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A surface-to-air Qaem missile.

The Qaem (or Ghaem; Persian: قائم, lit. 'upright')[1] refers to two completely distinct Iranian weapons: an air-to-ground glide bomb and a surface-to-air missile. These two weapons are similarly sized and identically named, and are both developed from the Toophan missile, but are separate weapon systems.

Qaem surface-to-air missile

[edit]
Two Qaem-114 missiles (middle left, middle right) mounted on IAIO Toufan helicopter. Other two missiles are Qassem

This is an Iranian SACLOS beam-riding SHORAD surface-to-air missile.[2][3] With a range of six kilometers and a maximum altitude of two kilometers, the Qaem is intended for use against UAVs and low flying or stationary helicopters.[4] The Qaem is a development of the Toophan missile, itself an unlicensed copy of the American BGM-71 TOW missile, and entered mass production in 2010.[5][6]

The Qaem anti-aircraft missile uses a laser guidance system.[7] Iran also produces a variant, the Qaem-M, which adds a proximity fuse.[8] This weapon appears to be designed and manufactured based on the Toophan which is an anti-tank guided missile.[9]

North Korea may operate Qaem-114.[10]

The Islamic Republic of Iran mass-produces these missiles. This type of missile is capable of being fired from the surface as well as from helicopters. This anti-armor missile is capable of destroying low-speed, low-altitude targets. No information has been released about this missile's technical specifications, but according to published photos of it and its physical appearance, it is nearly 120 centimeters long, weighs 18 to 20 kilograms, and has a diameter of about 150 centimeters. Since the Toophan missile has a range of 3,850 meters, this missile will have the same range, too.[9][11] The vertical anti-helicopter-guided missile can be guided by laser beams and is resistant to electronic warfare and enemy disruption.[12]

Qaem air-to-ground bomb

[edit]
a Qaem air-to-ground munition seen at an arms expo.

A completely unrelated Iranian munition, but also named "Qaem," is carried by Qods Mohajer-6 UAVs[13] and Hamaseh UAVs.[14]

The Qaem is available in four variants: the Qaem 1, with a suspected infrared seeker; a variant simply named Qaem, with suspected laser guidance;[13] a larger variant named Qaem-5, with TV guidance; and an even larger variant named Qaem-9, also with TV guidance.[14]

The Qaem A2G glide bomb is related to the Sadid-345 glide bomb, but has different wings and size.[15]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Qaem

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from Grokipedia
Qaem, also known as Ghaem, designates a family of small, precision-guided glide bombs developed by Iran's Ministry of Defense for deployment from unmanned aerial vehicles and manned . These munitions, including variants such as Qaem-1 and Qaem-5, feature electro-optical, television, or guidance systems for terminal homing, enabling strikes against stationary and moving targets with reported (CEP) accuracies as low as 50 centimeters. The Qaem bombs are compact, with the Qaem-1 weighing approximately 12.5 kilograms, measuring 90 centimeters in length, and having a of 12.5 centimeters, allowing drones like the Mohajer-6 to carry multiple units for enhanced operational flexibility in reconnaissance-strike missions. Their design supports free-fall or trajectories, extending effective range beyond unguided drops and facilitating precision attacks on bunkers, armored vehicles, and personnel. Notable for integration into Iran's asymmetric warfare doctrine, Qaem munitions have been employed by Iranian proxies and directly supplied to allies, including shipments of Qaem-5 bombs to prior to its 2022 invasion of , where they were analyzed for containing Western-sourced semiconductors despite . Independent assessments highlight their role in proliferating low-cost, high-precision capabilities, though actual field performance remains subject to limited verified data amid claims from Iranian state sources.

Surface-to-Air Missile Variant

Origins and Development

The Qaem surface-to-air missile was developed by Iran as an adaptation of the Toophan anti-tank guided missile, which itself derives from reverse-engineering the American BGM-71 TOW system acquired prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War. This modification shifted the wire-guided, semi-automatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) platform from ground targets to low-altitude aerial threats, such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), utilizing laser beam-riding guidance for improved precision in short-range air defense roles. Development emphasized cost-effective enhancements to existing technology, incorporating a boosted motor for vertical launch capability and a range extended to approximately 6 kilometers with a maximum altitude of 2 kilometers. In early February 2010, Iranian Defense Minister announced the initiation of production for the Qaem and its Qaem-2 , positioning them as dedicated anti-helicopter weapons to bolster tactical air defense against low- to medium-altitude . commenced that year, reflecting Iran's broader strategy of indigenizing missile systems amid limiting access to foreign arms. Subsequent upgrades included the Qaem-M variant, featuring a proximity fuse for enhanced lethality against hovering or evasive targets. By August 2019, unveiled an updated precision-guided version of the Qaem alongside other air-to-air missiles, demonstrating ongoing refinements in guidance and integration to address evolving threats like armed drones. These developments occurred within the (IRGC) framework, prioritizing man-portable and vehicle-mounted systems for asymmetric defense.

Technical Design and Specifications

The Qaem employs semi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) guidance via laser beam-riding, enabling precise targeting of low-altitude threats such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Developed indigenously by as a (SHORAD) solution, it functions in a man-portable or vehicle-mounted configuration, emphasizing mobility for tactical engagements against slow-moving or hovering aerial targets. Its operational range extends to 6 kilometers, with engagement suited for altitudes below typical medium-range systems, prioritizing close-in defense against asymmetric threats like drones. The system was publicly displayed in April 2023 alongside other Iranian developments, underscoring its integration into layered air defense architectures. Detailed parameters such as dimensions, type, maximum speed, and yield remain undisclosed in open sources, reflecting limited transparency typical of Iranian military hardware. Subsequent variants, including the truck-mounted Qaem-118, incorporate electro-optical or guidance options and achieve ranges up to 25 kilometers with multiple launchers per platform, enhancing coverage for point defense. These evolutions maintain the core beam-riding heritage while adapting to broader threat envelopes, though independent verification of performance claims is constrained by reliance on state-affiliated disclosures.

Testing and Operational Deployment

The Qaem was publicly unveiled by during a on April 18, 2023, indicating prior successful developmental testing by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. This short-range system, designed for low-altitude interception, employs or for engaging aerial targets such as drones and low-flying aircraft. A advanced variant, designated Qaem-118, was demonstrated during the second phase of the Great Prophet 19 military exercise conducted by the (IRGC) Ground Forces in southwest in February 2025. The exercise showcased the missile's 25 km engagement range and multi-sensor targeting capabilities, including , electro-optical, and systems, simulating real-world air defense scenarios against unmanned aerial vehicles. This deployment highlighted its integration into mobile tactical units for rapid response. Following these demonstrations, the Qaem family of missiles has been incorporated into IRGC air defense batteries, enhancing layered short-range protection for ground forces and strategic assets. Production evidence includes interdicted shipments of Qaem-118 components in mid-2025, suggesting scaled for domestic operational use. No confirmed engagements have been reported as of October 2025, with primary validation occurring through exercises like Great Prophet series rather than active warfare.

Variants and Recent Upgrades

The Qaem (SAM) features variants tailored for engaging low-altitude threats, primarily helicopters and drones. Early configurations include an infrared-homing variant for passive and a laser-guided model for enhanced precision against maneuvering targets. These adaptations reflect Iran's emphasis on cost-effective defenses against aerial incursions in scenarios. In August 2019, unveiled an expanded series of Qaem missiles, incorporating improvements in guidance and integration for air defense roles. This development aimed to bolster short-range capabilities amid regional tensions. A significant recent upgrade is the Qaem-118, introduced by the (IRGC) Ground Forces on February 19, 2025, during military exercises. This variant extends the engagement envelope to 25 kilometers and employs versatile guidance options, including , electro-optical, and thermal imaging, allowing interception of low-flying and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in diverse conditions. Mounted on mobile platforms such as the Aras-3 tactical vehicle with five-launcher configurations, the Qaem-118 prioritizes rapid deployment and survivability on contested battlefields. Iranian officials claim it incorporates propulsion for improved speed and range over prior models.

Air-to-Ground Bomb Variant

Development History

The Qaem family of air-to-ground glide bombs represents the second generation of Iranian miniature precision-guided munitions, developed by the Ministry of Defense in collaboration with Defense Industries Organization and Iran Electronics Industries. This series evolved from the earlier Sadid family of smart bombs, which introduced Iran's initial efforts in small-diameter guided munitions with the Sadid-342 glide bomb showcased publicly in 2014, though the Sadid lineage traces back to developments around 2010. The Qaem bombs draw conceptual inspiration from U.S. Small Diameter Bombs but incorporate indigenous guidance systems tailored for Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and aircraft, emphasizing standoff ranges and electro-optical seekers to enhance accuracy in contested environments. Initial public disclosure of the Qaem series occurred on February 5, 2018, during the unveiling and announcement of the Mohajer-6 UAV, where the Qaem-1 variant—a lightweight, TV/thermal-guided weighing approximately 12.5 kg—was demonstrated as compatible armament. This marked the transition to operational integration, with of Qaem-guided projectiles commencing alongside the Mohajer-6 platform to support Iran's asymmetric doctrine. The family expanded with the unveiling of Qaem-5 (20 kg class, featuring infrared and proximity fuse options) and Qaem-9 (30 kg class, suited for fighter jets) on August 6, 2019, in a ceremony presided over by then-Defense Minister Brigadier General Amir Hatami, who highlighted their precision within 50 cm and operational altitudes from 4,000 to 10,000 feet. Subsequent developments included a larger-winged variant displayed on December 14, 2021, at an Iranian self-sufficiency exhibition, indicating ongoing refinements for extended range and capacity. By 2019, Qaem-5 production had begun, enabling exports such as television-guided units supplied to for use in . These milestones reflect Iran's iterative approach to indigenizing technology amid , prioritizing UAV compatibility over manned platforms.

Guidance Systems and Specifications

The Qaem series of air-to-ground glide bombs incorporates multiple guidance options tailored for precision strikes from and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The standard Qaem variant relies on semi-active , enabling operators to designate targets with ground-based or airborne lasers for terminal homing. The Qaem-1 employs an (IR) seeker, facilitating fire-and-forget engagements against thermal signatures in low-visibility conditions. Higher-end models, such as the Qaem-5, integrate television (TV) guidance alongside optical and , allowing for real-time video feed adjustments and combined seeker modes to enhance accuracy across diverse weather scenarios. Key specifications for the Qaem bombs include a lightweight design optimized for UAV carriage, with the Qaem-1 weighing approximately 12.5 kg, measuring 90 cm in length and 12.5 cm in diameter. The Qaem-5, a larger variant, extends to about 108 cm in length and 15.2 cm in diameter. These bombs feature a parachute deployment system to extend glide range, achieving standoff distances of 12 to 40 km depending on release altitude. Minimum release altitude is 1,219 meters (4,000 feet), with operational ceilings up to 3,048 meters (10,000 feet). Reported (CEP) stands at 50 cm, supporting applications against bunkers, armored vehicles, and personnel.
VariantGuidance TypeWeight (kg)Length (cm)Diameter (cm)Range (km)
Qaem~12.59012.512-40
Qaem-1IR12.59012.512-40
Qaem-5TV/Optical/Thermal/~20-2510815.2Up to 40
These systems draw from Iranian reverse-engineering efforts, though independent verification of performance remains limited due to restricted access and reliance on state-reported data.

Combat Applications and Effectiveness

The Qaem series of precision-guided bombs, developed by Iran's Ministry of Defense, has seen limited but documented deployment in , primarily via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Mohajer-6 and Ababil-3 variants. Initial operational use occurred in , where Iranian state media reported the bombs' employment against positions in February 2018, integrated with drone platforms for strikes on terrorist . These applications leveraged the bomb's glide capabilities, allowing deployment from standoff ranges of 12 to 40 kilometers while minimizing exposure of launch assets to ground fire. Proliferation to allies has extended its combat footprint. In 2024, assessments confirmed Iranian of Qaem-5 variants to for use in the Ukraine conflict, with wreckage from a Russian-operated drone in the region revealing the bomb's integration into loitering munitions for precision ground attacks. This marks a escalation in Iran-Russia military ties, with the Qaem-5's TV, , or guidance enabling targeting of fortified positions and mobile armor. While specific strike outcomes remain classified, the system's adaptation for drone delivery underscores its role in attritional campaigns where manned face high risks. Effectiveness evaluations rely heavily on Iranian disclosures, which claim a (CEP) of 50 centimeters, rendering the Qaem suitable for bunker-busting, troop suppression, and engagements against moving targets with warheads ranging from 2.4 to 8.5 kilograms. Independent verification is sparse, as Western analyses prioritize Iranian claims with caution due to state-controlled testing environments that may inflate performance metrics; for instance, real-world factors like electronic warfare jamming or adverse weather could degrade seeker accuracy beyond advertised thresholds. Nonetheless, sustained use by proxies in and adoption by Russian forces suggest practical reliability in low-intensity operations, where the bomb's modular guidance—interchangeable between electro-optical and semi-active modes—provides flexibility over unguided alternatives, though its light payload limits utility against hardened or area targets compared to larger munitions.

Proliferation and International Use

The Qaem series of precision-guided bombs, developed by 's Ministry of Defense, has seen limited proliferation beyond Iranian forces, with confirmed transfers primarily to for deployment in the Ukraine conflict. In early 2024, supplied with Qaem-5 television-guided variants, which feature electro-optical seekers enabling precision strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These munitions, produced starting around 2019, were integrated into Iranian Mohajer-6 drones operated by forces. The first documented operational use occurred in May 2024, when a Russian Mohajer-6 UAV armed with Qaem-5 bombs crashed in Russia's near the Ukrainian border, providing visual evidence of the system's deployment. Subsequent reports confirmed Russian employment of Qaem-equipped drones for attacks on Ukrainian targets, leveraging the bombs' 6-14 km standoff range depending on the variant and launch altitude. No verified exports to other state actors or non-state groups, such as or the Houthis, have been publicly documented for the air-to-ground Qaem variants, though Iran's broader arms transfer patterns to proxies raise ongoing monitoring concerns. This transfer aligns with Iran's post-2020 expiration under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, enabling legal exports of , though subject to end-user restrictions violated in practice. Russian adoption highlights the Qaem's adaptability to munitions, but operational effectiveness remains constrained by electronic warfare vulnerabilities and limited payload (typically 1.7-12.5 kg warheads).

Strategic Implications and Criticisms

Role in Iranian Defense Doctrine

The Qaem precision-guided munitions represent a tactical enhancement within Iran's asymmetric defense doctrine, which emphasizes deterrence, area denial, and to offset conventional military劣iorities against adversaries like the and . Developed as low-cost guidance kits convertible to unguided bombs, Qaem variants enable Iranian fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct standoff precision strikes with ranges up to 50 kilometers, incorporating , , or for terminal accuracy. This aligns with Tehran's "forward defense" strategy, which leverages proxies, UAV swarms, and systems for preemptive disruption of enemy and command structures, minimizing reliance on vulnerable manned platforms amid sanctions-induced obsolescence of Iran's air fleet. In operational terms, Qaem's integration supports Iran's doctrinal shift toward hybrid threats, including drone-delivered munitions for tactical support in proxy conflicts, as seen in Ababil-series UAVs carrying Qaem bombs for guided attacks with warheads as small as 1.7 kilograms yet sufficient for anti-personnel or anti-armor roles. This capability bolsters deterrence by enabling cost-effective coercion—such as precise targeting of naval or ground assets—without escalating to salvos, which are reserved for strategic retaliation. Iranian military exercises in the , including AI-assisted Qaem launches from helicopters in February 2025, demonstrate its role in layered defense, combining with cruise and ballistic systems to impose high costs on invaders through persistent, low-signature threats. Critics from Western analyses argue that Qaem's doctrinal utility is limited by guidance vulnerabilities to electronic warfare and Iran's constrained production scale, potentially undermining reliability in sustained conflicts; however, empirical deployments, including exports to allies like for operations, underscore its value in sustaining asymmetric attrition. Overall, Qaem exemplifies Tehran's emphasis on indigenized, scalable precision tools to achieve causal effects—disrupting enemy momentum—within a broader missile-centric posture that prioritizes survival over symmetry.

Proliferation Concerns and Export Evidence

The proliferation of the Qaem air-to-ground raises concerns due to its precision guidance capabilities, which could enable non-state actors or adversarial states to conduct targeted strikes with reduced , potentially escalating regional conflicts. Iran's transfer of such advanced munitions aligns with broader patterns of supplying precision-guided weapons to proxies, destabilizing the by enhancing the lethality of groups like and the Houthis, though specific Qaem transfers to these entities remain unverified. Export evidence emerged in May 2024 when wreckage of an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone in Russia's region revealed an attached Qaem-5 variant, indicating the first documented supply of this bomb to for use in . The Qaem-5, a television-guided air-to-ground munition with a maximum range of 40 kilometers, was deployed via drone, marking a new escalation in Iran-Russia military cooperation amid Western sanctions. Multiple analyses confirmed the bomb's identification from debris, including its payload configuration, though Iranian officials have not publicly acknowledged the transfer. No confirmed exports of Qaem bombs to Iranian proxies have been reported, distinguishing it from other systems like ballistic missiles provided to Yemen's Houthis. However, the Russia transfer underscores risks of technology diffusion, as reverse-engineering could proliferate Qaem-like designs beyond state actors, complicating non-proliferation efforts. U.S. and allied assessments view such exports as contributing to global instability, particularly in enabling sustained aerial campaigns in violation of international arms embargoes.

Performance Assessments and Limitations

The Qaem series of precision-guided bombs, including variants like Qaem-1 and Qaem-5, are designed for electro-optical or laser guidance, with Iranian defense officials claiming a circular error probable (CEP) of approximately 50 cm under optimal test conditions. These assessments stem primarily from controlled military drills, such as those conducted by the Iranian Army in January 2025, where Qaem bombs were deployed alongside drones and missiles, demonstrating hits on simulated targets at altitudes between 4,000 and 10,000 feet. Independent verification of these precision claims remains limited, as no open-source analyses from Western intelligence or combat data confirm sub-meter accuracy against defended or dynamic targets, contrasting with broader skepticism toward Iranian guided munitions due to inconsistent performance in proxy conflicts. Operational effectiveness is constrained by the weapon's small , typically 1.7 to 8.5 kg, which restricts its utility to soft targets like personnel, light vehicles, or unarmored structures rather than hardened bunkers or armored formations. Guidance systems relying on , , or seekers require clear line-of-sight and favorable weather, rendering the bomb ineffective in adverse conditions such as , screens, or electronic warfare jamming, which adversaries like or U.S. forces routinely employ. Deployment from low-endurance platforms like the Mohajer-6 UAV further limits standoff range to the drone's operational radius of about 200 km, exposing launch assets to air defenses. While Iranian reports highlight successful integration with UAVs for precision strikes in exercises, real-world combat applications—potentially including exports to for use in —lack detailed battle damage assessments, raising doubts about reliability under electronic countermeasures or high-threat environments. The system's miniaturization enables high payload capacity on small drones (up to six Qaem-5 units per Mohajer-6), but this comes at the expense of kinetic impact, making it more suited for harassment or opportunistic strikes than decisive engagements. Overall, without peer-reviewed or adversarial testing data, performance metrics appear overstated relative to established Western equivalents like the GBU-39, which offer larger yields and multi-mode guidance resilience.

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