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Qardaha (Arabic: القَرْدَاحَة / ALA-LC: Qardāḥah) is a town in northwestern Syria, in the mountains overlooking the coastal town of Latakia. Nearby localities include Kilmakho to the west, Bustan al-Basha to the southwest, Harf al-Musaytirah to the southeast and Muzayraa to the north. According to the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, Qardaha had a population of 8,671 in 2004.[1] It has a predominantly Alawite population and is the traditional home of the Assad family,[2] which ruled Syria from 1970 until 2024. It is believed that many of Assad’s loyalists have fled to Qardaha after the end of the Assad regime in December 2024.

Key Information

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who ruled from 1970 to 2000, was born in Qardaha. Under Assad, the government poured massive investments into Qardaha, Latakia and the surrounding region. Qardaha has many luxurious villas. A major statue of Hafez al-Assad used to exist in the town center, and a huge mausoleum containing the graves of Bassel al-Assad and Hafez al-Assad was also previously located there. Hasan al-Khayer was also born in Qardaha.

Climate and geography

[edit]

Qardaha has a hot-summer Mediterranean climate (Köppen climate classification: Csa). Qardaha is in a mountainous area, but its altitude is only between 350 and 500 meters. It is in a beautiful forested area. Qardaha has much rainfall. The average high temperature in July is 29 °C, and in January is 7 °C. There is nearly 828 mm of rainfall annually and three days of snow in January. The climate and nature in Qardaha favour agriculture, and there are apple and orange plantations and tobacco farms.

Climate data for Qardaha
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year
Mean daily maximum °C (°F) 7
(45) 		11
(52) 		15
(59) 		19
(66) 		24
(75) 		28
(82) 		29
(84) 		28
(82) 		26
(79) 		23
(73) 		17
(63) 		10
(50) 		20
(68)
Mean daily minimum °C (°F) 3
(37) 		6
(43) 		6
(43) 		8
(46) 		13
(55) 		17
(63) 		20
(68) 		20
(68) 		17
(63) 		15
(59) 		9
(48) 		5
(41) 		12
(53)
Average precipitation mm (inches) 182
(7.2) 		119
(4.7) 		63
(2.5) 		40
(1.6) 		29
(1.1) 		6
(0.2) 		4
(0.2) 		1
(0.0) 		37
(1.5) 		79
(3.1) 		90
(3.5) 		178
(7.0) 		828
(32.6)
Average rainy days (≥ 1 mm) 16 14 11 8 4 1 1 1 4 7 11 14 92
Average snowy days (≥ 1 cm) 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Source: [citation needed]

Source #3 Climate Zone (Rainy and snowy days) [3]

History

[edit]

According to written traditions, the residents of Qardaha descended from the Kalbiyya tribal confederation and the town served as the confederation's principal center. During the late Ottoman era, between 1840 and 1880, tensions between the authorities and the Alawite tribes of the coastal mountains increased sharply. In 1854 the Ottoman governor of the Latakia Sanjak ("Latakia District") was killed in an armed confrontation between the authorities and members of the Qardaha-based tribe. This emboldened the Kalbiyya fighters, who proceeded to launch more raids against Ottoman positions, which the authorities responded to harshly.[2]

Fear of attracting the attention and subjugation of the authorities, and avoiding taxation and military conscription, was one of the reasons many of the Alawite fellahin ("peasants") who lived in the vicinity of Qardaha, opted not to establish an agglomeration of settlement. Until the present day, Qardaha is surrounded by scattered rural hamlets. The town formerly had a significant Christian population until the mid to late 20th-century, when most Christian families left for the major coastal cities.[2]

The interior of Assad Mausoleum before its destruction, with the main tomb in the center

In 1970, Qardaha was given city status, along with al-Shaykh Badr and Duraykish. Together they made up around 6% of the total urban population of the two coastal governorates, Latakia and Tartus. The three towns were also designated the seats of newly formed districts (mantiqah) centered around them.[2] According to French anthropologist Fabrice Balanche, the Ba'athist government which gained power in the 1960s, displayed a degree of favoritism for the three towns, all of which were Alawite, and Qardaha specifically. He particularly pointed to the fact that the subdistricts (nahiya) of al-Qadmus and Mashta al-Helu, predominantly Ismaili and Christian, respectively, were slated to become districts when each of their populations passed the 60,000 threshold, although the subdistricts of Qardaha, al-Shaykh Badr and Duraykish all had less than 40,000 inhabitants.[2] The opening of civil and administrative services associated with its city status and state investments, such as the construction of a tobacco processing plant, spurred Qardaha's significant growth between 1970 and 1981, with an annual average of 4.9% compared to the coastal region's average of 3.8%.[4]

In early October 2012 during the Syrian civil war, Mohammad al-Assad, cousin of President Bashar al-Assad and leader of the local Shabiha, was wounded after a gunfight in the town with a member of the rival Alawite Khayyir clan. This was sparked by a discussion about the earlier detention at Damascus airport of Abdel-Aziz Khayyer, a Qardaha native and member of the latter clan.[5] On 24 April 2013, the village was attacked with a barrage of rockets launched by rebels.[6] In early August 2013 in a surprise offensive, rebel fighters advanced south to the outskirts of the village of Aramo, 20 km. (12 miles) from Qardaha. One of the attackers stated "The objective is to reach Qardaha and hurt them like they are hurting us."[7]

On 11 December 2024, the tombs of Hafez al-Assad and Bassel al-Assad were set on fire by rebel fighters.[8]

References

[edit]

Sources

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Qardaha

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Qardaha is a predominantly Alawite town in the of northwestern , situated at approximately 35°27′N 36°04′E with an elevation of 325 meters above . It serves as the ancestral home and birthplace of , who seized power in 1970 and ruled until 2000, establishing the family's dominance over Syrian politics through control of the military and security apparatus, primarily drawing support from the Alawite minority sect. The town became a symbol of the Assad regime's sectarian favoritism, with the family concentrating power among Alawite networks while much of the local population remained economically marginalized despite proximity to regime elites. Following the regime's collapse in December 2024, Qardaha emerged as a focal point for lingering Assad loyalist resistance, witnessing ambushes against government forces and arrests of family associates linked to illicit activities such as Captagon production.

Geography and Environment

Location and Topography

Qardaha is located in , northwestern , within the Jabal Ansariyeh mountain range at coordinates approximately 35°27′N 36°03′E. The town lies roughly 25 kilometers inland from the Mediterranean coast, positioned to overlook the nearby coastal city of to the west. This placement situates it amid 's coastal mountain topography, enhancing its strategic overlook of surrounding valleys and plains. Elevations in Qardaha range from 350 to 500 meters above , featuring rugged hills, valleys, and forested terrain typical of the Ansariyeh highlands. The mountainous landscape provides natural defensibility through its steep inclines and isolated positioning, with proximity to larger centers like (25 km west) and (approximately 70 km south) while maintaining relative seclusion. The terrain supports centered on terraced cultivation of olives and trees, suited to the hilly, well-watered slopes, alongside some production in the broader region.

Climate and Natural Features

Qardaha exhibits a , featuring mild winters with average temperatures ranging from 4°C to 15°C and hot, dry summers with highs typically reaching 25°C to 31°C. Annual averages around 780 mm, concentrated primarily from to , supporting seasonal growth while contributing to relative water availability compared to Syria's arid interior regions. Proximity to the Mediterranean coast, approximately 25 km away, moderates temperatures and introduces higher levels, though specific frequency data for Qardaha remains limited in available records. The region's maquis shrublands and mixed forests, covering about 14% of natural forest land as of 2020, heighten vulnerability to wildfires during prolonged dry spells, as evidenced by extensive blazes in Governorate's mountainous areas in July 2025 that scorched thousands of hectares. Natural features include landscapes with dolines (sinkholes) prevalent in the coastal mountains around Qardaha, alongside forested expanses of fruit-bearing trees such as apples and apricots, which benefit from the area's higher rainfall and reduce risks relative to inland .

Historical Development

Pre-Modern History

The region encompassing modern Qardaha, situated in the Jabal Anṣāriyya (Nusayriyah Mountains) of coastal , exhibits archaeological traces of pre-Islamic settlement consistent with the rural, agricultural character of the highlands during Phoenician, Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine eras. Surveys in the Syrian coastal mountains reveal late antique structures such as cisterns, olive presses, and reused Byzantine churches, pointing to dispersed villages focused on and olive cultivation rather than urban development. These findings align with broader patterns in the province of , where the mountainous interior supported minor habitations amid dominant coastal cities like Laodicea (modern ). Following the Arab Muslim conquest of Syria between 636 and 638 CE, the Jabal Anṣāriyya remained a peripheral, isolated zone under Umayyad and Abbasid administration, with limited direct governance due to its terrain. The emergence of the Alawite (Nusayri) sect in the 9th-10th centuries, as an esoteric offshoot of founded by Muhammad ibn Nusayr, prompted adherents to seek refuge from Sunni orthodox persecution in remote areas like these mountains. By the 11th-12th centuries, Alawite communities had established footholds in the western Jabal Anṣāriyya, leveraging the rugged landscape for defense amid Fatimid tolerance followed by Seljuk and Crusader incursions. In the medieval period, under Ayyubid, Crusader, and especially rule (1250-1517 CE), the mountains hosted a network of fortified rural settlements, including towers, courtyard houses, and cave refuges documented archaeologically in sites near Qardaha. Qardaha itself likely originated as one such Alawite village during this era, developing amid ongoing marginalization and intermittent raids, which reinforced the community's insularity. By the onset of Ottoman control in the early , the area had solidified as an Alawite enclave, characterized by tribal autonomy and resistance to central taxation, setting the stage for its pre-modern persistence as a highland refuge.

Modern Era up to Ba'athist Rise

During the Ottoman era, Qardaha functioned as a modest settlement in the mountainous hinterland of the Syrian coast, maintaining semi-autonomous tribal governance amid broader imperial oversight from . , viewed as heterodox by Sunni Ottoman authorities, endured discriminatory taxation including the cizye head tax and additional levies, which fueled localized resistance and participation in larger 19th-century uprisings, such as the 1831–1832 revolt against Egyptian-Ottoman forces under Ibrahim Pasha. These dynamics reinforced Qardaha's isolation, with the village relying on and intermittent trade, while Ottoman reforms from the 1830s onward introduced inconsistent administrative centralization that exacerbated sectarian tensions without significant infrastructural investment. The French Mandate period (1920–1946) marked a temporary shift, as Qardaha fell within the —a coastal territory carved out by French authorities in 1920 as part of a divide-and-rule policy favoring minorities against Sunni urban elites. This arrangement offered brief administrative privileges, including separate governance structures and recruitment of Alawites into the French-raised Troupes Spéciales du Levant, which provided economic incentives and military training but did little to alleviate chronic or integrate the region economically. Qardaha experienced modest population increases from relative security, though the area persisted in , with dominant and limited connectivity to coastal ports like ; the Alawite State's dissolution by 1936 under pressure for Syrian unification further eroded these gains. Following Syrian independence in 1946, Qardaha was absorbed into the , where it remained a peripheral rural enclave amid national coups and instability, receiving minimal state investment in roads or services despite broader post-colonial efforts. Persistent socioeconomic deprivation, coupled with Sunni-majority dominance in politics and the military, heightened sectarian frictions, as in areas like Qardaha confronted exclusion from power structures; this environment spurred agitation by emerging Ba'athist networks, which appealed to minorities through promises of secular and , laying groundwork for their ascent without yet altering the village's marginal status.

Assad Family Era (1970–2024)

Hafez al-Assad, born in Qardaha in 1928, consolidated power through the Corrective Movement on November 16, 1970, becoming president in 1971 and transforming his hometown into a regime stronghold and Alawite power base. The town and surrounding district benefited from state favoritism, including land confiscations for regime projects, such as the mausoleum planned in 1984 on approximately 3 acres of seized property from local families, constructed by the Military Housing Establishment at significant cost in Syrian pounds. These developments symbolized the Assad family's dominion, with infrastructure enhancements like roads and public buildings prioritized to secure loyalty from the Alawite community, which supplied key personnel to the military and security apparatus. By the late 1990s, Qardaha District had seen population growth reflecting these investments, reaching 75,279 residents according to the 2004 census conducted by Syrian authorities. Schools, streets, and landmarks were renamed in honor of Assad family members, reinforcing cult-of-personality elements amid broader regional development in , including transport improvements like the 1995 Revolution Roundabout. The became a focal point after Bassel al-Assad's burial there following his 1994 death, and Hafez's interment in 2000, drawing regime loyalists despite local grievances over land appropriation. Under Bashar al-Assad's succession in 2000, enabled by a lowering the presidential age requirement to 34, Qardaha continued as a privileged enclave with efforts toward modernization, such as expanded and promotion of coastal in the Alawite mountains. However, imposed after 2011 economic reforms and civil unrest strained development, limiting infrastructure projects despite ongoing favoritism toward regime-supporting areas. The district's role as a recruitment hub for persisted, tying local prosperity to allegiance amid national economic challenges.

Demographics and Society

Population Statistics

According to the 2004 census conducted by Syria's Central Bureau of Statistics, Qardaha had a of 8,671 residents. This figure reflects the last comprehensive official enumeration, with the town's administrative district encompassing 75,279 inhabitants at the time. Prior to the , the likely grew due to elevated rates in rural n locales, where women averaged 4.1 children per woman as per 2004 census indicators. Steady increases were partly offset by rural-to-urban migration patterns common across , though localized development may have moderated outflows in Qardaha. The civil war from 2011 onward disrupted demographic tracking, with no subsequent national census. By 2024, estimates placed the town's population at approximately 10,000–15,000, accounting for wartime stability in regime-held coastal areas followed by displacement. A January 2025 assessment described Qardaha's population as around 50,000, potentially including adjacent subdistricts amid post-conflict adjustments. Following the Assad regime's collapse in December 2024, regional mobility data from the International Organization for Migration recorded over 1.1 million returns to Syria by May 2025, including to Latakia Governorate, though specific influxes to Qardaha remain unquantified amid reported local displacements.

Ethnic and Religious Composition

Qardaha's population is overwhelmingly , an of origin that constitutes the vast majority of residents in this coastal mountain stronghold. Alawites follow a syncretic, esoteric interpretation of , incorporating elements of , , and pre-Islamic traditions, which has historically distinguished them from orthodox Muslim sects. While the broader includes , Christian (primarily Greek Orthodox and ), and Ismaili minorities, Qardaha itself features negligible non-Alawite presence, with any such groups comprising less than 5% based on its role as a core Alawite settlement. The concentration of Alawites in Qardaha stems from centuries of seeking refuge in the Jabal Ansariyah (Alawite Mountains) to escape persecution under Sunni-dominated Ottoman rule and earlier caliphates, where they faced institutionalized marginalization from the onward. This geographic isolation fostered a tight-knit community, reinforced by tribal structures such as the confederation, to which the Assad family belongs, alongside other Alawite tribes like the Haddadin, Khayyatin, and Matawira. Social cohesion is maintained through practices of religious , with inter-sectarian marriages remaining rare across , including in Alawite areas like Qardaha, due to doctrinal differences and communal norms prioritizing intra-group unions. This , combined with esoteric rituals kept confidential within the community, has preserved distinct cultural identities amid historical pressures for assimilation.

Political Role and Governance

Association with the Assad Regime

Qardaha, the ancestral hometown of the Assad family, gained central symbolic importance under the regime due to its status as the birthplace of , born on October 6, 1930, to a Alawite in the village. Hafez's rise to power in 1970 through the positioned Qardaha as a core node in the regime's patronage networks, where and clan ties facilitated control over local administration and security structures, including mukhtars who enforced loyalty among the predominantly Alawite population. Following Hafez al-Assad's death on June 10, 2000, the construction of a grand complex in Qardaha during the early 2000s enshrined his remains alongside those of his son Bassel, transforming the site into a emblem of dynastic continuity and legitimacy. This development coincided with Bashar al-Assad's ascension, achieved via constitutional amendments lowering the presidential age requirement from 40 to 34 and emergency declarations to consolidate power, with Qardaha underscoring the Alawite minority's entrenched stake in Ba'athist governance despite its secular ideology. The town's role extended to serving as a recruitment base for loyalists in and roles, reinforced by frequent high-level visits that distributed and solidified dominance over local affairs.

Local Administration and Development

Qardaha functions as the administrative center of Qardaha District, one of four districts in Latakia Governorate. Local governance under the Ba'athist regime (1970–2024) centered on institutions including the municipality headquarters and a branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, which facilitated oversight and personnel selections prioritizing alignment with central authorities. Municipal leadership and administrative roles were appointed through party-affiliated channels, reflecting the regime's emphasis on in coastal Alawite areas. This structure supported targeted infrastructure projects, such as highways linking Qardaha to and extending toward the Turkish border via , enhancing connectivity initiated during the era. Economic activity in Qardaha has historically depended on , including such as cows, donkeys, and mules in communal areas, alongside broader reliance on state for fuel, food, and inputs that sustained rural livelihoods across until subsidy reforms accelerated post-2011. Development outcomes included state-built facilities like civil registries, though reports from 2024 noted persistent neglect in roads and buildings despite prior investments.

Involvement in Conflicts

Syrian Civil War (2011–2024)

Qardaha, the ancestral hometown of the Assad family in Syria's Alawite heartland, remained under firm regime control throughout the from its onset in 2011 until the government's collapse in December 2024. As a predominantly Alawite locality, it functioned as a critical bastion for regime loyalty, with local fortifications and military presence deterring direct rebel incursions into the town itself despite nearby threats. The area's strategic value stemmed from its position safeguarding the Alawite community's core territories in the Jabal al-Ala mountains against advances by predominantly Sunni rebel groups, including jihadist elements like Jabhat al-Nusra, which sought to exploit sectarian fault lines. Heavy recruitment from Qardaha bolstered regime forces, channeling locals into elite units such as the 4th Armoured Division—predominantly staffed by Alawite personnel for its reliability in defending key areas—and irregular militias, which drew from coastal Alawite villages to conduct operations and enforce loyalty. Alawite-dominated regions like , including Qardaha, supplied a disproportionate share of fighters to the Syrian Arab Army, driven by economic pressures and sectarian solidarity amid rebel threats to minority communities. This mobilization resulted in substantial casualties among Qardaha's fighting-age males, as the town prioritized defense of the Alawite hinterland over peripheral fronts. Rebel offensives in posed the most direct challenges to Qardaha during 2013–2014, when jihadist-led groups captured coastal villages and advanced inland, briefly threatening the town's outskirts in operations like the . Government counteroffensives, leveraging local militias and army reinforcements, contained these pushes without allowing rebels to breach Qardaha proper, preserving it as a secure rear base for regime operations in the northwest. Iranian-backed forces and allies provided broader support to stabilize the coastal front, though primary defense relied on indigenous Alawite units attuned to the terrain and stakes.

Post-Assad Clashes (2024–Present)

Following the ouster of on December 8, 2024, by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led opposition forces, Qardaha experienced a period of relative calm under the new interim government, though underlying sectarian tensions persisted among its predominantly population fearing marginalization. Early protests by in nearby coastal areas like and Tartous highlighted demands for protection against reprisals, with similar sentiments reported in Qardaha by February 2025 amid rising revenge violence and armed group activities. Tensions escalated on February 27, 2025, with intense clashes in Qardaha between Syrian government forces and elements linked to the former regime, marking one of the first direct confrontations in the town post-ouster. The situation intensified in early March 2025 as part of broader Western Syria clashes, where pro-Assad gunmen ambushed on March 6, killing at least 13-14 personnel in initial attacks and briefly seizing control of villages surrounding Qardaha, as well as suburbs in nearby and . Government reinforcements responded with operations in Qardaha, leading to over 225 deaths overall in the coastal violence by March 8, including security personnel, insurgents, and civilians. The Syrian Defense Ministry declared the against loyalists concluded by March 10, though monitors reported up to 973 civilian deaths in related revenge attacks targeting . As of July 2025, the Home Office assessed ongoing risks to actual or perceived Assad loyalists in Alawite areas like Qardaha, noting limited but targeted revenge killings alongside public calls for accountability for regime-era crimes, with interim authorities struggling to contain insurgent cells. These clashes represented the most significant post-ouster in the , underscoring persistent insurgent capabilities among former networks despite the HTS-led 's efforts to consolidate control.

Controversies and Perspectives

Allegations of Land Seizures and Favoritism

Following 's rise to power in 1970, allegations emerged of land expropriations in Qardaha targeting residents for regime-linked projects, including family tombs and state infrastructure. In 1984, approximately 3 acres belonging to Sheikh Ali al-Khayyir were forcibly seized by for constructing a intended for himself and his son Bassel, with the land acquired at a price below $200 per acre—far under market value—through involvement of family members and associate Jaber Shalish. Such actions displaced local families, including the al-Khayyir lineage, as plots were repurposed for symbolic regime structures like the civil registry and branch offices. Favoritism allegations center on the preferential allocation of seized lands to Assad family proxies and loyalists, often merchants connected to figures like Asma or Maher al-Assad, bypassing broader local distribution. These transfers, documented through coerced "mutual sales" with minimal or no compensation, reinforced nepotistic networks in Qardaha, the Assad clan's ancestral base, where state resources prioritized regime insiders over ordinary residents. Witness accounts, such as those from locals recounting forced undervalued sales in the 1990s, highlight patterns of intimidation to facilitate such favoritism, though primarily tied to broader Latakia-area practices extending to Qardaha. The countered these claims by portraying expropriations as consensual transactions validated by legal authorities, framing them as necessary for public infrastructure amid post-coup stabilization efforts rather than personal gain. While direct evidence of widespread local benefits is limited, proximity to power in Qardaha reportedly enabled some residents indirect economic opportunities through regime , though critics argue this favored a narrow circle over the community at large.

Sectarian and Loyalty Dynamics

Qardaha, as the ancestral stronghold of the Assad family, exemplifies the tight-knit Alawite that underpinned the regime's endurance, with community cohesion serving as a critical pillar against perceived existential threats from Sunni-majority insurgencies. Alawites, comprising approximately 10-12% of Syria's population, provided disproportionate loyalty to the Assads, viewing regime defense as synonymous with sectarian survival amid rising jihadist groups like , which explicitly targeted Alawite communities as heretics during the . This enabled effective against such threats, contributing to the containment of ISIS advances in coastal areas, though critics argue the regime's heavy reliance on Alawite militias exacerbated sectarian divides, framing the broader uprising as a Sunni conspiracy and provoking retaliatory backlash. Empirical data underscores Alawite overrepresentation in the apparatus, with roughly 70% of the Syrian army's 200,000 troops being Alawite despite their minority status, alongside 80% of officers, which facilitated control but bred widespread resentment among Sunnis who faced systemic in enlistment and promotions. This structure ensured through familial and sectarian networks originating from strongholds like Qardaha, where mukhabarat services maintained pervasive to suppress , intertwining personal allegiance with state coercion. While this bolstered short-term stability against jihadist incursions—evident in the 's role in degrading territorial holdings—it also rendered Alawites vulnerable to post- reprisals, as their institutional dominance fueled perceptions of privilege and complicity in atrocities. Following Bashar al-Assad's ouster in December 2024, Qardaha emerged as a focal point for Alawite anxieties over Islamist retribution, with residents protesting a of an attack on an Alawite in northern on December 25, 2024, demanding protection and invoking Assad-era stability against fears of targeted violence. These demonstrations, occurring amid broader coastal unrest, highlighted a communal defense of perceived gains in minority security under the , even as transitional authorities pledged inclusivity; yet underlying tensions persist, with citing historical jihadist threats as justification for prior alignments, underscoring a causal link between defensive and survival in 's fractured landscape. Local voices in Qardaha have expressed relief at the lack of immediate massacres but wariness of cycles, reflecting a pragmatic acknowledgment that over-dependence on isolated the from cross-sectarian alliances.

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  47. https://newlinesinstitute.org/political-systems/governance/syrian-regime-no-longer-able-to-provide-for-loyalists/
  48. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/bashar-al-assad-home-village-syrian-opposition-attack
  49. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-mountain/syrian-rebels-push-into-assads-alawite-mountain-stronghold-idUSBRE97410820130805/
  50. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/4th_Armoured_Division_%28Syria%29
  51. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/shabiha-militias-and-the-destruction-of-syria/
  52. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/syrias-once-empowered-alawite-minority-faces-uncertain-future-after-fall-of-assad
  53. https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/2014coastaloffensive-april1.pdf
  54. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/assad-loyalists-shaken-by-his-fall-some-relieved-by-lack-violence-2024-12-08/
  55. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-update-17-8-february-2025
  56. https://www.newsflare.com/video/724726/syria-heavy-clashes-erupt-in-qardaha-between-syrian-forces-and-former-regime-elements
  57. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0ew5g3vzreo
  58. https://apnews.com/article/syria-ambush-assad-jabel-alawites-sunnis-d33e9f12773c0e09e14a56c96235226f
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  60. https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/07/middleeast/syria-army-assad-deadly-clashes-intl
  61. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/07/death-toll-rises-syrian-security-forces-struggle-quell-assad-loyalist-attacks
  62. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cewk4rv9v17o
  63. https://www.dw.com/en/syria-military-ends-operation-against-assad-loyalists/a-71874745
  64. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-says-developments-within-expected-challenges-clashes-continue-arab-2025-03-09/
  65. https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/the-existential-challenge-for-syrias-alawites/
  66. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/07/syria-alawites-minority-postwar-post-assad?lang=en
  67. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/syrian-army-and-its-power-pyramid/
  68. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/25/protests-in-syria-after-old-video-shows-attack-on-alawite-shrine
  69. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/27/world/middleeast/syria-alawites-assad.html
  70. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/15/celebrating-the-unknown-syrian-alawites-fear-for-future-under-rebel-rule
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