Hubbry Logo
Insider tradingInsider tradingMain
Open search
Insider trading
Community hub
Insider trading
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Insider trading
Insider trading
from Wikipedia

Insider trading is the trading of a public company's stock or other securities (such as bonds or stock options) based on material, nonpublic information about the company.[1] In many countries, some kinds of trading based on insider information are illegal. The rationale for this prohibition of insider trading differs between countries and regions. Some view it as unfair to other investors in the market who do not have access to the information, as the investor with inside information can potentially make larger profits than an investor without such information.[2] However, insider trading is also prohibited to prevent the directors of a company (the insiders) from abusing a company's confidential information for the directors' personal gain.[3]

The rules governing insider trading are complex and vary significantly from country to country, as does the extent of enforcement. The definition of 'insider' in one jurisdiction can be broad and may cover not only insiders themselves but also any persons related to them, such as brokers, associates, and even family members. In some jurisdictions, a person who becomes aware of non-public information and then trades on that basis may be guilty of a crime.

Trading by specific insiders, such as employees, is commonly permitted as long as it does not rely on material information not available to the general public. Many jurisdictions require that such trading be reported so the transactions can be monitored. In the United States and several other jurisdictions, trading conducted by corporate officers, key employees, directors, or significant shareholders must be reported to the regulator or publicly disclosed, usually within a few business days of the trade. In such cases, insiders in the United States are required to file Form 4 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when buying or selling shares of their own companies. The authors of one study concluded that illegal insider trading raises the cost of capital for securities issuers, thus decreasing overall economic growth.[4] On the other hand, some economists, such as Henry Manne, have argued that insider trading should be allowed and can, in fact, benefit markets.[5]

There has long been "considerable academic debate" among business and legal scholars over whether insider trading should be illegal.[6] Several arguments against outlawing insider trading have been identified: for example, although insider trading is illegal, most insider trading is never detected by law enforcement, and thus the illegality of insider trading might give the public the potentially misleading impression that "stock market trading is an unrigged game that anyone can play."[6] Some legal analysis has questioned whether insider trading actually harms anyone in the legal sense, since it can be argued either that insider trading does not cause anyone to suffer an actual "loss" or that anyone who suffers a loss is not owed an actual legal duty by the insiders in question.[6] Opponents of political insider trading also point to conflicts of interest and social distrust.[7]

[edit]

Rules prohibiting or criminalizing insider trading on material non-public information exist in most jurisdictions around the world (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002), but the details and the efforts to enforce them vary considerably. In the United States, Sections 16(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 directly and indirectly address insider trading. The U.S. Congress enacted this law after the stock market crash of 1929.[8] While the United States is generally viewed as making the most serious efforts to enforce its insider trading laws,[9] the broader scope of the European model legislation provides a stricter framework against illegal insider trading.[10][11] In the European Union and the United Kingdom, all trading on non-public information is, under the rubric of market abuse, subject at a minimum to civil penalties and possible criminal penalties as well.[11] UK's Financial Conduct Authority has the responsibility to investigate and prosecute insider dealing, defined by the Criminal Justice Act 1993.

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) can apply to domestic politically exposed persons.[12]

Definition of "insider"

[edit]

In the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany and Romania for mandatory reporting purposes, corporate insiders are defined as a company's officers, directors and any beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class of the company's equity securities. Trades made by these types of insiders in the company's own stock, based on material non-public information, are considered fraudulent since the insiders are violating the fiduciary duty that they owe to the shareholders. The corporate insider, simply by accepting employment, has undertaken a legal obligation to the shareholders to put the shareholders' interests before their own, in matters related to the corporation. When insiders buy or sell based on company-owned information, they are said to be violating their obligation to the shareholders or investors.

For example, illegal insider trading would occur if the chief executive officer of Company A learned (prior to a public announcement) that Company A would be taken over and then bought shares in Company A while knowing that the share price would likely rise. In the United States and many other jurisdictions, "insiders" are not just limited to corporate officials and major shareholders where illegal insider trading is concerned but can include any individual who trades shares based on material non-public information in violation of some duty of trust. This duty may be imputed; for example, in many jurisdictions, in cases where a corporate insider "tips" a friend about non-public information likely to have an effect on the company's share price, the duty the corporate insider owes the company is now imputed to the friend and the friend violates a duty to the company if he trades on the basis of this information.

Liability

[edit]

Liability for inside trading violations generally cannot be avoided by passing on the information in an "I scratch your back; you scratch mine" or quid pro quo arrangement if the person receiving the information knew or should have known that the information was material non-public information. In the United States, at least one court has indicated that the insider who releases the non-public information must have done so for an improper purpose. In the case of a person who receives the insider information (called the "tippee"), the tippee must also have been aware that the insider released the information for an improper purpose.[13]

One commentator has argued that if Company A's CEO did not trade on undisclosed takeover news, but instead passed the information on to his brother-in-law who traded on it, illegal insider trading would still have occurred (albeit by proxy, by passing it on to a "non-insider" so Company A's CEO would not get his hands dirty).[14]: 589 

Misappropriation theory

[edit]

The misappropriation theory of insider trading is now accepted in U.S. law. It states that anyone who misappropriates material non-public information and trades on that information in any stock may be guilty of insider trading. This can include elucidating material non-public information from an insider with the intention of trading on it or passing it on to someone who will. This theory constitutes the background for the securities regulation that enforces the insider trading.[15] Disgorgement represents ill-gotten gains (or losses avoided) resulting from individuals violating the securities laws. In general in the countries where the insider trading is forbidden, the competent Authority seeks disgorgement to ensure that securities law violators do not profit from their illegal activity. When appropriate, the disgorged funds are returned to the injured investors. Disgorgements can be ordered in either administrative proceedings or civil actions, and the cases can be settled or litigated. Payment of disgorgement can be either completely or partially waived based on the defendant demonstrating an inability to pay. In settled administrative proceedings, Enforcement may recommend, if appropriate, that the disgorgement be waived. There are several approaches in order to quantify the disgorgement; an innovative procedure based on probability theory was defined by Marcello Minenna by directly analyzing the time periods of the involved transactions in the insider trading.[16]

Proof of responsibility

[edit]

Proving that someone has been responsible for a trade can be difficult because traders may try to hide behind nominees, offshore companies, and other proxies. The SEC prosecutes over 50 cases each year, with many being settled administratively out of court. The SEC and several stock exchanges actively monitor trading, looking for suspicious activity.[17][18][19] The SEC does not have criminal enforcement authority but can refer serious matters to the U.S. Attorney's Office for further investigation and prosecution.

Trading on information in general

[edit]

In the United States and most non-European jurisdictions, not all trading on non-public information is illegal insider trading.[11] For example, a person in a restaurant who hears the CEO of Company A at the next table tell the CFO that the company's profits will be higher than expected and then buys the stock is not guilty of insider trading—unless he or she had some closer connection to the company or company officers.[20] However, even where the tippee is not himself an insider, where the tippee knows that the information is non-public and the information is paid for, or the tipper receives a benefit for giving it, then in the broader-scope jurisdictions the subsequent trading is illegal.[20][21]

Notwithstanding, information about a tender offer (usually regarding a merger or acquisition) is held to a higher standard. If this type of information is obtained (directly or indirectly) and there is reason to believe it is nonpublic, there is a duty to disclose it or abstain from trading.[22]

In the United States in addition to civil penalties, the trader may also be subject to criminal prosecution for fraud or where SEC regulations have been broken, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) may be called to conduct an independent parallel investigation. If the DOJ finds criminal wrongdoing, the department may file criminal charges.[23]

Commercialisation

[edit]

The advent of the Internet has provided a forum for the commercialisation of trading on insider information. In 2016 a number of dark web sites were identified as marketplaces where such non-public information was bought and sold. At least one such site used bitcoin to avoid currency restrictions and to impede tracking. Such sites also provide a place for soliciting for corporate informants, where non-public information may be used for purposes[24] other than stock trading.[25]

Arguments for further prohibition

[edit]

A study of political insider trading found existing regulation including STOCK Act results in conflict of interest and contributes to social distrust.[7] Information asymmetry enjoyed by politicians was found to be high, which does not confirm the predictions of social contract theory.[7] Political insider trading by persons which are not required to report according to STOCK Act was found.[7] Higher insider trading was found when legislature is in session and in periods with higher geopolitical risk.[26]

[edit]

Legal trades by insiders are common,[8] as employees of publicly traded corporations often have stock or stock options. These trades are made public in the United States through SEC filings that are also being made available by academic researchers as structured datasets.[27][28]

U.S. SEC Rule 10b5-1 clarified that the prohibition against insider trading does not require proof that an insider actually used material nonpublic information when conducting a trade; possession of such information alone is sufficient to violate the provision, and the SEC would infer that an insider in possession of material nonpublic information used this information when conducting a trade. However, SEC Rule 10b5-1 also created for insiders an affirmative defense if the insider can demonstrate that the trades conducted on behalf of the insider were conducted as part of a pre-existing contract or written binding plan for trading in the future.[29]

For example, if an insider expects to retire after a specific period of time and, as part of retirement planning, the insider has adopted a written binding plan to sell a specific amount of the company's stock every month for two years, and the insider later comes into possession of material nonpublic information about the company, trades based on the original plan might not constitute prohibited insider trading.

There are very limited laws against "insider trading" in the commodities markets if, for no other reason than that the concept of an "insider" is not immediately analogous to commodities themselves (corn, wheat, steel, etc.). However, analogous activities such as front running are illegal under US commodity and futures trading laws. For example, a commodity broker can be charged with fraud for receiving a large purchase order from a client (one likely to affect the price of that commodity) and then purchasing that commodity before executing the client's order to benefit from the anticipated price increase.[citation needed]

Arguments for legalizing

[edit]

Some economists and legal scholars (such as Henry Manne, Milton Friedman, Thomas Sowell, Daniel Fischel, and Frank H. Easterbrook) have argued that laws against insider trading should be repealed.[citation needed] They claim that insider trading based on material nonpublic information benefits investors, in general, by more quickly introducing new information into the market.[citation needed]

Friedman, laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, said: "You want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make the public aware of that." Friedman did not believe that the trader should be required to make his trade known to the public, because the buying or selling pressure itself is information for the market.[14]: 591–7 

Others argue that insider trading is a victimless act: a willing buyer and a willing seller agree to trade property that the seller rightfully owns, with no prior contract (according to this view) having been made between the parties to refrain from trading if there is asymmetric information. The Atlantic has described the process as "arguably the closest thing that modern finance has to a victimless crime".[30]

Legalization advocates also question why "trading" where one party has more information than the other is legal in other markets, such as real estate, but not in the stock market. For example, if a geologist knows there is a high likelihood of the discovery of petroleum under Farmer Smith's land, he may be entitled to make Smith an offer for the land, and buy it, without first telling Farmer Smith of the geological data.[31]

Advocates of legalization make free speech arguments. Punishment for communicating about a development pertinent to the next day's stock price might seem an act of censorship.[32]

Some authors have used these arguments to propose legalizing insider trading on negative information (but not on positive information). Since negative information is often withheld from the market, trading on such information has a higher value for the market than trading on positive information.[33][34]

[edit]

The US and the UK differ in the way the law is interpreted and applied with regard to insider trading. In the UK, the relevant laws are the Criminal Justice Act 1993, Part V, Schedule 1; the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which defines an offence of "market abuse";[35] and the European Union Regulation No 596/2014.[36][37] The principle is that it is illegal to trade on the basis of market-sensitive information that is not generally known. This is a much broader scope than under U.S. law. The key differences from U.S. law are that no relationship to either the issuer of the security or the tipster is required; all that is required is that the guilty party traded (or caused trading) whilst having inside information, and there is no scienter requirement under UK law.[10][38][39]

Japan enacted its first law against insider trading in 1988. Roderick Seeman said, "Even today many Japanese do not understand why this is illegal. Indeed, previously it was regarded as common sense to make a profit from your knowledge."[40]

In Malta the law follows the European broader scope model. The relevant statute is the Prevention of Financial Markets Abuse Act of 2005, as amended.[41][42] Earlier acts included the Financial Markets Abuse Act in 2002, and the Insider Dealing and Market Abuse Act of 1994.[43]

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) paper on the "Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation" (updated to 2003)[44] states that the three objectives of good securities market regulation are investor protection, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and reducing systemic risk.

The discussion of these "Core Principles" state that "investor protection" in this context means "Investors should be protected from misleading, manipulative or fraudulent practices, including insider trading, front running or trading ahead of customers and the misuse of client assets." More than 85 percent of the world's securities and commodities market regulators are members of IOSCO and have signed on to these Core Principles.

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund now use the IOSCO Core Principles in reviewing the financial health of different country's regulatory systems as part of these organization's financial sector assessment program, so laws against insider trading based on non-public information are now expected by the international community. Enforcement of insider trading laws varies widely from country to country, but the vast majority of jurisdictions now outlaw the practice, at least in principle.

Larry Harris claims that differences in the effectiveness with which countries restrict insider trading help to explain the differences in executive compensation among those countries. The US, for example, has much higher CEO salaries than have Japan or Germany, where insider trading is less effectively restrained.[14]: 593 

By nation

[edit]

Australia

[edit]

The current Australian legislation arose out of the report of a 1989 parliamentary committee report which recommended removal of the requirement that the trader be 'connected' with the body corporate.[45] This may have weakened the importance of the fiduciary duty rationale and possibly brought new potential offenders within its ambit. In Australia if a person possesses inside information and knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is not generally available and is materially price sensitive then the insider must not trade. Nor must she or he procure another to trade and must not tip another. Information will be considered generally available if it consists of readily observable matter or it has been made known to common investors and a reasonable period for it to be disseminated among such investors has elapsed.[citation needed]

Brazil

[edit]

The practice of insider trading is an illegal act under Brazilian law, since it constitutes unfair behavior that threatens the security and equality of legal conditions in the market. Since 2001, the practice is also considered a crime. L[46] as amended by Law 10,303/2001,[47] provided for Article 27-D, which typifies the conduct of ‘Using relevant information not yet disclosed to the market, of which he is aware and from which he must maintain secrecy, capable of providing, for himself or for others, undue advantage, through trading, on his own behalf or on behalf of a third party, with securities: Penalty — imprisonment, from 1 (one) to 5 (five) years, and a fine of up to 3 (three) times the amount of the illicit advantage obtained as a result of the crime.’[48][49]

The first conviction handed down in Brazil for the practice of the offense of "misuse of privileged information" occurred in 2011, by federal judge Marcelo Costenaro Cavali, of the Sixth Criminal Court of São Paulo.[50] It is the case of the Sadia-Perdigão merger. The former Director of Finance and Investor Relations, Luiz Gonzaga Murat Júnior, was sentenced to one year and nine months in prison in an open regime, replaceable by community service, and the inability to exercise the position of administrator or fiscal councilor of a publicly traded company for the time he serves his sentence, in addition to a fine of R$349,711.53. The then member of the board of directors Romano Ancelmo Fontana Filho was sentenced to prison for one year and five months in an open regime, also replaceable by community service, in addition to not being able to exercise the position of administrator or fiscal councilor of a publicly held company. He was also fined R$374,940.52.[citation needed]

Canada

[edit]

In 2008, police uncovered an insider trading conspiracy involving Bay Street and Wall Street lawyer Gil Cornblum who had worked at Sullivan & Cromwell and was working at Dorsey & Whitney, and a former lawyer, Stan Grmovsek, who were found to have gained over $10 million in illegal profits over a 14-year span.[51] Cornblum committed suicide by jumping from a bridge as he was under investigation and shortly before he was to be arrested but before criminal charges were laid against him, one day before his alleged co-conspirator Grmovsek pled guilty.[52][53][54] Grmovsek pleaded guilty to insider trading and was sentenced to 39 months in prison.[55] This was the longest term ever imposed for insider trading in Canada. These crimes were explored in Mark Coakley's 2011 non-fiction book, Tip and Trade.

China

[edit]

The majority of shares in China before 2005 were non-tradeable shares that were not sold on the stock exchange publicly but privately. To make shares more accessible, the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) required the companies to convert the non-tradeable shares into tradeable shares. There was a deadline for companies to convert their shares and the deadline was short, and due to this there was a large amount of exchanges, and many of these were conducted based on critical inside information. At the time, insider trading did not lead to prison time. Generally, punishment may include monetary fees or temporary relieving from a position in the company, but prison time is rare. However, in 2015, the Chinese fund manager Xu Xiang was arrested for insider trading, and in 2017, he was sentenced to five and a half years in prison and fined 11 billion yuan.[56]

European Union

[edit]

In 2014, the European Union (EU) adopted legislation (Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive) that harmonised criminal sanctions for insider dealing. All EU Member States agreed to introduce maximum prison sentences of at least four years for serious cases of market manipulation and insider dealing, and at least two years for improper disclosure of insider information.[57]

India

[edit]

Insider trading in India is an offense according to Sections 12A and 15G of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015. Insider trading is when one with access to non-public, price-sensitive information about the securities of the company subscribes, buys, sells, or deals, or agrees to do so or counsels another to do so as principal or agent. Price-sensitive information is information that materially affects the value of the securities. The penalty for insider trading is imprisonment, which may extend to five years, and a minimum of five lakh rupees (500,000) to 25 crore rupees (250 million) or three times the profit made, whichever is higher.[58]

The Wall Street Journal, in a 2014 article entitled "Why It's Hard to Catch India's Insider Trading", said that despite a widespread belief that insider trading takes place on a regular basis in India, there were few examples of insider traders being prosecuted in India.[59] One former top regulator said that in India insider trading is deeply rooted and especially rampant because regulators do not have the tools to address it.[59] In the few cases where prosecution has taken place, cases have sometimes taken more than a decade to reach trial, and punishments have been light; and despite SEBI by law having the ability to demand penalties of up to $4 million, the few fines that were levied for insider trading have usually been under $200,000.[59]

Kuwait

[edit]

The U.S. SEC alleged that in 2009 Kuwaiti trader Hazem Al-Braikan engaged in insider trading after misleading the public about possible takeover bids for two companies.[60][61] Three days after Al-Braikan was sued by the SEC, he was found dead of a gunshot wound to the head in his home in Kuwait City on July 26, 2009, in what Kuwaiti police called a suicide.[60][61][62] The SEC later reached a $6.5 million settlement of civil insider trading charges, with his estate and others.[61]

Norway

[edit]

In 2009, a journalist in Nettavisen (Thomas Gulbrandsen) was sentenced to four months in prison for insider trading.[63]

The longest prison sentence in a Norwegian trial where the main charge was insider trading, was for eight years (two suspended) when Alain Angelil was convicted in a district court on December 9, 2011.[64][65]

Philippines

[edit]

Under Republic Act 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code, insider trading in the Philippines is illegal.[66]

United Kingdom

[edit]

Although insider trading in the UK has been illegal since 1980, it proved difficult to successfully prosecute individuals accused of insider trading. There were a number of notorious cases where individuals were able to escape prosecution. Instead the UK regulators relied on a series of fines to punish market abuses.

These fines were widely perceived as an ineffective deterrent,[67] and there was a statement of intent by the UK regulator (the Financial Services Authority) to use its powers to enforce the legislation (specifically the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000). Between 2009 and 2012 the FSA secured 14 convictions in relation to insider dealing.

United States

[edit]

United States law

[edit]

Until the 21st century and the European Union's market abuse laws, the United States was the leading country to prohibit insider trading on the basis of material non-public information.[11] Thomas Newkirk and Melissa Robertson of the SEC summarize the development of US insider trading laws.[8] Insider trading has a base offense level of 8, which puts it in Zone A under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This means that first-time offenders are eligible to receive probation rather than incarceration.[68]

Statutory

[edit]

U.S. insider trading prohibitions are based on English and American common law prohibitions against fraud. In 1909, well before the Securities Exchange Act was passed, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a corporate director who bought that company's stock when he knew the stock's price was about to increase committed fraud by buying but not disclosing his inside information.

Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933[69] contained prohibitions of fraud in the sale of securities, which were greatly strengthened by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.[70]

Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits short-swing profits (from any purchases and sales within any six-month period) made by corporate directors, officers, or stockholders owning more than 10% of a firm's shares. Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, SEC Rule 10b-5, prohibits fraud related to securities trading.

The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 place penalties for illegal insider trading as high as three times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided through illegal trading.[71]

SEC regulations

[edit]

SEC regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure") requires that if a company intentionally discloses material, non-public information to one person, it must simultaneously disclose that information to the public at large. In the case of unintentional disclosure of material, non-public information to one person, the company must make a public disclosure "promptly".[14]: 586 

Insider trading and similar practices are also regulated by the SEC under its rules on takeovers and tender offers under the Williams Act.

Court decisions

[edit]

Much of the development of insider trading law has occurred through or resulted from court decisions.

In 1909, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Strong v. Repide[72] that a director who expects to act in a way that affects the value of shares cannot use knowledge of that expectation to acquire shares from those who do not know of the expected action. Even though in general, ordinary relations between directors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to a shareholder general knowledge regarding the value of the shares of the company before he purchases any from a shareholder, some cases involve special facts that impose such duty.

In 1968, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals advanced a "level playing field" theory of insider trading in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.[73] The court stated that anyone in possession of inside information must either disclose the information or refrain from trading. Officers of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company had used inside information about the discovery of the Kidd Mine to make profits by buying shares and call options on company stock.[74]

In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission[75] that tippees (recipients of second-hand information) are liable for insider trading if they had reason to believe that the tipper had breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing confidential information. One such example would be if the tipper received any personal benefit from the disclosure, thereby breaching his or her duty of loyalty to the company. In Dirks, the "tippee" had received confidential information from an insider, a former employee of a company. The reason the insider had disclosed the information to the tippee, and the reason the tippee had disclosed the information to third parties, was to blow the whistle on fraud at the company. As a result of the tippee's efforts the fraud was uncovered and the company went into bankruptcy. But, while the tippee had given the "inside" information to clients who made profits from the information, the Supreme Court ruled that the tippee could not be held liable under the federal securities laws because the insider from whom he received the information had not released the information for an improper purpose (a personal benefit) but rather for the purpose of exposing the fraud. The court ruled that the tippee could not have been aiding and abetting a securities law violation committed by the insider because no securities law violation had been committed by the insider.

In 2019 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in United States v. Blaszczak that the "personal-benefit" test announced in Dirks does not apply to Title 18 fraud statutes, such as 18 USC 1348.[76][77] In Dirks, the court also defined the concept of "constructive insiders" as lawyers, investment bankers, and others who receive confidential information from a corporation while providing services to the corporation. The court held that constructive insiders are also liable for insider trading violations if the corporation expects the information revealed to them to remain confidential, since they acquire the fiduciary duties of a true insider.

The next expansion of insider trading liability came in SEC vs. Materia[78], 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), the case that first introduced the misappropriation theory of liability for insider trading. Materia, a financial printing firm proofreader who clearly was not an insider by any definition, was found to have determined the identity of takeover targets based on proofreading tender offer documents in the course of his employment. After a two-week trial, the district court found him liable for insider trading, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the theft of information from an employer, and the use of that information to purchase or sell securities in another entity, constituted a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a securities. The misappropriation theory of insider trading was born, and liability was thereby further expanded to encompass a larger group of outsiders.

In United States v. Carpenter[79] (1986), the Supreme Court cited an earlier ruling while unanimously upholding mail and wire fraud convictions for a defendant who had received his information from a journalist rather than from the company itself. The journalist R. Foster Winans was also convicted, on the grounds that he had misappropriated information belonging to his employer, The Wall Street Journal. In the widely publicized case, Winans had traded in advance of "Heard on the Street" columns appearing in the Journal.[80]

The Court stated in Carpenter: "It is well established, as a general proposition, that a person who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge or information for his own personal benefit but must account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom." However, in upholding the securities fraud (insider trading) convictions the justices were evenly split.

In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O'Hagan,[81] 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm representing Grand Metropolitan while it was considering a tender offer for Pillsbury Company. O'Hagan used this inside information by buying call options on Pillsbury stock, thereby realizing profits of over $4.3 million. O'Hagan argued that neither he nor his firm had owed a fiduciary duty to Pillsbury, so he had not committed fraud by purchasing Pillsbury options.[82] The Court rejected O'Hagan's arguments and upheld his conviction.

The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of the information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between a company insider and the purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.

The Court specifically recognized that a corporation's information is its property: "A company's confidential information ... qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information in violation of a fiduciary duty ... constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement – the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by another."

In 2000, the SEC enacted SEC Rule 10b5-1, which defined trading "on the basis of" inside information as trades that occur while the trader is aware of material nonpublic information. It is no longer a defense for one to say that one would have made the trade anyway. However, the rule also codified an affirmative defense for pre-planned trades.

In Morgan Stanley v. Skowron, 989 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), applying New York's faithless servant doctrine, the court held that a hedge fund's portfolio manager who had engaged in insider trading in violation of his company's code of conduct, which also required him to report that misconduct, was required to repay his employer the full $31 million his employer had paid him as compensation during his period of faithlessness.[83][84][85][86] The court called the insider trading the "ultimate abuse of a portfolio manager's position".[84] The judge also wrote: "In addition to exposing Morgan Stanley to government investigations and direct financial losses, Skowron's behavior damaged the firm's reputation, a valuable corporate asset."[84]

In 2014, in United States v. Newman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks and ruled that for a "tippee" (a person who used information they received from an insider) to be guilty of insider trading, the tippee must have been aware not only that the information was insider information, but must also that the insider had released the information for an improper purpose (such as a personal benefit). The Court concluded that an insider's breach of a fiduciary duty not to release confidential information, in the absence of an improper purpose on the part of the insider, is not enough to impose criminal liability on either the insider or the tippee.[13]

In 2016, in Salman v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the benefit a tipper must receive as the predicate for an insider-trader prosecution of a tippee need not be pecuniary, and that giving a 'gift' of a tip to a family member is presumptively an act for the personal, albeit intangible, benefit of the tipper.[21]

By members of Congress

[edit]

Members of the US Congress are not exempt from the laws that ban insider trading.[87] Because they generally do not have a confidential relationship with the source of the information they receive, however, they do not meet the usual definition of an "insider".[88] House of Representatives rules[89] may, however, provide that congressional insider trading is unethical. A 2004 study found that stock sales and purchases by senators outperformed the market by 12.3% per year.[90] Peter Schweizer points out several examples of insider trading by members of Congress, including action taken by Spencer Bachus following a private, behind-the-doors meeting on the evening of September 18, 2008 wherein Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke informed members of Congress about the issues due to the 2008 financial crisis; Bachus shorted stocks the next morning and cashed in his profits within a week.[91] Also attending the same meeting were Senator Dick Durbin and House Speaker John Boehner; the same day (effective the following day), Durbin sold mutual-fund shares worth $42,696 and reinvested it all with Warren Buffett. Also the same day (effective the following day), Boehner cashed out of an equity mutual fund.[92][93]

In May 2007, a bill entitled the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, or STOCK Act was introduced to hold congressional and federal employees liable for stock trades they made using information they gained through their jobs and also regulate analysts or political intelligence firms that research government activities.[94] The STOCK Act was enacted on April 4, 2012. In the approximately nine month period ending September 2021, Senate and House members disclosed 4,000 trades of stocks and bonds, worth at least $315 million.[95]

2020 congressional insider trading scandal
[edit]
The 2020 congressional insider trading scandal was a political scandal in the United States involving allegations that several members of the United States Senate violated the STOCK Act by selling stock at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States and just before a stock market crash on February 20, 2020, using knowledge given to them at a closed Senate meeting. The Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated a probe into the stock transactions on March 30, 2020. No charges were brought against anyone and all investigations into the matter are closed.

Further

[edit]

Anil Kumar, a senior partner at management consulting firm McKinsey & Company, pleaded guilty in 2010 to insider trading in a "descent from the pinnacle of the business world".[96]

Chip Skowron, a hedge fund co-portfolio manager of FrontPoint Partners LLC's health care funds, was convicted of insider trading in 2011, for which he served five years in prison. He had been tipped off by a consultant to a company that the company was about to make a negative announcement regarding its clinical trial for a drug.[97][98][99][100] Skowron initially denied the charges against him and his defense attorney said he would plead not guilty, saying "We look forward to responding to the allegations more fully in court at the appropriate time".[101][52][102] However, after the consultant charged with tipping him off pleaded guilty, he changed his position, and admitted his guilt.[101]

Rajat Gupta, who had been managing partner of McKinsey & Co. and a director at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Procter & Gamble Co., was convicted by a federal jury in 2012 and sentence to two years in prison for leaking inside information to hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam who was sentenced to 11 years in prison. The case was prosecuted by the office of United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara.[103]

Mathew Martoma, former hedge fund trader and portfolio manager at S.A.C. Capital Advisors, was accused of generating possibly the largest single insider trading transaction profit in history at a value of $276 million.[104] He was convicted in February 2014, and is serving a nine-year prison sentence.[104][105]

With the guilty plea by Perkins Hixon in 2014 for insider trading from 2010 to 2013 while at Evercore Partners, Bharara said in a press release that 250 defendants whom his office had charged since August 2009 had now been convicted.[106]

On December 10, 2014, a federal appeals court overturned the insider trading convictions of two former hedge fund traders, Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, based on "erroneous" instructions given to jurors by the trial judge.[107] The decision was expected to affect the appeal of the separate insider-trading conviction of former SAC Capital portfolio manager Michael Steinberg[108] and the U.S. Attorney[109] and the SEC[110] in 2015 did drop their cases against Steinberg and others.

In 2016, Sean Stewart, a former managing director at Perella Weinberg Partners LP and vice president at JPMorgan Chase, was convicted on allegations he tipped his father on pending health-care deals. The father, Robert Stewart, previously had pleaded guilty but did not testify during his son's trial. It was argued that by way of compensation for the tip, the father had paid more than $10,000 for Sean's wedding photographer.[111]

In 2017, Billy Walters, a Las Vegas sports bettor, was convicted of making $40 million on private information about Dallas-based dairy processing company Dean Foods, and sentenced to five years in prison. Walters's source, company director Thomas C. Davis, employing a prepaid cell phone and sometimes the code words "Dallas Cowboys" for Dean Foods, helping Walters to realize profits and avoid losses in the stock from 2008 to 2014, the federal jury found. Golfer Phil Mickelson "was also mentioned during the trial as someone who had traded in Dean Foods shares and once owed nearly $2 million in gambling debts to" Walters. Mickelson "made roughly $1 million trading Dean Foods shares; he agreed to forfeit those profits in a related civil case brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission". Walters appealed the verdict, but in December 2018 his conviction was upheld by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals.[112][113]

In 2018, David Blaszczak, the "king of political intelligence";[114] Theodore Huber and Robert Olan, two partners at hedge fund Deerfield Management; and Christopher Worrall, an employee at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), were convicted for insider trading by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York.[115] Worrall leaked confidential government information that he stole from CMS to Blaszczak, and Blaszczak passed that information to Huber and Olan, who made $7 million trading securities.[115][116] The convictions were upheld in 2019 by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals; that court's opinion was vacated by the Supreme Court in 2021 and the Second Circuit is now reconsidering its decision.[117]

In 2023, Terren Peizer was charged with insider trading by the SEC, which alleged that he sold $20 million of Ontrak Inc. stock while he was in possession of material nonpublic negative information.[118][119] Peizer was the CEO and chairman of Ontrak.[120][121] In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice announced criminal charges of securities fraud against Peizer, charging that thereby he had avoided $12 million in losses; he was arrested.[122][118][121][123] The case was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.[122] He was convicted of all three charges in June 2024, and faces up to 65 years in prison.[124][125]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Insider trading refers to the purchase or sale of a security by an individual possessing material nonpublic information about the issuer, particularly when such trading breaches a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence. In the United States, it is primarily regulated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which prohibit fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. While certain disclosures of insider transactions by corporate officers, directors, and significant shareholders are permitted and required under Section 16 of the same Act, illegal insider trading exploits asymmetric information to the detriment of uninformed market participants.
The prohibition of insider trading aims to preserve market integrity by ensuring that all investors trade on a relatively , thereby fostering trust and encouraging broader participation in capital markets. Empirical studies indicate that insider trading can distort price signals and reduce , as uninformed traders face costs that widen bid-ask spreads and discourage trading volume. For instance, intraday analyses of stocks reveal that detected insider activity correlates with diminished depth and increased spreads, suggesting immediate negative impacts on market efficiency. Proponents of strict argue that without such rules, insiders could systematically extract rents from outsiders, leading to and higher costs of equity financing. Conversely, economic analyses from a first-principles perspective contend that insider trading accelerates the incorporation of valuable into asset prices, potentially enhancing overall and providing incentives for insiders to gather . Historical from periods with varying levels show mixed on long-term market harm, with some research finding no significant erosion of investor confidence following high-profile prosecutions. Key controversies surrounding insider trading center on the tension between fairness norms and market dynamics, with debates persisting over whether outright bans represent optimal policy or unintended barriers to . Critics of highlight that legal insiders already trade on superior through routine disclosures, yet empirical work suggests that even illegal trades may not substantially move prices in efficient markets, challenging assumptions of widespread distortion. Enforcement efforts by the SEC have evolved to encompass tipper-tippee liability, as clarified in cases expanding the scope beyond direct insiders, though academic scrutiny reveals that such expansions may deter legitimate information dissemination without proportionally curbing abuses. Ultimately, the regime balances deterrence through civil and criminal penalties against the recognition that symmetry is unattainable, prioritizing causal mechanisms where insider advantages undermine voluntary exchange in securities markets.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Scope

Illegal insider trading consists of the purchase or sale of a by a person who possesses nonpublic (MNPI) about the security and trades on the basis of that information in violation of a of trust or confidence. This duty typically arises from a relationship, such as that owed by corporate officers, directors, or employees to their company's shareholders, or from other relationships imposing an obligation to keep information confidential. Federal securities law provides no explicit statutory definition of insider trading; instead, its contours are shaped by judicial interpretations of Section 10(b) of the and the SEC's Rule 10b-5, which prohibit fraudulent or deceptive practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The scope of illegal insider trading extends beyond traditional corporate insiders to include "tippees" who receive MNPI from insiders and trade on it, provided the tipper breaches a by disclosing the for personal benefit, as established in cases like Dirks v. SEC (1983). Under the misappropriation theory, upheld by the in United States v. O'Hagan (1997), liability can arise even without a duty to shareholders if the trader breaches a of to the source of the , such as an employer or client, by secretly using MNPI for securities trading. MNPI qualifies as "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable would view it as significantly altering the total mix of available , encompassing facts like earnings surprises, mergers, or regulatory actions not yet publicly disclosed through adequate dissemination. Legal insider trading, by contrast, occurs when corporate insiders trade their company's securities after proper disclosure via SEC filings such as Forms 3, 4, and 5 under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, allowing routine transactions without MNPI-based deception. The prohibition does not apply to trading on public information or immaterial facts, nor to legitimate or that uncovers non-insider insights. Rule 10b5-1 provides an for pre-planned trading schedules adopted in , insulating trades from liability even if MNPI is later acquired, though recent amendments in 2022 impose cooling-off periods and certification requirements to curb abuse. This framework aims to preserve market integrity by deterring unfair advantages from undisclosed information, though enforcement relies on proving —intentional or reckless misconduct—rather than mere possession of MNPI.

Distinction from Legitimate Information Use

The prohibition on insider trading under Section 10(b) of the and Rule 10b-5 requires proof of trading on material nonpublic (MNPI) coupled with a breach of duty, either through the classical theory—where corporate insiders or tippees violate obligations to shareholders by failing to disclose or abstain—or the misappropriation theory, where outsiders defraud sources of by misappropriating confidential data without disclosure. Absent such a breach, possession or use of nonpublic alone does not trigger liability, as U.S. securities laws do not categorically ban trading merely because is unpublished, except in narrow contexts like tender offers under SEC Rule 14e-3. Legitimate information use encompasses superior analysis of public data, where investors derive predictive insights through rigorous evaluation of filings, earnings reports, and market signals, creating asymmetric advantages without accessing MNPI. This practice aligns with market efficiency principles, as it rewards informational effort rather than prohibiting informational edges inherent to expertise. Similarly, the mosaic theory permits aggregating public information with innocuous nonpublic details—such as industry benchmarks from lawful consultations—to infer material conclusions, provided no single piece constitutes MNPI obtained via breach; courts have upheld this in cases like Dirks v. SEC (1983), distinguishing analytical synthesis from unlawful tipping. Expert networks exemplify a gray area resolved through compliance: consultants may share general sector knowledge or anonymized trends without disclosing MNPI, enabling "market color" that complements public data, but liability arises if experts breach employer nondisclosure agreements by tipping specifics, as in the 2011 Galleon Group prosecutions where improper disclosures led to convictions under . Firms mitigate risks via policies restricting queries to public-domain equivalents and monitoring for red flags, preserving legitimate research while demarcating it from . Empirical enforcement data from the SEC underscores this boundary, with charges focusing on duty breaches rather than informational asymmetry per se; between 2009 and 2023, over 80% of insider trading cases involved explicit tipping or , not mere nonpublic possession.

Economic Role of Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric information arises in financial markets when corporate insiders, such as executives or directors, possess material nonpublic information (MNPI) about a firm's prospects that is unavailable to external investors, creating a fundamental imbalance that influences trading dynamics and . This disparity, rooted in the insiders' proximity to operational details, enables them to anticipate price movements more accurately than outsiders, potentially leading to trades that exploit the informational edge for personal gain. Economically, such incentivizes the production of private information as a of managerial roles, but it also raises questions about whether markets efficiently aggregate and reflect this knowledge without regulatory intervention. In theoretical models, insider trading on asymmetric accelerates the incorporation of MNPI into asset prices, thereby enhancing market efficiency beyond what public disclosure alone achieves. Henry Manne argued in his analysis that legalizing insider trading would reward generators—often entrepreneurs or managers—with trading profits, functioning as a market-based compensation mechanism that outperforms fixed salaries or bonuses in aligning incentives with value creation. This process reduces the time lag between emergence and price adjustment, minimizing misallocations of capital to overvalued firms and directing resources toward undervalued opportunities, as trades signal underlying fundamentals to rational outsiders who infer from volume or price patterns. Empirical studies corroborate this by showing that aggregate insider purchases predict positive abnormal returns of approximately 5-7% over subsequent months, indicating that such activity conveys predictive signals that refine market pricing. However, persistent insider-driven asymmetry can impose costs by deterring uninformed investors from participating, as they anticipate losses from trading against better-informed parties—a phenomenon akin to in Akerlof's lemons model adapted to securities. This may widen bid-ask spreads, reduce , and elevate overall metrics, such as PIN (probability of informed trading), potentially harming in less transparent markets. For instance, analyses of emerging markets like Korea reveal that higher insider trading activity correlates with elevated asymmetry measures, though it does not uniformly impair long-term efficiency if outsiders adapt by relying on insider signals. Proponents of contend that without rules curbing insider advantages, the economy suffers from reduced incentives for outsiders to invest in costly information gathering, leading to suboptimal total information flow and broader frictions.

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Common Law Origins

The principles underlying prohibitions on insider trading trace their roots to English doctrines of and duty, which emerged in the medieval period through equity courts addressing breaches of trust in land uses and partnerships. By the , Chancery courts enforced rules against fiduciaries profiting from confidential information obtained in their roles, as seen in early trust cases where trustees were required to act solely for beneficiaries' benefit without . These equity principles, formalized in part by the Statute of Uses in 1535, prohibited undisclosed profits from privileged knowledge but were not explicitly applied to corporate securities trading, which did not exist in modern form until the 17th-18th centuries with joint-stock companies. In the , as proliferated under English and American law, courts initially permitted insiders to trade on nonpublic information absent affirmative , viewing directors' primary duty as owing to the corporation rather than individual shareholders. For instance, in Carpenter v. Danforth (1868), a New York court upheld directors' trades based on confidential merger plans, ruling no liability without deceit. Similarly, English courts in cases like Percival v. Wright (1902) affirmed that directors owed no general disclosure duty to selling shareholders, allowing purchases of shares using inside knowledge. However, emerging critiques from legal commentators, such as Jairus W. Perry in 1877, questioned the ethics of executives profiting from "intimate knowledge" gained in office, arguing it undermined trust. A doctrinal shift occurred in the early , with state courts recognizing "special circumstances" where silence equated to , requiring disclosure or abstention. The U.S. in Strong v. Repide (1909) endorsed this, holding that a director's purchase of shares using undisclosed merger breached duty, mandating rescission unless full facts were revealed. Cases like Oliver v. Oliver (1903) further treated corporate as a "quasi asset," imposing liability for trading on it without disclosure. Public scandals, such as the 1906 Union Pacific dividend delay allowing insiders to trade ahead, fueled condemnation, with figures like Elbert H. Gary of advocating equal access to in 1901 to prevent market perceptions of unfairness. These developments laid the groundwork for viewing insider trading as a breach rather than mere opportunism, though enforcement remained sporadic and state-based before federal regulation.

20th-Century Regulatory Emergence

The marked the foundational federal response to insider trading concerns in the United States, enacted amid revelations of market abuses during the 1929 crash. Section 16 of the Act imposed specific restrictions on corporate insiders, including officers, directors, and beneficial owners of more than 10% of a company's , mandating monthly reporting of transactions and requiring of profits from purchases and sales within a six-month period to deter short-term exploitation of nonpublic information. Section 10(b) provided broader authority by prohibiting "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with securities transactions, though it did not explicitly reference insider trading. In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), established by the same 1934 Act, adopted Rule 10b-5 under Section 10(b), which made it unlawful to employ "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or engage in "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a or deceit" upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. This rule, initially intended to extend antifraud protections to private transactions beyond exchange trading, became the primary for insider trading enforcement despite lacking explicit mention of nondisclosure duties. Regulatory enforcement gained traction in the 1960s as the SEC applied Rule 10b-5 to insider trading through administrative proceedings. The 1961 SEC decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. represented the first explicit federal recognition of an affirmative duty for insiders possessing material nonpublic information to either disclose it before trading or abstain entirely, extending liability beyond statutory short-swing rules to breach-of-trust principles. This was reinforced by the landmark 1968 federal court ruling in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., where executives and employees traded on undisclosed drilling results indicating valuable mineral deposits, with the Second Circuit upholding Rule 10b-5 violations and affirming that such trading undermined market integrity by exploiting informational asymmetries. By the late , these developments had shifted insider trading from narrow profit-recovery mechanisms to a judicially elaborated antifraud doctrine under Rule 10b-5, emphasizing duties owed to investors rather than solely to the corporation. Subsequent cases, such as the 1970s probes into corporate scandals, further entrenched SEC oversight, though liability remained tied to evidence of deception or breach rather than the mere possession of superior . This evolution prioritized empirical market fairness over unrestricted use, with enforcement actions rising as trading volumes and disclosure requirements expanded post-World War II.

Evolution Through Key U.S. Cases

The foundational U.S. precedent for insider trading liability emerged in Strong v. Repide (1909), where the held that corporate directors owe a to material facts known to them before purchasing shares from uninformed shareholders, or abstain from trading to avoid . This common-law principle emphasized equitable treatment in transactions involving superior knowledge by fiduciaries. Following the enactment of the and the SEC's adoption of Rule 10b-5 in 1942, which prohibits fraud in connection with securities transactions, the modern federal framework took shape through appellate decisions. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (1968), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals established that corporate insiders possessing material nonpublic —such as exploratory drilling results indicating valuable mineral deposits—must disclose it or refrain from trading, as failure to do so constitutes a deceptive practice under Rule 10b-5. The court defined materiality as a reasonable would consider important, extending liability to tippees who traded on relayed inside from insiders. This "disclose or abstain" rule marked a significant expansion of enforcement, applying antifraud provisions to affirmative duties in trading. The refined these boundaries in Chiarella v. United States (1980), reversing the conviction of a financial printer who traded on confidential takeover information gleaned from documents he handled, but to whom he owed no duty as an outsider. The Court articulated the "classical theory" of insider trading, holding that Rule 10b-5 liability requires a breach of duty owed directly to the shareholders being traded against, rather than a general duty to the marketplace. This decision limited prosecutions to traditional insiders with obligations, rejecting broader equal-access notions that would impose disclosure on any possessor of nonpublic information. Building on Chiarella, Dirks v. SEC (1983) clarified tipper-tippee liability, ruling that a tippee assumes a duty only if the tipper breaches their own obligation by disclosing information for a personal benefit, such as pecuniary gain or reputational enhancement. In the case, an analyst who received and disseminated tips about corporate from a former insider was not sanctioned, as the tipper sought no personal advantage and aimed to expose wrongdoing. The "personal benefit" test thus became central, distinguishing gratuitous disclosures from those enabling insider trading chains. The Court expanded the scope in United States v. O'Hagan (1997), upholding the SEC's "misappropriation theory" by affirming the conviction of a lawyer who traded on confidential merger information stolen from his client. Under this theory, liability arises when a person breaches a duty of trust to the source of the information—such as an employer or principal—by misappropriating it for securities trading, thereby deceiving that source and undermining market integrity. This complemented the classical theory, enabling prosecution of "outsiders" without direct ties to traded companies' shareholders. More recently, Salman v. United States (2016) reaffirmed and applied the Dirks personal benefit requirement, upholding the conviction of a trader who received tips passed through family members from an investment banker. The Court held that a tipper receives a personal benefit when gifting confidential information to a relative, as such transfers are akin to indirect trading gains, satisfying the breach element even without tangible compensation. This ruling resolved circuit splits post-United States v. Newman (2014), reinforcing tippee awareness of the tipper's breach while maintaining prosecutorial viability for familial tipping networks. Collectively, these cases have iteratively defined insider trading as rooted in specific breaches of trust, balancing market fairness against overbroad liability.

Theoretical and Economic Debates

Case for Legalization from Efficiency Perspectives

Proponents of legalizing insider trading, such as economist Henry G. Manne in his 1966 book Insider Trading and the Stock Market, contend that prohibitions distort market efficiency by preventing the rapid incorporation of material nonpublic information (MNPI) into stock prices. Manne argued that insider trades act as a mechanism to reflect private corporate insights—such as impending mergers or earnings surprises—prompting quicker price adjustments toward fundamental values, thereby reducing informational asymmetries for all market participants. This process enhances allocational efficiency, as resources are directed more accurately based on true economic signals rather than delayed public disclosures. From a first-principles economic viewpoint, insider trading incentivizes executives and directors to invest effort in generating valuable , knowing they can capture a portion of its value through personal trades without imposing direct costs on the firm. Unlike mandatory disclosure rules, which compel uniform and may dilute competitive edges, selective insider trading rewards superior foresight, akin to how patents incentivize by granting temporary monopolies. Manne posited that such trades do not systematically harm non-insiders, as price movements driven by genuine MNPI align shares with intrinsic worth, benefiting subsequent buyers and sellers who trade on more informed valuations; any "wealth transfer" is illusory if the information's improves overall and discovery. Empirical analyses bolster this efficiency rationale, with studies showing legal insider purchases predict positive abnormal returns of approximately 5-7% over six months, indicating trades convey predictive signals that refine price efficiency. Research on insider activity further demonstrates that it accelerates price discovery, as evidenced by reduced post-trade volatility and faster convergence to equilibrium prices in markets permitting such trades. Theoretical models confirm that even modest insider trading volumes enhance informational efficiency by deterring uninformed speculation and amplifying the signal from informed actions. These findings suggest that bans, by suppressing these trades, prolong mispricings, potentially leading to suboptimal capital allocation, as seen in slower market reactions to corporate events absent insider signals.

Arguments for Prohibition Based on Fairness and Property Rights

Proponents of prohibiting insider trading argue that it contravenes fundamental principles of fairness in securities markets by granting insiders an inherent advantage through unequal access to material nonpublic information (MNPI). This disparity undermines the expectation that participants in impersonal exchanges operate on a level informational playing field, as articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (1968), where the Second Circuit emphasized that "Rule 10b-5 is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information." Such inequality not only enables insiders to profit at the expense of uninformed traders but also erodes in market efficiency, potentially deterring retail investor participation and reducing overall liquidity. Fairness advocates further contend that permitting insider trading would exacerbate wealth transfers from outsiders to a privileged , as insiders could systematically "muscle out" public s by exploiting their positional advantages, including access to external financing for larger trades. Legal scholars like Zachary J. Gubler have highlighted how this practice fosters a —if not the reality—that markets are "rigged" to benefit corporate insiders, thereby justifying to preserve confidence and prevent cascading effects on market participation. Empirical support for this view draws from regulatory rationales, such as those in the SEC's early actions, which prioritized equity among s over pure efficiency gains. On property grounds, the argument posits that MNPI constitutes a valuable asset generated by the through its efforts, to which the firm and its shareholders hold exclusive entitlement, akin to proprietary trade secrets. Insiders who trade on such without disclosure effectively misappropriate this corporate property, breaching fiduciary duties owed to shareholders and depriving the entity of the full value it could realize through controlled dissemination or strategic use. Stephen M. Bainbridge, evaluating from first principles, asserts that "we are really dealing with property in ," where assigning exclusive to the firm incentivizes the production of valuable intelligence while prohibiting unauthorized exploitation maximizes social welfare. This theory, echoed in judicial precedents like (1987), which recognized confidential business as a "species of property," supports criminal and civil prohibitions to safeguard these against opportunistic insiders. Critics of alternative theories, such as pure models, reinforce the property rationale by noting that without , insiders might withhold information from colleagues or manipulate disclosures to facilitate personal trades, further violating duties of and care inherent in . John C. Coffee Jr. underscores that corporations deserve "the and benefit" of information compiled in business operations, positioning as a necessary bulwark against erosion of these entitlements. Together, these fairness and property-based arguments frame insider trading not merely as a regulatory preference but as a violation of core equitable and proprietary norms essential to capitalist markets.

Empirical Studies on Market Effects

Empirical analyses of insider trading's market effects have yielded mixed results, with some studies indicating contributions to through incorporation, while others document adverse impacts on volatility, , and overall market quality. In examinations of detected illegal insider trading cases from 1978 to 1989, prices incorporated approximately half of the eventual abnormal returns during trading periods, suggesting partial market detection of informed activity but incomplete gains prior to public disclosure. Older event studies, such as those by Jaffe in 1974, often found minimal pre-announcement run-ups in corporate events suspected of insider activity, implying limited aggregate distortion from undetected trading or rapid dissipation of effects. Studies of legal insider trading, required to be disclosed under U.S. Section 16, provide evidence of informational content that aids . Aggregate insider purchases predict positive abnormal returns of about 2-3% over subsequent months, while sales predict negative returns, indicating that disclosed trades convey private information to the market and accelerate price adjustments. However, outsiders attempting to mimic these trades generate only modest or insignificant profits after transaction costs, suggesting that while insider activity incorporates firm-specific information, it does not broadly undermine semi-strong form . Cross-country regressions across 33 nations in the mid-1990s link stricter insider trading prohibitions—measured by indices of scope, sanctions, and —to enhanced market characteristics. A one-unit increase in sanction stringency correlates with 5% greater equity ownership dispersion, reduced stock price synchronicity (indicating higher firm-specific informativeness by 1.7%), and elevated trading as a proxy for . These associations hold after controlling for legal origins and protections, implying that prohibitions foster broader participation and more accurate pricing. Conversely, analyses of 55 countries from 1984 to 1998 find that higher perceived insider trading prevalence (scaled 1-7 from surveys) raises annualized stock return volatility by up to 245 basis points, persisting after adjustments for GDP volatility, , leverage, and market maturity. Recent case-based evidence tempers claims of consistent efficiency benefits, as insider trades in events like the 2012 acquisition sometimes elicited price movements contrary to the eventual disclosure (e.g., temporary rises before a 27% drop), highlighting detection failures or noise trading interference. Overall, while legal insider activity demonstrably signals , illegal trading's opacity correlates with heightened volatility and suboptimal , supporting regulatory interventions to mitigate uninformed investor disadvantages without fully eliminating informational trading incentives.

Classical Insider Trading Theory

The classical theory of insider trading liability under U.S. holds that a corporate insider—such as an officer, director, or controlling shareholder—violates Section 10(b) of the and Rule 10b-5 when trading the corporation's securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information, as this constitutes a breach of duty owed to shareholders. Under this framework, the insider's access to confidential information creates an affirmative duty to either disclose it fully before trading or abstain from trading altogether, preventing the exploitation of informational asymmetry that disadvantages uninformed shareholders in transactions. This theory emerged from the Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (1968), the first major federal case to impose liability on insiders for undisclosed trading in their company's stock following a major mineral discovery announcement on November 12, 1963, which caused the stock price to rise from $18 to over $35 per share. The court articulated the "disclose or abstain" rule, reasoning that trading without disclosure deceives counterparties who rely on the integrity of the market and the fiduciary relationship, even absent a specific . The ruling applied to both direct insiders and temporary insiders, like geologists involved in the discovery, who owed a derived from their role in generating the . The U.S. later clarified the theory's scope in Chiarella v. United States (1980), reversing a conviction where a printer traded on nonpublic takeover information without a fiduciary relationship to the target company's shareholders, emphasizing that Rule 10b-5 liability requires a breach of duty to the specific investors defrauded, not a general fairness obligation. In Dirks v. SEC (1983), the Court extended this to tippers and tippees, holding that a tippee incurs liability only if the insider-tippee breaches their duty by disclosing for personal benefit—such as pecuniary gain or a reputational —rather than mere friendship or dissemination of information. Key elements under the classical theory include: (1) the trader's status as a to the corporation's shareholders; (2) possession of material, nonpublic information—defined as information a reasonable would consider important in deciding whether to buy or sell, per the Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988) "reasonable probability" standard; (3) use of that information in a securities transaction; and (4) lack of disclosure, resulting in deception through nondisclosure. Unlike the misappropriation theory, which targets outsiders breaching duties to information sources, the classical approach limits liability to those with direct fiduciary obligations to trading counterparties, preserving the theory's foundation in corporate agency principles rather than broader agency law. This distinction ensures liability tracks verifiable breaches of trust inherent in the insider-shareholder relationship, without extending to mere possession of confidential data obtained lawfully outside fiduciary bounds.

Misappropriation and Outsider Theories

The theory of insider trading imposes liability on individuals who breach a duty of trust and confidence owed to the source of material nonpublic information (MNPI) by using that information for securities trading without disclosure, thereby deceiving the information's provider. Unlike the classical theory, which requires a duty to the corporation's shareholders, the misappropriation theory targets outsiders—such as employees, consultants, or attorneys—who misappropriate confidential information entrusted to them by their employer or principal, even if trading occurs in securities of a unrelated to that source. This theory views the violation as a on the source of the information, who expects the recipient to maintain , rather than a direct breach against investors in the traded security. The U.S. affirmed the validity of the misappropriation theory in United States v. O'Hagan (521 U.S. 642, 1997), where a partner at a acquired MNPI about a client's impending for Pillsbury Company shares and purchased call options in Pillsbury stock. The Court held that O'Hagan's trading deceived his and client, violating Section 10(b) of the and Rule 10b-5, as it involved a breach of duty and by silence regarding the use of the information. To establish liability under this theory, prosecutors must prove: (1) the trader owed a duty of trust to the information source; (2) the trader breached that duty by trading on or tipping MNPI; (3) the information was material and nonpublic; and (4) the breach involved and causation of loss or reliance in the market. Outsider theories, often encompassed within the misappropriation framework, extend liability to non-corporate actors who obtain MNPI through improper means, such as hacking or theft, without a traditional fiduciary relationship to the issuing company. For instance, in cases involving "outsider trading," courts have applied principles to individuals who steal data from financial printers or databases and trade accordingly, emphasizing deception of the information's custodian over any duty to shareholders. This approach has broadened enforcement, as seen in SEC actions against hackers who accessed earnings data from newswires, where liability hinged on breaching confidentiality agreements with the data providers. Recent expansions include "shadow trading" under misappropriation theory, as in SEC v. Panuwat (2024), where an executive traded options in a peer competitor's stock using his employer's MNPI about an acquisition announcement. A federal jury in the Northern District of found Panuwat liable on August 23, 2024, ruling that he deceived his employer by failing to disclose the trades, even though the information's materiality to the peer company's stock stemmed from market inference rather than direct relation. Critics argue this stretches the theory beyond its original intent, potentially deterring legitimate trading and increasing pre-merger information leakage suppression, as evidenced by empirical data showing reduced abnormal returns after the theory's adoption in 1997. Proponents maintain it upholds market integrity by closing gaps in classical theory, preventing circumvention via unrelated securities.

Elements of Proof and Defenses

Prosecutors seeking to establish insider trading liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 must demonstrate that the defendant traded securities while in possession of material nonpublic information (MNPI), knew or was reckless in disregarding that the information was material and nonpublic, and acted with scienter in connection with the purchase or sale. MNPI constitutes any information pertaining to the issuer or security that has not been effectively disseminated to the investing public and that a reasonable shareholder would consider important in investment decisions, such as earnings surprises, mergers, or regulatory actions likely to substantially affect stock prices. Materiality is assessed under an objective standard: whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the omitted or undisclosed fact as significantly altering the total mix of available information. Scienter, a core element, requires proof of intentional misconduct or extreme recklessness amounting to an intent to defraud, rather than mere or ; courts have consistently held that of MNPI alone does not suffice without evidence of deliberate use or disregard in trading. In classical theory cases, proof further demands a breach of owed by corporate insiders to shareholders, evidenced by trading on the basis of that for personal gain. Under the misappropriation theory, applicable to "outsiders," the government must show the defendant breached a of trust or to the source of the MNPI (e.g., ) by misappropriating it for securities trading, deceiving that source in the process. For tipping liability, where an insider shares MNPI with a tippee, prosecutors must prove the tipper received a personal benefit in exchange, such as pecuniary gain or a gift to a relative, and that the tippee knew of the breach and the tipper's benefit. Defenses often challenge these elements directly, such as asserting the absence of MNPI at the time of by showing the information was already public or immaterial based on historical market reactions to similar disclosures. Lack of can be argued through evidence of reliance on public data, analytical errors without recklessness, or pre-existing trading plans unaffected by the information. A key arises under Rule 10b5-1, which shields trades executed pursuant to a written plan adopted in before the insider possessed MNPI, specifying trade details like amount, price, and date; however, post-2022 amendments require cooling-off periods (90-120 days) and limit multiple overlapping plans to prevent abuse. Defendants may also contest insider status by proving no duty existed, as in cases involving temporary insiders or outsiders without confidential relationships. like trading volume or timing is rebuttable if alternative explanations, such as diversification needs or market timing unrelated to MNPI, are substantiated.

Regulatory Frameworks

U.S. Securities Laws and SEC Enforcement

The prohibition on insider trading in the United States derives primarily from Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful for any person to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." The SEC exercised this authority to promulgate Rule 10b-5 in 1942, which explicitly prohibits three categories of fraudulent conduct in connection with securities transactions: employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting a material fact necessary to avoid misleading statements; and engaging in any act, practice, or course of business that operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person. Although neither the statute nor the rule explicitly mentions "insider trading," courts and the SEC have interpreted them to encompass trading on material nonpublic information (MNPI) in breach of a duty of trust or confidence, as well as tipping such information to others who then trade. This interpretation stems from the broad anti-fraud provisions, which target deceptive practices that undermine market by allowing select individuals unfair informational advantages. Complementary statutes bolster enforcement, including Section 21A of the 1934 Act (enacted via the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984), which authorizes the SEC to seek civil penalties equal to the greater of three times the profit gained or loss avoided from the unlawful trade, or a fixed amount—currently up to $2,398,074 for individuals and $11,990,369 for entities, adjusted for —or $1,000,000 per violation for controlling persons, whichever is greater. The SEC enforces these laws through its Division of Enforcement, which conducts investigations into suspected violations, often initiated by tips, trading surveillance data, or referrals from self-regulatory organizations like FINRA. Upon finding evidence of wrongdoing, the SEC may pursue civil remedies, including temporary restraining orders, permanent injunctions to halt future violations, of ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest, civil monetary penalties, and officer-and-director bars prohibiting individuals from serving in roles at public companies. Administrative proceedings before SEC administrative law judges can result in similar sanctions, with appeals possible to federal courts. For egregious cases involving willful violations, the SEC coordinates with the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution under the same Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 framework, where penalties include fines up to $5 million for individuals and $25 million for entities, alongside potential imprisonment of up to 20 years. The SEC also mandates prompt disclosure of insider transactions via Forms 3, 4, and 5 under Section 16 of the 1934 Act, with recent enforcement sweeps targeting late filings—such as a September 2024 initiative resulting in over $3.8 million in penalties against multiple firms and executives for delayed reports of and insider trades. In fiscal year 2024, the SEC's overall enforcement program yielded nearly $8.2 billion in financial remedies, though insider trading-specific actions remain a core focus amid ongoing market surveillance enhancements.

Rule 10b5-1 Plans and Pre-Planned Trading

Rule 10b5-1 provides an affirmative defense against allegations of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, allowing individuals to execute securities trades pursuant to pre-established written plans even if they later possess material nonpublic information (MNPI). Adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in December 2000, the rule addresses the challenge of proving whether a trade was made "on the basis of" MNPI by deeming trades under qualifying plans not to be so based, provided the plan is adopted when the person does not possess MNPI about the issuer or security. This mechanism enables corporate insiders, such as directors and officers, to diversify holdings or manage liquidity through systematic, pre-planned trading without the need for continuous abstention during periods of MNPI possession. To qualify for the defense, a 10b5-1 plan must be a written contract, instruction, or plan specifying the amount of securities, price, or date for trades, or providing a formula or algorithm for determining such elements; it must be adopted in good faith, with the adopter not aware of MNPI regarding the issuer or security, and no subsequent modifications, cancellations, or new instructions while possessing such information. Plans cannot include provisions allowing the insider to influence trades based on MNPI or company developments, ensuring mechanical execution by a broker or third party. Empirical analyses indicate that these plans facilitate a significant portion of insider sales—over 50% in some samples—often structured as laddered sales over months to mitigate market impact, though studies have identified patterns where plan adoptions cluster before negative earnings surprises, raising questions about opportunistic timing despite the rule's safeguards. In response to concerns over potential abuses, including "hindsight trading" where plans are initiated shortly before adverse events, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 10b5-1 on December 14, 2022, effective February 27, 2023, with certain disclosure requirements phased in later. Key changes include mandatory cooling-off periods before the first trade—90 days for directors, officers, and issuers; 30 days for other persons—to prevent rapid execution post-adoption; a certification requirement for directors and officers affirming no MNPI possession at adoption and good-faith entry without intent to defraud; prohibitions on multiple overlapping plans for the same class of securities and on single-trade plans for directors and officers; and restrictions barring plans with terms allowing trades influenced by MNPI-related inputs. These amendments aim to strengthen the defense's integrity by curbing practices like frequent plan cancellations or initiations timed to MNPI, though post-implementation data as of mid-2025 shows reduced abnormal returns preceding plan-based trades, suggesting partial mitigation of prior opportunistic patterns. The amendments also introduced related disclosure obligations to enhance transparency: insiders must indicate on filings whether trades were pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan, tagged in Inline ; issuers must disclose in quarterly () and annual ( or 20-F) reports their insider trading policies and procedures, including whether they permit 10b5-1 plans and any guidelines on their use; and detail any Section 16 officer's adoption or termination of such plans during the period. Issuers are required to furnish these policies as exhibits, promoting accountability without mandating substantive policy content. While these measures address documented risks—such as plans enabling sales yielding average excess returns of 2-6% before negative announcements in pre-amendment studies—they do not eliminate all scrutiny, as the SEC retains authority to challenge plans evidencing or non-compliance.

International Disclosure and Harmonization Efforts

The (IOSCO) has played a central role in promoting global standards for insider trading regulation, including disclosure requirements, through its non-binding principles and reports. In its 1998 report "Insider Trading: How Jurisdictions Regulate It," IOSCO surveyed regulatory approaches across member jurisdictions, highlighting common elements such as prohibitions on trading based on nonpublic and the need for timely disclosure of insider transactions to regulators and the public. IOSCO's core Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, updated periodically and endorsed by leaders in 2010, require securities regulators to possess adequate powers to monitor, investigate, and enforce against insider trading, with an emphasis on cross-border cooperation to address flows in integrated markets. These principles encourage harmonization by advocating for consistent definitions of insiders, , and disclosure timelines, though implementation remains voluntary and jurisdiction-specific. Regionally, the has advanced disclosure harmonization via the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), effective from July 2016, which mandates that persons discharging managerial responsibilities (PDMRs) and closely associated persons notify transactions in the issuer's securities exceeding €5,000 within three business days, with public disclosure required shortly thereafter. This builds on the earlier Market Abuse Directive (MAD) of 2003, which sought to unify prohibitions and enforcement across member states to prevent regulatory in the . MAR standardizes reporting formats and exemptions, such as for transactions under thresholds, and integrates insider lists and trading plans to enhance transparency, with the (ESMA) overseeing consistent application. Compliance data from ESMA indicates over 100,000 transaction notifications annually across EU exchanges, demonstrating the regime's scale, though enforcement varies by national authority. Globally, disclosure efforts emphasize prompt reporting to deter abuse and facilitate market surveillance, with many IOSCO members adopting rules requiring insiders to file transaction details within 2-5 business days—aligning with U.S. SEC requirements under Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act but adapted locally. Harmonization faces obstacles from divergent legal systems, such as versus civil law approaches to duties, leading to proposals for a unified "abstain" rule where insiders refrain from trading on nonpublic regardless of source. Bilateral and multilateral memoranda of understanding (MoUs), facilitated by IOSCO, enable for cross-border investigations, as seen in joint probes involving U.S. SEC and foreign regulators, but full convergence remains elusive due to concerns and differing penalty structures. Academic comparisons of 14 major markets reveal that while 90% criminalize insider trading, disclosure timelines and public access vary, underscoring ongoing IOSCO-led dialogues for greater alignment.

Global Jurisdictional Variations

United States

In the , insider trading is prohibited under Section 10(b) of the , which makes it unlawful to use "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, and the Securities and Exchange Commission's () Rule 10b-5, which implements this by barring fraud, misstatements, or omissions of material fact. Unlike explicit statutory definitions in some jurisdictions, U.S. law relies on judicial interpretations establishing that liability arises when a person trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust and confidence, either to the issuer's shareholders (classical theory) or to the source of the information (misappropriation theory). This breach-based approach contrasts with possession-based prohibitions in places like the , where mere awareness of inside information can trigger liability without proving deception or duty violation. The foundational case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (1968), established the "disclose or abstain" rule, holding that corporate insiders who possess material nonpublic information must disclose it before trading or refrain from trading to avoid defrauding . Subsequent rulings refined liability: Dirks v. SEC (1983) clarified that tippees (secondary recipients) are liable only if the tipper received a personal benefit for disclosing the information, ensuring enforcement targets breaches rather than mere sharing; United States v. O'Hagan (1997) affirmed the misappropriation theory, extending prohibitions to outsiders like lawyers or analysts who secretly use confidential information from their employer or client for personal gain. Materiality requires a substantial likelihood that the information would significantly alter the total mix of available information for a reasonable , as defined in Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988), often involving facts like mergers, earnings surprises, or regulatory approvals. Corporate officers, directors, and employees owe a duty to shareholders, making their trades on undisclosed corporate developments presumptively illegal; temporary insiders, such as accountants or bankers with access to under agreements, face similar duties. Tippee liability chains through personal benefit requirements, while applies to non-fiduciaries breaching duties to sources, enabling broad extraterritorial application to foreign actors trading U.S. securities or using U.S. markets. Defenses include Rule 10b5-1 plans, adopted in 2000 and amended in 2022 to include cooling-off periods, mandatory disclosures, and limits on multiple plans, allowing pre-scheduled trades to rebut claims if established before gaining nonpublic . The SEC pursues civil remedies, including of profits, civil penalties up to three times the monetary gain or loss avoided, and trading bans, while the Department of Justice handles criminal prosecutions under the same provisions, with penalties including up to 20 years and fines up to $5 million for individuals. emphasizes intent (), requiring proof of knowing deception, which demands more evidentiary rigor than regimes elsewhere but has led to over 1,000 SEC actions since the 1980s, often yielding settlements. U.S. law's judge-made evolution prioritizes fairness to equal-footed traders over absolute bans on information use, reflecting a market-preserving rationale rooted in preventing unfair advantages from betrayals rather than alone.

European Union

In the European Union, insider trading is primarily regulated under the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), formally Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, which entered into force on July 3, 2016, replacing the earlier Market Abuse Directive (MAD). MAR prohibits insider dealing, defined in Article 8 as occurring when a person possesses inside information and uses it by acquiring or disposing of financial instruments for their own account or a third party's, or by recommending or inducing another to do so on that basis. Inside information is specified as precise data that has not been made public, relating directly or indirectly to one or more financial instruments or emitters, and which, if made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on prices due to the legitimate expectations of investors. The regulation applies to a broad scope of financial instruments, including those admitted to trading on regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), organized trading facilities (OTFs), and certain over-the-counter derivatives, aiming to maintain market integrity amid evolving practices like high-frequency trading. Unlike the U.S. approach, which often relies on duty breaches under a classical theory, rules adopt an equal access paradigm focused on preserving market fairness by prohibiting trades based on non-public information regardless of relational duties, though liability requires use or attempted use of such information. MAR also mandates issuers to disclose inside information as soon as possible to prevent selective dissemination and requires maintenance of insider lists identifying persons with access to such data, with ESMA providing guidelines on formats and content. Exemptions are narrow, such as for market makers buying or selling to fulfill client orders without disclosing the information, or trades by persons discharging managerial responsibilities after a closed period if pre-approved. Enforcement is decentralized through national competent authorities (NCAs), such as the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in or the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht in , which investigate and impose administrative sanctions including fines up to €15 million or three times the profits gained, with criminal penalties varying by member state. The (ESMA) coordinates NCAs, issues technical standards, and receives notifications of suspected trading on inside information (STORs), with 51% of 2,000+ STORs in 2023 relating to alleged insider dealing, reflecting heightened surveillance. Recent proposals under the Listing Act seek to simplify insider lists but have prompted ESMA concerns over potential enforcement gaps. While harmonized at the EU level, implementation disparities persist due to national variations in penalties and prosecutorial vigor, contrasting with the U.S. SEC's centralized civil enforcement and private litigation options.

Other Jurisdictions

In the , insider dealing is criminalized under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which prohibits individuals with inside information—defined as information not generally available but likely to affect a security's price—from dealing in securities, encouraging others to deal, or disclosing the information for trading purposes. The (FCA) enforces these provisions alongside civil market abuse rules under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, with penalties including up to 10 years' imprisonment and unlimited fines. applies if the offender is in the UK during the relevant act, reflecting a broad territorial approach since the law's origins in 1980. Canada regulates insider trading primarily through provincial securities statutes, such as Ontario's Securities Act, which prohibits trading or tipping while in possession of material non-public information that could reasonably affect security prices. Federal oversight includes section 380.1, imposing up to 10 years' imprisonment for indictable offences, while insiders must report holdings and trades via the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI) within specified timelines, like 10 days of becoming an insider. Enforcement varies by province but emphasizes fiduciary duties and civil remedies alongside criminal sanctions, with recent policies focusing on core insiders to streamline reporting. Australia's insider trading prohibitions are codified in section 1043A of the , barring persons with inside information—material facts not generally available—from trading, procuring trades, or tipping if they know or ought reasonably to know the information is price-sensitive. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) enforces these, with civil penalties up to AUD 1.11 million per contravention and criminal penalties of up to 15 years' imprisonment or fines of AUD 1.565 million (or three times the benefit gained). Listed entities must maintain trading policies compliant with ASX Listing Rules, extending prohibitions to non-traditional insiders like those connected through professional relationships. In Asia, Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) under Part XIII criminalizes insider dealing, encompassing trading or counseling trades based on inside information about listed securities or derivatives, with the (SFC) imposing up to 10 years' imprisonment and HKD 10 million fines. Japan's Financial Instruments and Exchange Act prohibits insiders, including corporate officers and those with equivalent access, from trading on non-public material information, with penalties of up to 5 years' imprisonment or JPY 5 million fines, recently expanded to tipper liability and markets. India's SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations 2015, amended as of June 26, 2024, define unpublished price-sensitive information broadly and require structured digital trading plans for insiders, enforced by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) with civil and criminal sanctions including and imprisonment. China’s Securities Law criminalizes insider trading by directors, executives, and major shareholders using undisclosed material information, but enforcement relies heavily on administrative measures from the , with challenges in proving intent and inconsistent application noted in empirical analyses. These jurisdictions generally adopt a classical insider theory focused on corporate insiders' duties, though enforcement rigor varies, with stricter penalties in systems like and compared to civil law contexts like and .

Heightened SEC Actions Post-2020

Following the appointment of Gary Gensler as SEC Chair on April 17, 2021, the agency intensified its focus on insider trading through enhanced rulemaking and sustained enforcement efforts aimed at closing perceived loopholes in existing safeguards. Gensler's administration prioritized market integrity, viewing insider trading as a core threat to fair markets, which led to regulatory updates designed to limit opportunistic trading by corporate insiders. A pivotal action was the adoption of amendments to Rule 10b5-1 on December 15, 2022, which established an for pre-planned trading programs while imposing stricter conditions to prevent their misuse for insider trading. These changes introduced mandatory cooling-off periods—90 days for directors and officers (or the longer of 90 days or two days following the relevant quarterly report filing)—before trades could commence under such plans, alongside prohibitions on multiple overlapping plans and single-trade plans for Section 16 officers and directors. Issuers were also required to disclose their insider trading policies annually in filings and provide narrative descriptions of any material changes, with and Form 5 amendments mandating checkboxes to indicate if trades occurred under a 10b5-1 plan. Compliance deadlines were staggered, with most issuers required to adhere by February 27, 2023, though smaller reporting companies received a six-month deferral for certain disclosures. The SEC justified these measures as responses to empirical patterns of suspicious trading under prior rules, such as accelerated sales before negative announcements, though critics argued they added compliance burdens without direct evidence of widespread abuse. Enforcement actions complemented these regulatory shifts, with the SEC pursuing cases involving novel applications of insider trading prohibitions. In fiscal year 2021, the agency continued to treat insider trading as a enforcement priority, filing actions against individuals exploiting nonpublic in sectors like healthcare and . By mid-2025, notable prosecutions included charges in March 2025 against a German national and a Singaporean national for an alleged scheme generating $17.5 million in illicit profits through cross-border tipping networks. Overall SEC enforcement yielded record monetary remedies in fiscal year 2024—exceeding $8.2 billion—though total standalone actions declined to 431 from prior peaks, reflecting a strategic emphasis on high-impact insider trading and cases amid resource constraints. These efforts occurred against a backdrop of increased whistleblower tips post-2020, including those related to pandemic-era disclosures, which bolstered investigations into timely nonpublic use.

Shadow Trading and Novel Prosecutions

Shadow trading refers to the use of material nonpublic information (MNPI) obtained from one to trade securities in another economically linked entity, rather than the source 's own , under the misappropriation theory of insider trading established in United States v. O'Hagan (1997). This approach posits that individuals breach a duty of trust and confidence to the information's source by trading on it for personal gain, deceiving the source and potentially misleading the market for the traded security. Unlike classical insider trading, which involves trading the issuer's securities while possessing MNPI about that issuer, shadow trading extends liability to "peer" or related firms where the information foreseeably impacts their value, such as in concentrated industries like pharmaceuticals. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) first tested this theory in a high-profile enforcement action against Matthew Panuwat, a former executive at Medivation Inc., a company. On November 22, 2016, Panuwat, as head of , learned of Medivation's impending acquisition by Pfizer Inc., which constituted MNPI expected to boost sector-wide valuations. He purchased out-of-the-money call options in , a comparable oncology-focused peer, anticipating spillover effects from the deal announcement; Medivation's public disclosure occurred on November 25, 2016, after which Incyte's stock rose 8.5%. Panuwat netted approximately $107,000 in profits from the trades, executed despite Medivation's insider trading policy prohibiting personal benefit from confidential information, though it did not explicitly address peer trading. The SEC filed charges against Panuwat in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of on 29, 2021, marking the agency's inaugural shadow trading prosecution and seeking , civil penalties, and an officer-and-director bar. Following an eight-day in April 2024, Panuwat was found liable on April 5, 2024, for violating Section 10(b) of the and Rule 10b-5, with the jury determining he acted with and that the trades were deceptive under the misappropriation theory. U.S. District Judge William H. Orrick upheld the verdict on September 10, 2024, rejecting challenges to the SEC's novel application, though Panuwat appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the case remains pending as of 2025. This prosecution signals an expansion of SEC enforcement boundaries, prompting corporate insiders to reassess trading in economically linked securities and firms to amend policies explicitly prohibiting such activity based on MNPI from any source. While critics contend the theory dilutes the traditional duty owed to the traded company's shareholders—focusing instead on the source's trust— from the case, including Panuwat's emails acknowledging sector impacts and his deliberate option purchases, supported findings of foreseeable materiality and breach. No parallel criminal charges were brought by the Department of Justice in this matter, distinguishing it from more conventional insider schemes, but it underscores post-2020 trends toward aggressive civil theories amid fewer traditional tipper-tippee convictions.

Political and Congressional Insider Activity

Members of the United States Congress and other political figures have faced scrutiny for stock trading activities that may leverage non-public information obtained through official duties, such as briefings on economic policy, national security, or regulatory changes. The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act), enacted on April 4, 2012, explicitly prohibits members of Congress, their staff, and other federal officials from using nonpublic information derived from their positions for personal trading benefits, while mandating disclosure of securities transactions over $1,000 within 30 days (shortened from annual filings). Despite these measures, no member of Congress has been prosecuted for insider trading under the STOCK Act, highlighting enforcement challenges including difficulties in proving intent and the broad exemption for "public" information. Empirical analyses of congressional trading performance reveal mixed results, with some indicating outperformance relative to market benchmarks. For instance, portfolios tracked for dozens of members from both parties outperformed the in , continuing a pattern observed in prior years such as 2022, when members reportedly exceeded the index by 17.5%. In 2025, Republican members achieved an average return of 17.3% and Democrats 14.4%, compared to the S&P 500's 16.8%, according to a report by Unusual Whales; the analysis highlighted top performers with unusual trades achieving significant gains alongside underperformers such as Rep. Chip Roy with a -59% portfolio loss. Over 100 members executed approximately 10,000 trades annually since 2021, often in sectors like and that intersect with legislative oversight. Contrasting evidence from academic studies, however, shows House members' purchases underperforming the market by an average of 26 basis points over six months, suggesting that superior returns may stem from skill, diversification, or timing rather than systematic insider advantages. High-profile incidents have amplified concerns, particularly during the early in late January and early February 2020, when several senators sold significant stock holdings shortly after classified briefings on the virus's severity. Senator (R-NC) sold between $628,000 and $1.7 million in stocks on January 27, 2020, including shares in hotel and energy firms vulnerable to downturns, prompting an FBI inquiry that closed without charges in May 2020 due to insufficient evidence of insider use. Similar trades by Senators (R-GA), James Inhofe (R-OK), and (R-GA) drew investigations, but none resulted in prosecutions, underscoring the legal threshold requiring proof of material nonpublic information and breach of duty. Criminal convictions remain rare but notable. Former Representative Chris Collins (R-NY) pleaded guilty in 2019 to insider trading and for tipping off associates about a failed trial at Innate Immunotherapeutics, where he was a board member; he served prison time after cooperating with authorities. In 2023, former Representative Stephen Buyer (R-IN) was sentenced to 22 months in prison for trading on nonpublic merger information shared by a former client while advising on the deal, marking one of the few successful insider trading prosecutions against a former lawmaker. Spousal and family trading has also drawn attention, exemplified by Paul Pelosi, husband of Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), whose disclosed trades generated substantial returns without proven ties to confidential congressional information. In late 2024 and early 2025, he executed sales totaling approximately $38 million, including Nvidia and Apple shares, contributing to portfolio gains exceeding market averages; Pelosi's office has maintained that trades are managed independently by Paul Pelosi as a private investor. At least 97 members reported trades in 2021-2022 intersecting with their committee work, such as energy stocks amid oversight hearings, though disclosures under the STOCK Act revealed 78 violations for late or incomplete filings between 2019 and 2021. Reform efforts persist amid public and bipartisan pressure, with polls showing majority support across parties for stricter limits. In 2025, bills like the Ban Congressional Stock Trading Act (S. 1879) and the End Congressional Stock Trading Act (H.R. 1908) proposed outright bans on individual stock ownership by members, spouses, and dependents, with divestment deadlines and penalties; bipartisan introductions, including by Representatives (D-RI) and (R-TX), signal renewed momentum, though prior attempts have stalled. In December 2025, Representative Anna Paulina Luna filed a discharge petition to force a House vote on H.R. 1908, garnering bipartisan support and endorsements, including from Governor Ron DeSantis in early 2026. On January 12, 2026, Rep. Bryan Steil introduced the Stop Insider Trading Act with 73 cosponsors, which prohibits members of Congress, their spouses, and dependent children from purchasing securities issued by publicly traded companies and requires advance public notice of at least seven days for sales of existing holdings, with penalties for violations including a fee equal to the greater of $2,000 or 10% of the transaction value plus forfeiture of any net profits realized and required divestment for prohibited purchases; following its introduction, the bill advanced through the House Administration Committee, House Speaker Mike Johnson called for its immediate passage, and Rep. Chip Roy urged House leadership to bring the bill to the floor promptly; the bill has backing from House Republican leadership.

Criticisms and Reform Proposals

Inefficiencies in Current Bans

Current prohibitions on insider trading exhibit inefficiencies primarily through enforcement challenges, legal ambiguities, and inadequate deterrence, allowing persistent exploitation of non-public information despite regulatory intent. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated only 35 insider trading enforcement actions in 2024, a marginal increase from 32 the prior year, amid vast market opportunities for such activity, underscoring the rarity of prosecutions relative to potential violations. This scarcity stems from evidentiary hurdles, such as proving the materiality of information, its non-public status, and the trader's breach of , which demand substantial resources and often yield inconclusive outcomes. Legal ambiguities exacerbate these issues by conflating disparate fairness rationales—property rights in versus equal access—resulting in inconsistent application and compliance . Terms like "wrongful" use of , as in the proposed Insider Trading Prohibition Act of 2021, remain vaguely defined, oscillating enforcement between protecting insiders' informational and mandating egalitarian disclosure, which confounds both prosecutors and market participants. Consequently, firms implement overbroad compliance regimes, including protracted blackout periods and stringent preclearance, to mitigate undefined risks; a 1996 survey indicated 92% of public companies maintained such policies, often restricting legitimate trades on borderline , as illustrated by SEC v. Ingoldsby (1990), where data dissemination took nine days post-disclosure. These measures elevate costs, diminish share (with insiders holding 24-32% of equity), inflate compensation via devalued equity grants, and raise the , ultimately eroding without proportionally curbing violations. Deterrence remains limited, as enforcement actions displace rather than eliminate opportunistic trading, with non-targeted insiders in affected industries increasing activity post-prosecution. Empirical patterns persist, such as IRS officials generating abnormal returns of 0.7-3.5% on trades 60-120 days out, predictive of favorable rulings, indicating bans fail to fully suppress access to unreleased informational advantages even among regulated actors. This suggests prohibitions create a false sense of , akin to a effect, where apparent reassures investors without substantially altering trading behaviors grounded in informational asymmetries.

Selective Enforcement and Government Exemptions

Critics of insider trading regulation contend that enforcement exhibits selectivity, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice pursuing high-profile corporate cases aggressively while rarely targeting government officials despite evidence of suspicious trading patterns. For instance, the SEC has imposed and pursued novel theories like shadow trading in corporate contexts since 2020, yet no has faced federal prosecution for insider trading post-2012, even amid documented trades timed closely to legislative events or briefings. This disparity arises partly from jurisdictional limits, as the SEC lacks authority over congressional trading, leaving enforcement to self-policing committees with minimal penalties, often as low as $200 per violation, which are frequently waived or unevenly applied. The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 explicitly affirmed that members of are not exempt from insider trading prohibitions under Section 10(b) of the , mandating disclosure of stock trades exceeding $1,000 within 45 days and prohibiting trades based on nonpublic information obtained through official duties. However, the Act provides no outright ban on individual stock ownership or trading by legislators, their spouses, or dependent children, allowing continued exposure to potential conflicts where policy access could inform personal investments. Enforcement remains weak, with routine violations of disclosure deadlines—such as late filings by dozens of members annually—and fines collected inconsistently, totaling under $1 million since 2012 despite thousands of trades. Notable examples underscore perceived exemptions in practice. In February 2020, Senator sold up to $1.7 million in stocks shortly after classified briefings on the emerging threat, prompting SEC and DOJ investigations but resulting in no charges after a year-long probe cited insufficient evidence of intent. Similar scrutiny arose for trades by other senators like and , yet all investigations closed without prosecution, contrasting sharply with corporate cases like the 2011 conviction of manager , who received an 11-year sentence and $92.8 million in penalties for analogous tip-based trading. Such outcomes fuel arguments that political status affords de facto immunity, as prosecutorial discretion avoids inter-branch conflicts, unlike the apolitical pursuit of private-sector violators. Empirical analyses of congressional trading performance highlight enforcement gaps, with some reports indicating members' portfolios outperforming the by margins like 31% for Democrats in , though academic studies find mixed short-term results, such as House members' buys underperforming by 0.26% over six months. Over 50% of the 535 members traded stocks in recent years, with over 10,000 annual transactions since 2021, often in sectors under their committee oversight, raising causal concerns about nonpublic information's role absent rigorous blind trusts or bans. These patterns, unaccompanied by corporate-style scrutiny, exemplify how government structures enable exemptions-by-inaction, prioritizing self-regulation over parity with private actors.

Proposals for Deregulation or Narrower Rules

Henry G. Manne, in his 1966 book Insider Trading and the Stock Market, proposed the outright of insider trading, asserting that it functions as an efficient compensation mechanism for corporate executives who generate valuable non-public through their managerial efforts. Manne argued that bans distort incentives for production and delay the market's incorporation of such data into asset prices, ultimately reducing overall without protecting uninformed investors from losses they would incur anyway from information asymmetries. Building on property rights theory, Manne and subsequent scholars like those at the contended that newly discovered corporate information constitutes a property right attributable to insiders, akin to inventors claiming rewards for , and that prohibiting trades on it wastes resources by suppressing voluntary exchanges that signal firm value to the broader market. This view posits that deregulation would accelerate , as insider trades aggregate dispersed knowledge more rapidly than mandatory disclosures, which often lag or omit nuanced insights. Empirical studies supporting this include analyses showing no systematic harm to or confidence from insider activity in less-regulated contexts. Proposals for narrower rules focus on limiting prohibitions to cases of explicit breaches or from outsiders, excluding "classical" insiders trading on information derived from their roles without breaching duties to shareholders. For instance, some reformers advocate codifying defenses for pre-planned trading schedules under Rule 10b5-1 while exempting routine executive trades on self-generated insights, arguing current doctrines' vagueness enables that chills legitimate information flows. These adjustments aim to preserve incentives for managerial diligence without the overreach of broad abstain-or-disclose mandates, which Manne critiqued as fostering wasteful compliance costs exceeding any fairness gains. Critics of expansive bans, including economists examining enforcement data, propose scaling back tipper-tippee liability chains, which extend prohibitions indefinitely and deter or advisory roles essential for . In a 2025 analysis, researchers found insider trading restrictions fail to curb opportunistic behavior empirically, as sophisticated actors evade detection, suggesting narrower enforcement targeting verifiable over probabilistic intent would better align rules with causal harms like direct rather than mere informational advantages. Such reforms draw from first-principles efficiency considerations, prioritizing market signals over egalitarian constraints unsubstantiated by evidence of net detriment.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.