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Zaildar
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Zaildar was an officer in charge of a Zail which was an administrative unit of group of villages during the Sikh Empire, British Indian Empire in Punjab and Dogra dynasty rule in Jammu and Kashmir (princely state). The Settlement Officer, with the advice of the Deputy Commissioner, was responsible for appointing Zaildars from amongst the men of the tribe or the area, thus reinforcing his preexisting social authority with the official sanction as the representative of the government.[1][2] Zaildars were the revenue-collecting officers also responsible for maintaining law and order. The Lambardar and Safedposh assisted the Zaildar. The Zaildar in turn assisted the Deputy Commissioner.[2] The Zaildar was more influential than the Lambardar (village head) because a Zail included several villages.[3]

Influence of Zaildari system

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The position was important as it extended the influence of the colonial state into the villages.[4] It also reinforced the already dominant social status of the Zaildar with official government sanction.[2] The Zaildar exercised authority and patronage over the villagers.[2]

Appointment criteria

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Zails were established and demarcated by the District collector (also called Deputy Commissioner) during the land revenue settlement exercise. Settlement officers, with advice from the District collector and subject to the final approval of the state's Financial Commissioner,[1] appointed a Zaildar to each Zail either on a hereditary basis, for one person's life or for a fixed tenure.[1] The Zaildars were equivalent to the Chaudharis of earlier times and were hand-picked by the higher authorities, who based their decision on issues such as caste or tribe, local influence, extent of landholding, services rendered to the state by him or his family, and personal character and ability.[4]: 97–98 [2][5] A Zaildar once appointed could only be removed from office for misconduct or neglect; removal on account of old age or disability was a harsh punishment and in such cases he could continue to operate through a representative.[6]

"The introduction of the zaildari agency into any district must be approved by the local Government [Deputy Commissioner]. Any subsequent increase or decrease in the number of zaildars can be made under the orders of the Financial Commissioner, provided the percentage of the land revenue assigned for their emoluments is not exceeded ... No attempt should be made to fix the limits of zails, but the tribal organization and other important families of the tract should be explained in such detail as is necessary to enable Government to judge whether the agency should be introduced. Any proposals to appoint inamdars [also called safedposh] may be made in the same report. The opinions both of the Settlement Officer and of the Deputy Commissioner should be given. The report should be submitted to Government through the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner, each of whom should record his views on the proposal made in it."

— Punjab Settlement Manual, 1930 (point 578, page 272).[1]

Role and remuneration of Zaildars

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Zaildars were essentially revenue ministers and representatives of the British Empire who received remuneration for their duties, life grants of either a fixed amount[7] or a grant equal to one per cent of the revenue of their zails from the assessment of any single village that they chose.[8] Some of the responsibilities of the Zaildar corresponded to the responsibilities that fell under the Deputy Commissioner, such as revenue collection, mutations,[clarification needed] local governance issues, related dispute resolution, etc. Other duties corresponded with the responsibilities that fell under the Settlement officer, such as revenue settlement, reassessments, preparation of maps, etc.[1]

Safedposh

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In addition to these life inams, or grants, there were some Safedposhi grants of a semi-hereditary nature enjoyed by some of the leading agricultural families. They were semi-hereditary because one of the conditions of the grant was that on the death of an incumbent, his successor should, if possible, be a member of the same family.[8]

Abolition

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India

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Kashmir

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Kashmir took lead in abolition of the Zaildari system where it was abolished in 1950.[9]

Rest of India

[edit]

Post the Indian independence in 1947, the system of Zails, Zaildars and Safedposh continued to exist till 1964. Then the system was abolished by CM of Punjab Partap Singh Kairon following demands from his ministers and Members of the Legislative Assembly, because of conflicts between the elected MLAs and the Zaildars. Police and Tehsil officers had been giving more weight to the opinions of Zaildars and this had undermined the MLAs.[10] For the purpose, an amendment was carried out in Section 28 of The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 through Section 3 of Punjab Act 27 of 1964.

Pakistan

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After India, Pakistan abolished Zaildari system in 1967.

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See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Zaildar

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Zaildar was the title of a native appointed to administer a zail, an intermediate and administrative unit encompassing 2 to 100 villages in colonial under British , with primary duties centered on land collection and serving as an intermediary between authorities and rural populations. The zaildari system, formalized around as part of British efforts to streamline rural governance following the Punjab Land Act, empowered zaildars—often selected from influential landowning families on a hereditary or merit-based influence—to assist in implementing policies, resolving minor disputes, and upholding law and order within their jurisdiction, while being remunerated by one percent of the collected . Subordinates such as lambardars (village headmen) and safedposh (white-clothed aides) supported these functions, embedding the role deeply in 's agrarian hierarchy and contributing to the stability of British in the region. Though the position carried prestige and local authority, it was critiqued for reinforcing elite landholder dominance, and the system was largely discontinued after Indian independence in favor of more centralized village-level administration.

Origins and Historical Context

Establishment in British Punjab

The Zaildari system was first proposed in amid British efforts to reform and decentralize rural governance in , following the of the region in 1849. This initiative sought to create an administrative tier between district-level officials and village , drawing on local elites to facilitate efficient extraction and in a predominantly agrarian and tribal society. The proposal addressed inefficiencies in the existing lambardari system, where individual village lambardars reported directly to tehsildars, by introducing zaildars as supervisors over clusters of villages. Implementation occurred in 1880, marking the formal establishment of the system across British Punjab. Upon rollout, 79 zaildars were appointed, with two assigned specifically to police oversight roles and the remaining 77 handling broader and miscellaneous administrative functions. Zaildars were selected from prominent landowners or jagirdars, granting them authority over zails—groupings of multiple villages, often numbering from a few to over a hundred—thus elevating their status above lambardars while aligning local power structures with colonial objectives of stability and fiscal reliability. This colonial innovation reflected a pragmatic adaptation of , prioritizing influential rural intermediaries to minimize direct bureaucratic intervention and leverage indigenous hierarchies for governance. By vesting zaildars with responsibilities for , , and revenue supervision, the British aimed to mitigate resistance in Punjab's frontier-like conditions, where centralized control had proven challenging post-Sikh rule. The system's design emphasized hereditary or merit-based continuity among loyal families, fostering a collaborative elite network essential to imperial administration until post-independence reforms.

Pre-Colonial Administrative Parallels

In the , which governed until the mid-18th century, zamindars functioned as hereditary intermediaries between the imperial administration and cultivators, overseeing revenue assessment and collection across clusters of villages while maintaining local order and providing military support when required. These officials, often drawn from local landholding elites, retained a portion of the collected revenue as compensation and wielded significant autonomy in rural affairs, mirroring the supervisory role later formalized for zaildars. Chaudharis, as subordinate revenue officers, assisted in these duties, particularly in compiling village records and enforcing collections, with responsibilities extending over multiple settlements in a . Under the (1799–1849), administrative parallels emerged more directly through the talluqa system, an intermediate tier between s (districts) and mouzas (villages), typically encompassing 50 to 100 villages. Kardars, appointed as or talluqa heads, served as revenue collectors, magistrates, and central authority representatives, managing land assessments, , and law enforcement with minimal oversight, often drawing commissions from revenues to sustain operations. This structure relied on local notables for efficient rural control, emphasizing hereditary influence and fiscal accountability akin to the zaildari framework. Village-level punchayats handled minor judicial matters, but kardars coordinated broader enforcement, reflecting a decentralized yet hierarchical approach to in pre-British .

Administrative Framework

Definition and Structure of the Zail

The Zail constituted a key revenue and administrative subdivision in the colonial rural governance of British , defined as a territorial unit encompassing a cluster of villages grouped primarily by tribal affinity or shared social ties. Derived from terminology denoting a "sub-place" or collective grouping, the Zail served as an intermediary layer between higher district-level authorities and individual villages, facilitating localized oversight of land revenue and rudimentary . This structure was formalized under the Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1887, which codified the roles of Zail officials within the broader settlement and assessment framework. Structurally, a Zail typically comprised 5 to 40 villages, though variations occurred based on and , with the Zaildar appointed as its principal officer—often selected from prominent zamindars (landholders) or tribal leaders to leverage existing local influence. Zails were organized under the supervision of the Deputy Commissioner at the level, forming a hierarchical chain that extended downward to village-level functionaries such as lambardars (headmen) and safedposh (deputies or white-clad assistants). This arrangement emphasized , where Zaildars aggregated village-level data for and reporting, ensuring targets were met through collective accountability rather than direct imperial intervention. The system's prototype emerged in 1873 as a proposal for efficient rural administration, with initial implementation in 1880 during the Second Regular Settlement in , where 79 Zaildars were designated—two for specialized police duties and the remainder for general and tasks.

Appointment Criteria and Hereditary Aspects

The appointment of a zaildar was primarily the responsibility of the , who selected candidates based on personal influence, representation of the majority of agriculturists in the zail, demonstrated character, administrative , extent of holdings, and from indebtedness. Past services rendered by the candidate or their family, often in roles such as chaudhris or previous zaildars, were also weighed in the evaluation. Candidates were expected to possess knowledge of land revenue systems, agricultural expertise, and the capacity to maintain order, with selection typically confined to lambardars (village headmen) due to their established local standing. The process involved consultation with lambardars and other revenue officials, including non-binding votes or recommendations from to gauge community consensus and suitability. Loyalty to the colonial administration, local tribal or familial influence, and the ability to ensure revenue collection and were key qualifiers, prioritizing individuals from prominent or tribal families. Minors could be appointed provisionally with a substitute, but final approval rested with higher authorities like the , emphasizing merit over rigid formalism. Hereditary aspects were not formally enshrined as an absolute right, with no automatic succession recognized in official rules; however, preference was given to sons, close relatives, or heirs of or zaildars provided they met the requisite qualifications of influence and capability. This approach acknowledged the entrenched familial influence in rural , where descent often conferred advantages through inherited prestige and service records, but appointments could be withheld or revoked for incompetence, , or physical incapacity, at which point an heir might assume duties temporarily or permanently if deemed fit. In practice, the system's reliance on established landowning families fostered a quasi-hereditary , reinforcing stability but occasionally perpetuating dominance over administrative roles.

Roles and Functions

Revenue Collection Duties

Zaildars held primary responsibility for assembling and remitting land revenue from the villages within their zail, an administrative unit encompassing 2 to 100 villages, to British collectors or tehsildars. This role positioned them as key intermediaries in the revenue system prevalent in , where assessments were made on groups of estates rather than individuals, ensuring the colonial administration's fiscal demands were met efficiently. In practice, Zaildars oversaw the aggregation of collections handled at the village level by subordinate Lambardars, who directly realized payments from cultivators based on assessed shares of produce or cash equivalents. They enforced accountability by monitoring compliance, reporting delinquencies, and facilitating coercive measures such as attachments or auctions of defaulters' lands when necessary, all while maintaining records of demands and receipts to reconcile with higher revenue authorities. This supervisory function extended to other cesses and taxes linked to land, such as rates in canal-irrigated areas, though land revenue formed the core obligation. For their services, Zaildars received equivalent to one percent of the land yielded from their zail, providing a direct aligned with collection performance. Appointments emphasized individuals with substantial landholdings and local influence to leverage social authority for realization, reflecting British reliance on indigenous elites for administrative leverage amid limited direct bureaucratic reach in rural . The system's emphasis on timely harvests—often due by December for rabi and April for kharif crops—underscored the Zaildar's role in synchronizing local agrarian cycles with imperial fiscal calendars.

Maintenance of Law and Order

Zaildars were entrusted with upholding law and order as a core function within their zails, administrative units comprising clusters of villages typically ranging from two to one hundred settlements. This responsibility involved assisting British authorities in efforts, including monitoring local activities and reporting disturbances to ensure stability in rural . The system's implementation, formalized around 1880 following proposals in , positioned zaildars as intermediaries who leveraged their local influence to prevent unrest and support colonial governance. Specific duties encompassed resolving minor disputes among villagers, such as those over or petty conflicts, to avert escalation that could undermine collection or broader . In addition to general oversight, two of the approximately 79 zaildars across British were designated explicitly for police management, highlighting a targeted role in direct coordination. Zaildars often held enhanced authority over subordinate officials like lambardars, enabling them to mobilize village-level support for maintaining peace without relying solely on distant British police forces. Many zaildars were also appointed as honorary magistrates, conferring limited judicial powers to adjudicate minor offenses and reinforce order through local adjudication rather than formal courts. This integration of administrative and quasi-judicial roles facilitated efficient and deterrence of crime, aligning with British policies to co-opt influential landowners for rural control. Such appointments underscored the zaildar's position as a in the colonial strategy of decentralized policing, where personal loyalty and deference to authority were prerequisites for selection.

Remuneration and Privileges

Zaildars received remuneration primarily in the form of a commission drawn from the land revenue of their zail, typically equivalent to 1% of the assessed and collected revenue, though fixed life payments were also provided in some cases. This percentage-based system ensured their compensation aligned with the fiscal output of their administrative unit, incentivizing efficient collection while limiting it to prescribed limits to avoid excess. The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, explicitly authorized such percentages for zaildars' services in revenue realization, as determined by prevailing rules, reflecting the British emphasis on performance-linked emoluments over fixed salaries. Beyond direct payments, zaildars benefited from privileges that reinforced their role between colonial authorities and rural communities. Appointments were often hereditary, favoring heirs from established landholding families, which perpetuated elite status and local influence across generations. This tenure provided social prestige, including deference from subordinate officials like lambardars and villagers, as well as practical authority in supervising revenue assessments and minor policing duties. Such privileges, tied to and competence, distinguished zaildars as a collaborating rural , though they were revocable by officials for misconduct.

Supporting Officials

Lambardars

Lambardars functioned as the principal village-level intermediaries in the British Punjab revenue administration, operating under the oversight of the zaildar within a zail. Each village comprising the zail was led by a , who bore direct responsibility for assembling land assessments from local cultivators and channeling these collections to the zaildar for aggregation and forwarding to the . This hierarchical arrangement positioned lambardars as subordinates to the zaildar, who exercised superior authority over the multi-village territory of the zail, while lambardars managed granular, village-specific fiscal operations. Beyond duties, lambardars contributed to local governance by upholding basic order through the chowkidari watch-and-ward system, surveilling transients, and alerting authorities to potential threats such as political agitators; they further supported imperial efforts by facilitating drives in their communities. These roles underscored their function as the lowest tier in the , bridging rural populations with officials while leveraging personal influence to enforce compliance. Appointments to the position were conferred on members of prominent landholding families, frequently inheriting the role across generations to capitalize on established social leverage and ensure reliable execution of obligations; failure to remit revenues promptly could result in penalties, including short-term up to 14 days. This hereditary preference reinforced feudal-like networks but also embedded lambardars with prestige in official assemblies, such as those of deputy commissioners.

Safedposh

Safedposh, a term deriving from Persian meaning "white-clad" and referring to rural distinguished by their attire and social status, served as auxiliary officials under the Zaildar in British Punjab's colonial administration. These appointees, often selected from local landholders or Inamdars (recipients of service-based land exemptions), were tasked with executing the Zaildar's orders, particularly in relaying directives to villages and supporting -related activities. Unlike Lambardars, who functioned as elected village-level with direct accountability for collections, Safedposh held a subordinate, non-hereditary position focused on facilitation rather than primary responsibility. They assisted in maintaining administrative links between the zail and dispersed villages, helping to enforce compliance with land assessments and minor law-and-order tasks, though without the Zaildar's broader oversight authority or privileges. Appointments were typically made by the Zaildar, subject to approval by higher British officials like the Deputy Commissioner, emphasizing loyalty and local influence over formal qualifications. This role reinforced the hierarchical structure of rural , where Safedposh bridged intermediaries and implementation, contributing to the system's in revenue extraction during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Post-1947, their positions were phased out alongside the zail framework, with abolition formalized in by 1952 as part of efforts to dismantle colonial intermediaries.

Influence and Societal Impact

Achievements in Governance and Stability

Zaildars bolstered administrative stability in British by functioning as hereditary local intermediaries who bridged colonial officials and rural communities, drawing on kinship ties and landownership to enforce governance. Their oversight of zails—administrative units spanning 2 to 100 villages—enabled decentralized control, where they mediated tribal disputes, reported intelligence on potential unrest, and mobilized labor for , reducing the need for direct British intervention in remote areas. This structure, aligned with indigenous social hierarchies, minimized administrative friction and fostered compliance with colonial policies. A primary achievement lay in their role upholding law and order, which prevented minor conflicts from escalating into broader instability. Zaildars, vested with greater authority than subordinate lambardars, supervised police functions in some jurisdictions and suppressed localized crime or rebellion through community enforcement mechanisms. During the 1857 Indian Rebellion, Punjab's zaildars and allied elites maintained provincial loyalty, supplying troops and quelling dissent, which preserved the region as a stable base for British counteroffensives elsewhere. This collaboration exemplified how the system co-opted local power structures to avert uprisings, reinforcing Punjab's strategic value as a martial frontier. Revenue collection duties further underscored their governance efficacy, ensuring predictable fiscal inflows that underpinned colonial stability and development. By assessing and gathering land taxes with intimate local knowledge, zaildars facilitated efficient settlements, such as those in the second regular revenue operations, and supported initiatives like canal colonies—irrigating vast tracts, as in Shahpur District's Lower project covering 743,000 acres—which enhanced agricultural output and economic resilience. Rewards like land grants, exemplified by 15,000 acres allocated to figures such as Sahib Khan Tiwana in 1893, incentivized sustained performance, tying elite interests to imperial objectives. The system's implementation, proposed in 1873 and rolled out by 1880, demonstrated scalability; in alone, 79 zaildars were appointed, with two focused on police oversight and others on multifaceted duties, yielding socioeconomic steadiness amid colonial expansion. Overall, these mechanisms promoted a pragmatic model that prioritized causal levers like buy-in and localized enforcement over centralized , yielding relative rural tranquility in compared to other provinces.

Criticisms, Exploitation, and Controversies

Zaildars, as hereditary revenue officers and local enforcers of British authority in colonial , faced criticisms for perpetuating feudal exploitation through their control over land, credit, and labor. They often imposed additional levies beyond official assessments, such as taxes on artisans and ferries, which disproportionately burdened poorer tenants and laborers, trapping them in cycles of debt and bonded labor known as begaar. Exploitative rent practices, including the moa jora system that added a fifth to the standard one-third crop share, further exacerbated tenant hardships, particularly during economic downturns like depression when payments were shifted to kind, reducing cash liquidity for peasants. Misuse of authority was rampant, with Zaildars leveraging their semi-official status to favor kin and allies in revenue collection and , often evicting tenants at will under provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868, which prioritized proprietor rights over occupancy protections. This led to peasant grievances manifesting in localized resistances, such as the 1862 protests in village against excessive land exactions, and broader anti-recruitment campaigns in 1938 where nationalists highlighted Zaildar-led social stagnation and economic coercion. British co-optation post-1857 Revolt entrenched this system, granting Zaildars higher emoluments (e.g., increased payments reported in 1923–24) in exchange for loyalty, fostering and that eroded their traditional community standing. Controversies intensified as Zaildars opposed tenant-friendly reforms, including resistance to compensation increases in Tenancy Act amendments of 1933 and 1945, viewing them as threats to their dominance. Their role in maintaining rural oligarchies—numbering around 80,000 local officials including Zaildars and lambardars—left masses vulnerable to elite mercy, amplifying British injustice by stifling political awareness and enabling over . Such practices contributed to factional instability, with landed elites like Zaildars manipulating resources and elections, as seen in colonial-era district board interferences and post-Partition evacuee property appropriations.

Abolition and Post-Colonial Transition

Abolition in India (Post-1947)

Following 's in , the zaildari system in the eastern region (now part of Indian states) initially continued as part of transitional administrative arrangements amid partition disruptions and the integration of princely states like and States Union (PEPSU). However, the new democratic government prioritized land reforms to dismantle colonial-era intermediaries, viewing them as vestiges of that perpetuated unequal revenue extraction and local power concentrations. The abolition aligned with the Indian National Congress's commitments to redistribute land and empower cultivators directly, reducing reliance on hereditary officials. The offices of zaildars and associated inamdars were formally abolished in the early through targeted legislation, including the Punjab Abolition of Ala Malikiyat and Talukdari Rights Act, 1952, which eliminated superior proprietary claims and restructured rural hierarchies. This act vested land rights more directly with inferior owners and cultivators, bypassing zail-level oversight, while complementary measures in PEPSU via the 1954 Abolition of Ala Malikiyat Rights Act extended similar reforms. Responsibilities for collection, liaison, and village coordination shifted to lambardars at the patwari circle or village level, streamlining administration under tehsildars and reducing intermediary layers. By 1952, zails as administrative units were dissolved, with an estimated several hundred zaildar positions eliminated across districts. These reforms faced implementation challenges, including legal disputes over inam lands granted to zaildars for service and resistance from affected families, but proceeded without widespread compensation beyond nominal transitional allowances in some cases. Subsequent amendments to the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887—such as Punjab Act 27 of 1964—formally excised references to zaildars from statutory provisions, confirming the system's obsolescence. The changes contributed to greater bureaucratic centralization, though critics noted persistent informal influence by former zaildar lineages in local politics.

Abolition in Pakistan

The Zaildari system, inherited from British colonial administration, continued in after partition in 1947 as a mechanism for revenue collection and local oversight in rural , with zaildars supervising groups of villages and coordinating with subordinate lambardars. This persistence reflected the new state's initial reliance on established rural elites for administrative stability amid post-independence challenges, including refugee resettlement and economic consolidation. However, the system's hereditary and intermediary nature increasingly conflicted with efforts to modernize and reduce fragmented authority structures. Abolition occurred in 1967 through administrative reforms under President Ayub Khan (r. 1958–1969), which sought to centralize power by streamlining rural hierarchies and integrating them into state-controlled frameworks. These changes dismantled the zail level of administration, eliminating zaildars' formal roles in revenue supervision and , as part of broader centralization to enhance bureaucratic efficiency and align local functions with national development priorities. The reforms built on the 1959 Basic Democracies Ordinance, which had already shifted toward elected union councils and tehsil-level bodies, rendering hereditary zaildars redundant by devolving responsibilities to appointed patwaris and elected representatives under tighter provincial oversight. Post-abolition, village-level lambardars retained limited revenue-collection duties under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, but without the supervisory umbrella of zaildars, leading to more direct and district control. This transition contributed to the erosion of colonial-era privileges for intermediate elites, though it preserved underlying feudal landholding patterns that persisted through subsequent land reforms in 1959 and 1972, which focused on ownership ceilings rather than administrative abolition. No widespread resistance or major controversies accompanied the 1967 changes, as they aligned with Ayub Khan's military-backed prioritizing state consolidation over rural .

Specific Case in Kashmir

In the of Jammu and Kashmir under Dogra rule from 1846, Zaildars functioned as appointed feudal landlords overseeing groups of villages known as zails, responsible for revenue collection, local administration, and dispensing minor justice on behalf of the . These positions were typically held by influential Muslim families in the , who controlled vast estates and wielded significant social and economic power, bridging the gap between the distant Hindu rulers and the predominantly Muslim peasantry. Following the state's accession to on October 26, 1947, and the establishment of the National Conference government under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, radical land reforms were enacted to dismantle feudal structures. On July 13, 1950, the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act was passed, abolishing the rights of proprietors—including Zaildars and jagirdars—over land exceeding specified limits, vesting such estates in the state for redistribution to tillers in possession as of the Kharif 2007 crop season. The Act capped individual landholdings at 160 kanals (approximately 22.75 acres) and provided no direct compensation to former proprietors, substituting instead a limited based on prior land revenue—capped at Rs. 3,000 annually—declining over time. This legislation redistributed approximately 4.5 acres from around 9,000 large landowners, predominantly Zaildars, to over 2.31 tenant tillers, marking one of the most sweeping and immediate abolitions of intermediary tenures in . In the , where Zaildars had dominated rural society, the reforms precipitated the rapid decline of these families' economic and political influence; for instance, the Drabu family lost 1,446 kanals, while the family of Salar forfeited 3,000 kanals. Subsequent amendments, such as those in the Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act via Act XXVIII of 1956, further omitted references to Zaildars from administrative frameworks, solidifying their obsolescence. While the reforms empowered peasants and reduced feudal exploitation, many displaced Zaildar lineages adapted through , migration to urban areas, or entry into and bureaucracy; examples include descendants of Aziz Mir in Rajpora who pursued professional careers, and Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Mir who retained local influence via political involvement. Unlike gradual transitions elsewhere in , Kashmir's case exemplified a decisive break from colonial-era hierarchies, though remnants of Zaildar-era and social networks persisted amid broader socioeconomic shifts.

Legacy

Persistence of Feudal Structures

Despite formal abolition of the Zaildari system in under Ayub Khan's reforms in 1967, the entrenched hierarchies it fostered among dominant landowning castes like and Rajputs have endured in rural , manifesting in ongoing political dominance and networks. Descendants of Zaildar families frequently transitioned into post-independence political elites, leveraging inherited landholdings—often exceeding thousands of acres per family—to influence electoral outcomes through clientelist ties with tenants and voters. For instance, in districts like , these lineages maintained control over local governance and resource allocation, perpetuating feudal obligations where tenants provided labor and votes in exchange for protection and credit access. Land reforms in Pakistan, such as Martial Law Regulation 64 (1959), which resumed 1,902,788 acres, and MLR 115 (1972), affecting 2,826,400 acres, failed to dismantle these structures due to exemptions for orchards, religious endowments, and elite manipulations of land records, allowing over 60% of Punjab's legislators in 1972 to hail from landed aristocratic backgrounds. This persistence stems from colonial-era bargains between the British state and rural notables, which post-1947 Pakistani regimes replicated via state patronage—evidenced by allocations like Rs. 232,655,000 for rural development between 1963 and 1966—reinforcing a nexus where feudal elites secure bureaucratic and military support. Even under nominally reformist governments like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party, incorporation of these elites diluted anti-feudal measures, with 1977 election candidates predominantly from landowning classes. In , the Zaildari system's abolition aligned with broader zamindari elimination under the Punjab Land Reforms Act of 1953 and subsequent ceiling laws in the , redistributing intermediary tenures to direct cultivators and weakening formal feudal revenue roles. However, informal persistence occurs through caste-based , where former Zaildar-linked families from agriculturalist biraderis retain influence in village panchayats and state assemblies, often via kinship networks rather than monopoly, as Punjab's legacy facilitated more equitable holdings post-reform. This contrast highlights Pakistan's incomplete institutional rupture from colonial , sustaining in rural politics, whereas India's reforms, though imperfect, curbed overt landlordism but left subtler patrimonial ties intact. The term "Zaildar," denoting hereditary rural revenue collectors and local influencers in colonial , has been invoked in to evoke themes of village hierarchy, family traditions, and comedic rural life. Films bearing the title or featuring Zaildar-like protagonists often portray these figures as affluent landowners navigating arranged marriages, familial duties, and social antics, reflecting a stylized for pre-modern Punjabi agrarian society. The franchise, initiated with the 2016 film directed by and starring , centers on Nikka, a boisterous heir to a Zaildar lineage, who grapples with rituals and generational clashes in a comedic framework rooted in Punjabi customs like jatt pride and lavish shaadi ceremonies. Subsequent installments— (2017), (2021), and Nikka Zaildar 4 (released October 2, 2025)—expanded this archetype, grossing significantly at the and popularizing tropes of Zaildar descendants as anti-authority yet tradition-bound youths, with the fourth entry earning approximately ₹1 on its despite postponements. The series has drawn acclaim for revitalizing Punjabi cinema's appeal to audiences by merging feudal-era titles with contemporary humor, though Nikka Zaildar 4 faced backlash for depictions of Sikh women consuming alcohol and , interpreted by critics as undermining religious norms. Preceding these, standalone films like Zaildar (1972), a Pakistani Punjabi production, and Zaildaar (1995), an Indian entry directed by Shashi Raj featuring Guggu , depicted Zaildars in more straightforward dramatic narratives involving rural power dynamics, romance, and conflicts with rivals, aligning with mid-20th-century cinema's focus on feudal honor and village justice. Such portrayals typically romanticize the Zaildar's authority without delving into historical critiques of revenue extraction or colonial complicity, prioritizing entertainment over socio-political analysis. Beyond cinema, Zaildar motifs appear sporadically in Punjabi folk theater and songs referencing , but lack the serialized prominence of films.

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  19. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/9340517.pdf
  20. https://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/14v51_No1_14.pdf
  21. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3d79c6256b9bdac53a55801a066b70da3/uploads/2020/10/2020101422.pdf
  22. https://www.legitquest.com/act/the-punjab-land-revenue-rules-1953/7CE8
  23. https://kashmirlife.net/the-fall-of-the-feudals-444/
  24. https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/acts_states/jammu-and-kashmir/1950/1950J&K17.pdf
  25. https://sanipanhwar.com/uploads/books/2024-08-27_13-32-11_0788cab367bf2c0e4a2ee9af7e873705.pdf
  26. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2816034/
  27. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/entertainment/punjabi/movies/news/nikka-zaildar-4-ammy-virk-and-sonam-bajwa-pack-on-the-romance-drama-and-mischief-in-new-trailer-film-set-for-october-2-release/articleshow/123980831.cms
  28. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/entertainment/punjabi/movies/news/nikka-zaildar-4-box-office-collection-day-1-ammy-virk-and-sonam-bajwa-starrer-opens-with-rs-1-crore-on-thursday/articleshow/124285395.cms
  29. https://www.punjabnewsexpress.com/news/news/sikh-woman-shown-smoking-in-%25E2%2580%259Cnikka-zaildar-4%25E2%2580%259D-is-a-conspiracy-against-sikh-culture-and-tradition-prof-sarchand-singh-k-299250
  30. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1256595/
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