Hubbry Logo
Jericho (missile)Jericho (missile)Main
Open search
Jericho (missile)
Community hub
Jericho (missile)
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Jericho (missile)
Jericho (missile)
Jericho (missile)
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Jericho (Hebrew: יריחו, romanized: Yericho) is a general designation given to a loosely related family of deployed ballistic missiles developed by Israel since the 1960s. The name is taken from the first development contract for the Jericho I signed between Israel and Dassault in 1963, with the codename as a reference to the Biblical city of Jericho. As with some other Israeli high tech weapons systems, exact details are classified, though there are observed test data, public statements by government officials, and details in open literature especially about the Shavit satellite launch vehicle.

Key Information

The later Jericho family development is related to the Shavit and Shavit II space launch vehicles believed to be derivatives of the Jericho II MRBM and that preceded the development of the Jericho III ICBM.[1] The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the US concluded that the Shavit could be adapted as an ICBM carrying a 500 kg warhead over 7,500 km.[2] Additional insight into the Jericho program was revealed by the South African series of missiles, of which the RSA-3 are believed to be licensed copies of the Jericho II/Shavit, and the RSA-4 that used part of these systems in their stack with a heavy first stage. Subsequent to the declaration and disarming of the South African nuclear program,[3] the RSA series missiles were offered commercially as satellite launch vehicles, resulting in the advertised specifications becoming public knowledge.[4]

The civilian space launch version of the Jericho, the Shavit, was studied in an air launched version piggybacked on a Boeing 747 similar to a U.S. experimental launch of the Minuteman ICBM from a C-5 Galaxy.[5]

Jericho I

[edit]

Jericho I was first publicly identified being an operational short-range ballistic missile system in late 1971. It was 13.4 metres (44 ft) long, 0.8 m (2 ft 7 in) in diameter, weighing 6.5 tonnes (14,000 lb). It had a range of 500 km (310 mi) and a CEP of 1,000 m (3,300 ft), and it could carry a payload estimated at 400 kilograms (880 lb). It was intended to carry a nuclear warhead.[6][7] Due to Israel's ambiguity over its nuclear weapons program, the missile is classified as a ballistic missile. Initial development was in conjunction with France, Dassault provided various missile systems from 1963 and a type designated MD-620 was test fired in 1965. French co-operation was halted by an arms embargo in January 1968, though 12 missiles had been delivered from France.[7] Work was continued by IAI at the Beit Zachariah facility and the program cost almost $1 billion up to 1980, incorporating some U.S. technology.[8] Despite some initial problems with its guidance systems, it is believed that around 100 missiles of this type were produced.

In 1969, Israel agreed with the United States that Jericho missiles would not be used as "strategic missiles", with nuclear warheads, until at least 1972.[9]

During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, with the initial surprise breakthroughs on both northern and southern borders by Arab armies, the alarmed Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that "this is the end of the third temple."[10] He was warning of Israel's impending total defeat, but "Temple" was also the code word for nuclear weapons.[11] Dayan again raised the nuclear topic in a cabinet meeting, warning that the country was approaching a point of "last resort".[12] That night Meir authorized the assembly of thirteen nuclear weapon "physics packages" to arm Jericho I missiles at Sdot Micha Airbase, and F-4 aircraft at Tel Nof Airbase, for use against Syrian and Egyptian targets.[11] The range on the Jericho 1 is sufficient to strike major cities such as Damascus and Cairo from secured launch locations.[13] They would be used if absolutely necessary to prevent total defeat, but the preparation was done in an easily detectable way, likely as a signal to the US.[12] U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger learned of the nuclear alert on the morning of October 9. That day, in keeping with his deal and warning that prevented a preemptive Israeli attack on gathering Arab armies,[14] President Nixon ordered the commencement of Operation Nickel Grass, a U.S. airlift to replace all of Israel's material losses.[15] Anecdotal evidence suggests that Kissinger told Sadat that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to "going nuclear".[11]

It is believed that all Jericho 1 missiles were taken out of service in the 1990s and replaced with the longer-range Jericho 2. The Jericho 1 missiles were housed in Zekharia, located southeast of Tel Aviv and stationed in caves.[16]

Jericho II

[edit]
Shavit 3rd stage

The Jericho II (YA-3) is a solid fuel, two-stage ballistic missile system and a follow on from the Jericho I project. It is classified by some sources as a medium-ranged ballistic missile[17][18][19][20] and others as an intermediate-ranged ballistic missile.[21][22] As many as 90 Jericho 2 missiles are currently based in caves near Zekharia (Sdot Micha Airbase), southeast of Tel Aviv.[23]

A request from Israel for 1,100 miles (1,800 km) range Pershing II medium range ballistic missiles was rejected by the United States for inclusion as part of a military assistance incentive package offered in 1975 during negotiations over transferring the Sinai from Israeli to Egyptian control as part of a US-brokered peace deal.[24] Jericho II development began in 1977, and by 1986 there were reports of test firings. According to Missilethreat, a project of the George C. Marshall Institute, there is evidence the Jericho II originated as a joint Israeli-Iranian project, cooperation that ended with the loss of friendly relations after the 1979 Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah's rule.[25] There was a series of test launches into the Mediterranean from 1987 to 1992, the longest at around 1,300 km, mostly from the facility at Palmachim, south of Tel Aviv. Jane's reports that a test launch of 1,400 km is believed to have taken place from South Africa's Overberg Test Range in June 1989.[26]

The Jericho II is 14.0 m long and 1.56 m wide, with a reported launch weight of 26,000 kg (although an alternative launch weight of 21,935 kg has been suggested). It has a 1,000 kg payload and uses a two-stage solid propellant engine with a separating warhead. The missile can be launched from a silo, a railroad flat car, or a mobile vehicle. This gives it the ability to be hidden, moved quickly, or kept in a hardened silo, largely ensuring survival against any attack.[27] It has an active radar homing terminal guidance system similar to that of the Pershing II, for very accurate strikes.[28]

The Jericho II forms the basis of the three-stage, 23 ton Shavit NEXT satellite launcher, first launched in 1988 from Palmachim. From the performance of Shavit it has been estimated that as a ballistic missile it has a maximum range of about 7,800 km with a 500 kg payload.[8]

The Jericho II as an available Israeli counterattack option to Iraqi missile bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War is disputed. Jane's at the time believed that Jericho II entered service in 1989.[29] Researcher Seth Carus claims that, according to an Israeli source, the decision to operationally deploy the Jericho-2 was only made after 1994, several years after the Scud attacks had ended and a cease fire and disarmament regime were in place.[30] Raytheon Technologies, quoting Soviet intelligence archives, showed them believing the Jericho-2 to have been fully developed weapon in 1989, but did not indicate when it was available for deployment.[31] Investigators for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace accessed commercial satellite images of the Sdot Micha Airbase near Zachariah, a suspected Jericho missile base, comparison shows expansion between 1989 and 1993 of the type that would accommodate suspected Jericho II launchers and missiles.[32] Such an expansion would be more consistent with a post-1991 deployment chronology.

Jericho III

[edit]

It is believed that the Jericho III (YA-4) is a nuclear-armed ICBM[33][34] that entered service in 2011.[35] The Jericho III is believed to have two or three-stages, using solid propellant and having a payload of 1,000 to 1,300 kg. The payload could be a single 750 kg (150–400 kiloton)[35] nuclear warhead or two or three low-yield MIRV warheads. It has an estimated launch weight of 30,000 kg and a length of 15.5 m with a width of 1.56 m. It may be similar to an upgraded and re-designed Shavit space launch vehicle, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries. It probably has longer first and second-stage motors. It is estimated by missilethreat.com that it has a range of 4,800 to 6,500 km (3,000 to 4,000 mi),[36] though a 2004 missile proliferation survey by the Congressional Research Service put its possible maximum range at 11,500 km (missile range is inversely proportional to payload mass).[37]

According to an official report that was submitted to the U.S. Congress in 2004, it may be that with a payload of 1,000 kg the Jericho III gives Israel nuclear strike capabilities within the entire Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia and almost all parts of North America, as well as large parts of South America and North Oceania. Missile Threat reports: "The range of the Jericho 3 also provides an extremely high impact speed for nearby targets, enabling it to avoid any Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defenses that may develop in the immediate region."[36] On 17 January 2008 Israel test fired a multi-stage ballistic missile believed to be of the Jericho III type, reportedly capable of carrying "conventional or non conventional warheads."[38] On 2 November 2011, Israel successfully test fired a missile believed to be an upgraded version of the Jericho III from Palmachim; the long trail of smoke was seen throughout central Israel.[39] Israel's intercontinental ballistic missile launchers are believed to be buried so deeply that they would survive a first strike nuclear attack.[40][41]

After a successful missile test launch conducted in early 2008, Israeli weapons expert General Itzhak Ben-Israel, former chairman of the Israeli Space Agency at the Ministry of Science, said "Everybody can do the mathematics... we can reach with a rocket engine to every point in the world", thus appearing to confirm Israel's new capability. Israeli Ministry of Defense officials said that the 2008 test launch represented a "dramatic leap in Israel's missile technologies".[42]

After a further test in 2013 Alon Ben David published this opinion in an article in Aviation Week on the missile's range and throw weight: "Reportedly, Israel's Jericho III intermediate-range ballistic missile is capable of carrying a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) warhead more than 5,000 km."[43] Further tests conducted in July 2013 could have been for the Jericho 3 or possibly the Jericho 3A missile, a follow-up missile believed to have a new motor.[35]

Jericho IV

[edit]

In 2019, a successful test launch was conducted by Israel of a rocket, which was subsequently referred to as the "Jericho 4" by Israeli mass media. Despite this designation, the specific distinctions between the Jericho 4 and its predecessor, the Jericho 3, remain undisclosed.[44][45] 2024 article provides more details: "... the Jericho 4, a three-stage missile, whose capabilities will include the possibility of carrying fragmentation warheads."[46]

South African RSA Series

[edit]
RSA-3

The Jericho II/Shavit SLV was also license produced in the Republic of South Africa as the RSA series of space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles.

The RSA-3 was produced by the Houwteq (a discontinued division of Denel) company at Grabouw, 30 km east of Cape Town. Test launches were made from Overberg Test Range near Bredasdorp, 200 km east of Cape Town. Rooi Els was where the engine test facilities were located. Development continued even after South African renunciation[47] of its nuclear weapons for use as a commercial satellite launcher. Development reached its height in 1992, a year after nuclear renunciation, with 50–70 companies involved which employed 1300–1500 people from the public and private sector.[48][49] A much heavier ICBM or space launch vehicle, the RSA-4, with a first stage in the Peacekeeper ICBM class but with Jericho-2/RSA-3 upper stage components was in development,[50] the RSA-2 was a local copy of the Jericho II ballistic missile and the RSA-1 was a local copy of the Jericho II second stage for use as a mobile missile.[4][51][52][53]

The missiles were to be based on the RSA-3 and RSA-4 launchers that had already been built and tested for the South African space programme. According to Al J Venter, author of How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs, these missiles were incompatible with the available large South African nuclear warheads, he claims that the RSA series being designed for a 340 kg payload would suggest a warhead of some 200 kg, "well beyond SA's best efforts of the late 1980s." Venter's analysis is that the RSA series was intended to display a credible delivery system combined with a separate nuclear test in a final diplomatic appeal to the world powers in an emergency even though they were never intended to be used in a weaponized system together.[54] Three rockets had already been launched into suborbital trajectories in the late 1980s in support of development of the RSA-3 launched Greensat Orbital Management System (for commercial satellite applications of vehicle tracking and regional planning). Following the decision in 1989 to cancel the nuclear weapons program, the missile programs were allowed to continue until 1992, when military funding ended, and all ballistic missile work was stopped by mid-1993. In order to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, the government had to allow U.S. supervision of the destruction of key facilities applicable to both the long range missile and the space launch programmes.[55]

Variant Date of launch Launch location Payload Mission status
RSA-3 1989 June 1 Overberg Test Range South Africa RSA-3-d 1 Apogee: 100 km (62 mi)
RSA-3 1989 July 6 Overberg Test Range South Africa RSA-3 2 Apogee: 300 km (190 mi)
RSA-3 1990 November 19 Overberg Test Range South Africa RSA-3 3 Apogee: 300 km (190 mi)

In June 1994, the RSA-3 / RSA-4 South African satellite launcher program was cancelled.[56]

Potential targeting

[edit]

Jericho I

[edit]

Journalist Seymour Hersh wrote that during the Israeli losses in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Jericho I missiles at Sdot Micha Airbase, as well as nuclear-armed McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs, were ordered by Prime Minister Golda Meir to be brought as operational as possible, potentially including the loading of the separately stored 20 kiloton nuclear warheads. The targets would have included the military headquarters of Egypt and Syria, in Cairo and Damascus respectively, but the blast would have destroyed the cities, with similar yields to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[57][58]

Jericho II and III

[edit]

Hans M. Kristensen and others of the Federation of American Scientists have suggested politically relevant targets for the medium-range Jericho II missile, completed in the 1980s, as the western half of Iran, the southernmost cities of the Soviet Union, such as Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Sevastopol, including the Black Sea Fleet based there.

Suggested relevant targets for the Jericho III, completed in the 2000s, include all of Iran, including Tehran, all of Pakistan, and all of Russia west of the Urals, including Moscow.[59]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Jericho (missile)

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Jericho is a family of road-mobile, solid-fueled ballistic missiles developed by Israel Aerospace Industries since the early 1960s, encompassing short-range (Jericho 1), medium-range (Jericho 2), and intermediate-range (Jericho 3) variants designed primarily for strategic deterrence, with payloads suitable for conventional or nuclear warheads and ranges from approximately 500 km to 6,500 km. Initial development of the Jericho 1 began in 1962 under a contract with France's for the MD 620, a single-stage with an estimated range of 500 km, but French cooperation ended after the 1967 arms embargo, prompting to pursue indigenous production and upgrades. The Jericho 2, introduced in the 1980s as a two-stage system with inertial guidance, extended operational range to 1,500–3,000 km and formed the basis for Israel's Shavit space launch vehicle, demonstrating for deployment while maintaining military applicability. The Jericho 3, operational since the early following reported tests in 2008 and 2011, represents a three-stage advancement with a capacity of 1,000–1,300 kg and a maximum range of 4,800–6,500 km, enabling coverage of regional adversaries and potentially beyond, though exact capabilities remain classified and subject to estimates from . These systems underpin 's undeclared nuclear posture, providing a survivable second-strike option amid regional threats, with deployment in hardened and mobile launchers to enhance resilience against preemptive attacks.

Development and Variants

Jericho I

The Jericho I, also known as the Luz YA-1, was Israel's inaugural short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), initiated in the early 1960s through collaboration with France on the MD-620 design. Development proceeded with French technical support until the 1967 Six-Day War prompted Paris to withdraw assistance, after which Israel independently advanced the program using indigenous engineering. Approximately 16 flight tests occurred between 1965 and 1968, achieving 10 successes, with initial launches conducted at the French Île du Levant range before shifting to Israeli facilities in the Negev Desert. The featured a two-stage solid-propellant configuration, measuring 13.4 in length, 0.8 in diameter, and weighing 6,700 kg at launch. It achieved a range of approximately 500 km while carrying a kg payload, though estimates varied from 480 to 750 km depending on mass and configuration. Guidance relied on inertial systems with , yielding a (CEP) of around 1,000 . Launch platforms included hardened , with early deployments emphasizing fixed-site protection rather than full mobility. Operational deployment began in , with estimates of 50 to 100 missiles produced and integrated into Israel's strategic by the mid-1970s, primarily for conventional or nuclear-capable deterrence against regional threats. The system remained in service through the but was progressively phased out by the early as the longer-range Jericho II entered operational use, rendering the Jericho I obsolete for evolving strategic needs. No official Israeli disclosures confirm payload details, but unverified assessments suggest compatibility with nuclear warheads of 400-500 kg yield.

Jericho II

The Jericho II is a solid-fueled, road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) developed by Israel Aerospace Industries as a successor to the Jericho I, with design work commencing in the mid-1970s and extending into the late 1980s. Flight testing began in 1986, including a reported launch in May 1987 achieving approximately 800 km range, and the system achieved initial operational capability around 1990. It incorporates a two- or three-stage configuration powered by solid propellants, enabling rapid launch preparation compared to liquid-fueled predecessors, and serves as the foundational technology for Israel's Shavit satellite launch vehicle. Estimated performance varies across assessments, with a commonly cited range of 1,500 km when carrying a 1,000 kg , though some analyses extend this to 3,500 km under lighter loads due to its propulsion efficiency and dimensional scaling from the Jericho I. capacity supports high-explosive, submunitions, or nuclear warheads estimated at up to 1 megaton yield, though maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity and does not officially confirm arming details. Accuracy metrics, such as (CEP), remain classified, but the missile's inertial is inferred to provide improved precision over earlier variants through corrections. Multiple successful tests validated the design, with deployments integrated into Israel's strategic deterrence posture by the early ; reports indicate operational status persists, potentially numbering in the dozens, though exact inventory figures are undisclosed. A 1989 test from South Africa's range, resembling the Jericho II in profile and achieving 1,400 km flight, highlighted technical exchanges in and reentry vehicle design, though primary development remained indigenous to .

Jericho III

The Jericho III, designated YA-4, is a three-stage, solid-propellant (IRBM) developed by (IAI) as a successor to the Jericho II to enhance Israel's strategic deterrence capabilities. Development focused on extending range and flexibility while maintaining road-mobile and silo-based deployment options, with production centered on indigenous solid-fuel motors and inertial guidance systems augmented by for terminal accuracy. The missile measures approximately 15.5–16.0 meters in length, 1.56 meters in diameter, and has a launch weight of 29,000 kg. Estimated specifications include a range of 4,800–6,500 km when carrying a 1,000–1,300 kg payload, enabling strikes across the , parts of , and depending on configuration. It supports single-warhead delivery of high-explosive or nuclear payloads, with the latter estimated at 750 kg and yields of 150–400 kilotons based on Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal compatibility; smaller yields could theoretically permit multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or decoys, though this remains unconfirmed. Basing occurs via transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), , or railcars, primarily at the Zacharia site in underground caves for survivability against preemptive attacks. The first flight test occurred on January 17, 2008, from the Palmachim Air Force Base test center, validating the full three-stage configuration. A follow-on motor static test followed in February 2008, and a modified version was successfully launched on November 2, 2011, from Palmachim. Additional tests include a July 2013 launch described as "highly successful" by Israeli defense sources, potentially a III or upgraded 3A variant, and speculation of a December 2019 test. The achieved operational status by 2011, with limited public disclosures reflecting Israel's of strategic on ballistic capabilities.
ParameterSpecification
StagesThree (solid propellant)
Range4,800–6,500 km (estimated)
1,000–1,300 kg
GuidanceInertial with terminal
Warhead OptionsConventional or nuclear (est.)
These parameters are derived from defense analyses, as provides no official specifications, underscoring reliance on open-source intelligence and test observations for verification.

Reported Jericho IV and Future Iterations

Reports indicate that is developing a IV , described as a three-stage, solid-fueled intended to extend the series' capabilities into the intercontinental range category. This iteration would reportedly achieve ranges exceeding 10,000 kilometers, enabling strikes on distant targets while incorporating (MIRV) technology for enhanced flexibility. Such advancements align with 's strategic need to maintain deterrence amid evolving threats from adversaries with expanding arsenals, though official confirmation remains absent due to the country's policy of nuclear and ambiguity. Development of the Jericho IV appears to build on the Jericho III's proven three-stage design, potentially incorporating improved propulsion for greater throw-weight and accuracy, but no public tests or deployment timelines have been disclosed as of 2025. Analysts infer these capabilities from Israel's ongoing investments in solid-propellant rocketry and satellite launch vehicles like the Shavit, which share technological heritage with the family, suggesting iterative upgrades focused on reliability and survivability. However, claims of operational status or specific payloads, such as nuclear or conventional warheads, stem from unverified assessments rather than empirical data, underscoring the challenges in verifying details amid Israel's opacity. Future iterations beyond Jericho IV are not publicly detailed, but projections based on Israel's defense posture suggest continued emphasis on hypersonic glide vehicles or maneuverable reentry bodies to counter advanced missile defenses. These enhancements would prioritize penetration of layered air defenses, drawing from lessons in regional conflicts where efficacy has been tested. No verified evidence supports active programs for post-IV variants as of late 2025, with resources likely allocated to sustaining existing Jericho III stockpiles estimated at dozens of launchers. Israel's partnership terminations and indigenous production ensure self-reliance, mitigating reliance on foreign suppliers for or guidance systems.

Technical Specifications

Design and Propulsion

The Jericho series employs solid-propellant rocket motors in multi-stage configurations, emphasizing storability, rapid launch preparation, and resistance to preemptive strikes through mobile basing on transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), railcars, or hardened silos. Designs incorporate lightweight composite materials for casings and inertial guidance systems for trajectory control, with warhead separation mechanisms enabling payload delivery over extended ranges. Propulsion relies on high-energy composite solid fuels, typically ammonium perchlorate composites, which offer reliable ignition and sustained thrust without the logistical demands of liquid systems. The Jericho 1 features a two-stage solid-propellant design, with a total length of 13.4 meters, of 0.8 meters, and launch weight of 6,700 kg; its motors provide sufficient impulse for ranges up to 720 km while supporting payloads up to 650 kg. Successor Jericho 2 advances to a two-stage configuration scaled for medium-range applications, measuring 15 meters long with a 1.35-meter and 22,000 kg launch mass, utilizing enhanced formulations derived from vehicle technology shared with the Shavit program. Jericho 3 represents the pinnacle of the series' evolution, estimated as a three-stage solid-fueled system with a length of 15.5–16 meters, 1.56-meter diameter, and 29,000 kg launch weight, capable of propelling 1,000–1,300 kg payloads to intermediate ranges; its propulsion incorporates advanced nozzle designs and possibly thrust vector control for improved maneuverability during boost phase. These systems, developed indigenously by Israel Aerospace Industries, prioritize survivability and precision, with test firings validating propulsion reliability as recently as 2019.

Range, Payload, and Accuracy

The Jericho missile series features varying capabilities across its variants, with ranges, payloads, and accuracy metrics derived primarily from assessments due to Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity and limited official disclosures. Estimates indicate progression from short-range to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, enabling payloads including conventional high-explosive warheads or unconfirmed nuclear devices, though precise configurations remain classified. For the Jericho 1, a single-stage solid-fuel , the estimated range is 500 km when carrying a of approximately 400-650 kg, such as a 450 kg high-explosive or a nuclear device yielding around 20 kilotons. Accuracy is reported as a (CEP) of about 1,000 meters, reflecting early inertial guidance limitations. The Jericho 2, a two-stage solid-propellant , achieves a baseline range of 1,500 km with a 1,000-1,500 kg , potentially extending to 3,500 km with reduced mass; it can accommodate high-explosive loads or nuclear warheads up to 1 megaton yield. Specific CEP figures are scarce, but enhancements over the Jericho 1 suggest improved precision through upgraded guidance, though not quantified in public analyses. Jericho 3 specifications point to a three-stage design with a range of 4,800-6,500 km and a capacity of 1,000-1,300 kg, including a 750 kg nuclear warhead option, positioning it as an capable of reaching targets across the and beyond. Accuracy data remains unavailable in declassified sources, with reliance on advanced inertial systems inferred from successful tests but unverified independently.
VariantEstimated Range (km)Payload (kg)Reported CEP (m)
Jericho 1500400-650~1,000
Jericho 21,500-3,5001,000-1,500Not publicly specified
Jericho 34,800-6,5001,000-1,300Not publicly specified

Launch Platforms and Mobility

The Jericho series emphasizes mobility to ensure survivability against preemptive strikes, with later variants primarily employing road-mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs) for rapid deployment and relocation. The Jericho 2, a two-stage solid-fueled , can be launched from TEL vehicles, railroad flat trucks, or hardened silos, enabling it to be concealed in varied terrain or transported quickly to alternate sites. This configuration, often involving TELs towed by wheeled tractors serving as launch control centers, supports operational flexibility without reliance on fixed infrastructure. The Jericho 3, an entering service around 2008, extends this doctrine with road-mobile capabilities, allowing deployment from TELs that facilitate dispersal across Israel's limited geography. Reports indicate compatibility with both mobile launchers and silos, though emphasis on TELs underscores a shift toward survivable, non-static basing to counter regional threats. Earlier Jericho 1 systems also utilized mobile setups, including TELs, setting the precedent for the family's emphasis on transportability over vulnerability to detection. Overall, these platforms integrate with Israel's constraints, prioritizing quick erection, fueling independence via propellants, and evasion of satellite or .

International Collaboration

South African RSA Series

The RSA series comprised a family of solid-propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles developed by South Africa during the 1980s, incorporating technology derived from Israel's Jericho program through bilateral cooperation. This effort, managed by entities like Houwteq and involving up to 1,500 personnel across 50-70 companies, addressed strategic vulnerabilities amid international isolation and regional threats from Soviet-backed forces. The initial variants, RSA-1 and RSA-2, were designed as single- and two-stage intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with ranges of approximately 1,100 km (payload 1,500 kg) and 1,900 km, respectively, primarily to counter Cuban deployments in Angola. The RSA-3, a three-stage vehicle central to the series, mirrored the Israeli Jericho II/Shavit configuration, featuring a gross mass of 23,630 kg, length of 17.65 m, diameter of 1.3 m, and capacity for a 330 kg payload to low Earth orbit (LEO) at 210 km altitude and 41° inclination, while retaining IRBM potential. Developed with direct Israeli assistance, including shared stages and motors, it underwent testing at the Overberg Test Range, with successful launches on July 6, 1989 (apogee ~300 km) and November 19, 1990. The related RSA-4 extended range capabilities, demonstrated by a 1,400 km booster test on July 5, 1989, as part of the Arniston program—CIA-designated for South Africa's advanced Jericho-derived efforts. Cooperation encompassed technology transfers initiated in the 1970s, including missile components and test support, though publicly framed launches as space booster trials. The programs, code-named Arniston internally, advanced from I adaptations to II equivalents by the late 1980s.

Scope and Termination of Partnership

The partnership between and on development focused on adapting technology for the RSA series, particularly the RSA-3 intermediate-range and space . This collaboration, initiated in the , involved Israeli assistance in and systems, rendering the RSA-3 essentially identical to Israel's missile and Shavit . officials, including defense force commanders, participated in test-firings of the system to inform RSA development. The scope extended to technology transfers enabling to achieve payload capacities of up to 770 kg over 2,400 km ranges, with potential for further extensions. Israel supplied technical expertise and components, including solid-fuel rocket motors derived from Jericho II, while South Africa contributed to testing and integration efforts at facilities like Overberg. The agreement emphasized dual-use applications, framing the RSA-3 as a satellite launcher to mask military intent, though intelligence assessments confirmed its IRBM potential. Cooperation was part of broader defense ties, including nuclear-related discussions, but missile-specific exchanges prioritized propulsion and guidance enhancements. The partnership terminated in 1993 amid South Africa's political transition and non-proliferation commitments. Following the dismantling of its nuclear program in 1991 and the end of apartheid, suspended the RSA program and officially ended missile collaboration with to accede to the . This halt prevented potential ICBM development and aligned with international pressures, including U.S. concerns over proliferation. Earlier, in 1987, had scaled back overall defense contracts with under domestic and global scrutiny, though missile-specific work persisted until the 1993 cutoff.

Deployment and Testing

Historical Tests

The Jericho 1 , designated YA-1 and derived from the French MD-620 design, underwent an initial program starting in early 1965 at the Île du Levant Test Range in , with limited public details on individual outcomes due to the program's classified nature. Following to , approximately 16 test launches were conducted between 1965 and 1968, of which 10 were deemed successful, validating the liquid-fueled, single-stage system's short-range capabilities up to 500 kilometers. These tests paved the way for operational deployment by , with early Israeli firings likely from domestic sites to confirm reliability independent of French support. Development of the Jericho 2, a two-stage solid-propellant (MRBM) with reported South African collaboration, featured a series of test launches into the from Israeli facilities between May 1987 and March 1992, aimed at verifying ranges exceeding 1,500 kilometers. A specific second test firing occurred on November 19, 1990, from a site identified in U.S. intelligence as "Arniston," a South African test facility ( Test Range), highlighting joint verification efforts under the bilateral . These trials, conducted amid heightened regional tensions, demonstrated improved mobility and compared to the Jericho 1, transitioning the system to operational status in the early 1990s. The Jericho 3, an (IRBM) with potential reach, saw its first reported flight test in January 2008 from the near , testing an extended-range configuration derived from Shavit vehicle technology. A subsequent test on November 2, 2011, from the same site confirmed and guidance enhancements, with the achieving a consistent with ranges of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometers. These limited public disclosures, drawn from U.S. and international monitoring, reflect Israel's restrained testing cadence to minimize proliferation signals while advancing deterrence capabilities, with the system entering service around 2011. Further unconfirmed tests in subsequent years have been reported but lack detailed verification.

Operational Status and Inventory

The Jericho 2 and Jericho 3 constitute Israel's primary operational land-based ballistic s, with the Jericho 3 serving as the more advanced system in active service. The Jericho 2, a two-stage solid-fueled with a range of 1,500–3,500 km, entered operational deployment in the and remains in use, though it is scheduled for phase-out by 2026 as Jericho 3 production ramps up. The Jericho 3, a three-stage solid-fueled with a range of 4,800–6,500 km, achieved initial operational capability around 2011 following successful tests, and by 2024, was actively transitioning its arsenal toward this variant for extended reach and improved payload delivery. The earlier Jericho 1 short-range missile, deployed in the 1970s, is obsolete and has been retired from service. Inventory details for the Jericho series are not publicly disclosed by due to its policy of strategic ambiguity, relying instead on intelligence assessments from organizations like for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the (SIPRI). Estimates indicate possessed around 50 Jericho 2 missiles as of 2016, sufficient to support second-strike deterrence roles, though production of Jericho 3 has likely increased total holdings while reducing reliance on the older model. No verified figures exist for Jericho 3 deployment numbers, but SIPRI assessments as of describe an ongoing upgrade to bolster the fleet's survivability and range, potentially numbering in the dozens given the program's emphasis on mobile, road-transportable launchers. These missiles are believed to be stored and maintained at secure facilities, including , with readiness maintained through periodic testing under the guise of space launch vehicles. Open-source analyses emphasize that actual stockpiles may exceed public estimates to account for attrition reserves and technological upgrades, but claims beyond corroborated intelligence remain speculative.

Strategic Doctrine

Role in Israeli Deterrence

The Jericho missile family constitutes a of Israel's strategic deterrence, offering a credible second-strike capability against regional adversaries posing existential threats, such as and its proxies. Solid-fueled and potentially road-mobile, these missiles enhance survivability by complicating enemy preemptive strikes, thereby ensuring retaliatory strikes can inflict severe punishment even after an initial attack. The Jericho II, with a range exceeding 1,500 kilometers, covers much of the , while the Jericho III extends reach potentially to 6,500 kilometers or more, placing distant targets within Israel's response envelope. This land-based leg of Israel's presumed —complemented by air- and sea-delivered systems—underpins a deterrence strategy focused on denial and punishment, deterring aggression through the implicit threat of overwhelming retaliation. Analysts note that the program's development addressed Israel's need for an independent deterrent amid historical vulnerabilities, such as the 1973 , where rapid mobilization underscored the value of assured . Jericho's opacity aligns with Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, avoiding explicit declarations while signaling resolve to potential attackers. Deployment estimates suggest dozens of operational Jericho missiles, sufficient for a minimal deterrent force emphasizing quality over quantity, with ongoing upgrades maintaining technological edge against proliferating threats like Iran's ballistic programs. This posture has arguably contributed to regional restraint, as no state has tested Israel's red lines since the system's maturation, though critics question its escalatory risks in dense conventional conflicts.

Integration with Nuclear Ambiguity Policy

Israel's policy of nuclear opacity, in place since the 1960s, entails neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons, thereby fostering deterrence through perceived capability while avoiding the diplomatic and escalatory costs of explicit acknowledgment. The missile series integrates seamlessly with this doctrine by providing a family of solid-fueled, road-mobile ballistic missiles with ranges from 500 km ( I, now retired) to over 4,000–6,500 km ( III), which analysts assess as dual-capable for conventional or nuclear payloads without official Israeli confirmation of the latter. This ambiguity is reinforced by the missiles' operational secrecy; acknowledges only short-range systems like LORA publicly, leaving longer-range variants undeclared in nuclear contexts to preserve strategic uncertainty for adversaries. The deployment of up to 80 mobile launchers for Jericho II and III as of 2018 exemplifies how the system bolsters second-strike survivability, a core element of opacity-driven deterrence, as hardened or fixed sites would signal overt nuclear intent. By maintaining —evidenced in non-disclosure of integration—the Jericho enables to project resolve in crises, such as the rumored alerting of nuclear-armed Jericho missiles during the 1973 , without crossing into declaratory policy that could invite preemptive actions or . This integration deters regional actors like by implying a retaliatory threshold that adversaries cannot dismiss, yet avoids the arms-race dynamics of acknowledged arsenals, as noted in assessments of Israel's strategic posture. Critiques from non-proliferation advocates, including those at think tanks, contend that Jericho's role in opacity exacerbates instability by undermining transparency norms, potentially encouraging covert proliferation elsewhere; however, Israeli strategic analyses emphasize its necessity for asymmetric defense against numerically superior conventional threats. The policy's endurance, with Jericho as its undisclosed backbone, has arguably prevented existential wars since 1973 by calibrating uncertainty to Israel's favor, though shifts could occur if regional nuclear breakouts—such as by —compel a reevaluation toward candor.

Targeting Capabilities and Restraint

The Jericho missile series employs inertial guidance systems across its variants, supplemented in the Jericho 3 by a radar-guided warhead for terminal-phase corrections, enabling strikes against hardened or mobile targets with reduced susceptibility to interception. This configuration supports payload delivery of up to 750 kg, including nuclear or conventional warheads, with the Jericho 3's range of 4,800–6,500 km permitting targeting of adversaries across the Middle East, including Iran, and extending to portions of southern Europe or the former Soviet periphery. Accuracy metrics, measured by circular error probable (CEP), stand at approximately 1,000 meters for the early Jericho 1, with subsequent models like the Jericho 2 featuring unspecified improvements derived from shared technology with the Shavit launch vehicle. Operational targeting emphasizes strategic deterrence rather than tactical employment, with the system's solid-fuel and potential for decoys or multiple independently targeted reentry (MIRVs) in advanced configurations enhancing and penetration against defended . Israel maintains no public disclosure of specific target lists, aligning with its nuclear opacity , which avoids confirmatory statements on capabilities to prevent escalation or proliferation incentives. This opacity, rooted in a 1963 pledge not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the , inherently restrains overt signaling of aggressive postures, focusing deployment on second-strike or existential-threat scenarios rather than preemptive conventional use. Doctrinal restraint is embedded in Israel's , which prioritizes preventive action against emerging nuclear threats—such as strikes on reactors in (1981) and (2007)—but reserves ballistic missiles like for disproportionate response to existential dangers, as implied in the concept of overwhelming retaliation only under survival imperatives. Unlike adversaries' explicit first-use policies, Israel's approach avoids codified offensive targeting, relying on ambiguity to deter without provoking arms races, though critics argue this lacks verifiable no-first-use commitments. No variant has been used in , underscoring operational reserve for high-threshold contingencies.

Controversies and Assessments

Non-Proliferation Criticisms

Critics contend that 's development of the Jericho series, particularly the Jericho-3 with its reported range exceeding 4,800 kilometers, undermines global non-proliferation norms by enabling an unverified nuclear delivery capability in a prone to escalation. As a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), faces accusations of exempting itself from international safeguards while advancing solid-fueled, road-mobile ballistic missiles capable of carrying payloads up to 1,300 kilograms, presumed to include nuclear warheads. This opacity, coupled with successful tests in 2008 and 2011, is seen by advocates as eroding the NPT's effectiveness, as it allows to maintain strategic ambiguity without transparency measures. The Jericho program's capabilities have fueled proposals for a Middle East ban on long-range missiles exceeding 3,000 kilometers, with organizations like the Arms Control Association arguing that Jericho-3's three-stage design complicates such agreements, as regional actors such as Iran cite it as justification for their own programs. Israel's resistance to a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone, conditioned on prior normalization with neighbors, is criticized for perpetuating proliferation incentives; for instance, the Nuclear Threat Initiative notes Israel's deployment of approximately 50 nuclear weapons on land-based Jericho systems, which deters verification and disarmament talks at NPT review conferences in 1995, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Domestically in the United States, the Jericho's role in Israel's presumed has prompted legal challenges under the Symington and Glenn Amendments, which prohibit aid to non-NPT states engaging in unsafeguarded nuclear activities; lawsuits filed in 2016 argued that U.S. assistance, totaling billions annually, violates these laws given Jericho's nuclear delivery potential, though administrations have invoked waivers citing . Proponents of strict , including advocacy groups, assert that continued U.S. support signals tolerance for proliferation exceptions, potentially encouraging other states to pursue similar capabilities outside treaty frameworks. These concerns extend to risks, with historical reports of U.S. components allegedly adapted for Jericho, though Israel maintains indigenous development post-French withdrawal in the .

Strategic Necessity and Defensive Rationale

Israel's limited —spanning as little as 9 miles between some borders and the —renders it acutely vulnerable to rapid incursions or missile barrages that could overwhelm conventional forces before , necessitating survivable long-range strike options to underpin deterrence. The Jericho missile series, developed from the 1960s onward in collaboration with amid escalating threats from Arab coalitions, provides this capability through solid-fueled, road-mobile or silo-based systems resistant to preemptive destruction, enabling a second-strike response even after absorbing an initial attack. This defensive posture counters historical patterns of multi-front wars (, , ) and persistent calls for Israel's elimination by adversaries. The rationale embeds within Israel's of deterrence-by-denial and punishment, emphasizing general deterrence via projected superiority and specific red lines against existential threats, including weapons of mass destruction. variants, with ranges from 500 km (Jericho-1, retired) to reportedly 4,800–6,500 km (Jericho-3), are optimized for nuclear payloads, ensuring credible retaliation that discourages without requiring first-use. This second-strike assurance aligns with the "" concept of mutual devastation if survival is imperiled, prioritizing defense over offense by raising the costs of any attempt to overrun the state. Facing Iran's arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles and nuclear program pursuits as of 2025, alongside Hezbollah's precision-guided rockets, sustains a qualitative edge against quantitative imbalances, deterring escalation while complementing layered defenses like . Such capabilities have arguably prevented full-scale invasions since , as potential attackers weigh the risk of unavoidable counterstrikes targeting command centers or population equivalents in enemy territory.

Impact on Regional Stability

The Jericho missile series, particularly the Jericho-3 with its reported range of 4,800–6,500 km and nuclear delivery potential, underpins Israel's second-strike capability, enabling retaliation against threats originating from distant adversaries like . This survivability, derived from solid-propellant mobility and or road-mobile basing, discourages preemptive attacks by imposing credible costs on aggressors, aligning with deterrence principles that have correlated with the absence of full-scale Arab-Israeli wars since 1973. Israel's maintenance of nuclear ambiguity—neither confirming nor denying integration—amplifies this effect without escalating overt arms racing, fostering a cautious stability amid regional hostilities. Conversely, the program's advancement has catalyzed proliferation and defensive countermeasures among adversaries, as Iran's Shahab and series developments partly respond to perceived Israeli reach, extending to potential coverage of Gulf states. Arab states, including , have pursued modernization and U.S.-backed defenses like THAAD in reaction to the broader regional environment shaped by Jericho, heightening vulnerability perceptions and incentives for quantitative buildup over qualitative restraint. This dynamic risks instability through miscalculation, as short regional distances compress decision timelines during crises, though empirical outcomes show restrained escalation in proxy conflicts involving and rocket salvos intercepted by systems like Arrow-3. Emerging alignments, such as informal Israel-Gulf cooperation against Iranian proxies since the 2020 , reflect Jericho's indirect stabilizing influence by signaling shared deterrence interests, yet Iran's April 2024 missile barrage—intercepted with minimal damage—underscores ongoing tests of this equilibrium without tipping into broader war. Overall, while Jericho fortifies Israel's qualitative edge, its opacity sustains a precarious balance where deterrence prevails but proliferation pressures persist.

References

  1. https://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/passion/aircraft/military-dassault-aircraft/md-620-jericho/
  2. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jericho-3/
  3. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/08/israel-ballistic-missile-programme/
  4. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jericho-2/
  5. https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt1_africa.htm
  6. https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Israel.pdf
  7. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jericho-1/
  8. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/jericho-1.htm
  9. https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_carus2.htm
  10. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2002/04/ballistic-missile-capabilities-in-the-middle-east?lang=en
  11. https://www.newsweek.com/what-jericho-missile-israels-doomsday-nuclear-option-1833848
  12. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012-05/banning-long-range-missiles-middle-east-first-step-regional-arms-control
  13. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai9012.pdf
  14. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/jericho-2.htm
  15. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/5-weapons-make-it-clear-israel-dominates-the-sky-25371
  16. https://aamarchives.org/blog/south-africa-v-israel-at-the-icj.html
  17. https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/israel-aerospace-industries-ltd/
  18. https://www.deagel.com/Weapons/Jericho/a000852
  19. https://aviationweek.com/defense/israel-tests-jericho-iii-missile
  20. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-795752
  21. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/israel/
  22. https://www.twz.com/news-features/could-israel-use-conventionally-armed-jericho-ballistic-missiles-to-strike-iran
  23. https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/10/shallow-ramparts-air-and-missile-defenses-in-the-june-2025-israel-iran-war/
  24. https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/IDF-successfully-tests-new-rocket-propulsion-system-610073
  25. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/worldwide-ballistic-missile-inventories
  26. https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/israel_missile_design_characteristics.pdf
  27. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/road-mobile-ballistic-missiles-a-strong-option-for-bolstering-adf-self-reliance/
  28. https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/five-israeli-weapons-of-war-iran-fears-from-f-15-eagles-to-nuclear-tipped-jericho-missiles
  29. https://media.nti.org/pdfs/south_africa_missile.pdf
  30. http://www.astronautix.com/r/rsa-3.html
  31. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rsa/missile.htm
  32. http://www.astronautix.com/r/rsa.html
  33. https://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=458&tid=2
  34. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons
  35. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-03-20-mn-8097-story.html
  36. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001028023.pdf
  37. https://www.csis.org/files/publication/100830_IsraelThreatPerceptFinal.pdf
  38. https://www.twz.com/31358/did-israel-just-conduct-a-ballistic-missile-test-from-a-base-on-its-mediterranean-coast
  39. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/israel/
  40. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjrxnx0sr
  41. https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-nwdata/nuclear_list_bn_eng/list_of_nuclear_201806/israel-nuclear-weapons-capability
  42. https://fas.org/publication-term/israel/
  43. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-07/press-releases/new-us-israeli-strategic-dialogue-announced-israel-acquires-new
  44. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/iran-freaked-israel-has-jericho-missiles-armed-nuclear-weapons-212257
  45. https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm
  46. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB18c06sVIII.pdf
  47. https://www.nti.org/countries/israel/
  48. https://www.sipri.org/research/armaments-and-disarmament/nuclear-weapons/world-nuclear-forces/israel
  49. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/09/advantageous-ambiguity-israels-nuclear-arsenal?lang=en
  50. https://samf.substack.com/p/israels-nuclear-ambiguity
  51. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010-11/wrestling-nuclear-opacity
  52. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/israel-nuclear-disarmament/
  53. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-858167
  54. https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/israel-iran-tensions-samson-option-nuclear-policy-explained-125062000784_1.html
  55. https://basicint.org/why-the-israeli-policy-of-nuclear-ambiguity-is-harmful-for-prospects-of-a-wmd-free-zone-in-the-middle-east/
  56. https://armscontrolcenter.org/countries/israel/
  57. https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/lawsuit-claims-aid-to-nuclear-israel-illegal-under-symington-glenn-amendments/
  58. https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/israel-nukes-halt-military-aid
  59. https://www.wisconsinproject.org/missiles-too-dangerous-to-name/
  60. https://ine.org.pl/en/iranisrael-conflict-long-distance-rivalry-strategies-toolkits-and-struggle-for-penetrating-rival82117s-strategic-depth/
  61. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria01_rod01.html
  62. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/israel-not-so-secret-nuclear-weapon-superpower-181363/
  63. https://interestingengineering.com/military/israel-hidden-nuclear-power-could-be-larger
  64. https://www.mei.edu/publications/destabilizing-role-missiles-middle-east
  65. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/INSSMemo155.03.2.Brom.ENG.pdf
  66. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/12/space-middle-east/iiss_mdi-middle-east-space-activity_122024__.pdf
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.