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In metaphysics, particulars or individuals are usually contrasted with universals.[1][2] Universals concern features that can be exemplified by various different particulars. Particulars are often seen as concrete, spatiotemporal entities as opposed to abstract entities, such as properties or numbers. There are, however, theories of abstract particulars or tropes. For example, Socrates is a particular (there's only one Socrates-the-teacher-of-Plato and one cannot make copies of him, e.g., by cloning him, without introducing new, distinct particulars). Redness, by contrast, is not a particular, because it is abstract and multiply instantiated (for example a bicycle, an apple, and a particular woman's hair can all be red). In the nominalist view, everything is particular. A universal at each moment in time, from the point of view of an observer, is a set of particulars.

Overview

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Sybil Wolfram[3] writes:

Particulars include only individuals of a certain kind: as a first approximation individuals with a definite place in space and time, such as persons and material objects or events, or which must be identified through such individuals, like smiles or thoughts.

Some terms are used by philosophers with a rough-and-ready idea of their meaning. This can occur if there is lack of agreement about the best definition of the term. In formulating a solution to the problem of universals, the term 'particular' can be used to describe the particular instance of redness of a certain apple as opposed to the 'universal' 'redness' (being abstract).

The term particular is also used as a modern equivalent of the Aristotelian notion of individual substance. Used in this sense, particular can mean any concrete (individual) entity, irrespective of whether it is spatial and temporal or not.

See also

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References

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Particular

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In metaphysics, a particular is defined as an , that exists in a specific time and place, such as a unique object or substance that is neither predicated of a subject nor present in a subject. These entities are primary substances, exemplified by "the man or the ," which serve as the fundamental building blocks of reality and cannot be further divided into more basic components. Unlike abstract concepts, particulars are directly perceivable through the senses and possess numerical unity, making them the most definite sense of "substance." Particulars stand in contrast to universals, which are general attributes, properties, or kinds—such as "humanity" or "redness"—that can be predicated of multiple particulars and shared across them. In Aristotelian terms, universals like ("man") or genera ("") are secondary substances that classify and depend on particulars for their instantiation, as they exist only "in" the primary substances rather than separately. This distinction addresses the problem of how multiple entities can share qualities without being identical, with particulars providing the concrete instances and universals the repeatable forms. The relation between them is often described as , where a particular "has" or instantiates a universal asymmetrically. The particular-universal distinction traces its origins to , particularly and , who debated the ontological status of these entities in the context of and . argued that universals, known as Forms, exist independently as perfect, eternal ideals in a non-physical realm, with particulars imperfectly participating in or imitating them to gain their qualities. , critiquing this separation, maintained that universals cannot exist apart from particulars, insisting that forms are immanent within individual substances rather than transcendent, thus grounding metaphysics in the observable world of concrete beings. This framework influenced medieval , modern , and ongoing debates about realism, , and the nature of .

Core Concepts

Definition and Characteristics

In metaphysics, a is defined as an substance or that is numerically one and non-repeatable, serving as the primary subject of predication and in the sensible world. This concept, rooted in Aristotelian , contrasts with universals by emphasizing the particular's status as a tode ti—a "this something"—that is unique and not predicable of multiple subjects. The term originates from the Latin particularis, meaning "of a part" or "pertaining to a particle," which evolved in philosophical to signify singular, indivisible instances rather than general or divisible aspects of . Key characteristics of particulars include their spatiotemporal location, which confines them to a specific place and time, ensuring they cannot exist simultaneously in multiple locations. Individuality is another core attribute, as particulars are inherently unique and non-shareable, maintaining their identity through a form of unity that prevents replication across instances. Furthermore, particulars exhibit , manifesting as entities capable of causal interaction and possessing observable sensory qualities, such as , color, or texture, which distinguish them from abstract or general features. Illustrative examples highlight these traits: a specific apple on a tree represents a particular, existing at a definite spatiotemporal point with its own causal efficacy (e.g., potential to rot or nourish) and sensory attributes (e.g., its particular shade of red), whereas the property of "redness" itself is repeatable and not tied to any single instance. Similarly, the individual Socrates exemplifies a particular human substance, combining matter and form in a way that is irreducibly singular, unlike the universal "humanity" shared across many. These features underscore the particular's role as the foundational unit of concrete reality in metaphysical analysis.

Distinction from Universals

In metaphysics, particulars are conceived as unique, non-repeatable entities—such as a specific individual like —that exist at a single spatiotemporal location and cannot be wholly present in multiple instances simultaneously. In contrast, universals are repeatable properties or qualities, like humanity or redness, that can inhere in or be instantiated by multiple particulars at once, allowing for the sharing of characteristics across diverse entities. This core distinction underscores the opposition between the individuated, concrete existence of particulars and the abstract, shareable nature of universals, which serves as a foundational divide in ontological categorization. Ontologically, particulars function as primary substances, serving as the basic bearers of properties and the fundamental units of that ground , while universals operate as secondary qualities or predicates that describe or modify those substances without independent apart from their instantiation. Particulars, in this framework, are the primary subjects of predication, possessing a completeness and individuality that universals lack, as the latter are distributed across many without being divided. This hierarchical categorization highlights particulars' role in unifying and individuating , with universals providing the relational for similarity and classification. A central philosophical challenge in this distinction is the one-over-many problem, which questions how a single universal can account for the apparent sameness or unity among diverse particulars that share it, such as multiple white objects unified under whiteness. Realists address this by affirming the independent existence of universals as the explanatory ground for such resemblances, positing them as real entities that bridge the multiplicity of particulars. In opposition, nominalists reject universals altogether, treating them as mere linguistic conveniences or names without , thereby avoiding the need to explain their multiplicity. One prominent nominalist response to the one-over-many problem is resemblance nominalism, which explains the unity among similar particulars through primitive objective resemblances—direct, non-reductive relations of likeness among the particulars themselves—rather than invoking universals. Under this view, properties are not abstract entities but are grounded in the degrees of resemblance holding between concrete particulars, allowing for classification without positing shareable forms. This approach preserves the primacy of particulars while accounting for observed similarities, though it requires careful delineation of resemblance to avoid circularity or infinite regress. The broader debate between realism and nominalism thus pivots on whether universals are essential for ontological explanation or eliminable in favor of particular-based accounts.

Historical Development

Ancient and Classical Views

In , the concept of particulars emerged as a way to account for the individual, concrete entities that constitute the observable world, often in contrast to more abstract or general principles. Among the Pre-Socratics, advanced a materialist view positing atoms as the fundamental particulars: indivisible, eternal particles that serve as the building blocks of all things, differing only in shape, size, and arrangement, while the void allows for their motion and combination. These atoms were conceived as the ultimate atomic individuals, underlying the flux of sensory experience without themselves participating in change. Plato, building on this tradition but diverging sharply, treated particulars as imperfect, transient imitations of eternal, ideal Forms. In his , the sensible particulars of the physical world—such as individual objects or instances—are mere shadows or copies that participate in the unchanging universals, but they are inherently deficient due to their capacity for change and contingency. This participation explains why particulars exhibit properties like or , yet they remain fleeting and unreliable compared to the perfect archetypes in the realm of Forms. Aristotle critiqued Plato's separation of Forms from particulars, instead grounding individuality in primary substances, or ousiai, which he identified as the fundamental entities that exist independently and serve as subjects for predicates. In his Categories, Aristotle defines primary substances as individual beings, exemplified by "this something" (tode ti), such as a particular man or horse, which are neither predicable of nor present in a subject. His doctrine of hylomorphism further elaborates this by viewing particulars as unique composites of matter (the underlying potential) and form (the actualizing principle), where the form individuates the matter to produce a specific substance, as explored in the Metaphysics.

Medieval and Early Modern Perspectives

In medieval , synthesized Aristotelian with , positing that particulars are individuated through , specifically "designated matter" (materia signata), which serves as the principle distinguishing one from another of the same . This view holds that the form is universal in potential but actualized as particular by its union with a unique portion of , ensuring the of entities like humans or animals. Aquinas extended this to immaterial substances, such as human souls, arguing that their derives from their original embodiment, allowing for eternal persistence as distinct particulars in the , aligned with theological doctrines of personal . Building on yet critiquing Aquinas, John Duns Scotus introduced the concept of (haecceitas), or "thisness," as an individual formal distinction that renders a common nature particular without relying solely on matter. For Scotus, haecceity is a positive, non-qualitative property inherent to the individual , enabling the of both and immaterial beings, such as angels or separated , which posits as eternal and unique. This emphasized the intrinsic uniqueness of particulars, influencing debates on divine creation where God endows each entity with its own "thisness" to reflect infinite variety. In contrast, William of Ockham's rejected real universals altogether, asserting that only particulars exist in reality, while universals are mere mental concepts or names formed by from singulars. Ockham argued that terms like "humanity" signify individual humans without corresponding to any extra-mental universal entity, simplifying to singular substances and qualities, which resonated with empirical and theological emphasis on God's direct creation of discrete beings. This shift undermined , prioritizing particulars as the foundational units of existence and influencing later empiricist turns. Transitioning to the early modern period, John Locke conceived primary substances as underlying substrata or supports for clusters of qualities, unknowable in themselves but necessary to explain the persistence of individual objects. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke described these substrates as the "unknown support" of sensible qualities, distinguishing them from secondary qualities and aligning with a mechanistic where particulars are individuated by their properties. René Descartes, in his substance dualism, identified extended particulars as instances of res extensa, material substances defined by spatial extension and divisibility, separate from thinking substances (res cogitans). In the , Descartes posited that bodies are particulars composed of extended parts in motion, individuated by their spatial configurations, which provided a foundation for mechanistic physics while preserving theological dualism for the immortal soul. This framework marked a departure from scholastic matter-form composites toward a more geometric conception of particulars, emphasizing their role in empirical science.

Major Theories

Bare Particular Theory

The bare particular theory posits that particulars are fundamental entities, often termed "bare substrata" or "thin particulars," which serve as propertyless bearers that unify and individuate without being reducible to them. These bare particulars provide the numerical identity or "" of an object, ensuring that two objects with qualitatively identical remain distinct. Unlike views where particulars are composed solely of , this theory maintains that the particular itself is a simple, non-qualitative kernel that "supports" or instantiates universals, solving issues of how diverse or even incompatible qualities can coexist in a single . Historically, the theory traces to Aristotle's conception of primary substances in the Categories, where individual substances like "" or "this horse" are ultimate subjects that neither inhere in nor are predicated of anything else, functioning as the underlying "thisness" that bears accidents and qualities. developed a similar idea in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, describing substances as unknown substrata that support clusters of simple ideas or qualities, acting as the "support of those Ideas we have of them" without themselves being perceivable. In , defended bare particulars in works like Person and Object, arguing they are essential for analyzing ordinary objects as self-presenting entities that entail their properties, distinct from the properties themselves. Other contemporary proponents, such as E. B. Allaire and Gustav Bergmann, refined the view by emphasizing bare particulars as "naked" individuals that ground the unity of an object's attributes. A key argument for the is its solution to the problem of compresence, which asks how multiple, potentially diverse (e.g., being and being round) can be unified in one particular without reducing the particular to a mere collection of those . Bare particulars address this by serving as a non-qualitative unifier that "has" the properties through instantiation, preserving the object's numerical unity and allowing for empirical acquaintance with distinct individuals despite shared qualities. This also resolves individuation challenges, as two qualitatively identical objects (e.g., two spheres) differ solely by their distinct bare particulars, rejecting the . Critics argue that bare particulars lack identity criteria since, being propertyless "in themselves," they are indeterminate and cannot be distinguished without invoking the very properties they supposedly bear, leading to an or incoherence. The "bare" nature is seen as mysterious, as these entities allegedly have no intrinsic character yet must instantiate universals relationally, raising modal concerns about truly propertyless instances (e.g., points with no qualities). Despite such objections, defenders counter that bare particulars do possess properties derivatively through instantiation, providing a robust for substances. Formally, the theory can be expressed as: a particular PP bears properties F1,F2,…,FnF_1, F_2, \dots, F_n, but P≠{F1,F2,…,Fn}P \neq \{F_1, F_2, \dots, F_n\}, where the particular is not identical to the set or bundle of its properties, and instantiation is a primitive relation holding between the bare particular and each universal. This distinction ensures that the essence of PP is its bare , independent of the properties it unifies. P≠{F1,F2,…,Fn}P \neq \{F_1, F_2, \dots, F_n\}

Bundle Theory of Particulars

The bundle theory of particulars posits that concrete individuals are aggregates or mereological sums of properties, without any underlying substance or bare substratum to serve as their bearer. In this view, a particular is simply a collection of coexisting qualities, where the qualities themselves—whether understood as universals under resemblance nominalism or as trope instances—constitute the whole entity. This approach eliminates the need for an ontologically distinct "thisness" or substrate, treating objects as logical constructions from their attributes alone. Prominent proponents include , who in (1739) described physical objects and minds as bundles of perceptions or impressions, with no enduring substance beyond the flux of sensory contents. , in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), similarly viewed material objects as collections of ideas perceived by finite minds or God, rejecting any independent substratum as incoherent. advanced a related position in his logical atomism, particularly in Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), where particulars are bundles of sense-data qualities, constructed analytically without reference to unknowable metaphysical supports. A key variant is the trope bundle theory, which specifies that properties are particularized instances called tropes—abstract particulars like "this redness" rather than repeatable universals. Donald C. Williams, in "On the Elements of Being I" (1953), argued that tropes form the fundamental "alphabet of being," with concrete particulars emerging as bundles of concurrent tropes connected by spatiotemporal location and exact resemblance, avoiding both universals and substrates. Keith Campbell further developed this in Abstract Particulars (1990), defining tropes as non-transferable property instances that bundle into objects via internal relations of compresence, providing a nominalist where individuals are exhaustively composed of their trope constituents. The theory's primary argument is that it avoids the associated with substrate theories, where require a bearer, that bearer further , and so on ad infinitum; by contrast, bundles terminate the regress since compresent directly without need for an underlying "bare particular." Unlike the bare particular theory, which posits a featureless substrate to unify , the bundle approach derives unity from the themselves. However, critics contend that it fails to explain the bundle's internal cohesion, as the "compresence" relation tying together either introduces a vicious regress (if compresence is another in the bundle) or begs the question (if primitive). For instance, a red apple might be analyzed as the trope bundle comprising this redness, this roundness, and this appleness, unified by their spatiotemporal compresence, yet what ensures these tropes cohere as one object rather than disparate entities remains problematic.

Particulars in Categorical Logic

In categorical logic, particular propositions refer to statements that predicate a of some, but not necessarily all, members of a subject class, distinguishing them from universal propositions that apply to every member. The particular affirmative proposition, traditionally labeled as the "I" form, is expressed as "Some A are B," indicating that at least one instance of A shares the B. Similarly, the particular negative, or "O" form, states "Some A are not B," affirming that at least one instance of A lacks the B. These forms inherently carry existential , presupposing the existence of entities within the subject class to make the assertion meaningful, as argues that such propositions would be false if the subject terms denote empty classes. Within Aristotelian syllogisms, particular propositions function as non-universal quantifiers, facilitating deductive inferences about partial rather than total inclusions between categories and enabling a range of valid moods across the three figures. For instance, in the first figure's Darii mood—a universal affirmative major premise ("All M are P") paired with a particular affirmative minor premise ("Some S are M")—the conclusion is a particular affirmative ("Some S are P"), demonstrating how particulars allow syllogisms to capture existential overlaps without requiring universality. This structure underscores the role of particulars in expanding syllogistic validity beyond strictly universal reasoning, as detailed in Aristotle's enumeration of premise combinations that yield necessary conclusions. Aristotle's analysis in the Prior Analytics emphasizes that such syllogisms rely on the existential commitments of particular premises to ensure the conclusion's truth. The further illustrates the logical relations of particular propositions to their universal counterparts, positioning the I and O forms as subalterns to the universal affirmative (A) and negative (E) respectively. Thus, if a universal affirmative "All A are B" holds, the corresponding particular "Some A are B" must also be true, reflecting the subalternation rooted in existential . Particulars stand in subcontrary opposition to each other, where I and O cannot both be false simultaneously, while avoiding direct contradiction with universals. This framework, originating from Aristotle's and formalized in traditional syllogistic, highlights how particulars mediate between universal generalizations and specific negations, preserving the system's inferential coherence.

Ontological Implications in Contemporary Philosophy

In , the persistence of particulars over time remains a central ontological issue, vividly illustrated by the paradox, in which the gradual replacement of a ship's components challenges the identity of the original particular despite continuity in form and function. This puzzle highlights how particulars maintain numerical identity amid material flux, prompting debates on whether identity is preserved through spatiotemporal continuity or relational histories. One resolution posits that identity is situation-relative: in contexts isolating the original ship from its reconstructed counterpart, identity holds, but in broader scenarios encompassing both, identity claims become indeterminate to avoid contradiction. Mereology, the formal study of parthood relations, further informs the composition of complex particulars from simpler parts, addressing under what conditions pluralities of entities fuse into wholes, such as atoms forming molecules. Extensional holds that two particulars are identical if they share the same proper parts, providing a criterion for composition without invoking additional . In contemporary , this framework supports views like unrestricted composition, where any collection of parts yields a fusion, or , denying composites altogether in favor of mere sums of fundamentals. These approaches integrate with broader metaphysics, such as Humean mosaics, where parthood supervenes on local facts to structure complex particulars without primitive modality. Debates persist on whether particulars are fundamental or emergent, with physics suggesting quarks as ultimate, indivisible particulars composing all matter via the . Quarks, alongside leptons, represent the basic building blocks without substructure, raising ontological questions about whether these entities ground all higher-level particulars or emerge from quantum fields. In modal ontology, David Lewis's treats particulars as concrete entities confined to single possible worlds, with no trans-world identity; instead, possibilities involve counterpart particulars qualitatively similar across isolated, spatiotemporally unified worlds. This concrete pluralism posits uncountably many worlds, each a maximal sum of particulars, analyzing modality as quantification over these realms while rejecting abstract surrogates. In , Donald Davidson extends the of particulars to , arguing they are unrepeatable, dated individuals essential for causal relations and action theory, individuated by causes, effects, or spatiotemporal location. , as concrete particulars, enable the logical form of action sentences via (e.g., ∃x (Kicking(, , x))), accommodating multiple descriptions without entity multiplication. Critiques from , notably , reconceive particulars as actual occasions—momentary throbs of experience integrating prehensions of past data into novel unities via concrescence. These relational, processual entities replace static substances, emphasizing becoming over enduring being, with objective immortality achieved through integration into future occasions. Key contributions include D. M. Armstrong's realist , where particulars are thin substrata instantiating universals within states of affairs, forming a layered structure grounded in scientific properties like and charge. Armstrong rejects bare particulars and , positing universals as real constituents enabling laws of nature and resemblance. Complementing this, W. V. Quine's criterion of binds theories to individuated entities only via bound variables in quantification, rejecting unnecessary posits like abstracta unless required for truth, thus favoring parsimony in positing particulars such as dogs or numbers over mythical ones like .

References

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