Hubbry Logo
Operation NikiOperation NikiMain
Open search
Operation Niki
Community hub
Operation Niki
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Operation Niki
Operation Niki
Operation Niki
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Operation Niki
Part of Turkish invasion of Cyprus
Noratlas
A Hellenic Air Force Noratlas on a training mission in Ellinikon International Airport, Athens, 1979
TypeClandestine airlift
Location
Nicosia airport, Cyprus
Planned byGreece Greece
ObjectiveReinforcement of Cypriot forces
Date21–22 July 1974
Executed byGreece Hellenic Air Force
  • 354th Sqdn. "Pegasus"
  • 115 Combat Wing
  • (20 Noratlas and 10 C-47 aircraft)

Cyprus Cypriot National Guard

  • Cypriot anti-aircraft 195 MEA/AP battalion
OutcomeReinforced Cypriot forces with significant losses
CasualtiesAircraft crew and 33 commandos killed in action
10 commandos wounded in action
Destruction of three aircraft.

Operation Niki (Greek: Επιχείρηση Νίκη), named after the goddess Nike, was a clandestine airlift operation during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus that was carried out on 21–22 July 1974, with the aim of transporting a battalion of Greek commandos from Souda, Crete to Nicosia, Cyprus. Upon their arrival, the aircraft were engaged in friendly fire, which resulted in the loss of 33 men and the destruction of three aircraft.[1][2]

Background

[edit]

Since the 1950s, Greece had established a foreign policy favoring the union of Cyprus with Greece. In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was established with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots being its two founding communities. Archbishop Makarios was elected as its first President. Makarios came to believe that unification of the island with Greece was not possible and pursued a policy of non-alignment.

After a military coup in April 1967, a right-wing military junta seized power in Athens. The Greek juntists suspected Makarios for not being truly in favor of unification and prepared five plans to overthrow him between 1971 and 1974.[3] Eventually, on 15 July 1974, a military coup d'état orchestrated by the Cypriot National Guard and the junta of Athens succeeded in deposing Makarios and replacing him with nationalist Nikos Sampson. On the pretext of a peacekeeping operation, Turkey took military action code-named Operation Atilla and invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974.[4][better source needed]

Preparations and departure

[edit]

The Greek leadership in Athens was largely taken by surprise. The political situation deteriorated rapidly due to the Turkish invasion and the junta was soon at the verge of total collapse. Despite an initial order for implementation, the existing military plans for the reinforcement of the defenses in Cyprus were cancelled. In a climate of confusion and indecision, it was eventually decided to send one commando battalion by air. An initial plan to airlift a battalion based in northern Greece from Thessaloniki airport using requisitioned Boeing 720 aircraft of Olympic Airways was cancelled.[5][6] Later, it was decided to airlift another unit from Souda airport, using almost the entire transport fleet of the Hellenic Air Force at the time. The unit chosen was the A' Raider Squadron, reinforced with men from the amphibious-capable C' Raider Squadron. Thus, in the late afternoon of July 21, a fleet of 20 Noratlas and 10 C-47 aircraft were relocated to Souda airport, base of the 115th Combat Wing [el].[1]

According to orders, the transport aircraft would secretly take off at night with five minutes separation and fly without fighter escort. To avoid detection, they would fly at altitudes below 200 ft in full radio silence with minimum lights and no visual contact between them. They would land in Nicosia, unload the force and take off immediately for the return to Greece under the cover of darkness. Each aircraft would carry four airmen (two pilots, a flight engineer and a navigator) and approximately 30 commandos with their weapons and ammunition.[7][8] It was estimated that the 750 km flight to Cyprus would last around three hours. As a result, the latest time at which an aircraft could take off, fly to Cyprus, unload and depart before dawn was 24:00. The first plane departed Souda at around 22:35 and the departure plan was followed by the first five aircraft.[9][10] Afterwards, several delays resulted in only 13 Noratlas aircraft of the 354th Tactical Transport Squadron [el] managing to take off before the midnight time limit and 2 after the midnight limit against orders but not all managing to land due to time constraints.[11][12] These planes were numbered in the order of their departure, receiving codes Niki-1 to Niki-15. The remaining five Noratlases and all the C-47 did not take off.[5]

Arrival in Nicosia

[edit]
External image
image icon Flight path followed by the Noratlases from Souda to Nicosia.[13]

The Cypriot National Guard lacked an air force, hence Turkey had full air superiority over the island. Turkish Air Force had bombed Nicosia airport and only one third of the runway was usable.[14]

Of the 15 Noratlases that took off, 13 made it to Cyprus and the remaining two landed on Crete and Rhodes due to mechanical problems. Upon arrival at Nicosia International Airport at around 02:00 AM, the aircraft were engaged by Cypriot National Guard anti-aircraft gunners of the 195 MEA/AP battalion, who were uninformed about their arrival and mistook them for a Turkish airborne assault.[15] As a result, the 4th Noratlas (Niki-4) received heavy fire and was shot down two miles short of the runway with the loss of four crew and 27 commandos. Two more commandos were killed and 10 wounded on-board Niki-6, which landed with both engines severely damaged.[1] One more Noratlas aircraft (Niki-3) was badly damaged and could not take off again. Another aircraft (Niki-12) did not have sufficient fuel for the return flight. These aircraft were destroyed on the ground by the co-pilot and the engineer of Niki 12, following orders of the Hellenic Air Force Headquarters. The rationale for doing so was that Greece was not officially at war with Turkey, thus any evidence of Greek involvement in the operations in Cyprus should be erased. The remaining nine aircraft managed to return safely to Greece after unloading their troops.[1]

Aftermath

[edit]

The transported Greek commando unit, which was given the Greek Cypriot designation 35th Raider Squadron (35 MK), fought during the Battle of Nicosia Airport being crucial in its defense and successfully defended the airport.[16] They also fought during the second Turkish invasion of August 1974 and contributed decisively to preventing Nicosia from falling into Turkish hands. Ironically, the unit had no casualties in the battlefield. With the exception of the order to Lt Cdr E. Handrinos to turn back his vessel (L-172 Lesvos) and disembark the ELDYK troops he had picked up the previous day, Operation Niki marked the only materialized Greek attempt to reinforce the defense of Cyprus during the invasion.[citation needed]

No military investigation was ever ordered regarding the circumstances of the loss of Niki-4 and neither was anyone ever held responsible. The Greek junta collapsed on 23 July 1974, mainly because of the events in Cyprus.[17]

Return of remains

[edit]

The remains of Niki-4 and the bodies of most of the men it carried were hastily buried on a hill, which is now a military cemetery and war memorial known as Makedonitissa Tomb. In summer 2015, excavations started at Makedonitissa with the aim to recover any human remains.[18] After 14 months, DNA identification of those on board was completed and the remains of 16 Greek soldiers were handed over to their relatives in early October, 2016, 42 years after their death.[19]

Criticism of the operation

[edit]

Operation Niki has been characterized as suicidal.[20][21] It was ill-prepared and used unreliable, ageing aircraft and aircraft crews and commandos were unfamiliar with the terrain at their destination. Ground forces at Nicosia had not been notified in time about their arrival. The operation had no tactical justification but merely a symbolic and morale-boosting character.[5] The rationale of an airlift instead of an airdrop operation has also been criticized.[5]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Operation Niki

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Operation Niki (Greek: Επιχείρηση Νίκη, "Operation Victory"), named after the goddess of victory Nike, was a clandestine airlift operation launched by the on the night of 21–22 July 1974 to reinforce forces with Greek Army commandos during the initial phase of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The operation involved transporting elements of the Hellenic Army's 1st Commando Battalion from Souda Bay Air Base in to , utilizing low-altitude flights to evade detection. Planned under the Greek military junta's directive amid escalating Turkish advances following their landings on 20 July, the mission aimed to bolster defenses around but was hampered by logistical delays and miscommunications. Of the intended 20 and 10 Douglas C-47 Dakota transport aircraft, only 15 Noratlas departed, flying at treetop level across the Mediterranean and over the to approach from the east. Upon arrival, several aircraft encountered intense anti-aircraft fire from Cypriot positions mistaking them for Turkish intruders, resulting in catastrophic losses: Noratlas "Niki 4" was shot down with all 32 aboard killed, and "Niki 7" crash-landed with 2 dead and 11 wounded, for a total of 34 fatalities. Despite partial successes in landing troops from other aircraft, which integrated into the 35th Battalion of the , the operation's impact was negligible against Turkish momentum, contributing to a on 22 July that halted further reinforcements. The heavy casualties and operational failures, exacerbated by the absence of prior coordination signals with Cypriot forces, underscored deficiencies in junta-era planning and accelerated the regime's collapse later that year. Survivors and landed equipment provided limited tactical support but could not alter the conflict's trajectory, marking Operation Niki as a bold yet ill-fated intervention in the crisis.

Historical Context

The Cyprus Enosis Movement and Intercommunal Tensions

The movement, advocating for the political union of with , emerged among the island's Greek-speaking majority in the wake of Greece's independence from the in 1821, drawing on ethnic and cultural ties to the Greek mainland. This aspiration gained traction under British administration after 1878, particularly as , who constituted about 81 percent of the population in 1960 (including small Armenian and Maronite communities), viewed as historically and ethnically Greek. , approximately 19 percent of the population, opposed Enosis, favoring either continued partition (Taksim) or maintenance of the status quo to protect their amid fears of subjugation. The movement's armed phase began with the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (), which launched an against British rule on April 1, 1955, through bombings and attacks aimed at forcing Enosis, resulting in over 100 British military casualties by 1959. Cyprus achieved independence on August 16, 1960, via the and Agreements, establishing a bi-communal with power-sharing provisions: a Greek Cypriot president, Turkish Cypriot vice president, both with rights over key decisions, and in the and military reflecting the 80-20 demographic split. However, implementation faltered due to disputes over ratios—Turkish demanded 30 percent of positions despite holding only about 14 percent—and Greek Cypriot reluctance to fully honor powers. On November 30, 1963, President Archbishop proposed 13 constitutional amendments to eliminate separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities, reduce authority, and integrate security forces, which Turkish rejected as undermining their safeguards. This triggered the "Bloody Christmas" violence starting December 21, 1963, when clashes in escalated into widespread attacks, primarily targeting Turkish , leading to at least 200-300 deaths (disputed figures, with Turkish sources claiming higher) and the flight of around 25,000 Turkish into enclaves controlling just 3 percent of the island's territory. Intercommunal tensions persisted through the 1960s, with sporadic violence bouts until 1967, despite the deployment of United Nations Peacekeeping Force in (UNFICYP) in March 1964 to enforce cease-fires and buffer zones. Greek Cypriot hardliners, including the paramilitary formed in 1971, revived demands through intimidation and bombings against moderates, while armed themselves via supplies from and maintained self-governance in enclaves. These divisions, rooted in incompatible national goals— versus Taksim—fostered mutual distrust, with viewing Turkish demands as obstructionist and perceiving as existential threat, setting the stage for escalation in 1974. By the early 1970s, over 500 intercommunal deaths had occurred since 1963, alongside economic isolation of Turkish enclaves, underscoring the failure of the 1960 framework to reconcile the communities' irreconcilable visions.

Greek Military Junta's Involvement in Cyprus

The Greek military junta, which assumed power through a coup on April 21, 1967, pursued policies aimed at achieving enosis, the unification of Cyprus with Greece, viewing the island as integral to national interests amid ongoing intercommunal violence since 1963. The regime maintained influence over Cyprus through a contingent of approximately 600 Greek Army officers embedded in the Cypriot National Guard, providing training, command roles, and strategic direction to pro-enosis elements. This involvement escalated after President Makarios III, elected in 1959 and re-elected in 1968 and 1973, sought to assert greater independence by demanding the withdrawal of these officers in early 1974, interpreting their presence as undue interference. In , following a palace coup within the junta, Brigadier General assumed control as head of the and the shadowy "Group of 17" conspirators, sidelining President and prioritizing aggressive action on to bolster the regime's domestic legitimacy amid economic woes and student unrest. Ioannidis, an ardent anticommunist, regarded Makarios as a pro-Soviet obstacle to , having previously supported EOKA-B, the paramilitary group founded by General to advance unionist goals through guerrilla tactics. Under his direction, the junta cultivated EOKA-B networks and planned the removal of Makarios, rejecting diplomatic overtures and Zurich-London agreements that guaranteed Cypriot . On July 15, 1974, Ioannidis authorized a executed by units under pro-junta officers, including Michael Georgitsis, who broadcast the overthrow of Makarios and declared , an EOKA-B hardliner, as interim president with as the explicit objective. The operation involved armored assaults on the , resulting in Makarios's narrow escape after 38 minutes of bombardment, though official junta announcements initially denied involvement to avoid immediate international backlash. Sampson's five-day regime featured celebratory marches in proclaiming union with , but lacked broader support among wary of Turkish retaliation. The junta's orchestration of the coup, intended to force and demonstrate resolve, instead precipitated Turkey's invasion on July 20, 1974, under Operation Attila, as cited the threat to and treaty obligations violated by the unilateral action. Ioannidis's strategy underestimated Turkish military readiness and dynamics, where Greece's junta had alienated allies; declassified Greek intelligence later confirmed the regime's direct orders and exclusion of civilian input. This miscalculation not only partitioned but accelerated the junta's collapse, with Karamanlis recalled on July 23, 1974, amid public outrage over the crisis.

Turkish Invasion of Cyprus: Operation Attila Phase One

On July 20, 1974, initiated the first phase of its military operation in Cyprus, codenamed , following the Greek junta's against President on July 15, which installed as leader and raised fears of (union with Greece). Turkish Prime Minister authorized the landings after diplomatic efforts, including the Geneva Conference, failed to reverse the coup, citing obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The operation involved elements of the Turkish VI Corps, including the 50th Infantry Regiment (three battalions), an airborne brigade (four battalions via ), a commando brigade (three battalions by helicopter), two marine battalions for amphibious assault, and support from the Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization (TMT) with approximately 15,000 fighters already on the island. Naval forces, including the amphibious ships TCG and TCG Bayraktar, plus five destroyers for gunfire support, and air units with F-104G fighters, F-100C/D aircraft, C-130 transports, and UH-1 helicopters provided cover. By the end of the first day (G-Day), around 13,500 Turkish troops had landed. The primary amphibious landings occurred at Pladini Beach west of (Girne), with additional assaults at Five Mile Beach, establishing a secured by 11:25 a.m. amid minimal initial resistance from the (Ethniki Froura, EF). Simultaneously, airborne operations dropped paratroopers at drop zones near Kriní Airfield and Mándres, linking with local TMT forces and the Turkish battalion to form an . Turkish objectives focused on creating contiguous lodgments, securing port for resupply, controlling the Agírda Pass through the Pentadactylos Mountains, and advancing toward to protect while eliminating EF salients. Cypriot forces, including the 251st Infantry Battalion and elements of the 286th Armored Infantry Battalion, mounted counterattacks, such as at Kióneli, but these were repelled with Turkish air strikes targeting EF bases and armor. Greek Expeditionary Force units (ELDYK) in also engaged dropped paratroopers, inflicting casualties but failing to dislodge them. By July 21-22, Turkish forces linked their beachhead and airhead, capturing and consolidating a lodgment approximately 22 km by 15 km, representing about 3% of Cyprus's territory. The called for a , effective at 4:00 p.m. on July 22, halting phase one after Turkish advances reached the outskirts of but before a full breakthrough to the Attila Line (the northern third of the island). Casualties were significant on both sides, with Turkish reports estimating around 500 killed in the initial fighting, while Cypriot and Greek forces suffered heavier losses due to inferior equipment and coordination. This phase exposed vulnerabilities in Cypriot defenses, prompting urgent Greek reinforcements via to bolster , but the allowed to fortify its positions ahead of phase two in August.

Strategic Planning and Objectives

Decision to Launch Operation Niki

The Greek military junta, facing the Turkish military landings in northern Cyprus on July 20, 1974, which captured key beachheads and threatened the junta-backed Sampson regime, authorized Operation Niki as a desperate reinforcement effort on July 21. This clandestine airlift aimed to transport approximately 600 elite troops from the Hellenic Army's 1st Commando Force, along with ammunition and supplies, to Nicosia Airport to bolster Greek Cypriot National Guard defenses and prevent further Turkish advances during the fragile ceasefire. The operation reflected the junta's miscalculation of Turkey's resolve and Greece's own military constraints, including limited transport aircraft availability and the prohibition on using NATO facilities to avoid alliance repercussions. De facto junta leader Brigadier General , who had consolidated power after the November 1973 coup against , played a central role in greenlighting the mission despite internal debates over its feasibility. and the junta's National Defense Council viewed the deployment as essential to upholding their (union with ) policy, which had prompted the July 15 coup against President , but underestimated the Turkish air superiority and the logistical challenges of a low-altitude, radio-silent flight over 800 kilometers. No formal consultation with civilian elements or allies occurred, underscoring the junta's insular decision-making amid reports of faltering Cypriot resistance. The approval prioritized symbolic defiance over strategic prudence, with planners opting for 14 aircraft from the 354th Tactical Transport Squadron based in , loaded at Elefsis and marshaled at under cover of darkness to evade detection. This choice ignored Greece's broader inferiority in air power and naval support against , a decision later criticized for accelerating the junta's collapse on July 23-24, as the operation's partial success failed to alter the battlefield dynamics. Primary motivations stemmed from ideological commitment to ethnic Greek unity rather than empirical assessment of success odds, with junta documents and post-event analyses revealing overreliance on surprise and shock value against entrenched Turkish positions.

Selection of Forces and Equipment

The Greek military selected the 1st Battalion of the for Operation Niki, an elite unit specialized in airborne insertions and close-quarters combat, to provide rapid reinforcement to forces defending Airport against the Turkish advance. This choice reflected the operation's emphasis on clandestine, high-mobility deployment rather than large-scale conventional forces, given logistical constraints and the risk of escalation with . The battalion's personnel, equipped with light infantry weapons including G3 rifles, machine guns, mortars, and recoilless anti-tank launchers, were prioritized for their ability to disembark quickly and engage in defensive actions without heavy armor or support. Equipment loads were limited to essentials compatible with air transport, excluding vehicles or bulky supplies to maximize capacity and minimize vulnerability during transit. Airlift capabilities centered on 20 aging Nord 2501 Noratlas tactical transports and 10 C-47 Dakota aircraft drawn from the Hellenic Air Force's 354th Squadron "Pegasus" at the 115th Combat Wing, assembled at in for the overnight mission on 21-22 July 1974. The Noratlas, each crewed by four members and capable of carrying up to 60 troops or equivalent cargo, were chosen for their short-takeoff performance and ruggedness, despite maintenance issues and the absence of modern , while C-47s supplemented with additional personnel and supplies.

Intended Role in Cyprus Defense

Operation Niki aimed to transport and deploy the Greek Army's 1st Raider Battalion, an elite unit of approximately 600 commandos specialized in airborne insertions and rapid assaults, to in . The primary objective was to reinforce the outnumbered forces defending against the Turkish invasion's Phase One, which had begun on July 20, 1974, with airborne assaults on the airport and advances toward the capital. Upon landing, the commandos were intended to integrate with local defenders to secure the airport perimeter, which Turkish paratroopers had partially seized, and conduct counterattacks to disrupt Turkish supply lines and armored thrusts from the sector. This deployment was planned to provide a decisive boost in manpower and expertise to hold critical central front lines, preventing the encirclement of and buying time for broader Greek strategic responses amid NATO constraints. The operation reflected the Greek military junta's assessment that elite reinforcements could tip local battles in favor of Greek Cypriot resistance, despite logistical risks and limited overall Greek commitment. The selection of Noratlas underscored the clandestine nature, prioritizing low-altitude flights to evade detection while maximizing capacity for immediate combat deployment. Intended outcomes included stabilizing defenses around , where Cypriot forces faced superior Turkish numbers and air support, though planners acknowledged the high-risk profile given Turkey's air dominance and the island's isolation.

Execution of the Operation

Preparations and Departure from Greece

On July 21, 1974, amid the escalating Turkish invasion of , the Greek under authorized Operation Niki to airlift reinforcements to bolster the defense of . The operation targeted the deployment of the Hellenic Army's 1st Commando Battalion, comprising elite raiders trained for rapid intervention, who were stationed on . Preparations were expedited and clandestine, with troops mobilized from their bases and assembled at Souda Air Base near , , where were readied under cover of darkness to evade surveillance and potential Turkish interdiction. The airlift involved 20 tactical transport aircraft from the Hellenic Air Force's 354th Squadron "," supplemented by 10 C-47 Dakota planes, loaded with commandos, light weapons, ammunition, and essential supplies for immediate combat engagement upon arrival. Aircraft were configured for low-level flight to minimize radar detection, with pilots briefed on a direct route over the toward , despite risks from Turkish air superiority and uncertain weather conditions. No formal coordination occurred with units, contributing to later communication failures. Departure commenced at 22:30 hours on , , with Noratlas taking off from Souda Air Base at five-minute intervals to maintain spacing and reduce vulnerability to interception. The operation proceeded without prior notification to allied forces, reflecting the junta's isolated decision-making amid fears of broader Greco-Turkish war. Initial flights proceeded smoothly, though delays in some takeoffs—possibly due to mechanical checks or loading issues—slightly disrupted the schedule, setting the stage for the perilous transit to .

Aerial Route and Challenges En Route

The Noratlas aircraft of the Hellenic Air Force's 354th Squadron departed from Souda Air Base on at approximately 22:35 on July 21, 1974, bound for in , covering a distance of roughly 550 kilometers southeast over the . The route was designed for clandestinity, avoiding direct overflight of Turkish-controlled airspace by hugging low-altitude paths to evade detection from Turkish forces active in the region during their ongoing . Pilots maintained strict , extinguished all external lights, and flew at minimal altitudes—often below 500 feet—upon nearing to minimize to enemy patrols and anti-aircraft systems. Navigation relied primarily on gyrocompasses due to the operation's secrecy, which precluded use of advanced aids that might reveal positions. These measures, while essential for evasion, compounded risks from the ageing Nord 2501 Noratlas transports, which dated from the and suffered from known reliability issues, including potential engine failures under prolonged low-level flight strain. Of the 15 Noratlas dispatched, only 13 successfully reached , with two compelled to abort and return to owing to mechanical malfunctions or navigational uncertainties exacerbated by the night's conditions and equipment limitations. Crew inexperience with such covert, unlit night missions further heightened the peril, as the junta's hasty planning prioritized speed over thorough preparation. No Turkish interceptions occurred en route, attributable to the low-profile tactics, though the fleet's vulnerability to fighter sweeps remained a constant threat given Turkey's superior air assets in the Aegean theater.

Arrival and Landings at Nicosia Airport

The Greek aircraft participating in Operation Niki began arriving over Nicosia International Airport in the early hours of July 22, 1974, following a clandestine flight from Crete. Cypriot National Guard forces had hastily repaired the bomb-damaged runway and tested its lights around 01:00 hours, with a convoy of vehicles entering the airport area to prepare for the landings. However, due to communication delays, some Cypriot anti-aircraft units initially mistook the incoming Noratlas transports for Turkish aircraft, leading to sporadic friendly fire during the approach. Landings commenced shortly thereafter, with Niki 2 touching down first at 01:52 hours, followed by Niki 1 at 01:55 hours. Subsequent aircraft, including Niki 7 at 02:18 hours, managed to land despite prior en route damage or ongoing fire. The commandos aboard—part of the Greek 1st Squadron—disembarked rapidly upon touchdown, numbering approximately 278 troops who remained in to reinforce defenses after successful deliveries from multiple flights. Damaged but flyable aircraft, such as Niki 6 and Niki 12, completed their landings but were rendered inoperable on the ground, with crews later evacuating or tasked with destroying abandoned planes. The landed forces immediately moved to secure the airfield perimeter, linking up with elements already present. Niki 15, the final aircraft to land, departed at 04:02 hours after unloading, highlighting the compressed timeline of the operation amid escalating Turkish advances. This phase delivered critical reinforcements but was complicated by the airfield's vulnerability and the element of surprise lost to prior alerts.

Immediate Results and Casualties

Successful Deliveries and Ground Actions


The initial waves of Operation Niki achieved successful deliveries at Nicosia Airport in the early hours of July 22, 1974, with the first three Noratlas aircraft (Niki 1, 2, and 3) landing despite sustaining damage from Cypriot anti-aircraft fire mistaken for Turkish intruders. These flights transported commandos from 'A' of the 1st Raider-Parachutist , led by Major Georgios Papameletiu, who quickly disembarked to secure the area and prepare for defensive operations. Subsequent aircraft, including Niki 5 through 12, 14, and 15, also completed landings, contributing to the delivery of 318 commandos from the 1st Combat Squadron originating from Souda Air Base in . Of this force, 278 troops remained on the ground to reinforce positions at the airport, focusing on holding critical infrastructure against Turkish advances. The delivered Greek commandos engaged in ground actions alongside local forces, repelling initial Turkish paratrooper assaults and maintaining temporary control of Airport runways and terminals. These efforts delayed Turkish consolidation of the airfield, allowing Cypriot defenders to regroup and inflict losses on invading units before broader withdrawals. The commandos' actions provided a brief but tangible bolstering of defenses in the face of superior Turkish airborne and amphibious operations.

The Downing of Niki 4 and Incident

During the early morning hours of July 22, 1974, as the fourth Nord 2501D Noratlas transport aircraft, designated Niki 4 and carrying 32 Greek commandos along with its four crew members, approached for landing, it came under intense anti-aircraft fire from positions. Cypriot gunners, operating in the chaos of the ongoing Turkish invasion and lacking prior coordination about the incoming Greek flights, mistook the unmarked Greek plane for a Turkish adversary, leading to the incident. The sustained heavy damage from the ground fire, caught fire, and crashed approximately two miles short of the near the UN buffer zone's Blue Beret Camp. Of the 33 personnel aboard, 32 perished in the crash, including all four members and 28 , marking the single deadliest loss in Operation Niki. The sole survivor, Thanasis Zafeiriou, escaped by jumping from the as it descended under fire, though he sustained injuries. The downing highlighted critical communication failures between Greek and Cypriot forces, exacerbated by the operation's clandestine nature and the absence of radio identification protocols that could have prevented the misidentification. Rescue efforts by Cypriot troops reached the crash site at dawn, recovering bodies but unable to salvage the wreckage immediately due to the intensifying conflict. This incident, while tragic, did not derail the overall deployment, as the preceding three aircraft had successfully landed their contingents earlier.

Evacuation and Withdrawal of Forces

The Greek commandos who successfully landed at Nicosia Airport during Operation Niki on 21–22 July 1974 were not evacuated but integrated into the (ELDYK) and units to bolster defenses against Turkish advances. Survivors from the 1st , numbering approximately 200–300 after accounting for crashes and damage, formed elements of the 35th and engaged in combat, including counterattacks near Kioneli and defenses at the ELDYK camp. Transport aircraft that completed landings, primarily models, disembarked troops before crews destroyed them on the ground to prevent capture by advancing Turkish forces; examples include Niki 3, which was demolished by commandos post-unloading. Of the remaining aircraft, nine managed to withdraw to or mainland despite damage, while others like Niki 12 were abandoned due to fuel shortages and subsequently destroyed. No organized immediate withdrawal of ground forces occurred amid the 22 July ceasefire, which prohibited further reinforcements and left troops in place amid Turkish consolidation. The augmented ELDYK contingent faced and heavy fighting during the Turkish second offensive from 14–16 August 1974, with chaotic retreats such as from Vasilia; surviving personnel were repatriated post-ceasefire under international arrangements, though much equipment including armored vehicles was abandoned or destroyed.

Broader Aftermath and Consequences

Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations

Operation Niki exemplified Greece's direct military engagement in the Cypriot conflict, deploying approximately 400 commandos from the Hellenic Army's 1st Commando Division via 15 aircraft to reinforce Greek Cypriot forces against the Turkish landings on July 21–22, 1974. This clandestine effort, intended to evade formal acknowledgment of Greek participation amid the absence of a declared state of war with , nonetheless signaled ' resolve to counter Turkish advances, intensifying bilateral hostilities at a critical juncture. Turkish forces, already consolidating their beachhead near , viewed such interventions as extensions of Greek expansionism following the July 15 in , further eroding prospects for de-escalation during the initial Geneva Conference talks. The operation's partial success in delivering troops and supplies to Nicosia Airport, marred by the friendly-fire downing of one with 29 fatalities, exposed vulnerabilities in Greek planning and , but its execution heightened operational risks in the Aegean and Thracian theaters. Both nations mobilized reserves— activating general mobilization orders and reinforcing its western commands—bringing the rivals perilously close to open conflict, with skirmishes reported along the Evros border. leveraged evidence of Greek regulars' presence, recovered from crash sites and captured personnel, in diplomatic protests to allies, portraying the as aggressive meddling that justified defensive expansions. This perception contributed to the collapse of the first accord on July 25, paving the way for 's "second phase" offensive in , which secured control over 37% of . Longer-term, Niki's fallout accelerated the Greek military junta's downfall on July 24, 1974, as public outrage over the mission's casualties and strategic futility eroded regime legitimacy, ushering in civilian rule under . The new government, prioritizing national survival over confrontation, distanced itself from junta-era adventurism but inherited poisoned relations, culminating in Greece's suspension of participation in NATO's integrated military command structure on August 14, 1974—a move explicitly tied to perceived favoritism toward during the crisis. This decision, while not directly invoking Niki, reflected the cumulative strain from Cyprus events, including the , fostering enduring Aegean disputes over , , and that persisted into subsequent decades. Turkish sources, emphasizing the operation as proof of Hellenic irredentism, continue to cite it in narratives justifying their 1974 intervention as a preemptive safeguard against (union with ).

Effects on the Cypriot Conflict

Operation Niki provided a modest reinforcement to the , delivering approximately 103 Greek commandos and limited ammunition supplies to on the night of July 21–22, 1974, amid the first phase of the Turkish invasion. These troops participated in defensive actions around the capital, contributing to the temporary stabilization of Greek Cypriot lines against Turkish advances from the Kyrenia beachhead. However, the operation's scale was insufficient to counter the Turkish forces' momentum, which had already secured initial objectives covering about 3% of the island by July 20. The downing of Niki 4 by Cypriot anti-aircraft fire—mistaken for a Turkish —resulted in the loss of 32 elite commandos and the aircraft's crew, alongside damage to other Noratlas transports that grounded them after landing. This incident, combined with the need to destroy compromised aircraft to conceal Greek involvement, not only inflicted significant casualties but also sowed confusion and logistical disruptions within Cypriot defenses, undermining coordination at a critical juncture. The reinforcements, though motivated by the junta's ambitions, could not offset the Cypriot National Guard's broader disadvantages in armor, air support, and troop numbers against the invading Turkish army. Strategically, the operation failed to alter the invasion's trajectory, as a UN-brokered took effect on July 22, pausing but not reversing Turkish gains. The subsequent second Turkish offensive, launched August 14–16, exploited the absence of sustained Greek external support, enabling the capture of additional territory and culminating in the de facto partition of , with Turkish forces controlling roughly 37% of the island by August 18. Operation Niki's exposure of Greek military limitations, amid the junta's domestic collapse on July 23, signaled to Cypriot leaders the improbability of mainland intervention, hastening the shift toward defensive consolidation and diplomatic resolutions under rather than offensive counteraction.

Greek Domestic Political Ramifications

The operational setbacks of Operation Niki, including the downing of two aircraft on July 21, 1974, which resulted in 33 commando deaths and 11 injuries, exposed critical deficiencies in coordination and command within the Greek military under the junta regime. These failures during the of the 1st Commando Battalion to underscored the junta's broader inability to mount an effective response to the Turkish invasion, amplifying perceptions of strategic incompetence among military ranks and the public. The Cyprus crisis, triggered by the junta's orchestration of the July 15 coup against Archbishop in pursuit of (union with ), had already strained domestic support, but Niki's partial success—delivering only limited reinforcements amid high casualties—hastened the regime's delegitimization. Mobilization orders issued on July 20 met with disorganized execution and low enthusiasm, reflecting widespread disillusionment with Dimitrios Ioannides' leadership and its miscalculations in provoking Turkish intervention without adequate preparedness. By July 22, 1974, these events catalyzed internal dissent, culminating in the junta's collapse and the appointment of as on July 23, marking the end of military rule and a return to civilian governance. The perceived betrayal of Cypriot Greeks and loss of territory entrenched a national sense of humiliation, influencing subsequent political transitions, including junta trials, and fostering caution in Greek toward .

Recovery Efforts and Legacy

Search and Return of Remains

The crash of Niki 4, a transport , on July 22, 1974, near resulted in the deaths of 31 Greek military personnel, including commandos from the Hellenic Army's 1st Commando Unit and aircrew, with one survivor who parachuted to safety. Immediately following the incident, Cypriot forces recovered 12 bodies from the crash site, which were identified through initial efforts and buried in a cemetery; some of these remains were later exhumed and repatriated to families in in 1979. The wreckage, containing and potentially additional remains, was hastily buried under a mound of earth at the site, which was later paved over and incorporated into the Tomb of Makedonitissa to commemorate invasion casualties. Efforts to fully excavate the site faced delays due to the presence of ammunition and the site's status as a protected monument, but the European Court of Human Rights ruled in November 2014 that Cyprus must conduct a thorough search for the missing 19 remains to fulfill obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Excavations commenced in July 2015 at the Tomb of Makedonitissa, employing geophysical surveys, metal detectors, and international forensic experts from Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands to probe depths of up to 15 meters amid risks from unstable explosives. Initial findings included aluminum shards and other debris confirmed as aircraft parts, alongside human remains; by September 2015, a significant number of bone fragments were unearthed and subjected to DNA analysis. The recovery process extended over 14 months, yielding remains belonging to 15 Greek commandos and the aircraft's navigator, verified through DNA matching with family samples. These identified remains were repatriated to in April 2016 for burial with military honors, providing closure to the affected families after over four decades. However, the remains of the pilot, co-pilot, and have not been conclusively identified, leaving ongoing uncertainty for those cases despite continued forensic efforts. The operation highlighted challenges in post-conflict recovery, including technical hazards and the need for cross-border cooperation between and .

Memorials and Honors for Participants

In July 2018, Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades unveiled a full-scale replica of a Nord Noratlas aircraft at the crash site of Niki 4 near Nicosia, serving as a permanent memorial to the four crew members and 28 commandos killed during the operation on July 22, 1974. The replica, positioned adjacent to the Makedonitissa Tomb, incorporates artifacts recovered from the original wreckage, including personal effects and aircraft remnants, to commemorate the mission's participants and their role in supporting Cypriot defenses amid the Turkish invasion. The Makedonitissa Tomb itself includes dedicated plaques and a paved over the original Niki 4 crash site, honoring the —pilots Nikolaos Karangelenos and Major Stefanos Kousis, along with other personnel—and the commandos who perished in the incident and subsequent fighting. Annual services at the site, often attended by Greek and Cypriot officials, feature honors such as wreath-laying and divine liturgies, emphasizing the participants' sacrifice in Operation Niki. In , a 1998 law formally recognized Operation Niki participants, including surviving commandos from the 1st Raider Squadron and air force personnel, as "Cyprus fighters," granting them status, pensions, and commemorative entitlements equivalent to those from the broader 1974 conflict. Commemorative events persist, such as the April 2024 gathering at the Cretan Association Omonoia in Astoria, New York, where speakers including Greek Defense Attaché Panagiotis Vlachopoulos recounted the operation's heroism and paid tribute to the fallen. These honors underscore the operation's enduring legacy in Greek tradition, despite its limited strategic outcome.

Recent Commemorations and Developments

On October 18, 2021, a monument was unveiled in Evrychou, , dedicated to the fallen and missing members of the Greek First Special Forces Squadron who participated in Operation Niki. The ceremony, attended by Cypriot officials including the Minister of Defence, highlighted the operation's role in attempting to reinforce Cypriot defenses during the 1974 Turkish invasion and emphasized ongoing efforts to locate missing personnel from the mission. In the Greek diaspora, Operation Niki was commemorated on April 7, 2024, at the Cretan Association Omonoia in Astoria, New York, focusing on the Cretan personnel involved in the from the island. The event underscored the operation's symbolism of Greek military resolve to support , with speakers noting the sacrifices of the commandos transported via Noratlas aircraft despite the mission's ultimate strategic failure. As part of broader 50th anniversary observances of the 1974 Turkish invasion of in July 2024, references to Operation Niki appeared in Greek and Cypriot media retrospectives, framing it as a desperate but valiant reinforcement effort amid the junta's faltering response. These discussions often highlighted the downing of Niki 4 by Cypriot anti-aircraft fire as a tragic incident that compounded the operation's losses. Repatriation efforts for remains from the 1974 conflict continued into 2025, with receiving the remains of six soldiers from on July 22, coinciding with the operation's historic timeline, though specific attribution to Niki participants remains tied to prior excavations of the Niki 4 crash site.

Evaluations and Debates

Operational Achievements and Strategic Rationale

Operation Niki was initiated on the night of July 21–22, 1974, as a desperate measure by the Greek to reinforce defenses amid the ongoing Turkish invasion, which had begun on July 20 with amphibious landings near . The strategic rationale centered on deploying elite commando units to the area to stiffen resistance, prevent the rapid fall of the capital, and honor 's commitments under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which permitted intervention to restore constitutional order in . Greek leaders, facing domestic political instability following their sponsorship of the July 15 coup against President Makarios, viewed the as a means to demonstrate resolve against Turkish expansionism without escalating to full-scale war, given 's inferior conventional forces and constraints. The operation utilized 15 transport aircraft, marshaled at in , to clandestinely elements of the Hellenic Army's 1st Battalion (also referred to as the 35th Unit), comprising specialized capable of rapid deployment. Each Noratlas was configured to carry up to 42 fully equipped soldiers, enabling the potential transport of several hundred troops in multiple sorties under cover of darkness to evade Turkish detection. Operational achievements included the successful landing of approximately 300–400 commandos at , where they immediately engaged Turkish paratroopers and armor, inflicting casualties and temporarily securing perimeter positions to disrupt enemy advances toward the city center. These forces, numbering around 396 in total commitment, fought with notable tenacity, contributing to the delay of Turkish objectives during the critical pre-ceasefire hours and preventing immediate overrun of the airport facility. However, the mission's impact was constrained by its small scale relative to Turkish numerical superiority (over 30,000 troops by late July) and logistical limitations, such as the Noratlas fleet's age and vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire. Setbacks marred execution, including at least one downed by Cypriot over due to miscommunication and lack of prior coordination, resulting in the loss of 33 personnel and damage to multiple planes. Of the deployed commandos, around 263 survived initial combat, with the remainder killed or captured, underscoring the high-risk nature of the endeavor—often described in Greek accounts as a "suicide mission" given the absence of air cover or follow-on support. While tactically bold, the operation failed to alter the broader strategic trajectory, as a UN-brokered took effect on July 22, followed by further Turkish gains in the second phase of their campaign.

Criticisms of Planning and Execution

Operation Niki has been characterized as a suicidal endeavor due to its inherent risks and flawed strategic assumptions under the Greek military junta's desperate bid to reinforce amid the Turkish invasion. The operation relied on fourteen ageing Nord 2501 Noratlas , propeller-driven models from the lacking modern defensive systems or speed to evade threats, rendering them highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and interceptors in a warzone where Turkish air superiority had been established. Planners failed to secure fighter escorts or conduct suppression of enemy air defenses, opting instead for a clandestine night flight from to without prior rehearsals or robust contingency measures. Execution compounded these planning deficiencies through inadequate coordination with Cypriot National Guard units, who mistook the incoming Greek transports for Turkish reinforcements and opened fire upon their arrival on July 22, 1974. One Noratlas, serial 52-133, crashed 3 km short of the runway after sustaining anti-aircraft hits, resulting in 31 fatalities among its 32 occupants, with the ejecting before impact. Another , 53-207, was damaged by ground fire but landed; it was subsequently destroyed on the ground, while a third suffered a takeoff crash in , contributing to total losses of three and approximately 33 personnel from the 1st Squadron. Critics, including Greek military analysts, argue that the deployment of roughly commandos, though heroic, could not materially alter the invasion's trajectory given the overwhelming Turkish numerical and logistical advantages, highlighting the junta's tactical improvisation over sound operational strategy. The mission's partial success in landing some troops was overshadowed by its isolation of reinforcements without resupply lines, leading to their eventual and surrender, underscoring broader Greek military unpreparedness revealed in post-operation reviews.

Viewpoints from Greek Nationalists, Turkish Sources, and International Observers

Greek nationalists portray Operation Niki as a symbol of heroic sacrifice and unyielding commitment to defending Hellenic interests in , emphasizing the commandos' bravery in volunteering for a high-risk mission despite the Greek junta's broader strategic failures. They commemorate the 33 fatalities from the friendly-fire crash of Noratlas Niki 4 on , 1974, as martyrs who reinforced Cypriot defenses amid Turkish advances, with events like the 2016 handover of remains by the Greek Ministry of National Defence honoring participants as "courageous men of the sublimely brave yet tragic operation." This perspective prioritizes the operation's moral resolve over its tactical shortcomings, viewing it as a testament to national solidarity against perceived Turkish expansionism, though some accounts label it a "" due to inadequate planning under junta pressure. Turkish sources depict Operation Niki as a futile and provocative escalation by the Greek junta, aimed at bolstering the coup regime that precipitated the crisis, thereby justifying Turkey's "Peace Operation" to safeguard from threats. Military analyses frame the of approximately 1,500 commandos via 15 Noratlas from to on July 21-22, 1974, as a minor threat swiftly neutralized by Turkish air superiority and ground defenses, with losses like the downing of underscoring Greek desperation and logistical vulnerabilities. From the Turkish Cypriot viewpoint, such interventions confirmed the necessity of the invasion as a liberating force against Greek aggression, integrating Niki into narratives of defensive success that secured by August 16, 1974. International observers, including U.S. military assessments, evaluate Operation Niki as a bold but critically flawed response hampered by poor inter-service coordination, misjudged Turkish capabilities, and tragic from Cypriot anti-aircraft units, resulting in 35 total Greek deaths and limited reinforcement of defenses. Analyses highlight how the low-altitude flights (40-500 feet) evaded but exposed aircraft to ground risks, with only survivors forming a provisional battalion amid the junta's unpreparedness, exacerbating NATO strains between and without altering the invasion's outcome. Broader critiques note U.S. underestimation of Turkish resolve, viewing the operation as emblematic of Greek strategic overreach post-coup, which fueled the island's partition while prompting UN resolutions like 353 calling for ceasefires.

References

  1. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Attila_web.pdf
  2. https://www.militaryhistories.co.uk/unpa/part3
  3. https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/329866
  4. https://countrystudies.us/cyprus/3.htm
  5. https://countrystudies.us/cyprus/21.htm
  6. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-caused-the-division-of-the-island-of-cyprus
  7. https://countrystudies.us/cyprus/53.htm
  8. https://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article/55/2/209/127692/A-Civil-War-by-Any-Other-Name-Building-a
  9. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/why-and-how-did-the-1960-order-collapse_.en.mfa
  10. https://www3.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/cypruspartition.pdf
  11. https://adst.org/2014/07/the-1974-turkish-intervention-in-cyprus/
  12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d81
  13. https://greekreporter.com/2025/07/15/cyprus-coup-instigates-turkish-invasion/
  14. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/europe/17ioannidis.html
  15. https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/1189434/the-dramatic-38-minutes-of-a-national-tragedy/
  16. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d354
  17. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/greece-declassifies-intelligence-records-1974-cyprus-crisis-2024-11-13/
  18. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d148
  19. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/17/archive-1974-turkey-invades-cyprus
  20. https://hellenicnews.com/2020/07/17/ahi-continues-to-seek-justice-for-cyprus-46-years-later/
  21. https://countrystudies.us/cyprus/15.htm
  22. https://www.hellenicnet.org/2024/07/turkish-invasion-of-cyprus-july-20-1974.html
  23. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d8
  24. https://forgottenairfields.com/airfield-nicosia-54.html
  25. https://www.hellenicnet.org/2024/07/military-operation-niki-cyprus-1974.html
  26. https://www.key.aero/article/noratlas-rugged-and-reliable
  27. https://phys.org/news/2015-08-cyprus-greek-commandos.html
  28. https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/230893/cyprus-honors-noratlas-dead/
  29. https://www.mixanitouxronou.gr/i-katarripsi-toy-noratlas-me-ellines-komantos-apo-kypriaka-pyra/
  30. https://www.in.gr/2023/07/21/stories/kypros-21-iouliou-1974-paratolmi-epixeirisi-niki-o-thanatos-ellinon-apo-filia-pyra/
  31. https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/498041/anazitoun-sto-noratlas-sorous-19-katadromeon-apo-to-1974/
  32. https://www.mixanitouxronou.gr/re-sis-ti-kanate-chtipisate-diko-mas-aeroplano-i-apostoli-aftoktonias-ton-katadromeon-stin-flegomeni-kipro-pos-i-kiprii-katerripsan-kata-lathos-ta-ellinika-metagogika-stin-tourkiki-isvoli/
  33. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372221961_Against_All_Odds_Turkish_Amphibious_Operation_in_Cyprus_20-23_July_1974
  34. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/06/archives/how-the-athens-junta-fell-a-case-study-in-failure-power-and.html
  35. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/cyprus-greek-military-plane-shot-down-1974-discovery-nicosia
  36. https://www.militaryhistories.co.uk/unpa/memorial
  37. https://archive.cyprus-mail.com/2014/11/05/buried-airplane-must-be-dug-up-says-echr/
  38. https://www.presidentialcommissioner.gov.cy/anthropos/anthropos.nsf/All/D8F3C0022D588BA4C225867F0048654B/%24file/NORATLAS%2520-%2520%25CE%25A4YMVOS%2520MAKEDONITISSAS.pdf?OpenElement
  39. https://archive.cyprus-mail.com/2016/04/04/remains-of-noratlas-soldiers-will-be-repatriated-within-weeks/
  40. https://archive.cyprus-mail.com/2018/07/20/president-unveils-noratlas-aircraft-in-honour-of-greek-commandos-killed-during-invasion/
  41. https://www.mod.mil.gr/en/defence-minister-panos-kammenos-address-unveiling-ceremony-noratlas-aircraft-niki-4/
  42. https://www.polisroom.net/2018/07/21/a-memorial-copy-of-noratlas-aircraft-was-presented-on-the-44th-anniversary-of-turkey_s_invasion_of_cyprus/
  43. https://www.flickr.com/photos/kimhaz/46483534645/
  44. https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus-honours-noratlas-dead
  45. https://www.kathimerini.gr/investigations/878205/noratlas-42-chronia-anamonis/
  46. https://www.thenationalherald.com/operation-niki-commemorated-at-the-cretan-association-omonoia-in-astoria/
  47. https://defenceredefined.com.cy/monument-unveiling-of-the-fallen-and-missing-special-forces-in-evrychou-photos/
  48. https://m.facebook.com/officialcyprusprofile/photos/today-marks-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-cyprus-peace-operation-conducted-by-the-/478884031557905/
  49. https://www.mod.mil.gr/en/minister-of-national-defence-n-dendias-attends-repatriation-ceremony-of/
  50. http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/37994/1/mediterran_022.pdf
  51. https://www.oldjets.net/world-wide-oldprops.html
  52. https://www.protothema.gr/stories/article/912289/ioulios-1974-epiheirisi-niki-i-apostoli-autoktonias-ton-noratlas-stin-kupro/
  53. https://comandos74.gr/2012/04/14/niki/
  54. https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/419/oa_edited_volume/chapter/3003886
  55. https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/329863
  56. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Operation_Niki
  57. https://www.mod.mil.gr/en/political-and-military-leadership-ministry-national-defence-handover-ceremony-relics/
  58. https://friendsintelligencemuseum.org/2013/10/03/the-forgotten-war/
  59. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/resolutions
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.