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Piracy
Piracy
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The traditional "Jolly Roger" flag of piracy

Piracy is an act of robbery or criminal violence by ship or boat-borne attackers upon another ship or a coastal area, typically with the goal of stealing cargo and valuable goods, or taking hostages. Those who conduct acts of piracy are called pirates, and vessels used for piracy are called pirate ships. The earliest documented instances of piracy were in the 14th century BC, when the Sea Peoples, a group of ocean raiders, attacked the ships of the Aegean and Mediterranean civilisations. Narrow channels which funnel shipping into predictable routes have long created opportunities for piracy,[1] as well as for privateering and commerce raiding.

Historic examples of such areas include the waters of Gibraltar, the Strait of Malacca, Madagascar, the Gulf of Aden, and the English Channel, whose geographic structures facilitated pirate attacks.[2][3] The term piracy generally refers to maritime piracy, although the term has been generalized to refer to acts committed on land,[4] in the air, on computer networks, and (in science fiction) outer space. Piracy usually excludes crimes committed by the perpetrator on their own vessel (e.g. theft), as well as privateering, which implies authorization by a state government.

Piracy or pirating is the name of a specific crime under customary international law and also the name of a number of crimes under the municipal law of a number of states. In the 21st century, seaborne piracy against transport vessels remains a significant issue, with estimated worldwide losses of US$25 billion in 2023,[5] increased from US$16 billion in 2004.[6]

The waters between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast and in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore have frequently been targeted by modern pirates armed with automatic firearms and occasionally explosive weaponry. They often use small motorboats to attack and board ships, a tactic that takes advantage of the small number of crew members on modern cargo vessels and transport ships. The international community is facing many challenges in bringing modern pirates to justice, as these attacks often occur in international waters.[7] Nations have used their naval forces to repel and pursue pirates, and some private vessels use armed security guards, high-pressure water cannons, or sound cannons to repel boarders, and use radar to avoid potential threats.

Romanticised accounts of piracy during the Age of Sail have long been a part of Western pop culture. The two-volume A General History of the Pyrates, published in London in 1724, is generally credited with bringing key piratical figures and a semi-accurate description of their milieu in the "Golden Age of Piracy" to the public's imagination. The General History inspired and informed many later fictional depictions of piracy, most notably the novels Treasure Island (1883) and Peter Pan (1911), both of which have been adapted and readapted for stage, film, television, and other media across over a century. More recently, pirates of the "golden age" were further stereotyped and popularized by the Pirates of the Caribbean film franchise, which began in 2003.

Etymology

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The English word "pirate" is derived from the Latin pirata ("pirate, corsair, sea robber"), which comes from Greek πειρατής (peiratēs), "brigand",[8] from πειράομαι (peiráomai), "I attempt", from πεῖρα (peîra), "attempt, experience".[9] The meaning of the Greek word peiratēs literally is "anyone who attempts something". Over time it came to be used of anyone who engaged in robbery or brigandry on land or sea.[10] The term first appeared in English c. 1300.[11] Spelling did not become standardised until the eighteenth century, and spellings such as "pirrot", "pyrate" and "pyrat" occurred until this period.[12][13]

History

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Europe

[edit]

Antiquity

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A mosaic of a Roman trireme in Tunisia

The earliest documented instances of piracy are the exploits of the Sea Peoples who threatened the ships sailing in the Aegean and Mediterranean waters in the 14th century BC. In classical antiquity, the Phoenicians, Illyrians and Tyrrhenians were known as pirates. In the pre-classical era, the ancient Greeks condoned piracy as a viable profession; it apparently was widespread and "regarded as an entirely honourable way of making a living".[14] References are made to its perfectly normal occurrence in many texts including in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, and abduction of women and children to be sold into slavery was common. By the era of Classical Greece, piracy was looked upon as a "disgrace" to have as a profession.[14][15]

In the 3rd century BC, pirate attacks on Olympus in Lycia brought impoverishment. Among some of the most famous ancient pirateering peoples were the Illyrians, a people populating the western Balkan peninsula. Constantly raiding the Adriatic Sea, the Illyrians caused many conflicts with the Roman Republic. It was not until 229 BC when the Romans decisively beat the Illyrian fleets that their threat was ended.[16] During the 1st century BC, there were pirate states along the Anatolian coast, threatening the commerce of the Roman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean. On one voyage across the Aegean Sea in 75 BC,[17] Julius Caesar was kidnapped and briefly held by Cilician pirates and held prisoner in the Dodecanese islet of Pharmacusa.[18] The Senate invested the general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus with powers to deal with piracy in 67 BC (the Lex Gabinia), and Pompey, after three months of naval warfare, managed to suppress the threat.

As early as 258 AD, the Gothic-Herulic fleet ravaged towns on the coasts of the Black Sea and Sea of Marmara. The Aegean coast suffered similar attacks a few years later. In 264, the Goths reached Galatia and Cappadocia, and Gothic pirates landed on Cyprus and Crete. In the process, the Goths seized enormous booty and took thousands into captivity.[citation needed] In 286 AD, Carausius, a Roman military commander of Gaulish origins, was appointed to command the Classis Britannica, and given the responsibility of eliminating Frankish and Saxon pirates who had been raiding the coasts of Armorica and Belgic Gaul. In the Roman province of Britannia, Saint Patrick was captured and enslaved by Irish pirates.

Middle Ages

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A fleet of Vikings, painted mid-12th century

The most widely recognized and far-reaching pirates in medieval Europe were the Vikings,[19] seaborne warriors from Scandinavia who raided and looted mainly between the 8th and 12th centuries, during the Viking Age in the Early Middle Ages. They raided the coasts, rivers and inland cities of all Western Europe as far as Seville, which was attacked by the Norse in 844. Vikings also attacked the coasts of North Africa and Italy and plundered all the coasts of the Baltic Sea. Some Vikings ascended the rivers of Eastern Europe as far as the Black Sea and Persia.

In the Late Middle Ages, the Frisian pirates known as Arumer Zwarte Hoop led by Pier Gerlofs Donia and Wijerd Jelckama, fought against the troops of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V with some success.

Toward the end of the 9th century, Moorish pirate havens were established along the coast of southern France and northern Italy.[20] In 846 Moor raiders sacked the extra muros Basilicas of Saint Peter and Saint Paul in Rome. In 911, the bishop of Narbonne was unable to return to France from Rome because the Moors from Fraxinet controlled all the passes in the Alps. Moor pirates operated out of the Balearic Islands in the 10th century. From 824 to 961 Arab pirates in the Emirate of Crete raided the entire Mediterranean. In the 14th century, raids by Moor pirates forced the Venetian Duke of Crete to ask Venice to keep its fleet on constant guard.[citation needed]

After the Slavic invasions of the former Roman province of Dalmatia in the 5th and 6th centuries, a tribe called the Narentines revived the old Illyrian piratical habits and often raided the Adriatic Sea starting in the 7th century. Their raids in the Adriatic increased rapidly, until the whole Sea was no longer safe for travel.

The Narentines took more liberties in their raiding quests while the Venetian Navy was abroad, as when it was campaigning in Sicilian waters in 827–882. As soon as the Venetian fleet would return to the Adriatic, the Narentines momentarily outcast their habits again, even signing a Treaty in Venice and baptising their Slavic pagan leader into Christianity. In 834 or 835 they broke the treaty and again they raided Venetian traders returning from Benevento. All of Venice's military attempts to punish them in 839 and 840 utterly failed.

Later, they raided the Venetians more often, together with the Arabs. In 846, the Narentines broke through to Venice itself and raided its lagoon city of Caorle. This caused a Byzantine military action against them that brought Christianity to them. After the Arab raids on the Adriatic coast circa 872 and the retreat of the Imperial Navy, the Narentines continued their raids of Venetian waters, causing new conflicts with the Italians in 887–888. The Venetians futilely continued to fight them throughout the 10th and 11th centuries.

Domagoj was accused of attacking a ship which was bringing home the papal legates who had participated in the Eighth Catholic Ecumenical Council, after which Pope John VIII addresses to Domagoj with request that his pirates stop attacking Christians at sea.[21][22]

The Vitalienbrüder. Piracy became endemic in the Baltic Sea in the Middle Ages because of the Victual Brothers.

In 937, Irish pirates sided with the Scots, Vikings, Picts, and Welsh in their invasion of England. Athelstan drove them back.

The Slavic piracy in the Baltic Sea ended with the Danish conquest of the Rani stronghold of Arkona in 1168. In the 12th century the coasts of western Scandinavia were plundered by Curonians and Oeselians from the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. In the 13th and 14th century, pirates threatened the Hanseatic routes and nearly brought sea trade to the brink of extinction. The Victual Brothers of Gotland were a companionship of privateers who later turned to piracy as the Likedeelers. They were especially noted for their leaders Klaus Störtebeker and Gödeke Michels. Until about 1440, maritime trade in both the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia was seriously in danger of attack by the pirates.

H. Thomas Milhorn mentions a certain Englishman named William Maurice, convicted of piracy in 1241, as the first person known to have been hanged, drawn and quartered,[23] which would indicate that the then-ruling King Henry III took an especially severe view of this crime.

The ushkuiniks were Novgorodian pirates who looted the cities on the Volga and Kama Rivers in the 14th century.

"Cossacks of Azov fighting a Turk ship" by Grigory Gagarin

As early as Byzantine times, the Maniots (one of Greece's toughest populations) were known as pirates. The Maniots considered piracy as a legitimate response to the fact that their land was poor and it became their main source of income. The main victims of Maniot pirates were the Ottomans but the Maniots also targeted ships of European countries.

Zaporizhian Sich was a pirate republic in Europe from the 16th through to the 18th century. Situated in Cossack territory in the remote steppe of Eastern Europe, it was populated with Ukrainian peasants that had run away from their feudal masters, outlaws, destitute gentry, run-away slaves from Turkish galleys, etc. The remoteness of the place and the rapids at the Dnieper river effectively guarded the place from invasions of vengeful powers.

The main target of the inhabitants of the Zaporizhian Sich who called themselves "Cossacks", were rich settlements at the Black Sea shores of Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate.[citation needed] By 1615 and 1625, Zaporozhian Cossacks had even managed to raze townships on the outskirts of Istanbul, forcing the Ottoman Sultan to flee his palace.[citation needed] Don Cossacks under Stenka Razin even ravaged the Persian coasts.[24][unreliable source?]

Mediterranean corsairs

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A French ship under attack by Barbary pirates, ca. 1615

Though less famous and romanticized than Atlantic or Caribbean pirates, corsairs in the Mediterranean equaled or outnumbered the former at any given point in history.[25] Mediterranean piracy was conducted almost entirely with galleys until the mid-17th century, when they were gradually replaced with highly maneuverable sailing vessels such as xebecs and brigantines. They were of a smaller type than battle galleys, often referred to as galiots or fustas.[26]

Pirate galleys were small, nimble, lightly armed, but often crewed in large numbers in order to overwhelm the often minimal crews of merchant ships. In general, pirate craft were extremely difficult for patrolling craft to actually hunt down and capture. Anne Hilarion de Tourville, a French admiral of the 17th century, believed that the only way to run down raiders from the infamous corsair Moroccan port of Salé was by using a captured pirate vessel of the same type.[27]

Barbary pirates were involved in the Barbary slave trade in North Africa

Using oared vessels to combat pirates was common, and was even practiced by the major powers in the Caribbean. Purpose-built galleys, or hybrid sailing vessels, were built by the English in Jamaica in 1683[28] and by the Spanish in the late 16th century.[29] Specially-built sailing frigates with oar-ports on the lower decks, like the James Galley and Charles Galley, and oar-equipped sloops proved highly useful for pirate hunting, though they were not built in sufficient numbers to check piracy until the 1720s.[30]

The expansion of Muslim power through the Ottoman conquest of large parts of the eastern Mediterranean in the 15th and 16th century resulted in extensive piracy on sea trading. The so-called Barbary pirates began to operate out of North African ports in Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Morocco around 1500, preying primarily on the shipping of Christian powers, including massive slave raids at sea as well as on land. The Barbary pirates were nominally under Ottoman suzerainty, but had considerable independence to prey on the enemies of Islam. The Muslim corsairs were technically often privateers with support from legitimate, though highly belligerent, states. They considered themselves as holy Muslim warriors, or ghazis,[31] carrying on the tradition of fighting the incursion of Western Christians that had begun with the First Crusade late in the 11th century.[32]

The Bombardment of Algiers by the Anglo-Dutch fleet in 1816 to support the ultimatum to release European slaves

Coastal villages and towns of Italy, Spain and islands in the Mediterranean were frequently attacked by Muslim corsairs, and long stretches of the Italian and Spanish coasts were almost completely abandoned by their inhabitants. After 1600, the Barbary corsairs occasionally entered the Atlantic and struck as far north as Iceland. According to Robert Davis between 1 million and 1.25 million Europeans were captured by Barbary corsairs and sold as slaves in North Africa and the Ottoman Empire between the 16th and 19th centuries. The most famous corsairs were the Ottoman Albanian Hayreddin and his older brother Oruç Reis (Redbeard), Turgut Reis (known as Dragut in the West), Kurtoglu (known as Curtogoli in the West), Kemal Reis, Salih Reis and Koca Murat Reis. A few Barbary corsairs, such as the Dutch Jan Janszoon and the English John Ward (Muslim name Yusuf Reis), were renegade European privateers who had converted to Islam.[33][34]

The Barbary pirates had a direct Christian counterpart in the military order of the Knights of Saint John that operated first out of Rhodes and after 1530 Malta, though they were less numerous and took fewer slaves. Both sides waged war against the respective enemies of their faith, and both used galleys as their primary weapons. Both sides also used captured or bought galley slaves to man the oars of their ships. The Muslims relied mostly on captured Christians, the Christians used a mix of Muslim slaves, Christian convicts and a small contingency of buonavoglie, free men who out of desperation or poverty had taken to rowing.[32]

Historian Peter Earle has described the two sides of the Christian-Muslim Mediterranean conflict as "mirror image[s] of maritime predation, two businesslike fleets of plunderers set against each other".[35] This conflict of faith in the form of privateering, piracy and slave raiding generated a complex system that was upheld/financed/operated on the trade in plunder and slaves that was generated from a low-intensive conflict, as well as the need for protection from violence. The system has been described as a "massive, multinational protection racket",[36] the Christian side of which was not ended until 1798 in the Napoleonic Wars. The Barbary corsairs were quelled as late as the 1830s, effectively ending the last vestiges of counter-crusading jihad.[37]

Amaro Pargo was one of the most famous corsairs of the Golden Age of Piracy

Piracy off the Barbary coast was often assisted by competition among European powers in the 17th century. France encouraged the corsairs against Spain, and later Britain and Holland supported them against France. By the second half of the 17th century the greater European naval powers began to initiate reprisals to intimidate the Barbary States into making peace with them. The most successful of the Christian states in dealing with the corsair threat was England.[citation needed] From the 1630s onwards England had signed peace treaties with the Barbary States on various occasions, but invariably breaches of these agreements led to renewed wars.

Albanian piracy, mainly centered in the town of Ulcinj (thus came to be known as Dulcignotti), flourished during the 15th to the 19th century.[38]

France, which had recently emerged as a leading naval power, achieved comparable success soon afterwards, with bombardments of Algiers in 1682, 1683 and 1688 securing a lasting peace, while Tripoli was similarly coerced in 1686. In 1783 and 1784 the Spaniards bombarded Algiers in an effort to stem the piracy. The second time, Admiral Barceló damaged the city so severely that the Algerian Dey asked Spain to negotiate a peace treaty. From then on, Spanish vessels and coasts were safe for several years.[citation needed]

Until the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, British treaties with the North African states protected American ships from the Barbary corsairs. Morocco, which in 1777 was the first independent nation to publicly recognize the United States, became in 1784 the first Barbary power to seize an American vessel after independence. While the United States managed to secure peace treaties, these obliged it to pay tribute for protection from attack. Payments in ransom and tribute to the Barbary states amounted to 20% of United States government annual expenditures in 1800,[39] leading to the Barbary Wars that ended the payment of tribute. Algiers broke the 1805 peace treaty after only two years, and refused to implement the 1815 treaty until compelled to do so by Britain in 1816.

In 1815, the sacking of Palma on the island of Sardinia by a Tunisian squadron, which carried off 158 inhabitants, roused widespread indignation. Britain had by this time banned the slave trade and was seeking to induce other countries to do likewise. This led to complaints from states which were still vulnerable to the corsairs that Britain's enthusiasm for ending the trade in African slaves did not extend to stopping the enslavement of Europeans and Americans by the Barbary States.

U.S. naval officer Stephen Decatur boarding a Tripolitan gunboat during the First Barbary War, 1804

In order to neutralise this objection and further the anti-slavery campaign, in 1816 Lord Exmouth was sent to secure new concessions from Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, including a pledge to treat Christian captives in any future conflict as prisoners of war rather than slaves and the imposition of peace between Algiers and the kingdoms of Sardinia and Sicily. On his first visit he negotiated satisfactory treaties and sailed for home. While he was negotiating, a number of Sardinian fishermen who had settled at Bona on the Tunisian coast were brutally treated without his knowledge. As Sardinians they were technically under British protection and the government sent Exmouth back to secure reparation. On August 17, in combination with a Dutch squadron under Admiral Van de Capellen, he bombarded Algiers.[40] Both Algiers and Tunis made fresh concessions as a result.

Securing uniform compliance with a total prohibition of slave-raiding, which was traditionally of central importance to the North African economy, presented difficulties beyond those faced in ending attacks on ships of individual nations, which had left slavers able to continue their accustomed way of life by preying on less well-protected peoples. Algiers renewed its slave-raiding, though on a smaller scale. Measures to be taken against the city's government were discussed at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. In 1820, another British fleet under Admiral Sir Harry Neal again bombarded Algiers. Corsair activity based in Algiers did not entirely cease until its conquest by France in 1830.[40]

Southeast Asia

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A 19th-century illustration of an Iranun pirate

In thalassocratic Austronesian cultures in Island Southeast Asia, maritime raids for slaves and resources against rival polities have ancient origins. It was associated with prestige and prowess and often recorded in tattoos. Reciprocal raiding traditions were recorded by early European cultures as being prevalent throughout Island Southeast Asia.[41][42][43][44][45]

Iban war prahu in Skerang river
1890 illustration by Rafael Monleón of a late 18th-century Iranun lanong warship. The Malay word for "pirate", lanun, originates from an exonym of the Iranun people
Double-barrelled lantaka cannons, kalasag shields, armor, and various swords (including kalis, panabas, and kampilan) used by Moro pirates in the Philippines (c. 1900)

With the advent of Islam and the colonial era, slaves became a valuable resource for trading with European, Arab, and Chinese slavers, and the volume of piracy and slave raids increased significantly.[45] Numerous native peoples engaged in sea raiding; they include the Iranun and Balanguingui slavers of Sulu, the Iban headhunters of Borneo, the Bugis sailors of South Sulawesi, and the Malays of western Southeast Asia. Piracy was also practiced by foreign seafarers on a smaller scale, including Chinese, Japanese, and European traders, renegades, and outlaws.[43] The volume of piracy and raids were often dependent on the ebb and flow of trade and monsoons, with pirate season (known colloquially as the "Pirate Wind") starting from August to September.[42]

Slave raids were of high economic importance to the Muslim Sultanates in the Sulu Sea: the Sultanate of Sulu, the Sultanate of Maguindanao, and the Confederation of Sultanates in Lanao (the modern Moro people). It is estimated that from 1770 to 1870, around 200,000 to 300,000 people were enslaved by Iranun and Banguingui slavers.[41][42] David P. Forsythe put the estimate much higher, at around 2 million slaves captured within the first two centuries of Spanish rule of the Philippines after 1565.[46]

Spanish warships bombarding the Moro Pirates of the southern Philippines in 1848

These slaves were taken from piracy on passing ships as well as coastal raids on settlements as far as the Malacca Strait, Java, the southern coast of China and the islands beyond the Makassar Strait. Most of the slaves were Tagalogs, Visayans, and "Malays" (including Bugis, Mandarese, Iban, and Makassar). There were also occasional European and Chinese captives who were usually ransomed off through Tausug intermediaries of the Sulu Sultanate. Slaves were the primary indicators of wealth and status, and they were the source of labor for the farms, fisheries, and workshops of the sultanates. While personal slaves were rarely sold, they trafficked extensively in slaves purchased from the Iranun and Banguingui slave markets. By the 1850s, slaves constituted 50% or more of the population of the Sulu archipelago.[41][43][42]

The scale was so massive that the word for "pirate" in Malay became lanun, an exonym of the Iranun people. The economy of the Sulu sultanates was largely run by slaves and the slave trade. Male captives of the Iranun and the Banguingui were treated brutally, even fellow Muslim captives were not spared. They were usually forced to serve as galley slaves on the lanong and garay warships of their captors. Female captives, however, were usually treated better. There were no recorded accounts of rapes, though some were starved for discipline. Within a year of capture, most of the captives of the Iranun and Banguingui would be bartered off in Jolo usually for rice, opium, bolts of cloth, iron bars, brassware, and weapons. The buyers were usually Tausug datu from the Sultanate of Sulu who had preferential treatment, but buyers also included European (Dutch and Portuguese) and Chinese traders as well as Visayan pirates (renegados).[42]

Baluarte Watchtower, La Union. A 400-year-old Spanish-era structure built to guard against pirates, later used in World War II as a communication tower for the USAFIP-NL airfield.
Currimao Watchtower, Ilocos Norte. 'Currimao' comes from the Iloco term cumaws (pirates) and the Spanish word correr (to run), reflecting the warnings given by watchmen during pirate attacks.

Spanish authorities and native Christian Filipinos responded to the Moro slave raids by building watchtowers and forts across the Philippine archipelago, many of which are still standing today. In Northern Luzon particularly in the Pangasinan, Ilocos and Cagayan, the coastal villages and towns, were frequently raided by Moro and Chinese pirates, locally known as tírong or cumaw (raiders, attackers or pirates). These pirates looted and burned villages (barrios) and captured women and children for enslavement. To counter these threats, Spanish authorities constructed circular adobe watchtowers, or baluartes, measuring 6 to 7 meters high. These structures, built strategically along the coastline using coral blocks bonded with a mixture of lime and egg whites, served as both lookout points and defensive fortifications to protect villages from pirate attacks.[47][48][49]

A fight between Filipino pirates, Bugis trading ship, and Dutch mariners.

Some provincial capitals were also moved further inland. Major command posts were built in Manila, Cavite, Cebu, Iloilo, Zamboanga, and Iligan. Defending ships were also built by local communities, especially in the Visayas Islands, including the construction of war "barangayanes" (balangay) that were faster than the Moro raiders and could give chase. As resistance against raiders increased, Lanong warships of the Iranun were eventually replaced by the smaller and faster garay warships of the Banguingui in the early 19th century. The Moro raids were eventually subdued by several major naval expeditions by the Spanish and local forces from 1848 to 1891, including retaliatory bombardment and capture of Moro settlements. By this time, the Spanish had also acquired steam gunboats (vapor), which could easily overtake and destroy the native Moro warships.[41][50][51]

Several famous pirates, such as Intjeh Cohdja and Wassingrana, were hunted by the VOC for hijacking their merchant ships in the Eastern salient of Java.[52]

Aside from the Iranun and Banguingui pirates, other polities were also associated with maritime raiding. The Bugis sailors of South Sulawesi were infamous as pirates who used to range as far west as Singapore and as far north as the Philippines in search of targets for piracy.[53] The Orang laut pirates controlled shipping in the Straits of Malacca and the waters around Singapore,[54] and the Malay and Sea Dayak pirates preyed on maritime shipping in the waters between Singapore and Hong Kong from their haven in Borneo.[55]

East Asia

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In East Asia by the ninth century, populations centered mostly around merchant activities in coastal Shandong and Jiangsu. Wealthy benefactors including Chang Pogo established Silla Buddhist temples in the region. Chang Pogo had become incensed at the treatment of his fellow countrymen, who in the unstable milieu of late Tang often fell victim to coastal pirates or inland bandits. After returning to Silla around 825, and in possession of a formidable private fleet headquartered at Cheonghae (Wando), Chang Pogo petitioned the Silla king Heungdeok (r. 826–836) to establish a permanent maritime garrison to protect Silla merchant activities in the Yellow Sea. Heungdeok agreed and in 828 formally established the Cheonghae (淸海, "clear sea") Garrison (청해진) at what is today Wando island off Korea's South Jeolla province. Heungdeok gave Chang an army of 10,000 men to establish and man the defensive works. The remnants of Cheonghae Garrison can still be seen on Jang islet just off Wando's southern coast. Chang's force, though nominally bequeathed by the Silla king, was effectively under his own control. Chang became arbiter of Yellow Sea commerce and navigation.[56]

From the 13th century, Wokou based in Japan made their debut in East Asia, initiating invasions that would persist for 300 years. The wokou raids peaked in the 1550s, but by then the wokou were mostly Chinese smugglers who reacted strongly against the Ming dynasty's strict prohibition on private sea trade.

Sixteenth century Japanese pirate raids

During the Qing period, Chinese pirate fleets grew increasingly large. The effects large-scale piracy had on the Chinese economy were immense. They preyed voraciously on China's junk trade, which flourished in Fujian and Guangdong and was a vital artery of Chinese commerce. Pirate fleets exercised hegemony over villages on the coast, collecting revenue by exacting tribute and running extortion rackets. In 1802, the menacing Zheng Yi inherited the fleet of his cousin, captain Zheng Qi, whose death provided Zheng Yi with considerably more influence in the world of piracy. Zheng Yi and his wife, Zheng Yi Sao (who would eventually inherit the leadership of his pirate confederacy) then formed a pirate coalition that, by 1804, consisted of over ten thousand men. Their military might alone was sufficient to combat the Qing navy. However, a combination of famine, Qing naval opposition, and internal rifts crippled piracy in China around the 1820s, and it has never again reached the same status.

In the 1840s and 1850s, United States Navy and Royal Navy forces campaigned together against Chinese pirates. Major battles were fought such as those at Ty-ho Bay and the Tonkin River though pirate junks continued operating off China for years more. However, some British and American individual citizens also volunteered to serve with Chinese pirates to fight against European forces. The British offered rewards for the capture of westerners serving with Chinese pirates. During the Second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion, piratical junks were again destroyed in large numbers by British naval forces but ultimately it was not until the 1860s and 1870s that fleets of pirate junks ceased to exist.

Four Chinese pirates who were hanged in Hong Kong in 1863

Chinese Pirates also plagued the Tonkin Gulf area.[57][58]

Piracy in the Ming dynasty

[edit]

Pirates in the Ming era tended to come from populations on the geographic periphery of the state.[59] They were recruited largely from the lower classes of society, including poor fishermen, and many were fleeing from obligatory labor on state-building projects organized by the dynasty. These lower-class men, and sometimes women, may have fled taxation or conscription by the state in the search of better opportunities and wealth, and willingly joined local pirate bands.[60][61] These local, lower class individuals seem to have felt unrepresented, and traded the small amount of security afforded them from their allegiance to the state for the promise of a relatively improved existence engaging in smuggling or other illegal trade.

Originally, pirates in the coastal areas near Fujian and Zhejiang may have been Japanese, suggested by the Ming government referring to them as "wokou (倭寇)", but it is probable that piracy was a multi-ethnic profession by the 16th century, although coastal brigands continued to be referred to as wokou in many government documents.[62] Most pirates were probably Han Chinese, but Japanese and even Europeans engaged in pirate activities in the region.[63]

Illegal trade and authority

[edit]

Pirates engaged in a number of different schemes to make a living. Smuggling and illegal trade overseas were major sources of revenue for pirate bands, both large and small.[64] As the Ming government mostly outlawed private trade overseas, at least until the overseas silver trade contributed to a lifting of the ban, pirates basically could almost by default control the market for any number of foreign goods.[64][65][66] The geography of the coastline made chasing pirates quite difficult for the authorities, and private overseas trade began to transform coastal societies by the 15th century, as nearly all aspects of the local society benefitted from or associated with illegal trade.[67] The desire to trade for silver eventually led to open conflict between the Ming and illegal smugglers and pirates. This conflict, along with local merchants in southern China, helped persuade the Ming court to end the haijin ban on private international trade in 1567.[66]

Pirates also projected local political authority.[68] Larger pirate bands could act as local governing bodies for coastal communities, collecting taxes and engaging in "protection" schemes. In addition to illegal goods, pirates ostensibly offered security to communities on land in exchange for a tax.[69] These bands also wrote and codified laws that redistributed wealth, punished crimes, and provided protection for the taxed community.[68] These laws were strictly followed by the pirates, as well.[70] The political structures tended to look similar to the Ming structures.[70]

Hierarchy and structure

[edit]

Pirates did not tend to stay pirates permanently. It seems to have been relatively easy both to join and leave a pirate band, and these raiding groups were more interested in maintaining a willing force.[71] Members of these pirate groups did not tend to stay longer than a few months or years at a time.[71]

There appears to have been a hierarchy in most pirate organizations. Pirate leaders could become very wealthy and powerful, especially when working with the Chinese dynasty, and, consequently, so could those who served under them.[69] These pirate groups were organized similarly to other "escape societies" throughout history, and maintained a redistributive system to reward looting; the pirates directly responsible for looting or pillaging got their cut first, and the rest was allocated to the rest of the pirate community.[69] There seems to be evidence that there was an egalitarian aspect to these communities, with capability to do the job being rewarded explicitly. The pirates themselves had some special privileges under the law when they interacted with communities on land, mostly in the form of extra allotments of redistributed wealth.[69]

Clientele

[edit]

Pirates, of course, had to sell their loot. They had trading relationships with land communities and foreign traders in the southeastern regions of China. Zhu Wan, who held the office of Grand Coordinator for Coastal Defense, documented that pirates in the region to which he had been sent had the support of the local elite gentry class.[72] These "pirates in gowns and caps" directly or indirectly sponsored pirate activity and certainly directly benefitted from the illegal private trade in the region. When Zhu Wan or other officials from the capital attempted to eliminate the pirate problem, these local elites fought back, having Zhu Wan demoted and eventually even sent back to Beijing to possibly be executed.[73] The gentry who benefitted from illegal maritime trade were too powerful and influential, and they were clearly very invested in the smuggling activities of the pirate community.[74]

In addition to their relationship with the local elite class on the coast, pirates also had complicated and often friendly relationships and partnerships with the dynasty itself, as well as with international traders.[75] When pirate groups recognized the authority of the dynasty, they would often be allowed to operate freely and even profit from the relationship. There were also opportunities for these pirates to ally themselves with colonial projects from Europe or other overseas powers.[76] Both the dynasty and foreign colonial projects would employ pirates as mercenaries to establish dominance in the coastal region.[77] Because of how difficult it was for established state powers to control these regions, pirates seem to have had a lot of freedom to choose their allies and their preferred markets.[78] Included in this list of possible allies, sea marauders and pirates even found opportunities to bribe military officials as they engaged in illegal trade.[79] They seem to have been incentivized mostly by money and loot, and so could afford to play the field with regards to their political or military allies.

Because pirate organizations could be so powerful locally, the Ming government made concerted efforts to weaken them. The presence of colonial projects complicated this, however, as pirates could ally themselves with other maritime powers or local elites to stay in business. The Chinese government was clearly aware of the power of some of these pirate groups, as some documents even refer to them as "sea rebels," a reference to the political nature of pirates.[76] Pirates like Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong accrued tremendous local power, eventually even being hired as naval commanders by the Chinese dynasties and foreign maritime powers.[80]

South Asia

[edit]

Bawarij were Sindhi pirates named for their distinctive barja warships[81] who were active between 251 and 865 AD.[82] Their frequent piracy and the incident in which they looted two treasure ships coming from Ceylon became the casus belli for the Umayyad conquest of Sindh.[83]

Pirates who accepted the Royal Pardon from the Chola Empire would get to serve in the Chola Navy as "Kallarani". They would be used as coast guards, or sent on recon missions to deal with Arab piracy in the Arabian Sea. Their function is similar to the 18th century privateers, used by the Royal Navy.

Starting in the 14th century, the Deccan (Southern Peninsular region of India) was divided into two entities: on the one side stood the Muslim Bahmani Sultanate and on the other stood the Hindu kings rallied around the Vijayanagara Empire. Continuous wars demanded frequent resupplies of fresh horses, which were imported through sea routes from Persia and Africa. This trade was subjected to frequent raids by thriving bands of pirates based in the coastal cities of Western India. One of such was Timoji, who operated off Anjadip Island both as a privateer (by seizing horse traders, that he rendered to the raja of Honavar) and as a pirate who attacked the Kerala merchant fleets that traded pepper with Gujarat.

During the 16th and 17th centuries, there was frequent European piracy against Mughal Indian merchants, especially those en route to Mecca for Hajj. The situation came to a head when the Portuguese attacked and captured the vessel Rahimi which belonged to Mariam Zamani the Mughal queen, which led to the Mughal seizure of the Portuguese town Daman.[84] In the 18th century, the famous Maratha privateer Kanhoji Angre ruled the seas between Mumbai and Goa.[85] The Marathas attacked British shipping and insisted that East India Company ships pay taxes if sailing through their waters.[86]

Persian Gulf

[edit]

The southern coast of the Persian Gulf was known to the British from the late 18th century as the Pirate Coast, where control of the seaways of the Persian Gulf was asserted by the Qawasim (Al Qasimi) and other local maritime powers. Memories of the privations carried out on the coast by Portuguese raiders under Albuquerque were long and local powers antipathetic as a consequence to Christian powers asserting dominance of their coastal waters.[87] Early British expeditions to protect the Imperial Indian Ocean trade from competitors, principally the Al Qasimi from Ras Al Khaimah and Lingeh, led to campaigns against those headquarters and other harbours along the coast in 1809 and then, after a relapse in raiding, again in 1819.[88] This led to the signing of the first formal treaty of maritime peace between the British and the rulers of several coastal sheikhdoms in 1820. This was cemented by the Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity in 1853, resulting in the British label for the area, 'Pirate Coast' being softened to the 'Trucial Coast', with several emirates being recognised by the British as Trucial States.[87]

Madagascar

[edit]
The cemetery of past pirates at Île Ste-Marie (St. Mary's Island)

At one point, there were nearly 1,000 pirates located in Madagascar.[89] Île Sainte-Marie was a popular base for pirates throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. The most famous pirate utopia is that of the probably fictional Captain Misson and his pirate crew, who allegedly founded the free colony of Libertatia in northern Madagascar in the late 17th century, until it was destroyed in a surprise attack by the island natives in 1694.[90]

Caribbean

[edit]
Jacques de Sores looting and burning Havana in 1555
Puerto del Príncipe being sacked in 1668 by Henry Morgan
Book about pirates "De Americaensche Zee-Roovers" was first published in 1678 in Amsterdam

The classic era of piracy in the Caribbean lasted from circa 1650 until the mid-1720s.[91] By 1650, France, England and the United Provinces began to develop their colonial empires. This involved considerable seaborne trade, and a general economic improvement: there was money to be made – or stolen – and much of it traveled by ship.

French buccaneers were established on northwestern part of Hispaniola after the devastations of Osorio as early as 1625,[92] but lived at first mostly as hunters rather than robbers; their transition to full-time piracy was gradual and motivated in part by Spanish efforts to wipe out both the buccaneers and the prey animals on which they depended. The buccaneers' migration from Hispaniola's mainland to the more defensible offshore island of Tortuga limited their resources and accelerated their piratical raids. According to Alexandre Exquemelin, a buccaneer and historian who remains a major source on this period, the Tortuga buccaneer Pierre Le Grand pioneered the settlers' attacks on galleons making the return voyage to Spain.

The growth of buccaneering on Tortuga was augmented by the English capture of Jamaica from Spain in 1655. The early English governors of Jamaica freely granted letters of marque to Tortuga buccaneers and to their own countrymen, while the growth of Port Royal provided these raiders with a far more profitable and enjoyable place to sell their booty. In the 1660s, the new French governor of Tortuga, Bertrand d'Ogeron, similarly provided privateering commissions both to his own colonists and to English cutthroats from Port Royal. These conditions brought Caribbean buccaneering to its zenith.

Henry Every is shown selling his loot in this engraving by Howard Pyle. Every's capture of the Grand Mughal ship Ganj-i-Sawai in 1695 stands as one of the most profitable pirate raids ever perpetrated.

A new phase of piracy began in the 1690s as English pirates began to look beyond the Caribbean for treasure. The fall of Britain's Stuart kings had restored the traditional enmity between Britain and France, thus ending the profitable collaboration between English Jamaica and French Tortuga. The devastation of Port Royal by an earthquake in 1692 further reduced the Caribbean's attractions by destroying the pirates' chief market for fenced plunder.[93] Caribbean colonial governors began to discard the traditional policy of "no peace beyond the Line," under which it was understood that war would continue (and thus letters of marque would be granted) in the Caribbean regardless of peace treaties signed in Europe; henceforth, commissions would be granted only in wartime, and their limitations would be strictly enforced. Furthermore, much of the Spanish Main had simply been exhausted; Maracaibo alone had been sacked three times between 1667 and 1678,[94] while Río de la Hacha had been raided five times and Tolú eight.[95]

Bartholomew Roberts was the pirate with most captures during the Golden Age of Piracy. He is now known for hanging the governor of Martinique from the yardarm of his ship.

At the same time, England's less favored colonies, including Bermuda, New York, and Rhode Island, had become cash-starved by the Navigation Acts, which restricted trade with foreign ships. Merchants and governors eager for coin were willing to overlook and even underwrite pirate voyages; one colonial official defended a pirate because he thought it "very harsh to hang people that brings in gold to these provinces."[96] Although some of these pirates operating out of New England and the Middle Colonies targeted Spain's remoter Pacific coast colonies well into the 1690s and beyond, the Indian Ocean was a richer and more tempting target. India's economic output was large during this time, especially in high-value luxury goods like silk and calico which made ideal pirate booty;[97] at the same time, no powerful navies plied the Indian Ocean, leaving both local shipping and the various East India companies' vessels vulnerable to attack. This set the stage for the famous pirates, Thomas Tew, Henry Every, Robert Culliford and (although his guilt remains controversial) William Kidd.

In 1713 and 1714, a series of peace treaties ended the War of the Spanish Succession. As a result, thousands of seamen, including European privateers who had operated in the West Indies, were relieved of military duty, at a time when cross-Atlantic colonial shipping trade was beginning to boom. In addition, European sailors who had been pushed by unemployment to work onboard merchantmen (including slave ships) were often enthusiastic to abandon that profession and turn to pirating, giving pirate captains a steady pool of recruits from various coasts across the Atlantic.[98]

In 1715, pirates launched a major raid on Spanish divers trying to recover gold from a sunken treasure galleon near Florida. The nucleus of the pirate force was a group of English ex-privateers, all of whom would soon be enshrined in infamy: Henry Jennings, Charles Vane, Samuel Bellamy, and Edward England. The attack was successful, but contrary to their expectations, the governor of Jamaica refused to allow Jennings and their cohorts to spend their loot on his island. With Kingston and the declining Port Royal closed to them, Jennings and his comrades founded a new pirate base at Nassau, on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas, which had been abandoned during the war. Until the arrival of governor Woodes Rogers three years later, Nassau would be home for these pirates and their many recruits.

Shipping traffic between Africa, the Caribbean, and Europe began to soar in the 18th century, a model that was known as triangular trade, and was a rich target for piracy. Trade ships sailed from Europe to the African coast, trading manufactured goods and weapons in exchange for slaves. The traders would then sail to the Caribbean to sell the slaves, and return to Europe with goods such as sugar, tobacco and cocoa. Another triangular trade saw ships carry raw materials, preserved cod, and rum to Europe, where a portion of the cargo would be sold for manufactured goods, which (along with the remainder of the original load) were transported to the Caribbean, where they were exchanged for sugar and molasses, which (with some manufactured articles) were borne to New England. Ships in the triangular trade made money at each stop.[99]

Born to a noble family in Puerto Rico, Roberto Cofresí was the last notably successful pirate in the Caribbean.

As part of the peace settlement of the War of the Spanish succession, Britain obtained the asiento, a Spanish government contract, to supply slaves to Spain's new world colonies, providing British traders and smugglers more access to the traditionally closed Spanish markets in America. This arrangement also contributed heavily to the spread of piracy across the western Atlantic at this time. Shipping to the colonies boomed simultaneously with the flood of skilled mariners after the war. Merchant shippers used the surplus of sailors' labor to drive wages down, cutting corners to maximize their profits, and creating unsavory conditions aboard their vessels. Merchant sailors suffered from mortality rates as high or higher than the slaves being transported (Rediker, 2004). Living conditions were so poor that many sailors began to prefer a freer existence as a pirate. The increased volume of shipping traffic also could sustain a large body of brigands preying upon it. Among the most infamous Caribbean pirates of the time were Edward Teach or Blackbeard, John Rackham, and Bartholomew Roberts. Most of these pirates were eventually hunted down by the Royal Navy and killed or captured; several battles were fought between the brigands and the colonial powers on both land and sea.

Piracy in the Caribbean declined for the next several decades after 1730, but by the 1810s many pirates roamed the waters though they were not as bold or successful as their predecessors. The most successful pirates of the era were Jean Lafitte and Roberto Cofresi. Lafitte is considered by many to be the last buccaneer due to his army of pirates and fleet of pirate ships which held bases in and around the Gulf of Mexico. Lafitte and his men participated in the War of 1812 battle of New Orleans. Cofresi's base was in Mona Island, Puerto Rico, from where he disrupted the commerce throughout the region. He became the last major target of the international anti-piracy operations.[100]

Hanging of Captain Kidd; illustration from The Pirates Own Book (1837)

The elimination of piracy from European waters expanded to the Caribbean in the 18th century, West Africa and North America by the 1710s and by the 1720s even the Indian Ocean was a difficult location for pirates to operate.

England began to strongly turn against piracy at the turn of the 18th century, as it was increasingly damaging to the country's economic and commercial prospects in the region. The Piracy Act 1698 for the "more effectual suppression of Piracy"[101] made it easier to capture, try and convict pirates by lawfully enabling acts of piracy to be "examined, inquired of, tried, heard and determined, and adjudged in any place at sea, or upon the land, in any of his Majesty's islands, plantations, colonies, dominions, forts, or factories." This effectively enabled admirals to hold a court session to hear the trials of pirates in any place they deemed necessary, rather than requiring that the trial be held in England. Commissioners of these vice-admiralty courts were also vested with "full power and authority" to issue warrants, summon the necessary witnesses, and "to do all thing necessary for the hearing and final determination of any case of piracy, robbery, or felony." These new and faster trials provided no legal representation for the pirates; and ultimately led in this era to the execution of 600 pirates, which represented approximately 10 percent of the pirates active at the time in the Caribbean region.[102] Being an accessory to piracy was also criminalised under the statute.

Capture of the Pirate Blackbeard, 1718 depicting the battle between Blackbeard and Robert Maynard in Ocracoke Bay; romanticized depiction by Jean Leon Gerome Ferris from 1920

Piracy saw a brief resurgence between the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713 and around 1720, as many unemployed seafarers took to piracy as a way to make ends meet when a surplus of sailors after the war led to a decline in wages and working conditions. At the same time, one of the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht that ended the war gave to Great Britain's Royal African Company and other British slavers a thirty-year asiento, or contract, to furnish African slaves to the Spanish colonies, providing British merchants and smugglers potential inroads into the traditionally closed Spanish markets in America and leading to an economic revival for the whole region. This revived Caribbean trade provided rich new pickings for a wave of piracy. Also contributing to the increase of Caribbean piracy at this time was Spain's breakup of the English logwood settlement at Campeche and the attractions of a freshly sunken silver fleet off the southern Bahamas in 1715. Fears over the rising levels of crime and piracy, political discontent, concern over crowd behaviour at public punishments, and an increased determination by Parliament to suppress piracy, resulted in the Piracy Act 1717 and Piracy Act 1721. These established a seven-year penal transportation to North America as a possible punishment for those convicted of lesser felonies, or as a possible sentence that capital punishment might be commuted to by royal pardon. In 1717, a pardon was offered to pirates who surrendered to British authorities.

After 1720, piracy in the classic sense became extremely rare as increasingly effective anti-piracy measures were taken by the Royal Navy, making it impossible for any pirate to pursue an effective career for long. By 1718, the British Royal Navy had approximately 124 vessels and 214 by 1815; a big increase from the two vessels England had possessed in 1670.[102] British Royal Navy warships tirelessly hunted down pirate vessels, and almost always won these engagements.

Blackbeard's severed head hanging from Maynard's bowsprit; illustration from The Pirates Own Book (1837)

Many pirates did not surrender and were killed at the point of capture; notorious pirate Edward Teach, or "Blackbeard", was hunted down by Lieutenant Robert Maynard at Ocracoke Inlet off the coast of North Carolina on November 22, 1718, and killed. His flagship was a captured French slave ship known originally as La Concorde, he renamed the frigate Queen Anne's Revenge. Captain Chaloner Ogle of HMS Swallow cornered Bartholomew Roberts in 1722 at Cape Lopez, and a fatal broadside from the Swallow killed the pirate captain instantly. Roberts' death shocked the pirate world, as well as the Royal Navy. The local merchants and civilians had thought him invincible, and some considered him a hero.[103] Roberts' death was seen by many historians as the end of the Golden Age of Piracy. Also crucial to the end of this era of piracy was the loss of the pirates' last Caribbean safe haven at Nassau.

In the early 19th century, piracy along the East and Gulf Coasts of North America as well as in the Caribbean increased again. Jean Lafitte was just one of hundreds of pirates operating in American and Caribbean waters between the years of 1820 and 1835. The United States Navy repeatedly engaged pirates in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and in the Mediterranean. Cofresí's El Mosquito was disabled in a collaboration between Spain and the United States. After fleeing for hours, he was ambushed and captured inland. The United States landed shore parties on several islands in the Caribbean in pursuit of pirates; Cuba was a major haven. By the 1830s piracy had died out again, and the navies of the region focused on the slave trade.

About the time of the Mexican–American War in 1846, the United States Navy had grown strong and numerous enough to eliminate the pirate threat in the West Indies. By the 1830s, ships had begun to convert to steam propulsion, so the Age of Sail and the classical idea of pirates in the Caribbean ended. Privateering, similar to piracy, continued as an asset in war for a few more decades and proved to be of some importance during the naval campaigns of the American Civil War.

Privateering would remain a tool of European states until the mid-19th century's Declaration of Paris. But letters of marque were given out much more sparingly by governments and were terminated as soon as conflicts ended. The idea of "no peace beyond the Line" was a relic that had no meaning by the more settled late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Canary Islands

[edit]
Mural representing the attack of Charles Windon to San Sebastián de La Gomera (1743)

Due to the strategic situation of this Spanish archipelago as a crossroads of maritime routes and commercial bridge between Europe, Africa and America,[104] this was one of the places on the planet with the greatest pirate presence.

In the Canary Islands, the following stand out: the attacks and continuous looting of Berber, English, French and Dutch corsairs sometimes successful and often a failure;[104] and on the other hand, the presence of pirates and corsairs from this archipelago, who made their incursions into the Caribbean. Pirates and corsairs such as François Le Clerc, Jacques de Sores, Francis Drake defeat in Gran Canaria,[105] Pieter van der Does, Murat Reis and Horacio Nelson attacked the islands and was defeated in the Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1797).[106] Among those born in the archipelago stands out above all Amaro Pargo, whom the monarch Felipe V of Spain frequently benefited in his commercial incursions and corsairs.[107][108]

North America

[edit]
Dan Seavey was a pirate on the Great Lakes in the early 20th century.

Piracy on the east coast of North America first became common in the early seventeenth century, as English privateers discharged after the end of the Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604) turned to piracy.[109][110] The most famous and successful of these early pirates was Peter Easton.

River piracy in late 18th-mid-19th century America was primarily concentrated along the Ohio River and Mississippi River valleys. In 1803, at Tower Rock, the U.S. Army dragoons, possibly, from the frontier army post up river at Fort Kaskaskia, on the Illinois side opposite St. Louis, raided and drove out the river pirates.

Stack Island was also associated with river pirates and counterfeiters in the late 1790s. In 1809, the last major river pirate activity took place, on the Upper Mississippi River, and river piracy in this area came to an abrupt end, when a group of flatboatmen raided the island, wiping out the river pirates. From 1790 to 1834, Cave-In-Rock was the principal outlaw lair and headquarters of river pirate activity in the Ohio River region, from which Samuel Mason led a gang of river pirates on the Ohio River.

River piracy continued on the lower Mississippi River, from the early 1800s to the mid-1830s, declining as a result of direct military action and local law enforcement and regulator-vigilante groups that uprooted and swept out pockets of outlaw resistance.

"Roaring" Dan Seavey was a pirate active in the early 1900s in the Great Lakes region who joined the United States Marshals Service in later life, working to curb poaching, smuggling, and piracy on Lake Michigan.[111]

Culture and social structure

[edit]

Rewards

[edit]

Pirates had a system of hierarchy on board their ships determining how captured money was distributed. However, pirates were more egalitarian than any other area of employment at the time. In fact, pirate quartermasters were a counterbalance to the captain and had the power to veto his orders. The majority of plunder was in the form of cargo and ship's equipment, with medicines the most highly prized. A vessel's doctor's chest would be worth anywhere from £300 to £400, or around $470,000 in today's values. Jewels were common plunder but not popular, as they were hard to sell, and pirates, unlike the public of today, had little concept of their value. There is one case recorded where a pirate was given a large diamond worth a great deal more than the value of the handful of small diamonds given to his crewmates as a share. He felt cheated and had it broken up to match what they received.[112]

Henry Morgan who sacked and burned the city of Panama in 1671 – the second most important city in the Spanish New World at the time; engraving from 1681 Spanish edition of Alexandre Exquemelin's The Buccaneers of America

Spanish pieces of eight minted in Mexico or Seville were the standard trade currency in the American colonies. However, every colony still used the monetary units of pounds, shillings, and pence for bookkeeping while Spanish, German, French, and Portuguese money were all standard mediums of exchange as British law prohibited the export of British silver coinage. Until the exchange rates were standardised in the late 18th century each colony legislated its own different exchange rates. In England, 1 piece of eight was worth 4s 3d while it was worth 8s in New York, 7s 6d in Pennsylvania and 6s 8d in Virginia. One 18th-century English shilling was worth around $58 in modern currency, so a piece of eight could be worth anywhere from $246 to $465. As such, the value of pirate plunder could vary considerably, depending on who recorded it and where.[113][114]

Ordinary seamen received a part of the plunder at the captain's discretion but usually a single share. On average, a pirate could expect the equivalent of a year's wages as his share from each ship captured while the crew of the most successful pirates would often each receive a share valued at around £1,000 ($1.17 million) at least once in their career.[112] One of the larger amounts taken from a single ship was that by captain Thomas Tew from an Indian merchantman in 1692. Each ordinary seaman on his ship received a share worth £3,000 ($3.5 million), with officers receiving proportionally larger amounts as per the agreed shares, with Tew himself receiving 2½ shares. It is known there were actions with multiple ships captured where a single share was worth almost double this.[112][115]

By contrast, an ordinary seamen in the Royal Navy received 19s per month to be paid in a lump sum at the end of a tour of duty, which was around half the rate paid in the Merchant Navy. However, corrupt officers would often "tax" their crews' wage to supplement their own, and the Royal Navy of the day was infamous for its reluctance to pay. From this wage, 6d per month was deducted for the maintenance of Greenwich Hospital, with similar amounts deducted for the Chatham Chest, the chaplain and surgeon. Six months' pay was withheld to discourage desertion. That this was insufficient incentive is revealed in a report on proposed changes to the RN Admiral Nelson wrote in 1803; he noted that since 1793 more than 42,000 sailors had deserted. Roughly half of all RN crews were pressganged and these not only received lower wages than volunteers but were shackled while the vessel was docked and were never permitted to go ashore until released from service.[116]

Although the Royal Navy suffered from many morale issues, it answered the question of prize money via the Cruizers and Convoys Act 1708 which handed over the share previously gained by the Crown to the captors of the ship. Technically it was still possible for the Crown to get the money or a portion of it but this rarely happened. The process of condemnation of a captured vessel and its cargo and men was given to the High Court of the Admiralty and this was the process which remained in force with minor changes throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

Ship prize shares
Rank Pre 1808 Post 1808
Captain 3/8 2/8
Admiral of fleet 1/8 1/8
Sailing Master
& Lieutenants
& Captain of Marines
1/8 1/8
Warrant Officers 1/8 1/8
Wardroom Warrant officers
& Petty Officers
1/8 1/8
Gunners, Sailors 1/8 2/8
Bartholomew Roberts' crew carousing at the Calabar River; illustration from The Pirates Own Book (1837). Roberts is estimated to have captured over 470 vessels.

Even the flag officer's share was not quite straightforward; he would only get the full one-eighth if he had no junior flag officer beneath him. If this was the case then he would get a third share. If he had more than one then he would take one-half while the rest was shared out equally.

There was a great deal of money to be made in this way. The record breaker was the capture of the Spanish frigate Hermione, which was carrying treasure in 1762. The value of this was so great that each individual seaman netted £485 ($1.4 million in 2008 dollars).[117] The two captains responsible, Evans and Pownall, received £65,000 each ($188.4 million). In January 1807 the frigate Caroline took the Spanish San Rafael, which brought in £52,000 for her captain, Peter Rainier (who had been only a midshipman some thirteen months before). All through the wars there are examples of this kind of luck falling on captains. Another famous 'capture' was that of the Spanish frigates Thetis and Santa Brigada, which were loaded with gold specie. They were taken by four British frigates who shared the money, each captain receiving £40,730. Each lieutenant got £5,091, the Warrant Officer group, £2,468, the midshipmen £791 and the individual seamen £182.

It should also be noted that it was usually only the frigates which took prizes; the ships of the line were far too ponderous to be able to chase and capture the smaller ships which generally carried treasure. Nelson always bemoaned that he had done badly out of prize money and even as a flag officer received little. This was not that he had a bad command of captains but rather that British mastery of the seas was so complete that few enemy ships dared to sail.[118]

Comparison chart using the share distribution known for three pirates against the shares for a Privateer and wages as paid by the Royal Navy.
Rank Bartholomew Roberts George Lowther William Phillips Privateer
(Sir William Monson)
Royal Navy
(per month)
Captain 2 shares 2 shares 1.5 shares 10 shares £8, 8s
Master 1.5 shares 1.5 shares 1.25 shares 7 or 8 shares £4
Boatswain 1.5 shares 1.25 shares 1.25 shares 5 shares £2
Gunner 1.5 shares 1.25 shares 1.25 shares 5 shares £2
Quartermaster 2 shares 4 shares £1, 6s
Carpenter 1.25 shares 5 shares £2
Mate 1.25 shares 5 shares £2, 2s
Doctor 1.25 shares 5 shares £5 +2d per man aboard
"Other Officers" 1.25 shares various rates various rates
Able Seamen (2 yrs experience)
Ordinary Seamen (some exp)
Landsmen (pressganged)

1 share

1 share

1 share
22s
19s
11s

Loot

[edit]
Pirate treasure looted by Samuel Bellamy and recovered from the wreck of the Whydah; exhibit at the Houston Museum of Natural Science, 2010

Even though pirates raided many ships, few, if any, buried their treasure. Often, the "treasure" that was stolen was food, water, alcohol, weapons, or clothing. Other things they stole were household items like bits of soap and gear like rope and anchors, or sometimes they would keep the ship they captured (either to sell off or keep because it was better than their ship). Such items were likely to be needed immediately, rather than saved for future trade. For this reason, there was no need for the pirates to bury these goods. Pirates tended to kill few people aboard the ships they captured; usually they would kill no one if the ship surrendered, because if it became known that pirates took no prisoners, their victims would fight to the last breath and make victory both very difficult and costly in lives. In contrast, ships would quickly surrender if they knew they would be spared. In one well-documented case 300 heavily armed soldiers on a ship attacked by Thomas Tew surrendered after a brief battle with none of Tew's 40-man crew being injured.[119]

Punishment

[edit]
A contemporary flyer depicting the public execution of 16th-century pirate Klein Henszlein and his crew in 1573

During the 17th and 18th centuries, once pirates were caught, justice was meted out in a summary fashion, and many ended their lives by "dancing the hempen jig", a euphemism for hanging. Public execution was a form of entertainment at the time, and people came out to watch them as they would to a sporting event today. Newspapers reported details such as condemned men's last words, the prayers said by the priests, and descriptions of their final moments in the gallows. In England most of these executions took place at Execution Dock on the River Thames in London.

In the cases of more famous prisoners, usually captains, their punishments extended beyond death. Their bodies were enclosed in iron cages (gibbet) (for which they were measured before their execution) and left to swing in the air until the flesh rotted off them- a process that could take as long as two years. The bodies of captains such as William "Captain" Kidd, Charles Vane, William Fly, and John Rackham, were all treated this manner.[120]

Role of women

[edit]
1724 engraving of Bonny from A General History of the Pyrates

While piracy was predominantly a male occupation throughout history, a minority of pirates were female.[121] Pirates did not allow women onto their ships very often. Additionally, women were often regarded as bad luck among pirates. It was feared that the male members of the crew would argue and fight over the women. On many ships, women (as well as young boys) were prohibited by the ship's contract, which all crew members were required to sign.[122] : 303 

Only four female pirates are known to have been active during the Golden Age of Piracy. They were Anne Bonny and Mary Read, women who served under John Rackham in 1720, Mary Critchett an escaped prisoner in 1729, and Martha Farley the wife of a minor pirate in 1727.

Democracy among Caribbean pirates

[edit]

Unlike traditional Western societies of the time, many Caribbean pirate crews of European descent operated as limited democracies. Pirate communities were some of the first to instate a system of checks and balances similar to the one used by the present-day democracies. The first record of such a government aboard a pirate sloop dates to the 17th century.[123]

Pirate Code

[edit]

As recorded by Captain Charles Johnson regarding the articles of Bartholomew Roberts.

  1. Every man shall have an equal vote in affairs of moment. He shall have an equal title to the fresh provisions or strong liquors at any time seized, and shall use them at pleasure unless a scarcity may make it necessary for the common good that a retrenchment may be voted.
  2. Every man shall be called fairly in turn by the list on board of prizes, because over and above their proper share, they are allowed a shift of clothes. But if they defraud the company to the value of even one dollar in plate, jewels or money, they shall be marooned. If any man rob another he shall have his nose and ears slit, and be put ashore where he shall be sure to encounter hardships.
  3. None shall game for money either with dice or cards.
  4. The lights and candles should be put out at eight at night, and if any of the crew desire to drink after that hour they shall sit upon the open deck without lights.
  5. Each man shall keep his piece, cutlass and pistols at all times clean and ready for action.
  6. No boy or woman to be allowed amongst them. If any man shall be found seducing any of the latter sex and carrying her to sea in disguise he shall suffer death.
  7. He that shall desert the ship or his quarters in time of battle shall be punished by death or marooning.
  8. None shall strike another on board the ship, but every man's quarrel shall be ended on shore by sword or pistol in this manner. At the word of command from the quartermaster, each man being previously placed back to back, shall turn and fire immediately. If any man do not, the quartermaster shall knock the piece out of his hand. If both miss their aim they shall take to their cutlasses, and he that draw the first blood shall be declared the victor.
  9. No man shall talk of breaking up their way of living till each has a share of 1,000. Every man who shall become a cripple or lose a limb in the service shall have 800 pieces of eight from the common stock and for lesser hurts proportionately.
  10. The captain and the quartermaster shall each receive two shares of a prize, the master gunner and boatswain, one and one half shares, all other officers one and one quarter, and private gentlemen of fortune one share each.
  11. The musicians shall have rest on the Sabbath Day only by right. On all other days by favor only.[124]

Known pirate shipwrecks

[edit]

To date, the following identifiable pirate shipwrecks have been discovered:

  • Whydah Gally (discovered in 1984), a former slave ship seized on its maiden voyage from Africa by the pirate captain Samuel Bellamy. The wreck was found off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, buried under 10 ft (3 m) to 50 ft (15 m) feet of sand, in depths ranging from 16 ft (5 m) to 30 ft (9 m) feet deep, spread for four miles, parallel to the Cape's easternmost coast. With the discovery of the ship's bell in 1985 and a small brass placard in 2013, both inscribed with the ship's name and maiden voyage date, the Whydah is the only fully authenticated Golden Age pirate shipwreck ever discovered.[125] Since 2007, the Wydah collection has been touring as part of the exhibit "Real Pirates" sponsored by National Geographic.[126]
  • Queen Anne's Revenge (discovered in 1996), the flagship of the infamous pirate Blackbeard. He used the ship for less than a year, but it was an effective tool in his prize-taking. In June 1718, Blackbeard ran the ship aground at Topsail Inlet, now known as Beaufort Inlet, North Carolina. Intersal,[127] a private firm working under a permit with the state of North Carolina, discovered the remains of the vessel[128] in 28 feet (8.5m) of water about one mile (1.6 km) offshore of Fort Macon State Park, Atlantic Beach, North Carolina. Thirty-one cannons have been identified to date, and more than 250,000 artifacts have been recovered.[129] The cannons are of different origins (such as English, Swedish, and possibly French) and different sizes, as would be expected with a colonial pirate crew.[128][130]
  • Golden Fleece (discovered in 2009), the ship of the notorious English pirate Joseph Bannister, which was found by the American shipwreck hunters John Chatterton and John Mattera in the Dominican Republic, at Samaná Bay. The discovery is recounted in Robert Kurson's book Pirate Hunters (2015).[131][132][133][134]

Privateers

[edit]
Modern reconstruction of skull alleged to have belonged to 14th century pirate Klaus Störtebeker. He was the leader of the privateer guild Victual Brothers, who later turned to piracy and roamed European seas.

A privateer or corsair used similar methods to a pirate, but acted under orders of the state while in possession of a commission or letter of marque and reprisal from a government or monarch authorizing the capture of merchant ships belonging to an enemy nation. For example, the United States Constitution of 1787 specifically authorized Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal. The letter of marque and reprisal was recognized by international convention and meant that a privateer could not technically be charged with piracy while attacking the targets named in his commission. This nicety of law did not always save the individuals concerned, however, since whether one was considered a pirate or a legally operating privateer often depended on whose custody the individual found himself in—that of the country that had issued the commission, or that of the object of attack. Spanish authorities were known to execute foreign privateers with their letters of marque hung around their necks to emphasize Spain's rejection of such defenses. Furthermore, many privateers exceeded the bounds of their letters of marque by attacking nations with which their sovereign was at peace (Thomas Tew and William Kidd are notable alleged examples), and thus made themselves liable to conviction for piracy. However, a letter of marque did provide some cover for such pirates, as plunder seized from neutral or friendly shipping could be passed off later as taken from enemy merchants.

Kent battling Confiance, a privateer vessel commanded by French corsair Robert Surcouf in October 1800, as depicted in a painting by Garneray

The famous Barbary corsairs of the Mediterranean, authorized by the Ottoman Empire, were privateers, as were the Maltese corsairs, who were authorized by the Knights of St. John, and the Dunkirkers in the service of the Spanish Empire. In the years 1626–1634 alone, the Dunkirk privateers captured 1,499 ships, and sank another 336.[135] From 1609 to 1616, England lost 466 merchant ships to Barbary pirates, and 160 British ships were captured by Algerians between 1677 and 1680.[136] One famous privateer was Sir Francis Drake. His patron was Queen Elizabeth I, and their relationship ultimately proved to be quite profitable for England.[137]

Privateers constituted a large proportion of the total military force at sea during the 17th and 18th centuries. During the Nine Years War, the French adopted a policy of strongly encouraging privateers (French corsairs), including the famous Jean Bart, to attack English and Dutch shipping. England lost roughly 4,000 merchant ships during the war.[138] In the following War of Spanish Succession, privateer attacks continued, Britain losing 3,250 merchant ships.[139] During the War of Austrian Succession, Britain lost 3,238 merchant ships and France lost 3,434 merchant ships to the British.[138]

During King George's War, approximately 36,000 Americans served aboard privateers at one time or another.[138] During the American Revolution, about 55,000 American seamen served aboard the privateers.[140] The American privateers had almost 1,700 ships, and they captured 2,283 enemy ships.[citation needed] Between the end of the Revolutionary War and 1812, less than 30 years, Britain, France, Naples, the Barbary states, Spain, and the Netherlands seized approximately 2,500 American ships.[141] Payments in ransom and tribute to the Barbary states amounted to 20% of United States government annual revenues in 1800.[142] Throughout the American Civil War, Confederate privateers successfully harassed Union merchant ships.[143]

Privateering lost international sanction under the Declaration of Paris in 1856.

Commerce raiders

[edit]

A wartime activity similar to piracy involves disguised warships called commerce raiders[144] or merchant raiders, which attack enemy shipping commerce, approaching by stealth and then opening fire. Commerce raiders operated successfully during the American Revolution.[citation needed] During the American Civil War, the Confederacy sent out several commerce raiders, the most famous of which was the CSS Alabama.[citation needed] During World War I and World War II, Germany also made use of these tactics, both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Since commissioned naval vessels were openly used, these commerce raiders should not be considered even privateers, much less pirates—although the opposing combatants were vocal in denouncing them as such.

Contemporary piracy

[edit]

Seaborne piracy against transport vessels is a significant issue, with estimated worldwide losses of US$16 billion per year in 2004,[6] increased to US$25 billion over the next 20 years.[5] Waters between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, and also in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, which are used by over 50,000 commercial ships a year. In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime piracy has also led to pressure on offshore oil and gas production, providing security for offshore installations and supply vessels is often paid for by oil companies rather than the respective governments.[145] In the late 2000s,[146] the emergence of piracy off the coast of Somalia spurred a multi-national effort led by the United States to patrol the waters near the Horn of Africa. In 2011, Brazil also created an anti-piracy unit on the Amazon River.[147] Sir Peter Blake, a New Zealand world champion yachtsman, was killed by pirates on the Amazon river in 2001.[148]

In the European Union, vessels suffer river piracy, with attacks on the Serbian and Romanian stretches of the Danube river, an international waterway.[149][150][151]

Map showing the extent of Somali pirate attacks on shipping vessels between 2005 and 2010

Modern pirates favor small boats and taking advantage of the small number of crew members on modern cargo vessels. They also use large vessels to supply the smaller attack/boarding vessels. Modern pirates can be successful because a large amount of international commerce occurs via shipping. Major shipping routes take cargo ships through narrow bodies of water such as the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca making them vulnerable to be overtaken and boarded by small motorboats.[152][153] Other active areas include the South China Sea and the Niger Delta. As usage increases, many of these ships have to lower cruising speeds to allow for navigation and traffic control, making them prime targets for piracy.

Also, pirates often operate in regions of poor developing or struggling countries with small or nonexistent navies and large trade routes. Pirates sometimes evade capture by sailing into waters controlled by their pursuer's enemies. With the end of the Cold War, navies have decreased in size and patrol less frequently, while trade has increased, making organized piracy far easier. Modern pirates are sometimes linked with organized-crime syndicates, but often are small individual groups.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) maintains statistics regarding pirate attacks dating back to 1995. Their records indicate hostage-taking overwhelmingly dominates the types of violence against seafarers. For example, in 2006, there were 239 attacks, 77 crew members were kidnapped and 188 taken hostage but only 15 of the pirate attacks resulted in murder.[154] In 2007 the attacks rose by 10 percent to 263 attacks. There was a 35 percent increase on reported attacks involving guns. Crew members that were injured numbered 64 compared to just 17 in 2006.[155] That number does not include instances of hostage taking and kidnapping where the victims were not injured.

Aerial photograph of the Niger Delta, a center of piracy

The number of attacks from January to September 2009 had surpassed the previous year's total due to the increased pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia. Between January and September the number of attacks rose to 306 from 293. Pirates boarded the vessels in 114 cases and hijacked 34 of them. Gun use in pirate attacks increased to 176 cases from 76 in 2008.[156]

Rather than cargo, modern pirates have targeted the personal belongings of the crew and the contents of the ship's safe, which potentially contains large amounts of cash needed for payroll and port fees. In other cases, the pirates force the crew off the ship and then sail it to a port to be repainted and given a new identity through false papers purchased from corrupt or complicit officials.[157]

Modern piracy can take place in conditions of political unrest. For example, following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Thai piracy was aimed at the many Vietnamese who took to boats to escape. Further, following the disintegration of the government of Somalia, warlords in the region have attacked ships delivering UN food aid.[158]

A collage of Somali pirates armed with AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and semi-automatic pistols in 2008

The attack against the German-built cruise ship the Seabourn Spirit offshore of Somalia in November 2005 is an example of the sophisticated pirates mariners face. The pirates carried out their attack more than 100 miles (160 km) offshore with speedboats launched from a larger mother ship. The attackers were armed with automatic firearms and an RPG.[159]

Since 2008, Somali pirates centered in the Gulf of Aden made about $120 million annually, reportedly costing the shipping industry between $900 million and $3.3 billion per year.[160] By September 2012, the heyday of piracy in the Indian Ocean was reportedly over. Backers were now reportedly reluctant to finance pirate expeditions due to the low rate of success, and pirates were no longer able to reimburse their creditors.[161] According to the International Maritime Bureau, pirate attacks had by October 2012 dropped to a six-year low.[162] Only five ships were captured by the end of the year, representing a decrease from 25 in 2011 and 27 in 2010,[163] with only one ship attacked in the third quarter compared to 36 during the same period in 2011.[162] However, pirate incidents off on the West African seaboard increased to 34 from 30 the previous year, and attacks off the coast of Indonesia rose from 2011's total of 46 to 51.[162]

Many nations forbid ships to enter their territorial waters or ports if the crew of the ships are armed, in an effort to restrict possible piracy.[164] Shipping companies sometimes hire private armed security guards.

Modern definitions of piracy include the following acts:

Together with treason and counterfeiting;[165] piracy, including acts against the law of nations,[166] is one of three criminal offenses against which the United States Congress is delegated power to enact penal legislation by the Constitution of the United States.[165]

In modern times, ships and airplanes are hijacked for political reasons as well. The perpetrators of these acts could be described as pirates (for instance, the French term for plane hijacker is pirate de l'air, literally air pirate), but in English are usually termed hijackers. An example is the hijacking of the Italian civilian passenger ship Achille Lauro by the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1985, which is regarded as an act of piracy. A 2009 book entitled International Legal Dimension of Terrorism called the attackers "terrorists".[167]

Modern pirates also use a great deal of technology. It has been reported that crimes of piracy have involved the use of mobile phones, satellite phones, GPS, machetes, AK74 rifles, sonar systems, modern speedboats, shotguns, pistols, mounted machine guns, and even RPGs and grenade launchers.[citation needed]

In 2020, the amount of piracy increased by 24% after being at its lowest 21st century level in 2019. The Americas and Africa have been identified by the International Chamber of Commerce as the most vulnerable to piracy as a result of less-wealthy governments in the regions being unable to adequately combat piracy.[168]

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre keeps a live piracy map to help keep track of all recent piracy and armed robbery incidents.[169]

Anti-piracy measures

[edit]

Incidents of pipeline vandalism by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, 2002–2011

Under a principle of international law known as the "universality principle", a government may "exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory if that conduct is universally dangerous to states and their nationals."[170] The rationale behind the universality principle is that states will punish certain acts "wherever they may occur as a means of protecting the global community as a whole, even absent a link between the state and the parties or the acts in question." Under this principle, the concept of "universal jurisdiction" applies to the crime of piracy.[171] For example, the United States has a statute (section 1651 of title 18 of the United States Code) imposing a sentence of life in prison for piracy "as defined by the law of nations" committed anywhere on the high seas, regardless of the nationality of the pirates or the victims.[172]

The goal of maritime security operations is "actively to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations",[173] and pirates are often detained, interrogated, disarmed, and released. With millions of dollars at stake, pirates have little incentive to stop. In Finland, one case involved pirates who had been captured and whose boat was sunk. As the pirates attacked a vessel of Singapore, not Finland, and are not themselves EU or Finnish citizens, they were not prosecuted. A further complication in many cases, including this one, is that many countries do not allow extradition of people to jurisdictions where they may be sentenced to death or torture.[174]

The Dutch are using a 17th-century law against sea robbery to prosecute.[175] Warships that capture pirates have no jurisdiction to try them, and NATO does not have a detention policy in place. Prosecutors have a hard time assembling witnesses and finding translators, and countries are reluctant to imprison pirates because the countries would be saddled with the pirates upon their release.[176]

Suspected Somali pirates keep their hands in the air

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia formed in November 2006.[177]

Since the 2010s, the U.S. Navy and others have been developing artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems that generate piracy alerts based on surveillance data.[178][179]

Self-defense

[edit]

The fourth volume of the handbook: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area (known as BMP4)[180] is the current authoritative guide for merchant ships on self-defense against pirates. The guide is issued and updated by Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), a consortium of interested international shipping and trading organizations including the EU, NATO and the International Maritime Bureau.[181] It is distributed primarily by the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), the planning and coordination authority for EU naval forces (EUNAVFOR).[181]

The BMP4 encourages vessels to register their voyages through the region with MSCHOA, as this registration is a key component of the operation of the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC, the navy-patrolled route through the Gulf of Aden). The BMP4 contains a chapter entitled "Self-Protective Measures" which lays out a list of steps a merchant vessel can take to make itself less of a target to pirates, and make it better able to repel an attack if one occurs. This list includes rigging the deck of the ship with razor wire, rigging fire-hoses to spray sea-water over the side of the ship to hinder boardings, having a distinctive pirate alarm, hardening the bridge against gunfire and creating a "citadel" where the crew can retreat if pirates get on board.[181] Other unofficial self-defense measures that can be found on merchant vessels include the setting up of mannequins posing as armed guards or firing flares at the pirates.[182]

Though it varies by country, generally peacetime law in the 20th and 21st centuries has not allowed merchant vessels to carry weapons. As a response to the rise in modern piracy, however, the U.S. government changed its rules so that it is now possible for U.S.-flagged vessels to embark a team of armed private security guards. The US Coastguard leaves it to ship owners' discretion to determine if those guards will be armed.[183][184] The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) in 2011 changed its stance on private armed guards, accepting that operators must be able to defend their ships against pirate attacks.[185]

This has given birth to a new breed of private security companies that provide training for crew members and operate floating armouries for protection of crew and cargo. This has proved effective in countering pirate attacks.[186][187] The use of floating armouries in international waters allows ships to carry weapons in international waters, without being in possession of arms within coastal waters where they would be illegal. Seychelles has become a central location for international anti-piracy operations, hosting the Anti-Piracy Operation Center for the Indian Ocean. In 2008, VSOS became the first authorized armed maritime security company to operate in the Indian Ocean region.[188]

With safety trials complete in the late 2000s, laser dazzlers have been developed for defensive purposes on super-yachts.[189] They can be effective up to 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) with the effects going from mild disorientation to flash blindness at closer range.[190]

In February 2012, Italian Marines based on the tanker Enrica Lexie allegedly fired on an Indian fishing trawler off Kerala, killing two of her eleven crew. The Marines allegedly mistook the fishing vessel as a pirate vessel. The incident sparked a diplomatic row between India and Italy. Enrica Lexie was ordered into Kochi where her crew were questioned by officers of the Indian Police.[191] The fact is still sub juris and its legal eventual outcome could influence future deployment of VPDs, since states will be either encouraged or discouraged to provide them depending on whether functional immunity is ultimately granted or denied to the Italians.[192]

Another similar incident has been reported to have happened in the Red Sea between the coasts of Somalia and Yemen, involving the death of a Yemeni fisherman allegedly at the hands of a Russian Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) on board a Norwegian-flagged vessel.[193][194]

Despite VPD deployment being controversial because of these incidents, according to the Associated Press,[195] during a United Nations Security Council conference about piracy "U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice told the council that no ship carrying armed guards has been successfully attacked by pirates" and "French Ambassador Gerard Araud stressed that private guards do not have the deterrent effect that government-posted marine and sailors and naval patrols have in warding off attacks".

Self protection measures

[edit]
A private guard escort on a merchant ship providing security services against piracy in the Indian Ocean
An LRAD sound cannon mounted on RMS Queen Mary 2

The best protection against pirates is to avoid encountering them. This can be accomplished by using tools such as radar,[196] or by using specialised systems that use shorter wavelengths, as small boats are not always picked up by radar. An example of a specialised system is WatchStander.[197]

While the non-wartime 20th century tradition has been for merchant vessels not to be armed, the U.S. Government has recently changed the rules so that it is now "best practice" for vessels to embark a team of armed private security guards.[183][198] The guards are usually supplied from ships intended specifically for training and supplying such armed personnel.[199] The crew can be given weapons training,[200] and warning shots can be fired legally in international waters.

Other measures vessels can take to protect themselves against piracy are air-pressurised boat stopping systems which can fire a variety of vessel-disabling projectiles,[201] implementing a high freewall[202] and vessel boarding protection systems (e.g., hot water wall, electricity-charged water wall, automated fire monitor, slippery foam).[203] Ships can also attempt to protect themselves using their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).[204] Every ship over 300 tons carries a transponder supplying both information about the ship itself and its movements. Any unexpected change in this information can attract attention.

Previously this data could only be picked up if there was a nearby ship, rendering single ships vulnerable. Special satellites have been launched recently that are now able to detect and retransmit this data. Large ships cannot therefore be hijacked without being detected. This can act as a deterrent to attempts to either hijack the entire ship, or steal large portions of cargo with another ship, since an escort can be sent more quickly.

Patrol

[edit]

In an emergency warships can be called upon. In some areas such as near Somalia, patrolling naval vessels from different nations are available to intercept vessels attacking merchant vessels. For patrolling dangerous coastal waters, or keeping cost down, robotic or remote-controlled USVs are also sometimes used.[205] Shore- and vessel-launched UAVs are used by the U.S. Navy.[206][207] A British former British chief of defence staff (David Richards), questioned the value of expensive kit procured by successive governments, saying "We have £1bn destroyers trying to sort out pirates in a little dhow with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenade launchers] costing US$50, with an outboard motor [costing] $100".

[edit]

United Kingdom laws

[edit]
A merchant seaman aboard a fleet oil tanker practices target shooting with a Remington 870 12 gauge shotgun as part of training to repel pirates in the Strait of Malacca, 1984

Section 2 of the Piracy Act 1837 creates a statutory offence of aggravated piracy. See also the Piracy Act 1850.

In 2008 the British Foreign Office advised the Royal Navy not to detain pirates of certain nationalities as they might be able to claim asylum in Britain under British human rights legislation, if their national laws included execution, or mutilation as a judicial punishment for crimes committed as pirates.[208]

Definition of piracy jure gentium

[edit]

See section 26 of, and Schedule 5 to, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997. These provisions replace the Schedule to the Tokyo Convention Act 1967. In Cameron v HM Advocate, 1971 SLT 333, the High Court of Justiciary said that that Schedule supplemented the existing law and did not seek to restrict the scope of the offence of piracy jure gentium.

See also:

  • Re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] AC 586, PC
  • Attorney General of Hong Kong v Kwok-a-Sing (1873) LR 5 PC 179

Jurisdiction

[edit]

See section 46(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and section 6 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878. See also R v Kohn (1864) 4 F & F 68.

Piracy committed by or against aircraft

[edit]

See section 5 of the Aviation Security Act 1982.

Sentence

[edit]

The book Archbold says that in a case that does not fall within section 2 of the Piracy Act 1837, the penalty appears to be determined by the Offences at Sea Act 1799, which provides that offences committed at sea are liable to the same penalty as if they had been committed upon the shore.[209]

History

[edit]

William Hawkins said that under common law, piracy by a subject was esteemed to be petty treason. The Treason Act 1351 provided that this was not petty treason.[210]

In English admiralty law, piracy was classified as petty treason during the medieval period, and offenders were accordingly liable to be hanged, drawn and quartered on conviction. Piracy was redefined as a felony during the reign of Henry VIII. In either case, piracy cases were cognizable in the courts of the Lord High Admiral. English judges in admiralty courts and vice admiralty courts emphasized that "neither Faith nor Oath is to be kept" with pirates; i.e. contracts with pirates and oaths sworn to them were not legally binding. Pirates were legally subject to summary execution by their captors if captured in battle. In practice, instances of summary justice and annulment of oaths and contracts involving pirates do not appear to have been common.[citation needed]

United States laws

[edit]

In the United States, criminal prosecution of piracy is authorized in the U.S. Constitution, Art. I Sec. 8 cl. 10:

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

The founding fathers were at loggerheads over piracy.[211] and the Marshall Court (1801-1835) dealt with many cases of piracy.[212][213] In 1820 the penalty for piracy was death.[214] By 1909 the penalty was life imprisonment.[215] Title 18 U.S.C. § 1651 now states:

Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.

Citing the United States Supreme Court decision in the 1820 case of United States v. Smith (1820),[214] a U.S. District Court ruled in 2010 in the case of United States v. Said that the definition of piracy under section 1651 is confined to "robbery at sea". The piracy charges (but not other serious federal charges) against the defendants in the Said case were dismissed by the Court.[216]

The U.S. District Court for the E.D.Va. has since been overturned: "On May 23, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion vacating the Court's dismissal of the piracy count. United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir.2012). See also United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (upholding an instruction to the jury that the crime of piracy includes 'any of the three following actions: (A) any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation committed for private ends on the high seas or a place outside the jurisdiction of any state by the crew or the passengers of a private ship and directed against another ship or against persons or property on board such ship; or (B) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship; or (C) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in (A) or (B) above").'" The case was remanded to E.D. Va., see US v. Said, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515 – Dist. Court, ED Virginia (2014).

International law

[edit]

Effects on international boundaries

[edit]

During the 18th century, the British and the Dutch controlled opposite sides of the Straits of Malacca. The British and the Dutch drew a line separating the Straits into two halves. The agreement was that each party would be responsible for combating piracy in their respective half. Eventually this line became the border between Malaysia and Indonesia in the Straits.

Law of nations

[edit]
International Maritime Organization (IMO) conference on capacity-building to counter piracy in the Indian Ocean

Piracy is of note in international law as it is commonly held to represent the earliest invocation of the concept of universal jurisdiction. The crime of piracy is considered a breach of jus cogens, a conventional peremptory international norm that states must uphold. Those committing thefts on the high seas, inhibiting trade, and endangering maritime communication are considered by sovereign states to hold the status of hostis humani generis (an enemy of humankind).[217]

Because of universal jurisdiction, action can be taken against pirates without objection from the flag state of the pirate vessel. This represents an exception to the principle extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur ("One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory is disobeyed with impunity").[218]

A Convention on Piracy was adopted by the League of Nations in 1932. To this day, the Harvard Draft adds to the debate of what constitutes piracy.[219]

International conventions

[edit]

Articles 101 to 103 of UNCLOS

[edit]
British Royal Navy Commodore gives a presentation on piracy at the MAST 2008 conference

Articles 101 to 103 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) contain a definition of piracy iure gentium (i.e. according to international law).[220] They read:

Article 101

Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

  • (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed—
    • (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
    • (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
  • (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
  • (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Article 102

Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.

Article 103

Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.[221]

This definition was formerly contained in articles 15 to 17 of the Convention on the High Seas signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958.[222] It was drafted[223] by the International Law Commission.[220]

A limitation of article 101 above is that it confines piracy to the High Seas. As the majority of piratical acts occur within territorial waters, some pirates are able to go free as certain jurisdictions lack the resources to monitor their borders adequately.[citation needed]

IMB definition

[edit]

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as:

the act of boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act.[224]

Uniformity in maritime piracy law

[edit]

Given the diverging definitions of piracy in international and municipal legal systems, some authors argue that greater uniformity in the law is required in order to strengthen anti-piracy legal instruments.[225]

Cultural perceptions

[edit]
"Mic the Scallywag" of the Pirates of Emerson Haunted Adventure Fremont, California

Pirates are a frequent topic in fiction and, in their Caribbean incarnation, are associated with certain stereotypical manners of speaking and dress, some of them wholly fictional: "nearly all our notions of their behavior come from the golden age of fictional piracy, which reached its zenith in 1881 with the appearance of Robert Louis Stevenson's Treasure Island."[226] Hugely influential in shaping the popular conception of pirates, Captain Charles Johnson's A General History of the Pyrates, published in London in 1724, is the prime source for the biographies of many well known pirates of the Golden Age.[227] The book gives an almost mythical status to pirates, with naval historian David Cordingly writing: "it has been said, and there seems no reason to question this, that Captain Johnson created the modern conception of pirates."[227]

A person costumed in the character of captain Jack Sparrow, Johnny Depp's lead role in the Pirates of the Caribbean film series

In the 1830s, Letitia Elizabeth Landon received material relating to piracy for an annual for which she was responsible and she produced two Pirate Songs, the first in 1831, The Pirate's Song off Tiger Island. and the second, Bona. The Pirate's Song. in 1837. This last was reproduced many times as 'The Pirate's Song', often uncredited. Bona is now the city of Annaba in Algeria.

Some inventions of pirate culture such as "walking the plank"—in which a bound captive is forced to walk off a board extending over the sea—were popularized by J. M. Barrie's 1911 novel, Peter Pan, where the fictional pirate Captain Hook and his crew helped define the fictional pirate archetype.[228] English actor Robert Newton's portrayal of Long John Silver in Disney's 1950 film adaptation also helped define the modern rendition of a pirate, including the stereotypical West Country "pirate accent".[229][230] Other influences include Sinbad the Sailor, and the Pirates of the Caribbean films have helped rekindle modern interest in piracy and have performed well at the box office. The video game Assassin's Creed IV: Black Flag also revolves around pirates during the Golden Age of Piracy.

The classic 1879 Gilbert and Sullivan comic opera The Pirates of Penzance focuses on The Pirate King and his hapless band of pirates.[231]

Many sports teams use "pirate" or a related term such as "raider" or "buccaneer" as their nickname, based on the popular stereotypes of pirates. The earliest such example was probably the Pittsburgh Pirates of Major League Baseball that acquired their nickname in 1891 after allegedly "pirating" a player from another team.[232] Many amateur and school-based sports programs along with several professional sports franchises have also adopted pirate-related names, including the Las Vegas Raiders and Tampa Bay Buccaneers of the National Football League. In turn, the Buccaneer's name was inspired by the Gasparilla Pirate Festival, a large community parade and related events in Tampa, Florida centered around the legend of José Gaspar, a mythical pirate who supposedly operated in the area.

Economics of piracy

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Sources on the economics of piracy include Cyrus Karraker's 1953 study Piracy was a Business,[233] in which the author discusses pirates in terms of contemporary racketeering. Patrick Crowhurst researched French piracy and David Starkey focused on British 18th-century piracy. Note also the 1998 book The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates by Peter T. Leeson.[234]

Piracy and entrepreneurship

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Some 2014 research examines the links between piracy and entrepreneurship. In this context, researchers take a nonmoral approach to piracy as a source of inspiration for 2010s-era entrepreneurship education[235] and to research in entrepreneurship[236] and in business-model generation.[237]

In this respect, analysis of piracy operations may distinguish between planned (organised) and opportunistic piracy.[238]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Piracy constitutes illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or against another vessel or persons or property on board, occurring on the high seas or in places beyond any state's jurisdiction. This definition, codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the , underscores piracy as a of , enabling any state to seize pirate vessels and prosecute offenders regardless of nationality. Maritime piracy has persisted since antiquity, disrupting trade routes in regions such as the Mediterranean under ancient Greeks and Romans, the during the , and the during the so-called from approximately 1716 to 1722. Naval campaigns by European powers, including the suppression of Barbary pirates by the in the early and British efforts against Caribbean bases, significantly curtailed large-scale operations, though piracy recurred in areas like the and . Economically, historical piracy imposed costs through lost cargo, ransoms, and heightened premiums, while causally linked to weak , overabundant seafarers, and opportunities from global trade expansion. In contemporary times, piracy manifests primarily as armed robbery in or hijackings on the high seas, with hotspots in the , where boarding and theft predominate, and Southeast Asian straits. The International Maritime Bureau recorded 116 incidents in 2024, the lowest since 1994, reflecting successes from multinational patrols, best management practices like citadels on ships, and private security, yet underscoring ongoing vulnerabilities in under-policed waters. These acts endanger crews, inflate shipping costs estimated in billions annually, and exploit state failures, as seen in Somali piracy's decline post-2012 interventions but persistence in resource-scarce zones.

Definition and Etymology

Piracy, in its conceptual sense, refers to the unauthorized or destruction of vessels, , or persons at through acts of violence or , typically conducted by non-state actors operating independently of governmental for personal gain. This understanding traces to ancient maritime practices where seaborne raiders targeted trade routes, as evidenced in records from the onward, emphasizing predation outside lawful warfare or sanctioned . Conceptually distinct from state-sponsored naval actions, piracy embodies a disruption of international maritime order, often involving organized groups exploiting weak enforcement on open waters, with historical examples including Viking raids and Barbary corsairs that blurred lines with legitimate raiding but lacked formal commissions. Under , piracy is narrowly defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the (UNCLOS) as any of the following acts: (a) illegal acts of violence or detention, or acts of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or against another ship or , or persons or therein, on the high seas; (b) such acts against ships, , persons, or in places outside any state's ; or (c) voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship or with of its piratical status, or to such acts. This definition incorporates the "two-vessel" doctrine, requiring perpetrators to operate from a separate vessel, and excludes acts within or motivated by political ends, limiting its application to high-seas incidents under . UNCLOS Article 100 mandates cooperation among states to repress piracy, while Article 105 grants all states the right to seize pirate vessels and arrest individuals on the high seas, reflecting piracy's status as a customary international subject to prosecution by any nation irrespective of the offense's location or parties' nationalities. A key conceptual and legal distinction exists between piracy and privateering, the latter involving privately owned vessels authorized by letters of marque from a belligerent state to attack enemy shipping during declared wars, thereby rendering such actions lawful under international prize law rather than criminal depredation. Privateers, unlike pirates, operated under governmental commissions that legitimized their captures as contributions to state warfare, with proceeds shared per agreement; the practice largely ended with the 1856 Declaration of Paris abolishing privateering among signatories, though it underscored piracy's essence as stateless, profit-driven illegality. This differentiation highlights causal realism in maritime governance: piracy persists where state control lapses, enabling private violence, whereas privateering aligned with sovereign interests but risked abuse when commissions expired or wars concluded.

Historical Origins of the Term

The English term "piracy" derives from the piratia, which in turn stems from the peirateia ("act of piracy" or "sea-robbing"), rooted in peiratēs ("brigand" or "pirate"). This Greek noun originates from peira ("trial" or ""), reflecting the notion of an attempt or venture to seize goods or ships illegally for personal gain, as opposed to sanctioned warfare. The related peiraomai ("I attempt" or "I try") underscores a causal link to opportunistic raiding, distinguishing early pirates as independent actors exploiting maritime vulnerabilities without state authority. In , the term peiratēs first appears in historical texts around the 2nd century BCE, such as in Polybius's accounts of Hellenistic-era sea raiders who preyed on trade routes in the Aegean and . Earlier allusions to similar activities exist in works by and , but the specific nomenclature crystallized amid frequent coastal attacks during the collapse and subsequent periods of weak centralized control, where small crews in fast vessels targeted merchant shipping. The Romans adopted the word as pirata by the BCE, applying it to who disrupted Roman commerce until Pompey's decisive campaign in 67 BCE, which cleared the Mediterranean of an estimated 1,000 pirate vessels and freed 120,000 captives. This Latin form emphasized robbery at sea (latrocinium maritimum), a definition codified in and later influencing European legal traditions. The term entered as pirate around the 12th century, carried through medieval and crusading narratives, before appearing in circa 1300 as "pirate," denoting sea-robbers operating beyond commissions. "Piracy" as a noun followed in the early , initially in legal and navigational contexts to describe unsanctioned maritime depredation, distinct from privateering authorized by letters of marque. By the 16th century, English writers like used it to chronicle encounters with Barbary corsairs and freebooters, solidifying its association with organized, predatory seafaring outside lawful warfare. This evolution reflects a broadening from literal Greek "attempts" at plunder to a formalized concept of illicit naval , driven by empirical patterns of disruption in under-governed waters.

Historical Piracy

Ancient and Classical Periods

Piracy emerged in the Mediterranean during the , with evidence suggesting maritime raiding as early as the Minoan period (c. 2000–1500 BCE), when fragmented palace economies and trade routes incentivized opportunistic seizures of cargo and captives. Legend attributes the first organized anti-piracy efforts to King of , who assembled a fleet to suppress raiders disrupting Aegean commerce, reflecting piracy's role in undermining early centralized trade networks. By the Late (c. 1200 BCE), groups like the Lukka (possibly linked to later ) conducted pirate-like raids documented in Egyptian and Hittite records, contributing to the era's systemic disruptions alongside invasions by . In Archaic and (c. 800–323 BCE), piracy was a widespread and often socially tolerated occupation, particularly among islanders and coastal dwellers lacking fertile land, as noted by , who described it as a common profession among Hellenes and barbarians alike. Homeric epics portray pirates as bold entrepreneurs who raided for honor and wealth, with no stigma attached; for instance, boasts of his pirate exploits in the Odyssey. Tyrants like of (r. 540–522 BCE) exemplified state-sanctioned piracy, using a powerful to plunder Ionian and Aegean shipping, amassing treasures that funded monumental constructions before his downfall. Greek city-states occasionally fitted out private vessels for raids, blurring lines between piracy and legitimate warfare, though philosophers like later condemned it as contrary to civilized trade. During the Hellenistic period (323–31 BCE), Illyrian pirates from the Adriatic coast intensified threats to Roman and Greek trade, operating from rugged inlets with state backing under queens like Teuta (r. c. 231–228 BCE), who rejected Roman demands to curb attacks on Italian merchants. Their swift galleys preyed indiscriminately on vessels, prompting Roman expeditions in 229 BCE that subdued key strongholds and imposed tribute, though piracy persisted as a symptom of weak imperial control. By the late Roman Republic, Cilician pirates dominated the eastern Mediterranean from bases in Rough Cilicia's inhospitable terrain, capturing an estimated 4000 ships annually by 67 BCE and fueling the slave trade by targeting grain freighters bound for Rome. These raiders, often former fishermen or deserters, employed hit-and-run tactics with light vessels, ransoming captives—including a young Julius Caesar in 75 BCE for 50 talents—and disrupting supplies to the point of famine risks. Pompey's decisive campaign in 67 BCE, granted extraordinary powers over 500 ships and 120,000 men, cleared the seas in 40 days by dividing the Mediterranean into zones and offering amnesty to surrendering pirates, restoring trade but highlighting piracy's recurrence amid power vacuums.

Medieval and Early Modern Eras

Norse Vikings conducted extensive maritime raids across Europe from the late 8th century, beginning with the attack on Lindisfarne monastery in 793, targeting coastal settlements and ships for gold, silver, and slaves using longships for speed and surprise. These operations, often seasonal and opportunistic, extended to the British Isles, Francia, and Iberian Peninsula, with fleets sometimes numbering dozens of vessels, though initial raids involved single ships or small groups. Viking piracy declined by the 11th century due to Christianization of Scandinavia, consolidation of kingdoms, and fortified defenses, shifting Norse activities toward trade and settlement. In the during the late , the Vitalienbrüder, originally privateers commissioned in 1392 by to supply against Danish blockade, evolved into pirates preying on merchants after their patron's defeat. Led by figures like , they operated from bases in the and , disrupting trade routes and extracting ransoms until a Hanseatic-Danish-Teutonic alliance suppressed them around 1400, with Störtebeker executed in 1401. Such groups blurred lines between warfare and predation, often supported by local landowners or rulers who benefited from plunder. Transitioning into the , Mediterranean piracy intensified with Ottoman expansion after 1453, as Barbary corsairs from , , and Tripoli—initially active since the 8th-century Muslim conquests of Iberia—escalated raids on European shipping and coasts under formal Ottoman backing from the late . These operations captured thousands of vessels and over a million European captives for enslavement between 1530 and 1780, employing galleys and later advanced European-style ships acquired around 1600 to extend reach into the Atlantic. Christian counterparts, including the Knights of established after 1530, conducted retaliatory corsair actions against Muslim shipping, capturing prizes and slaves in a cycle of religiously motivated maritime . In northern European waters, early modern piracy persisted amid religious wars and weak naval enforcement, with French and English privateers turning rogue during truces, though state commissions increasingly regulated such activities to distinguish legal sea-raiding from outright before the mid-17th century upsurge. Overall, this era saw piracy as an extension of interstate conflict, with economic incentives driving opportunistic attacks on vulnerable merchant traffic lacking protection.

Golden Age and Decline (1650–1730)

The era from 1650 to 1730 marked a peak in Atlantic piracy, transitioning from organized buccaneering against Spanish colonial assets to widespread rogue operations by demobilized privateers. Buccaneers, often operating semi-legally under English or French commissions during conflicts like the Anglo-Spanish War, targeted Spanish shipping and ports in the . Henry Morgan exemplified this phase, leading raids from Jamaica-based fleets; by 1670, he commanded 36 ships and 1,800 men, culminating in the 1671 sack of , where his forces burned much of the city and seized vast spoils estimated at over £70,000 in value. These actions blurred lines between sanctioned privateering and piracy, as treaties like the 1670 Godolphin Treaty curtailed aggressive privateering against Spain, pushing some operators toward outright illegality. The conclusion of the in 1714 exacerbated piracy by discharging thousands of experienced sailors from naval and service, many of whom turned to sea-roving for livelihood amid scarce legitimate opportunities in colonial ports like Nassau in . This post-war surge, peaking between 1716 and 1722, saw pirate crews numbering in the hundreds commandeering fast sloops to prey on merchant vessels carrying sugar, slaves, and specie; estimates suggest pirates captured over 1,000 ships during this interval. Notable figures included Edward Teach, known as , whose brief but terrorizing career from 1716 to 1718 involved blockading Charleston in May 1718 with four vessels, extorting medicine and supplies while cultivating a fearsome image with lit fuses in his beard to intimidate prey without frequent combat. Pirate strongholds like Nassau served as recruitment and resupply hubs until British intervention intensified. In 1718, Governor Woodes Rogers arrived in the Bahamas with warships, offering royal pardons to repentant pirates while authorizing hunts for holdouts; Blackbeard was slain in a naval engagement off North Carolina on November 22, 1718. Colonial assemblies passed anti-piracy acts, and Royal Navy squadrons patrolled trade routes, leading to mass executions—over 400 pirates hanged by the mid-1720s. Incentives for informants and improved merchant convoying further eroded pirate viability, reducing incidents sharply after 1722; by 1730, organized piracy in the Atlantic had effectively collapsed under sustained imperial pressure.

Regional Variations in Historical Piracy

Mediterranean and European Seas

Piracy in the emerged prominently during the late with the , who operated from bases along the southern coast of Asia Minor starting around 140 BCE. These buccaneers disrupted Roman grain shipments from and raided coastal settlements across the , amassing fleets that numbered in the hundreds of vessels. By the 70s BCE, their activities had escalated to the point of interrupting tribute flows to and even capturing high-profile figures, such as a young in 75 BCE off the Aegean island of Pharmacusa. The granted extraordinary powers to the Great via the Lex Gabinia in 67 BCE, enabling him to assemble a fleet of 500 ships, 120,000 , and 5,000 cavalry to eradicate the threat. divided the Mediterranean into 13 zones, systematically clearing pirate strongholds in and the within three months, capturing or destroying over 1,300 pirate ships and strongholds while resettling captured pirates in inland communities to curb . This campaign temporarily restored maritime security but highlighted piracy's roots in political instability and weak state control over coastal regions. In medieval European waters, particularly the and Baltic, Norse conducted extensive raiding expeditions from the late 8th to 11th centuries, blending piracy with exploration and settlement. Beginning with the 793 CE sack of monastery in , Viking longships exploited superior speed and shallow-draft design to strike coastal monasteries, towns, and trade routes from to the Mediterranean, capturing slaves, silver, and goods valued in the millions of modern equivalents. These operations, often seasonal and led by chieftains, disrupted Carolingian and Anglo-Saxon economies, prompting defensive measures like burhs in and the formation of maritime leagues. The saw intensified piracy during the amid the Scandinavian civil wars, where the Vitalienbrüder—initially privateers hired by dukes to supply during the 1391-1395 —devolved into independent marauders after the conflict's resolution. Numbering up to 2,000 men under leaders like , they preyed on merchant vessels, virtually halting Baltic trade and prompting Danish King Eric of Pomerania to seize on in 1394 as a pirate haven, though many relocated to . The , formed in the 13th century to protect trade, countered such threats through naval expeditions, illustrating how commercial interests fostered collective anti-piracy efforts in northern European seas. From the 16th to early 19th centuries, Barbary corsairs based in Ottoman-aligned North African regencies—, , Tripoli, and —dominated Mediterranean piracy, launching state-sanctioned raids that captured an estimated 1 to 1.25 million European slaves between 1530 and 1780. Employing fast galleys and xebecs, these Muslim pirates targeted Christian shipping and coastal villages as far north as and , with a 1631 raid on , enslaving nearly 100 villagers. By 1650, alone held over 30,000 European captives in brutal labor or markets, fueling economic incentives for rulers who derived significant revenue from piracy. European powers gradually suppressed Barbary piracy through naval action; the , rejecting tribute demands, fought the (1801-1805) under President Jefferson, culminating in the capture of Tripoli's gunboats, followed by Commodore Stephen Decatur's 1815 squadron that forced to release captives and cease demands. Britain bombarded in 1816, destroying much of its fleet, while France's 1830 conquest of ended organized corsair activity. These interventions reflected growing naval supremacy and unwillingness to subsidize piracy, though sporadic incidents persisted until European colonial expansion.

Caribbean and Atlantic Oceans

Piracy in the and Atlantic Oceans intensified in the amid European colonial rivalries and the lucrative Spanish treasure fleets transporting silver and gold from the . The , encompassing the northern coast of from to and adjacent islands, became a primary target due to its role in funneling wealth to via annual systems vulnerable to . , originating as French and English hunters of feral cattle and hogs on using boucans for meat curing, transitioned to maritime raiding against Spanish holdings by the 1630s, establishing bases on Tortuga Island. From 1623 to 1638, these operations captured or destroyed over 500 Spanish and Portuguese vessels, marking the as a . During the buccaneering era of 1650 to 1680, multinational expeditions, often numbering hundreds of men aboard captured ships, assaulted fortified ports like Porto Bello in 1664 and in 1671 under leaders such as , who commanded up to 2,000 participants in overland assaults yielding vast spoils including 175 mules laden with silver. These raids exploited Spain's overstretched defenses and the tactical advantages of shallow-water sloops for evasion, contrasting with deeper-draft galleons. Anglo-French alliances formalized under commissions from England and France amplified attacks on Spanish shipping, with , , serving as a key provisioning hub until its partial destruction by earthquake in 1692. The post-War of the Spanish Succession phase from 1715 to 1726 represented the peak of independent piracy, as thousands of unemployed privateers repurposed vessels for indiscriminate plunder across the Atlantic approaches to the . Nassau in emerged as a pirate republic accommodating around 2,000 operatives and dozens of ships by 1716, facilitating blockades such as Edward Teach's () 1718 seizure of , where he detained over 20 vessels and demanded medical supplies. Operations extended into the broader Atlantic, targeting slave ships off and merchant routes to North American colonies, with figures like capturing 53 prizes in 1717 alone before his vessel wrecked off . Piracy's economic impact included insurance premiums on trade rising tenfold between 1713 and 1718, prompting colonial governors to offer pardons. Suppression efforts accelerated after 1718, with British royal governor arriving in Nassau to proclaim amnesty, leading to the surrender of over 400 pirates, though holdouts like rejected terms. Naval patrols, increased protections, and executions—such as Blackbeard's killing by in November 1718—dismantled major strongholds, reducing active pirate ships from peaks of 200 to near zero by 1726. In the Atlantic, residual threats diminished as European powers prioritized trade security, with the last notable pirate, Juan Ortiz, hanged in 1726, signaling the era's close. This decline stemmed from coordinated imperial responses rather than inherent pirate disorganization, as evidenced by the efficacy of legal amnesties and superior naval firepower against adapted but outnumbered privateer hulls.

Indian Ocean, East Indies, and Asia

European piracy emerged in the during the early with maritime activities, persisting intermittently through subsequent centuries as interlopers challenged monopolies on routes to . In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, islands off , particularly Île Sainte-Marie (Nosy Boraha), functioned as major pirate bases, attracting figures who preyed on ships carrying wealth from and the . From approximately 1690 to 1730, the sheltered bay of Ambodifotatra on Île Sainte-Marie hosted pirate settlements, enabling raids on Mughal convoys and European vessels transiting the region. British pirates, including —who captured the Mughal ship Ganj-i-Sawai laden with treasure in 1695—and , operated prominently here in the 1690s, exploiting the vast riches of . Local actors also contributed to piracy, such as , a Maratha admiral who controlled coastal forts along India's region from 1698 to 1729, extracting tribute from British, Dutch, and shipping through fortified naval bases. and Swahili corsairs from the and East African coast intermittently targeted dhow traffic and European intruders, though European naval patrols gradually diminished their scale by the mid-18th century. These operations relied on knowledge of winds for seasonal raiding, with pirates dispersing during adverse weather to island refuges. In the , encompassing the and surrounding seas, piracy flourished among indigenous seafaring groups amid fragmented polities and rivalries from the 16th to 19th centuries. Moro pirates, based in the and , conducted slave-raiding expeditions against Spanish colonial settlements and coastal communities, capturing an estimated 500 individuals annually from the Philippine Islands extending southward to Batavia (modern ). Operating from swift vinta boats armed with cannons, these Muslim warriors targeted Christian populations, contributing to prolonged instability and prompting Spanish counter-expeditions, such as the bombardment of Balanguingui in 1848. Bugis and Makassar seafarers from Sulawesi frequently blurred lines between trade and predation, using agile perahu vessels to ambush merchant ships in the Java and Celebes Seas during the 18th and 19th centuries. Iban (Sea Dayak) headhunters from Borneo participated in coastal raids organized by Malay sultans, employing longhouse-based networks for reconnaissance and assault from the mid-18th century onward. These activities intensified with European colonial incursions, as declining regional powers like Johor and Aceh sponsored privateers against Dutch and British interests, with raids spanning insular Southeast Asia between 1768 and 1798. Suppression efforts by colonial navies, including joint Anglo-Dutch operations, reduced but did not eradicate such piracy until the late 19th century. Piracy in broader Asia, particularly along the East China Sea coasts, peaked with the wokou (Japanese: wakō), multinational raiders comprising Japanese ronin, Chinese smugglers, and Korean elements who devastated Korean and Chinese settlements from the 13th to 16th centuries. Activity surged after the 1220s, with organized fleets numbering hundreds of ships launching annual incursions, sacking ports like Ningbo in 1555 and capturing thousands in slaves and goods. By the 16th century, Chinese-dominated wokou shifted focus to smuggling silk and porcelain evading Ming bans, using Tsushima and Goto Islands as staging points for hit-and-run tactics against poorly defended shorelines. Chinese piracy persisted into the 19th century, exemplified by fleets under leaders like , who commanded over 600 junks and 50,000 men by 1808, dominating the through tribute extortion from coastal villages and attacks on European traders. These groups exploited weak imperial naval capacity and opium trade disruptions, with operations declining after Qing suppression campaigns in the 1810s. Unlike European counterparts, Asian piracy often integrated with local economies, blending raiding with legitimate commerce and kinship-based crews, sustained by geographic fragmentation and state neglect of maritime frontiers.

Other Global Regions

In the , particularly along the western coasts of , piracy manifested as intermittent incursions by European and filibusters targeting Spanish colonial shipping and ports, exploiting the region's isolation from Atlantic defenses. These raids began prominently in the late and intensified in the late 17th, challenging Spain's claims but remaining episodic due to logistical challenges like crossing the Darién Isthmus or rounding . Unlike the sustained operations in the or , Pacific piracy often blended with state-sanctioned privateering during Anglo-Spanish conflicts, though independent actors operated without consistent commissions. A seminal raid occurred during , when his squadron entered the Pacific via the in September 1578, sacking the undefended port of , , on October 14, 1578, and seizing provisions and vessels. On March 1, 1579, Drake captured the Spanish treasure galleon Nuestra Señora de la Concepción (known as Cacafuego) off the Peruvian coast near Cañete, yielding cargo including 80 pounds of gold, 13 chests of silver coins, 26 tons of silver bars, and jewels valued at over £100,000—equivalent to half the English treasury at the time. This haul funded further raids on and other settlements before Drake departed northward, evading Spanish pursuit across the ocean's expanse. The most organized buccaneer expedition followed in 1680, when approximately 300 English, French, and Dutch adventurers, initially under John Coxon, trekked across the Isthmus of Darién (Panama) in April, commandeering Spanish ships including the frigate Trinidad to prosecute raids southward. Bartholomew Sharp assumed command after internal divisions, leading assaults on ports like Ilo, Arica (sacked in June 1680), and La Serena, capturing multiple vessels and loot estimated at thousands of pesos while inflicting casualties through ambushes and fireships. The group circumnavigated via Cape Horn in 1681, but Sharp's trial for piracy in England ended in pardon, highlighting the blurred lines with national interests. Such activities peaked from 1680 to 1694, prompting Spain to bolster coastal forts, implement Manila galleon escorts, and reduce inter-port trade volumes by up to 20% in affected areas, though no permanent pirate bases formed due to hostile terrain and Spanish countermeasures. Elsewhere in peripheral regions, such as West Africa's or remote Pacific islands, organized historical piracy remained negligible compared to major theaters. Along West African coasts, European interlopers during the 17th-18th centuries engaged primarily in sanctioned trade or rather than systematic ship-to-ship piracy, exerting minimal disruption on local maritime networks dominated by indigenous canoe-based commerce. In the central and South Pacific, isolated acts by deserters or later 19th-century figures like William "Bully" Hayes occurred, but pre-1800 records show no equivalent to the flotillas, with Spanish and indigenous navigation facing threats more from privateers during wartime than independent pirates.

Operational and Social Structures

Ship Organization, Tactics, and Codes

Pirate ships during the (roughly 1650–1730) featured a relatively flat compared to or naval vessels, with sizes typically ranging from 50 to 200 men depending on the vessel's and operational needs. The , elected by majority vote of the , commanded during combat and navigation but lacked absolute authority in non-emergency matters, a system designed to address problems in high-risk ventures where desertion was common. The , often holding equal or greater sway outside battle, oversaw provisions, loot allocation, and internal disputes, effectively balancing the captain's power to prevent tyranny and ensure retention. Supporting roles included the , who managed deck operations and rigging; the carpenter, tasked with hull repairs using tools like adzes and caulking irons; the gunner, responsible for arming and firing the ship's 10–30 cannons; and a , usually coerced from prizes, who performed amputations without amid high mortality from and wounds. This division of labor prioritized agility and repair capability, as pirates frequently careened vessels on beaches to clean hulls fouled by marine growth, extending operational range but exposing them to naval patrols. Crew governance emphasized consensus to incentivize participation, with major decisions like target selection or alliance formation requiring votes, though captains like retained veto power in crises. Evidence from trial records and captured documents indicates this "" was pragmatic rather than ideological, emerging from precedents to solve free-rider issues in plunder-dependent economies, where crews shared risks equally but faced execution if captured. Women were rare aboard, limited to roles like prostitutes in port or occasional fighters such as , but systemic exclusion stemmed from practical concerns over discipline and cohesion in all-male bands. In tactics, pirates exploited speed and deception over firepower, converting captured sloops or brigs—vessels drawing 8–12 feet with or square rigs for maneuverability—to outpace lumbering Indiamen carrying 500–1,000 tons. Attacks began with from spies in ports like Nassau, followed by shadowing prey under neutral flags to close within range (about 200 yards), then hoisting the black flag to signal and demoralize defenders. Cannons loaded with or bar shot targeted rigging to immobilize sails, minimizing hull damage to preserve prizes, after which boarding parties—armed with cutlasses, flintlock pistols, and grenades—overwhelmed crews via grapples and hooks, often achieving surrender through rather than casualties, as prolonged fights risked mutual destruction. In fleet actions, such as the 1718 raid on Charleston, coordinated squadrons used feigned retreats to lure escorts away, capturing multiple vessels with minimal losses. Success rates were high against unarmed traders but dropped against convoyed ships, prompting shifts to coastal ambushes or small-boat raids in later periods. Pirate codes, known as articles of agreement or chasse-partie, were contractual documents drafted at voyage outset, ratified by on a or , to stipulate loot shares, conduct, and penalties, drawing from 17th-century customs for equitable risk-sharing. Shares followed a fixed scale—typically two for the , , and ; 1.5 for gunner and ; one for ordinary —with "royals" (1/600th) for injured limbs, reflecting actuarial realism amid 80–90% mortality rates from and . Violations like theft incurred on islands with and water, gambling bans prevented disputes, and Sabbath rest for musicians curbed fatigue, as in ' 1720 code enforced across his 400-man fleet. John Phillips' 1724 articles similarly prohibited with death penalties and mandated lights-out by 8 p.m. for , though adherence varied, with breaches often leading to or execution by the 's majority vote. These codes, preserved in accounts like Captain Charles Johnson's 1724 A General History of the Pyrates, prioritized incentives over morality, fostering short-term cooperation but dissolving upon wealth accumulation or capture.

Rewards, Loot Distribution, and Punishments

Pirate crews formalized rewards and loot distribution through written articles of agreement, which functioned as contractual codes to incentivize participation and prevent disputes over spoils. These documents, signed by all members before voyages, typically allocated shares based on rank and , ensuring that ordinary crew received one share while officers obtained multiples to reflect responsibilities like or gunnery. The principle of "no prey, no pay" prevailed, meaning distributions occurred only after successful captures, with loot appraised, inventoried, and divided proportionally once sold or converted to currency in pirate havens. In the articles aboard ' ship Royal Fortune in 1720, the captain and each received two shares, the , gunner, carpenter, and master one and a half shares, and all other crew one share; the surgeon was granted 200 to replenish his medicine chest and 100 for instruments, separate from his shares. Similar structures appeared in other codes, such as those of the in the late , where the oversaw equitable division to maintain crew loyalty and operational efficiency. Loot included gold, silver, jewels, and goods like fabrics or spices, prioritized for quick liquidation to avoid naval pursuits, with captains sometimes retaining small personal prizes like fine clothing or weapons not entered into the common stock. Rewards extended to injury compensation, reflecting pragmatic incentives for hazardous work; Roberts' code stipulated 800 pieces of eight for loss of a right arm, 600 for the left, 500 for a right leg, 400 for the left, and 100 for an eye or joint damage, paid from the common fund to sustain fighters rather than burden the crew. Provisions like and were distributed equally regardless of rank, promoting cohesion, while captured women or boys were off-limits under penalty, though varied. Punishments enforced these systems through crew-elected enforcement, often by the , targeting , , or to preserve amid the high risks of or capture. Common penalties included flogging with a cat-o'-nine-tails for quarrels or neglect of weapons, with up to 39 lashes administered publicly; in Roberts' articles, onboard fighting resolved at the "washing board" with the loser facing overboard disposal or crew-decided penalty. Theft from the common loot triggered severe reprisals, such as —stranding the offender on an with minimal supplies like a and powder, as in cases documented among 18th-century crews—or execution by from the yardarm to deter that could fracture alliances. , dragging the offender under the hull through barnacle-encrusted waters, was reserved for grave offenses like repeated disobedience, risking drowning or lacerations, though rarer than floggings due to manpower loss. Clapping in irons—shackling to the ship—served for temporary confinement, while gambling prohibitions, common to avoid debts sparking , incurred fines deducted from shares. These measures, derived from naval traditions but adapted for , prioritized crew survival over mercy, as unchecked infractions threatened the venture's viability against superior state forces.

Daily Life, Health Risks, and Social Dynamics

Daily life aboard pirate ships during the (circa 1650–1730) revolved around the demands of , maintenance, and opportunistic raiding, with routines dictated by weather, provisions, and the pursuit of prizes. Crew members divided into watches for duties, including rigging sails, pumping bilge water, and standing lookout for merchant vessels; these shifts typically lasted four hours, allowing intermittent rest in hammocks slung between decks. Meals were communal and sparse, often consisting of biscuits, salted pork or beef soaked to remove excess , and dried peas or beans boiled into ; fresh provisions like livestock (chickens, pigs, goats) or tropical fruits (yams, plantains, pineapples) were consumed early in voyages but quickly depleted, leading to reliance on meat, caught at sea, or even soups from boiled bones when stores ran low. Health risks were pervasive due to poor , overcrowding, and exposure to violence, contributing to high mortality rates that exceeded those on naval vessels. , caused by deficiency, afflicted crews after weeks without fresh produce, manifesting in symptoms like bleeding gums, , slow-healing wounds, , and eventual from or hemorrhage; it accounted for more sailor fatalities than storms, combat, or shipwrecks combined during long voyages. Other ailments included from contaminated water, and other venereal diseases contracted in ports, intestinal parasites from spoiled food, and injuries from cannon fire, sword fights, or falls during boarding actions, often untreated beyond rudimentary by crew surgeons using tools like saws for amputations. Pirate lifespans were abbreviated, with many succumbing within two to five years of active service due to these factors, though some survived longer by capturing prizes with better provisions. Social dynamics within pirate crews emphasized pragmatic to maintain cohesion amid high-stakes operations, contrasting sharply with the rigid hierarchies of or naval ships. Captains were typically elected by vote and held authority primarily during battle or chases, with broader decisions—like targeting vessels, dividing spoils, or altering course—requiring crew consensus via democratic assemblies; this system, enshrined in pirate codes, aimed to prevent mutinies by ensuring equitable shares of loot (often one double share for the captain, equal portions for others after deductions for a common fund covering medical care and alcohol). Punishments were severe and codified to deter infractions, including flogging or for minor offenses like disputes, and death for from the crew or , enforced collectively to uphold trust in a lawless environment. Relations with captives varied by utility: skilled sailors were often coerced into joining (with incentives like higher pay), women and children ransomed or released, but resistance frequently met brutal ends such as execution or enslavement, reflecting the crews' prioritization of survival over mercy.

Distinctions from Sanctioned Maritime Warfare

Privateering and Letters of Marque

Privateering constituted a form of legalized wherein governments issued letters of marque to private ship owners, empowering them to attack and seize enemy merchant vessels during declared wars, with proceeds divided among owners, crews, and the state after judicial condemnation in prize courts. These commissions explicitly restricted operations to adversarial nationals, theoretically differentiating privateers from pirates, who operated without sanction and preyed indiscriminately on all shipping, rendering them outlaws under . Captured privateers displaying valid letters were typically treated as prisoners of war rather than executed as felons, though loss or expiration of the document often led to piratical reclassification by captors. The institution emerged from medieval letters of reprisal, evolving into systematic state policy amid 16th-century European rivalries. In Elizabethan England, Queen Elizabeth I authorized privateers, dubbed "Sea Dogs," to target Spanish shipping amid undeclared hostilities, bolstering royal finances strained by religious wars and exploration costs. Sir Francis Drake, granted a commission in 1572, exemplified this approach; his raids on Spanish ports and fleets, including the capture of over 100,000 pounds of treasure from Nombre de Dios in 1572–1573, enriched investors and the crown while weakening Iberian dominance. Drake's subsequent global voyage from 1577 to 1580, under similar implicit sanction, returned with spoils valued at half the queen's annual revenue. Privateering peaked during colonial conflicts, notably the , where resource-poor rebels relied heavily on it for . Colonial legislatures and the Continental Congress commissioned roughly 1,500 to 2,000 vessels between 1775 and 1783, crewed by up to 70,000 men, which captured or destroyed over 2,000 British ships—exceeding Continental Navy achievements and inflicting economic damage estimated at millions in lost cargo. Prizes required adjudication in admiralty courts to validate legality and distribute shares, typically 1/8 to the government, fostering a profit-driven auxiliary fleet that supplemented formal naval efforts. By the , rising professional navies and ironclad warfare diminished privateering's utility, culminating in its international via the Declaration of Paris on April 16, 1856. This accord, negotiated at the Congress of Paris concluding the , declared "Privateering is and remains abolished" among signatories including Britain, , and , aiming to protect neutral commerce and curb unregulated raiding. The , absent from the treaty, upheld the norm by abstaining from issuances post-1812, though the Confederacy briefly revived it in 1861 before Union forces neutralized most operations, treating uncertified raiders as pirates. Despite formal abolition, the practice underscored governments' historical expedient of outsourcing naval aggression to private enterprise, blurring boundaries with outright piracy when commissions lapsed or oversight faltered.

State Commerce Raiders vs. Independent Pirates

State commerce raiders, also known as guerre de course practitioners when conducted by naval forces, are state-directed operations targeting enemy merchant shipping to economically weaken adversaries during declared conflicts, distinct from the opportunistic, unsanctioned attacks of independent pirates. These raiders typically deploy fast, armed vessels under official naval command or direct oversight, focusing on disrupting supply lines rather than territorial conquest, with captured s often adjudicated by prize courts to benefit the sponsoring state. In contrast, independent pirates operate without governmental authorization, attacking vessels indiscriminately regardless of nationality or wartime status, driven primarily by personal enrichment and evading . This legal legitimacy afforded to raiders—rooted in the laws of —allows them to operate with relative impunity against designated foes, whereas pirates face universal condemnation as hostis humani generis, or enemies of all mankind, subject to seizure and prosecution by any nation. Historically, state commerce raiders exemplified strategic asymmetry, enabling weaker naval powers to inflict disproportionate damage on superior fleets by avoiding battle while preying on commerce. During the (1861–1865), the commissioned raiders like the , which from August 1862 to June 1864 captured or burned 65 Union merchant vessels across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, driving up insurance rates and diverting Northern shipping to safer but costlier routes; this effort, though capturing only about 5% of the U.S. merchant fleet, compelled the Union to reflag hundreds of ships under foreign flags. Similarly, in (1914–1918), Imperial Germany's surface raiders, such as , sank or captured 23 Allied ships totaling over 70,000 gross register tons before their neutralization, employing disguise, speed, and auxiliary support to evade patrols. Independent pirates, by comparison, lacked such coordinated state logistics or legal protections; for instance, Caribbean of the 17th century, operating without commissions after the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), shifted from sanctioned raids to outright piracy, facing relentless pursuit by naval coalitions like those formed by Britain and . Operationally, state raiders emphasized long-range endurance and intelligence integration, often using for refueling and diplomatic cover in neutral ports, as seen with Confederate raiders evading Union blockades via British shipyards. Pirates, however, relied on captured prizes for sustenance and frequently fragmented into short-lived crews due to internal disputes over loot, with average operational spans rarely exceeding two years in the (1716–1722). While both employed similar tactics—such as false flags and boarding actions—the raiders' adherence to conventions like the 1856 Declaration of Paris (banning privateering for signatories but permitting naval raiding) ensured captured crews were often or exchanged, reducing brutality compared to pirates' routine enslavement or for minimal resistance. This distinction blurred in cases like Barbary corsairs (16th–19th centuries), who received semi-official sanction from North African regencies to raid Christian shipping, blending state raiding with piratical excess until suppressed by European bombardments, such as Britain's 1816 action at . Ultimately, state raiders served national strategy, contributing to war outcomes like the Confederacy's partial mitigation of Union naval superiority, whereas independent piracy eroded global trade without advancing any sovereign interest.

Myths, Realities, and Cultural Depictions

Debunking Romanticized Legends

Romanticized depictions of pirates, particularly those from the (circa 1716–1722), portray them as swashbuckling rebels operating egalitarian ships with democratic governance and honorable conduct, often burying treasure for future adventures. In reality, these notions stem largely from 19th-century fiction, such as Robert Louis Stevenson's (1883), which amplified isolated anecdotes into enduring legends, while overlooking primary sources like trial records and naval logs that reveal piracy as a short-lived, profit-driven enterprise marked by and violence. The idea of pirate ships as proto-democracies, with crews electing captains and voting on major decisions, exaggerates the pragmatic "articles of agreement" used by some crews, such as ' code in 1720, which outlined loot shares and punishments to minimize internal strife and . These rules were not ideological commitments to equality but self-interested mechanisms to sustain operations; captains retained absolute authority during , and leadership changes often occurred through violent coups rather than orderly votes, as seen in the 1718 against where dissenters were marooned or killed. Moreover, participation was involuntary for many—pressed sailors or former slaves faced penalties like flogging—undermining claims of voluntary, inclusive governance. Historical analyses of pirate trials, including those at the between 1716 and 1726, show hierarchical power dynamics where a small cadre of officers dominated, contradicting modern libertarian interpretations. Buried treasure, a staple of pirate lore, has scant historical basis and primarily originates from the case of , who in 1699 hid some loot on Gardiner's Island before his capture, leading to its recovery by authorities. Most pirates lacked the stability or foresight for such hoarding; they rapidly dissipated spoils on rum, gambling, and prostitutes in ports like Nassau, with crew shares divided immediately per articles to prevent theft or rebellion. No systematic archaeological evidence supports widespread burial practices during the , and contemporary accounts, such as those from captured captains, describe pirates seizing goods for immediate consumption rather than long-term storage. The myth's persistence reflects narrative convenience in rather than empirical patterns in piracy . Pirate careers were neither glamorous nor prolonged, averaging one to three years due to high risks of , naval interception, or execution; for instance, Blackbeard's active piracy spanned only from November 1716 to November 1718 before his death in battle off Ocracoke Inlet. Of approximately 5,000 pirates active in the early , over 400 were hanged following British suppression campaigns, with survivors often retiring penniless or re-entering legitimate trade under duress. This brevity stemmed from causal realities: piracy required constant mobility to evade patrols, leading to , , and interpersonal violence that shortened lifespans far below those of merchant sailors. Notions of pirates as chivalrous rogues ignore documented brutality, including routine to extract information or valuables, as in the 1720 sacking of the Whydah where survivors reported floggings and drownings. Trial testimonies from victims, such as those against Charles Vane's crew in 1721, detail rapes, mutilations, and mass executions to terrorize targets into surrender, tactics designed for rather than mercy. While some inflated pirate savagery to justify naval expenditures, primary evidence from Admiralty records confirms these acts as standard, driven by the high-stakes incentives of plunder in an era when capture meant death. This contrasts sharply with romanticized views, revealing piracy as a parasitic disruption rather than a noble alternative to naval hierarchies.

Actual Brutality and Short-Term Operations

Pirate assaults on merchant vessels routinely involved lethal force against crews to suppress resistance, with survivors often tortured to disclose locations of concealed valuables. Methods included , such as Edward Low's 1722 amputation of a captain's lips and ears followed by coerced consumption of the severed parts. applied burning matches to captives' flesh, while Henry Every's men in 1695 tortured and executed passengers aboard the . These practices, corroborated by trial records and eyewitness depositions, served to terrorize targets and extract confessions under duress. Humiliatory rituals amplified the brutality, as in "blooding and sweating," where victims ran between lines of pirates wielding sail needles to jab exposed skin until exhaustion or collapse. Such violence extended to internal discipline, with —dragging offenders beneath the hull amid and drowning risks—or marooning on desolate islands with scant provisions, as inflicted on mutineers like those under . Contemporary accounts from pirate trials reveal these acts were not aberrations but strategic tools to maintain crew cohesion and deter opposition, reflecting the era's maritime savagery where quarter was rarely granted under black or red flags signaling no mercy. Pirate operations emphasized brevity and opportunism, employing with swift sloops to seize prizes before naval reinforcements arrived, followed by rapid loot division and crew scattering to safe havens like Nassau. This fragmented approach, avoiding sustained blockades or convoys, aligned with the Golden Age's transient nature, where the entire peak piracy wave spanned roughly 1716 to 1722. Careers averaged two years, curtailed by rampant mortality from —which outkilled combat, storms, and wrecks combined— outbreaks, venereal infections from port visits, and combat injuries lacking advanced treatment. Execution upon capture, as at London's , further truncated tenures, with naval pursuits and disease decimating crews mid-voyage and compelling frequent that diluted cohesion. Thus, piracy's viability hinged on short, high-yield raids rather than enduring enterprises, yielding quick fortunes for survivors but collapse under cumulative risks.

Evolution of Pirate Imagery in Media and Folklore

Early depictions of pirates in and emphasized their brutality and criminality, drawing from contemporary accounts of maritime violence during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Alexander Exquemelin's The Buccaneers of America (1684), based on his experiences among privateers turned pirates, portrayed figures like as daring but savage raiders who tortured captives and sacked ports, influencing initial folk tales of sea-rovers as existential threats to trade. Daniel Defoe's Captain Singleton (1720) further reinforced this by depicting piracy as a perilous, amoral enterprise fraught with and , sourced from trial records and sailor narratives rather than embellishment. Captain Charles Johnson's A General History of the Pyrates (), a pseudonymous compilation of biographies, marked a pivotal shift by blending factual trial testimonies with dramatic flourishes, establishing enduring archetypes such as the flamboyant (Edward Teach) with his lit fuses and fearsome persona. This work, which sold widely and was reprinted multiple times, propagated myths like pirate codes and democratic crews into , despite its that exaggerated exploits for market appeal—Johnson himself likely fabricated elements to heighten intrigue, as evidenced by inconsistencies with verified logs. Its influence persisted in oral traditions and chapbooks, where pirates transitioned from mere outlaws to larger-than-life anti-authoritarian symbols in British and American sailor yarns. The saw full romanticization in literature, diverging from empirical realities of short, violent careers toward adventurous rebels against empire. Robert Louis Stevenson's (1883), inspired by earlier maps and Johnson's histories, codified the modern pirate image: the one-legged as a cunning, silver-tongued rogue; quests; and the flag symbolizing defiance. These elements, absent or rare in historical records—eyepatches and parrots, for instance, stemmed from Stevenson's invention rather than evidence—embedded in via serialized tales and theater adaptations, portraying pirates as freedom-seekers in an of imperial expansion. J.M. Barrie's Peter Pan (1904) amplified this by featuring the theatrical , further softening edges into whimsical villains suitable for children's lore, influenced by Victorian nostalgia for unregulated seas. 20th-century media entrenched these tropes through film and animation, prioritizing spectacle over veracity. Swashbuckler movies like Captain Blood (1935), starring Errol Flynn, depicted pirates as chivalrous swordsmen rebelling against tyranny, drawing from romantic literary precedents while ignoring documented atrocities like slave-taking and crew executions. Disney's Pirates of the Caribbean franchise (2003 onward) popularized a comedic, supernatural variant—exemplified by Jack Sparrow's eccentric antics—reviving global interest but further detaching imagery from causal realities of economic desperation and naval suppression, as pirates' operations were typically opportunistic raids lasting months, not epic quests. This evolution reflects a cultural preference for escapist heroism, sustained by media profitability, despite primary sources like Admiralty records confirming piracy's grim efficiency in terror rather than treasure-hunting romance.

Contemporary Maritime Piracy

Key Hotspots and Incident Trends (Post-2000)

In the early 2000s, emerged as the dominant region for maritime piracy, with , the , and recording an alarming surge in attacks, including 72 seafarers killed in 2000 alone, reflecting heightened violence and opportunism amid dense shipping traffic and lax enforcement. This pattern shifted dramatically from the mid-2000s onward, as piracy off Somalia's coast in the and western escalated into the era's most prominent hotspot, fueled by Somalia's governmental collapse, which enabled organized groups to hijack vessels for with minimal resistance. Incidents peaked during 2008–2012, accounting for a significant portion of global attacks, before plummeting due to coordinated naval interventions by multinational task forces, reducing reported Somali-linked events to near zero by the mid-2010s. By the 2010s, the off supplanted as the world's most perilous area, with incidents rising from fewer than 40 in 2010 to 84 in 2020, characterized by aggressive boardings, kidnappings (comprising up to 95% of global maritime kidnappings in peak years), and oil cargo theft targeting tankers and bulk carriers. This uptick stemmed from entrenched criminal networks in and neighboring states exploiting weak coastal patrols and high-value offshore assets, though numbers began declining post-2020—dropping to 34 incidents in 2021 and further in subsequent years—owing to enhanced regional cooperation via frameworks like the Yaoundé Architecture and improved naval capacities. Southeast Asian waters, particularly the , Indonesian ports, and the , have remained persistent secondary hotspots, with opportunistic thefts and occasional hijackings comprising a steady share of incidents—Indonesia alone reported 10 attacks in 2024—driven by geographic chokepoints and proximity to routes. Globally, reported incidents trended downward overall post-2012, reaching historic lows of 115 in , before a modest rebound to 120 in 2023 and 116 in 2024, with a sharper uptick to 116 events in January–September 2025 (versus 79 in the prior year's equivalent period), signaling potential resurgence risks amid fluctuating enforcement. These shifts underscore how piracy hotspots migrate toward regions of state fragility and high maritime commerce, with declines correlating directly to targeted patrols rather than inherent reductions in criminal incentives.

Tactics, Motivations, and Organizational Shifts

Contemporary maritime pirates employ high-speed skiffs launched from larger "mother ships" to approach and board vessels, often using grapnel hooks, ladders, or poles to scale hulls while armed with automatic rifles like AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades for suppression. In the , tactics have shifted toward opportunistic attacks on anchored or slow-moving ships in ports and offshore fields, prioritizing crew kidnappings for over full vessel hijackings, with incidents peaking at 123 reported cases in 2020 before declining to 34 in 2021 due to enhanced patrols. Somali pirates, active primarily off the , historically favored extended hijackings holding ships and crews for multimillion-dollar s, utilizing captured dhows as forward bases to extend operational range beyond coastal waters. Southeast Asian groups, by contrast, focus on "hit-and-run" theft of cargo such as or from berthed vessels, employing stealthier approaches with knives or to avoid prolonged engagements. Pirates' primary motivation is financial gain through ransoms, cargo resale, or extortion, driven by acute poverty, unemployment, and the absence of viable economic alternatives in regions with weak , such as 's collapsed state post-1991 or Nigeria's oil-rich but unstable . In , initial acts in the framed as retaliation against illegal foreign evolved into profit-oriented enterprises by the mid-2000s, with ransoms averaging $2-3 million per hijacking at the 2011 peak, distributing proceeds among participants and financiers. actors, often linked to onshore criminal networks including ex-militants from the 2000s amnesty era, target high-value kidnappings yielding $100,000-$1 million per crew member, reflecting opportunistic exploitation of maritime traffic rather than ideological or subsistence motives. Organizational structures have transitioned from loosely affiliated, clan-based opportunists to hierarchical syndicates resembling businesses, with specialized roles for scouts, attackers, guards, negotiators, and investors who fund operations via shares of ransoms. In , post-2000 groups like the network exhibited durability and coordination, using satellite phones for real-time command and adapting to naval interdictions by fragmenting into smaller cells or pivoting to fisheries . piracy saw similar professionalization since the mid-2000s, evolving from oil bunkering tied to insurgencies to transnational gangs employing GPS and encrypted communications, though persistent underreporting—estimated at 50% of incidents—complicates tracking shifts toward more covert, latency-prone operations. Overall, international counter-piracy efforts since 2010, including patrols and best management practices, prompted and geographic migration, reducing Somali hijackings from 237 in 2011 to near zero by 2013 while elevating West African threats.

Recent Developments (2024–2025 Surge)

In the first nine months of 2025, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded 116 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships worldwide, marking a 47% increase from the 79 incidents reported during the same period in 2024 and the highest nine-month total since 2017. This uptick followed a relatively stable 2024, with 116 total incidents globally, a slight 3% decline from 120 in 2023, indicating that the surge materialized primarily in 2025 amid regional escalations in opportunistic thefts and violent seizures. The IMB attributed the rise to heightened vigilance gaps and economic pressures in key hotspots, though it noted cautious optimism due to the predominance of low-level, non-violent boardings that resulted in no crew injuries in over 80% of cases. The emerged as the dominant hotspot, accounting for 57 incidents in the first half of 2025 alone—over 63% of global reports—primarily involving theft from anchored or berthed vessels by small groups using hooks or ladders to access stores and equipment. These attacks, often lasting under 30 minutes, exploited lax , with perpetrators boarding undetected in 70% of cases, though no hijackings or hostages were reported there. In contrast, the saw a 25% rise in incidents, including four vessel hijackings and kidnappings of 40 seafarers in the first half of 2025, driven by organized groups targeting product tankers for siphoning and crew , reminiscent of pre-2020 peaks but with renewed sophistication in evasion tactics. Off and in the , piracy indicators resurged with small-boat approaches and attempted boardings, including one hijacking in early 2025, prompting renewed naval advisories despite a decade of relative dormancy following international patrols. Southeast Asian waters beyond the Strait, including and the , reported sporadic increases in armed robberies, while the overall trend included 79 boardings, four hijackings, and elevated hostage-taking compared to 2024's 14 kidnappings. In response, the IMB updated its Best Management Practices (BMP) guidelines in June 2025, emphasizing enhanced deck patrols and reporting to counter the 50% first-half surge from 60 incidents in 2024's equivalent period. Despite the numbers, IMB data underscores that underreporting remains a factor, potentially understating the true scale by 20-30% based on historical audits.

Economic Dimensions

Disruptions to Trade and Direct Costs

Maritime piracy imposes direct economic costs primarily through s demanded for hijacked vessels and crews, the value of stolen cargo, and repairs to damaged ships. Between April 2005 and December 2012, Somali pirates extracted s totaling between $339 million and $413 million from owners of 179 hijacked ships. In alone, 31 s were paid amounting to $159.62 million, with an average of $4.97 million per incident. The highest recorded single was $13.5 million, paid in April for the release of the very large crude carrier MV Irene after 58 days of captivity. More recently, in April 2024, Somali pirates released the Bangladesh-flagged MV Abdullah following a $5 million payment after hijacking it en route from to . Cargo theft and vessel damage add further direct losses, though these are often secondary to s in high-profile cases like Somali operations, where crews are typically unharmed to facilitate payments. These direct costs ripple into broader trade disruptions, including elevated premiums, deployment of armed guards, and enhanced security equipment, which collectively inflate shipping expenses. Somali piracy in its 2008–2012 peak prompted an estimated $635 million in additional insurance payouts annually, alongside $1.064–1.16 billion for private security measures. Shipowners also incur costs from rerouting vessels to avoid hotspots, such as detours around the , adding 486–680 million in fuel and time losses per year during that period. Faster transit speeds to evade attacks further increase fuel consumption by up to 4% on affected routes. Overall, the estimates annual global economic losses from piracy at $25 billion, encompassing theft, ransoms, and heightened operational risks. In hotspots like the and , these factors have measurably hindered trade flows; for instance, persistent Somali threats caused a 2.3% decline in exports along European routes due to monthly averages of 26 attacks. The World Bank calculated that Somali piracy alone cost the global economy up to $18 billion annually in the early through combined direct seizures and indirect trade frictions, with every $120 million in pirate gains imposing $0.9–3.3 billion in burdens on shipping firms and consumers via price pass-throughs. A 2024 resurgence, including the MV Abdullah hijacking amid Houthi-related instability, has renewed these pressures, though total incidents fell to 79 globally—the lowest since 1994—highlighting that even sporadic events sustain elevated vigilance costs. Such disruptions exacerbate vulnerabilities, particularly for bulk commodities transiting chokepoints carrying 90% of world trade by volume.

Incentives, Risks, and Comparative Efficiency

In regions plagued by and weak , such as , maritime piracy offers substantial economic incentives driven by the disparity between local wages and potential ransoms. Somali pirates, often former fishermen, can earn remuneration equivalent to 67 to 150 times the annual GDP of approximately $500, with net industry profits estimated at $120 million annually during peak periods. These payouts, derived primarily from hijacking vessels in the and , exceed lifetime earnings for many participants accustomed to less than $2 per day, transforming piracy into a rational, albeit illicit, entrepreneurial activity amid absent legitimate opportunities. However, these incentives are counterbalanced by significant risks, including operational hazards, violent confrontations, and legal repercussions. Pirates face high probabilities of death or injury during failed hijackings, exacerbated by armed private on ships and international naval patrols that have intercepted operations, leading to shootouts or sinkings. Captured pirates, such as those from Somali groups, are frequently prosecuted under national laws in third countries like or , resulting in lengthy prison sentences or, in rare cases invoking historical precedents, , though international frameworks emphasize trials under . Declining success rates—evidenced by a drop from over 200 attacks in to fewer than 10 annually post-2015—further diminish returns due to enhanced defenses, rendering sustained participation probabilistically unviable without state collapse. Comparatively, piracy exhibits variable efficiency relative to other organized crimes, boasting low entry barriers and high short-term returns for small-scale operators but lacking and incurring escalating enforcement costs. Economic models indicate piracy's peaks in ungoverned spaces like Somalia's coast, where minimal capital (e.g., skiffs and AK-47s) yields multimillion-dollar ransoms per vessel, outperforming local alternatives like but paling against global trafficking's $300-500 billion annual scale. Unlike human smuggling or narcotics, which leverage entrenched networks for repeat profits, piracy's episodic nature and vulnerability to patrols yield net efficiencies eroded by $7-12 billion in global shipping rerouting and security expenditures, often exceeding pirate gains by factors of 10 or more. This asymmetry underscores piracy's role as a high-risk, location-bound niche rather than a sustainably efficient criminal enterprise.

Long-Term Impacts on Global Commerce

Maritime piracy imposes persistent economic burdens on global commerce through elevated premiums, which remain higher even after attack surges subside, as underwriters factor in residual risks. During the Somali piracy peak from 2008 to 2012, war risk premiums for vessels transiting the surged by up to 10-fold, adding approximately $0.5 to $3 per metric ton to shipping costs, with these increases persisting into the despite declining incidents. Globally, piracy-related and expenditures contributed to an estimated annual cost of $15–25 billion to the shipping industry between 2008 and 2023, amplifying commodity prices and consumer costs by factors of 7 to 27 times the direct ransoms paid. Piracy induces long-term shifts in shipping routes and modal choices, reducing efficiency and trade volumes in affected corridors. Exporters exposed to pirate attacks off rerouted vessels around the , incurring fuel and time costs equivalent to 10–20% longer voyages, which deterred small firms from ocean freight and prompted switches to costlier air transport for high-value goods. While aggregate trade along high-risk routes like the recovered within six months of incidents, firm-level exporting patterns altered durably, with affected enterprises consolidating shipments into larger, less frequent volumes to minimize exposure, thereby constraining for smaller developing-economy producers. The World Bank estimated Somali piracy's trade disruptions alone caused losses exceeding $18 billion, with ripple effects hindering export growth in and the rim. These disruptions exacerbate vulnerabilities in global supply chains, particularly for energy and bulk commodities, fostering inflationary pressures and investment deterrence. Heightened piracy risks off and in the from 2008 onward correlated with a 0.1–28% decline in quantities along impacted lanes, as shippers invested armed guards and fortified vessels, raising operational costs by $1–2 billion annually industry-wide. In developing economies reliant on maritime exports, such as those in and , persistent threats undermine in port infrastructure and deter participation in global value chains, perpetuating cycles of reduced competitiveness. Even post-2012 suppression efforts, the multiplier effect—where each $120 million in pirate ransoms generated $0.9–3.3 billion in broader economic losses—underscores piracy's role in sustaining higher baseline costs for international .

Anti-Piracy Measures

Historical Suppression Campaigns

![Decatur boarding a Tripolitan gunboat during the First Barbary War][float-right] British authorities launched coordinated suppression efforts against the surge in Atlantic piracy following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, which demobilized privateers and fueled pirate recruitment. By 1716, the British government deployed naval squadrons to the Caribbean and appointed aggressive governors, such as Alexander Spotswood in Virginia, who authorized expeditions against pirate strongholds. In 1718, Woodes Rogers arrived in the Bahamas with royal commissions, offering pardons to surrendering pirates while establishing fortified bases at Nassau to disrupt their operations; over 400 pirates accepted amnesty, but resisters faced capture or execution. That November, Lieutenant Robert Maynard killed the notorious pirate Edward Teach (Blackbeard) off North Carolina, dismembering his crew and ending a key threat. Mass trials followed, with 56 pirates, including Stede Bonnet, convicted and hanged in Charleston in 1718. These multifaceted tactics—combining naval patrols, legal prosecutions, and public displays of executed pirates in gibbets—reduced piracy incidents dramatically by 1725, effectively ending the "Golden Age." In the Mediterranean, European and American powers targeted state-sponsored Barbary corsairs, whose raids enslaved over a million Europeans between the 16th and 19th centuries. The United States initiated the First Barbary War in 1801 after Tripoli declared war over unpaid tributes; President Thomas Jefferson dispatched a squadron under Commodore Dale, escalating to Commodore Edward Preble's blockade of Tripoli in 1803. Stephen Decatur's daring raid on February 16, 1804, aboard USS Intrepid burned the captured frigate USS Philadelphia, preventing its use by pirates and boosting morale. Pressure from U.S. naval bombardments and Marine landings forced a peace treaty on June 10, 1805, ending tribute demands from Tripoli. The Second Barbary War in 1815 saw Decatur lead a squadron that bombarded Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, securing treaties abolishing Christian slavery and tributes by June 30. Britain followed with a August 1816 bombardment of Algiers using 27 warships, freeing 3,000 captives and compelling Dey Omar to renounce slavery. France's 1830 conquest of Algiers dismantled the final Barbary pirate bases, though sporadic piracy persisted until European colonization. Other campaigns included U.S. operations in the from 1814 to 1825 against privateers-turned-pirates preying on commerce post-Napoleonic Wars, involving flotillas under commanders like Commodore Daniel Patterson that captured vessels and enforced blockades. In the , Portuguese forces from the early targeted pirate havens to secure trade monopolies, establishing forts at Hormuz (1507) and (1511) while enforcing the licensing system to curb unlicensed raiding. These efforts, though often intertwined with imperial expansion, demonstrated recurring patterns of naval power, legal incentives, and decisive strikes to restore maritime order against pirate disruptions.

Modern Self-Defense and Technological Aids

Merchant vessels transiting high-risk areas increasingly employ privately contracted personnel (PCASP) as a primary measure against piracy. These teams, typically comprising 4 to 6 former equipped with semi-automatic rifles and pistols, deter boardings through visible presence and, if necessary, calibrated use of force. In the from 2012 to 2013, at least 50% of utilized guards, correlating with a sharp decline in successful Somali hijackings. No vessels with embarked PCASP were successfully hijacked in the theater, underscoring their effectiveness in preventing takeovers despite ongoing attacks. However, deployment remains subject to permissions and port entry restrictions, with some nations prohibiting firearms to avoid liability risks from misuse. Non-lethal deterrents complement options, focusing on repelling approaches without escalation. Long-range acoustic devices (LRAD) emit high-decibel beams up to 3,000 meters, inducing disorientation and pain to discourage pirate skiffs. cannons, delivering pressurized streams at 100-150 psi, target ladders or boarders to dislodge them, often integrated with remotely operated systems for crew safety. Physical barriers like coils along railings, deployed since the 2008-2012 Somali surge, impede climbing, while electrified fences (e.g., SecureShip systems) deliver non-lethal shocks upon contact. Slippery foam dispensers and boat-trapping nets further hinder small craft maneuvers, with adoption rising post-International Maritime Organization (IMO) best management practices updates in 2011. Technological aids enhance detection and response, leveraging sensors for early warning. Thermal imaging cameras, such as FLIR systems, provide 24/7 perimeter surveillance up to 5 kilometers, identifying heat signatures of approaching threats in low visibility. Automated identification systems (AIS) and enhanced offer 360-degree tracking, integrated with AI algorithms to flag anomalous vessel behaviors in piracy hotspots like the . Citadels—reinforced safe rooms with independent air, water, and communication for 24-72 hours—allow crews to barricade while awaiting , a measure credited with saving lives during failed boardings, as per IMO guidelines. These layered defenses, combining human, physical, and electronic elements, have reduced global piracy incidents by over 90% since peak levels in 2011, though vulnerabilities persist in under-patrolled regions. The multinational naval coalition known as (CTF-151), operational since January 2009 under the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), conducts patrols to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea beyond coastal states' , primarily targeting Somali-based threats in the and . Complementing CTF-151, the European Union Naval Force's , launched in December 2008, deploys warships and aircraft to deter piracy, protect vessels and vulnerable shipping lanes, and monitor illegal fishing activities off Somalia's coast. These efforts involve contributions from over 30 nations, including rotations of command such as Pakistan's assumption of CTF-151 leadership on January 22, 2025, and ongoing coordination with independent deployments from countries like and . United Nations Security Council resolutions provided the legal basis for these patrols, with Resolution 1816 (June 2, 2008) authorizing international naval forces to enter Somali territorial waters for a one-year period—renewed annually thereafter—to apprehend and disarm pirates, marking a departure from traditional respect for in failed states. Subsequent resolutions, including (April 27, 2010), explicitly called on states to criminalize piracy under domestic laws, facilitate prosecutions, and avoid "catch and release" practices that previously allowed suspects to evade justice. The patrols' deterrence effect contributed to a sharp decline in Somali piracy after its 2008–2011 peak, when incidents exceeded 200 annually, reducing reported attacks to near zero by 2012 through a combination of presence, aerial , and best-management practices for merchant vessels. Legal enforcement has relied on third-country prosecutions due to Somalia's collapsed judicial system, with pioneering trials starting in 2009 in a purpose-built high-security at Shimo La Tewa prison, handling over 100 cases by 2012 with UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assistance for evidence collection and fair trial standards. , , and followed suit, prosecuting suspects transferred via bilateral agreements with patrolling navies; Resolution 2125 (November 18, 2013) commended these nations for their contributions, noting over 1,200 pirates imprisoned regionally by 2013. Challenges persist, including evidentiary hurdles from maritime arrests and risks upon release, prompting calls for specialized piracy courts or capacity-building in itself. Amid the 2024–2025 piracy resurgence—driven by distractions from Houthi attacks in the , with incidents in the and rising more than threefold from January to September 2025 compared to 2024—patrols have adapted through enhanced intelligence sharing and vessel registrations for protection. A 47.5 percent increase in reported piracy and armed robbery in the first quarter of 2025 prompted UN warnings of broader deterioration, yet CTF-151 and commanders reaffirmed commitments to joint operations in March 2025 meetings. Prosecutions remain bottlenecked, with regional courts overwhelmed and limited new transfers, underscoring the need for sustained international funding and alternative models like piracy-specific tribunals.

International Conventions and Definitions

The Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994, establishes the core international definition of maritime piracy in Article 101. This provision states that piracy consists of (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or and directed against another ship, , or persons or property thereon, on the high seas or in a place outside any state's ; (b) voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship or with knowledge of its character; or (c) inciting or intentionally facilitating such acts. The definition requires two vessels or (the "two-ship" rule), excludes acts by government entities or for political ends, and limits jurisdiction to areas beyond territorial seas, typically beyond 12 nautical miles from coastlines. This UNCLOS framework codifies customary international law, drawing from Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which similarly defined piracy as acts of violence or depredation on the high seas for private ends by private ships against other vessels. Under UNCLOS Article 100, all states parties bear a duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy wherever it occurs on the high seas, while Article 105 grants universal jurisdiction, permitting any warship or government aircraft to board, seize, and arrest pirate vessels, aircraft, or persons suspected of piracy, with subsequent referral to competent authorities for prosecution. As of 2023, 169 states and the European Union are parties to UNCLOS, though non-parties like the United States recognize its piracy provisions as reflective of customary law. A key distinction in international practice separates piracy from armed robbery against ships, as clarified by the (IMO). Piracy under UNCLOS applies exclusively to acts on the high seas, whereas armed robbery involves analogous illegal or detention for private ends occurring within , archipelagic waters, or under a coastal state's sovereignty. The IMO's Assembly Resolution A.1025(26), adopted on 2 December 2009, defines armed robbery as (a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a ship or by persons who board a ship in ; (b) any act of inciting or facilitating such acts; or (c) any act attempting or conspiring to do so. This differentiation affects enforcement, as territorial incidents fall under coastal state jurisdiction rather than universal rights under UNCLOS Article 111. Supplementary instruments address related threats but do not redefine core piracy. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), entered into force on 1 March 1992, criminalizes acts like violence against ships in or on fixed platforms but targets or state-linked threats rather than private piracy, requiring state parties to prosecute or extradite offenders. Regional codes, such as the Code of Conduct (2009, revised as Jeddah Amendment in 2017), promote information-sharing and cooperation but defer to UNCLOS definitions. These frameworks emphasize empirical incident reporting, with bodies like the IMO and International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau tracking data to distinguish definitional boundaries amid ongoing debates over expanding piracy to include cyber threats or non-violent depredations.

National Laws and Prosecution Practices

National laws criminalizing maritime piracy typically incorporate the definition from Article 101 of the Convention on the (UNCLOS), which specifies piracy as any illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation, or attempts thereof, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or against another ship or , or against persons or property on board, on the high seas or in places outside the jurisdiction of any state. This framework grants states , allowing any nation to arrest, try, and punish pirates regardless of the offense's location or the victims' nationality, provided the acts meet the high seas requirement. Domestic implementation varies, with penalties often severe to deter the crime's disruption to commerce and threats to life. In the United States, federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 1651 defines piracy according to the law of nations—aligning with UNCLOS—and imposes a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, with jurisdiction extending to acts on the high seas since the Act of 1819. The United Kingdom addresses piracy through the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997, which adopts the UNCLOS definition and subjects offenders to life imprisonment under common law or statutory provisions. India, a major maritime trading nation, enacted the Maritime Anti-Piracy Act, 2022, to explicitly enable arrests, investigations, and prosecutions for high seas piracy, prescribing death or life imprisonment for direct acts of piracy and up to 14 years for aiding or organizing such acts. These laws emphasize enforcement by naval or coast guard forces, with provisions for seizing pirate vessels and assets. Prosecution practices rely on national courts, as no international tribunal handles piracy cases, leading to a patchwork of approaches shaped by capacity, evidence collection, and international transfers. Capturing states often prosecute when national interests—such as attacks on their flagged vessels—are involved, but frequently hand over suspects to third countries with specialized facilities to avoid domestic burdens like prolonged detention or asylum claims. For instance, between 2006 and 2012, global prosecutions totaled around 1,186, with Kenya handling a significant portion through transfers from international naval forces like EU NAVFOR and CTF-151. Kenya's courts convicted over 100 Somali pirates under its Penal Code during this peak period of Indian Ocean piracy. Other nations have developed targeted mechanisms: Seychelles established a dedicated anti-piracy court in 2010, prosecuting dozens of Somali suspects transferred by international patrols, resulting in convictions with sentences up to life. The has tried cases in federal district courts, such as the 2010 prosecution of five Somali pirates for attempting to hijack the USS Ashland, yielding life sentences. European countries like the and have conducted domestic trials for pirates captured during operations protecting their shipping interests, emphasizing evidence from shipboard surveillance and witness testimony. In regions like the , and neighboring states prosecute under or statutes adapted for maritime contexts, though convictions remain lower due to evidentiary challenges in .
CountryKey Legislation/ApproachPenaltiesNotable Prosecution Examples
18 U.S.C. § 1651Somali pirates tried in federal courts (e.g., 2010 USS Ashland case)
Penal Code, via international transfersDeath or Over 100 Somali convictions (2006–2012)
Special anti-piracy courtUp to Dozens of Somali pirates convicted post-2010
Maritime Anti-Piracy Act, 2022Death or ; up to 14 years for aidingEnabled high seas arrests; initial cases post-2022
These practices have evolved with declining Somali piracy incidents since 2012, shifting focus to capacity-building in affected states and bilateral agreements for evidence-sharing and prisoner transfers. Despite , actual enforcement depends on naval presence, forensic capabilities, and willingness to bear trial costs, with many captures ending in releases if no receiving state agrees to prosecute.

Challenges in Universal Jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction permits any state to prosecute acts of piracy committed on the high seas, irrespective of the nationalities of the perpetrators or victims, as codified in Article 105 of the Convention on the (UNCLOS). However, empirical data reveals its limited application: international prosecutions occur in no more than 1.47% of universally punishable piracy cases, reflecting systemic barriers to enforcement. Only five countries have invoked this jurisdiction for modern sea robbery, underscoring a gap between legal authorization and practical utilization. A primary challenge stems from definitional ambiguities in international instruments, including UNCLOS's narrow criteria requiring acts on the high seas for private ends by a ship or aircraft against another vessel. This excludes incidents in or failed attacks without boarding, complicating classification and ; for instance, some national laws, like India's, omit a entirely, resulting in procedural delays or ineffective trials. Disharmonies among treaties, such as between UNCLOS and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), further hinder coordination, as SUA mandates action but lacks universal 's breadth. Prosecutorial reluctance arises from resource constraints, evidentiary difficulties, and proof burdens. States often prioritize flag-state or victim-state to avoid costs of trials, detention, and , leading to releases of captured suspects—over 90% in some Somali piracy operations due to absent domestic implementing laws or political will. In failed states like , inability to gather evidence or establish perpetrator nationality exacerbates issues, while procedural hurdles such as statutes of limitations, immunities, or laws impede domestic application. Political interference and lack of state commitment compound these, as seen in low rates despite captures by multinational patrols. Human rights considerations add friction, with concerns over , fair trial standards, and post-trial reintegration deterring prosecutions; for example, European courts have released pirates citing inadequate evidence or rights violations under the . These factors contribute to a "prosecution gap," where universal jurisdiction's theoretical universality fails against real-world incentives favoring deterrence over adjudication, perpetuating impunity in hotspots like the .

References

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