foundries like SMIC, restricting access to tools and resulting in lower yields on 7nm nodes compared to industry standards. These restrictions hinder technological advancement and increase dependency on non-Chinese suppliers for cutting-edge processes. Client reluctance to diversify suppliers underscores challenges in reducing dependency on dominant foundries like TSMC. For example, in late 2025, Nvidia halted testing of Intel's unproven 18A process node due to performance and yield risks, the established maturity and reliability of TSMC's 2nm and 3nm processes, high switching costs including adaptations to differing design rules, and timing constraints for product launches such as Blackwell Ultra and the Rubin series. Financial risks stem from the model's cyclical demand patterns, where foundry revenues can fluctuate 20-50% year-over-year due to economic downturns and adjustments in end markets like smartphones and centers. High capital expenditures amplify this volatility; for instance, invested $17 billion in its Taylor, Texas fabrication plant to expand advanced node capacity, contributing to elevated debt levels amid uncertain returns. Smaller foundries often experience technology lag, struggling to match leaders like in sub-7nm processes due to limited R&D budgets and access to enabling technologies, confining them to mature nodes above 10nm. Efforts to mitigate geopolitical risks include U.S. initiatives under the , which as of 2025 have funded new domestic fabrication facilities by and to diversify advanced node production away from . Environmental impacts add another layer of limitation, with individual fabrication facilities consuming up to 40 million liters of daily—equivalent to over 14 billion liters annually—and significant energy, accounting for a substantial portion of regional use, such as TSMC's 4.8% of Taiwan's total in recent years. While protections offer some mitigation against theft in this asset-light model, they do not fully address these operational and external challenges.

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