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Haecceity
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Haecceity (/hɛkˈsiːɪti, hiːk-/; from the Latin haecceitas, 'thisness') is a term from medieval scholastic philosophy, first coined by followers of Duns Scotus to denote a concept that he seems to have originated: the irreducible determination of a thing that makes it this particular thing. Haecceity is a person's or object's thisness, the individualising difference between the concept "a person" and the concept "Socrates" (i.e., a specific person).[1] In modern philosophy of physics, it is sometimes referred to as primitive thisness.[2]
Etymology
[edit]Haecceity is a Latin neologism formed as an abstract noun derived from the demonstrative pronoun haec(ce), meaning 'this (very)' (feminine singular) or 'these (very)' (feminine or neuter plural). It is apparently formed on the model of another (much older) neologism qui(d)ditas ('whatness'), which is a calque of Aristotle's Greek to ti esti (τὸ τί ἐστι)[3] or 'the what (it) is'.
Haecceity vs. quiddity
[edit]Haecceity may be defined in some dictionaries as simply the "essence" of a thing, or as a simple synonym for quiddity or hypokeimenon. However, in proper philosophical usage these terms have not only distinct but opposite meanings. Whereas haecceity refers to aspects of a thing that make it a particular thing, quiddity refers to the universal qualities of a thing, its "whatness", or the aspects of a thing it may share with other things and by which it may form part of a genus of things.[4]
Haecceity in scholasticism
[edit]Duns Scotus makes the following distinction:
Because there is among beings something indivisible into subjective parts—that is, such that it is formally incompatible for it to be divided into several parts each of which is it—the question is not what it is by which such a division is formally incompatible with it (because it is formally incompatible by incompatibility), but rather what it is by which, as by a proximate and intrinsic foundation, this incompatibility is in it. Therefore, the sense of the questions on this topic [viz. of individuation] is: What is it in [e.g.] this stone, by which as by a proximate foundation it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts?
— Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1. q. 2, n. 48
In Scotism and the scholastic usage in general, therefore, "haecceity" properly means the irreducible individuating differentia that together with the specific essence (i.e. quiddity) constitute the individual (or the individual essence), much as specific differentia combined with the genus (or generic essence) constitute the species (or specific essence). But haecceity differs from the specific differentia by not having any conceptually specifiable content: it adds no further specification to the whatness of a thing but merely determines it to be a particular unrepeatable instance of the kind specified by the quiddity. This is connected with Aristotle's notion that an individual cannot be defined.
According to Scotism, individuals are more perfect than the specific essence and thus have not only a higher degree of unity, but also a greater degree of truth and goodness. God multiplied individuals to communicate to them His goodness and beatitude.[5]
Haecceity in anglophone philosophy
[edit]In analytical philosophy, the meaning of "haecceity" shifted somewhat. Charles Sanders Peirce used the term as a non-descriptive reference to an individual.[6] Alvin Plantinga and other analytical philosophers used "haecceity" in the sense of "individual essence". The "haecceity" of analytical philosophers thus comprises not only the individuating differentia (the scholastic haecceity) but the entire essential determination of an individual (i.e., including what the scholastics would call its quiddity).
Haecceity in sociology and continental philosophy
[edit]Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, used the term "haecceity", to emphasize the unavoidable and irremediable indexical character of any expression, behavior, or situation. For Garfinkel, indexicality was not a problem. He treated the haecceities and contingencies of social practices as a resource for making sense together. In contrast to theoretical generalizations, Garfinkel introduced "haecceities" in "Parson's Plenum" (1988) to indicate the importance of the infinite contingencies in both situations and practices for the local accomplishment of social order.[7] According to Garfinkel, members display and produce the social order they refer to within the setting they contribute to. The study of practical action and situations in their "haecceities"—aimed at disclosing the ordinary, ongoing social order constructed by the members' practices[8]—is the work of ethnomethodology. Garfinkel called ethnomethodological studies investigations of "haecceities", i.e.,
just thisness: just here, just now, with just what is at hand, with just who is here, in just the time that just this local gang of us have, in and with just what the local gang of us can make of just the time we need, and therein, in, about, as, and over the course of the in vivo work, achieving and exhibiting everything that those great achievements of comparability, universality, transcendentality of results, indifference of methods to local parties who are using them, for what they consisted of, looked like, the "missing what" of formal analytic studies of practical action.
— Harold Garfinkel, Lawrence D. Wieder, Two Incommensurable, Asymmetrically Alternate Technologies of Social Analysis, 1992, p. 203
Gilles Deleuze uses the term in a different way to denote entities that exist on the plane of immanence. The usage was likely chosen in line with his esoteric concept of difference and individuation and his critique of object-centered metaphysics.
Michael Lynch (1991) described the ontological production of objects in the natural sciences as "assemblages of haecceities", thereby offering an alternate reading of Deleuze and Guattari's (1980) discussion of "memories of haecceity" in the light of Garfinkel's treatment of "haecceity".[9]
Other uses
[edit]Gerard Manley Hopkins drew on Scotus, whom he called "of reality the rarest-veined unraveller",[10] to construct his poetic theory of inscape.
James Joyce made similar use of the concept of haecceitas to develop his idea of the secular epiphany.[11]
James Wood refers extensively to haecceitas (as "thisness") in developing an argument about conspicuous detail in aesthetic literary criticism.[12]
See also
[edit]- Entitativity
- Formal distinction
- Haecceitism
- Hypostasis
- Identity of indiscernibles
- Ipseity
- Irreducibility
- Objective precision
- Open individualism
- Ostensive definition
- Personal identity
- Principle of individuation
- Quiddity
- Rigid designation
- Scotism
- Scotistic realism
- Ship of Theseus
- Sine qua non
- Tathātā
- Type-token distinction
- Vertiginous question
References
[edit]- ^ Gardner, W. H., Gerard Manley Hopkins (1975), p. xxiii
- ^ French, Steven (2019), "Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2022-04-21
- ^ Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1030a
- ^ Hicks, P., The Journey So Far (2003), p. 218
- ^ Bettoni-Bonansea. Duns Scotus- The Basic Principles of His Philosophy (PDF). pp. 63–64. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 30, 2022.
- ^ Bertman, M. A., Humanities Insights (2007), p. 39
- ^ Rawls, Anne W. (2003), "Harold Garfinkel", in Ritzer, George (ed.), The Blackwell companion to major contemporary social theorists, Malden, Massachusetts Oxford: Blackwell, ISBN 9781405105958. Also available as: Rawls, Anne W. (2003). "Harold Garfinkel". Chapter 5. Harold Garfinkel. Wiley. pp. 122–153. doi:10.1002/9780470999912.ch6. ISBN 9780470999912. Extract.
- ^ Button, G., ed., Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (1991), p. 10
- ^ Lynch, Mike (1991), Button, Graham (ed.), "Method: measurement – ordinary and scientific measurement as ethnomethodological phenomena", Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 77–108, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511611827.006, ISBN 978-0-521-38952-5, retrieved 2022-02-20
- ^ Duns Scotus's Oxford quoted in Gardner, p. xxiv
- ^ Kearney, R., Navigations (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), pp. 133–134.
- ^ Bartosch, R., EnvironMentality: Ecocriticism and the Event of Postcolonial Fiction (Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2013), p. 270.
Further reading
[edit]- E. Gilson, The Philosophy of the Middle Ages (1955)
- A. Heuser, The Shaping Vision of Gerard Manley Hopkins (OUP 1955)
- E. Longpre, La Philosophie du B. Duns Scotus (Paris 1924)
- Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. 1980. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. London and New York: Continuum, 2004. Vol. 2 of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 2 vols. 1972–1980. Trans. of Mille Plateaux. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. ISBN
- Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. 1991/1994. "What is Philosophy?". Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Gregory Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Harold Garfinkel, 'Evidence for Locally Produced, Naturally Accountable Phenomena of Order, Logic, Meaning, Method, etc., in and as of the Essentially Unavoidable and Irremediable Haecceity of Immortal Ordinary Society', Sociological Theory Spring 1988, (6)1:103-109
External links
[edit]
The dictionary definition of haecceity at Wiktionary- Singularity
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article — "Medieval Theories of Haecceity"
Haecceity
View on Grokipediafrom Grokipedia
Haecceity, from the Latin haecceitas meaning "thisness," is a metaphysical concept introduced by the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) to denote the principle of individuation that distinguishes one particular entity from others within the same species, beyond shared qualitative properties or common nature.[1] In Scotus's framework, haecceity is a formal distinction within the essence of an individual, really identical to its common nature (e.g., "humanity" for Socrates) yet uniquely contracting it into numerical unity, rendering the entity this one rather than another.[2] This individuating factor is non-qualitative and irreducible, often described as the "hereness and nowness" of existence, and it cannot be separated from the individual even by divine power.[2]
Scotus developed haecceity in response to Aristotelian debates on universals and individuation during the late 13th and early 14th centuries, contrasting with views like Thomas Aquinas's emphasis on prime matter as the individuating principle.[1] In works such as Reportata Parisiensia and Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum, Scotus posits haecceity as an ultimate ratio of individuality, ensuring that entities like Socrates and Plato, though sharing the nature of "man," are numerically distinct through their respective thisnesses.[2] This concept influenced later thinkers, including Charles Sanders Peirce, who adapted it in his semiotics and phenomenology as an indexical, brute fact of secondness—pure reaction and immediacy—unmediated by description or generality.[2]
In contemporary metaphysics, haecceity extends to haecceitism, a doctrine concerning possible worlds and modality, which holds that worlds can differ non-qualitatively—solely through the distribution of primitive thisnesses—without varying in their qualitative character.[3] As articulated by David Lewis, haecceitism asserts that "there are at least two worlds that differ in what they represent de re concerning an individual without differing qualitatively," challenging qualitative supervenience and counterpart theory in analyzing identity across possibilities.[3] Anti-haecceitism, its opposing view, maintains that all modal facts supervene on qualitative ones, eliminating primitive identities.[3] These debates underscore haecceity's enduring role in ontology, from medieval scholasticism to modern discussions of fundamentality, individuality, and the nature of reality.
Origins and Core Concepts
Etymology
The term haecceity derives from the Medieval Latin haecceitas, literally meaning "thisness," formed by combining the feminine demonstrative pronoun haec ("this," from hic) with the abstract suffix -ceitas, analogous to English -ity.[4][5] This neologism was coined to express the unique individuation of entities in philosophical discourse, drawing on Latin grammatical structures to denote particularity.[6] John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) introduced the term haecceitas explicitly in his theological and philosophical works around 1300, most notably in the Ordinatio (Book II, distinction 3), where it designates the principle of individual essence.[5] Prior to Scotus, scholastic discussions of individuation lacked this precise terminology, though related concepts appeared in earlier medieval texts.[5] The term entered English philosophy in the mid-17th century through translations and adaptations of scholastic Latin sources, retaining its original form as haecceity to preserve the Latin root while facilitating discourse on metaphysics and identity.[4] Early English usages appeared in theological and philosophical treatises influenced by Scotist thought, marking a bridge between medieval scholasticism and emerging modern philosophy.[7]Definition and Distinction from Quiddity
Haecceity, derived from the Latin haecceitas meaning "thisness," refers to the non-qualitative property that accounts for the numerical individuation and identity of a particular substance, distinguishing it from other entities of the same kind despite shared qualities.[5] This principle addresses the unique "this" aspect of an individual, irreducible to its observable or essential attributes, ensuring that one entity remains distinct even if qualitatively identical to another.[5] In contrast, quiddity (quidditas), or "whatness," pertains to the essential nature or universal properties that define a kind or species, such as the shared humanity that characterizes all humans.[8] While quiddity explains the common essence—what makes something a member of a certain category—haecceity resolves the problem of why two entities sharing that essence (e.g., two humans) are not the same individual.[5] For instance, the haecceity of Socrates is the irreducible factor that sets him apart from Plato, beyond their mutual quiddity of humanity, preventing them from being numerically identical despite potential qualitative similarities.[5] This distinction traces its roots to Aristotelian metaphysics, where the combination of form (explaining quiddity) and matter was insufficient to fully account for individuation, as matter alone could not guarantee unique identity without additional principles.[5] Haecceity thus emerges as a metaphysical tool to bridge this gap, emphasizing primitive individuality over mere compositional differences.[9]Haecceity in Medieval Scholasticism
Duns Scotus's Formulation
John Duns Scotus developed the concept of haecceity (Latin: haecceitas, meaning "thisness") around 1300 in his commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences, particularly in the Lectura and the more refined Ordinatio (also known as the Opus Oxoniense). He posited haecceity as a formal, non-qualitative property that inheres in individual substances, serving as their principle of individuation while remaining distinct from the common nature or essence (quidditas) shared by members of the same species. Unlike qualitative attributes, haecceity lacks any descriptive content and functions solely to confer numerical singularity upon the individual, ensuring that it is this particular entity and not another.[5][10] Central to Scotus's formulation is the doctrine of the formal distinction (distinctio formalis a parte rei), which holds that haecceity is really identical to the individual essence but formally distinct from the common nature, meaning they cannot be separated in reality yet possess different conceptual content. This distinction allows for individuation without positing additional substantial forms or accidents, preserving the unity of the substance while accounting for its uniqueness. In the Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, Scotus argues that the common nature, such as humanity, is contracted to the individual through haecceity, which actualizes it without introducing multiplicity or division. The Lectura II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–6, similarly emphasizes this intrinsic mode, where haecceity and the nature are "really the same but formally distinct."[5][10] Scotus's theory directly addresses Aristotelian challenges regarding why individuals of the same species, such as two humans like Socrates and Plato, are numerically distinct despite sharing identical essential qualities. He rejects explanations based on mere negation (e.g., "not being another") as insufficient, instead proposing haecceity as a positive, real principle of individuation that positively determines the entity's thisness. In Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 49, Scotus contends that this positive entity ensures indivisibility and numerical unity, avoiding the pitfalls of negative or relational accounts.[5] This formulation resolves the problem of "second-grade unity" in universals by attributing to the common nature a real but less-than-numerical unity, which haecceity then individuates into full numerical unity within particulars. Scotus thereby reconciles the universality of essences with the irreducibility of individuals, influencing subsequent scholastic metaphysics by providing a metaphysical ground for both commonality and singularity without compromising substance unity. In Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 169, he illustrates how haecceity "ties" the indifferent nature to the individual, preventing it from existing indifferently in reality.[5][10]Debates Among Other Scholastics
Thomas Aquinas rejected the notion of haecceity as a distinct formal principle of individuation, instead positing that individual substances are individuated through "signate matter," or matter designated by quantity, which serves as the principle distinguishing one material being from another.[11] In his De Ente et Essentia (c. 1254–1256), Aquinas argues that the essence of a material substance consists of form and common matter, but individuation occurs via this particular, quantified matter, ensuring that no two substances share the exact same material substrate.[11] This approach integrates individuation into the hylomorphic composition of substances without requiring an additional metaphysical formality like haecceity.[12] William of Ockham, advancing a nominalist perspective, critiqued the postulation of real haecceities or any abstract principles of individuation, maintaining that individuals are simply distinct by virtue of their concrete, singular existence without need for further explanatory entities.[13] In his Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 6 (c. 1320s), Ockham asserts that "every thing outside the soul will be this by itself," rejecting Scotus's formal distinction between common nature and haecceity as an unnecessary multiplication of realities.[13] He argued that universality pertains only to mental concepts or terms, not to extra-mental realities, thereby dissolving the problem of individuation into the immediate singularity of substances.[14] Henry of Ghent offered an intermediate position, viewing individuation not as a positive formality but as a negative process involving division from all other beings, often termed "double negation."[15] In his Quodlibeta II, q. 8 (c. 1276), Henry describes the individual as that which is undivided in itself and divided from everything else, without positing haecceity as a real property or essence modifier.[16] Other thinkers, such as Giles of Rome, similarly treated haecceity-like principles as accidental properties or divine ideas in the mind of God, bridging essence and existence without full endorsement of Scotus's view.[17] The 14th-century controversies surrounding haecceity intensified in quodlibetal disputations, where scholastics debated its role in the essence-existence distinction and the problem of universals, often challenging whether it adequately resolved individuation for both material and immaterial beings. Works like Godfrey of Fontaines's Quodlibeta (c. 1280s–1290s) and those of Peter of Auvergne explored haecceity's compatibility with Aristotelian categories, with some rejecting it in favor of negation or matter-based accounts, while others refined it as an "individual difference" extrinsic to essence. These debates highlighted tensions between realist commitments to formal distinctions and nominalist parsimony, shaping subsequent scholastic ontology.Haecceity in Analytic Philosophy
Haecceitism and Possible Worlds
Haecceitism is a doctrine in modal metaphysics asserting that two possible worlds can differ solely in the distribution or existence of particular individuals—via their haecceities or "thisnesses"—without any accompanying qualitative differences in properties or relations.[18] For example, a world in which Socrates exists and a qualitatively identical world in which he does not would constitute a haecceitistic difference, as the variance stems from the primitive identity property of "being Socrates" rather than any descriptive qualities.[19] The term "haecceitism" was used by Robert M. Adams in his 1979 paper "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," with David Kaplan discussing the doctrine in his 1975 paper "How to Russell a Frege-Church" and attributing the label to Adams, but David Lewis provided an influential formulation in his defense of modal realism, defining haecceitistic differences as those where worlds vary in de re representation of individuals (e.g., who occupies certain roles) while remaining purely qualitatively identical.[18] In this framework, haecceities function as non-qualitative, primitive properties that ground transworld identity, enabling distinctions across possible worlds based on individual essences rather than shared attributes.[19] Haecceitism connects directly to the concept of haecceity by treating "thisnesses" as fundamental entities that allow for modal variation independent of qualitative facts, thereby supporting de re modalities—claims about specific individuals across worlds, such as "Socrates might not have existed."[18] Proponents argue that this accommodates intuitive possibilities, like the role-switching scenario where two individuals exchange positions without altering the world's qualitative profile, preserving the distinctness of particulars in logical space.[18] Robert Adams advanced this view in his 1979 paper, contending that primitive thisnesses are irreducible to qualitative properties and are necessary for a robust account of individuation in possible worlds.[18] However, critics like Lewis reject haecceitism, endorsing anti-haecceitism or qualitative supervenience, which holds that all facts about worlds, including de re identities, supervene on qualitative facts alone—meaning no two worlds can differ non-qualitatively without qualitative variance.[19] Lewis's counterpart theory exemplifies this anti-haecceitist stance, where transworld relations are handled through qualitative similarity to counterparts rather than haecceitistic identities, avoiding what he saw as the mysterious positing of non-qualitative differences.[18] Historical precursors to haecceitism appear in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's philosophy of monads and complete individual concepts, which encode all predicates of a substance and echo haecceity by providing unique, non-qualitative essences that determine modal possibilities.[20] Leibniz's individual notions, as divine ideas containing the entire career of a monad, allow for distinctions across possible worlds based on primitive identities, prefiguring haecceitistic concerns with how particulars are individuated modally without relying solely on shared qualities.[20] This approach influenced later analytic debates by suggesting that modal differences could arise from the "thisness" inherent in each monad's complete concept, aligning with haecceitism's emphasis on non-qualitative individuation in logical space.[18]Individuation and Identity Theories
In analytic metaphysics, haecceity addresses puzzles of synchronic and diachronic identity by serving as the primitive "thisness" that individuates objects within bundle theories, where substances are collections of properties or tropes lacking inherent unity. Proponents argue that without such a non-qualitative principle, bundles would fail to constitute numerically distinct individuals, as shared properties alone cannot explain why one red-round-sweet item differs from another qualitatively identical one. This role is central to constituent ontologies, which posit haecceity to bind properties without introducing additional qualities.[21] Edwin B. Allaire's "Bare Particulars" (1963) exemplifies this approach, defending bare particulars as the haecceitistic substratum that unifies tropes or universals into a single particular, resolving the "compresence problem" of how properties cohere in one object rather than distributing across many.[22] Allaire contends that bare particulars are "characterless" entities whose sole function is individuation, ensuring identity without qualitative contribution, a view rooted in realist responses to nominalist bundle theories. Similarly, Reinhardt Grossmann's ontology in The Existence of the World (1992) employs bare particulars as the foundational substratum for concrete individuals, arguing that they provide the necessary haecceity to ground numerical sameness amid qualitative diversity, avoiding mereological fusions that would blur distinctions between objects.[23] Grossmann's framework emphasizes that such substrata are ontologically primitive, essential for explaining the identity of wholes composed of parts. Haecceity also figures in theories of personal identity, where it explains why an individual persists as numerically the same through change, such as bodily or psychological alterations, without relying solely on relational or qualitative continuity. In this diachronic context, haecceity acts as an enduring primitive that underpins sameness, addressing why a person at time t1* remains identical to themselves at t2* despite differing properties. Peter van Inwagen engages this idea in his ontological analyses of material composition and identity criteria, suggesting that primitive thisness could supplement mereological accounts of organisms, though he favors simples for ultimate persistence; his Special Composition Question highlights the need for such principles to resolve puzzles of personal sameness over time.[24] Critiques of haecceity in these theories contrast reductionist dismissals with realist defenses, often intersecting with trope theory and mereology. Reductionists view haecceity as dispensable, treating individuation as linguistic (e.g., via definite descriptions) or nominal, without positing a substantive entity; in trope theory, particularized properties (tropes) are primitively individuated, eliminating the need for an extra haecceitistic layer, as each trope's location or compresence suffices for identity. Realists counter that such reductions fail to explain numerical unity in mereological bundles, where parts might compose multiple wholes without a unifying thisness, leading to overpermutation or identity collapse; haecceity thus preserves a robust ontology against these eliminativist challenges.[25] The 20th-century revival of haecceity discussions in analytic philosophy owed much to Willard Van Orman Quine's "On What There Is" (1948), which intensified scrutiny of ontological commitments to abstracta like individual essences, prompting debates on whether haecceities qualify as indispensable for identity or as suspect posits akin to Platonic forms.[26] Quine's criterion of ontological commitment—binding only to entities quantified over in the best scientific theory—fueled nominalist critiques of haecceity as an unnecessary abstract entity, yet also spurred realist defenses in individuation theories by clarifying the stakes of positing bare particulars or thisnesses. This influence extended to broader analytic exchanges on abstract entities, where haecceity's role in unifying bundles was weighed against Quinean parsimony.Haecceity in Continental Philosophy
Deleuze and Guattari's Usage
In their collaborative work A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari introduce haecceity as a mode of individuation that operates beyond fixed subjects or essences, reinterpreting it as a non-subjective, intensive multiplicity composed of events, affects, and relations. They describe haecceity not as a stable "thisness" inherent to an individual but as a dynamic configuration, exemplified by temporal and atmospheric instances such as "A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing [...] They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected" (p. 261). This conception rejects the notion of enduring identities, emphasizing instead how such multiplicities emerge from the interplay of speeds, slownesses, and intensities on a "plane of consistency," where longitude denotes affects and speeds, and latitude denotes composed capacities (p. 252). By framing haecceity in this way, Deleuze and Guattari shift it from a scholastic principle of essential individuation to a processual event that dissolves anthropocentric or molar unities, allowing for the apprehension of the world as a series of imperceptible becomings.[27] This reconfiguration marks a departure from the medieval essence-based haecceity, transforming it into something event-based and relational, inherently tied to differential affects and variable speeds rather than static properties. For Deleuze and Guattari, a haecceity is "nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds" (p. 292), forming assemblages that territorialize and deterritorialize without a unifying core. They illustrate this through the concept of the "refrain," a rhythmic territorial marker in music or nature—such as a bird's song or a child's improvised melody—that establishes a haecceity by modulating intensities and creating provisional milieus, as in the evolution from a child's refrain to cosmic deterritorialization (pp. 311–323). Unlike essential properties that fix identity, these refrains operate as intensive thresholds, enabling the composition of bodies through relations of movement and rest, where haecceity emerges as a molecular event rather than a substantive form.[27] Deleuze and Guattari's haecceity critiques arborescent structures of thought, which impose hierarchical, tree-like organizations on reality, by promoting rhizomatic connections that treat individuals as open assemblages without a central haecceitas as a unifying principle. In this framework, haecceities facilitate lines of flight and becomings, where entities are packs or bands of intensities—such as a "desert hour with a thousand dromedaries" (p. 32)—rather than isolated subjects, undermining essentialist hierarchies in favor of flat, connective multiplicities. This anti-arborescent approach aligns haecceity with nomadic war machines and smooth spaces, where individuation occurs through spatiotemporal singularities and vortical flows, free from the striations of form or substance (pp. 370–479).[27] Their usage draws on Baruch Spinoza's conatus, the striving of bodies through affects and powers of acting, to ground haecceity in an ethics of composition and capacity (pp. 252–253), while incorporating Henri Bergson's notion of duration as qualitative, heterogeneous multiplicity to emphasize temporal becoming over spatial fixity (p. 261). Adapting John Duns Scotus's original haecceity for anti-essentialist ends, Deleuze and Guattari recast it as an intensive, evental process rather than a formal individuation, aligning it with univocity of being to affirm difference without hierarchy (Zourabichvili, 2012, p. 145).[28] This synthesis enables a philosophy of immanence where haecceities proliferate as blocks of sensation and indiscernibility, resisting reification into stable identities.Sociological and Identity Applications
In sociology, particularly within ethnomethodology, haecceity captures the irreducible uniqueness or "thisness" of micro-level social interactions, emphasizing the distinctive details of everyday encounters that defy generalization. This concept aligns with the policy of unique adequacy, which demands researchers achieve deep competence in the local practices of a setting to grasp the haecceity of its ongoing, lived interactions, as articulated by ethnomethodologists like Harold Garfinkel. Although not explicitly termed in Erving Goffman's dramaturgical analysis, the idea resonates with his portrayal of everyday performances as singular, context-bound expressions of self-presentation, where individuals enact unique roles in frontstage and backstage dynamics to manage impressions.[29][30] In continental philosophy, Jean-Luc Nancy extends haecceity to underscore the shared yet irreducible singularities in community through his notion of "being-singular-plural," outlined in his 2000 work of the same title. Here, haecceity denotes a non-qualitative "thisness" that defines singularity without relying on substance, identity, or structure, allowing beings to coexist in a relational proximity where existence is inherently "with" others. Nancy argues that community emerges not from a common essence but from the circulation of these singular-plural existences, fostering an ethical sharing that reveals strangeness and touch within the "with." This framework, building briefly on Deleuze and Guattari's shift toward haecceity as affective individuation, reorients social ontology toward ecstatic, non-totalizing togetherness.[31][32] Applications to identity politics, particularly in queer theory and postcolonialism, leverage haecceity to resist universal categories by affirming fluid, non-subjective singularities. In queer theory, adaptations via Deleuze and Guattari inform Judith Butler's performativity, where haecceity enables a politics of becoming that disrupts molar identities through molecular affects and desubjectivized proliferations, challenging normative binaries like sexual difference. Similarly, in postcolonial theory, haecceity manifests as "postcolonial haecceities," describing unique trajectories of cultural and migrant becoming that evade essentialist colonial representations, as explored in analyses of North African literature and subaltern voices. These uses position haecceity as a tool for deterritorializing fixed identities, promoting relational multiplicities over hierarchical or universal norms.[33][34] Critiques of haecceity in social and identity contexts highlight its potential risk of veering into essentialism, where an overemphasis on individual "thisness" might inadvertently universalize human nature or depersonalize differences by prioritizing substance over relational flux. Theological and social analyses argue that such essentialist pitfalls mask authentic variations in experiences across genders, races, and social locations, reinforcing hierarchies like androcentrism or ecological elitism. In response, fluid interpretations of haecceity, as in Nancy's work, counter this by rooting dignity in particularity and coexistence, avoiding binary or categorical impositions while navigating the tension between singularity and social construction.[35][36]Contemporary Developments
Recent Ontological Theories
In recent ontological theories, Matthew Davidson has advanced a constituentist realist account of haecceities, positing them as abstract entities that exist independently and incorporate concrete individuals as constituents. This view, detailed in his 2024 book About Haecceity: An Essay in Ontology, distinguishes haecceities from qualitative properties by emphasizing their role in singular propositions and semantic understanding, where grasping a haecceity involves recognizing an individual as part of its structure, rather than relying on primitive identities or divine ideas.[37] Davidson argues that this framework avoids the pitfalls of primitivism, which posits unanalyzable thisnesses, by grounding haecceities in actualist independence, allowing them to persist even if unexemplified.[37] Contemporary debates on haecceity realism have integrated the concept with grounding theory, exploring how haecceities might explain non-qualitative facts without circularity. Responses to anti-haecceitism in modal metaphysics challenge the necessity of haecceitistic differences across possible worlds, arguing that all truths supervene on qualitative ones to maintain parsimony in ontology.[18] Alexander Skiles further defends haecceity realism by resolving apparent Euthyphro-style dilemmas in grounding, showing that haecceitists can account for why individuals instantiate their properties without positing brute necessities.[39] Critiques from ontic structural realism, notably in James Ladyman and Don Ross's framework, question the need for primitive thisnesses like haecceities, proposing instead that reality is fundamentally relational and structural, with individuality emerging from networks of relations rather than non-qualitative properties. This structuralist approach, developed post-2000, contends that positing haecceities violates principles of naturalized metaphysics by introducing unobservable primitives unsupported by science.[40] Post-2000 updates to theories of individuation continue to engage haecceity concepts in minimalist ontologies that prioritize explanatory power over substantive commitments. These developments address gaps in earlier traditions by aligning haecceity with such frameworks.Interdisciplinary Extensions
In cognitive science and artificial intelligence, haecceity has been invoked in discussions of big data ethics to emphasize the recognition of individual uniqueness against reductive practices that treat people as mere statistical points in analytics. As articulated in theological and philosophical analyses since the 2020s, haecceity underscores the ethical need to respect the "thisness" of individuals in digital technologies and algorithmic design.[41] In literary and artistic practices, haecceity underscores the singular "thisness" of creative expressions, particularly in postmodern contexts where individuation defies conventional narratives. Postmodern literature and film often invoke haecceity to evoke nonlinear sensations of history and identity, transforming abstract events into tangible, unique haecceities that resist totalizing interpretations—as seen in post-heritage cinema's reframing of the past through cinematic immediacy. In artistic media like artist's books, haecceity manifests as the haptic "bookness," the irreducible qualities that individuate a work from generic forms, emphasizing sensory uniqueness in material encounters.[42] Music theory, especially in improvisational genres, applies haecceity to capture the unrepeatable essence of performances; in jazz, it denotes the singular intensity of a solo's phrasing and context-bound emergence, aligning with Deleuzian views of music as a haecceity that deterritorializes fixed structures into vital, individuated flows. These applications, proliferating since the 2010s, extend haecceity beyond metaphysics to foster experiential singularity in creative outputs.[43] Scientific analogies draw on haecceity to probe individuation in quantum mechanics, where identical particles challenge traditional notions of unique identity. Steven French's work in the 2000s argues that bosons and fermions, governed by symmetric and antisymmetric statistics, lack haecceity-like properties due to their indistinguishability, as they share all intrinsic and relational attributes without violating the principle of the identity of indiscernibles in a non-trivial way. This leads to interpretations of quantum entities as non-individuals, where haecceity fails as a principle of differentiation, prompting quasi-set theories to model collections without assuming primitive thisness. Such debates, influential since French and Redhead's seminal analysis, illustrate haecceity's limits in describing particle behavior, influencing ongoing discussions in physics philosophy about entity uniqueness in indistinguishable systems.References
- https://www.[routledge](/page/Routledge).com/About-Haecceity-An-Essay-in-Ontology/Davidson/p/book/9781032575162