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Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism
Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism
Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism
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The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (French: Parti Nigerien pour la Democratie et le Socialisme, PNDS-Tarayya) was a political party in Niger. It is a banned left-leaning party, part of the Socialist International;[4] it came to power in 2011 following the election of the former long-time leader Mahamadou Issoufou. Mohamed Bazoum is the former president of the party and the former Secretary-General is Foumakoye Gado.

Key Information

"Tarayya" means "gathering" in the Hausa language.[5]

History

[edit]

Third Republic

[edit]

Established on December 23, 1990,[6] the party won 13 of the 83 seats in the National Assembly in the February 1993 parliamentary elections,[7][8] five of which were won in Issoufou's home department of Tahoua Department. In the presidential elections that followed, the first-multi-party election for the presidency, PNDS leader Mahamadou Issoufou, finished in third place with 15.92% of the vote in the first round.[7] As part of a coalition called the Alliance of the Forces of Change, the PNDS backed Mahamane Ousmane of the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) in the second round, with Ousmane defeating Mamadou Tandja of the National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD). In the National Assembly, the PNDS formed part of the AFC majority, and Issoufou was appointed prime minister.[8]

In a decree issued on 21 September 1994, Ousmane strengthened his powers at the expense of those of the Prime Minister, and Issoufou resigned on 28 September. The PNDS was unwilling to put forward another candidate to take Issoufou's place and withdrew from the AFC, thereby depriving the AFC of its parliamentary majority. The PNDS then formed an alliance with the opposition MNSD despite its history of hostility toward that party; Adji Kirgam and Mazou Ibrahim, two PNDS leaders who opposed this alliance, were expelled from the party.[8]

The loss of the AFC's majority led to an early parliamentary elections in January 1995, which saw the PNDS win 12 seats and the MNSD–PNDS alliance, together with two minor groups, gained a majority of seats in the National Assembly. Hama Amadou of the MNSD became prime minister while Issoufou became president of the National Assembly. This situation involved cohabitation between the new government and President Ousmane, and intense rivalry developed between them. In January 1996, the military under Ibrahim Bare Mainassara seized power in a coup.[8]

Military rule and Fourth Republic

[edit]

In the July 1996 presidential elections, won by Mainassara in the first round, the PNDS candidate Issoufou officially finished in fourth place with 7.60% of the vote.[7] Along with other opposition parties, grouped together as the Front for the Restoration and Defense of Democracy, the PNDS boycotted the November 1996 parliamentary elections.[9]

Fifth Republic

[edit]

Following another coup in April 1999, Issoufou finished second in the first round of the presidential contest in the general elections held later in the year, receiving 22.79% of the vote. In the second round he received 40.11% of the vote and was defeated by Mamadou Tandja. In the parliamentary elections, the PNDS won 16 of the 83 seats in the National Assembly,[7][10] becoming the largest opposition party.

Mahamadou Issoufou speaking to the press during his 2004 election campaign.

In the 2004 general elections, Issoufou was the party's presidential candidate again. He finished second in the first round of voting with 24.6% of the vote and was defeated again by Tandja in the second round. In the parliamentary elections, the PNDS received 13.4% of the vote and won 17 of the 113 seats; eight additional seats were won by alliances of the PNDS with the Nigerien Progressive Party – African Democratic Rally, the Nigerien Self-Management Party, the Union of Independent Nigeriens and the Union for Democracy and the Republic.[7]

Sixth Republic

[edit]

The party boycotted the 2009 parliamentary elections.[11]

Seventh Republic

[edit]

The party did contest the 2011 general elections, with Issoufou elected president in the second round, defeating Seyni Oumarou of the MNSD, whilst it emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly, winning 34 of the 113 seats. Issoufou was re-elected in the 2016 general elections amidst a second-round boycott by his opponent Hama Amadou. The PNDS retained its status as the largest party in the National Assembly, winning 75 seats in an expanded 171-seat body.

2023 coup

[edit]

During the 2023 Nigerien coup d'état, which saw the overthrow of party leader Mohamed Bazoum as President of Niger, supporters of the coup demonstrated outside the party's headquarters before ransacking and burning the premises. The coup led to the 2023-2024 Nigerien crisis; the party supports the reinstatement of Bazoum as president.[12]

Electoral history

[edit]

Presidential elections

[edit]
Election Party candidate Votes % Votes % Result
First Round Second Round
1993 Mahamadou Issoufou 205,707 15.92% – – Lost Red XN
1996 183,826 7.60% - - Lost Red XN
1999 435,041 22.79% 710,923 40.11% Lost Red XN
2004 599,792 24.60% 794,357 34.47% Lost Red XN
2011 1,192,945 36.16% 1,797,382 58.04% Elected Green tickY
2016 2,252,016 48.43% 4,105,499 92.49% Elected Green tickY
2020–21 Mohamed Bazoum 1,879,629 39.30% 2,490,049 55.67% Elected Green tickY

National Assembly elections

[edit]
Election Party leader Votes % Seats +/– Position
1993 Mahamadou Issoufou 183,150 14.62%
13 / 83
 Increase 13 Increase 4th
1995 203,629 14.08%
12 / 83
 Decrease 1 Increase 3rd
1996 Boycotted
0 / 83
 Decrease 12
1999 378,634 21.47%
16 / 83
 Increase 16 Increase 3rd
2004 314,810 13.76%
17 / 83
 Increase 1 Steady 3rd
2009 Boycotted
0 / 83
 Decrease 17
2011 1,066,011 33.00%
34 / 113
 Increase 34 Increase 1st
2016 1,701,372 35.73%
75 / 171
 Increase 41 Steady 1st
2020 Mohamed Bazoum 1,745,266 37.04%
79 / 166
 Increase 4 Steady 1st

References

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[edit]
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Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism

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The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism–Tarayya (French: Parti nigérien pour la démocratie et le socialisme–Tarayya; PNDS-Tarayya) is a centre-left social democratic political party in Niger, established in 1990 amid the country's shift to multiparty democracy. Founded by Mahamadou Issoufou, a mining engineer and opposition figure, the party positioned itself as a progressive alternative emphasizing democratic governance, social equity, and economic modernization through resource management, particularly uranium exports. Affiliated with the Socialist International, PNDS-Tarayya gained prominence as an opposition force before achieving electoral success, forming governments from 2011 to 2023 under Issoufou's presidency (2011–2021) and his protégé Mohamed Bazoum's (2021 until ousted in a military coup), during which it pursued counterterrorism operations against jihadist groups and infrastructure investments yielding modest GDP growth, though persistent insecurity, corruption allegations, and perceived authoritarian measures eroded public support leading to the junta's seizure of power.

History

Formation during democratization (1990-1993)

The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya) emerged in December 1990 as Niger transitioned from decades of single-party rule under the National Movement for a Development Society (MNSD). Founded by , a prominent mining union leader, along with teachers, students, and other intellectuals, the party positioned itself as a proponent of , emphasizing political pluralism, , and economic reforms to address widespread discontent with authoritarian governance and . PNDS activists contributed to the mounting pressure for democratization through labor mobilization and advocacy for multi-party reforms, culminating in President Ali Saibou's reluctant convening of the National Conference on July 29, 1991. This assembly, involving over 1,000 delegates from diverse sectors, lasted until November 3, 1991, suspending the 1989 constitution, divesting Saibou of executive powers, and establishing a transitional government under Cheiffou. The conference's outcomes formalized the end of military-influenced rule and laid the groundwork for the Third Republic's multi-party framework, with PNDS leaders influencing debates on union independence and democratic institutions. In Niger's inaugural multi-party legislative elections on February 12 and 14, 1993, PNDS fielded candidates across constituencies and secured 17 seats in the 83-member , trailing the victorious Alliance of the Forces of Change coalition. This modest representation underscored the party's emerging status as a credible left-leaning opposition amid fragmentation among over 20 competing parties, while highlighting its base in urban and union-affiliated voters.

Opposition and challenges under military and early republican rule (1993-2010)

The PNDS-Tarayya initially aligned with President Mahamane Ousmane's following the 1993 transition to the Third Republic but resigned amid escalating disputes over and cohabitation tensions between the presidency and prime ministership, joining the broader opposition. This shift positioned the party as a vocal critic during the political that culminated in early 1995 parliamentary elections, where instability and fractures hampered its influence despite its established parliamentary presence from 1993. The January 27, 1996, military coup by Colonel , which ousted Ousmane and dissolved democratic institutions, prompted PNDS-Tarayya to denounce the takeover and the subsequent non-competitive presidential poll in July 1996, alongside other opposition groups. Under Maïnassara's regime, the party endured heightened repression, including arbitrary arrests and curbs on political activity, yet demonstrated resilience by forging tactical alliances, such as the September 1996 Front for the Restoration and Defense of Democracy (FRDD) with the MNSD-Nassara and smaller parties to challenge military rule. Maïnassara's assassination in the April 1999 coup led by Major ushered in a transitional council that pledged civilian handover, allowing PNDS-Tarayya to regroup and contest the ensuing elections without endorsing the interim military authority. In the Fourth Republic under President (1999–2010), PNDS-Tarayya sustained its opposition role through participation in the November 1999 legislative and presidential contests and the 2004 general elections, prioritizing electoral engagement over ideological rigidity despite widespread allegations of irregularities favoring the ruling MNSD-Nassara. The party navigated repression and exclusion from governing coalitions by cultivating cross-partisan networks, including renewed ties with former rivals like MNSD-Nassara against authoritarian drifts, which fortified its organizational base amid Niger's recurrent instability. This adaptive strategy, emphasizing survival through alliances rather than confrontation, underpinned its firm resistance to Tandja's 2009 constitutional aimed at extending his tenure, galvanizing opposition unity that foreshadowed the 2010 military intervention.

Ascendancy in the Fifth Republic (2011-2020)

Mahamadou Issoufou, leader of the PNDS-Tarayya, secured victory in the 2011 presidential runoff election held on March 12, defeating Seini Oumarou with 57.95 percent of the vote according to provisional results announced by the electoral commission. Issoufou was inaugurated as president on April 7, 2011, marking the PNDS's first ascent to executive power following the 2010 military coup that ousted Mamadou Tandja. In concurrent legislative elections, the PNDS won 39 seats in the 113-seat National Assembly, forming a coalition government with allied parties to achieve a parliamentary majority. The early years of Issoufou's presidency faced immediate security tests, including stabilization efforts after the transitional period and emerging threats from incursions in southeastern , particularly in the starting around 2013. Spillover effects from the 2012 Tuareg-led rebellion in neighboring also strained border areas, though avoided a full-scale domestic uprising through negotiated accords with Tuareg groups predating the Fifth . These challenges tested the PNDS-led government's capacity to maintain order amid fragile post-coup institutions, with the administration prioritizing military reinforcements and regional cooperation to contain insurgent activities. Issoufou sought re-election in 2016 amid ongoing security pressures from jihadist groups, winning the first round on February 21 with 48.43 percent before a runoff against on March 20, where he garnered 92.5 percent of the vote after major opposition candidates the contest. The , led by a citing alleged irregularities in the initial round, reduced turnout to approximately 53 percent and drew criticism for undermining electoral legitimacy, though Issoufou's campaign emphasized continuity in democratic governance and security stabilization. Legislative elections that year further bolstered PNDS influence, securing additional support. To address governance weaknesses, the Issoufou administration established the High Authority for Combating Corruption and Related Offenses (HALCIA) in 2011, tasked with investigating graft and promoting transparency, alongside an anti-corruption hotline and judicial reforms. However, empirical assessments indicated limited impact, with Niger's ranking on Transparency International's improving modestly from 143rd in 2011 to 103rd by 2015 but remaining indicative of persistent systemic issues. These institutional measures underscored the PNDS's rhetorical commitment to reform, though critics attributed ongoing challenges to entrenched patronage networks rather than insufficient policy intent.

Transition to Bazoum leadership and Sixth Republic (2021-2023)

Following the completion of Mahamadou Issoufou's two terms as president, he endorsed , a longtime PNDS-Tarayya ally and former , as the party's for the 2020–2021 . The election's first round occurred on December 27, 2020, with no securing a , leading to a runoff on March 21, 2021, between Bazoum and of the Democratic and Social Convention-Rahama (CDS-Rahama). Bazoum won the runoff with 55.7% of the vote against Ousmane's 44.3%, marking the first democratic between elected leaders in Niger's post-independence history. The PNDS-Tarayya maintained its legislative influence from prior elections, enabling Bazoum to form a continuing the party's dominance under the Fifth Republic's 2010 . Bazoum was inaugurated on April 2, 2021, shortly after foiled a coup attempt on March 31 involving elements of the military, which echoed prior instability but did not derail the transition. In his inaugural address, Bazoum pledged to intensify counter-terrorism efforts against jihadist groups in the , criticizing insufficient international support for regional security operations and committing to bolster Niger's military capacity. He also outlined economic reforms aimed at , including improvements in , , and to address and attract , building on Issoufou-era policies while emphasizing pragmatic . These initiatives sought to sustain PNDS-Tarayya's focus on stability and development amid ongoing threats from groups like and affiliates. By early 2023, strains emerged within the security apparatus, particularly involving the Presidential Guard commanded by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as Bazoum pursued military reshuffles to consolidate loyal leadership and address perceived inefficiencies in counter-terrorism operations. These moves, including plans to replace Tchiani and demote senior officers, heightened friction with elements of the armed forces, reminiscent of the 2021 coup attempt's dynamics where loyalty to the presidency clashed with institutional rivalries. In the months leading to July 2023, Bazoum advanced final policy efforts, such as strengthening Western partnerships for security aid and economic deals on uranium exports, to reinforce PNDS-Tarayya's pro-stability agenda before mounting pressures culminated in the abrupt end to his administration.

2023 coup d'état and immediate aftermath

On July 26, 2023, members of Niger's Presidential Guard detained President at his residence in , isolating him along with his wife and son, while cutting off communications and restricting access to the . Later that day, the Guard's commander, General , announced the formation of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), a that suspended the , dissolved the government and parliament, and imposed a nationwide and border closures. The CNSP justified the takeover by citing the Bazoum administration's alleged failures in addressing escalating jihadist insurgencies from groups affiliated with and , persistent economic stagnation amid uranium-dependent revenues, and undue foreign influence in domestic affairs, particularly from and Western partners supporting counterterrorism efforts. These claims aligned with broader Sahel-wide grievances, where jihadist attacks had intensified since 2012, though empirical conflict indicated that fatalities under Bazoum had not markedly worsened compared to prior years, suggesting the justifications emphasized perceived governance lapses over unmitigated deterioration. In response, the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya), Bazoum's , attempted to rally supporters to defend constitutional order, but these efforts faced immediate suppression as the CNSP arrested dozens of senior PNDS officials and other political figures on charges of plotting against the state. On July 27, pro-coup demonstrators ransacked the PNDS headquarters in , looting assets, setting fire to the building, and destroying over 50 party vehicles, actions that the junta did not curb and which effectively neutralized organized party mobilization. The Economic Community of West African States () responded swiftly with , asset freezes, and a one-week for Bazoum's release, escalating to threats of military intervention by August 6 to restore him, but internal divisions—evident in hesitancy from key members like and amid domestic opposition to force—led to the threat's de-escalation without action, exposing fractures in regional unity over enforcement mechanisms.

Post-coup suppression and exile activities (2023-present)

Following the July 26, 2023, , Niger's military authorities under the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) suspended the activities of all political parties on July 27, 2023, imposing a prohibition on PNDS-Tarayya operations within the country that remains in effect as of 2025. Pro-coup demonstrators ransacked and torched the PNDS headquarters in on the same day, destroying vehicles and infrastructure amid widespread anti-government unrest. The junta subsequently arrested over 130 PNDS officials, including key ministers such as the heads of mines, oil, and the itself, in late July 2023, as part of a broader crackdown on the ousted administration's supporters. Former President , PNDS leader and the party's presidential candidate in 2021, has remained in arbitrary detention without trial since his ouster on July 26, 2023, confined to the alongside his wife as of July 2025. His family endured severe hardships, including prolonged periods without electricity or running water, with a PNDS statement in August 2023 highlighting a week-long deprivation of utilities. While Bazoum's son was released in early 2024 after an initial joint detention, the Community Court of Justice ruled in December 2023 that Bazoum's confinement was unlawful and ordered his release, a decision ignored by the authorities; in April 2025, the junta pardoned and freed dozens of other former officials and officers detained post-coup, but excluded Bazoum. PNDS exile activities have been limited by the domestic clampdown, with leadership fragmented and focused on international advocacy rather than organized operations. As a member of the , the party has benefited from affiliated calls for restoration, including a April 15, 2025, statement urging Nigerien authorities to reinstate suspended political parties and expedite a return to constitutional rule. The CNSP's consolidation of power, culminating in General Abdourahamane Tchiani's swearing-in as transitional president on March 26, 2025, for a five-year period under a new , has rendered PNDS politically inert within Niger's junta-controlled framework, barring any domestic participation or electoral challenges. This formalization, amid ongoing party suspensions and targeted detentions, has entrenched the suppression of PNDS influence, with no verified resumption of internal activities by late 2025.

Ideology and political positions

Social democratic foundations and socialist rhetoric

The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya), founded on December 23, 1990, explicitly adopted a social democratic framework, blending commitments to multi-party with socialist emphases on economic equity and state-led redistribution to mitigate Niger's entrenched . This positioning reflects an aspirational rooted in adapting European social democratic models to Sahelian contexts, prioritizing collective welfare over approaches while rejecting one-party prevalent under prior regimes. The party's longstanding affiliation with the , evidenced by hosting the organization's Africa Committee meeting in on June 17-18, 2023, reinforces its rhetorical alignment with international , which advocates regulated markets, progressive taxation, and public investment in to foster . In party statements and platforms, such as those articulated by founder , this manifests as pledges for enhanced worker protections, including for Niger's and agricultural sectors, and targeted rural initiatives to counteract subsistence vulnerabilities that empirically correlate with social volatility. PNDS-Tarayya's socialist rhetoric underscores causal mechanisms linking —particularly in rural areas where over 80% of Nigeriens reside—to , advocating state intervention not as ideological but as pragmatic necessity to break cycles of deprivation without recourse to identity-based divisions. This first-principles orientation, undiluted by extraneous socio-political framing, positions equity as a foundational bulwark against fragmentation, drawing from post-colonial African socialist legacies while adapting to democratic pluralism.

Pragmatic shifts in economic and security policy

Under the presidency of (2011–2021), the PNDS-Tarayya administration deviated from rigid socialist principles by implementing market-oriented reforms to attract , particularly in the uranium sector, which constitutes a cornerstone of Niger's export economy. The government leveraged the 2007 Mining Code, which had expanded exploration permits and reduced Areva's prior monopoly by enabling new entrants like Rio Tinto, to foster increased uranium production; output rose amid global demand, contributing to economic expansion despite the party's self-identification as social democratic. Reforms included commitments to trade liberalization under WTO rules and business climate improvements, such as streamlined procedures, to draw capital into and projects. These policies yielded empirical gains in aggregate output, with GDP growth averaging 6.2% annually from 2010 to 2019, driven by exports and oil developments, elevating total GDP from $7.9 billion in 2010 to $12.9 billion by 2019. However, such growth masked structural vulnerabilities, including heavy dependence on foreign and volatile prices; poverty metrics remained stark, with the national rate hovering around 44.5% by 2014 after a slight decline from 50.3% in 2011, and affecting 42.9% of the population by 2020 amid rapid demographic pressures that outpaced per capita gains. This disparity underscores critiques of over-reliance on extractive sectors and inflows, which failed to address entrenched rural or diversify beyond minerals representing over 70% of exports. On security, the PNDS government adopted a realist approach to jihadist insurgencies from groups like and AQIM, prioritizing military capacity-building and external assistance over ideological constraints, while implicitly recognizing material drivers such as and that facilitated recruitment in border regions like Diffa and Tillabéri. Policies emphasized bolstering the armed forces through training and equipment acquisitions, enabling containment of threats that had intensified post-2010, with jihadist attacks peaking in the mid-2010s before partial stabilization via pragmatic rather than expansive social programs alone. This shift reflected causal acknowledgment that exacerbated vulnerabilities to , though empirical data indicate persistent violence, with thousands displaced and expenditures straining budgets amid fiscal aid dependence. Under Mohamed Bazoum's brief 2021–2023 tenure, continuity in this vein persisted, focusing on operational enhancements to counter material and ideological insurgent footholds.

Foreign relations and alignment with Western institutions

The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS), during the presidencies of (2011–2021) and (2021–2023), pursued a emphasizing alignment with Western powers, particularly and the , as a bulwark against jihadist insurgencies in the . This orientation facilitated military cooperation, including Niger's participation in 's , launched in 2014 to combat groups like and affiliates, with Nigerien forces conducting joint operations that reportedly neutralized over 120 militants in Tillabéri in early 2020 alone. Such pacts were framed by PNDS leaders as essential for , given the empirical surge in attacks—Niger faced a record 1,600 conflict events in 2021—where Western intelligence and logistics supplemented local capacities amid limited domestic resources. PNDS governments deepened integration with regional Western-aligned bodies like the Economic Community of West African States () and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), retaining the currency pegged to the under French Treasury oversight, which ensured monetary stability but drew accusations of perpetuating colonial dependencies. Foreign aid inflows underscored this alignment: Niger received approximately $2 billion annually in pre-coup, including $107 million in U.S. bilateral aid for FY2023 (primarily military) and €120 million ($130 million) in French development support for 2022, funding counter-terrorism and infrastructure amid poverty rates exceeding 40%. Bazoum explicitly acknowledged reliance on such aid, hosting U.S. and French bases while contrasting Niger's stability with neighbors' breakdowns, positioning PNDS as a pragmatic partner in Western-led stability efforts. Critics, including junta supporters post-2023 coup, portrayed this pro-Western stance as neocolonial subservience, arguing that aid inflows—equivalent to billions of CFA francs yearly—fostered dependency without resolving root insecurities, as violence persisted despite Barkhane's presence until its 2022 wind-down. PNDS countered that disengagement risked Russian influence, as seen in the junta's subsequent alliances with and via the and overtures to , potentially exchanging resources for security guarantees but eroding ECOWAS ties that had mediated regional disputes under Bazoum. This debate highlights causal trade-offs: Western partnerships provided verifiable tactical gains against but fueled domestic sovereignty grievances, with empirical aid suspension post-coup amplifying economic strains without evident security dividends from the pivot eastward.

Leadership and organization

Founding and successive leaders

The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism–Tarayya (PNDS-Tarayya) was established on December 23, 1990, during its constitutive general assembly, primarily under the leadership of , a mining engineer and activist who had previously coordinated opposition efforts against military rule. Issoufou, drawing from socialist principles and experiences in student movements, positioned the party as a social democratic alternative amid Niger's transition to multiparty democracy following the 1990 national conference. He served as the party's longstanding chairman, guiding it through electoral defeats in the early 1990s and building alliances that culminated in its victory in the 2010 parliamentary elections and Issoufou's presidential win in March 2011. Issoufou retained influence over PNDS-Tarayya during his two presidential terms (2011–2021), fostering a structured succession by elevating , a longtime associate and co-founder involved since the party's inception, to key roles including foreign minister (2011–2013) and (2013–2020). Bazoum assumed de facto leadership of the party apparatus around 2015, focusing on organizational consolidation while Issoufou prepared for term limits, enabling Bazoum's presidential candidacy. This grooming ensured continuity, as Bazoum secured the presidency in a February 2021 runoff, marking Niger's first voluntary democratic power transfer between elected leaders, with Issoufou handing over on April 2, 2021. With Bazoum's ascension to the , Foumakoye Gado, a founding member and former secretary-general since at least , emerged as the party's , maintaining operational control amid post-election challenges. Gado's role balanced factional dynamics within PNDS-Tarayya, representing continuity from the Issoufou era while navigating internal tensions, though the 2023 coup led to his arrest alongside other leaders before his release in 2025. This succession pattern underscores Issoufou's strategic design for party longevity through loyalist promotions rather than open contests.

Internal structure and party apparatus

The PNDS-Tarayya maintained a centered on national , which served as the primary forum for electing , endorsing policies, and resolving internal disputes, as demonstrated by its 8th Ordinary Congress held in December 2022. Regional federations operated under federal executive bureaus responsible for local mobilization and coordination, with examples including elective councils in Tahoua and Diffa that renewed regional periodically. A dedicated played a key role in and voter outreach, issuing public calls for mobilization during political crises, such as defending republican institutions in the lead-up to the 2023 events. The party's apparatus emphasized decentralized animation through these regional and youth structures, fostering operational efficiency in strongholds like , the capital, and , where large-scale rallies drew thousands of supporters ahead of elections. Internal cohesion depended heavily on patronage mechanisms, whereby an influential "old guard" within the party leveraged government appointments to sustain and control across levels of administration. This approach, while enabling broad reach, exposed vulnerabilities to factional tensions during periods of democratic contestation. Following the July 2023 , the party's apparatus underwent significant fragmentation due to targeted suppression, including arrests of senior figures like chairman Foumakoye Gado and attacks on members by junta supporters. Formal structures were effectively dismantled, with the party banned and residual activities confined to informal networks amid ongoing persecution.

Key alliances and factional dynamics

The PNDS-Tarayya formed part of the Alliance of the Forces of Change (AFC) coalition in the early 1990s, alongside parties such as the Democratic and Social Convention-Rahama (CDS-Rahama) and the Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress-Zaman Lahiya (ANDP-Zaman Lahiya), to challenge the ruling National Movement for a Developing Society (MNSD). This alliance secured a parliamentary in , enabling Mahamane Ousmane's presidential victory, but the PNDS withdrew from the AFC on September 25, 1994, citing marginalization within the coalition. In anticipation of the 2011 elections following the military ouster of President , the PNDS joined a broad opposition comprising 17 parties to back Mahamadou Issoufou's presidential bid, emphasizing democratic restoration and power-sharing among diverse ideological groups. This pragmatic coalition-building extended to legislative pacts, such as pre-2004 alliances with the Progressive Party for Renewal-African Democratic Rally (PPN-RDA) and the Nigerien Party of Independents-Al Ouma (PNA-Al Ouma), reflecting the party's willingness to partner beyond strict socialist lines for electoral viability. Internally, the PNDS exhibited tensions between an influential "old guard"—veteran members exerting control over appointments and —and emerging reformers advocating policy adaptation, as evidenced by the entrenched power dynamics shaping government roles during Issoufou's tenure. These divides highlighted pragmatic reformers' dominance in strategies versus purist elements favoring ideological purity, though the party maintained cohesion through centralized leadership. Post-2023 coup, the PNDS faced severe suppression, with the junta arresting party supporters and senior figures while allowing pro-coup rallies, exacerbating rifts between loyalists demanding Bazoum's restoration and those potentially seeking accommodation amid the ban on party activities.

Electoral history

Presidential elections

The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) first fielded a presidential candidate in the 1993 election, with , the party's founder, finishing third in the first round held on February 27, amid 's transition to multiparty democracy following the National Conference. Issoufou's campaign emphasized social democratic reforms, but he was outpaced by and , who advanced to the March 27 runoff.
Election YearPNDS CandidateFirst Round Vote ShareRunoff Vote ShareOutcomeKey Context
2011Mahamadou Issoufou24.2% (leading field of 10)58% vs. Seini Oumarou (42%)VictoryPost-coup transitional polls; no major fraud claims; marked first ballot-based power transfer since independence.
2016Mahamadou Issoufou (incumbent)48.5% (leading field of 15)92.5% vs. Hama Amadou (7.5%)Re-electionOpposition boycott in runoff reduced turnout and competition; court validated first-round results despite disputes over candidate eligibility.
2021Mohamed Bazoum39.3% (leading first round)55.7% vs. Mahamane Ousmane (44.3%)VictoryConstitutional court confirmed results; opposition alleged widespread fraud, leading to protests, though international observers noted irregularities but upheld overall validity; represented planned democratic succession from Issoufou.
PNDS victories in 2011 and 2021 followed two-round systems requiring absolute majorities, with runoffs typical due to fragmented fields; the 2016 result reflected strategic opposition abstention rather than broad consensus. Following the July 2023 military coup that ousted Bazoum, Niger's constitution and electoral institutions were suspended, halting presidential contests and sidelining PNDS amid junta suppression of affiliated figures and parties. No elections have occurred since, with the junta prioritizing security over restoration of civilian rule.

National Assembly elections

In the 1993 National Assembly election, held on February 14, the PNDS secured 11 seats out of 83, representing a modest debut in the newly multiparty legislature following Niger's transition from military rule. This outcome positioned the party within the opposition of the Forces of Change (AFC) coalition, which collectively held 50 seats, enabling it to challenge the government amid fragmented opposition dynamics. Voter turnout was approximately 56% of registered electors. The PNDS achieved a breakthrough in the , 2011, (with supplementary polls in May), capturing 37 seats out of 113 as the leading party with 33% of the vote, correlating directly with Mahamadou Issoufou's presidential victory in the concurrent cycle. This plurality reflected the party's consolidation after years of exclusion under prior regimes, bolstered by opposition fragmentation and alliances within the Coalition for Democracy and Republicanism (CFDR), which had boycotted flawed polls. The result facilitated PNDS-led governance, underscoring how synchronized presidential and legislative contests amplified incumbency advantages for aligned parties.
Election YearPNDS SeatsTotal SeatsVote Share (%)Key Notes
19931183Not specifiedPart of AFC opposition coalition (50 seats total).
20113711333Plurality; aligned with Issoufou's presidency; opposition split aided gains.
202080166Not specifiedDominant bloc; turnout 62.9%; pre-coup majority via fragmented rivals.
By the December 27, 2020, election, the PNDS had solidified as the preeminent force, winning 80 seats out of 166 (approximately 48% of contested positions), forming a dominant bloc ahead of the 2023 coup that suspended the assembly. This success stemmed from sustained presidential cycle momentum under Issoufou's term-limited administration, where coalition dependencies diminished as opposition coalitions like CAP 20-21 splintered, yielding only 19 seats to key rivals such as MODEN/FA-Lumana. Voter turnout reached 62.9%, with PNDS drawing empirical strength from urban centers and Hausa-majority regions like Dosso and Maradi, where ethnic mobilization and patronage networks offset jihadist disruptions in the north. Such patterns highlight causal links between executive incumbency, electoral timing, and legislative dominance, as fragmented challengers failed to consolidate against PNDS organizational discipline.

Local and regional elections

The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya) achieved significant success in subnational elections, leveraging its organizational apparatus to secure majorities in communal and regional councils. In the December 13, 2020, polls—the first comprehensive local elections since 2010—the party won 1,799 of 4,246 communal councilor seats and dominated and council results, including 39 of 117 councilor positions, according to provisional tallies by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). This outcome positioned PNDS-Tarayya as the leading force across 266 municipalities and eight regions, enabling control over resource allocation and local governance structures. The party's performance underscored its urban strongholds, with consistent mayoral victories in and other centers bolstering patronage distribution through municipal contracts and services. These wins, mirroring trends without direct overlap, reinforced PNDS-Tarayya's subnational dominance amid a fragmented opposition. In regional contests, the party captured a plurality of seats, facilitating coordinated responses to localized issues like and . PNDS-Tarayya's local apparatus played a key role in rural mobilization, particularly in regions facing incursions from nomadic jihadist groups, by channeling party resources into community defense committees and voter outreach. This effort contributed to higher turnout in vulnerable rural communes during the 2020 vote, sustaining the party's relevance beyond urban patronage. Following the 2023 coup, however, the dissolved all local and regional councils, curtailing PNDS-Tarayya's subnational influence.

Governance record

Economic management and development initiatives

Under the governance of the PNDS-Tarayya from 2011 to 2021, Niger recorded average annual GDP growth of 4.1% between 2011 and 2019, rising from $7.9 billion in 2010 to $12.9 billion in 2019, primarily driven by expansions in and amid favorable weather in some years and increased public investment. This growth was supported by participation in IMF extended credit facility programs, which facilitated and fiscal discipline, though public debt as a share of GDP rose from around 20% in 2011 to over 50% by 2019 due to infrastructure borrowing. Uranium revenues, a key export comprising up to 4.3% of GDP at peaks in the , were channeled into state budgets but remained volatile owing to global price fluctuations and limited value addition domestically. A flagship development initiative was the 3N ("Nigeriens Nourish Nigeriens") program launched in 2011, targeting food self-sufficiency through investments in , , , and sustainable farming practices, which reportedly doubled by enhancing yields in crops like millet and . , contributing over 40% to GDP, benefited from these efforts in years of adequate rainfall, enabling output growth of around 5% annually in the primary sector during the mid-2010s. However, outcomes were inconsistent, with recurrent droughts—such as those in 2012 and 2020—undermining gains and exposing vulnerabilities in rain-fed systems despite expanded covering only about 1% of . Despite macroeconomic advances, structural challenges persisted, including high rates hovering at 40.8% of the below the national line in 2018 and a of 37.3 indicating moderate inequality, as growth failed to broadly distribute benefits beyond urban and resource-linked elites. Reliance on foreign , averaging 10-15% of GDP annually, and commodity exports without significant diversification or industrial processing limited long-term resilience, with critiques from IMF assessments noting insufficient reforms in revenue mobilization and development to reduce aid dependency.

Counter-terrorism efforts and security outcomes

During Mahamadou Issoufou's presidency (2011–2021), under PNDS-Tarayya governance, Niger pursued counter-terrorism through multinational frameworks, including participation in the Joint Force established in 2017 by , , , , and to conduct joint operations against jihadist groups like in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). These efforts involved coordinated patrols and strikes targeting insurgent mobility across porous borders, supplemented by bilateral cooperation with France's , which provided intelligence, logistics, and air support for Nigerien forces. However, the October 2017 , where ISGS militants killed five Nigerien soldiers alongside four U.S. personnel during a joint patrol, exposed operational shortcomings such as inadequate reconnaissance, delayed air support, and underestimation of enemy numbers, prompting internal reviews and temporary adjustments to reduce ground risks. Security outcomes remained mixed, with PNDS officials asserting progress in securing urban and central areas through enhanced military deployments and foreign partnerships, which correlated with fewer high-profile attacks in and southern compared to border zones. Yet empirical data indicate persistent escalation: jihadist violence resulted in over 1,800 fatalities from 2013 onward, predominantly in peripheral regions, reflecting failures to curb territorial gains by groups exploiting ethnic tensions and governance vacuums. In , bordering and , violence spiked notably between 2014 and 2015, with ongoing ambushes and civilian targeting by ISGS affiliates, as armed groups expanded influence amid weak state presence and resource competition. Critics, including military officers who later backed the 2023 coup, attributed these lapses to over-centralized command structures that prioritized capital defense over rural fortifications, insufficient troop equipping, and reliance on external partners without building domestic capacity, allowing jihadists to control swathes of tri-border territory. Aggregate casualty figures from 2013 to 2021 underscore the strategy's limitations, with ACLED-recorded events—largely jihadist-driven—rising amid battles, explosions, and civilian attacks, totaling thousands of deaths when including combatants and non-combatants, far exceeding pre-2011 baselines and contributing to public disillusionment that undermined PNDS legitimacy. This deterioration, particularly in ungoverned peripheries, fueled narratives of systemic , as evidenced by sustained attack frequencies despite G5 operations, which critics viewed as reactive rather than preventive. PNDS countered that resource constraints and cross-border spillovers from Mali's instability necessitated phased approaches, yet the net result was jihadist entrenchment, with groups maintaining operational sanctuaries and recruitment pipelines.

Social reforms and human rights record

During the presidency of (2011–2021), the PNDS-Tarayya government prioritized increased public expenditure on and as part of broader social development efforts, with spending averaging around 10–12% of GDP in the latter half of the decade. This contributed to modest gains in adult literacy rates, which rose from approximately 28% in the early 2010s to 30.5% by 2018 according to World Bank data, though rates remained among the lowest globally due to high and persistent access barriers in rural areas. spending per also saw incremental rises, reaching $35.76 by 2020, supporting initiatives like community-based programs, yet inefficiencies in targeting and delivery limited broader impacts on outcomes such as maternal mortality and . The administration enacted gender parity quotas in 2011, mandating alternating male-female candidates on electoral lists for legislative and local elections, which boosted women's representation in the to 27% by 2011 and sustained levels around 25–30% thereafter. labor laws were strengthened through ratification of international conventions and national prohibitions on hazardous work for minors, but enforcement remained weak, with insufficient inspectors and high rural incidence rates persisting at over 70% of aged 5–14 engaged in labor by 2015 estimates from the U.S. Department of Labor. On , Niger under PNDS governance was rated "Partly Free" by through 2021, with general constitutional protections for expression upheld but marred by government intolerance toward criticism, including prosecutions for social media posts and arrests of journalists—such as five detained in 2015 ahead of elections and two in 2020 for investigative reporting. These incidents, often justified under or security pretexts, highlighted tensions between reformist rhetoric and practical suppressions of dissent.

Criticisms and controversies

Allegations of corruption and patronage networks

The PNDS-Tarayya government, led by President from 2011 to 2021, enacted anti-corruption legislation including the establishment of the High Authority for the Fight Against Corruption and Related Offenses (HALCIA) in 2011, which conducted investigations into fraud cases involving civil servants, judges, and security forces such as customs officers. However, HALCIA's efforts yielded limited prosecutions, with critics alleging that spared PNDS allies and perpetuated among high-level officials. Niger's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores under Issoufou reflected stagnant progress, averaging approximately 30 out of 100 and ranking the country around 150th out of 180 nations in most years, signaling entrenched networks in and resource sectors. These low rankings were attributed by observers to , where party elites allegedly influenced appointments and contract awards to favor loyalists, bloating the bureaucracy with inefficient, partisan hires. Specific allegations centered on favoritism in the uranium sector, Niger's primary export, where renegotiated contracts with foreign firms like (formerly ) in the 2010s were criticized for opaque terms that funneled revenues to connected insiders rather than broad development, exacerbating perceptions of elite enrichment amid widespread . NGOs and local activists, such as those from Niger, highlighted how such deals exemplified broader patronage, with limited trickle-down benefits despite uranium accounting for over 70% of export earnings. Empirical audits post-2023 coup have further probed these networks, underscoring unaddressed vulnerabilities in PNDS-era .

Perceived failures in addressing jihadist threats

Despite substantial international military assistance, including from France's Operation Barkhane and U.S. training programs, jihadist groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) expanded their influence in Niger's Tillabéri region during the PNDS-led administrations of Presidents Mahamadou Issoufou (2011–2021) and Mohamed Bazoum (2021–2023), establishing de facto control over rural areas through ambushes and governance parallel structures. A 2020 analysis noted that Niamey's multifaceted responses—ranging from kinetic operations to negotiation attempts—failed to curb ISGS growth, as the group exploited local grievances over state neglect and heavy-handed tactics that alienated communities. This expansion persisted into 2022–2023 under Bazoum, with ISGS and affiliated militants conducting over 200 reported attacks in border zones, displacing more than 300,000 people amid intensified violence. Critics, including coup perpetrators in July 2023, attributed these lapses to PNDS mismanagement, alleging underfunding of domestic forces and diversion of security budgets toward networks rather than bolstering troop readiness or border defenses. Empirical indicators support perceptions of inadequacy: military casualties from jihadist ambushes surged in the late , with ISGS claiming responsibility for high-profile strikes like the 2017 Tongo Tongo attack that killed four U.S. and five Nigerien soldiers, exposing coordination gaps despite foreign embeds. PNDS defenders countered that Niger's resource scarcity—exacerbated by uranium-dependent revenues vulnerable to global prices—limited scalable responses, yet analysts highlighted causal missteps, such as overreliance on foreign-led patrols that fostered resentment and enabled jihadist recruitment among marginalized Fulani herders. Strategic shortcomings compounded these issues, as PNDS security doctrines prioritized centralized military deployments over community-based intelligence or economic incentives in jihadist strongholds, allowing groups to impose taxation and enforcement in ungoverned spaces. By 2021, Tillabéri alone accounted for a disproportionate share of national displacement and fatalities, with UN data indicating over 200,000 internally displaced persons fleeing jihadist incursions—figures that ballooned post-2022 amid unchecked cross-border flows from and . These outcomes fueled public disillusionment, framing PNDS tenure as a period of reactive containment rather than proactive eradication, though some attributed persistence to transnational dynamics beyond unilateral control.

Dependencies on foreign influence and neocolonial critiques

Under the leadership of and the PNDS-Tarayya from 2011 to 2021, Niger maintained a close military partnership with , hosting up to 1,500 French troops as part of , a counter-terrorism initiative launched in to combat jihadist groups in the . This arrangement provided logistical support and intelligence sharing, with Niger's government publicly affirming the partnership as essential for despite growing domestic . The presence of foreign forces, however, fueled accusations of sovereignty erosion, as French bases in and elsewhere enabled operations that prioritized regional stability over local autonomy, correlating with policy concessions such as unrestricted overflight rights and basing privileges. Economically, the PNDS era saw continued reliance on French firms for extraction, Niger's primary export commodity, with (formerly ) controlling major operations like the Somair mine, where it extracted approximately 86% of production value under agreements renewed in the . These deals, structured to favor French nuclear interests, provided limited royalties to the Nigerien state—often below 10% of revenues—while exposing the to price volatility without substantial local processing , a pattern critics attribute to neocolonial resource extraction dynamics. Foreign aid inflows, averaging around 2 billion USD annually by the late and constituting roughly 12-15% of GDP, further entrenched dependencies, with and French grants tied to governance reforms and security cooperation that aligned Niger's policies with donor priorities. Post-2023 coup critiques from the junta framed PNDS governance as complicit in neocolonial structures, denouncing military pacts with as tools of external control and expelling troops while nationalizing assets to reclaim . Right-leaning analyses emphasize causal links between dependency and diminished decision-making , citing empirical correlations like sustained French access to resources amid fiscal vulnerabilities, whereas left-leaning institutional sources often portray such assistance as enabling development without equivalent scrutiny of concessionary strings. This divergence highlights source biases, with mainstream outlets downplaying costs in favor of stability narratives, yet data on composition—predominantly grants for counter-terrorism and migration control—suggests pragmatic trade-offs that prioritized short-term inflows over long-term .

Suppression of dissent and electoral irregularities

During the 2016 presidential election runoff on March 20, the opposition Front for the Strengthening of (FCD) coalition, including the CDS-Rahama party led by , boycotted the vote, alleging widespread fraud such as underage voting, multiple voting, and ballot stuffing in the first round on 21. PNDS leader secured 92.5% of the vote amid the boycott, with turnout dropping to around 12%, though Niger's validated the results despite international observers noting logistical issues and delays but not systemic invalidation. Opposition figures contested the court's , viewing it as aligned with the ruling party, which contributed to perceptions of an authoritarian consolidation under PNDS rule. Suppression of dissent manifested in targeted actions against critics, including the persecution of opposition leaders and figures, often justified by the government as necessary for maintaining stability amid jihadist threats. For instance, in March 2020, authorities arrested a University of Niamey lecturer for social media posts deemed critical, part of a broader where activists faced for expressing opinions online. During anti-corruption protests in March 2020, police arrested participants, deployed , and inadvertently caused a marketplace fire that killed three people, highlighting forceful responses to public gatherings. Journalists and leaders critical of PNDS were routinely detained and sentenced, fostering an environment where risked legal repercussions, though proponents argued such measures prevented disorder in a volatile context. Electoral irregularities extended beyond 2016, with the U.S. State Department reporting intermittent bans on opposition activities and observed flaws in processes during Issoufou's tenure, including in the elections where similar arose but were not overturned. These patterns drew for undermining democratic pluralism, yet PNDS officials maintained that robust participation and court oversight ensured legitimacy, balancing security imperatives against full openness.

Legacy and current status

Achievements in democratic consolidation

Under the leadership of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya), Niger experienced two notable peaceful power transitions, marking significant milestones in the country's democratic history. In 2011, following the 2010 military intervention that ousted President , PNDS candidate won the presidential election with 58% of the vote in the runoff, assuming office without major violence and initiating a period of civilian rule. This transition adhered to constitutional processes after the interim period. Subsequently, in 2021, Issoufou honored term limits by stepping down after two five-year terms, allowing PNDS-affiliated to win the presidency with 55.7% in the February runoff, achieving Niger's first civilian-to-civilian handover of power since independence in 1960. These events stood out as rare in the , where military coups have frequently disrupted governance in neighboring states like and . The PNDS governments maintained a multi-party framework during Issoufou's tenure from 2011 to 2021, with legislative and presidential elections held periodically, enabling opposition participation despite regional instability. This period saw Niger operate as a functioning multi-party for over a decade, a departure from prior cycles of and coups. Quantitative indicators reflected this progress; the Polity IV score for improved from -3 in 2009 (under Tandja's extended rule) to +3 in 2010 following the transition, signaling a shift toward greater democratic structures, though the remained tentative and fragile amid ongoing challenges. Constitutional adherence, particularly Issoufou's refusal to seek a third term, reinforced institutional norms against executive overreach. These developments under PNDS stewardship contributed to empirical gains in , including sustained electoral cycles and power alternation within the ruling coalition, fostering a for non-violent political change in a coup-prone environment. However, the achievements were contextualized by the region's volatility, with the transition nearly derailed by a failed coup attempt on the eve of Bazoum's inauguration.

Impacts of the 2023 coup on party viability

The 2023 , which ousted President of the PNDS-Tarayya on July 26, resulted in the immediate arrest of key party leaders, including chairman Foumakoye Gado on July 31, severely disrupting organizational structure and access to state institutions. The junta, known as the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), suspended all activities shortly thereafter, prohibiting public demonstrations by PNDS supporters while permitting pro-coup rallies, which further isolated the party from mobilizing its base. This suspension, effective since July 2023, denied PNDS-Tarayya legal avenues for operation, including funding, media access, and electoral participation, eroding its institutional viability. By early , the junta's consolidation of power exacerbated these constraints through the formal dissolution of all in March, as recommended by a national commission from which PNDS representatives were excluded. This measure, part of a proposed five-year transition to rule announced in February , effectively banned PNDS-Tarayya operations nationwide, forcing remaining members into networks or clandestine activities abroad and domestically. While pockets of loyalty persist among exiles and underground sympathizers, empirical indicators—such as zero legal seats, suppressed protests, and lack of public events—demonstrate organizational atrophy compared to pre-coup rivals like the MNSD-Nassara, some of whose figures have navigated junta tolerance through non-confrontational stances. The coup's structural fallout thus accelerated PNDS-Tarayya's decline, as the regime's security failures under Bazoum's administration—manifest in unchecked jihadist advances—fueled the initial ouster, stripping the party of its incumbency advantages and exposing underlying vulnerabilities without recourse to rebuild. Long-term prognosis remains dim, with ongoing detentions of Bazoum and associates precluding leadership renewal, and the junta's monopoly on coercive resources hindering any rival resurgence absent external intervention or internal fractures. Former President , leader of the PNDS-Tarayya until the 2023 coup, has remained under arbitrary detention without trial since July 26, 2023, confined to the presidential palace as of July 2025. In December 2023, the Community Court of Justice ruled his detention arbitrary and ordered his release, a decision ignored by Niger's junta after the country's withdrawal from in January 2024. Bazoum faces charges of high and undermining state security, with his parliamentary immunity lifted by the State Court in June 2024 following proceedings that denied him lawyer access and . Other PNDS-Tarayya affiliates, including at least 30 former officials and party leaders such as Foumakoye Gado, have faced arbitrary arrests and prolonged detentions post-coup, often without formal charges or fair trial guarantees. The junta has leveraged the judiciary for politically motivated prosecutions, including unverified claims of economic crimes and against ex-ministers, amid documented procedural abuses such as restricted legal representation and ignored court orders on related detentions. The National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland's five-year transition plan, formalized on March 26, 2025, with junta head sworn in as transitional president, includes recommendations for dissolving all existing and imposing new registration rules, severely limiting PNDS-Tarayya's organizational viability and rehabilitation prospects. This extended timeline prioritizes military oversight over rapid civilian restoration, entrenching barriers to PNDS-Tarayya members' political participation and exposing them to ongoing reprisals under junta control.

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