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Stand Watie
Stand Watie
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Brigadier-General Stand Watie (Cherokee: ᏕᎦᏙᎦ, romanized: Degadaga, or Degadoga, lit.'Stand firm'[citation needed]; December 12, 1806 – September 9, 1871), also known as Standhope Uwatie and Isaac S. Watie, was a Cherokee politician who served as the second principal chief of the Cherokee Nation from 1862 to 1866. The Cherokee Nation allied with the Confederate States during the American Civil War, and he was subsequently the only Native American Confederate general officer. Watie commanded Indian forces in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, made up mostly of Cherokee, Muskogee, and Seminole. He was the last Confederate States Army general to surrender.[1]

Key Information

Before removal of the Cherokee to Indian Territory in the late 1830s, Watie and his older brother Elias Boudinot were among Cherokee leaders who signed the Treaty of New Echota in 1835. The majority of the tribe opposed their action. In 1839, the brothers were attacked in an assassination attempt, as were other relatives active in the Treaty Party. All but Stand Watie were killed. Watie in 1842 killed one of his uncle's attackers, and in 1845 his brother Thomas was killed in retaliation, in a continuing cycle of violence that reached Indian Territory. Watie was acquitted by the Cherokee at trial in the 1850s on the grounds of self-defense.

Watie led the Southern Cherokee delegation to Washington, D.C., after the American Civil War to sue for peace, hoping to have tribal divisions recognized. The federal government negotiated only with the leaders who had sided with the Union. Watie stayed out of politics for his last years, and tried to rebuild his plantation.

Early life

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Stand Watie was born on December 12, 1806, at Oothcaloga, Cherokee Nation (present-day Calhoun, Georgia), the son of Uwatie (Cherokee for "the ancient one", sometimes spelled Oowatie), a full-blood Cherokee, and Susanna Reese, daughter of a white father and Cherokee mother.[2] He was named Degataga. According to one biography, this name means "standing firm" when translated to English.[3] Watie's brothers were Gallagina, nicknamed "Buck" (who later took the name Elias Boudinot), and Thomas Watie. They were close to their paternal uncle Major Ridge, and his son John Ridge, both later leaders in the tribe. By 1827, their father David Uwatie had become a wealthy planter, who held African-American slaves as laborers.[2]

After Uwatie converted to Christianity with the Moravians, he took the name of David Uwatie; he and Susanna renamed Degataga as Isaac. Degataga preferred to use "Stand", a loose translation of his Cherokee name. Later, the family dropped the "U" from the spelling of their surname, using "Watie." Along with his two brothers and sisters, Watie learned to read and write English at the Moravian mission school in Spring Place, Cherokee Nation (now Georgia).[2]

Stand Watie occasionally helped write articles for the Cherokee Phoenix newspaper, for which his older brother Elias served as editor from 1828 to 1832. The first Native American newspaper, the Phoenix published articles in both Cherokee and English.[4]

Watie became involved in the dispute over Georgia's repressive anti-Indian laws. After gold was discovered on Cherokee lands in northern Georgia, thousands of white settlers encroached on Indian lands. There was continuing conflict, and Congress passed the 1830 Indian Removal Act, to relocate all Indians from the Southeast to lands west of the Mississippi River. In 1832, Georgia confiscated most of the Cherokee land, despite federal laws to protect Native Americans from state actions. The state sent militia to destroy the offices and press of the Cherokee Phoenix, which had published articles against Indian Removal.[5]

Believing that removal was inevitable, the Watie brothers favored securing Cherokee rights by treaty before relocating to Indian Territory. They were among the Treaty Party leaders who signed the 1835 Treaty of New Echota.

Indian Territory

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In 1835, Watie, his family, and many other Cherokee emigrated to Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma). They joined some Cherokee who had relocated as early as the 1820s and were known as the "Old Settlers".[6] Those Cherokee who remained on tribal lands in the East were rounded up and forcibly removed by the U.S. government in 1838.[7] Their journey became known as the "Trail of Tears," as 4,000 people died.[8]

After removal, members of the Cherokee government carried out sentences against Treaty Party men for execution; their giving up tribal lands was a "blood" or capital offense under Cherokee law. Stand Watie, his brother Elias Boudinot, their uncle Major Ridge and cousin John Ridge, along with several other Treaty Party men, were all sentenced to death on June 22, 1839; only Stand Watie survived. He arranged for his brother Elias' children to be sent for their safety and education to their mother's family in Connecticut; their mother Harriet had died in 1836 before the migration.[9]

In 1842, Watie encountered James Foreman, whom he recognized as one of his uncle's executioners, and killed him. This was part of the post-Removal violence within the tribe, which was close to civil war for years. Ross supporters executed Stand's brother Thomas Watie in 1845.[10] In the 1850s, Stand Watie was tried in Arkansas for the murder of Foreman; he was acquitted on the grounds of self-defense. His nephew E. C. Boudinot, who had returned to the West and become a lawyer, defended him.[9]

American Civil War

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In 1861, Principal Chief John Ross signed an alliance with the Confederate States to avoid disunity in Indian Territory.[11] Within less than a year, Ross and part of the National Council concluded that the agreement had proved disastrous. In the summer of 1862, Ross removed the tribal records to Union-held Kansas and then proceeded to Washington, D.C., to meet with President Lincoln.[11] After Ross fled to Federal-controlled territory, Watie replaced him as principal chief.[2] After Ross' departure, Tom Pegg took over as principal chief of the pro-Union Cherokee.[12] Following Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863, Pegg called a special session of the Cherokee National Council. On February 18, 1863, it passed a resolution to emancipate all slaves within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation.

After many Cherokee fled north to Kansas or south to Texas for safety, pro-Confederates took advantage of the instability and elected Stand Watie principal chief. Ross' supporters refused to recognize the validity of the election. Open warfare broke out between Confederate and Union Cherokee within Indian Territory, the damage heightened by brigands with no allegiance at all.[13] After the Civil War ended, both factions sent delegations to Washington. Watie pushed for recognition of a separate "Southern Cherokee Nation", but never achieved that.[2]

National Color of the 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles

Watie was the only Native American to rise to a Confederate brigadier-general's rank during the war. Fearful of the Federal Government and the threat to create a State (Oklahoma) out of most of what was then the semi-sovereign "Indian Territory", a majority of the Cherokee Nation initially voted to support the Confederacy in the American Civil War for pragmatic reasons, though less than a tenth of the Cherokee owned slaves. Watie organized a regiment of mounted infantry. In October 1861, he was commissioned as colonel in what would become the 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles.[14]

Although Watie fought Federal troops, he also led his men in fighting between factions of the Cherokee and in attacks on Cherokee civilians and farms, as well as against the Creek, Seminole and others in Indian Territory who chose to support the Union. Watie is noted for his role in the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 6–8, 1862. Under the overall command of General Benjamin McCulloch, Watie's troops captured Union artillery positions and covered the retreat of Confederate forces from the battlefield after the Union took control.[15] However, most of the Cherokees who had joined Colonel John Drew's regiment defected to the Union side. Drew, a nephew of Chief Ross, remained loyal to the Confederacy.[15]

In August 1862, after John Ross and his followers announced their support for the Union and went to Fort Leavenworth, the remaining Southern Confederate minority faction elected Stand Watie as principal chief.[16] After Cherokee support for the Confederacy sharply declined, Watie continued to lead the remnant of his cavalry. He was appointed to the grade of Brigadier-General on May 10, 1864, with a date of rank of May 6,[14] though he did not receive word of his promotion until after he led the ambush of the steamboat J. R. Williams on July 16, 1864.[17] Watie commanded the First Indian Brigade of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi, composed of two regiments of Mounted Rifles and three battalions of Cherokee, Seminole and Osage infantry.

They fought in a number of battles and skirmishes in the western Confederate states, including the Indian Territory, Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Texas. Watie's force reportedly fought in more battles west of the Mississippi River than any other unit. Watie took part in what is considered to be the greatest (and most famous) Confederate victory in Indian Territory, the Second Battle of Cabin Creek, which took place in what is now Mayes County, Oklahoma on September 19, 1864. He and General Richard Montgomery Gano led a raid that captured a Federal wagon train and netted approximately $1 million worth of wagons, mules, commissary supplies, and other needed items.[18] Stand Watie's forces massacred black haycutters at Wagoner, Oklahoma during this raid. Union reports said that Watie's Indian cavalry "killed all the Negroes they could find", including wounded men.[19]

Since most Cherokee were now Union supporters, during the war, General Watie's family and other Confederate Cherokee took refuge in Rusk and Smith counties of east Texas.[20]

The Confederate Army put Watie in command of the Indian Division of Indian Territory in February 1865. By then, however, the Confederates were no longer able to fight in the territory effectively.[2] On June 23, 1865, at Doaksville in the Choctaw Nation (now Oklahoma), Watie signed a cease-fire agreement with Union representatives for his command, the First Indian Brigade of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. He was the last Confederate general in the field to surrender.[14][21][22]

In September 1865, after his demobilization, Watie went to Texas to see his wife Sallie and to mourn the death of their son, Comisky, who had died at age 15.[23] After the war, Watie was a member of the Cherokee Delegation to the Southern Treaty Commission, which renegotiated treaties with the United States.[24]

Later life

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Historical marker

The U.S. government, recognizing that the two factions would never agree on common terms, decided to negotiate with them separately and play them against each other. By doing so, it was able to extract a number of concessions from both sides. The resulting treaty required the Cherokee to free their slaves. The Southern Cherokee wanted the government to pay to relocate the Cherokee Freedmen from their lands. The Northern Cherokee suggested adopting them into the tribe, but wanted the federal government to give the Freedman an exclusive piece of associated territory. The federal government required that the Cherokee Freedmen would receive full rights for citizenship, land, and annuities as the Cherokee. It assigned them land in the Canadian addition. This treaty was signed by Ross on July 19, 1866, and ratified by the U.S. Senate on July 27, four days before Ross' death.[25]

The tribe was strongly divided over the treaty issues and a new chief was elected, Lewis Downing, a full-blood and compromise candidate. He was a shrewd and politically savvy Principal Chief, bringing about reconciliation and reunification among the Cherokee.

After the treaty signing, Watie had gone into exile in the Choctaw Nation. Shortly after Downing's election, he returned to the Cherokee. Watie tried to stay out of politics and rebuild his fortunes. He returned to Honey Creek, where he died on September 9, 1871. Watie was buried in the old Ridge Cemetery, later called Polson's Cemetery, in what is now Delaware County, Oklahoma,[2] as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation.[26]

Personal life

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After moving to Indian Territory, Stand Watie married Sarah Bell on September 18, 1842. Their families had been long-time friends. They had three sons: Saladin, Solon and Cumiska, and two daughters, Minnee and Jacqueline. Saladin died while the family was living at Mount Tabor / Bellview, Texas (the home of his in-laws the Bells) in 1868, while Solon died during the following year. Both daughters died not long after their father. Sarah died in 1884.[27] One source states that Stand Watie married four women: Eleanor Looney, Elizabeth Fields, Isabella Hicks, and Sarah Caroline Bell. His child with Elizabeth Fields was stillborn in 1836.

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Works cited

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Stand Watie (December 12, 1806 – September 9, 1871), born Degataga meaning "stand firm" in , was a prominent leader of the Treaty Party faction within the who advocated for relocation from ancestral lands in the and later commanded Confederate Cherokee forces as a during the , becoming the last major Confederate commander to lay down arms on June 23, 1865. Born near , Georgia, to a family of mixed and European descent with his father Uwatie anglicizing the family name from Cordery, Watie operated a successful plantation in where he owned enslaved , reflecting the adoption of plantation agriculture and chattel among the elite. As editor of the newspaper alongside his brother , he initially supported Cherokee sovereignty but shifted to favor negotiation with U.S. authorities amid pressures from Georgia's , leading him to sign the in 1835 without majority tribal consent, which ceded Cherokee lands and precipitated the removal that resulted in thousands of deaths. This decision sparked violent factional conflict, including the 1839 murder of Boudinot and other Treaty Party members, which Watie avenged by killing John Ross supporters, deepening intratribal divisions grounded in disputes over land, assimilation, and economic interests tied to . During the Civil War, Watie raised the regiment in 1861, commissioning as a colonel and earning promotion to in 1864 for guerrilla-style raids that disrupted Union supply lines, such as the capture of the steamboat J. R. Williams laden with supplies in 1864. Aligned with the Confederacy partly due to shared interests in preserving slavery—prevalent among planters—and opposition to Union-aligned Principal Chief John Ross, Watie's forces secured a pro-Confederate council that elected him principal chief in 1862, enabling sustained operations in the Trans-Mississippi Theater despite logistical hardships and desertions. His persistence amid defeats, including the loss of key engagements like Pea Ridge, underscored a commitment to autonomy and defense of vested property rights, though postwar Reconstruction treaties imposed by the Union revoked his leadership and mandated within the .

Early Life

Birth and Family Background

Stand Watie, born Degataga—meaning "stand firm" in —was delivered on December 12, 1806, in Oothcaloga, within the in present-day . He was the son of Uwatie, a full-blood who adopted the anglicized name David Watie and embraced European-style , and Susanna Reese, whose mixed heritage included a Welsh father and mother, reflecting the intermarriages common among acculturated elites. The family, including Watie's brother (originally Buck Watie), resided on a where Uwatie cultivated crops using enslaved labor, a practice adopted by a minority of wealthy households to emulate Southern planter society and integrate economic elements of white American culture. This familial environment exposed young Degataga to a blend of traditions and Western influences, fostering an early orientation toward literacy and adaptation that distinguished elite families from traditionalist segments of the . Uwatie's shift from subsistence farming to a larger-scale operation with slaves underscored the selective among Cherokee leaders, who viewed such methods as pathways to and prosperity amid encroaching U.S. expansion. Watie received his primary education at the Moravian Mission School in Springplace, Georgia, a institution run by Christian missionaries that emphasized English literacy, reading, writing, and basic arithmetic alongside moral instruction. Attendance at such schools, common for children of affluent families, equipped him with bilingual skills and cultural fluency that later facilitated his involvement in tribal printing and advocacy, while highlighting the tensions between missionary-driven assimilation and autonomy.

Initial Involvement in Cherokee Affairs

Stand Watie became involved in Cherokee public affairs in the late 1820s through support for the tribe's inaugural newspaper, the . Alongside his brother , , and Elijah Hicks, Watie helped raise funds to establish the publication, which the Cherokee National Council had authorized in 1826 to disseminate information in both and English. The first issue appeared on February 21, 1828, in , the Cherokee capital, with Boudinot as editor; Watie contributed occasional articles promoting tribal progress and legal defenses against external threats. The Phoenix focused on asserting Cherokee sovereignty amid Georgia's aggressive land policies, including the state legislature's December extension of laws over tribal territory, which nullified Cherokee governance and encouraged settler intrusions. Watie's writings and involvement aligned with efforts to modernize the nation through expanded literacy, adoption of constitutional government—modeled after the U.S. in —and agricultural improvements, aiming to demonstrate the Cherokees' capacity for self-rule and deter removal demands. These initiatives reflected a pragmatic stance favoring to Euro-American practices while resisting outright dispossession. The 1829 discovery of gold in northern Georgia, on lands near Dahlonega, intensified white migration and state pressures, prompting Watie's faction to prioritize documented advocacy and selective land negotiations over passive accommodation. This period marked Watie's growing alignment with Boudinot and the family, who advocated treaties securing compensation and relocation terms as viable alternatives to coerced expulsion, contrasting with broader tribal resistance led by Principal Chief John Ross. Their approach emphasized empirical assessment of geopolitical realities, including U.S. , to safeguard long-term Cherokee viability.

Cherokee Removal and Internal Conflicts

Signing of the Treaty of New Echota

Stand Watie, a prominent member of the Cherokee Treaty Party, participated in the signing of the on December 29, 1835, at , Georgia, alongside leaders such as , , and . This minority delegation, representing a faction that viewed as inevitable amid escalating U.S. federal and state pressures, negotiated the cession of Cherokee lands east of the in exchange for territory in present-day , financial compensation, and relocation assistance. The signers, numbering about 39 Cherokee delegates out of a nation of roughly 16,000, argued that the treaty provided structured terms preferable to the alternative of unilateral federal dissolution of tribal lands without guarantees. The treaty's context stemmed from U.S. policy under President Andrew Jackson, who disregarded the 1832 Supreme Court ruling in Worcester v. Georgia, which affirmed Cherokee sovereignty and invalidated Georgia's extension of state laws over tribal territory. Jackson's administration instead prioritized Indian removal, offering negotiators incentives while Georgia militias harassed Cherokee communities and seized resources, creating coercive conditions that the Treaty Party saw as forcing pragmatic accommodation over futile resistance led by Principal Chief John Ross. Ross and the majority faction rejected the treaty as unauthorized, petitioning Congress with over 15,000 signatures against it, but U.S. Senate ratification on May 23, 1836, proceeded despite lacking broad tribal consent. Immediate backlash within the manifested as fierce opposition, including public denunciations and vows of retribution against the signers for allegedly betraying communal interests. This internal division highlighted the causal risks of defying the majority under Ross, whose followers viewed the as a capitulation enabling federal overreach; by 1839, several signers faced assassination, with , , and Boudinot killed in coordinated attacks, though Watie evaded such fates through vigilance and . The Treaty Party's strategic calculus, grounded in the empirical reality of ignored judicial protections and mounting state encroachments, positioned the agreement as a defensive measure against total dispossession, even as it fractured tribal unity.

Violence and Feuds in the 1830s

On June 22, 1839, members of the Cherokee National Party, opposed to the , assassinated , his son , and —prominent leaders of the Treaty Party who had signed the 1835 agreement ceding Cherokee lands to the . These killings, carried out as retribution for what the assassins deemed treasonous collaboration with federal removal policies, targeted relatives of Stand Watie: was his uncle, and was his cousin and brother-in-law. Watie himself narrowly escaped a simultaneous assassination attempt after receiving advance warning from an . The assassinations intensified the ongoing feuds between the Treaty Party, which viewed the pact as a pragmatic necessity for survival amid relentless U.S. encroachment, and the National Party under John Ross, which rejected it as unauthorized by the tribal majority. Watie responded by pursuing and confronting identified perpetrators, framing his actions as defensive measures to safeguard Treaty Party members from further factional reprisals. These retaliatory killings, including confrontations with assailants like James Foreman, were justified by Watie as amid the absence of effective tribal enforcement mechanisms. Subsequent trials of Watie and allies for these acts resulted in acquittals, primarily due to the failure of witnesses to appear, underscoring the collapse of judicial processes strained by the disruptions of forced removal and internal anarchy. The schisms fueling such violence stemmed directly from U.S. government strategies that validated a minority faction to circumvent majority opposition, incentivizing division as a means to enforce removal rather than arising from organic Cherokee disunity. This federal approach transformed policy disagreements into existential threats, compelling Treaty Party adherents like Watie to prioritize factional defense for physical and political continuance.

Trail of Tears and Relocation

Stand Watie, along with the Ridge and Boudinot families and other Treaty Party adherents, departed Georgia for on March 1, 1837, conducting a voluntary under the provisions of the 1835 before the U.S. government's enforcement of widespread forced removals. This earlier, separate journey—distinct from the detachments organized by Principal Chief John Ross—spanned roughly 800 miles overland and by water, involving exposure to harsh weather and logistical strains common to such migrations, though the group preserved its organizational unity without the immediate oversight of federal military escorts imposed on later contingents. In marked contrast, the principal forced removals of the population commenced in May 1838 after the U.S. Army rounded up approximately 17,000 individuals into internment camps, leading to overland and riverine marches through the winter of 1838–1839 that claimed an estimated 4,000 lives—about one-fifth of the total—from , , exposure, and starvation. Watie's faction, having relocated independently nearly a year prior, sidestepped these camps and the peak mortality rates tied to military-directed operations, though their advance party still contended with endemic diseases and supply shortages en route. Upon reaching the designated Cherokee lands west of the , Watie settled near Honey Creek in the northeastern sector of , where the Treaty Party promptly pursued allotments of up to 640 acres per family head as stipulated in Article 11 of the agreement, which aimed to compensate signers for ceded eastern holdings. Federal agents initially surveyed these claims, but U.S. officials neglected to uphold treaty-mandated protections against intra-tribal reprisals, enabling Ross partisans to assassinate , , and on June 22, 1839, thereby undermining the pact's guarantees of security for emigration advocates. Watie evaded these attacks, sustaining the faction's cohesion amid the ensuing instability.

Establishment in Indian Territory

Settlement and Economic Activities

Following the in the late , Stand Watie established his residence in , focusing on agricultural and commercial ventures that mirrored the of the , a model embraced by portions of the acculturated elite. He developed a successful along Spavinaw Creek in what is now , where enslaved labor supported crop production and operations, aligning with the practices of slaveholding families who comprised a minority but influential segment of the tribe. By the eve of the Civil War, Watie owned nearly 100 slaves, a holding that underscored his economic standing amid the Five Tribes' territories, where enslaved people constituted about 14 percent of the population in 1860. Complementing his agricultural pursuits, Watie invested in river-based , acquiring a profitable operation on the to facilitate transport of goods and passengers across key waterways in . He also operated ferries, including what became known as the Watie ferry, strategically positioned to leverage the 's role as a vital artery for trade between , , , and the interior territories. These enterprises capitalized on the geographic advantages of the region's river systems, enabling self-sufficient economic activities such as hauling timber from his and supporting local exchange networks without heavy reliance on external markets. Through these endeavors, Watie built substantial wealth and influence, grounding his position in practical enterprise rather than immediate political dominance, though tensions with rival factions persisted. His adoption of slave labor and Southern economic structures reflected broader adaptations among Treaty Party adherents, who sought stability and prosperity in the new lands allotted under the 1835 .

Political Rivalries with John Ross Faction

Following relocation to after the , Stand Watie and his Treaty Party allies faced persistent disputes with John Ross's National Party over land distribution, as the 1835 had allocated specific parcels and annuities to Treaty Party signers, which Ross's incoming majority contested and sought to redistribute through the Cherokee council. Watie advocated adherence to these treaty-based rights, arguing for decentralized allocation that preserved factional autonomies rather than centralized reassignment favoring the larger Ross faction. These conflicts stemmed partly from federal delays in enforcing New Echota provisions, leaving Treaty Party lands vulnerable to encroachment and prompting Watie's group to prioritize self-reliant governance structures over Ross's unified national council. Governance tensions intensified in the 1840s, with Watie's minority faction resisting Ross's consolidation of power under the 1839 Cherokee Constitution, which centralized authority in the Principal Chief and council dominated by Ross supporters, marginalizing Treaty Party voices on issues like disbursements and . In 1843, Watie joined a delegation to Washington to Ross's administration, claiming mismanagement of funds and suppression of opposition, though federal response favored Ross's . Ross, leveraging his control over the Cherokee Advocate newspaper and council elections, curtailed dissent, framing Treaty Party efforts as disruptive to national unity. Reconciliation efforts, such as the 1846 with the , aimed to unify the Old Settlers, Party, and National Party by pardoning prior factional violence and equitably redistributing lands—allocating 7 million acres collectively while providing $500,000 for improvements—but failed to dismantle Ross's centralized dominance, as implementation reinforced his council's oversight and Party grievances over unfulfilled annuities persisted into the . Symbolic gestures, including a public handshake between Ross and Watie in Washington during treaty negotiations, masked ongoing suppression, with Ross's pro-Union inclinations alienating southern-oriented Party members who sought alliances preserving local autonomies amid federal neglect of treaty obligations. This dynamic positioned Watie's faction as defenders of decentralized, treaty-anchored rights against encroachments that prioritized majority fiat over contractual realism.

American Civil War Service

Formation of Confederate Cherokee Forces

As Union forces under Colonel William H. Emory abandoned key forts in Indian Territory, including Forts Washita, Arbuckle, and Cobb, in May 1861 and retreated northward to Kansas, the Cherokee Nation faced heightened vulnerability to external threats and unfulfilled federal protection obligations outlined in prior treaties. This withdrawal, amid the Confederacy's active recruitment of Native allies through promises of sovereignty recognition, territorial defense, and material support such as arms and annuities, prompted Stand Watie and his pro-Southern Cherokee faction—long rivals to Principal Chief John Ross's neutrality stance—to align with the Confederate States. Watie viewed the Union's inaction as a betrayal of commitments to safeguard Indian Territory against incursions, particularly from Kansas-based raiders, contrasting with Confederate overtures that included subsidies to counter economic disruptions from the war. Ross's vacillation, initially maintaining Cherokee neutrality in October 1860 but facing mounting pressure from Confederate advances in and the absence of Union countermeasures, culminated in a Cherokee General decision on August 20–21, 1861, to ally with the Confederacy. This led to the formal Treaty with the Cherokees on October 7, 1861, which reaffirmed Cherokee sovereignty, guaranteed land rights, and pledged mutual defense against northern aggressors. Watie, leveraging his influence among Cherokees with Southern economic ties including slaveholding, positioned his followers to capitalize on these terms for immediate territorial security. In July 1861, Confederate authorities commissioned Watie as a and authorized him to recruit a of Cherokee mounted volunteers, which he organized as the Cherokee Mounted Rifles (later designated the 1st or 2nd Regiment depending on numbering conventions amid overlapping formations). By late 1861, following the treaty's ratification, the unit was mustered into Confederate service, equipped with Southern-supplied rifles and horses to patrol against Union-aligned threats encroaching from and to secure Cherokee holdings in the face of federal neglect. This force, drawn primarily from Watie's supporters, emphasized mobility for rapid response, reflecting pragmatic defenses rooted in the empirical reality of undefended borders rather than ideological abstraction.

Key Military Engagements and Tactics

Stand Watie's Cherokee Mounted Rifles participated in the , Arkansas, from March 7–8, 1862, under Confederate General , where they served primarily as scouts and skirmishers, capturing Union artillery positions before the overall Confederate defeat forced a retreat that highlighted chronic supply shortages in . Watie's forces specialized in guerrilla tactics, leveraging the rugged terrain of for hit-and-run raids on Union supply lines and outposts, often launching from bases south of the to target positions in and , which compensated for limited manpower and resources through mobility and surprise. Following his promotion to on May 6, 1864, Watie commanded a of mixed Native American regiments, including , , and Creek units, conducting operations amid high rates and internal factional strife within the Confederate Indian forces. In the Second Battle of Cabin Creek on September 19, 1864, Watie, alongside Confederate Richard Gano, ambushed a Union wagon train en route to , capturing approximately 300 wagons laden with supplies valued at over $1 million, disrupting Federal logistics in the region through coordinated assaults.

Strategic Achievements and Challenges

Stand Watie employed effective hit-and-run guerrilla tactics with his mounted forces, leveraging mobility and intelligence to harass Union supply lines and frustrate advances in . These operations often forced Union patrols to withdraw, as seen in flanking maneuvers near , that expelled federal forces from parts of the region during his first independent command. Such tactics prolonged Confederate presence in the West by disrupting logistics to key Union outposts like , where repeated raids on convoys and river transports delayed full occupation and resupply efforts. Notable successes included the capture of the Union steamboat J.R. Williams on June 15, 1864, yielding 150 barrels of flour, 16,000 pounds of bacon, and other quartermaster stores en route from Fort Smith to . In the Second Battle of Cabin Creek on September 19, 1864, Watie's forces seized a 300-wagon supply train valued at approximately $1.5 million, including ammunition, clothing, and provisions critical to Union operations. These raids not only deprived federal troops of but also boosted Confederate morale and sustained irregular warfare capabilities despite broader strategic setbacks. Watie faced significant challenges from deep internal divisions within the , where pro-Union factions loyal to John Ross contested his authority, leading to intra-tribal skirmishes and divided loyalties that eroded manpower and cohesion. Confederate high command often neglected Native troops in , providing inadequate supplies and reinforcements, which forced furloughs after Union victories like Honey Springs in July 1863 and exacerbated desertions among allied tribes such as the Creeks and Seminoles. Logistical hurdles in the contested, resource-scarce terrain compounded these issues, limiting forces to small-scale actions unsuitable for conventional engagements and resulting in high casualties among fighters, alongside reprisals against civilian populations that intensified factional hatreds.

Surrender as Last Confederate General

Stand Watie, commanding the remnants of Confederate and allied Native American forces, formally surrendered on June 23, 1865, at Doaksville in the Choctaw Nation, near Fort Towson in present-day . He signed a cease-fire agreement with Union representatives, including Asa C. Matthews, marking the effective end of organized Confederate resistance in the Trans-Mississippi theater. This surrender occurred more than two months after General Robert E. Lee's capitulation at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, as Watie's operations in the isolated Western theater—far removed from eastern battlefronts—allowed guerrilla-style warfare to persist amid delayed news of broader Confederate defeats. General Edmund Kirby Smith's had yielded three weeks earlier on May 26, 1865, but Watie, urged by Principal Chief Peter Pitchlynn, continued evading Union forces through until negotiating terms that minimized immediate reprisals against his command. As the sole Native American to achieve the rank of in the Confederate Army—a commission documented in official Confederate records—Watie's capitulation symbolized the protracted endpoint of Indigenous-aligned Southern resistance, with his unit comprising , , Creek, and Osage fighters who had outlasted conventional armies through mobility in .

Post-War Reconstruction and Cherokee Politics

Negotiations with Federal Government

Following the surrender of Confederate forces in June 1865, Stand Watie, as the former principal chief of the pro-Confederate faction, joined efforts to negotiate with the government to protect Southern Cherokee land claims and political status amid Reconstruction policies. In early 1866, a Southern Cherokee delegation, including Watie and representatives such as Elias C. Boudinot and William P. Adair, traveled to , to sue for , seeking formal recognition of their faction's wartime governance and restoration of tribal divisions as legitimate entities separate from the Union-aligned leadership under John Ross. The delegation argued that the Confederate Cherokee had operated independently during the war, controlling significant portions of the Nation's territory, and demanded equitable treatment to avoid total subordination to Ross's faction, which had received preliminary federal overtures at the 1865 Fort Smith Council. Federal authorities, however, refused to grant separate sovereignty or full restoration to the Southern Cherokee, viewing the Nation as a unified entity whose Confederate alliance warranted collective penalties rather than factional validation. This stance reflected the Union's post-war emphasis on loyalty oaths and centralized oversight, as evidenced by Commissioner of Indian Affairs D.N. Cooley’s instructions to prioritize Union factions in treaty talks, effectively sidelining Watie's group despite their military concessions. The resulting Treaty of July 19, 1866, affirmed Cherokee possession of their diminished domain in Indian Territory—approximately 4 million acres after prior cessions—but imposed stringent conditions, including the abolition of slavery, extension of citizenship and land rights to over 1,000 freedmen, and cessions of western lands for railroad rights-of-way and potential settlement by other tribes or white emigrants. These terms underscored the causal impact of Union military dominance, which eroded pre-war assurances of by enforcing federal dictates on internal , , and , without accommodating the Southern faction's push for partitioned recognition. Watie's delegation secured no distinct concessions for Confederate loyalists, leading to the 's ratification primarily through Ross's Union representatives, though it nominally applied to the entire and preserved core against total dissolution. This outcome highlighted the federal government's strategic use of Reconstruction to consolidate control over Native polities, prioritizing national unity and infrastructure expansion over factional equity.

Efforts to Reunify Cherokee Nation

Following his election as principal chief by Confederate-aligned Cherokees in August 1862, after John Ross's flight to Union lines, Stand Watie advocated for a governance structure emphasizing alliances among Cherokee factions to protect minority interests against the majoritarian dominance of Ross's National Party. This approach stemmed from longstanding Treaty Party principles, prioritizing pragmatic coalitions over unilateral rule to maintain tribal stability amid external pressures. Watie's leadership, extending formally until 1866, positioned him to influence post-war reconciliation, though wartime devastation— including widespread displacement of Cherokee families to refugee camps in and the , destruction of farms, and loss of livestock—had reduced the nation's effective population and economic capacity, fostering urgency for merger. In early 1866, Watie joined the Southern delegation to , negotiating the Reconstruction Treaty with the on July 19, 1866, which mandated abolition of , for freedmen, cession of the Neutral Lands, and between pro-Union and pro-Confederate factions to enable national reunification. Representing the Pin or Southern , Watie initially pressed for formal recognition of a separate Southern entity but conceded to unified under compromises, including constitutional amendments ratified in a special convention on November 26, 1866, that incorporated protections for former allies while restoring Ross's faction to primacy. These measures aimed to rebuild tribal assets amid poverty and infrastructure ruin, yet factional distrust lingered, with Southern facing marginalization into the 1870s.

Final Years and Death

Following his involvement in the 1866 Cherokee Reconstruction Treaty negotiations, Stand Watie retired from public life and returned to his home at Honey Creek in 1867 after a period of exile in the Choctaw Nation. There, he focused on rebuilding his plantation, which had been devastated by wartime destruction, though financial recovery proved challenging amid the broader economic hardships faced by Confederate-aligned Cherokees. Watie died on September 9, 1871, at age 64 from illness. He was buried with Masonic honors in the Ridge family plot at , , formerly known as the old Cemetery. The subdued nature of posthumous recognition underscored the persistent factional divisions within the that had defined his later career.

Personal Life and Character

Family and Relationships

Stand Watie married Eleanor Looney around 1834; she was the daughter of John Looney, a prominent leader and chief in the western . This union connected Watie to influential Cherokee families, though it produced limited surviving offspring, including at least one daughter, , born circa 1840. Watie's earlier brief marriages to Elizabeth Fields and Isabella Hicks yielded no surviving children; Fields died in childbirth in 1836 along with their infant. In 1842 or 1843, Watie wed Sarah Caroline Bell, a Cherokee woman from a respected family, with whom he established his primary household in . They had seven children: sons Saladin Ridge, (also known as Watch), Eugene Cumiskey (Miska), and Reece; daughters Josephine (Ninnie) and Jackoline (Charlotte); and a son Elias who died in infancy. None of these children produced heirs, contributing to the eventual dissipation of Watie's direct lineage. Watie's household exemplified the acculturated Cherokee elite, incorporating enslaved for labor on and in domestic roles, a practice adopted by many leaders who embraced modeled on Southern norms. He owned nearly 100 slaves by the Civil War era, reflecting his status among the wealthiest , whose faction controlled a significant portion of the tribe's estimated 1,600 enslaved people. Watie's kin ties reinforced loyalties within the Treaty Party faction, which advocated Cherokee removal via the 1835 . His brother (Gallagher), uncle , and cousin formed a core network of signatories, sustaining familial solidarity amid tribal divisions and assassination threats against Treaty advocates. These blood and marital connections influenced Watie's pragmatic alignment with federal policies favoring relocation and assimilation.

Views on Slavery and Cherokee Sovereignty

Stand Watie, a prosperous planter in Indian Territory, owned nearly one hundred enslaved Africans, reflecting his endorsement of slavery as a cornerstone of Cherokee economic structure among the elite. By 1860, Cherokee holders possessed 2,511 slaves, representing about 15 percent of the territory's population and integral to agricultural operations like Watie's plantation. This practice involved Africans exclusively, not Native individuals, aligning with the tribe's adoption of Southern planter customs during acculturation; the 1827 Cherokee Constitution omitted explicit endorsement of black slavery—mirroring the U.S. Constitution's approach—but tribal laws incorporated slave codes regulating such ownership. Watie's position prioritized property rights in human labor as essential to sustaining Cherokee prosperity and autonomy, viewing abolitionist pressures as an external imposition threatening tribal self-determination. Central to Watie's ideology was an unwavering defense of Cherokee sovereignty, pursued through alliances that countered federal overreach and preserved treaty lands. He perceived the U.S. government as the Cherokee's foremost foe, having historically disregarded tribal independence via encroachments like the coerced execution of the 1835 —signed by Watie's faction to relocate westward and secure a perpetual homeland, yet enforced through the devastating against majority opposition. In aligning with the Confederacy via treaty in October 1861, Watie emphasized pragmatism over abstract loyalties, securing concessions such as rights to sell land, protections for investments, and potential congressional representation—benefits absent under Union dominance, which harbored abolitionist elements endangering slave property and inviting further erosion of Native governance. This Confederate pact positioned the South as a strategic shield against Union abolitionism and invasions into , which Watie saw as hypocritical violations of ; federal forces not only pressured neutrality but arrested Principal Chief John Ross in 1862, compelling his Union shift amid territorial threats. Watie's reasoning subordinated ideological battles over to causal preservation of tribal lands and institutions, arguing that Northern victory would amplify federal interference, undermining the very treaties meant to guarantee independence.

Controversies and Historical Debates

Accusations of Betrayal and Division

The Treaty Party, led by figures including Stand Watie, faced vehement accusations of treason from the National Party under John Ross for signing the Treaty of New Echota on December 29, 1835, which ceded Cherokee ancestral lands east of the Mississippi River to the United States without the consent of the Cherokee National Council or a majority of the population. Opponents argued this unauthorized agreement directly precipitated the enforcement of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, resulting in the forced relocation known as the Trail of Tears from 1838 to 1839, during which missionary accounts and tribal estimates indicate over 4,000 Cherokees—nearly one-fifth of the removed population—died from exposure, disease, and starvation along the 1,200-mile route to Indian Territory. Ross faction members held Watie personally accountable for the catastrophe, viewing the treaty as a betrayal of Cherokee sovereignty and collective survival that sacrificed thousands of lives for personal or factional gain. This perception fueled retaliatory violence, including a near-fatal assassination attempt on Watie by fellow Cherokees who deemed his actions tantamount to selling out the nation. During the , Watie's Confederate Cherokee forces exacerbated internal divisions through military campaigns against Union-aligned Cherokees, including raids that displaced families and prompted John Ross to request U.S. federal protection from Watie's raiders amid the ensuing Cherokee civil strife in . Critics within the pro-Union faction labeled these operations as terror campaigns against their own people, contributing to widespread flows and brutal internecine violence that fragmented Cherokee communities. Some contemporary and later interpretations, particularly in academic narratives influenced by emphasis on slavery's role, have framed Watie's alliance with the Confederacy primarily as an extension of pro-slavery interests among elite Cherokees, downplaying the context of Union military incursions into tribal lands and the pre-existing factional hostilities.

Defenses of Pragmatic Leadership

Supporters of Watie's leadership argue that his signing of the Treaty of New Echota in 1835 represented a pragmatic acknowledgment of the Cherokee Nation's untenable position amid Georgia's aggressive land policies, which began with the state legislature's 1828 and 1829 acts extending jurisdiction over Cherokee territory, nullifying tribal laws, abolishing Cherokee courts, and surveying lands for white settlement despite federal treaties guaranteeing Cherokee sovereignty. These measures, coupled with President Andrew Jackson's refusal to enforce the U.S. Supreme Court's 1832 ruling in Worcester v. Georgia—which affirmed Cherokee sovereignty and invalidated Georgia's extensions—rendered resistance futile and relocation inevitable, prompting Watie and fellow Treaty Party members to negotiate terms that secured financial compensation, land in Indian Territory, and protections for minority Cherokee interests rather than face total dispossession without recourse. This approach prioritized long-term survival and rights preservation for a faction facing existential threats from state and federal inaction, consistent with Watie's defense of minority Cherokee positions against majority National Party opposition. Watie's alignment with the Confederacy in 1861 is defended as a calculated response to Union military aggressions in , including incursions by federal-aligned forces that disrupted neutrality and prompted the Nation's formal declaration of causes on August 21, 1861, citing U.S. violations and failures to provide promised protection as causal factors in seeking Confederate . The Confederacy initially fulfilled its commitments by recognizing , assuming U.S. obligations, and dispatching aid such as supplies and troops to counter Union threats, which contrasted with the federal government's history of broken promises and enabled Watie to organize the to defend tribal lands. This decision sustained autonomy amid invasion risks, with Watie's forces repelling early Union advances and leveraging Confederate support to maintain resistance longer than many predicted. Watie's military record counters portrayals of his campaigns as quixotic, as evidenced by key victories that captured vital supplies, thereby prolonging Confederate operations in the Trans-Mississippi Theater despite resource shortages. On June 15, 1864, Watie's brigade seized the Union steamboat J. R. Williams on the , securing $100,000 in munitions, ammunition, and stores that bolstered his regiment's capabilities. Similarly, on September 19, 1864, at the Second Battle of Cabin Creek, his forces under joint command captured a Union wagon train valued at $1 million in wagons, mules, and commissary goods, disrupting federal logistics and enabling sustained that tied down Union troops until his surrender on June 23, 1865. These feats demonstrate pragmatic adaptability, transforming numerical disadvantages into strategic assets through mobility and opportunism, rather than futile conventional engagements.

Assessments of Military and Political Legacy

Stand Watie's military leadership during the Civil War is assessed by historians as effective in sustaining Confederate-aligned Cherokee forces through decentralized, mobile operations in , enabling his command to outlast major Eastern Theater armies following Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865. His and later the Indian Division conducted raids and skirmishes, such as the victories at Chustenahlah in December 1861 and Cabin Creek in July 1864, which disrupted Union supply lines and preserved factional control over portions of lands despite numerical disadvantages. Watie's surrender on June 23, 1865, at Doaksville—as the final Confederate general in the field—underscored the logistical isolation of the , where communication breakdowns and resource scarcity allowed peripheral forces to evade coordinated collapse, unlike the more integrated Virginia campaigns. Politically, Watie's alliance with the Confederacy advanced short-term sovereignty interests for his Southern Cherokee faction by securing promises of territorial protection and autonomy against perceived Union threats to and tribal institutions, positioning him as principal chief of the pro-Confederate in 1862. However, this strategy exacerbated internal divisions, as rival Principal Chief John Ross's initial Union loyalty drew retaliatory raids that displaced thousands and fueled a civil war mirroring national conflict, ultimately weakening the Nation's bargaining power with the federal government. Post-war negotiations saw Watie advocate for recognition of factional divisions to preserve Southern rights, but U.S. authorities imposed the 1866 Treaty, which abolished , ceded lands, and mandated reunification on terms that marginalized his supporters. The war's toll under Watie's command contributed to severe demographic and economic setbacks for the , with population dropping from approximately 21,000 in 1861 to 15,000 by 1865 due to combat, disease, and hardships, representing a loss of over 25 percent. Indian Territory's infrastructure—farms, mills, and settlements—was largely destroyed, leaving lasting and displacement that hindered reconstruction. Long-term, Watie's legacy includes precedents for factional pluralism in governance, as post-war treaties institutionalized minority representation, influencing modern tribal politics where competing interests persist despite centralized leadership; yet, his actions are critiqued for prioritizing elite property interests over unified national resilience, perpetuating schisms evident in ongoing debates over historical accountability.

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