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Amerikabomber
Amerikabomber
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The Amerikabomber (lit.'America bomber') project was an initiative of the German Ministry of Aviation (German: Reichsluftfahrtministerium) to obtain a long-range strategic bomber for the Luftwaffe that would be capable of striking the United States (specifically New York City) from Germany, a round-trip distance of about 11,600 km (7,200 mi).

Key Information

A Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor of the Luft Hansa made a direct flight from Berlin to New York in August 1938. The Amerikabomber concept was raised in the same year, but advanced plans for such a long-range strategic bomber design were not presented to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring until early 1942. Various proposals were put forward, but these plans were all eventually abandoned as they were too expensive, too reliant on rapidly diminishing matériel and production capacity, and technically infeasible.

Background

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According to Albert Speer's book, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, Adolf Hitler was fascinated with the idea of New York City in flames.[1] In 1937, Willy Messerschmitt hoped to win a lucrative contract by showing Hitler a prototype of the Messerschmitt Me 264 that was being designed to reach North America from Europe.[2][3] On 8 July 1938, barely two years after the death of Germany's main strategic bombing advocate, Generalleutnant Walter Wever, and eight months after the Reich Air Ministry awarded the contract for the design of the Heinkel He 177, Germany's only operational heavy bomber during the war years, the Luftwaffe's commander-in-chief Hermann Göring gave a speech saying, "I completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip flights to New York with a 4.5-tonne bomb load. I would be extremely happy to possess such a bomber, which would at last stuff the mouth of arrogance across the sea."[4] Canadian historian Holger H. Herwig claims the plan started as a result of discussions by Hitler in November 1940 and May 1941 when he stated his need to "deploy long-range bombers against American cities from the Azores." Due to their location, he thought the Portuguese Azores islands were Germany's "only possibility of carrying out aerial attacks from a land base against the United States."[4] At the time, Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar had allowed German U-boats and navy ships to refuel there, but from 1943 onwards, he leased bases in the Azores to the British, allowing the Allies to provide aerial coverage in the middle of the Atlantic.[citation needed]

Requests for designs, at various stages during the war, were made to the major German aircraft manufacturers (Messerschmitt, Junkers, Focke-Wulf and the Horten Brothers) early in World War II, coinciding with the passage of the Destroyers for Bases Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom in September 1940. Heinkel's bid for the project had occurred sometime shortly after February 1943, by which time the RLM had issued the Heinkel firm the airframe type number 8-277[5] for what essentially became its entry.[6]

Plan

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The Amerikabomber project plan was completed on April 27, 1942, and submitted to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring on May 12, 1942. The 33-page plan was discovered in Potsdam by Olaf Groehler [de], a German historian. Ten copies of the plan were made, with six going to different Luftwaffe offices and four held in reserve. The plan specifically mentions using the Azores as a transit airfield to reach the United States. If used, the Heinkel He 277,[7] Junkers Ju 390, and the Messerschmitt Me 264 could reach American targets with a 3, 5 and 6.5 tonnes (6,600, 11,000 and 14,300 lb) payload respectively.[4] Although it is apparent that the plan itself deals only with an attack on American soil, it is possible the Nazis saw other interrelated strategic purposes for the Amerikabomber project. According to military historian James P. Duffy, Hitler "saw in the Azores the ... possibility for carrying out aerial attacks from a land base against the United States ... [which in turn would] force it to build up a large antiaircraft defense."[4] The anticipated result would have been to force the United States to use more of its antiaircraft capabilities—guns and fighter planes—for its own defense rather than for that of Great Britain, thereby allowing the Luftwaffe to attack the latter country with less resistance.[citation needed]

Partly as a liaison with the Wehrmacht Heer, in May 1942 Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch requested the opinion of Generalmajor Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz on the new proposal,[8] with regard to the aircraft available to fill the needs of an Amerikabomber, which had then included the Me 264, Fw 300 and the Ju 290. von Gablenz gave his opinion on the Me 264, as it was in the second half of 1942, before von Gablenz's own commitments in the Battle of Stalingrad occurred: the Me 264 could not be usefully equipped for a true trans-Atlantic bomber mission from Europe, but it would be useful for a number of very long-range maritime patrol duties in co-operation with the Kriegsmarine's U-boats off the US East Coast.[9]

Design

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Conventional bombers

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The most promising proposals were based on conventional principles of aircraft design, and would have yielded aircraft very similar in configuration and capability to the Allied heavy bombers of the day. These would have needed ultra-long range capability similar to the Messerschmitt Me 261 maritime reconnaissance design, the longest-ranged intended design actually flown during the Third Reich's existence. Many of the developed designs, themselves first submitted during 1943 suggested tricycle landing gear for their undercarriage, a relatively new feature for large German military aircraft designs of that era. These included the following concepts:

Three prototypes of the Me 264 were built, but it was the Ju 390 that was selected for production. A verified pair of the Ju 390 design were constructed before the program was abandoned. After World War II, several authors[10] claimed that the second Ju 390 actually made a transatlantic flight, coming within 20 km (12 mi) of the northeast US coast in early 1944, but this claim has since been discredited as Ju 390 V2 never flew. As both the Me 264 and He 277 were each intended to be four-engined bombers from their origins, the troubling situation of being unable to develop combat-reliable piston aviation engines of 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) and above output levels led to both designs being considered for six-engined upgrades, with Messerschmitt's paper project for a 47.5-metre (156 ft) wingspan "Me 264B" airframe upgrade to use six BMW 801E radials,[11] and the Heinkel firm's July 23, 1943-dated request from the RLM to propose a 45-metre (148 ft) wingspan, six-engined variant of the still-unfinalized He 277 airframe design that could alternatively accommodate four of the troublesome, over 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) output apiece Junkers Jumo 222 24-cylinder six-bank liquid-cooled engines, or two additional BMW 801E radials beyond the four it was originally meant to use.[12] July 23, 1943, was the same day that the USAAF submitted a "letter of intent" to Convair, that ordered the first 100 production Convair B-36 bombers to be built—itself a design first asked for by the earlier USAAC on April 11, 1941—an enormous six-engined, 70-metre (230 ft) wingspan design far superior to either the Heinkel He 277 or Focke-Wulf Ta 400 designs.[13]

Huckepack Projekt (Piggyback Project)

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One idea similar to Mistel-Gespann was to have a Heinkel He 177 bomber carry a Dornier Do 217, powered with an additional Lorin-Staustrahltriebwerk (Lorin-ramjet), as far as possible over the Atlantic before releasing it. For the Do 217 it would have been a one-way trip. The aircraft would be ditched off the east coast, and its crew would be picked up by a waiting U-boat. When plans had advanced far enough, the lack of fuel and the loss of the base at Bordeaux prevented a test. The project was abandoned after the forced move to Istres increased the distance too much.[citation needed]

The Huckepack Projekt was brought up again at multiple joint conferences between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. After a few weeks the plan was abandoned on August 21, 1942. Air Staff General Kreipe wrote in his diary that the German navy could not supply a U-boat off the United States to pick up the aircrew. The plan saw no further development, since the Kriegsmarine would not cooperate with the Luftwaffe.[4]

Other designs

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Other designs were rockets with wings. Perhaps the best-known of these today is Eugen Sänger's pre-war Silbervogel ("Silverbird") sub-orbital bomber.

Potential targets

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Included in the plan was a list of 21 targets of military importance in North America. Many of these would not have been viable targets for conventional bombers of World War II, operating from bases in Europe. Of these targets, primarily but not exclusively located in the eastern United States, 19 were located in the United States; one in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada (a possibly achievable target for a similar Japanese project) and one in Greenland. Nearly all were companies that manufactured parts for aircraft, so the goal was likely to cripple US aircraft production.[4]

Feasibility and consequences

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Were New York City to be bombed, the required combat radius was 11,680 kilometres (7,260 mi), as the bomber would have needed to make a return trip without refueling. The only German aircraft already built and flown that had a range close to this was the Messerschmitt Me 261 Adolfine, with a maximum range of 11,025 kilometres (6,850 mi).

Had sufficient time and resources been devoted to the project at a point in time early enough, an Amerikabomber may have become operational before the war's end. However, as historian James P. Duffy pointed out, Nazi Germany had no central authority for the development and construction of advanced weaponry, including new aircraft concepts and designs, as well as critical problems in developing high-powered aviation engines – that is, with output of over 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) each, which could operate reliably in combat conditions – that would have been required. Hitler was often swayed to waste time, money and resources on new "miracle weapons" and other projects that were unlikely to be successful. The Amerikabomber project was not one of the projects so favored. In addition, Allied bombing became so intense during the middle of the war that it disrupted critical German supply chains, particularly fuel; in addition, ever-greater proportions of resources were reserved for home defense purposes.[4] German scientists were forced more and more to compete for ever scarcer resources. Together, all of the above political and strategic constraints made construction of such an aircraft increasingly less likely.

It was unlikely that any damage caused to targets in North America, by the relatively small conventional bomb loads that could be delivered by such an ultra-long-range bomber, would be significant enough to justify the loss of such a bomber. Nazi Germany's nuclear programme was years behind the Allies, and did not include weapons in the form of aerial bombs, so it was unlikely that the Amerikabomber could have made a major difference to the outcome of the war.

Ultimately, all of the aircraft designs under consideration were deemed too expensive or ambitious and were abandoned. Post-war, however, they continued to be of interest to aerospace engineers:

  • the British Air Ministry considered development of the Horten H.XVIII as an airliner, and;
  • the theoretical groundwork done on the Sänger Silbervogel would prove seminal to lifting body designs in the space age – one of the designs for the Amerikabomber would use a concept similar to a space shuttle.[14]

See also

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  • A9/A10Aggregat series multistage rocket design intended to reach North America
  • Hughes H-4 Hercules — American prototype flying boat intended for transatlantic transport, conceived in the context of World War II-era strategic doctrine
  • Lookout Air Raids, the only direct Axis air attack on the continental United States
  • Northrop YB-35 and Convair B-36 — American long-range World War II-era-conceived, piston-engined heavy bomber designs meant to reach Germany directly from North America.
  • Project Z, Japanese proposals that paralleled the Amerikabomber
    • Nakajima Fugaku design, a Japanese bomber capable of attacking continental North America, of this project
  • Nazi plans for North America

References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Amerikabomber was a program initiated in 1942 to develop a long-range capable of striking the East Coast, such as , from European bases, with a required non-stop range exceeding 7,000 kilometers (4350 miles) and payload capacity for significant bomb loads. Ordered by , the project sought to counter Allied bombing campaigns by enabling retaliatory strikes on American industrial and population centers, though it reflected Germany's strategic shift toward offensive capabilities amid defensive pressures in . Several designs competed, including the , which featured six radial engines, a pressurized cabin, and defensive armament, with three prototypes constructed and demonstrating feasibility for transatlantic flights from western . The Junkers Ju 390 emerged as the favored contender due to its derivation from the existing Ju 290 transport, allowing reuse of production components for two stretched prototypes with a projected range of up to 9,700 kilometers, though neither entered mass production. Other proposals, such as the Focke-Wulf Ta 400 and Heinkel He 277, were considered but sidelined as resources prioritized fighter aircraft and immediate war needs, ultimately dooming the program to cancellation without operational deployment. The initiative highlighted Germany's technological ambitions but underscored causal limitations in wartime resource allocation and industrial capacity under Allied bombing and material shortages.

Origins and Strategic Imperative

Pre-War Conceptual Foundations

The pre-war conceptual foundations of long-range in Nazi Germany's originated with General Walther Wever, the service's first appointed in 1935. Wever, recognizing the limitations of alone, advocated for a doctrine integrating strategic bombing to target enemy industrial and logistical nodes, as articulated in his 1935 manual The Conduct of the Air War (Die Luftkriegführung). This text rejected indiscriminate area bombing in favor of systematic attacks on military-economic infrastructure to erode an opponent's war-making capacity, while maintaining air superiority and ground support roles. Wever's vision drew from observations of and interwar theorists but emphasized practical feasibility, including the development of heavy bombers for deep strikes beyond frontline tactical ranges. To realize this strategic component, Wever launched the Uralbomber competition in November 1935, tasking and Dornier with designing a four-engine capable of operating from German to strike Soviet industrial facilities in the —a distance requiring a combat radius exceeding 3,000 km (1,863 mi) and a total range of around 10,000 km (6,214 mi) with a 1,500–3,000 kg (3,307–6,614 lb) bomb load. The specifications demanded cruising speeds of 300–400 km/h (186–249 mph) at altitudes up to 7,000 m (22,966 ft), powered by emerging high-output engines like the diesel or radials, to enable unescorted missions against fortified rear areas. Prototypes, including the (first flight December 1937) and (first flight October 1936), emerged but underperformed due to engine unreliability, excessive weight, and insufficient power, achieving only 2,000–3,000 km (1,242–1,863 mi) ranges in testing. Wever's death in a June 3, 1936, aircraft accident—caused by a propeller detaching from a He 70 he was piloting—prompted a doctrinal pivot under successor , who prioritized fast medium bombers () and Stuka dive bombers for the expected quick campaigns in . The Uralbomber effort was terminated on April 29, 1937, with prototypes repurposed for transport or scrapped, reflecting resource constraints and a focus on short-war tactics over long-term strategic buildup. These foundational experiments nonetheless validated the engineering challenges of ultra-long-range aviation, including , structural integrity, and , providing a conceptual and technical precursor to wartime revivals—though pre-war planning remained Europe-centric, with no documented emphasis on transatlantic operations against the prior to 1939.

Wartime Initiation and Directives (1942)

The Amerikabomber project emerged as a formal initiative of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) in early , driven by the Luftwaffe's need for a strategic capable of intercontinental strikes against the , which had entered the war in December 1941. Responding to operational shortcomings in existing German bombers, the RLM issued guidelines in January emphasizing four-engine designs with extended range, increased payload, and defensive armament to enable round-trip missions from European bases. A comprehensive 33-page project plan, outlining technical requirements and strategic rationales, was finalized on April 27, 1942, and presented to , head of the , on May 12, 1942. The directives specified a minimum non-stop round-trip range of 11,600 kilometers (approximately 7,200 miles) to reach targets like , with a bomb load of at least 4,000 kilograms (8,800 pounds) and provisions for forward basing in locations such as the to extend operational flexibility. Göring's approval initiated a design competition among major aircraft firms, prioritizing feasibility within resource constraints amid escalating demands on German industry. This plan, later recovered from Potsdam archives by historian Olaf Groehler, reflected broader ambitions for psychological and material impact on U.S. industrial capacity, though implementation faced delays due to competing priorities like the Eastern Front. Ten copies were distributed, with six allocated to Luftwaffe commands, underscoring the project's high-level endorsement despite skepticism from some technical evaluators regarding engine reliability and .

Design Competition Framework

Technical Specifications and Range Demands

The Amerikabomber competition, initiated by the Reich Air Ministry in , required a capable of transatlantic operations from European or bases to targets on the U.S. East Coast, such as , approximately 5,500 km (3,418 miles) distant. Primary range demands centered on a minimum of 11,000 km (6,835 miles) for round-trip capability with reserves, though ambitious proposals targeted 15,000 km (9,321 miles) to support full payloads and potential one-way missions. Bomb load specifications mandated at least 4,000 kg (8,818 lb) of ordnance for effective strategic strikes, with some requirements extending to 5,000-10,000 kg (11,023-22,046 lb) depending on mission profiles. Cruising speeds were specified at 500 km/h (311 mph) or higher at operational altitudes to minimize exposure to defenses, complemented by service ceilings exceeding 8,000 m (26,247 ft). Defensive armament typically included multiple 13 mm machine guns and 20 mm cannons in powered turrets for crew protection over vast ocean expanses. Powerplant demands favored four or more high-performance engines, such as radials or DB 603 inlines, each delivering 1,700-2,000 hp, to balance range, payload, and speed amid constraints. By , amid escalating resource shortages, the Ministry revised demands to a 11,000 km (6,835 miles) range with a 4,000 kg (8,818 lb) load, prioritizing feasibility over initial extremes.
Key SpecificationRequirement
Range11,000-15,000 km (6,835-9,321 miles)
Bomb Load4,000-10,000 kg (8,818-22,046 lb)
Cruising Speed≥500 km/h (≥311 mph)
Service Ceiling≥8,000 m (≥26,247 ft)
Engines4+ high-output piston (1,700+ hp each)

Evaluation Process and Criteria

The evaluation for Amerikabomber designs was managed by the Reich Air Ministry's (RLM) Technisches Amt, the Luftwaffe's technical office responsible for assessing proposals. Following Hermann Göring's directive in mid-1942, major manufacturers including , , , and were solicited to submit conceptual designs meeting the strategic requirements for transatlantic operations. Proposals were reviewed through a multi-stage assessment involving theoretical performance calculations, aerodynamic modeling (where data was available), and reviews of material and engine availability; no formal wind-tunnel testing was mandated at the initial phase due to resource constraints, relying instead on engineering estimates and prior project data from related airframes like the Ju 290. Selected designs advanced to prototype construction without a single outright winner, reflecting the Luftwaffe's pragmatic approach amid wartime pressures, with emphasis on parallel development to hedge against delays. Primary criteria centered on operational viability for round-trip missions from European bases to targets on the U.S. East Coast, such as , approximately 6,500 km distant. Range was paramount, requiring at least 11,600 km total (enabling a one-way strike with reserves) or ideally 15,000 km while carrying a 4,000 kg load, to account for headwinds, errors, and return fuel. Cruising speed above 400 km/h at operational altitudes exceeding 8,000 m was demanded to evade interceptors and improve efficiency, alongside a service ceiling of 10,000-12,000 m. Payload capacity was evaluated in trade-offs, with minimums of 2,000-4,000 kg for , supplemented by defensive armament including multiple machine-gun or cannon turrets for self-protection against fighters. Production feasibility weighed heavily, favoring designs leveraging existing components (e.g., or Jumo 211 engines) to minimize development time and enable series production by 1944-1945, though systemic shortages in high-output engines often undermined projections. Secondary considerations included versatility for secondary roles like maritime or support, with auxiliary fuel tanks or drop tanks permissible to extend range. The Technisches Amt scrutinized structural integrity for long-endurance flights, crew ergonomics for missions lasting 20-30 hours, and overall weight efficiency to avoid exceeding takeoff limits of 50-70 tons on available runways. While optimistic manufacturer claims (e.g., Messerschmitt's projected 15,000 km for the Me 264) influenced selections, historical assessments note that evaluations underemphasized real-world fuel consumption variances and engine reliability issues, as evidenced by later prototype trials revealing shortfalls in achieved ranges. No designs fully met all criteria in practice, highlighting the challenges of first-principles engineering under resource scarcity.

Primary Bomber Designs

Messerschmitt Me 264 Development

The 's development stemmed from the company's pre-war exploration of long-range aircraft concepts, influenced by designs like the Me 261 which demonstrated extended endurance capabilities. In March 1941, the Reich Air Ministry (RLM) solicited proposals for heavy long-range bombers, prompting Messerschmitt to advance their existing Projekt 1061 initiative. An order for six prototypes was issued in early 1941, subsequently reduced to three by February 1942 due to shifting production priorities. Positioned as Messerschmitt's contender in the Amerikabomber competition initiated in spring 1942, the Me 264 aimed to fulfill requirements for a with sufficient range to strike U.S. East Coast targets from European bases. The first prototype, designated Me 264 V1 (Werk Nummer 26400001, Stammkennzeichen RE+EN), underwent assembly at Messerschmitt's facility. It achieved its initial flight on December 23, 1942, from , powered by four Junkers Jumo 211J liquid-cooled inline engines each delivering 1,340 horsepower (1,000 kW); the test lasted about 22 minutes and confirmed basic airworthiness despite minor stability concerns. Efforts to enhance performance included re-engining the V1 with four 801G radial engines rated at 1,750 horsepower (1,300 kW) each by late , addressing power deficiencies observed in early trials. The second prototype, Me 264 V2, progressed to partial construction without initial defensive armament or armor but was never flown. The third, Me 264 V3, planned to integrate four remote-controlled gun turrets and protective plating, yet remained unfinished amid material shortages and factory disruptions. Limited testing of the V1 exposed challenges in achieving the mandated 15,000 km (9,320-mile) unrefueled range while carrying a 3,000 kg (6,600-pound) bomb load, compounded by aerodynamic inefficiencies and engine unreliability. The program's viability eroded as Allied air campaigns intensified; the V1 was destroyed on July 18, 1944, during a U.S. Army Air Forces raid on Lechfeld airfield. mandated cessation of work on October 18, 1944, redirecting resources to fighter aircraft under the (Jägernotprogramm), given the Me 264's protracted delays, inadequate empirical range data, and competition from adapted designs like the Ju 390. Only the V1 logged flight hours, totaling under 20, underscoring causal factors such as dispersed priorities and resource scarcity over inherent design flaws.

Junkers Ju 390 Adaptations

The emerged as a long-range adaptation of the , achieved by stretching the forward of the wings and inserting an additional wing section per side to support two extra engines, yielding a six-engine layout with 801D radials each producing 1,268 kW (1,700 hp). This configuration increased the wingspan to 50.3 meters (165 feet) and overall length to 34 meters (112 feet), enhancing fuel capacity and structural capacity for extended missions while maintaining the Ju 290's basic aerodynamic profile. In alignment with Amerikabomber requirements for transatlantic bombing capability, the Ju 390 incorporated modifications for offensive and defensive roles, including provisions for a significant bomb load—estimated at up to 10,000 kg (22,000 lb) in some configurations—and defensive armament comprising five 20 mm cannons and three 13 mm machine guns positioned in dorsal turrets, tail, ventral gondola, and waist mounts. The design prioritized range over speed, targeting 9,700 km (6,000 mi) ferry distance to enable round-trip strikes from European bases to U.S. targets like , supported by internal fuel tanks optimized for endurance. Two prototypes were constructed at facility: the Ju 390 V1 (works number GH+UK), which conducted its on 20 primarily as a transport to validate airworthiness and basic performance; and the Ju 390 V2, flown shortly thereafter in a / guise with refined fuel systems and longer wings for improved efficiency. through 1944 confirmed a maximum speed of 505 km/h (314 mph) at altitude, a service ceiling of 6,100 meters (20,000 feet), and operational range aligning with strategic demands, though vulnerability to fighters and production complexities limited viability. The program received an initial order for 26 Ju 390 A-1 bombers in early 1944 following promising trials, but it was terminated in June 1944 amid Allied advances, resource shortages, and prioritization of fighters over heavy bombers. No operational units were formed, and claims of a V1 transatlantic reconnaissance flight approaching within 20 km (12 mi) of New York in 1943-1944 lack corroboration from primary records. The adaptations underscored German efforts to repurpose airframes for intercontinental strike roles, though empirical constraints on payload-range tradeoffs and defensive weaknesses undermined the concept's practicality.

Focke-Wulf Ta 400 and Heinkel He 277

The represented Focke-Wulf's entry into the Amerikabomber competition, envisioned as a six-engined capable of intercontinental raids. Conceived under Tank's direction in 1943–1944, the design adopted a conventional configuration with a pressurized cabin for a crew of nine, including pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and gunners. It was powered by six 801D air-cooled radial engines mounted in underwing nacelles—each delivering 1,700 horsepower—to provide the thrust needed for a of approximately 60,000 kg (132,000 lb) and an estimated range exceeding 12,000 km (7,456 mi) with a 10,000 kg (22,050 lb) bomb load. Defensive armament included multiple 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in remote-controlled turrets, with provisions for up to 25,000 kg (55,116 lb) of ordnance in internal bays. models confirmed aerodynamic viability, including a of 45.8 m (150 ft) and a projected maximum speed of around 535 km/h (332 mph) at 6,000 m (19,685 ft) altitude, but the project halted at the mockup stage due to resource constraints and prioritization of fighter production. In parallel, proposed the He 277 as a refined evolution of the He 177A, specifically tailored for the Amerikabomber requirements by decoupling its powerplants into four independent Daimler-Benz DB 603A inverted-V12 liquid-cooled engines, each rated at 1,750 horsepower, to eliminate the chronic reliability issues of the predecessor's twin-coupled Jumo 009 setup. The redesign featured a lengthened for enhanced fuel capacity—aiming for a 9,000–10,000 km (5,592–6,214 mi) ferry range—and improved defensive arrays with remote-controlled MG 151/20 and MG 131 turrets covering dorsal, ventral, and tail positions. Gross weight was projected at 35,000–40,000 kg (77,162–88,185 lb), with a crew of seven to ten and bomb loads up to 6,000 kg (13,228 lb) over long distances. Converted from existing He 177 airframes, two to three prototypes underwent initial flight tests in late 1943 at Vienna-Schwechat, demonstrating better stability and climb rates than the He 177, though engine overheating and bombing campaign pressures persisted. Neither the Ta 400 nor He 277 advanced to full-scale production or operational evaluation in the competition, overshadowed by the Messerschmitt Me 264's earlier flight tests and the 's shift toward defensive fighters amid Allied advances by mid-1944. The Ta 400's multi-engine complexity and the He 277's inheritance of Heinkel's production delays—compounded by material shortages—rendered both impractical for rapid deployment, despite their theoretical compliance with the Reich Air Ministry's demands for 15,000 km (9,321 mi) range and 4,000 kg (8,818 lb) payloads on transatlantic missions. Historical assessments note that while data for the Ta 400 indicated competitive , the absence of flying prototypes limited empirical validation, and Heinkel's prototypes revealed persistent powerplant vulnerabilities unsuitable for unescorted deep-strike roles.

Auxiliary and Experimental Concepts

Huckepack Projekt Mechanics

The Huckepack Projekt, also known as the Piggyback Project, proposed a configuration to achieve transatlantic bombing range by utilizing a Heinkel He 177 as a carrier for a . The He 177 would transport the Do 217 mounted externally in a piggyback arrangement, similar to the Luftwaffe's system but adapted for long-range strategic strikes rather than tactical anti-shipping roles. This setup aimed to extend the effective operational radius beyond the individual aircraft's fuel limitations, with the carrier aircraft ferrying the payload-equipped bomber to a mid-Atlantic release point. Mechanically, the Do 217 variant—likely a Do 217E-5—would be modified with supplementary propulsion in the form of a engine to enable the final leg of the mission after separation. Upon release, the Do 217 would ignite the ramjet for high-speed, fuel-efficient flight toward targets on the U.S. East Coast, such as New York or , carrying a bomb load sufficient for strategic impact. The He 177, powered by its coupled Daimler-Benz DB 610 engines producing approximately 2,950 horsepower each, would return to a European base after jettisoning the , relying on its baseline range of about 3,000-5,000 kilometers depending on . The Do 217's mission profile, however, was inherently one-way, as the ramjet's efficiency precluded round-trip capability, necessitating pilot sacrifice or uncrewed operation, though no such adaptations were pursued beyond conceptual stages. The project emerged in discussions around 1942-1943 as part of broader Amerikabomber efforts, revived in joint Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine conferences to integrate naval refueling or support for feasibility. challenges included structural reinforcement of the He 177's fuselage and wings to bear the Do 217's approximate 10-12 ton gross weight during takeoff and cruise, precise release mechanisms to ensure stable separation at altitude, and aerodynamic integration to minimize drag penalties—estimated to reduce the carrier's speed by 20-30% during tandem flight. No prototypes were constructed, and the concept was abandoned within weeks due to insurmountable risks, including vulnerability to interception, unreliable technology (Lorin designs suffered from ignition and thrust modulation issues in early tests), and resource diversion from proven designs.

Maritime and Hybrid Proposals

Maritime proposals within the Amerikabomber project emphasized flying boats to exploit oceanic basing and potential shipboard refueling, aiming to bridge range gaps for strikes on the East Coast from mid-Atlantic positions. These designs leveraged Germany's experience in development for support, with early 1939 inquiries from highlighting options for nuisance raids via forward-refueled flying boats rather than fully self-sufficient land-based bombers. The Blohm & Voss BV 222 Wiking, a six-engined flying boat with a 46.5 m and of 50,000 kg, achieved a range of 6,100 km with 4-ton payload after its first flight on 7 September 1940. Primarily deployed for and —ferrying up to 92 troops or equivalent —it was assessed for extended Atlantic operations, including potential bombing roles when refueled by tenders, though its range fell short of unassisted transatlantic round trips without reserves. Dornier proposed the in the late as a tandem eight-engined flying boat (four pairs in hull nacelles), with a projected 60 m wingspan, 76,000 kg empty weight, and variable range of 4,000–7,000 km based on 20–40 ton payloads. Intended initially for transatlantic civil transport, military adaptations targeted resupply and heavy bombing, positioning it as a "flying milch cow" for logistics, but development halted pre-war due to shifting priorities, with no prototypes completed. In spring 1941, Arado submitted the E.470 concept, a colossal flying boat with 68.5 m wingspan, 130-ton takeoff weight, 7,400 km range, and 5-ton bomb capacity, tailored for reconnaissance and attack in the Western Atlantic as part of bundled Amerikabomber tenders. This design aimed to support wolfpacks while enabling strikes on American targets, though it remained a paper project amid resource shortages. Hybrid proposals integrated air and naval elements, such as ship- or submarine-based refueling for flying boats to attain Hitler's 1941-specified 12,000 km range for round-trip raids on industry. Concepts included catapult-launched scouts from U-boats for target designation, extending effective reach without full transoceanic endurance, but these faced logistical hurdles like Allied antisubmarine dominance and lacked prototyping.

Prototyping, Testing, and Performance Data

Flight Trials and Empirical Results

The V1 prototype conducted its on December 23, 1942, lasting approximately 22 minutes under Karl Baur, during which the aircraft exhibited favorable handling despite its high . Landing was marred by brake failure, causing the aircraft to overrun the runway into a plowed field. Subsequent short-duration flights in early 1943 uncovered minor faults and difficult handling characteristics, including a March 1943 incident where the left landing gear collapsed on touchdown, resulting in a 180-degree spin and that required two months of repairs. Testing resumed on April 16, 1944, but persisted with quality control deficiencies and engine reliability issues from the radials, preventing progression to long-range endurance trials. The prototype achieved no verified transatlantic-range flights and was destroyed in a U.S. Army Air Forces bombing raid on July 18, 1944. The Junkers Ju 390 V1 prototype's initial flight occurred on October 20, 1943, primarily configured for endurance testing as a derivative of the Ju 290. It reportedly completed a 32-hour in 1944, demonstrating an operational endurance aligning with projected ranges exceeding 9,000 km when equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks, though exact distance covered remains unconfirmed in primary records. The Ju 390 V2, adapted for bomber role, achieved a service ceiling of approximately 6,100 meters during trials but underwent limited testing before program curtailment. Claims of a clandestine transatlantic flight approaching lack corroboration from declassified Allied intelligence or German archives and are considered apocryphal by historians. Both prototypes highlighted propulsion challenges with six BMW 801 engines, including vibration and maintenance demands, but validated basic airframe stability for extended operations. Other Amerikabomber candidates, such as the and , advanced only to design stages without flightworthy prototypes, yielding no empirical data from trials; the He 277 inherited unresolved coupled-engine fire risks from the He 177, curtailing any potential testing. Overall, empirical results underscored technical feasibility for intercontinental reach in the Ju 390 but revealed systemic limitations in performance, structural reliability, and resource allocation that precluded operational validation.

Engineering Innovations and Metrics

The primary engineering innovations in the Amerikabomber designs centered on achieving transatlantic range through optimized , efficient powerplants, and lightweight construction to maximize fuel efficiency and payload capacity. The featured a highly streamlined with flush riveting and a smooth wooden-skinned forward section to minimize drag, paired with high-aspect-ratio wings designed for long-endurance flight at high altitudes. This approach allowed for an estimated range of 15,000 km with a 3,000 kg bomb load, though actual testing revealed vibration issues from the four radial engines necessitating modifications. The innovated by extending the Ju 290 airframe with a lengthened and increased to accommodate six 801E engines, enabling a ferry range exceeding 9,700 km while supporting a 10,000 kg payload in transport configuration. Defensive innovations included remote-controlled turrets for crew protection without compromising streamlining. The addressed prior He 177 coupled-engine reliability problems by adopting four independent diesel or radial engines, with a redesigned and for improved stability and a projected range of 6,000 km at operational weights. The introduced a novel six-engine layout with tandem tractor-pusher pairs on each wing to distribute power while maintaining a narrow profile for reduced drag, incorporating mixed radial and possibly jet-assisted propulsion in variants for enhanced takeoff performance. Across designs, metrics emphasized over speed, with typical maximum speeds around 500-560 km/h at altitude and service ceilings of 8,000-9,000 m to evade .
DesignEnginesMax Speed (km/h)Range (km)Payload (kg)
Me 2644 × D/E490 (est.)11,600 (3t load)3,000
Ju 3906 × E5059,70010,000
He 2774 × DB 603 or equiv.5656,0004,000 (est.)
Ta 4006 × (tandem)5358,00024,000
These figures derived from projected performance, as full production prototypes were limited; actual flights, such as the Me 264 V1's 1942 maiden voyage, confirmed feasibility but highlighted engine cooling and structural challenges under load.

Operational Planning

Target Selection and Strategic Prioritization

The Amerikabomber initiative prioritized targets on the U.S. East Coast to maximize psychological and symbolic impact, with selected as the foremost objective due to its status as a global financial hub and population center. envisioned strikes that would ignite the city's skyline, aiming to replicate the terror inflicted on German cities by Allied bombers and thereby erode American resolve to continue the war. This focus stemmed from directives issued in 1942 by chief , who specified bomber specifications enabling round-trip missions of approximately 11,600 kilometers from European bases to New York, emphasizing retaliation and propaganda over immediate material destruction given the anticipated low sortie rates. Secondary targets encompassed industrial facilities, ports, and supporting U.S. war production, such as shipyards and factories in the Northeast, to disrupt and Atlantic shipping. These selections reflected a strategic prioritizing economic chokepoints vulnerable to precision or incendiary attacks, with reconnaissance missions integrated to aid interdiction of convoys. Plans outlined in studies, including adaptations of the , contemplated payloads of up to 12 tons for such operations, though prioritization favored high-visibility urban assaults to amplify deterrent effects amid Germany's defensive posture by 1943. Overall prioritization derived from interlinked goals: immediate morale erosion via spectacular raids on icons like the or , coupled with auxiliary roles in maritime interdiction to strain U.S. supply lines to . Resource constraints and the project's developmental delays—evident in prototypes like the Me 264's 1942 trials—necessitated focusing on feasible one-way or refueled missions from outposts, subordinating dispersed industrial campaigns to concentrated terror strikes. This approach, while ambitious, acknowledged the bombers' projected output of fewer than 100 units, rendering sustained illusory in favor of asymmetric .

Payload Capabilities and Mission Profiles

![Messerschmitt Me 264 V1 prototype][float-right] The Amerikabomber projects envisioned payloads optimized for transatlantic strikes, balancing bomb loads against fuel requirements for round-trip flights exceeding 10,000 km. For the , the production variant planned a 3,000 kg bomb load with a range of 11,600 km, sufficient for missions from European bases to U.S. East Coast targets like New York and return. Earlier proposals considered up to 8,400 kg for shorter ranges of 11,500 km or 14,000 kg for 8,000 km, but transatlantic profiles prioritized over maximum ordnance. The was designed for heavy with a typical capacity of around 10,000 kg, though specific transatlantic loads were adjusted for its estimated 9,500 km range to enable strikes on American industrial centers. Mission profiles included high-altitude daylight raids or nocturnal area bombing, potentially incorporating reconnaissance for coordination en route.
DesignTransatlantic PayloadRange with Payload
Me 2643,000 kg11,600 km
3,000 kg~6,000 km
Ju 390~5,000-10,000 kg9,500 km
Up to 24,000 kg (max)12,000 km
The targeted 3,000 kg (6,615 lb) for transatlantic sorties over a maximum range of 6,000 km, with local missions allowing up to 5,600 kg; profiles emphasized atomic carriage in advanced concepts, though conventional high-explosive or incendiary loads predominated planning. The aimed for up to 24,000 kg capacity across 12,000 km, supporting versatile profiles with guided munitions like or Hs 293 for precision strikes on urban and naval targets. Operational missions across designs focused on morale and infrastructure disruption, launching from western Europe or forward bases, navigating mid-Atlantic voids to evade interception, and employing defensive armament for self-protection during vulnerable approach and egress phases. No achieved operational deployment, limiting data to projected performance from wind-tunnel and prototype evaluations.

Feasibility Evaluation

Technical Viability from First Principles

![Messerschmitt Me 264 V1 prototype][float-right] The Amerikabomber project's technical viability hinged on achieving a combat radius sufficient to strike targets on the U.S. East Coast, approximately 5,800 kilometers from bases in western such as Brest, while carrying a meaningful of at least 2,000 kilograms of bombs. This demanded endurance exceeding 11,000 kilometers for round-trip missions, factoring in prevailing winds, reserves, and loiter time, or acceptance of one-way operations. Fundamental aerodynamic principles favored high-aspect-ratio wings to maximize lift-to-drag ratios (typically 15-20 for heavy bombers), enabling efficient cruise at altitudes above 8,000 meters to minimize drag and fuel burn. Structural designs employed stressed-skin aluminum monocoques, capable of withstanding the span loadings of wings exceeding 40 meters, as demonstrated in prototypes like the with its 43-meter . Propulsion challenges centered on balancing thrust, reliability, and specific fuel consumption (SFC) under wartime material constraints. Radial engines such as the BMW 801D, delivering 1,700 horsepower each, powered designs like the Me 264 (four engines) and (six engines), providing takeoff thrust-to-weight ratios around 0.25-0.3, adequate for heavily loaded departures but marginal for climb performance. SFC values of approximately 0.55 pounds per horsepower-hour allowed theoretical ranges aligning with requirements via the Breguet equation, R = (V / c) × (L/D) × ln(W₀ / W₁), where (V) near 500 km/h, low SFC (c), and optimized L/D yielded projections of 11,000-15,000 kilometers in clean configurations. However, high wing loadings (over 200 kg/m²) compromised maneuverability and initial climb rates, necessitating longer runways and risking vulnerability during takeoff. Empirical tests validated core feasibility despite optimistic projections. The Me 264 V1 prototype completed a 4,500-kilometer flight lasting 10 hours in , confirming endurance scalability with refined fuel systems and pressurized cabins for high-altitude operations. The Ju 390 V1 achieved over 9,500 kilometers in ferry configurations, with payload-range trades allowing 10,000 kilograms over shorter distances but sufficient for 4,000-5,000 kilogram loads transatlantically. Innovations like extended fuselages for fuel integralization and laminar-flow airfoils reduced drag, mirroring Allied approaches in the B-29, which attained comparable ranges with similar technology. Engine overheating and vibration issues arose from coupled installations in some designs, yet single prototypes flew without catastrophic failure, indicating that iterative refinement—feasible absent wartime disruptions—could resolve them. Causal factors limiting realization included not insurmountable physics but integration trade-offs: excessive weight from defensive armament (up to 4 tons) eroded range margins, while unpressurized early variants constrained altitude efficiency. From , available high-strength alloys supported gross weights up to 75,000 kilograms, as in the Ju 390, without exceeding tensile limits. Ultimately, the designs adhered to established principles of subsonic flight, proving a transatlantic bomber viable with 1940s-era , contingent on prioritizing production over competing fronts.

Resource and Logistical Constraints

Germany's aviation industry faced acute shortages of critical materials such as high-grade aluminum alloys and specialized steels, which restricted the fabrication of large airframes required for long-range bombers like the and Ju 390. Allied bombing campaigns dispersed production facilities, leading to irregular processes and reduced output efficiency, with prototypes often completed in isolated, under-resourced sites rather than scaled factories. Only one Me 264 flew in , and plans for variants like the six-engined Me 264B were abandoned due to insufficient raw materials and industrial capacity diverted to urgent fighter production. The Ju 390 program similarly produced just two prototypes before contracts for V2 through V7 and series aircraft were terminated in June 1944, as resources were reallocated to defensive aircraft amid escalating material constraints. Fuel posed an insurmountable barrier, given the immense consumption demands of transatlantic missions—estimated at over 20 tons per Me 264 —against a backdrop of plummeting gasoline availability. output, reliant on , peaked at around 124,000 barrels per day in early 1944 but declined sharply by late 1944 due to Allied raids on plants and associated supplies, crippling operations and rendering sustained deployments impossible. By December 1944, many synthetic facilities were inoperable from bomb damage or shortages, exacerbating the inability to test or field fuel-intensive prototypes without compromising frontline needs. Strategic prioritization further compounded logistical challenges, as the Luftwaffe shifted focus from offensive to defensive fighters following losses in air superiority, leaving Amerikabomber efforts underfunded and deprioritized. Multiple competing designs, including the and , fragmented development efforts and diluted scarce engineering talent, preventing any single project from achieving maturity. Forward basing options, such as the for refueling, became unavailable after Portugal's alignment with the Allies in , extending mission ranges by up to 800 miles and heightening vulnerability to interception without escorts or protected supply lines. These factors ensured that, despite initial prototypes, no operational Amerikabomber force could be logistically sustained amid Germany's broader resource collapse.

Cancellation Factors and Long-Term Assessment

Internal Nazi Decision-Making and Resource Shifts

![Messerschmitt Me 264 V1, the primary prototype for the Amerikabomber project][float-right] The Amerikabomber initiative, formalized by in June 1942 through specifications for a long-range capable of transatlantic strikes, encountered mounting internal resistance as wartime priorities evolved. Early prototypes like the advanced to initial flight tests in December 1942, but development stalled amid resource competition from tactical and defensive programs. By October 1943, , acting on Göring's broader directives, halted further work on the Me 264 to reallocate Messerschmitt's efforts toward high-priority jet fighters such as the Me 262. This cancellation reflected a systemic pivot in Nazi resource allocation driven by escalating Allied air superiority. Göring's October 7, 1943, order emphasizing "fighters, fighters, nothing but fighters" underscored the Luftwaffe's defensive imperatives following heavy losses, including 774 aircraft in August 1940 during the and over 2,600 in 1942 alone. Armaments Minister , collaborating with Milch, enforced production rationalization; monthly aircraft output rose from 981 in 1941 to 1,296 in 1942, but bomber shares declined as fighter production surged 55.9% by 1944 under the Jägerstab (Fighter Staff) initiative launched in March 1944. Hitler's preferences further marginalized projects, favoring retaliatory weapons like V-1 and V-2 rockets, which diverted aluminum, fuel, and skilled labor—critical scarcities exacerbated by Allied raids on plants and engine factories. The He 177, intended as an interim long-range platform, exemplified these constraints, achieving only 35% operational readiness by January 1943 due to persistent engine failures and material shortages. Amerikabomber designs demanded four high-performance engines and vast fuel reserves, rendering them untenable amid Germany's 1943-1944 fuel crisis and the need to sustain immediate frontline operations. By mid-1944, the sole Me 264 prototype was destroyed in an Allied bombing raid on its assembly site in July, effectively terminating practical advancement without formal decree, as resources had already shifted decisively to short-term survival measures over speculative transoceanic capabilities. This reorientation, while pragmatically addressing acute threats, perpetuated the Luftwaffe's doctrinal underinvestment in , a shortfall rooted in prewar cancellations like the 1936 abandonment of the and due to engine unavailability.

Counterfactual Analyses and War Impact Debates

Historians have debated whether an operational Amerikabomber fleet, such as expanded production of the or , could have altered World War II's outcome by enabling sustained strikes on U.S. targets. Counterfactual analyses typically assume earlier prioritization, potentially yielding dozens of aircraft by 1943, capable of transatlantic raids from bases in occupied or the with ranges exceeding 11,000 km. However, such scenarios overlook Germany's acute resource shortages, which historically limited prototypes to mere handfuls—three Me 264 airframes and two Ju 390s—before cancellation in December 1944. Skeptics emphasize the negligible material impact, given the bombers' constrained combat radius payloads of approximately 1,000–3,000 kg when targeting distant East Coast cities like New York, far below the scale needed to disrupt America's wartime output, which peaked at over 300,000 aircraft and 86,000 tanks in 1944 alone. Unescorted missions would face interception by U.S. fighters, including P-51 Mustangs with extended-range capabilities, mirroring the Luftwaffe's earlier losses over without viable long-range escorts like a production Me 262. Deployment timing compounds futility: by mid-1943, Allied air superiority dominated European skies, and U.S. industrial dispersal mitigated vulnerability, rendering sporadic raids psychologically disruptive at best but causally irrelevant to halting flows or invasions like . Proponents of , drawing from Luftwaffe planning documents, suggest propaganda value in demonstrating reach, potentially eroding U.S. public resolve or diverting resources to homeland defenses—echoing fears in 1942–1943 intelligence assessments. Yet, causal assessments dismiss this, noting America's post-Pearl Harbor commitment and vast production base rendered such effects inconsequential without nuclear armament, which Germany's program never achieved. Resource shifts to bombers would likely exacerbate defensive shortfalls against Allied incursions, accelerating collapse rather than averting it, as evidenced by the Jägernotwendig program's prioritization of fighters over strategic assets. Overall, debates converge on consensus: the Amerikabomber's absence stemmed from rational trade-offs, not a decisive missed opportunity, given empirical limits of conventional against a distant, fortified .

References

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