Hubbry Logo
Ali AminiAli AminiMain
Open search
Ali Amini
Community hub
Ali Amini
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Ali Amini
Ali Amini
Ali Amini
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Ali Amini (Persian: علی امینی; 12 September 1905–12 December 1992) was an Iranian politician who was the Prime Minister of Iran from 1961 to 1962. He held several cabinet portfolios during the 1950s, and served as a member of parliament between 1947 and 1949.

Key Information

Amini was widely regarded as "a protégé of the United States"[1] and a "pro-American liberal reformer".[2]

Early life and education

[edit]

Amini was born on 12 September 1905 in Tehran.[3] He was a grandson of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar through his mother, Fakhr-ol-Dowleh.[4] His father was a significant statesman during the Qajar era, Mohsen Amin-ol-dowleh.[4]

He completed his studies first in Dar ol-fonoon and then in France where he graduated with a degree in law from Grenoble University,[5] followed by his PhD in economics from Paris. His PhD thesis was concerned with the foreign trade monopoly in Iran.[6]

Upon his return to Iran, he was employed at the Ministry of Justice by Ali-Akbar Davar.[3]

Career

[edit]
See also: Cabinet of Ali Amini

Amini was a founding member of the Democrat Party of Iran, and entered the 15th term of parliament with the party's ticket.[3] His first ministerial portfolio was in the cabinet of Ali Mansur.[3]

He served as a minister in the cabinet of Mohammad Mosaddegh, but broke away from Mosaddegh in July 1952. He was later regarded as a "traitor" by the National Front, because of his collaboration with the post-1953 Iranian coup d'état government.[5] He became minister of economic affairs in the cabinet of Fazlollah Zahedi and remained in office until 1955.[5] He was then appointed as the justice minister under Hossein Ala' in 1955.[3][7] He was named the ambassador to the US in 1956 which he held until 1958.[3][7]

His tendencies were pro-American to the extent that they made the Shah uncomfortable. Mohammad Reza Shah in particular distrusted Amini's popularity and friendship with then-senator John F. Kennedy.[6] Therefore, his tenure ended in 1958.[5]

In the 1950s, Amini was a candidate for the premiership. He was appointed prime minister in 1961. In July 1962, however, he was replaced by the Shah's close friend and a major Birjand landowner Asadollah Alam. In the late 1970s, Amini attempted a comeback into Iranian politics at the age of 70. He served as an advisor to the Shah during the final days of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Personal life

[edit]

Amini married Batoul Voosough (died 1992) in 1932 and they had a son, Iraj.[8] She was the daughter of Hasan Vosugh od-Dowleh whose brother was Ahmad Qavam.[4]

Honours

[edit]

Amini was awarded Grand Croix of the Legion of Honor in 1962.[9]

Later years and death

[edit]

In 1979 and following the Iranian Revolution, Amini moved to Paris, France. There he headed the Front for the Liberation of Iran, a monarchist opposition group.[10] He complained about internal struggles among the exiled Iranian monarchists, saying "We're not even back in Tehran [and] they quarrel over the name of the country's future prime minister."[10] He wrote his biography published by Harvard University.

He died in Paris on 12 December 1992, aged 87.[8] His body was buried in Passy Cemetery.

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Ali Amini

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Ali Amini (12 December 1905 – 12 December 1992) was an Iranian statesman and diplomat who served as the 67th from 6 May 1961 to 19 July 1962. Educated in at universities in and , Amini held various cabinet positions under prime ministers such as , , and before his premiership. As ambassador to the from 1956 to 1958, he negotiated aspects of the post-1953 oil consortium agreement, though later criticized for concessions deemed unfavorable to . Appointed prime minister with support from the amid 's acute , Amini implemented measures, including reductions and enforcement, while initiating legislation in 1961 that redistributed estates from large landlords. Amini's reformist agenda encountered opposition from conservative landowners, religious leaders, and bureaucratic inertia, compounded by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reluctance to slash military expenditures despite pressing for overall budget balancing. Unable to secure parliamentary approval or stabilize finances fully after 14 months, he resigned in July 1962, paving the way for the Shah's more centralized reforms. Renowned for his sharp wit, eloquence, and rapport with ordinary Iranians, Amini critiqued the monarchy's authoritarian drift in subsequent years. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, he lived in exile in , briefly engaging in liberal monarchist opposition efforts until his death.

Early life and education

Upbringing and family

Ali Amini was born in 1905 in to an aristocratic family prominent in Qajar-era politics and nobility. His mother, Fakhr-ol-Dowleh (also known as Ashraf al-Moluk), was a daughter of , who reigned as shah from 1896 until his death in 1907. His father, (Mirza Mohsen Khan Amin-ol-Dowleh), was the son of Mirza Ali Khan Amin-od-Dowleh, a high-ranking Qajar official who held the premiership on several occasions during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The family's connections to the Qajar court afforded Amini a privileged upbringing in the capital, coinciding with the final years of the dynasty and the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), which established Iran's first parliament and limited monarchical powers. Early in life, he attended the Roshdieh School for elementary education, followed by secondary studies at Dar ol-Fonun, a prestigious institution founded in 1851 to modernize Iranian education along European lines. These formative experiences in Tehran's elite circles laid the groundwork for his later entry into , though specific details on siblings or dynamics remain sparsely documented in historical records.

Studies in France and return to Iran

Amini completed his secondary education at Dar ol-Fonun in Tehran before traveling to in 1925 to pursue advanced studies. There, he enrolled at the University of Grenoble to study law and later at the for . He earned a in from the latter institution. His doctoral dissertation examined the foreign trade monopoly in , analyzing its economic implications during the early Pahlavi era. Following the completion of his studies, Amini returned to and entered government service by joining the . Under Minister Ali-Akbar Davar, who was modernizing the , Amini handled various administrative roles that positioned him for future advancement. By 1939, he had progressed to Director-General of within the and .

Pre-premiership political career

Entry into parliament and early ministries

Amini was elected to the (Majlis) as a deputy representing , serving from June 12, 1947, to July 28, 1949. This marked his initial foray into legislative politics during the post-World War II period of Iranian governance under Shah , amid efforts to stabilize the following Allied occupation and internal factionalism. Following his parliamentary tenure, Amini transitioned to executive roles, serving as Minister of Economy in the cabinets of several prime ministers, including , Mohammad Mossadegh, and . In particular, he was appointed Minister of National Economy in Mossadegh's government on December 1951, during a period of debates and economic strain preceding the 1953 coup. These early ministerial positions focused on economic administration, including customs oversight and implementation, reflecting his prior bureaucratic experience in the . His roles underscored a technocratic approach, often aligned with stabilizing Iran's finances amid political volatility, though they predated his more prominent finance and diplomatic appointments.

Diplomatic roles and finance ministry

Amini was appointed Iran's Minister of Finance following the August 1953 coup against , serving in General Fazlollah Zahedi's government from late August 1953 until early 1955. In this capacity, he oversaw fiscal policies during a period of political transition and economic recovery from the oil nationalization crisis, including efforts to restore relations with Western oil interests. Subsequently, Amini held the position of Minister of Justice from April 1955 to January 1956 under Prime Minister Hossein Ala'. He then transitioned to diplomatic service as Iran's ambassador to the , a role he assumed in January 1956 and maintained until May 1958. During his ambassadorship, Amini advocated for increased U.S. economic assistance to , warning in early 1958 that insufficient aid could push Middle Eastern nations toward communist alignment amid regional instability. His tenure fostered perceptions of him as a pro-Western figure well-regarded in Washington circles.

Premiership (1961–1962)

Appointment amid crisis

In the months preceding May 1961, Iran grappled with acute political and economic turmoil. Rigged parliamentary elections in August 1960 and January-February 1961 eroded public trust, fueling unrest among the urban middle class and opposition groups like the National Front. A teachers' strike on May 2 escalated into widespread demonstrations, with a teacher's death on May 3 sparking protests of 15,000 to 30,000 in Tehran. Economically, the cost of living had risen nearly 30% in under three years, compounded by capital flight, inadequate tax revenues, and budget deficits that threatened national solvency. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, alarmed by the deteriorating situation and reportedly contemplating flight from the country, faced urgent counsel from military leaders including Generals and Hasan Alavi-Kia to install a strong reformist figure. On the night of May 4, the offered Ali Amini, a longtime critic of prior governments and advocate for structural changes, the premiership with extraordinary powers to sidestep parliamentary gridlock and address the crisis directly. Amini accepted, and his appointment was formalized by royal decree on May 5, succeeding ; the approved his cabinet on May 9. This move reflected the 's recognition that conventional leadership could not quell the opposition or stabilize finances, though it also highlighted his reluctance to fully relinquish control. Amini's selection was influenced by external pressures, including U.S. encouragement for a reform-oriented to secure ongoing amid Iran's fiscal desperation. As an independent economist and former diplomat with experience in and , Amini was positioned to demand , anti-corruption measures, and international support, marking a shift toward emergency governance in a bid to avert collapse.

Cabinet composition and initial governance

Ali Amini was appointed on May 5, 1961, amid economic crisis and political deadlock, and promptly formed a cabinet emphasizing technocratic expertise and reformist orientation, drawing support from figures in the Plan Organization. His government operated under emergency powers granted by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, bypassing parliamentary approval for initial measures to address fiscal insolvency and . Notable appointments included Hassan Arsanjani as Minister of Agriculture, a radical advocate for land redistribution who quickly announced programs to break up large estates and empower peasants, gaining rural support. In June 1961, cabinet reshuffles brought in Jahangir Amuzegar as Minister of Finance (later expanding to Labor and Commerce), an economist tasked with reorganizing the ministry to enforce and stabilize budgets amid shortages. The cabinet's composition reflected Amini's intent to sideline entrenched elites, incorporating independent critics of prior regimes, though internal frictions emerged as ministers pursued aggressive agendas. Initial governance prioritized economic stabilization, with Amini enacting by dismissing approximately 20,000 civil servants to curb bloated payrolls and reduce deficits. drives targeted officials, including arrests and public exposures, while tax collection reforms aimed to broaden bases previously evaded by elites; on May 27, 1961, Amini restricted luxury imports like foreign cabaret performers to conserve . Press controls were lifted to foster , signaling a shift toward transparency, though these steps provoked resistance from military and bureaucratic interests. By November 1961, Amini secured a royal mandate explicitly for eradicating graft and inefficiencies, underscoring the cabinet's early focus on structural overhaul despite limited parliamentary oversight.

Economic policies and reforms

Austerity measures and budget cuts

Amini's government confronted a dire fiscal crisis upon assuming power in May , inheriting a disorganized system marked by inefficiencies, rampant , and escalating deficits driven by excessive spending and import dependencies. To address this, Amini enacted immediate policies aimed at slashing expenditures and restoring fiscal discipline, including severe curbs on s to preserve foreign exchange reserves and stringent credit restrictions to combat . These measures also encompassed efforts to prosecute corrupt officials and streamline government operations, with the intent of qualifying for additional international loans by demonstrating budgetary restraint. Central to these reforms was the preparation and passage of the 1340 budget (corresponding to the Iranian 1961–1962) on August 16, 1961, which projected ongoing deficits despite proposed cuts in non-essential spending. Amini sought to bridge shortfalls through a combination of deficit financing, partial diversion of revenues from development projects to operational needs, and targeted reductions in administrative overhead, though military allocations—protected by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's insistence—remained largely untouched, exacerbating the imbalance. By mid-1962, these efforts faced mounting challenges, including a persistent $30 million gap during deliberations, which Amini could not close without broader concessions on defense outlays or external . The policies succeeded in moderating and curbing some excesses among elites—such as limiting foreign travel and luxury imports—but provoked resistance from entrenched interests and failed to fully stabilize finances, ultimately contributing to Amini's on July 19, 1962, after U.S. assistance requests yielded insufficient support.

Anti-corruption efforts and agrarian initiatives

Upon assuming the premiership on May 6, 1961, Amini prioritized combating as a core element of his economic stabilization agenda, announcing a comprehensive campaign targeting administrative, fiscal, and judicial malfeasance. This included the detention of several high-ranking commandants implicated in graft and the imposition of austerity measures such as barring nightclubs from importing foreign cabaret performers to conserve . By early 1962, these efforts had reportedly diminished high-level dishonesty within the government, with dozens of officials facing scrutiny or removal, though entrenched interests limited deeper structural changes. In parallel, Amini advanced agrarian reforms to address rural inequality and boost productivity, appointing Arsanjani as Minister of Agriculture shortly after taking office in May 1961, which prompted the announcement of an initial land redistribution program. A government spokesman outlined a timetable for these initiatives in July 1961, emphasizing the transfer of land ownership to peasants to foster self-reliance and counter leftist agitation in rural areas. These measures, supported by the Shah, marked an early phase of what would evolve into broader reforms, including provisions for peasant cooperatives and credit access, though implementation stalled amid Amini's budgetary constraints and opposition from large landowners. The anti-corruption drive facilitated agrarian progress by curbing elite resistance, yet Amini's short tenure prevented full enactment, with subsequent governments building upon his framework.

Conflicts, resignation, and immediate aftermath

Tensions with the Shah and military

Amini's austerity program, aimed at resolving Iran's deficit exceeding 10 billion rials in , included demands for sharp reductions in expenditures, which consumed over 40% of the national . The , prioritizing regime security amid regional threats and domestic unrest, resisted these cuts, viewing the armed forces as indispensable for maintaining his rule and countering leftist influences. Military leaders, benefiting from generous allocations for and salaries, similarly opposed the reforms, perceiving them as an existential threat to their institutional power and perks. These fiscal disputes exacerbated broader conflicts over governance authority. Amini, like Mosaddegh before him, attempted to limit the 's hands-on involvement in daily administration, advocating that the "reign and not rule" to insulate reforms from palace intrigue. However, the frequently bypassed Amini by issuing directives through favored courtiers and undermining cabinet decisions, such as vetoing military downsizing despite U.S. diplomatic pressure for token concessions. This interference alienated Amini, who had conditioned his premiership on greater civilian autonomy, and fueled perceptions of the as an obstacle to effective rule. Tensions peaked with direct confrontations against military hardliners. In July 1961, the government arrested retired General Hossein Azemoudeh, a vocal and former in Mosaddegh's 1953 trial, after he accused Amini of subverting the by suspending , delaying elections, and detaining five other generals on charges. Azemoudeh's defiance underscored the military's resistance to Amini's purge, which targeted officers implicated in and , further eroding support among the brass loyal to the Shah's inner circle.

Resignation and transition to Asadollah Alam

Amini tendered his resignation to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on July 17, 1962, after 14 months in office, primarily due to over the Shah's insistence on maintaining high military expenditures amid Iran's severe . Amini's austerity program had sought deep cuts to the defense budget to address budget deficits exceeding $200 million annually and stabilize the economy, but the Shah prioritized military buildup against perceived threats from and the , viewing such reductions as a threat to and his authority. These tensions were exacerbated by Amini's broader push for structural reforms, including land redistribution and anti-corruption measures, which challenged entrenched elites and the Shah's centralized control, leading to perceptions that Amini's independent streak undermined the monarchy. The Shah accepted the resignation promptly, signaling a shift away from Amini's reformist but confrontational approach toward a more compliant administration. On the same day, July 17, 1962, the Shah appointed Asadollah Alam, a longtime personal friend and court insider, as the new Prime Minister, reflecting a deliberate choice for loyalty over Amini's technocratic independence. Alam, previously a provincial governor and close confidant, formed his cabinet by July 19, 1962, marking a smooth institutional transition but one that reversed some of Amini's fiscal restraints by accommodating the Shah's military priorities while initiating the "White Revolution" reforms under tighter monarchical oversight. This handover stabilized the government temporarily but highlighted the Shah's pattern of intervening to preserve his dominance, as U.S. intelligence assessments noted Alam's role in consolidating royal power rather than pursuing Amini's autonomous agenda.

Later years and opposition

Activities under the Shah post-1962

Following his resignation as prime minister on July 17, 1962, Ali Amini held no further official government positions under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, having fallen out of favor at court due to tensions over fiscal and military spending. He retreated from direct political involvement, maintaining a low public profile amid the Shah's consolidation of power through loyal appointees like . Amini continued to lead a loosely organized comprising moderate nationalists and conservatives, which sought a balanced constitutional system uniting elements of the Mosaddegh-era legacy with restrained —though this group faced infiltration and erosion from the Shah's apparatus, limiting its efficacy. Lacking formal platforms, his influence persisted informally among intellectuals, former officials, and segments of the conservative elite, where he voiced private reservations about the regime's authoritarian drift and overreliance on expenditure at the expense of sustainable reforms. Throughout the 1960s and much of the 1970s, Amini resided primarily in as a private citizen, focusing on personal matters amid the Shah's policies, which built on but diverged from his earlier initiatives in land redistribution and anti-corruption. He avoided overt confrontation, yet his prestige as a pre-1962 reformer positioned him as a potential to radical opposition, though the regime's suppression of dissent curtailed organized activity. As revolutionary pressures intensified in late 1978, Amini reentered the political spotlight. On November 1, 1978, the met with him for the first time in over a decade, exploring his suitability for a stabilizing premiership amid cabinet failures under . Amini advocated forming a broad to restore order and constitutional norms, but these efforts faltered amid escalating protests and the 's reluctance to cede control, paving the way for his eventual flight from in early 1979.

Exile after 1979 and stance against the Islamic Republic

Following the in February 1979, Ali Amini fled to , , where he established himself as a vocal opponent of the new regime. From exile, he criticized the theocratic government led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, positioning himself as a key figure in monarchist resistance efforts against what he viewed as an authoritarian and religiously imposed rule that supplanted Iran's . By 1982, Amini had become the coordinator of the Front for the Liberation of Iran (FLI), a centrist-leaning monarchist dedicated to the ouster of Khomeini and the dismantling of the Islamic Republic's governance structure. The FLI, headquartered in and funded primarily through donations from affluent Iranian exiles, advocated for without specifying an immediate restoration of the but emphasized opposition to the clerical dominance and revolutionary excesses that Amini argued undermined 's secular and modernizing traditions. In public statements, such as a 1984 interview, Amini forecasted the regime's inevitable collapse, declaring that "one way or another, Khomeini will die," reflecting his belief in the unsustainable nature of the Islamic government's ideological and repressive policies. Amini's leadership of the FLI represented a liberal strand within the broader exiled monarchist opposition, focusing on diplomatic and rhetorical challenges rather than armed , though the group faced fragmentation, including a 1986 schism when former royalist official Manuchehr Ganji defected to form a rival faction. His activities waned amid deteriorating health, limiting the FLI's impact, but he persisted in denouncing the Islamic Republic's suppression of political freedoms and economic mismanagement until his death in on December 12, 1992, at age 83.

Legacy and assessments

Contributions to modernization and stability

During his tenure as from May 1961 to July 1962, Ali Amini implemented austerity measures to address Iran's acute economic instability, including rampant exceeding 10% annually, budget deficits, and import dependency. He introduced a stabilization program that restricted credit, reduced imports by approximately 20%, and curtailed , particularly in and civil budgets, which helped lower rates and restore fiscal balance. These steps, supported by U.S. financial aid conditional on reforms, averted immediate collapse amid political unrest following the 1960 elections' nullification. Amini advanced agricultural modernization through initial land reforms, distributing over 1 million hectares of and state lands to smallholders and tenants, which disrupted feudal structures and encouraged private farming incentives. This laid groundwork for broader agrarian changes, boosting in key regions and reducing rural discontent that fueled urban migration and instability. By targeting absentee landlords and promoting , these policies aimed to integrate rural economies into national development, though implementation faced resistance from entrenched elites. In combating , Amini purged inefficient bureaucrats, streamlined administrative processes, and enforced accountability in public spending, which enhanced governmental efficiency and during a period of parliamentary deadlock. His advocacy for the to "reign but not rule" sought constitutional stability by curbing monarchical overreach, positioning his moderate reformist approach as a bulwark against radicalism or . These efforts collectively fostered short-term political and economic steadiness, enabling to navigate the post-Mossadegh era toward developmental progress despite underlying tensions.

Criticisms regarding Western influence and authoritarian tactics

Amini's government, appointed on May 6, 1961, faced accusations from Iranian nationalists and the National Front of prioritizing Western interests, particularly those of the , over national sovereignty. Critics, including leaders of the National Front, portrayed Amini as an instrument of American influence, citing his prior role as Iran's to the U.S. from to 1958 and his reliance on U.S. financial aid to stabilize the economy amid fiscal crisis. His implementation of measures and budget reforms, which aligned with recommendations from U.S. advisors seeking to curb and redirect oil revenues, was derided by opponents as capitulation to foreign pressures following the coup and oil negotiations. These views were amplified by leftist groups, who labeled Amini an "agent of American imperialism" for advancing reforms perceived as extensions of Western economic leverage rather than indigenous policy. Regarding authoritarian tactics, Amini's administration operated under a royal mandate that suspended parliamentary functions, dismissing the on June 2, 1961, and ruling by decree for much of his 13-month tenure, actions deemed unconstitutional by constitutionalists within the National Front. He established a special tribunal and secured extraordinary powers to appoint ministers without legislative approval, enabling rapid enactment of fiscal cuts but bypassing democratic oversight. Opposition intensified when Amini delayed elections—originally slated for late 1961—and resorted to , including five army generals in July 1961 for alleged plotting and National Front figures for dissent, moves defended as necessary for stability but criticized as repressive consolidation of power. General Hossein Azemoudeh publicly condemned these steps as "illegal action and disorder" before his own in November 1961, highlighting tensions with military and political rivals. While Amini initially eased press restrictions to build support, such measures ultimately alienated moderate reformers, contributing to his resignation on July 17, 1962. These tactics, though short-lived, drew from a pattern of executive overreach under the , prioritizing administrative efficiency over pluralistic governance amid economic urgency.

Personal life

Family and relationships

Ali Amini was born on 12 September 1905 in to an aristocratic family; his father was , a son of the Qajar-era statesman Mirza Ali Khan Amin od-Dowleh, and his mother was Princess Fakhr ed-Dowleh, a of Mozaffar ed-Din Qajar. He had at least four siblings, including Mohammad Amini, Ahmad Amini, and Reza Amini. In 1932, Amini married Batoul Voosough, daughter of the statesman Hasan Vosugh od-Dowleh (whose brother was ); the couple had one son, . Batoul Voosough died in 1992, the same year as her husband. No other marriages or significant personal relationships are documented in available records.

Honours, death, and burial

Amini received the from in 1962, recognizing his diplomatic and political contributions. He died on 12 December 1992 in Paris, France, at the age of 87. Amini was buried in Passy Cemetery in Paris.

References

  1. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-ali-amini-1564084.html
  2. https://fis-iran.org/oral-history/amini-ali/
  3. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d50
  4. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d4
  5. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d35
  6. http://www.qajarpages.org/mozaffareddinchildren.html
  7. https://iranwire.com/en/special-features/67266/
  8. https://www.iichs.ir/en/news/1681/ali-amini
  9. http://www.qajarpages.org/amini.html
  10. https://www.the-independent.com/news/people/obituary-ali-amini-1564084.html
  11. http://www.iichs.org/index_en.asp?id=1687&doc_cat=16
  12. https://search.proquest.com/openview/ae514597047ce84fbb6a7759a79469b7/1
  13. https://fis-iran.org/wp-content/uploads/Oral%20History%20-%20Transcripts/Ali-Amini-English.pdf
  14. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/persons
  15. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-12-17-mn-2943-story.html
  16. https://www.nytimes.com/1958/01/06/archives/iranian-criticizes-u-s-program.html
  17. https://eaworldview.com/2014/02/iran-ali-amini-hassan-rouhani-historical-analogies/
  18. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/INTELLIGENCE%20SUPPORT%20FOR%20%5B15890143%5D.pdf
  19. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d46
  20. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/petroleum-and-progress-in-iran/controlled-revolution/303885BD24BF5FC450A22E01D3892C39
  21. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40394539
  22. https://www.nytimes.com/1961/05/30/archives/irans-peasants-eager-for-farms-landreform-promises-win-popularity.html
  23. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1961/09/iran/657519/
  24. https://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/11170_CFIranIntForAffs19601963.pdf
  25. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79t00975a005700120001-5
  26. https://www.nytimes.com/1961/05/27/archives/corruption-in-the-open-exposures-bring-use-of-greeting-where-did.html
  27. https://www.nytimes.com/1961/11/09/archives/premier-of-iran-warns-wealthy-to-change-ways-dr-amini-asks.html
  28. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d105
  29. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d102
  30. https://time.com/archive/6623631/iran-the-reformers-lot/
  31. https://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/news/central-intelligence-agency/iran-s-financial-crisis-1961/
  32. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000028300.pdf
  33. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d168
  34. https://www.nytimes.com/1963/02/02/archives/iran-distributes-2-million-acres-land-reform-now-reality-arsanjani.html
  35. https://www.nytimes.com/1961/07/29/archives/iran-gets-action-in-land-reform-anticorruption-drive-aids.html
  36. https://www.nytimes.com/1961/08/06/archives/peasants-are-key-to-future-of-iran-premier-acts-to-win-them-to-land.html
  37. https://countrystudies.us/iran/18.htm
  38. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d94
  39. https://journals.rudn.ru/international-relations/article/view/34195
  40. https://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/news/hossein-azemoudeh-arrested-1961/
  41. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/02/17/Former-Iranian-Prime-Minister-Ali-Amini-said-today-Iranians/9474382770000/
  42. https://irdc.ir/en/news/242/assadullah-alam-was-aware-of-the-weak-foundations-of-the-shahs-government
  43. https://fis-iran.org/wp-content/uploads/Oral%2520History%2520-%2520Transcripts/Ali-Amini-English.pdf
  44. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d27
  45. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000764597.pdf
  46. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1978/12/18/letter-from-iran
  47. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/12/magazine/paris-the-iranian-exiles.html
  48. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00587R000100220005-4.pdf
  49. https://countrystudies.us/iran/96.htm
  50. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/INTELLIGENCE%2520SUPPORT%2520FOR%2520%255B15890143%255D.pdf
  51. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/129842/1/Roush_Research_Report.pdf
  52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45310718
  53. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284172
  54. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/04/homa-katouzian-on-khalil-maleki-part-2-debunking-conspiracy-theory.html
  55. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA574059.pdf
  56. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1962-01-01/iran-continuing-crisis
  57. https://iran-times.com/satrapi-awarded-french-legion-of-honor/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.