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Sejil, or Sejjil, (Persian: سجیل, lit. 'brimstone') is a family of Iranian solid-fueled medium range ballistic missiles. The Sejil are replacements for the Shahab liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. According to US Pentagon sources, the missile profile of the Sejil closely matches those of the Ashura, Ghadr-110 and the Samen.[5]

Key Information

Development of the Sejjil missile likely began in the late 1990s, building upon Iran’s accumulated experience from previous missile programs, particularly the Zelzal short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) series.[1]

Design

[edit]

According to Jane's Information Group, details of the design other than the number of stages and that it uses solid fuel have not been released. Uzi Rubin, former director of Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, indicated that, "Unlike other Iranian missiles, the Sajil bears no resemblance to any North Korean, Russian, Chinese or Pakistani (missile technology). It demonstrates a significant leap in Iran's missile capabilities." Rubin went on to state that the Sejil-1 " ... places Iran in the realm of multiple-stage missiles, which means that they are on the way to having intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities ..."[6]

The missile utilizes composite solid fuel and unlike the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is launched only vertically, the Sejil could be launched at a variable angle.[7] As a weapon, Sejil presents much more challenge to Iran's potential enemies, as solid-fuel missiles can be launched with much less notice than liquid-fueled missiles, making them more difficult to strike prior to launch.[8]

Iran claims that if launched from the city of Natanz, it could reach Tel Aviv in less than seven minutes.[9] On June 18, 2025, during the Iran-Israel War the IRGC claimed to have fired a Sejjil missile at Israel; Israel claims the missile was intercepted with fragments causing minor damage to a vehicle.[10]

Variants

[edit]
  • Sejil-1: The Sejil is a two-stage, solid-propellant, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) produced by Iran with a reported 2,400 km (1,500 mi) range. [1] A successful test launch took place on 13 November 2008. Its range, if confirmed, would allow it to strike targets as far away as Israel and southeastern Europe.[11]
  • Sejil-2: According to CSIS Missile Threat, it is unclear if there is an independent Sejil-2 variant, or whether the name is simply a reference by Iran to testing in 2009 of the original Sejil. [2]
  • Sejil-3: According to CSIS Missile Threat, unconfirmed reports about the development of a Sejil-3 state that it would reportedly have three stages, a maximum range of 4,000 km, and a launch weight of 38,000 kg.[2]
  • Sejil-2 missile images
  • Artist's impression
    Artist's impression
  • Sejil (right) and Qiam (left) missile
    Sejil (right) and Qiam (left) missile

See also

[edit]
[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sejjil

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Sejjil is a two-stage, solid-propellant developed by , featuring road-mobile launchers and an estimated range of approximately 2,000–2,500 kilometers with a capacity of ~700–750 kilograms. Development of the Sejjil likely originated in the late , drawing from Iran's prior experience with shorter-range solid-fuel systems, marking a significant advancement in its pursuit of more responsive and survivable strategic weapons. First publicly tested in November 2008, the Sejjil underwent several successful launches through 2012, including variants like the Sejjil-2, achieving operational deployment thereafter. Its solid-fuel composition enables shorter preparation times compared to 's earlier liquid-propellant missiles like the , potentially complicating preemptive strikes and enhancing deterrence value against regional targets including and U.S. bases in the . maintains that the Sejjil is conventionally armed and not designed for nuclear payloads, though its range and accuracy improvements have fueled international concerns over proliferation risks, with assessments varying on production scale.

Development History

Origins in Iranian Missile Programs

The Sejjil missile program originated from Iran's efforts to develop indigenous solid-propellant technology during the late 1990s, building on advancements in unguided rockets such as the series, which enabled domestic production of solid fuels previously reliant on foreign assistance. These early solid-fuel initiatives addressed limitations in liquid-propellant systems, which were vulnerable to restricting imports of volatile components and expertise. Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), under the Ministry of Defense, led the technical development of solid-propellant capabilities for medium-range ballistic missiles, while the (IRGC) provided operational oversight and integration into its missile arsenal. The program evolved from prototypes like the , an initial designation linked to Sejjil efforts, focusing on scaling solid propellants from short-range rockets to longer-range applications through iterative material refinements and burn-rate adjustments. Key challenges included overcoming shortages in high-performance binders and oxidizers, necessitating self-reliant processes to evade sanctions that hampered access to advanced chemical . By prioritizing domestic R&D, achieved breakthroughs in composite propellants suitable for multi-stage designs, reducing dependency on external suppliers and enhancing despite persistent technical hurdles like propellant grain stability.

Key Testing Milestones (2008–2012)

The inaugural public test of the Sejjil missile took place on November 12, 2008, marking Iran's first successful launch of a two-stage, solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile with a demonstrated range of approximately 2,000 kilometers. This test validated the missile's rapid acceleration and distinct solid-fuel burn signature, distinguishing it from liquid-fueled predecessors like the Shahab-3. In May 2009, conducted a second test focusing on the Sejjil-2 variant, which incorporated enhancements to guidance and systems for improved accuracy and stability during flight. This launch, covering an estimated 800 kilometers in a partial , confirmed refinements to inertial guidance mechanisms, addressing potential issues in reentry stability observed in earlier solid-fuel designs. Further tests in December 2009, October 2010, and February 2011 iteratively refined the Sejjil-2's performance, with each launch demonstrating reliable ignition of solid-propellant stages and consistent midcourse trajectory control under simulated combat conditions. These evaluations emphasized validations of reliability and integration, despite procurement challenges from limiting access to advanced composites and electronics. The final reported test occurred in , underscoring the missile's production scalability and operational readiness, as solid-fuel storability enabled quicker deployment preparations compared to liquid alternatives, even as sanctions impeded full-scale manufacturing expansion. This milestone capped a series of developmental flights that empirically established the Sejjil's core functionality, including two-stage separation and terminal accuracy within several hundred meters via onboard inertial systems.

Post-2012 Developments and Production

Following a period of inactivity after its last reported test in , the Sejjil program saw renewed activity in January 2021 during Iran's Great Prophet 15 military exercises, where a launch demonstrated sustained operational readiness and potential refinements in launch preparation times. Iranian officials asserted that post-2012 enhancements focused on improving inertial sensors for greater accuracy and enhancing transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) mobility to reduce vulnerability to preemptive strikes, though independent verification of these claims remains limited due to restricted access to testing data. International sanctions, intensified after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in , constrained 's access to foreign dual-use materials for solid-fuel composites, delaying scaled production but spurring domestic advancements in synthesis and composite materials by the early . Despite these hurdles, reportedly initiated serial production of Sejjil missiles around 2020–2022, integrating them into IRGC stockpiles for rapid deployment scenarios. U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments from 2023–2025 indicated a modest expansion of 's medium-range solid-fuel inventory, including Sejjil variants, with stockpiles enabling salvo launches of up to dozens of missiles within hours, as evidenced by their first combat deployment during the June 2025 Israel- conflict. In that , fired Sejjil-1 missiles targeting Israeli sites, confirming the system's integration into active forces and its role in overwhelming air defenses through sheer volume and solid-fuel quick-reaction advantages. Post-conflict revealed rebuilding affected production facilities, signaling intent to replenish and sustain output amid ongoing sanctions.

Technical Design

Propulsion and Structural Features

The Sejjil missile utilizes a two-stage solid-propellant system, marking a departure from Iran's earlier reliance on liquid-fueled designs and enabling enhanced operational flexibility. This configuration consists of a primary solid-fuel booster in the first stage for initial ascent and a second solid-fuel stage for midcourse , supplemented by liquid-propellant attitude control systems for stability. The solid propellants allow the missile to be stored fully assembled and fueled for extended periods, facilitating launch preparation in minutes from mobile transporter-erector-launchers, in contrast to the hours or days needed for liquid-fuel systems that require on-site fueling and are vulnerable to detection during preparation. Structurally, the Sejjil measures approximately 18 in length and 1.25 in diameter, with a launch weight of 23,600 kg, optimized for road-mobile deployment to improve against operations. The design's inherent simplicity from solid propellants reduces mechanical complexity, such as the absence of large fuel tanks and pumps found in liquid systems, contributing to a lighter and faster initial acceleration during the boost phase. This shorter boost duration—characterized by rapid velocity buildup to over 4,300 per second—narrows the temporal window for ground-based detection and tracking compared to slower-igniting liquid alternatives. The architecture's reliance on composites for grains enhances reliability under storage and operational stresses, while the modular staging allows for efficient separation post-first-stage burnout, preserving into the midcourse phase with minimal energy loss. Overall, these features prioritize causal advantages in launch and evasion, aligning with doctrines emphasizing rapid, unpredictable strikes from dispersed positions.

Guidance, Accuracy, and Warhead Capabilities

The Sejjil missile primarily employs a strapdown inertial navigation system (INS) for midcourse guidance, which provides autonomous trajectory control without reliance on external signals vulnerable to jamming. The Sejjil-2 variant incorporates enhancements to this system, including refined navigation algorithms tested during a May 2009 launch, aimed at reducing drift errors over its 2,000-2,500 km range. While Iranian state media assert integration of satellite-based augmentation—potentially GPS or Beidou-compatible receivers—for terminal phase corrections, independent analyses emphasize INS dominance to ensure operational resilience in contested environments, with unverified claims of such hybrid systems improving circular error probable (CEP) to under 300 meters in later iterations compared to 500–1,000 meters in baseline models. Warhead capacity is estimated at ~700-750 kg, configured for conventional high-explosive (HE) payloads optimized for area or hardened-target effects, with the conical designed for atmospheric stability during descent. This payload supports unitary HE charges or submunitions, though structural limits preclude scaling beyond 1,000 kg without range trade-offs. Theoretical adaptability for nuclear devices exists if miniaturized become available, potentially yielding 10–20 kilotons based on mass constraints analogous to historical designs like the series, but no verified Iranian nuclear integration has occurred. In the terminal phase, the reentry vehicle exhibits basic aerodynamic control via fins or jet vanes—upgraded in post-2009 models from Ghadr-derived components—to execute minor trajectory adjustments, enabling limited evasion of point defenses. However, as a solid-fueled , its maneuverability remains constrained by fixed post-boost velocity and lack of sustained propulsion, resulting in predictable parabolic paths unlike glide vehicles or hypersonics; indicates that without advanced or continuous thrust, evasion relies on speed (Mach 12–14 at impact) rather than agility, with effectiveness diminishing against layered intercepts. Demonstrated in 2021 exercises, these features prioritize penetration over precision maneuvering, with accuracy ultimately bounded by INS gyro drift over extended flight times.

Variants and Upgrades

Sejjil-1 Baseline Model

The Sejjil-1 represents the baseline configuration of Iran's Sejjil family of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), first publicly tested by the (IRGC) on November 12, 2008. This test flight covered approximately 800 km, demonstrating the missile's two-stage solid-propellant design as a proof-of-concept for Iran's indigenous scaling of solid-fuel technology to the MRBM class. Unlike prior liquid-fueled systems such as the , the Sejjil-1's solid propellant allows for storage in a fueled state, reducing launch preparation from hours to minutes and improving operational survivability against preemptive strikes. The missile measures 18 meters in length, with a diameter of 1.25 meters and a launch weight of 23,600 kg, capable of delivering a 700 kg payload—potentially high-explosive or other warhead types—to a range of 2,000 km. It relies on a basic inertial navigation system for guidance, which lacks the reentry vehicle maneuvering or terminal-phase corrections found in later variants, contributing to its primary limitation of reduced accuracy. Western assessments note that the Sejjil-1's early guidance technology results in inherently lower precision compared to subsequent models like the Sejjil-2, which introduced stability enhancements. This baseline design thus served primarily as a technological benchmark, validating solid-fuel feasibility while highlighting areas for refinement in control and targeting systems.

Sejjil-2 and Subsequent Enhancements

The Sejjil-2 variant debuted with a successful test launch on May 20, 2009, incorporating refinements to the second-stage solid-propellant engine, including a more powerful design that extended the 's effective to approximately 2,000–2,500 km while improving overall propulsion efficiency. Follow-up tests in September and an optimized version on December 16, 2009, validated these enhancements, demonstrating greater reliability in two-stage separation and flight stability compared to initial models. These upgrades emphasized precision through refined inertial guidance systems, reducing (CEP) estimates to under 300 meters in later evaluations, though exact figures vary by configuration. Iranian sources claim additional stealth features, such as anti- coatings on the Sejjil-2 , to minimize radar cross-section and complicate during boost and midcourse phases. Post-2012 production iterations prioritized mobility enhancements, integrating advanced transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) capable of carrying the 23-ton over rough terrain for rapid dispersal, thereby countering vulnerability to preemptive strikes through shortened launch preparation times inherent to solid-fuel technology. Limited public data on further upgrades suggest incremental improvements in for midcourse trajectory corrections, supporting objectives, but independent verification remains constrained by Iran's opaque testing protocols; no major upgrades have been reported for 2025 or 2026, with the missile demonstrating consistent performance in combat use during the 2025 Israel-Iran conflicts.

Operational Deployment

Pre-Combat Testing and Readiness

The Sejjil underwent limited overt after its sixth and final public demonstration in , which achieved a range of approximately 1,900 km into the , as Iranian authorities shifted emphasis toward operational secrecy and integration into military exercises to avoid revealing technical details or production scales. This approach reflected broader IRGC practices for advanced systems, prioritizing covert validation over high-profile launches to minimize vulnerability to foreign intelligence. In subsequent IRGC drills, such as the Great Prophet 15 exercises in January 2021, the Sejjil was launched from mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs), confirming its compatibility with rapid deployment protocols and demonstrating logistical efficacy in simulated combat environments. These exercises highlighted the missile's two-stage solid-propellant design, which eliminates pre-launch fueling requirements—unlike liquid-fueled predecessors such as the —allowing for quicker erection, targeting, and firing sequences. The solid-fuel configuration inherently supports "" maneuvers, enabling TELs to disperse, fire salvos, and reposition swiftly to evade counterstrikes, a tactic repeatedly exercised by IRGC Force units to enhance and operational . By the mid-2020s, this readiness was bolstered through dispersed basing and storage strategies, with the Sejjil integrated into IRGC stockpiles alongside complementary systems, though exact inventory figures remained classified and subject to production constraints observed in earlier development phases.

Combat Use in 2025 Israel-Iran Conflicts

The Sejjil missile achieved its first verified combat deployment on June 18, 2025, when Iran's (IRGC) launched Sejjil-2 solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missiles toward in retaliation for Israeli airstrikes that began on June 13 under Operation Rising Lion. The IRGC described this as the inaugural operational use of the two-stage system, targeting military sites in central over a distance exceeding 1,500 km, with Iranian state media claiming precision strikes that caused minimal reported damage according to Israeli assessments. Israeli defenses, including the and systems, intercepted the majority of the inbound projectiles, resulting in one light injury and no significant structural impacts from the Sejjil salvo. In subsequent escalations, the IRGC incorporated Sejjil variants into broader barrages, notably the 12th wave of Operation True Promise 3 on the same date, deploying what it termed "ultra-heavy" two-stage Sejjil s with enhanced warheads weighing up to 1,500 kg to test saturation tactics against Israel's layered defenses. Iranian announcements emphasized the missiles' rapid launch capabilities and maneuverability to evade interception, though and Israeli military statements indicated partial successes in overload attempts, with dozens of missiles penetrating outer layers but few reaching targets intact. The barrage contributed to over 300 total projectiles fired that day, underscoring Sejjil's role in Iran's strategy of combining solid-fuel quick-response assets with liquid-fuel systems for sustained pressure. Overall outcomes highlighted Sejjil's operational reliability in combat, with no reported launch failures attributed to the itself, though rates exceeded 90% per Israeli data, limiting strategic effects to psychological deterrence rather than decisive damage. IRGC claims of destroyed air defenses remain unverified by independent , which attributes any overload stress to volume rather than Sejjil-specific breakthroughs.

Strategic Role

Integration into Iranian Military Doctrine

The Sejjil missile has been integrated into the (IRGC) Aerospace Force's doctrine as a cornerstone of Iran's asymmetric deterrence strategy, compensating for Tehran's conventional military inferiority against technologically superior adversaries such as and the . This approach prioritizes missile barrages to impose costs on aggressors, enabling "deterrence by punishment" without exposing vulnerable assets like to interception or destruction. The IRGC views solid-fuel systems like the Sejjil as essential for rapid response capabilities, allowing launches with minimal preparation time compared to liquid-fuel predecessors, thereby enhancing survivability in preemptive strike scenarios. In doctrinal terms, the Sejjil supports Iran's "forward defense" paradigm, where missile forces underpin hybrid warfare by deterring escalation against IRGC-backed proxies in the "Axis of Resistance." Its medium-range profile facilitates strikes on regional targets, including Israeli infrastructure, without relying on an air force susceptible to suppression, as demonstrated in exercises like the 2009 "Grand Prophet" maneuvers that incorporated Sejjil launches alongside shorter-range systems. This integration aligns with causal imperatives of Iran's strategy: by threatening symmetric retaliation, Tehran offsets power asymmetries, forcing adversaries to weigh the risks of limited actions that could provoke overwhelming missile volleys. The missile's indigenous solid-propellant design further embeds it in IRGC by reducing logistical dependencies on foreign suppliers, such as North Korean liquid-fuel technologies that characterized earlier Shahab variants. This bolsters doctrinal resilience under sanctions, enabling decentralized deployment and storage that complicates enemy and targeting. Empirical validation occurred in June 2025, when the IRGC first employed the Sejjil operationally against , signaling its evolution from deterrent reserve to active escalatory tool in direct confrontations. Such use underscores the missile's role in networked deterrence, where solid-fuel rapidity permits synchronized salvos with cruise and shorter-range assets to saturate defenses.

Comparative Advantages Over Liquid-Fuel Missiles

The Sejjil missile's solid-propellant design enables significantly shorter launch preparation times compared to liquid-fueled alternatives like the Shahab-3, which requires hours for fueling due to the need to load volatile hypergolic propellants such as unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO). In contrast, the Sejjil can achieve readiness in minutes, as its pre-cast solid fuel eliminates on-site mixing and reduces vulnerability to satellite reconnaissance during preparation. This rapid timeline enhances operational surprise and survivability against preemptive strikes, a critical edge in Iran's asymmetric deterrence posture. Solid propellants also confer superior storage and deployment resilience over liquid systems, which suffer from propellant corrosiveness and instability—UDMH, for instance, can degrade storage facilities and demands specialized handling to prevent leaks or spontaneous ignition. The Sejjil's fuel, being inert and cast within the missile casing, allows indefinite shelf-life under controlled conditions without frequent maintenance, facilitating mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) operations in dispersed, hardened sites. This contrasts with units, often requiring fixed silos or vulnerable surface storage to mitigate hazards, thereby increasing detection risks via signatures or logistical footprints. While solid fuels yield marginally lower and efficiency than optimized engines—potentially limiting mass for equivalent range—the Sejjil's design offsets this through simplified logistics and scalability in production, enabling to larger inventories without the demands of systems. For instance, both missiles achieve comparable ranges of approximately 2,000 km, but the Sejjil's reduced supports indigenous advances, as evidenced by its transition from dependency in earlier Shahab variants. These attributes prioritize battlefield utility over raw propulsive performance in 's missile evolution.

Controversies and Assessments

Iranian Claims Versus Western Intelligence Evaluations

Iranian officials have claimed the Sejjil missile achieves a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers, with some statements specifying up to 2,500 kilometers, positioning it as a defensive system capable of precision strikes against regional threats without nuclear applications. Iranian military spokespersons, such as IRGC commander Hajizadeh, have asserted a (CEP) as low as 10 meters for recent variants, emphasizing its solid-fuel design for rapid deployment and reliability in conventional roles. These claims portray the Sejjil as a maturing indigenous technology, with successful tests announced in 2008, 2009, and sporadically thereafter, underscoring Iran's self-reliance amid sanctions. Western intelligence assessments, including those from U.S. and Israeli sources, corroborate the Sejjil's range at approximately 2,000-2,500 kilometers but express skepticism regarding its accuracy and operational maturity, estimating CEP values in the hundreds of meters rather than the sub-10-meter precision claimed by . Analysts from organizations like the and the Washington Institute cite limited open-source test data, infrequent launches since 2011, and production constraints on solid-fuel components due to sanctions as evidence of overstated reliability. Recent combat use in 2025 exchanges revealed failure rates of 8-9% for Iranian ballistic missiles broadly, with debris recovery and trajectory analysis indicating inconsistencies in guidance systems that undermine precision claims. Regarding payload, maintains the Sejjil carries conventional warheads of up to 1,500 kilograms exclusively, denying any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intent. However, U.S. and Israeli evaluations highlight the missile's , with its two-stage solid-propellant architecture inherently compatible with nuclear or chemical warheads, enabling delivery of over intercontinental distances if advances enrichment efforts. This assessment draws from of recovered components and simulations, noting that lighter nuclear payloads could extend effective range while maintaining the system's quick-launch advantage over liquid-fueled predecessors, irrespective of Tehran's declarations. Such evaluations prioritize empirical feasibility over official narratives, viewing the Sejjil as a dual-use platform that bolsters 's latent nuclear deterrent posture.

International Concerns Over Proliferation and Regional Threats

and Israeli assessments highlight the Sejjil's range exceeding 2,000 kilometers, enabling strikes on Israeli population centers like and underscoring its potential as a nuclear delivery vehicle if advances its warhead program. This capability violates the intent of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 (JCPOA) and urged to refrain from work designed for nuclear payloads, even after formal restrictions lapsed in October 2023. Iran's deployment of missiles during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, including in the 12th wave of attacks as reported by the , amplified escalation risks by demonstrating rapid, solid-fuel launch sequences that evade early warning and preemption. These operations, part of over a dozen barrages exchanged in the 12-day conflict, exposed vulnerabilities in regional defenses and raised alarms over Iran's willingness to employ advanced systems in direct confrontations, potentially drawing in broader alliances. Gulf Cooperation Council states, including , decry the Sejjil program as a catalyst for arms proliferation and instability, citing Iran's advancements as provoking defensive buildups and intensifying sectarian rivalries through asymmetric threats to energy infrastructure and U.S. bases. Saudi officials have condemned Iranian strikes in the 2025 conflicts, such as those on Qatari facilities hosting American assets, as emblematic of broader aggression that undermines Gulf security and fuels a regional . Proliferation fears center on Iran's transfer of ballistic missile components and expertise to proxies like and Yemen's Houthis, with Sejjil's solid-fuel technology potentially informing shorter-range adaptations that extend threats beyond Iran's borders. Such diffusion, evidenced by proxy attacks incorporating Iranian designs, erodes deterrence balances and heightens Sunni-Shia frictions, as Iran's offensive patterns—rather than reactive postures—demonstrate intent to project power via empowered militias.

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  60. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-857856
  61. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/02/15/arsenal-assessing-the-islamic-republic-of-irans-ballistic-missile-program/
  62. https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2025/06/19/iran-shocks-with-2500-km-range-sejjil-missile-to-attack-israeli-military-targets.html
  63. https://www.facebook.com/groups/1628518593936147/posts/9933842423403681/
  64. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-ballistic-missile-arsenal-still-growing-size-reach-and-accuracy
  65. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-iran
  66. https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1220753/ninety-percent-of-the-time-the-missile-works-every-time-iranian-missile-failure-rates-during-true-promise-ii/
  67. https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/alert-iran-claims-first-use-sejjil-missile-fired-with-potential-submunition-payload-over-israel
  68. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iranian-missiles-and-us-missile-defense
  69. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/141124_CSIS_Toukan_Irans_Nuclear_Missile_Delivery_Capability.pdf
  70. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/jcpoa-sunset-alert-missile-restrictions
  71. https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-19-2025/
  72. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-mounting-missile-threats-neighboring-countries
  73. https://rsdi.ae/en/publications/the-menace-from-above-lessons-on-evolving-missile-defense-for-the-gulf
  74. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2605543/saudi-arabia
  75. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/feb/03/irans-missiles-transfers-proxies
  76. https://mecouncil.org/publication/irans-missile-and-drone-program-disrupting-u-s-aerial-hegemony/
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