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The National Islamic Front (NIF; Arabic: الجبهة الإسلامية القومية; transliterated: al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Qawmiyah) was an Islamist political organization founded in 1976[1] and led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi that influenced the Sudanese government starting in 1979, and dominated it from 1989 to the late 1990s. It was one of only two Islamic revival movements to secure political power in the 20th century (the other being the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the Islamic Republic of Iran).[2]

Key Information

The NIF emerged from Muslim student groups that first began organizing in the universities during the 1940s, and its main support base has remained the college educated.[2] It supported the maintenance of an Islamic state run on Sharia and rejected the concept of a secular state. It took a "top down" or "Islamisation from above" approach of "infiltrating Sudan's state apparatus, army, and financial system".[3] It demonstrated itself to be both politically adept and ruthless in its use of violence, in particular in the internal conflicts of the Second Sudanese Civil War and the War in Darfur, as well in the provisioning of proxy forces such as the Lord's Resistance Army, the West Nile Bank Front and the Uganda National Rescue Front II against Uganda.

In the late 1990s, the Front changed its name to National Congress,[4][5] and the "gross human rights violations" of the regime's early years gave way to "more subtle methods of social control such as restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, opinion, religion, association, and movement."[2] In 1999, Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the NIF and his supporters were expelled from the ruling National Congress Party by President of Sudan Omar Hassan al-Bashir[6] and subsequently founded the rival Popular Congress Party which has remained in opposition.[7]

History

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Formation and early history

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Created in the 1960s as an Islamist student group, it was known as the Islamic Charter Front. From 1964 to 1969, it was headed by Hassan al-Turabi after the overthrow of the government of President Ibrahim Abboud. During this period, the ICF supported women's right to vote and ran women candidates. In 1969, the government was overthrown by General Gaafar Nimeiry in a coup d'état, after which the members of the Islamic Charter Front were placed under house arrest or fled the country. Although strongly opposed to Communism, the NIF copied their organization.[8] The National Islamic Front itself was founded following the failure of the anti-Numayri coup, led by the Ansar in July 1976.[1]

Sources of strength

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Turabi's group served as "intermediaries" between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, whose port Jeddah was almost directly across the Red Sea only about 200 miles from Port Sudan and capable of hosting Saudi immigrant workers. Following the Arab Oil Embargo, Saudi Arabia had serious financial resources which it could invest in Sudan to discourage communist influence.[9] Throughout the Cold War, the organization benefited from the pro-Islamist support of Saudi Arabia. Saudi financial help for the NIF and its dominance of Islamic banking (which later meant all banking), gave them the means to transcend their original bases in intellectual and university circles.[10]

In the fall of 1977, the Faisal Islamic Bank opened a branch in Sudan—60% of its start up capital was Saudi.[11] By the mid-1980s the bank was second biggest in Sudan in terms of money held on deposit.[9] Also founded in the late 1970s was the Al Baraka Bank. Both provided rewards for whose affiliated with Hassan al-Turabi's Islamist National Islamic Front—employment and wealth for young militant college graduates and easy credit for devout Muslim investors and businessmen.[9]

In 1979, when Nimeiry sought an accommodation with the NIF, al-Turabi was invited to become Attorney-General, NIF members would help other member be placed in "every available position of power" in the Sudanese government.[12] It also benefited from Nimeiry's falling out with his former communist allies. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) was the largest communist party in the Arab world[3] and was the Islamists' rival amongst university students. The SCP and NIF appealed to university students by being less based on family connections than the mainstream Sudanese parties.[13] Although Nimeiry called his regime socialist to the end he turned on the SCP as a threat to his power and likely as an impediment in gaining aid from the United States.

With al-Nimeiry regime

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In 1983, al-Tarabi used his position as Attorney General to push for the strict application of Sharia. "Within eighteen months, more than fifty suspected thieves had their hands chopped off. A Coptic Christian was hanged for possessing foreign currency; poor women were flogged for selling local beer."[14] Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, an Islamic intellectual who had reinterpreted Islamic law in a more liberal direction and opposed the new Sharia laws was hanged in January 1985.[10] In March 1985, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was charged with sedition. This came, in part, because Nimeiry had grown suspicious of their banking power. This official condemnation of the group proved temporary though as President Nimeiry had lost support of the Sudanese people and the military and was consequently overthrown. An attempt at democracy followed his overthrow and the organization attempted to use this to their advantage. In the 1986 elections their financial strength and backing among university graduates still gave them only ten percent of the vote and therefore a third-place position. They made up for this by increasingly gaining support of the military during a time of civil war. The well educated status of their leadership, al-Turabi was one of the best educated men in Sudan, also gained them prestige.

1989 coup

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In 1989, the southern rebels, Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed an agreement with the democratic government that included provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing of the Sharia (which the non-Muslim south opposed), the lifting of the state of emergency, and the abolition of all foreign political and military pacts and proposed a constitutional conference to decide Sudan's political future. On March 11 1989, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi formed a new governing coalition that included the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and representatives of southern parties and the trade unions. The NIF refused to join the coalition because it was not committed to enforcing the Sharia.

On June 30 1989 this government was overthrown by Colonel (later General) Omar al-Bashir who was committed to imposing Sharia law and to seeking a military victory over the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). While some NIF leaders, including al-Turabi, were placed under house arrest following the coup as part of the internal power struggle that brought al-Bashir to power, they were soon released.

Alliance with military

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The NIF alliance with the Omar al-Bashir putch has been described (by Olivier Roy) as similar to the Jamaat-e-Islami alliance with Pakistan General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.[15] Jamaat-e-Islami also favored top-down Islamism and Zia also staged a coup against an elected government. Explanations for why the military allied itself with the NIF include its infiltration by the NIF,[16] and the "ideological justification" the NIF gave the war as a jihad against the animists and Christians of the south,[17] while the Pakistan military had just lost a war and Omar al-Bashir was continuing a war, both wars ended in the loss by secession of a large area of their country (Bangladesh and South Sudan), and in international criticism for millions of civilians killed and human rights abused.

Governance

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Like the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, and unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the NIF was interested in spreading Islam from above rather than preaching to the masses. It strove to eliminate the power of the traditional Sufi brotherhood based parties (the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party) and replace them with itself.[18] Under the NIF government, education was overhauled to focus on the glory of Arab and Islamic culture, and memorizing the Quran. Religious police in the capital insured that women were veiled, especially in government offices and universities.[14][18]

Alleged human rights abuses by the NIF regime included war crimes, ethnic cleansing, a revival of slavery, torture of opponents, and an unprecedented number of refugees fleeing into Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea, Egypt, Europe and North America.[19] Repression of the "secular middle class" was "savage" and unprecedented for Sudan where "political customs" were relatively relaxed.[20] "Purges and executions were carried out in the upper ranks" of the army, and civil and military officials were subjected to Islamist "reeducation". Opponents were forced into exile to prevent them from organizing an alternative to the regime.[18]

International organizations denounced the routine interrogation and torture by security agencies in anonymous "ghost houses". To compensate for its lack of mass support the NIF employed paramilitary force made up of Fula tribesmen (traditionally agricultural day labourers) to "do its dirty work", the tribesmen being bound to the NIF because "they risked forfeiting everything should the NIF lose its grip on power." In interviews al-Turabi dismissed abuses as minimal and attributed them to the "extreme sensitively" of his opponents.[21]

The NIF intensified the war against the south which was declared a jihad.[14][18] School uniforms were replaced with combat fatigues and students engaged in paramilitary drills. Young students learned jihadist chants.[14] On state television, actors simulated “weddings” between jihad martyrs and heavenly virgins (houris) on state television. Turabi also gave asylum and assistance to non-Sudanese jihadi, including Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members.[14] They also placed Sadiq al-Mahdi in prison (despite the fact he was related to Turabi by marriage, the two had become bitter enemies by the mid-1980s). The regime also committed what are widely deemed to have been massive human rights violations against religious minorities, particularly in the south. Women in Sudan could face execution for adultery even in cases of rape. This was used by several soldiers in their war against the south.

The NIF also tried to position itself as the world's leading Sunni Islamist organization, leading the only Sunni Islamist state before the Taliban. Although critical of Saddam Hussein, al-Turabi held an anti-American Islamist conference during Operation Desert Storm, toward the end of supporting the Iraqi people in their war. During terrorism expert Steven Emerson's 1998 testimony before the United States Senate, he implicated the Sudanese National Islamic Front as partly responsible for the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing.[22] That attack, on February 26, 1993, occurred on the 2nd anniversary of the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, thus ending the 1991 Gulf War.

Beginning in 1991, they also harbored Osama bin Laden for several years after the Saudis revoked his citizenship. It is suspected they hoped he could aid them through his wealth and construction company. However, eventually the NIF government deemed him too great a liability and banished him.

Bin Laden had been exiled to Sudan because he had publicly spoken out against the Saudi government for basing U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia in order to oppose Iraq's takeover of Kuwait. So although bin Laden and the NIF appeared to be on opposite sides of sympathy for or against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, they both found differing reasons for their greater and common concern, the presence and involvement of the United States in that region's conflict.

The abuses against southerners (some of whom were Christians) had aroused the activism of Christian groups in Europe and the US.[21] Sanctions were imposed by US and parlayed into legitimacy for the narrowly based NIF—a symbol of "resistance to imperialism".[18] Sudan came under United Nations sanctions for sponsoring a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.[14]

Decreasing Influence

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Starting around 1999, Hassan al-Turabi's political clout waned. Between late 1999 and early 2000 the NIF went through a power struggle following an attempt by al-Turabi to take away Bashir's ability to name regional governors. In December 1999, Bashir stripped al-Turabi of his posts, dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution and declared a state of national emergency.[6] Al-Turabi created a splinter Popular Congress Party in summer of 2000.[6]

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the regime made attempts to downplay, at least on the public international stage, any international Islamist aspects of the organization. Further, al-Turabi was imprisoned (temporarily) in 2004 and the regime allowed the Christian John Garang to be Vice President in a peace deal. By 2006, there had been “a hundred-and-eighty-degree turn” in al-Turabi’s stated views, with declarations of support for gender equality, democracy and human rights.[14]

By 2012, South Sudan had gained independence, but abuses in Darfur had gained note, and the government was reportedly "still dominated" by high-ranking members of the NIF.[23]

Electoral history

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National Assembly elections

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Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Position Result
1986 Hassan al-Turabi 726,021 18.51%
51 / 301
 New 3rd Opposition

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

National Islamic Front

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from Grokipedia
The National Islamic Front (NIF) was a Sudanese Islamist political organization, ideologically aligned with global revivalism, that orchestrated the 1989 military bringing General to power and establishing an authoritarian regime committed to enforcing law nationwide. Led by the intellectual , a and Islamic scholar who served as its chief architect, the NIF pursued a "top-down" of societal Islamization, rejecting models in favor of comprehensive ideological reform rooted in . Under NIF dominance, Sudan transitioned from a fragile to a repressive Islamist state, where the regime systematically imposed punishments, curtailed , and mobilized resources for against non-compliant southern populations, exacerbating and displacing millions. The group's tenure, which evolved into the National Congress Party by the , was marked by international isolation due to alleged support for , economic mismanagement, and atrocities in regions like , where state-backed militias conducted under the banner of . This era of rule persisted until al-Bashir's ouster in amid mass protests, revealing the NIF's failure to sustain popular legitimacy despite its institutional entrenchment.

Ideology and Objectives

Core Islamist Principles

The National Islamic Front (NIF), founded in 1976 under Hassan al-Turabi's leadership, adhered to a Muslim Brotherhood-derived Islamism that prioritized the creation of a comprehensive Islamic state in Sudan, where Sharia law would dictate governance, rejecting secularism as incompatible with divine sovereignty. This ideology viewed Islam as an all-encompassing system (din wa dawla), integrating religious principles into politics, economics, society, and law, with tawhid (God's unity) as the foundational axiom ensuring that human authority derived solely from Quranic and Sunnah sources rather than popular will or Western models. The NIF's approach emphasized top-down Islamization, using state mechanisms to enforce religious norms, including the application of hudud punishments for offenses like theft and adultery, as demonstrated in the 1983 Sharia implementations under allied regimes. Central to NIF principles was the supremacy of (consultation) as an Islamic mechanism for decision-making, reinterpreted by al-Turabi to incorporate participatory elements while subordinating them to (jurisprudence) derived from traditionalist schools, thereby framing governance as accountable to God rather than electorates. The movement advocated not only as defensive warfare but as an ideological and societal struggle to eradicate un-Islamic influences, justifying infiltration of institutions like the military and bureaucracy to achieve power, as seen in the 1989 coup. Social policies under NIF influence promoted gender roles aligned with conservative interpretations of , such as veiling mandates and restrictions on women's public participation, while marginalizing non-Muslims through discriminatory laws that fueled conflicts like the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), resulting in over 2 million deaths. Al-Turabi's writings and speeches underscored a pragmatic adaptation of these principles, blending Sudanese cultural elements with global Islamist thought to legitimize an authoritarian Islamic order, yet maintaining rejection of pluralism in favor of an ummah-centric state where and deviance warranted suppression. This framework, propagated through NIF-affiliated universities and mosques since the Brotherhood roots, aimed at societal purification and expansion of Islamic rule beyond , influencing alliances with transnational jihadists in the .

Strategic Influences and Adaptations

The National Islamic Front (NIF), under Hassan al-Turabi's leadership, derived key strategic influences from the tradition, adapting its focus on gradual societal penetration and institutional building to Sudan's multi-sectarian context rather than pursuing outright revolutionary confrontation. This approach echoed Hassan al-Banna's emphasis on through and professional networks, which the NIF employed to establish parallel Islamist structures like Islamic banks and universities during the . Ideological inspirations from Sayyid Qutb's vanguardism and Abul A'la Maududi's conception of Islamic sovereignty further informed the NIF's rejection of secular democracy in favor of a phased Islamization, prioritizing cadre loyalty and moral reform over mass mobilization. Following the 1979 , the NIF adapted by forging pragmatic alliances with , securing military aid—including $850 million in arms by 1993—and training programs that bolstered Sudan's Popular Defense Forces (PDF), which grew to 150,000 members by 1991 for and regime defense. This influence manifested in joint efforts to export revolution, such as hosting the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) assemblies from 1991 onward, which united Sunni and Shia militants—including and early affiliates—to position as a pan-Islamist hub, despite doctrinal Sunni-Shia tensions. Such adaptations prioritized resource acquisition over ideological purity, enabling the NIF to evade early isolation by framing as a bridge between Arab and African Islamist fronts. Al-Turabi's "strategy of comprehending the society" represented a core adaptation, shifting from a narrow cadre-based model to a "comprehensive people's Islamic front" by co-opting non-movement elites—comprising 60% of the reconstituted Council post-1989—and allying with Sufi orders and Salafis to erode traditional parties' bases. This tactical flexibility allowed infiltration of the and during the 1977 Nimeiry reconciliation, culminating in the 1983 laws, but pivoted to a coup in June 1989 when electoral gains (third place in 1986 polls) faced reversal under democratic pressures. Post-seizure, adaptations included initial concealment of overt Islamist control to mitigate backlash, followed by federal restructuring into 26 provinces by 1994 for localized enforcement and NIF patronage distribution, though this diluted internal cohesion and fueled later fractures, such as the 1999 split with .

Origins and Early Development

Roots in Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood

The Sudanese branch of the , inspired by the Egyptian parent organization founded in , established its presence in Sudan during the late through informal study circles and preaching activities among students and intellectuals, formally organizing as a structured group by the early . This early phase emphasized da'wa (Islamic propagation) and moral reform, drawing on Brotherhood ideologues like to advocate for societal Islamization amid Sudan's post-colonial secular leanings and ethnic diversity. The movement gained traction in universities, particularly the , where it recruited from Arabized northern elites, positioning itself against communist and pan-Arab influences prevalent in the and . Hassan al-Turabi, a Sorbonne-educated lawyer who returned to Sudan in 1964, emerged as a pivotal figure after joining the Brotherhood and rapidly ascending to its leadership by 1969, reshaping it into a more pragmatic, politically oriented force known as the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM). Under Turabi's influence, the group prioritized infiltration of state institutions over overt confrontation, adapting Brotherhood tactics to Sudan's multiparty system while maintaining core goals of implementing sharia and fostering an Islamic state. Following the 1964 October Revolution, which briefly restored civilian rule, the Brotherhood pushed for an Islamic constitution, forming the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) in 1968 as its electoral vehicle to contest seats and lobby for sharia-based governance, securing modest representation in the 1968-1969 constituent assembly. Repression under Jaafar Nimeiry's regime after 1969 forced the movement underground, where it honed secretive organizational methods and built parallel networks in , mosques, and the military, sustaining growth despite arrests and exiles. By the mid-1970s, still operating under the Brotherhood banner, it had consolidated as a disciplined cadre-based entity, with Turabi consolidating authority and steering it toward long-term power seizure rather than immediate revolution. This evolution directly birthed the National Islamic Front (NIF) as the Brotherhood's public political facade in the , enabling legal participation post-Nimeiry's 1985 ouster while masking its Islamist agenda behind nationalist rhetoric. The NIF inherited the Brotherhood's infrastructure, ideology, and membership, transforming the Sudanese Islamist project from a revivalist into a state-capturing machine.

Expansion Through Education and Institutions

The Sudanese , the precursor to the National Islamic Front (NIF), emerged as a student-based movement in the and , initially confining its membership to a small elite group at the , where it drew inspiration from the Egyptian to propagate Islamist ideology among educated youth. By the , under the leadership of following his assumption of control in 1964, the group intensified recruitment efforts in universities, competing fiercely with communist and secular factions for student allegiance through ideological debates, study circles, and organizational discipline. This focus on higher education allowed the Brotherhood to cultivate a cadre of committed activists, leveraging campuses as incubators for political mobilization and cadre training, which laid the groundwork for broader institutional penetration. During the 1970s, particularly after the 1977 reconciliation with President Jaafar Nimeiry's regime, the Islamists consolidated control over key student unions, including at the , by allying with state security forces to employ intimidation and violence against rivals, thereby achieving a near-monopoly on campus politics. From 1978 to 1984, this dominance extended to higher secondary schools, where the group used patronage networks—bolstered by emerging Islamic banking institutions—to secure employment and resources for loyal student leaders, embedding Islamist sympathizers within emerging professional elites. Such strategies not only suppressed opposition but also facilitated the infiltration of bureaucratic and institutions, as university recruits were funneled into state roles, transforming educational spaces into vehicles for long-term ideological expansion. By the late 1980s, the Brotherhood's grip on student unions had become instrumental in orchestrating the 1989 coup, with NIF-affiliated officers like emerging from these indoctrinated networks, though early signs of resistance appeared in electoral setbacks that highlighted the coercive nature of their control. This educational foothold enabled the movement to prioritize Arabic-language instruction and Islamist curricula in controlled institutions, prioritizing ideological conformity over pluralistic access and foreshadowing post-coup policies of university proliferation under NIF rule.

Ascendancy Under Nimeiry

Infiltration of Bureaucracy and Military

Following the 1977 National Reconciliation agreement between President Jaafar Nimeiry and opposition factions, including the Sudanese —the precursor to the National Islamic Front—the Islamists secured amnesty, political participation, and entry into government roles, marking the start of their systematic integration into state structures. This pact, negotiated amid Nimeiry's domestic pressures, allowed Brotherhood leader to return from exile and leverage the regime's vulnerabilities for influence. Turabi's appointment as in 1979 positioned him to direct the placement of Islamist loyalists across the , ministries, and administrative bureaucracies, embedding ideological cadres in key decision-making nodes. From this vantage, Islamists advanced a top-down Islamization strategy, purging secular elements and aligning policies with Brotherhood objectives, which eroded Nimeiry's prior socialist framework. By 1983, Turabi had orchestrated the September Laws, imposing punishments nationwide and further entrenching Islamist control over legal and bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms. In parallel, the Islamists initiated penetration of the by cultivating networks among mid-level officers through religious study groups, ideological training, and promotions favoring sympathizers, though their military foothold under Nimeiry stayed subordinate to the president's personal command structure. This gradual buildup, rooted in post-reconciliation organizing, sowed seeds for later dominance, as evidenced by Islamist-aligned officers rising to command positions by the late . Nimeiry's reliance on such allies for regime stability inadvertently amplified their leverage, despite his ultimate ouster in 1985.

Islamist Charter and Sharia Implementation

In September 1983, President , under pressure from economic crises and political maneuvering, abruptly decreed the implementation of law across through the September Laws, marking a pivotal shift toward Islamist . These laws, announced on September 8, introduced punishments including for , flogging for alcohol consumption, and death by for , while also prohibiting and mandating Islamic penal codes in place of secular statutes. Nimeiry justified the reforms as a return to Sudan's Islamic roots to unify the nation and resolve fiscal woes, though critics noted the absence of or parliamentary . Hassan al-Turabi, a leading figure in the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood—the precursor to the National Islamic Front (NIF)—exerted significant influence on this process, having been appointed attorney general and advocating for codified Sharia as a means of societal purification. Al-Turabi's support for the laws aligned with the Brotherhood's long-term strategy of "Islamisation from above," embedding Islamist principles into state institutions without awaiting grassroots consensus. This top-down approach allowed Brotherhood affiliates to infiltrate judicial and bureaucratic roles, drafting penal codes that prioritized Quranic precepts over existing civil laws, though al-Turabi later distanced himself after Nimeiry's excesses led to his brief imprisonment in 1984. The implementation exacerbated north-south divisions, as the laws disregarded the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord's provisions for southern autonomy and secular governance, prompting renewed rebellion in the south by year's end. While bolstering the Islamists' ascendancy by legitimizing their ideological agenda within Nimeiry's regime, the reforms alienated non-Muslims and moderates, contributing to widespread unrest that culminated in Nimeiry's ouster in 1985. The episode underscored the Brotherhood's tactical , using state power to advance despite the founder's authoritarian pivot, which temporarily aligned with but ultimately outpaced their structured vision for an .

Seizure of Power

The 1989

On June 30, 1989, a group of military officers led by Colonel Omar Hassan al-Bashir executed a bloodless against the democratically elected government of , overthrowing Sudan's fragile coalition administration formed after the 1986 elections. The operation involved army units seizing key installations in , including the presidential palace, radio stations, and airports, with minimal resistance due to prior infiltration of security forces by Islamist sympathizers. The coup was masterminded by , leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist organization that had methodically built influence within the and bureaucracy during the preceding decade, positioning itself to exploit the al-Mahdi government's paralysis amid economic collapse, corruption scandals, and stalled peace talks with southern rebels. Al-Bashir, a relatively obscure with ties to NIF networks, served as the public face to lend a veneer to what was effectively an Islamist power grab, allowing the NIF to bypass its limited electoral support—having won only 51 of 260 seats in the 1986 parliamentary elections—and impose its agenda without broader popular mandate. In the immediate aftermath, al-Bashir proclaimed himself chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS), suspending the constitution, dissolving parliament, banning , and detaining hundreds of opposition figures, including and other leaders, to neutralize resistance. The RCC-NS justified the as a "national salvation revolution" to address governance failures, but it swiftly aligned with NIF ideology by pledging stricter implementation and purging non-Islamist elements from state institutions, marking the onset of three decades of authoritarian rule under al-Bashir. While initially framed as corrective military intervention, declassified accounts and later trials confirmed the NIF's orchestration, including financial support from Gulf donors and coordination with sympathetic brigades, underscoring how ideological preparation enabled rapid consolidation despite the coup's low casualties—estimated at fewer than 50 deaths nationwide.

Consolidation of Control

Following the 30 June 1989 coup, the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), chaired by and backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF), swiftly dismantled existing institutions to eliminate opposition and embed Islamist loyalists. The RCCNS declared a , suspended the , dissolved the and provincial councils, and banned all , trade unions, professional associations, and outlets, effectively prohibiting organized dissent. Mass arrests targeted politicians, journalists, academics, and military officers suspected of disloyalty, with hundreds detained in the initial weeks; this repression extended to executions, as evidenced by the 1990 killing of 28 army officers following a failed counter-coup attempt, later confirmed through investigations. To secure institutional dominance, the regime initiated purges across the , bureaucracy, and judiciary, dismissing thousands of civil servants deemed unreliable and replacing them with NIF cadres who had been prepositioned through prior infiltration efforts. Real power resided informally with NIF leader , who orchestrated the coup's ideological framework, while Bashir's facade masked the Islamist takeover; security apparatuses, including intelligence units, were expanded to monitor and suppress internal threats, fostering a climate of fear that deterred challenges. By late 1989, these measures had centralized control under NIF influence, transitioning nominal military rule toward Islamist governance while maintaining bans on ; policies restricted associations and enforced compliance through and loyalty oaths, enabling the regime to weather early unrest and prepare for broader implementation.

Governance and Policies

Following the 30 June 1989 coup, the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), led by with National Islamic Front (NIF) backing, immediately suspended the 1985 transitional constitution, dissolved the parliament, and banned all , trade unions, and professional associations to consolidate Islamist control and eliminate secular opposition. This Decree One of the National Salvation Revolution dismantled existing democratic institutions, detaining key political leaders and imposing a that curtailed freedoms of expression and assembly. The regime justified these measures as necessary for moral and Islamic renewal, establishing a centralized authority under RCCNS oversight while infiltrating the and with NIF loyalists. Legally, the regime reinstated and expanded Sharia-based laws previously introduced in 1983 under Nimeiry, which had been partially suspended after his 1985 ouster. On 22 March 1991, a new Penal Code was enacted, codifying punishments such as amputation for theft, stoning for adultery, and flogging for alcohol consumption or illicit sex, applied nationwide including to non-Muslims in the north. This code drew from classical Hanafi and Maliki interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, supplemented by Sudanese customary elements, and was enforced through special Islamic courts with expedited procedures that limited appeals and . Public order laws mandated veiling for women, segregated , and prohibited mixed-gender interactions, with violations punishable by penalties, aiming to enforce a strict Salafist-influenced moral order. Politically, the NIF restructured governance through a "civilization project" emphasizing top-down Islamization, introducing the Popular Committees system in 1992 for grassroots mobilization and surveillance, which replaced independent with regime-aligned structures. A 1994 decentralization law created 26 states with federal-like divisions, but real power remained with the NCP (NIF's successor, formalized in 1998), ensuring Islamist dominance over elections and appointments. The 1998 Constitution declared an Islamic sovereign state with as the primary legislative source, stipulating that "the rule is Allah's" and prioritizing Islamic principles over secular rights, though it nominally allowed limited pluralism under NCP . These reforms entrenched one-party rule until partial multiparty allowances in 1996 and 2010, both manipulated to favor NCP incumbents amid ongoing suppression of dissent via expanded security laws like the 1993 Act.

Economic Strategies and Challenges

The National Islamic Front-led regime under pursued economic strategies rooted in Islamic principles, including the full Islamization of the banking sector by 1997, when all 29 operating banks transitioned to interest-free (riba-free) models compliant with law, supported by the establishment of a in 1992 and the Banking Business Act of 2003. These reforms extended to collection, formalized as compulsory in 1984 and refined via the Zakat Act of 2001, alongside microfinance initiatives that grew to serve 1.1 million beneficiaries with SDG 2.1 billion in portfolio by 2014. Concurrently, the regime initiated market-oriented in the early , deregulating prices, , and while privatizing state-owned enterprises to reduce fiscal burdens and attract , though favored regime insiders through networks. Oil extraction emerged as a cornerstone strategy from 1999 onward, generating billions in revenue and briefly fueling GDP growth amid broader diversification efforts into and , yet proceeds were disproportionately allocated to spending and elite enrichment rather than broad development. Privatization drives in the and targeted sectors like , , and land, but devolved into a kleptocratic system where and NIF loyalists seized assets via , distorting markets and entrenching as a tool. Persistent challenges undermined these strategies, including U.S. sanctions imposed in 1997 that excluded Sudanese entities from global finance and exacerbated debt arrears, such as the $1.15 billion owed to the IMF by 1990. The 2011 secession of stripped Sudan of approximately 75% of its oil fields, slashing export revenues and triggering a fiscal that forced measures, including cuts on fuel and bread starting in 2017 per IMF recommendations. Civil conflicts, notably in , fostered parallel war economies with militias profiting $123 million annually from smuggling by the 2010s, while systemic funneled illicit flows abroad, leaving nearly 50% of the population below the line. Macroeconomic instability intensified, with surging to 36.9% in 2014 and exceeding 60% by 2018 amid crises and black-market trading by officials, eroding public confidence in banks where 90% of cash circulated informally. These factors, compounded by political isolation and inefficient , culminated in chronic shortages, , and the 2018-2019 protests that precipitated Bashir's ouster, as removals and price hikes exposed the regime's failure to deliver equitable growth.

Social and Cultural Transformations

The National Islamic Front (NIF) regime, following the coup, pursued a top-down Islamization of Sudanese society, enforcing Sharia-based public morality codes through Public Order Courts and Popular Police committees, which targeted behaviors such as improper dress, alcohol consumption, and mixing, resulting in widespread flogging and fines that eroded personal freedoms. These measures disproportionately affected women and non-Muslims in northern , with non-Muslim women from displacement camps facing heightened prosecution for Sharia-defined offenses despite their religious differences. Women experienced profound restrictions under the regime's gender policies, including classification as legal minors whose testimony held half the value of a man's in , requirements for male guardian permission to , and dismissal of hundreds from supervisory roles in the since 1989 due to prohibitions on women holding authority over men. By July 1, 1989, government employees and students were mandated to adopt over traditional attire like the tobe, with non-compliance risking arrest or job loss; an October 1991 case saw a sentenced to lashes and a fine for violation, later suspended after familial intervention. The regime promoted government-sponsored mass weddings offering cash incentives of approximately $100 and land grants to encourage early , while suppressing independent women's organizations and trade unions to curb resistance. Cultural practices faced erosion through Islamist propagation, with rural areas witnessing missionary efforts and media campaigns that diminished traditional rituals such as zar spirit possession ceremonies in regions like Gezira. Non-Muslims, particularly displaced southerners numbering around 2 million in by the early 1990s, endured punishments like up to one year in prison for alcohol offenses, alongside policies restricting access to , food, and employment, contributing to an estimated 300,000 deaths from starvation since 1988. The penal code's provisions, expanded in 1991, included amputations for theft, for , and crucifixions, with at least two men executed by and crucifixion since 1989, enforcing a singular Islamist framework over diverse cultural expressions. In education, the NIF accelerated and Islamization, mandating as the in higher education by late 1989 and establishing centers like the one at Gezira University for "Islamizing ," while purging universities of and dismissing scores of lecturers for political reasons in fall 1990. Enrollment expanded through doubled university entrants and the creation of five new institutions, such as al-Sharq and universities, but favored northern Muslim populations, limiting access for non- speakers and southerners whose demographic share of higher education remained at 0.1% despite comprising 25.6% of the population in 1987 data. Students underwent reeducation in Popular Defense Forces militia camps prior to entry, embedding Islamist ideology and exacerbating and skilled emigration amid regional disparities.

Military Engagements and Conflicts

Southern Sudanese Civil War

The National Islamic Front (NIF)-led regime under inherited the Second Sudanese Civil War upon its 1989 coup, which had begun in 1983 amid grievances over northern domination, resource inequities, and the imposition of law by the prior government. The NIF intensified the conflict by framing it as a religious struggle, declaring against southern rebels of the /Army (SPLA) in 1992, with Bashir adopting the title of imam al-jihad (spiritual leader of the holy war) to mobilize Islamist fighters, including foreign . This ideological reframing escalated hostilities, portraying the predominantly Christian and animist south as infidels resisting Islamic unity, while government forces employed scorched-earth tactics, aerial bombings of civilian areas, and militia raids to disrupt SPLA supply lines and displace populations. To bolster its military capacity, the NIF established the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) in 1989 as a extension of its Islamist base, recruiting civilians—often through coercive in harsh training camps—for in the south. PDF units, alongside troops, conducted village razings, abductions, and forced displacements, particularly in the and oil-rich regions like Unity and Upper Nile states, where control over petroleum resources fueled strategic offensives. Human Rights Watch documented government-orchestrated atrocities in these areas during the 1990s, including mass killings, rape as a weapon, and the enslavement of southern civilians by allied militias, displacing over 100,000 people in targeted offensives by 1993 alone. These actions systematically blocked , exacerbating ; for instance, government restrictions on relief operations contributed to widespread , with estimates attributing much of the war's 2 million deaths—primarily civilians—to , , and engineered food shortages rather than direct combat. The NIF's strategy prioritized total victory to enforce national Islamic governance, rejecting southern autonomy demands and instead pursuing Arabization and Islamization policies, such as resettling northern Arab tribes in seized southern lands. However, SPLA resilience, bolstered by Ethiopian and Ugandan support until the mid-1990s, along with internal NIF strains from and , led to military stalemate by the late 1990s. Peace negotiations gained traction after 2000, culminating in the 2005 (CPA), which granted southern and suspended in the south, though NIF non-compliance on power-sharing and border issues sowed seeds for South Sudan's 2011 and subsequent instability. The war's prosecution under NIF rule highlighted causal drivers beyond religious —namely, Khartoum's centralist resource extraction amid ethnic fractures—but the regime's jihadist undeniably prolonged suffering, with empirical data underscoring disproportionate civilian targeting over conventional military aims.

Darfur Insurgency and Regional Instability

The Darfur insurgency erupted in February 2003 when the (SLM/A) and the (JEM), composed primarily of non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, launched attacks on government military installations in the region, protesting decades of economic marginalization and political exclusion under the National Congress Party (NCP) regime, the successor to the National Islamic Front. These groups controlled significant territory by mid-2003, prompting a harsh response from the Sudanese government led by President . The NCP regime, facing a military stretched thin by the ongoing civil war in southern , opted to arm and direct nomadic Arab militias known as the to supplement regular forces in suppressing the rebels, a strategy that escalated the conflict into widespread ethnic violence targeting civilian populations perceived as supportive of the insurgents. Government aircraft provided air support for ground operations, which involved systematic village burnings, mass killings, rapes, and looting, displacing over 2 million people internally and driving more than 200,000 refugees into by 2005. Death toll estimates from the violence, including indirect causes like starvation and disease, ranged from 200,000 to 400,000 by 2007, with U.S. government assessments confirming patterns of against non-Arab communities. The regime initially denied arming the militias but later acknowledged limited cooperation, though independent investigations attributed to Sudanese military and security officials. This counterinsurgency fueled regional instability, as and rebel fighters conducted cross-border raids into and the (CAR), exacerbating ethnic tensions and enabling rebel alliances that threatened those governments. In , Sudanese-backed militias attacked border villages, killing hundreds and displacing tens of thousands, while rebels found sanctuary and recruited from refugee camps, contributing to Chadian rebel offensives against President in 2005-2008. Similarly, in CAR, spillover violence from armed groups destabilized border areas, leading to increased banditry and weak state control, with Sudanese government support for proxies complicating regional peacekeeping efforts. and the 2005 Peace Agreement failed to halt the fighting, as the NCP's reliance on militias prolonged the low-intensity war, draining resources and isolating diplomatically until Bashir's 2019 ouster.

Erosion of Power

Internal Fractures and Opposition

The primary internal fracture within the National Islamic Front (NIF) emerged in late 1999 amid a escalating power struggle between President and , the movement's ideological architect and Speaker of the . Turabi, seeking to curtail Bashir's executive authority, advocated constitutional amendments to empower parliament, including provisions that would have required parliamentary approval for ministerial appointments and potentially enabled proceedings against the president. On December 6, 1999, Bashir preempted this by dismissing Turabi from his position as assembly speaker, followed by the dissolution of the , declaration of a , and deployment of troops to secure key institutions. This self-coup purged dozens of Turabi loyalists from government posts and the NIF's rebranded National Congress (formed in 1998), consolidating military-backed control under Bashir while sidelining the civilian Islamist cadre. In response, Turabi established the Popular Congress Party (PCP) in early 2000, fracturing the NIF's monolithic structure into rival Islamist factions: Bashir's pragmatic, military-aligned National Congress Party (NCP) and Turabi's more ideologically rigid PCP. The schism reflected deeper tensions between the regime's security apparatus, which prioritized stability and international pragmatism amid sanctions and civil wars, and Turabi's vision of parliamentary supremacy and transnational , including past alliances with groups like . Although Bashir's faction retained state resources and suppressed PCP activities—leading to Turabi's arrests in 2001, 2004, and 2010—the split eroded the NIF's ideological unity, fostering mutual accusations of and diluting its hegemonic grip on Sudan's Islamist networks. These divisions extended to intra-regime rivalries, exacerbated by and scandals that alienated mid-level NCP officials and officers. By the mid-2000s, defections and purges within the services highlighted opposition from elements frustrated by Bashir's personalization of power, which sidelined collective NIF decision-making in favor of networks loyal to him personally. Turabi's PCP, though marginalized, mounted intermittent internal opposition by allying with broader dissident coalitions, such as calls for constitutional and critiques of the regime's policies, further underscoring the NIF's vulnerability to factionalism over doctrinal purity. This internal opposition, rooted in personal and institutional rivalries rather than external pressures alone, progressively undermined the regime's cohesion, paving the way for broader challenges.

The 2019 Uprising and Bashir's Ouster

The 2019 Sudanese uprising began on December 19, 2018, in the city of , when protests erupted over a tripling of prices following the government's decision to lift subsidies on imports amid acute foreign currency shortages and exceeding 85 percent. These initial demonstrations, organized by local trade unions and rapidly joined by broader groups including the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), quickly expanded to and other urban centers, evolving from economic grievances into demands for the end of Omar al-Bashir's 30-year authoritarian rule, which was rooted in the National Islamic Front's (NIF) Islamist framework and marked by systemic corruption, , and repression. By January 2019, protests had become nationwide, with demonstrators chanting "Freedom, peace, and justice" and establishing sit-ins outside military installations to appeal for institutional support against the regime's security forces, which responded with lethal force, killing over 100 protesters by March according to monitors. The NIF-dominated National Congress Party (NCP), Bashir's political vehicle evolved from the original Front, mobilized loyalist militias and state media to frame the unrest as foreign-backed sabotage, but underlying —fueled by decades of Islamist policies prioritizing ideological militias over productive —eroded regime cohesion, with defections emerging among security elements. Sustained nonviolent tactics, including neighborhood committees coordinating and professional strikes paralyzing functions, amplified pressure, drawing millions into the streets despite crackdowns that included internet blackouts and arrests of thousands. On April 6, 2019, a massive at the military headquarters marked the uprising's climax, as protesters encircled the site and negotiated directly with army officers, exposing fractures within the security apparatus where elements of the (SAF) grew alienated from Bashir's reliance on (RSF) paramilitaries for crowd control. Four days later, on , senior generals executed a bloodless coup, ousting Bashir, dissolving the and NCP-led government, suspending the , and imposing a under a Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by Awad Ibn Auf, who resigned the same day amid protester rejection of his RSF ties. Bashir was placed under and later charged with corruption and inciting violence, signaling the collapse of the NIF's institutional hold after three decades of enforced Islamization and economic isolation. While the ouster ended Bashir's personal rule, the TMC's formation highlighted the 's self-preservation calculus, as SAF leaders distanced themselves from the NIF's ideological excesses to co-opt the revolution's momentum without fully ceding power to civilians.

Controversies and Criticisms

Human Rights Allegations

The National Islamic Front (NIF), which seized power in the 1989 coup and evolved into the National Congress Party (NCP), faced widespread allegations of systematic violations during its rule under , including arbitrary detention, , extrajudicial killings, and in conflict zones. Security forces, particularly the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), routinely arrested political opponents, activists, and journalists without , often subjecting them to in secret "ghost houses" to suppress . Thousands of such detentions occurred, with reports of beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged , contributing to an atmosphere of fear that stifled organizations, trade unions, and opposition parties. The regime's enforcement of Sharia-based punishments exemplified domestic abuses, with public floggings imposed for offenses like alcohol consumption or extramarital relations, affecting thousands annually under public order laws. Cross-limb amputations for or were carried out by state-appointed doctors, as in the 2013 case of a man convicted of armed robbery who lost a hand and foot, marking a rare but documented resurgence after earlier implementations in the 1990s and 2000s. Death sentences by for were also issued, including against a pregnant woman in 2002, though international pressure sometimes led to commutations. These corporal punishments, rooted in the 1991 Criminal Act, disproportionately targeted non-Muslims and southerners, exacerbating ethnic and . In the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), NIF/NCP forces and allied militias perpetrated atrocities against southern populations, including aerial bombings of civilian areas, forced displacements, and , with government-backed Popular Defense Forces abducting Dinka and Nuer civilians for labor and sexual exploitation. Reports documented thousands held in , with children and women subjected to and , contributing to an estimated 2 million deaths from violence, famine, and disease induced by these tactics. The U.S. Congress condemned the NIF's conduct as a "genocidal ," citing systematic targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups. The Darfur conflict from 2003 onward drew international condemnation for , as the regime armed and directed militias to raze non-Arab villages, resulting in over 300,000 deaths and the displacement of 2.7 million people through mass killings, systematic , and scorched-earth tactics. The issued arrest warrants for Bashir in 2009 and 2010 on charges including , five counts of (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, , ), and war crimes, finding reasonable grounds that he orchestrated counterinsurgency policies intentionally targeting Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups for destruction. and documented tens of thousands of civilian murders and widespread sexual violence, with militias acting as extensions of state authority. These acts, verified through survivor testimonies and , underscored a pattern of under NIF/NCP oversight.

Repression of Dissent and Civil Society

Following the 1989 military coup led by and backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF), the regime promptly banned all opposition , dissolved trade unions, professional associations, and other independent organizations to eliminate potential sources of organized . This dissolution extended to informal neighborhood committees and student unions, which were either co-opted or suppressed, leaving Islamist-aligned groups to dominate public life. The regime established a pervasive security apparatus, including the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), empowered by laws granting broad arrest powers without judicial oversight, enabling systematic targeting of activists, students, defenders, and perceived opponents. NISS agents routinely conducted arbitrary detentions, often involving incommunicado holding and , as documented in patterns of abuse against leaders and journalists covering protests or government policies. Repression intensified during periods of unrest, with mass arrests quelling demonstrations; for instance, in October 2013, security forces detained at least 800 activists, opposition members, and journalists amid anti-government protests. In January 2018, NISS arrested at least 13 journalists while they covered Communist Party-led protests in , with over 100 participants also detained. By late December 2018 to mid-March 2019, authorities had arrested 90 journalists in response to nationwide demonstrations against economic policies. Independent NGOs faced restrictions or outright bans, particularly those advocating for or operating in conflict zones, further eroding civil society's capacity for oversight or mobilization. Public dissent was effectively criminalized through anti-terrorism and public order laws, which the regime invoked to prosecute critics, resulting in no tolerance for non-Islamist political expression and the monopolization of social arenas by NIF-affiliated entities. These measures sustained authoritarian control for three decades, though underground networks and sporadic resistance persisted despite the risks.

Legacy and Contemporary Relevance

Long-Term Societal Impacts

The National Islamic Front's (NIF) governance from 1989 to 2019 entrenched Sharia-based legal frameworks that profoundly reshaped Sudanese social norms, particularly in family and personal status laws, which persisted in regulating Muslim affairs even after Omar al-Bashir's ouster. These laws codified against women, including mandatory veiling, restrictions on public dress under the Public Order regime, and heightened vulnerability to gender-based violence, fostering a culture of patriarchal control that marginalized female autonomy and suppressed secular feminist activism. Non-Muslims faced systemic through forced Islamization efforts, including the destruction of sites and , contributing to religious polarization and the erosion of pluralistic social fabrics in northern . Education under NIF rule became a vehicle for Islamist , with curricula revised to prioritize religious over secular skills, leading to a decline in educational quality and delivery that exacerbated and skill gaps persisting into the post-Bashir era. The regime's infiltration of universities and schools politicized intellectual spaces, stifling critical and producing generations socialized in to authoritarian Islamist values, which hindered broader societal and adaptability. Economic policies tied to Islamic banking and state favoritism toward NIF loyalists resulted in chronic mismanagement, peaking at over 100% annually by the , and widespread affecting 46% of the by 2014, entrenching dependency and inequality that fueled social unrest and migration waves exceeding 2.7 million Sudanese abroad by 2019. Repression of under NIF control dismantled independent unions and civic institutions, creating a legacy of weakened associational life and distrust in state mechanisms, as security apparatuses subjected dissidents to arbitrary detention and torture, with estimates of thousands affected annually. This authoritarian imprint contributed to societal fragmentation, evident in the 2019 uprising's demands for and the ongoing 2023 civil war's exacerbation of ethnic divisions rooted in NIF-era favoritism toward Arab-Muslim elites. While reforms post-2019, such as the 2020 abolition of the apostasy death penalty, mitigated some extremes, the embedded Islamist networks in institutions continue to challenge secular governance, perpetuating cycles of instability and hindering national reconciliation.

Role in Ongoing Civil War and Potential Revival

Former leaders and networks affiliated with the National Islamic Front (NIF), reorganized as the National Congress Party (NCP) until its formal dissolution in 2019, have provided political, financial, and logistical support to the (SAF) amid the that erupted on , 2023, between SAF under General and the (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. These Islamists, including NCP figures like former Foreign Minister Ali Karti and , view the conflict as an opportunity to bolster SAF's position against the RSF, which they perceive as a to Islamist influence due to its tribal and paramilitary character. By mobilizing underground networks established during the Bashir era, they have facilitated , via diaspora channels, and ideological framing of the war as a defense against secular or foreign-backed fragmentation. This alignment has drawn accusations from Sudan's , who claim NCP remnants exacerbated the war's outbreak and prolongation to undermine the 2019 transitional framework and civilian-led governance. The democratic alliance has called for designating the Islamist movement as a terrorist entity, citing its role in sustaining SAF's efforts through and resource diversion, which has contributed to over 20 million displacements and famine risks in SAF-controlled areas by mid-2025. Elements within SAF, including officers with historical ties to the —a core influence on NIF—have reciprocated by tolerating Islamist infiltration into state institutions, potentially enabling jihadist revival risks amid the power vacuum. The war's chaos has enabled a potential revival of NIF ideology, with Islamists quietly rebuilding cadre structures in Khartoum and eastern , leveraging SAF victories to advocate for a post-conflict order favoring governance and centralized authority. Analysts note that sustained SAF dominance could extend military rule, allowing Islamists to negotiate influence in any transitional government, reversing 2019 gains like the dismantling of Bashir's security apparatus. However, internal NCP fractures—such as rivalries between Karti's faction favoring pragmatic alliances and hardliners pushing ideological purity—may limit cohesion, while RSF advances in and urban centers could disrupt regrouping efforts.

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  102. https://timep.org/2024/05/09/the-forgotten-war-on-sudans-christians/
  103. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/sudan
  104. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/revolution-in-sudan-let-it-fall/
  105. https://www.wrmea.org/1996-may-june/disastrous-performance-in-sudan-gives-islamism-bad-name.html
  106. https://ccas.georgetown.edu/2025/05/16/authoritarian-legacies-and-the-war-in-sudan/
  107. https://globalchristianrelief.org/stories/sudan-ends-30-years-of-islamic-law-historic-move-abolishes-death-penalty-for-leaving-islam/
  108. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-islamists-plot-post-war-comeback-by-supporting-army-2025-07-25/
  109. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/sudan-at-a-crossroads-the-potential-resurgence-of-political-islam
  110. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/08/13/sudans-democratic-alliance-blames-islamists-for-civil-war/
  111. https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/sudans-ousted-ruling-party-aligns-with-army-in-bid-to-regain-power
  112. https://jamestown.org/program/one-year-on-civil-war-risks-reviving-jihadism-in-sudan/
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