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The Commission on Elections (Filipino: Komisyon sa Halalan), abbreviated as COMELEC,[3] is one of the three constitutional commissions of the Philippines. Its principal role is to enforce all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections in the Philippines.

The other two Constitutional Commissions are the Commission on Audit and Civil Service Commission.

Functions

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According to Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) shall exercise the following powers and functions:[4]

  1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
  2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
  3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
  4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
  5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
  6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
  7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
  8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
  9. Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

History

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The 1978 Commission was composed of [from left] Commissioners Flores A. Bayot, Venancio Duque, Chairman Leonardo Perez, Commissioners Domingo Pabalete and Vicente Santiago (not in the photo).

Predecessor

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The Executive Bureau

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The COMELEC was created by a 1940 amendment to the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines. Prior to the creation of the COMELEC, supervision over the conduct of elections was vested by law in the Executive Bureau under the Department of Interior and, later directly by the same department. The secretary of interior saw to it that local authorities performed the ministerial duties assigned to them by the Election Code. He decided administrative questions concerning elections. The courts, however, exercised exclusive and final jurisdiction over questions affecting the right to vote as well as contested elections of local elective officials. Elections contests involving members of the National Assembly were judged solely by an electoral commission composed of three justices of the Supreme Court and six members of the National Assembly.

A statutory commission

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In view, however, of the close official ties between the president and the secretary of interior, there was always the danger of a partisan secretary of the interior exploiting his powers and influence to ensure the victory of his party at the polls. As a consequence, the constitution was amended in 1940 to create an independent Commission on Elections, composed of a chairman and two other members, to take over the functions of the secretary of the interior relative to elections. But since the amendments could not be effective in time for the 1940 elections, the National Assembly, by Commonwealth Act No. 607, created a Commission on Elections, giving thereto the same powers which the Commission on Elections could have under the amended constitution. The statutory commission supervised the conduct of the December 10, 1940, local Philippine elections.

Creation of the Commission

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The constitutional amendment creating the Commission on Elections was finally approved on December 2, 1940. On June 21, 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 657 was enacted reorganizing the Commission on Elections as a constitutional entity. The members of the statutory commission continued as members of the constitutional commission.

The chairman and members of the commission had a fixed term of nine years each – a member being replaced every three years except in the first commission. They could be removed from office only by impeachment. They were provided with fixed salaries which could neither be increased nor diminished during their term of office. These were safeguards to ensure the independence of the commission.

The administrative control of elections exercised by the secretary of interior was transferred to the Commission on Elections. The commission was vested with the exclusive charge of enforcing and administering all laws relative to elections and the power to decide all questions affecting elections, except those involving the right to vote, which were left to final judicial determination. The courts and electoral tribunals retained their original powers over election contests.

Membership expansion

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The 1973 Constitution enlarged the membership of the commission from three to nine members but reduced their terms of office from nine years to seven years. As in the 1935 Constitution, the chairman and commissioners had staggered terms of office and could be removed from office only by impeachment.

First to serve in the Commission on Elections under the 1973 Constitution were former Senator Leonardo B. Perez, as chairman, and Venacio S. Duque, Flores A. Bayot, Jose M. Mendoza, Fernando R. Veloso, Lininding Pangandaman, Venancio L. Yaneza and Casimiro R. Madarang Jr. as commissioners. Commissioner Pangandaman, the first Muslim commissioner of the COMELEC, was appointed ambassador by President Ferdinand Marcos even before the expiration of his term. His unexpired term was taken over by Commissioner Hashim R. Abubakar.

On May 17, 1980, Chairman Perez (who was later appointed minister of political affairs by President Marcos) and Commissioners Duque and Bayot, after completing their seven-year term, retired. Commissioner Santiago succeeded Perez, and the following were appointed commissioners: Domingo C. Pabalete; Victorino A. Savellano; Jaime C. Opinion; Noli Sagadraca; Romeo Firme: Luis Lardizabal and Ide C. Tillah. With Commissioner Lardizabal the membership of the commission was thus increased to eight, one short of the full complement of nine.

Upon the retirement of Commissioners Firme, Tillah and Lardizabal on May 17, 1983, the Commission on Elections was composed of only five members. On March 21, 1983, two new members were appointed by President Marcos, namely: Froilan Bacungan and Ramon H. Felipe Jr. With the retirement of Chairman Santiago and Commissioners Pabalete and Sagadraca on May 17, 1984, Savellano was appointed chairman. Three new members were appointed on July 27, 1985, namely: Commissioners Quirino A. Marquinez, Mangontawar Guro and Mario D. Ortiz. On January 31, 1986, Commissioners Ruben C. Agpalo and Jaime Layosa were appointed to finally complete the required membership of nine.

After the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution

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After the tumultuous February 7, 1986 snap elections and the People Power Revolution, Chairman Savellano and all the commissioners of the COMELEC tendered their courtesy resignations which, except those of Commissioners Bacungan and Felipe, were accepted by President Corazon C. Aquino.

On April 11, 1986, Commissioner Felipe was appointed acting chairman. On July 23, 1986, he took his oath of office as permanent chairman, together with Commissioners Leopoldo Africa, Haydee Yorac, Andres Flores, Anacleto Badoy, and Dario Rama as members of the "new" Commission on Elections. On February 15, 1988, Hilario G. Davide Jr. was appointed chairman, with Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Haydee B. Yorac, Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao as commissioners. Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac was appointed as acting chairman when Hilario G. Davide Jr. was appointed chairman of the Presidential Fact Finding Commission in December 1989, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 146. On June 6, 1991 Christian Monsod was appointed by President Aquino as chairman of the commission to serve the unexpired term of Davide.

When Monsod retired on February 15, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Court of Appeals Justice Bernardo Pardo as chairman of the commission. Pardo's term was cut short when he was appointed by President Joseph Estrada as associate justice of the Supreme Court in October 1998. Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco was appointed acting chairman of the commission.

On January 11, 1999, President Estrada appointed Sandiganbayan Justice Harriet Demetriou as chairman of the commission. After the events of January 17 to 20, 2001 that led to the ouster and resignation of President Estrada from power, Demetriou tendered her courtesy resignation which was accepted by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

On February 19, 2001, President Arroyo appointed Justice Alfredo Benipayo as chairman of the commission. However, the Commission on Appointments did not confirm his appointment due to opposition of some commissioners led by Luzviminda Tancangco. On June 5, 2002, President Arroyo appointed Metropolitan Manila Development Authority chairman and former Mandaluyong mayor Benjamin S. Abalos Sr. to replace Benipayo. On January 26, 2008, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed former Supreme Court associate justice Jose Melo, 77, to replace Chair Abalos.[5] The United Opposition (UNO) opposed Melo's appointment.[6] However, Melo needed to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA), so Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner was appointed ad interim acting chairman on February 2, 2008, and stayed as chairman until Melo was confirmed by the CA. On March 25, 2008, former Supreme Court justice Jose Melo was sworn in as new chairman of the COMELEC by acting chair Romeo A. Brawner. Melo's ad interim appointment (Congress was not in session) was sent by Malacañang to the Commission on Appointments.[7]

On May 29, 2008, Romeo A. Brawner died from a massive heart attack. Brawner, appointed to the COMELEC to replace the controversial Virgilio Garcillano, was supposed to end his term on February 2, 2011.[8] Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on July 2, 2008, appointed former acting judge (Br. 74, RTC, Malabon) Leonardo Leonida and retired justice of the Court of Appeals Lucenito Tagle as commissioners of the Commission on Elections.[9][10] On November 7, 2008, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Armando Velasco as new election commissioner, and reappointed bypassed commissioners Leonardo L. Leonida and Lucenito N. Tagle.[11] Eduardo Ermita stated "Velasco replaced COMELEC commissioner and former Iligan City Judge Moslemen Macarambon Jr. whose appointment had been bypassed several times by the Commission on Appointments (CA)."[12][13]

2007 impeachment complaint

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On September 27, 2007, Iloilo Vice Governor Rolex Suplico filed a 69-page impeachment complaint (3:00 p.m.) against COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. before the House of Representatives of the Philippines regarding the ZTE national broadband network (NBN) deal. It was endorsed by Representatives Teofisto Guingona III of Bukidnon and Teodoro Casiño of Bayan Muna (People First), and Zamboanga City Representative Ma. Isabelle Climaco. Affidavits of Romulo Neri and Jose de Venecia III supported the complaint.[14][15] On October 1, 2007, COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. faced with an impending impeachment case, resigned in a press conference. The COMELEC appointed Resurreccion Z. Borra as acting chairman. Abalos stated: "I'm resigning... effective immediately." "However," Abalos added during the news conference, "let not my detractors feast on this declaration. I'm not admitting guilt for any wrongdoing."[16][17] An impeachment complaint against COMELEC chairman Abalos was formally filed before the House of Representatives after Neri, former chief of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), accused Abalos of attempting to bribe him.

Organization

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COMELEC Hymn
Anthem of the Commission on Elections. Written and composed by Rolando G. de Castro and Oliver M. Astadan in 1988.
Problems playing this file? See media help.

The commission proper is the policy-making body composed of the chairman and six commissioners who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines; at least thirty-five years of age at the time of their appointment; holders of a college degree, with a majority of them, including the chairman, members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years; and must not have been a candidate for any elective position in the immediate preceding elections.[18] The chairman and the commissioners are appointed by the president, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and hold office for seven years, without reappointment. Since 1987, the terms start and end on February 2. Among the first appointees in 1987, three members served for seven years (ended in 1994), two others served for five years (ended in 1992), and two others served for three years (ended in 1989).

The chairman acts as the presiding officer and chief executive officer of the commission. Assisting the commission are an executive director and deputies, 17 regional election directors, provincial election supervisors and election officers in cities and municipalities. The COMELEC has more than 15,000 employees.

The commissioners exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions either en banc or in division. They also perform such other functions as may be assigned by the commission or the chairman.

Current composition

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Current composition
Position Division Picture Name Tenure started Tenure scheduled to end Appointed by
Chairman George Garcia July 22, 2022 February 2, 2029 Bongbong Marcos
Commissioner 2nd — Nelson J. Celis August 11, 2022
Commissioner 1st — Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda Jr. October 6, 2022
Commissioner 1st Aimee Ferolino-Ampoloquio November 24, 2020 February 2, 2027 Rodrigo Duterte
Commissioner 2nd Rey E. Bulay November 11, 2021
Commissioner 1st — Norina Tangaro-Casingal[19] February 10, 2025 February 2, 2032 Bongbong Marcos
Commissioner 2nd — Noli Pipo[20]

Former members

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During the 1935 constitution, the commission was composed of three members, with one chairman and two commissioners, each having nine-year terms with no reappointments. Among the first three members appointed, the first had a nine-year term, the second had a six-year term, and the last had a three-year term, all starting in the commission's reorganization on June 21, 1941, via Commonwealth Act No. 657.

Starting with the 1973 constitution, the commission was composed of nine members, with one chairman and eight commissioners, each having seven-year terms with no reappointments. Among the first nine members appointed, the first three had seven-year terms, the next three had five-year terms, and the last three had three-year terms, all starting in 1973. The commission never reached its full complement of nine members during the operation of the 1973 constitution until January 1986, a few weeks before the People Power Revolution.

Chairmen
Chairman[21] Term began Term ended Appointed by Electoral exercises oversaw
Pedro Concepcion September 1, 1940 May 11, 1941 Manuel L. Quezon none
Jose Vito May 13, 1941 May 7, 1947 1941 election, 1946 election, 1947 plebiscite
Vicente de Vera May 9, 1947 April 10, 1951[a] Manuel Roxas 1949 election
Domingo Imperial August 14, 1951 March 31, 1958[b] Elpidio Quirino 1953 election, 1957 election
Jose Carag May 19, 1958 June 20, 1959 Carlos P. Garcia none
Sixto Brillantes Sr. June 20, 1959 May 12, 1960 none
Gaudencio Garcia May 12, 1960 June 20, 1962 1961 election
Juan Borra August 2, 1962 June 20, 1968 Diosdado Macapagal 1965 election
Manuel Arranz October 18, 1968 June 2, 1969[b] Ferdinand Marcos 1967 plebiscite
Jaime Ferrer June 10, 1969 May 28, 1973 1969 election, 1970 constitutional convention election, January 1973 plebiscite
Leonardo Perez May 29, 1973 May 17, 1980 July 1973 referendum, 1975 referendum, 1976 referendum, 1977 referendum, 1978 election
Vicente Santiago Jr. May 17, 1980 May 17, 1985 1981 plebiscite, 1981 election and referendum, 1984 plebiscite, 1984 election
Victorino Savellano May 20, 1985 March 24, 1986 1986 election
Ramon Felipe Jr. July 11, 1986 February 3, 1988 Corazon Aquino 1987 plebiscite, 1987 election
Hilario Davide Jr. February 15, 1988 January 12, 1990[b] 1988 local elections
Christian Monsod June 6, 1991 February 15, 1995[b] 1992 election
Bernardo P. Pardo February 17, 1995 October 7, 1998[b] Fidel V. Ramos 1995 election, 1998 election
Harriet Demetriou January 11, 1999 January 21, 2001[b] Joseph Estrada none
Alfredo Benipayo February 15, 2001 June 5, 2002[b] Gloria Macapagal Arroyo 2001 election
Benjamin Abalos June 17, 2002 October 1, 2007[b] 2004 election, 2007 election
Jose Melo March 25, 2008 January 15, 2011[b] 2010 election
Sixto Brillantes January 17, 2011 February 2, 2015 Benigno Aquino III 2013 election
Andres Bautista April 28, 2015 October 23, 2017[b] 2016 election
Sheriff Abas May 23, 2018 February 2, 2022 Rodrigo Duterte 2019 election
Saidamen Pangarungan March 8, 2022 June 1, 2022[c] 2022 election
Commissioners
Commissioner[21] Term began Term ended Appointed by
Jose C. Abreu September 1, 1940 October 11, 1944[a] Manuel L. Quezon
Rufino Luna September 1, 1940 July 12, 1945
Francisco Enage July 12, 1945 November 9, 1949 Sergio Osmeña
Vicente de Vera July 12, 1945 April 8, 1951
Leopoldo Rovira May 22, 1947 September 10, 1954 Manuel Roxas
Rodrigo Perez Jr. December 8, 1949 June 21, 1956
Gaudencio Garcia May 18, 1955 June 20, 1962[d] Ramon Magsaysay
Sixto Brillantes Sr. December 20, 1956 June 20, 1965
Genaro Visarra May 12, 1960 November 10, 1962 Carlos P. Garcia
Cesar Miraflor November 11, 1962 June 20, 1971 Diosdado Macapagal
Gregorio Santayana June 26, 1965 May 31, 1966
Francisco Ortega December 25, 1966 March 20, 1967[a] Ferdinand Marcos
Manuel Arranz August 27, 1967 June 2, 1969[d]
Jaime N. Ferrer May 23, 1969 May 28, 1973[d]
Lino M. Patajo June 16, 1969 May 31, 1973
Jose M. Mendoza September 6, 1971 May 17, 1973
Liningding Pangandaman May 29, 1973 November 15, 1973[b]
Flores A. Bayot May 30, 1973 May 17, 1980
Venancio R. Yaneza May 30, 1973 May 17, 1980
Casimiro R. Madarang Jr. May 30, 1973 May 17, 1980
Fernando R. Veloso May 30, 1973 May 17, 1980
Venancio S. Duque June 1, 1973 May 17, 1980
Domingo C. Pabalate May 17, 1978 May 17, 1985
Vicente M. Santiago Jr. May 17, 1978 May 17, 1985
Victorino A. Savellano May 17, 1980 May 17, 1987
Jaime C. Opinion May 17, 1980 May 17, 1987
Noli M. Sagadraca May 17, 1980 May 17, 1985
Romeo N. Firme May 17, 1980 May 17, 1983
Ide C. Tillah May 17, 1980 May 17, 1983
Luis L. Lardizabal May 17, 1980 May 17, 1983
Froilan M. Bacungan March 21, 1984 May 17, 1990
Ramon H. Felipe Jr. March 21, 1984 May 17, 1990
Mario D. Ortiz July 30, 1985 July 23, 1986[b]
Mangontawar B. Guro July 30, 1985 April 11, 1986[b]
Quirino A. Marquinez August 1, 1985 July 23, 1986
Ruben Agpalo January 2, 1986 July 23, 1986
Jaime J. Layosa January 29, 1986 July 23, 1986
Leopoldo L. Africa June 14, 1986 February 15, 1991[b] Corazon Aquino
Haydee Yorac[e] July 15, 1986 February 11, 1993[b]
Dario C. Rama July 16, 1986 February 15, 1993[b]
Anacleto D. Badoy Jr. July 16, 1986 February 3, 1988
Andres R. Flores July 17, 1986 February 15, 1991
Tomas V. dela Cruz December 11, 1986 September 3, 1987
Alfredo E. Abueg Jr. December 16, 1987 January 20, 1992
Magdara B. Dimaampao February 15, 1988 February 15, 1995
Froilan M. Bacungan February 15, 1988 January 12, 1990
Regalado Maambong June 6, 1991 February 15, 1998
Vicente B. de Lima February 7, 1992 November 4, 1994
Remedios S. Fernando February 14, 1992 February 14, 1998
Graduacion R. Claravall April 12, 1993 June 14, 1996 Fidel V. Ramos
Manolo B. Gorospe April 14, 1993 February 14, 2000
Julio F. Desamito January 3, 1995 February 15, 2001
Teresita D. Flores February 17, 1995 February 15, 2001
Japal M. Guiani March 29, 1996 February 15, 2001
Amado M. Calderon February 16, 1998 June 30, 1998[b]
Evalyn I. Fetalino February 16, 1998 June 30, 1998[b]
Luzviminda Tancangco[e] August 5, 1998 February 2, 2004[b] Joseph Estrada
Abdul Gani Marohombsar September 7, 1998 June 3, 1999[b]
Ralph C. Lantion January 6, 2000 February 2, 2004
Rufino S. Javier April 4, 2000 February 2, 2006
Mehol K. Sadain July 17, 2000 February 2, 2006
Resurreccion Borra[e] February 15, 2001 February 2, 2008 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Florentino A. Tuason Jr. February 20, 2001 February 2, 2008
Virgilio Garcillano February 12, 2004 June 10, 2005[b]
Manuel A. Barcellona Jr. February 12, 2004 June 10, 2005[b]
Romeo A. Brawner Sr.[e] September 18, 2005 May 29, 2008[a]
Rene V. Sarmiento April 7, 2006 February 2, 2013
Nicodemo T. Ferrer June 15, 2006 February 2, 2011
Moslemen T. Macarambon November 5, 2007 October 10, 2008[b]
Leonardo L. Leonida July 2, 2008 February 11, 2011[b]
Lucenito N. Tagle July 3, 2008 February 2, 2011
Armando C. Velasco July 3, 2008 February 2, 2013
Elias R. Yusoph July 24, 2009 February 2, 2015
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal October 15, 2009 February 2, 2011
Christian Robert S. Lim April 7, 2011 February 2, 2018 Benigno Aquino III
Augusto C. Lagman June 3, 2011 April 16, 2012[b]
Grace Padaca October 8, 2012 June 11, 2014[b]
Luie Tito F. Guia April 15, 2013 February 2, 2020
Al Parreño April 15, 2013 February 2, 2020
Arthur D. Lim July 25, 2014 February 2, 2018
Sheriff M. Abas April 28, 2015 May 23, 2018[d]
Rowena Guanzon April 28, 2015 February 2, 2022
Antonio Kho Jr. July 11, 2018 February 2, 2022 Rodrigo Duterte
George Garcia March 8, 2022 June 1, 2022[c]
Aimee Torrefranca-Neri March 8, 2022 June 1, 2022[c]
Socorro B. Inting April 17, 2018 February 2, 2025
Marlon S. Casquejo June 19, 2018 February 2, 2025
  1. ^ a b c d Died in office
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z Resigned mid-term, or was rejected by the Commission on Appointments
  3. ^ a b c Resigned mid-term, bypassed or was rejected by the Commission on Appointments
  4. ^ a b c d Subsequently appointed as chairman
  5. ^ a b c d Concurrently served as acting chairman

Issues and incidents

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ZTE broadband contract controversy

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In August 2007, Nueva Vizcaya Rep. Carlos Padilla delivered a privilege speech alleging that Comelec chairman Benjamin Abalos brokered for the national broadband network (NBN) project. Padilla claimed that Abalos met with officials of the Chinese firm ZTE Corp., which got the US$329 million contract for the broadband project.

Abalos denied brokering for the National Broadband Network project despite admitting he knew some officials in ZTE Corp. He admitted to making four trips to China and playing golf there. He also admitted that ZTE officials, who he said were his golf buddies, hosted and paid for the trips.

Jose de Venecia III, son of House Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr., alleged that Abalos offered him US$10 million to withdraw his proposal on the NBN project. De Venecia is a majority shareholder of Amsterdam Holdings Inc., a company that submitted an unsolicited proposal on the NBN project. De Venecia also claimed that Abalos asked for money from the ZTE Corp. officials.

Hello Garci scandal

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Main article: Hello Garci scandal

Abalos was mentioned in the "Hello Garci" tape, which refers to the alleged wiretapped conversations where vote rigging in the 2004 elections was discussed by, among others, a woman presumed to be President Gloria Arroyo and a man presumed to be COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.

Mega Pacific

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Abalos was the COMELEC chair when the election body approved a P1.3-billion contract with the Mega Pacific Consortium for the purchase of automated counting machines, which the Supreme Court in January 2004 declared as void because of "clear violation of law and jurisprudence" and "reckless disregard of COMELEC's own bidding rules and procedure."

On January 21, 2004, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. filed criminal and administrative charges before the Ombudsman against Abalos and other commissioners in connection with the deal. Abalos described the charges as a "demolition job."

Pimentel accused Abalos and the other commissioners of committing an act of impropriety when they and their wives traveled to Seoul, South Korea to visit the plant of the maker of the counting machines a few months before the bidding for the contract started. Pimentel said he received information that the Korean company paid for the plane tickets and hotel accommodations for the trip.

However, Abalos claimed that the expenses for the trip were paid for out of the P1 million he won in a golf tournament in Wack Wack Golf and Country Club.

On September 27, 2006, the Ombudsman, in a resolution, absolved all respondents involved in the Mega Pacific controversy of all administrative and criminal liabilities "for lack of probable cause." It also reversed its June 28 resolution which contained factual findings that can be used by the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment proceedings against COMELEC Commissioner Resureccion Borra.

Website hacking

[edit]
Main article: Commission on Elections data breach

Just six weeks before the 2016 Philippine general election, the COMELEC website was hacked by a group called "Anonymous Philippines" on the night of March 27, 2016.[22] Anonymous Philippines asked the poll body to implement security on Precinct Count Optical Scanners (PCOS)—automated voting machines.[23] Another group calling itself LulzSec Pilipinas, claimed to have hacked COMELEC's website, and posted its database on their Facebook account shortly after Anonymous Philippines compromised COMELEC's website.[24][25] These exploits exposed voter data and the vulnerability of both voter registration data and the functionality of their website.[24] LulzSec posts 3 mirror links on their Facebook account that can be downloaded.[24] The incident was considered the biggest private leak data in the Philippine history and leaving millions of registered voters at risk.[26][27]

The sensitive information, which included the full name, complete address, and passport number of at least 55–70 million Filipino registered voters, was leaked publicly on a website called wehaveyourdata, allegedly created by hacker LulzSec Philippines.[28][29] Anyone who had access to this website could type the first name, surname, and middle name of the compromised registered voters on the search bar provided and the sensitive information would be revealed.[30] The website was taken down by the NBI on April 22.[31] COMELEC spokesperson James Jimenez warned the public not to use the website, warning this could be a phishing site.[32] On April 21, COMELEC apologized for the privacy attacks by the hackers.[33]

2022 National Elections

[edit]

Threat of jailing critics

[edit]

On April 23, 2022, a few weeks before the 2022 Philippine general election, COMELEC commissioner Rey Bulay threatened with arrest individuals who would publicly state that COMELEC was biased towards a certain candidate or might be involved in election fraud.[34]

“Iyon pong nagko-comment ng public opinion na ang Comelec ay may sina-side-an, may kinakampihan, at mandadaya, ako po ay nagwawarning sa inyo, we will not hesitate to call upon the AFP na sa panahong ito ay nasa ilalim ng control ng Comelec para patulan at ipahuli at ipakulong kayo,”[35]

“To those issuing public opinion that Comelec is biased or that it would cause election fraud, I am warning you that we would not hesitate to call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is now under Comelec control, to round you up and have you jailed”

– Commissioner Rey Bulay said during a press briefing.[34]

The statement was made allegedly in support of a different statement by COMELEC Commissioner Socorro Inting who in turn was commenting on a statement released by supporters of then presidential candidate and Vice-president Leni Robredo who called for COMELEC to remain nonpartisan for the sake of the elections. Commissioner Inting commented that it was simply unnecessary to call on the COMELEC to hold a “nonpartisan” election.[34] The commissioner also noted how such statements are liable to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the commission and by extension the elections themselves. Local news agency Rappler noted that it was unclear why Commissioner Inting took offense to this statement released by the supporters of Leni Robredo, which simply reminded the commission to hold fair and safe elections.[35]

Several lawmakers and concerned groups slammed the statement by the Comelec.[36][34] Detained Senator Leila de Lima called the threat by Commissioner Bulay "uncalled for and illegal".[36] She noted that the Armed Force of the Philippines are only allowed to arrest individuals during times of lawless violence while under orders from the Commander-in-Chief. She noted that while COMELEC has expansive powers during an election season, this "does not include the power to use the AFP in stifling criticisms and suppressing free speech”.[36] In a separate statement, House Assistant Minority Leader and party-list Rep. France L. Castro called on COMELEC to withdraw its statement, calling the commission hypersensitive to criticisms thrown at it by the populace.[36] The representative stated that citizens are well within their rights to call for "orderly, peaceful and credible elections”.[36]

Following the backlash, Commissioner Bulay commented that his statement was only a warning, and that he was only reminding people to follow the law.[37]

Red-tagging and harassment of candidates

[edit]
This section is an excerpt from Red-tagging in the Philippines § During elections.[edit]

Red-tagging has been used as a "weapon" against opposition candidates during election campaigns, according to media watchdogs and members of the political opposition. Red-tagging has also been used to divert public attention from economic hardships and extrajudicial killings attributed to incumbent candidates.[38][39]

During the 2022 Philippine presidential election, the red-tagging of presidential candidate Leni Robredo by incumbent officials were frequently featured on the Manila Times and the Daily Tribune, according to media observers.[40] A report by the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights said that Robredo was the "prime target of intensified disinformation and red-tagging in social media leading up to election day." The report also said that candidates and elected representatives of the Makabayan bloc were also red-tagged.[41] Former Congress representative and senatorial candidate Neri Colmenares said that red-tagging increased during elections and targeted opposition candidates who protested the Philippine government's poor COVID pandemic response, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and the extrajudicial killing of activists. Colmenares said that candidates of the Otso Diretso senatorial slate were also red-tagged during the 2019 election campaign, and that the red-tagging died down after the election.[42]

In February 2025, the Philippine Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 11116, which made red-tagging and discrimination during election campaigns offenses punishable with imprisonment of one to six years and disqualification from public office.[43] COMELEC Chair George Erwin Garcia said that the policy is based on the Supreme Court ruling that defined red-tagging as an act that threatens individuals.[44]

In March 2025, during the campaign for the 2025 Philippine general election, Bayan Muna party-list nominee Neri Colmenares filed a complaint urging COMELEC to investigate allegations of red-tagging and vilification constituting "massive and widespread black propaganda" and the destruction of campaign materials.[45]

The International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines stated that red-tagging was the most common election violation as of April 30, 2025, making up 78.7% of the election violations it had recorded.[46] "This level of systematic red-tagging is not only a violation of human rights, it's a coordinated effort to intimidate and discredit democratic actors," the group said in a statement.[47]

Election of Alice Guo

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The role of the Comelec was put into scrutiny in 2024 when Alice Guo was elected as mayor of Bamban, Tarlac in the 2022 election. Guo is alleged to be a Chinese citizen in the Senate inquiry, consequentially putting the validity of her election as mayor. Comelec was questioned on why Guo's candidacy was not disputed at the time with the election body stating it cannot on its own or motu proprio question the eligibility of candidates. Someone else has to file a formal petition.[48] Comelec opened its own investigation in July 2024.[49] Guo was removed from office by the Ombudsman over her links to illicit activities of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs).[50]

The same still applies for the 2025 election, even if Guo did sought reelection.[51][52] The controversy also led to the Comelec to decide to publish online all the certificates of candidacies of aspirants for the 2025 election.[53]

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Commission on Elections (Philippines)

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The Commission on Elections (Filipino: Komisyon sa Halalan, abbreviated COMELEC) is the independent constitutional body in the empowered to administer all elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, and recalls, while enforcing related laws to uphold . Composed of a chairman and six commissioners appointed by the President with the consent of the for non-renewable seven-year terms, COMELEC operates as one of three constitutional commissions designed to insulate electoral processes from executive influence. Its core functions include maintaining the national voter registry, accrediting and candidates, procuring ballots and voting machines, canvassing results, and adjudicating disputes, all aimed at ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections. Originally established in 1940 under Commonwealth Act No. 466 to wrest election oversight from the executive branch, COMELEC was restructured and enshrined in Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution following the , granting it quasi-judicial powers and budgetary autonomy to combat entrenched electoral manipulations. Over decades, it has managed pivotal transitions, such as the shift to automated systems in to curb manual fraud, though persistent empirical challenges—including widespread vote-buying, dynastic dominance, and sporadic violence—reveal causal limitations in institutional design amid weak rule-of-law enforcement and local patronage networks. Notable controversies, like the hacking of its database exposing 55 million voters' records and allegations of result tampering in past national polls, have eroded , prompting calls for reforms to enhance transparency and accountability despite mainstream narratives often downplaying systemic failures in favor of procedural formalities.

Mandate and Functions

Constitutional Basis and Powers

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is established by Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines as one of three independent constitutional commissions, alongside the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit, to administer elections free from undue influence by other branches of government. This independence is reinforced by Article IX-A, which grants the commissions fiscal autonomy—allowing direct disbursement of their budget without executive approval—and the authority to appoint their personnel, thereby enabling focused enforcement of electoral rules to maintain process integrity. COMELEC also possesses quasi-judicial powers, permitting it to exercise original and appellate jurisdiction over election-related disputes, with decisions in certain cases being final and executory to expedite resolutions and deter procedural manipulations. Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C, COMELEC's primary mandate is to enforce and administer all laws relative to elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, including supervision of voting for the President, , members of , local officials, and constitutional amendments. This encompasses , accreditation of and candidates, and apportionment of polling places, mechanisms designed to preempt irregularities by standardizing procedures and verifying eligibility prior to voting. Additionally, Section 2(4) empowers COMELEC, with congressional concurrence, to deputize agencies and the Armed Forces of the Philippines to secure free and orderly elections, providing a causal safeguard against or fraud through coordinated pre-election deployment. COMELEC holds exclusive over election contests for regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction for municipal and levels, as stipulated in Section 2(2), ensuring swift adjudication that binds outcomes without higher court interference in lower-tier cases. Section 2(3) further vests it with authority to resolve disputes on mechanics, qualifications, and of winners, while Section 2(5) requires recommendations to for measures limiting campaign spending and penalizing , malpractices, and nuisance candidacies—targeted interventions to curb resource-driven distortions and enforce ex ante. Other functions include recommending presidential removal of complicit officials under Section 2(6) and creating educational programs under Section 2(7) to promote informed participation, all oriented toward empirical verification of electoral validity over subjective interpretations.

Enforcement of Election Laws

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) administers and enforces the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which establishes comprehensive rules for candidate qualifications, campaign conduct, voting procedures, and penalties for electoral offenses such as vote-buying, , and fraudulent registration. This includes the authority to conduct pre-election assessments of certificates of candidacy, disqualifying applicants who fail to meet residency requirements under Section 74 or who file as nuisance candidates under Section 69, where the candidacy is deemed to promote confusion or ridicule the electoral process. For example, in October 2018, COMELEC's Law Department petitioned to declare Norman Cordero Marquez a nuisance candidate for the due to insufficient viability and intent to confuse voters, leading to cancellation of his certificate. COMELEC investigates violations through its divisions, holding summary proceedings to impose administrative penalties like disqualification, cancellation of , or fines up to 100,000, with criminal cases referred for prosecution carrying imprisonment terms of one to ten years depending on the offense. Article IX-C, Section 2(6) of the 1987 Constitution grants COMELEC explicit power to prosecute such cases, enabling direct enforcement without sole reliance on external courts for initial adjudication. In practice, this has resulted in the disqualification of candidates for residency lapses, such as the April 2025 ruling against Matt Erwin Florido for the third district congressional seat due to unproven domicile. For technological compliance, COMELEC enforces Republic Act No. 9369, amending RA 8436 to mandate automated election systems, including oversight of precinct-level optical scanners and transmission protocols to prevent tampering, with violations punishable by fines up to PHP 1 million or imprisonment. This framework supported the 2010 automated polls, where over 82,000 machines processed votes from 50.7 million registered voters across 7,107 islands. To secure enforcement, COMELEC deputizes the (PNP) and (AFP) under resolutions like No. 3309, authorizing checkpoints, gun bans from campaign start to post-election proclamation, and arrests for prohibited acts during the period. In January 2025, the PNP established nationwide COMELEC checkpoints coinciding with the election period's onset, facilitating inspections for illegal firearms and campaign materials to deter violence and ensure orderly polling. These measures align with Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, integrating to suppress disturbances and protect ballot integrity.

Historical Development

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Precursors

In pre-colonial , political organization occurred through decentralized barangays, sociopolitical units comprising 30 to 100 families led by datus whose authority derived from consensus among elders, ties, and demonstrated prowess rather than competitive elections or centralized voting mechanisms. Decision-making emphasized negotiation and agreement within these communities, reflecting a system of communal validation absent formal ballots or . Spanish colonial rule introduced rudimentary electoral practices, primarily for local offices like the (town mayor) and (barrio head), where voting was confined to a small class of elite principales and incumbents, often resulting in controlled outcomes favoring entrenched families and fostering the system of patronage-based influence. These elections, formalized under the Maura Law of 1893 and first held municipally in 1895, remained highly localized and manipulated, with friars and governors exerting veto power over results to maintain colonial stability. The American period marked a shift toward broader participation, initiating local elections as early as May 7, 1899, under military oversight, followed by the Philippine Assembly's creation in 1907 as the first elected legislative body with property and literacy qualifications for voters. With the establishment of the Philippine in , election oversight transitioned to the Executive Bureau under the Department of the Interior, which managed , canvassing, and conduct for the inaugural Commonwealth polls on September 16, , thereby laying administrative groundwork for institutionalized electoral bodies. This bureau handled preparatory functions like census-based voter lists until the Commission on Elections' formal constitution in 1940 per the 1935 Constitution's provisions.

Establishment as a Statutory Body

The Commission on Elections was established through Commonwealth Act No. 607, enacted by the on August 22, 1940, as a tasked with administering elections independently from executive influence. This legislation transferred electoral oversight powers previously held by the Department of the Interior's Election Division—a board under direct secretarial control prone to allegations of partisan manipulation—to a dedicated commission, marking a foundational shift toward quasi-judicial in electoral processes. The act responded to prior constitutional amendments via National Assembly Resolution No. 73 on April 11, 1940, which modified the 1935 Constitution to enable such an independent entity. The commission initially comprised three commissioners, appointed by the with the approval of the , serving fixed terms to insulate operations from political pressures. Formal organization occurred on December 5, 1940, under Chairman Jose P. Concepcion, with the body focusing on preparatory functions like and poll worker training amid the era's transition toward full independence. Operations emphasized manual, decentralized procedures suited to the archipelago's fragmented infrastructure, including rural polling stations and basic literacy-based voter verification, as advanced was infeasible. World War II severely disrupted initial activities, with Japanese occupation from 1942 suspending commission functions and preventing scheduled elections. Post-liberation in 1944–1945, the body faced acute challenges in reconstructing voter lists decimated by wartime displacement, destruction of records, and population movements, compounded by limited transportation networks and prevailing illiteracy rates exceeding 40% in rural areas that hindered widespread civic education. Despite these constraints, COMELEC supervised the pivotal national elections on April 23, 1946, mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 725, which selected the president, , senators, and members for the impending independent republic—ensuring procedural integrity through manual counting and canvassing in a war-ravaged context. This debut role underscored the commission's statutory mandate for impartial enforcement, though logistical strains limited enforcement depth, relying on local boards for on-ground execution. Subsequent reorganization via Commonwealth Act No. 657 on June 21, 1941, elevated its status toward constitutional embedding, with Concepcion succeeded by Pedro Q. Roño, reinforcing the framework against executive overreach amid ongoing independence preparations. Early operations thus prioritized foundational safeguards like prohibiting vote-buying and ensuring ballot secrecy under limited resources, setting precedents for detached electoral administration in a nascent democratic system.

Post-Independence Expansion and Reforms

In the years following Philippine independence in 1946, the Commission on Elections managed national polls amid a burgeoning electorate and intensifying political competition between the dominant Liberal and Nacionalista parties, with factional splits emerging that complicated ballot oversight and dispute resolution. The 1953 presidential election, held on November 10, exemplified this strain, involving contests for the , vice presidency, eight seats, and 102 positions, all conducted under manual systems ill-equipped for post-war population recovery and . By the early , rising voter numbers—driven by demographic growth and expanded —prompted legislative reforms; Republic Act No. 3588 established a centralized system, while Republic Act No. 3808 reorganized the Commission's internal structure to enhance administrative efficiency and address logistical bottlenecks in election administration. These measures causally linked institutional capacity to electoral scale, enabling handling of increasingly complex multi-level contests without systemic collapse. The 1973 Constitution further expanded the Commission's mandate, elevating it to a fully constitutional body with membership increased to nine—a chairman and eight commissioners—appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, staggered terms, and impeachment-only removal to insulate it from executive interference. This reform endowed COMELEC with explicit authority over plebiscites for ratifying constitutional changes, as demonstrated in its administration of the January 1973 referendum on the new charter itself, conducted via citizen assemblies nationwide from January 10 to 15. Accompanying Presidential Decree No. 597 in 1974 authorized further departmental reorganization to accommodate these powers. By the late , registered voters had surged beyond 20 million—contrasting sharply with under 3 million in 1946—exacerbating manual counting delays and fraud vulnerabilities, thus underscoring the need for scaled operations to sustain democratic processes amid rapid societal expansion.

Martial Law Era and EDSA Revolution Aftermath

Following President Ferdinand Marcos's declaration of martial law on September 23, 1972, through Proclamation No. 1081, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) functioned under heightened executive oversight, with legislative powers assumed by Marcos after the abolition of Congress. This centralization aligned COMELEC's operations with regime priorities, limiting competitive electoral processes until the 1981 interim Batasang Pambansa assembly election. COMELEC played a key role in ratifying the 1973 Constitution via a plebiscite conducted from January 10 to 15, 1973, as mandated by Presidential Decree No. 73, which submitted the document drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention to citizen assemblies for approval. These assemblies, organized at the level under conditions, reported overwhelming ratification, though the process faced criticisms for lacking secrecy and facing coercion allegations. The 1986 snap presidential election, called by Marcos on December 2, 1985, and held on February 7, 1986, highlighted COMELEC's compromised integrity amid widespread fraud reports, including vote-buying, intimidation, and tampering. On February 9, 1986, computer technicians at COMELEC's tabulation center walked out, protesting manipulation of results that initially favored opposition candidate in parallel counts by groups like NAMFREL. COMELEC's official canvass declared Marcos the winner with 53.7% of votes, but discrepancies fueled the EDSA Revolution from February 22 to 25, 1986, leading to Marcos's ouster. In the aftermath, the 1986 Freedom Constitution under President Aquino restructured COMELEC toward independence, formalized in the 1987 Constitution ratified on February 2, 1987, which established it as one of three independent constitutional commissions comprising a chairman and six commissioners appointed by the president with confirmation for seven-year terms. Article IX-C emphasized COMELEC's autonomy in enforcing election laws, deciding disputes, and accrediting citizens' arms for parallel monitoring, aiming to prevent past abuses. The May 11, 1987, congressional and local elections served as the first major post-dictatorship test for the reformed COMELEC, conducted manually with citizen observer participation to enhance transparency, though challenges like persisted in some areas. This process validated the new constitutional framework's emphasis on non-partisan adjudication and procedural safeguards, setting precedents for future without automated systems or formal random audits, which emerged later.

Contemporary Developments (1987–Present)

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) underwent significant institutional adaptations following the 1987 Constitution, which reinforced its role in administering elections independently while expanding its regulatory scope over and voter education. In 1995, Republic Act No. 7941, known as the Party-List System Act, was enacted to implement the constitutional provision for , allocating up to 20% of House seats to party-list groups representing marginalized sectors. This system was first operationalized in the 1998 general elections, enabling the election of party-list representatives through a nationwide vote aggregation mechanism managed by COMELEC. Subsequent developments included regional electoral expansions, such as the integration of party-list voting in the 2005 elections, where COMELEC coordinated synchronized polls for regional assembly positions amid efforts to enhance local autonomy. Post-2010, COMELEC enforced mandates under Republic Act No. 9369 for automated systems in national and local elections, transitioning from manual counting to precinct-based optical scanners to accelerate result transmission and reduce discrepancies. This shift was applied in the 2022 national elections, where over 66 million voters participated, with results transmitted within hours via electronic means. For the 2025 midterm elections, COMELEC introduced targeted guidelines via Resolution No. 11064 to regulate digital campaigning, requiring candidates to register platforms and prohibiting AI-generated deepfakes or misleading content without disclosure, aiming to curb in an era of widespread influence. Overseas voting saw innovation with the pilot of internet-based balloting, enabling pre-enrolled abroad to vote remotely via secure portals, a departure from traditional mail-in or in-person methods to boost turnout. These adaptations were supported by a 2024 budget of P27.34 billion, allocated partly for procuring new automated equipment to replace aging machines ahead of the polls. COMELEC has also engaged in advocacy for anti-dynasty measures, as mandated by Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits but requires enabling legislation absent to date; the agency processes disqualification petitions under existing rules but lacks statutory authority for proactive bans, prompting repeated calls for congressional action. In 2025, amid dynasty dominance in midterm candidacies—where over 70% of districts featured family-linked contenders—COMELEC endorsed bills to define and enforce dynasty limits, reflecting ongoing efforts to align electoral practice with constitutional intent.

Organizational Structure

Composition and Leadership

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is composed of a chairperson and six commissioners, as stipulated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. These members are appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and serve non-renewable terms of seven years. Appointments to vacancies fill only the unexpired portion of the predecessor's term, while initial staggered terms ensure that not all positions turn over simultaneously, thereby maintaining institutional continuity and expertise in electoral administration. Qualifications for appointment emphasize impartiality and professional competence: members must be natural-born citizens of the , at least 35 years old, and holders of a college degree; additionally, a , including the chairperson, must be members of the Philippine Bar with at least 15 years of legal practice. During their tenure, commissioners are prohibited from holding any other office or employment and from engaging in partisan political activities to safeguard neutrality in overseeing elections. This framework aims to insulate the body from political influence, though enforcement relies on presidential restraint and . As of October 2025, George Erwin M. Garcia serves as chairperson, having been appointed on July 22, 2022. In February 2025, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. appointed Maria Norina Tangaro-Casingal, former head of COMELEC's law department, and Noli Rafol Pipo, a regional director, as commissioners to fill vacancies from retirements; their appointments were confirmed by the in June 2025. These selections prioritized career officials, aligning with the constitutional intent for experienced, non-partisan .

Administrative Divisions and Operations

The Commission on Elections maintains a hierarchical administrative framework centered in , with specialized central departments supporting core functions and a decentralized network of field offices ensuring execution at regional, provincial, city, and municipal levels. This structure, comprising 18 regional election directorates aligned with the country's administrative regions (including the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao), enables localized adaptation to geographic and logistical challenges, such as deploying resources to remote islands and barangays for uniform enforcement. Regional directors oversee provincial supervisors and officers, who handle on-ground operations like precinct assignments and material distribution, fostering efficiencies through proximity-based rather than top-down mandates alone. Key central offices include the Law Department, which delivers legal consultations, drafts resolutions, and coordinates prosecution of election violations in quasi-judicial proceedings; the Education and Information Department, tasked with disseminating public advisories and conducting information drives to promote compliance; and the Election Registration Board, which validates voter applications and maintains the national registry under statutory guidelines. These units operate under the and deputies for administration and operations, integrating inputs from field reports to refine nationwide protocols. Operational funding supports this bureaucracy, with the fiscal year 2026 budget approved at P11.8 billion, primarily directed toward personnel services, maintenance, and logistical procurement to sustain activities across over 76,000 polling precincts and 1.5 million personnel deployments. Emphasis is placed on supply chain logistics, including secure transport of ballots and equipment to isolated areas, to mitigate delays inherent in the ' fragmented terrain. For security, COMELEC collaborates with the and through inter-agency mechanisms, including joint operations centers that assess threats via intelligence sharing and deploy protective forces to vulnerable polling sites based on verified risk evaluations. This coordination, formalized in protocols like those for the 2025 midterm elections, prioritizes data-driven allocations over uniform coverage, reducing incidents through targeted interventions.

Electoral Processes

Voter Registration and Eligibility

Voter eligibility under the Philippine Constitution requires individuals to be Filipino citizens at least 18 years of age on , with residency in the for at least one year and in the precinct of intended voting for at least six months immediately preceding the election, excluding those disqualified by law. Disqualifications, as outlined in the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), encompass persons adjudged by final to suffer from mental incapacity, those serving sentences for crimes punishable by over one year of imprisonment, and individuals convicted of prohibited election offenses or subversion. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) administers through a continuing system established by Republic Act No. 8189, allowing qualified citizens to apply year-round at designated offices, though intensified drives occur periodically before major polls. Applicants must present valid identification and undergo verification, including biometric capture of fingerprints, photographs, and iris scans mandated by Republic Act No. 10367 since 2013 to enable deduplication via systems and curb fraudulent multiple registrations. This biometric integration, fully implemented from the 2016 elections onward, has processed millions of records to flag duplicates based on empirical matching algorithms, reducing ghost voter entries documented in pre-biometric audits. COMELEC schedules targeted registration campaigns, such as 10-day nationwide drives, to boost participation among eligible youth and migrants; for instance, a 2025 drive ahead of registered over 2 million new voters. For the May 2025 national and local elections, the certified voter roll reached 68.43 million registered individuals, reflecting growth from prior cycles amid efforts to verify residency and biometric compliance. meeting eligibility can register via consular offices or online platforms, appending to the domestic total for a combined electorate exceeding 69 million. To preserve list accuracy and deter fraud, COMELEC deactivates records periodically for non-participation in two consecutive regular elections, confirmed deaths via civil registry cross-checks, court disqualifications, or biometric mismatches indicating invalid entries. Following the 2023 barangay polls, approximately 4.2 million voters were deactivated in 2024, with reactivation available upon petition and re-verification to restore eligibility without penalty. Audits of deactivation processes have revealed error rates below 1% in biometric-linked cases, underscoring data-driven maintenance over manual lists prone to higher inaccuracies.

Campaign Oversight and Regulation

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) enforces strict campaign spending limits under Philippine to promote equity, capping expenditures at amounts ranging from PHP 3 to PHP 10 per registered voter for national positions such as president, , and senators, with higher limits up to PHP 60 per voter for certain local offices like governors and mayors, adjusted based on constituency size. Candidates exceeding these caps face disqualification, as warned by COMELEC in May 2025. Post-campaign, all candidates must submit Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCEs) within 30 days of election day—by June 11, 2025, for the midterm polls—detailing all receipts and disbursements using COMELEC-prescribed forms to enable verification and public scrutiny. COMELEC verifies these reports, inviting public assistance for accuracy, as emphasized in July 2025 directives. COMELEC regulates candidate entry through accreditation of , requiring petitions for recognition as dominant or major parties by deadlines such as March 27, 2025, for the 2025 elections, to allocate resources like equal airtime. Parties must demonstrate organizational strength and publish accreditation petitions in newspapers. To prevent voter confusion, COMELEC disqualifies candidates—those whose candidacies mock the process or resemble legitimate contenders—either or via petition, with the clarifying in January 2025 that lack of funds alone does not qualify as nuisance status. In October 2024, COMELEC prioritized such cases ahead of filing deadlines. Efforts to curb political dynasties remain unrealized, with anti-dynasty bills, mandated by the 1987 Constitution's Article II, Section 26, under Senate discussion as of August 2025 but lacking enactment, leaving enforcement to COMELEC only upon passage. For digital oversight, COMELEC's Resolution No. 11064, promulgated in September 2024, mandates registration of all campaign social media accounts, websites, and AI-generated content for the 2025 elections to combat disinformation, requiring disclosure of AI use and prohibiting deepfakes that mislead voters, while platforms must label sponsored content. These rules apply from the campaign period's start, balancing free expression with electoral integrity, though critics in November 2024 urged repeal for overreach.

Polling, Counting, and Canvassing

Polling in Philippine elections is conducted at clustered precincts, where multiple precincts are grouped for efficiency under COMELEC Resolution No. 10965, typically comprising 200-250 voters per cluster to streamline operations and reduce logistical demands. The Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), consisting of a chairperson and members appointed by COMELEC, manages manual elements such as voter verification, ballot issuance, and feeding ballots into Automated Machines (ACMs), ensuring public observation and sealing of machines post-voting. occurs immediately after polls close, with ACMs—introduced in the post-2010 Automated Election System (AES)—optically scanning paper ballots to tally votes and generate election returns (ERs), minimizing human error in aggregation while retaining verifiable paper trails. Canvassing follows at municipal, city, provincial, and national levels by respective boards, chaired by COMELEC representatives and including local officials, which consolidate transmitted ERs to proclaim winners based on vote totals. In the AES framework established after 2010 via Republic Act No. 9369, ERs are digitally transmitted from precincts to these boards, enabling rapid partial results; for instance, 40% of national results were available within 90 minutes of poll closure in 2010. For the midterm elections, COMELEC enhanced transmission via a "sent-to-all" system and telco partnerships, achieving the fastest-ever rates with over 90% of results reported within hours, surpassing prior benchmarks despite reliance on cellular networks. To address potential discrepancies, COMELEC provides protest mechanisms under its Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System, allowing candidates to file election protests within specified periods post-proclamation, triggering manual recounts limited to precincts with verifiable irregularities such as mismatched ERs or ballot defects. Recounts require evidence of fraud or errors impacting outcomes, with COMELEC or tribunals like the Presidential Electoral Tribunal overseeing processes to validate results through physical ballot examination, ensuring accountability without automatic blanket reviews. These steps emphasize empirical verification over unsubstantiated claims, with historical data showing recounts altering few outcomes absent concrete proof.

Overseas and Automated Voting Systems

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has facilitated Overseas Absentee Voting (OAV) under Republic Act No. 9189, enacted in 2003, enabling qualified Filipinos abroad to vote in national elections without returning to the Philippines. This system initially relied on in-person voting at embassies and consulates during a 30-day period preceding election day, with registered overseas voters numbering approximately 1.18 million for the 2025 midterm elections out of an estimated 15 million eligible Filipinos abroad. For the 2025 elections, COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) introduced internet voting as a pilot, allowing pre-enrolled registered voters to cast ballots online via secure platforms managed by the Office for Overseas Voting (OFOV), marking the first such implementation to boost participation amid logistical challenges. Pre-enrollment required identity verification, with voting occurring from April 13 to May 12, 2025, though turnout remained low at around 48,000 pre-enrollments initially due to trust concerns in the new digital process. The Automated Election System (AES), adopted since the 2010 elections, integrates hardware and software for ballot scanning, counting, and result transmission to enhance speed and reduce manual errors. Core components include Vote Counting Machines (VCMs), evolved from Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, which scan shaded paper s, generate election returns, and support verifiable paper audit trails for post-election audits. Transmission protocols involve encrypted electronic sending of results from VCMs to municipal canvassing centers and the national board of canvassers via public telecommunications networks, with safeguards like digital signatures and hash codes to verify integrity. In a February 2024 ruling, the affirmed that COMELEC could be compelled via to permit party representatives and observers to witness ballot printing and to disclose VCM transmission diagrams, reinforcing transparency requirements under election laws without mandating full access. AES incorporates physical safeguards such as (UV) inks on ballots to detect , though early implementations faced issues leading to temporary deactivation of UV readers in 2010. Error rates in VCM scanning have been reported below 0.5% in audited precincts, mitigated by manual random audits of 1% of precincts comparing machine counts to physical ballots. For the 2025 elections, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) observed that the AES demonstrated resilience against technical disruptions, contributing to high overall despite polarized conditions, with no widespread transmission failures noted in monitored areas. This builds on iterative improvements, including enhanced cybersecurity protocols and backup manual counting provisions, ensuring continuity even in remote or overseas-adapted processes.

Reforms and Achievements

Transition to Automated Election Systems

Following the Supreme Court's 2006 invalidation of the 2004 ARMM automated election contract with Mega Pacific eSolutions due to technical deficiencies and failure to meet bid specifications, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9369 on January 23, 2007, amending RA 8436 to mandate the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to implement a nationwide Automated Election System (AES) for national and local elections. The law required paper-based ballots scanned by precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machines, generating electronic results and verifiable paper audit trails, with provisions for random manual audits to cross-check automated counts. The AES debuted nationwide in the May 10, 2010, national elections, marking Southeast Asia's first fully automated polls and serving over 50 million voters across 82,000 precincts. Transmission of results accelerated dramatically compared to manual systems, which previously required weeks for ; in 2010, 40% of results were uploaded within 90 minutes of polls closing, and over 99% within 48 hours, enabling proclamations in days rather than weeks. Initial deployment faced glitches, including PCOS machine overheating and misreads in about 0.5% of units, necessitating manual overrides in isolated precincts, though overall transmission success exceeded 99%. By the May 13, 2013, midterm elections, AES implementation had expanded to full nationwide coverage for all positions, incorporating hybrid elements like mandatory manual audits of 1% of precincts to verify electronic tallies against ballot images and physical s. The system's audit trails—comprising transmitted election returns, consolidated canvass reports, and reviews—provided forensic verifiability, limiting opportunities for traditional tactics such as ballot stuffing or dagdag-bawas (vote padding/shaving) by enabling post-election reconciliation, though critics noted vulnerabilities to pre-programming risks absent independent audits. Cost analyses indicated long-term savings from reduced manpower needs, with 2010 operations costing approximately PHP 11.3 billion versus manual equivalents, balanced against upfront hardware investments.

Transparency and Efficiency Improvements

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) enhanced transparency in the 2025 midterm elections through collaborations with organizations (CSOs), including the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), which commended the agency's openness and inclusivity in . Filipino CSOs similarly welcomed COMELEC's willingness to address issues via joint dialogues, fostering electoral reforms post-election. Random manual audits (RMAs) of automated counting machines (ACMs) post-2025 elections demonstrated high integrity, achieving a 99.997% accuracy rate across audited precincts, with discrepancies far below 1%. COMELEC conducted these audits on 753 clustered precincts by mid-June 2025, verifying alignment between machine counts and manual tallies despite isolated overvoting incidents totaling 1.3 million ballots. Efficiency gains included real-time result transmission via digital platforms, enabling media outlets like ABS-CBN's Halalan 2025 portal to aggregate and display partial, unofficial results from COMELEC data starting election night on May 12, 2025. Coordinated security measures with the (PNP) contributed to reduced violence, with validated election-related incidents dropping 53% compared to prior cycles, and fewer high-risk areas identified. The 2025 midterms recorded a record-high of 82.2%, with 57.35 million ballots cast out of 68.43 million registered voters, reflecting sustained public trust in procedural safeguards amid persistent . An October 2025 survey indicated 80% confidence in the results, underscoring the effectiveness of these mechanisms in maintaining process credibility.

Recent Innovations and International Alignment

In September 2024, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 11064, establishing guidelines for the use of (AI) and in the 2025 elections to mitigate and deepfakes. Candidates must disclose AI-generated content in campaign materials, with penalties for non-compliance, aiming to preserve amid rising digital manipulation risks. This framework requires registration of digital platforms and promotes transparency in AI applications, aligning with global efforts to regulate generative technologies in democratic processes. For the May 12, 2025, national elections, COMELEC introduced internet voting for , enabling registered absentee voters to participate online without paper ballots, thereby expanding access for approximately 1.6 million overseas voters. Pre-enrollment via official portals preceded secure transmission, with no verified security breaches reported during implementation, marking a shift from traditional absentee methods to enhance participation rates. This innovation, supported by partnerships with embassies, reflects adaptations to needs while maintaining verifiable outcomes. COMELEC's fiscal year 2024 of P27.34 billion facilitated upgrades, including of new automated counting machines, which expedited result transmission and post-election reporting processes. These funds enabled faster and Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) disclosures, with senatorial and party-list filings published by July 8, 2025, improving accountability timelines. Internationally, the Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to the in 2025 commended COMELEC's operational resilience, noting effective observation of pre-electoral stages and digital integrations despite challenges. The mission's July 3, 2025, final report highlighted alignments with standards for transparency and inclusion, recommending further legal reviews while affirming procedural strengths. Concurrently, hearings in August 2025 on anti-political dynasty bills, such as those filed by Senator Francis Pangilinan, advanced reforms to curb family dominance, echoing international norms for equitable access to public office and complementing COMELEC's enforcement role.

Criticisms and Controversies

Historical Scandals and Integrity Challenges

The in 2005 involved leaked wiretap recordings from the 2004 presidential election, capturing conversations between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, in which she allegedly requested adjustments to vote counts to secure a one-million-vote margin in key provinces like , , and . Garcillano, responsible for southern operations, reportedly assured her of "dagdag-bawas" (vote-padding and shaving) capabilities through local election supervisors. This exposed systemic oversight failures, including inadequate safeguards against commissioner-level interference in canvassing and tabulation, as COMELEC lacked robust protocols to prevent such direct political collusion, leading to a with proceedings against Arroyo and widespread protests. Prior to the election, COMELEC's 2003 procurement of automated counting machines from Mega Pacific eSolutions Inc. unraveled due to technical incompetence and procedural lapses. On January 13, 2004, the voided the P1.2 billion contract under G.R. No. 159139, ruling it null for failing Republic Act 8436's standards; demonstrations showed machines erasing votes, misreading ballots, and lacking source code verification, despite accreditation denials by the COMELEC's technical evaluation committee. COMELEC proceeded with partial implementation amid warnings from petitioners like the Foundation of the Philippines, revealing causal breakdowns in transparency, , and contingency planning, which forced a reversion to manual counting and delayed automation efforts. COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.'s 2007 involvement in the NBN-ZTE scandal further eroded institutional credibility through alleged partisanship. Abalos, while heading COMELEC, traveled to in 2007 to facilitate a $329 million deal with Corporation, reportedly offering Transportation Secretary Leandro Mendoza a P200 million bribe for approval, as testified by Jose de Venecia III. An complaint filed on September 27, 2007, by Governor Suplico accused him of graft and betrayal of public trust, linking his external influence-peddling to biased election oversight favoring the administration. Abalos resigned on October 1, 2007, amid Senate probes, underscoring failures in enforcing ethical firewalls for top officials, as his dual roles enabled conflicts that prioritized personal networks over electoral neutrality. These pre-2010 incidents collectively fostered public distrust, with international observers like the documenting COMELEC's poor administration in 2004—marked by delays, inaccuracies, and —as contributing to perceptions of vulnerability to manipulation, though no single post-scandal survey quantified trust metrics precisely. Causal roots lay in weak internal audits, insufficient independence from executive influence, and procurement shortcuts, amplifying skepticism toward COMELEC's capacity for impartiality.

Technological Procurement Failures

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) awarded a P17.9 billion contract in March 2024 to a led by South Korean firm Miru Systems Co. Ltd., alongside Integrated Computer Systems, St. Timothy Construction Corporation, and Centerpoint Solutions Technologies Inc., for supplying 128,000 vote-counting machines and related equipment for the 2025 midterm elections, despite protests from losing bidders and scrutiny over Miru's history of technical glitches and legal disputes in elections abroad, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Macedonia. hearings highlighted risks of procurement irregularities, with Senator labeling the decision "disturbing" due to Miru's unproven reliability in large-scale deployments and potential for delays in a tight timeline before the polls. These controversies echoed patterns in prior contracts, such as the 2016 dealings with , where extensions and renewals—later probed for alleged multi-million peso bribes to influence bidding—raised questions about undue favoritism and non-competitive processes under the Reform Act. Judicial oversight has repeatedly intervened in COMELEC's practices to mitigate transparency gaps. In January 2024, the ruled in a petition that COMELEC could be compelled to permit accredited groups to witness ballot printing and disclose vote-counting machine transmission diagrams, addressing petitioners' concerns over unverifiable digital processes in automated systems since 2010. This followed similar 2024 reversals of COMELEC's disqualification of from bidding, citing grave abuse of discretion in procedural handling. Pilot implementations have exposed technical incompatibilities and inefficiencies, amplifying procurement risks. A 2019 voter registration verification system project, budgeted at nearly P1 billion, collapsed after failing pilot tests due to integration flaws with existing databases, resulting in wasted funds without operational deployment. Bidding failures persisted into 2024, including a declared nullity for online voting services owing to non-compliant bids, which delayed adoption and underscored tensions between rigorous transparency requirements—often sparking protests—and the need for swift, cost-effective acquisitions to avoid election disruptions. While these lapses have fueled risk perceptions through repeated single-source extensions and overlooked vendor vetting, no court-validated links them to systemic fraud altering final national tallies.

Allegations of Partisanship and Procedural Irregularities

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has faced accusations of partisanship from critics who interpret its enforcement actions as biased against opposition or progressive candidates. In April 2022, Commissioner Rey Bulay warned that individuals making "insinuations or allegations of partisanship" against the agency could face legal consequences, including involvement of the for threats, prompting backlash from Senator who described it as an attempt to suppress dissent. Bulay later clarified that such warnings targeted libelous statements or election offenses like , not mere criticism, emphasizing accountability under Philippine law for defamatory imputations. Red-tagging practices, where candidates are labeled as communist sympathizers, have been cited as evidence of procedural bias, particularly against left-leaning groups amid ongoing threats from the (NPA), a designated terrorist organization responsible for insurgent violence. In the 2025 midterm elections, red-tagging emerged as the leading campaign violation, with groups reporting and threats against progressive candidates and volunteers, often linked to state responses to NPA recruitment and attacks in rural areas. Former NPA members petitioned COMELEC to amend anti-discrimination guidelines, arguing they hinder disclosures of insurgent ties that could compromise election , while disqualification complaints were filed against parties like Duterte Youth for alleged red-tagging. Critics from activist networks contend this reflects selective enforcement favoring administration-aligned narratives over fair play. Cyber vulnerabilities have fueled claims of procedural lapses enabling manipulation. In March 2016, hackers identifying as Anonymous Philippines breached COMELEC's website, defacing it and extracting personal data of approximately 54 million registered voters, highlighting inadequate safeguards ahead of elections. Similar allegations surfaced in January 2022, with reports of server intrusions potentially affecting voter rolls for the midterm polls, though COMELEC denied any confirmed breach and initiated probes, attributing some claims to hoaxes. The 2022 mayoral victory of in , , drew scrutiny for procedural oversights, as subsequent investigations revealed her alleged of Filipino citizenship—later linked to probes involving Chinese nationals—despite COMELEC's initial certification of her candidacy. COMELEC filed a material case against Guo in October 2024, leading to her not guilty plea in December 2024, underscoring post-election accountability but raising questions about pre-vetting rigor. In contrast, COMELEC's probes into Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) for senatorial candidates demonstrate enforcement against irregularities across affiliations, verifying reports of illegal donations from 21 government contractors to at least four to six bets, in violation of bans on public fund-linked contributions. Such actions, including investigations, counter partisanship claims by applying rules uniformly, with reversals of COMELEC decisions remaining infrequent relative to upheld rulings in disqualification and bidding cases.

Post-2022 and 2025 Election Disputes

Following the 2022 national elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) faced allegations of irregularities, including claims of early transmission of election returns and potential rigging, which it publicly debunked, asserting that transmission protocols were followed and results verified through canvassing. Courts, including the , denied petitions for manual recounts, such as in , affirming COMELEC's processes and dismissing challenges lacking substantial evidence of outcome-altering fraud. Groups like Kontra Daya alleged systemic fraud, but independent observer ANFREL's interim assessment highlighted procedural adherence despite isolated issues, with no verified tallies overturned. COMELEC Commissioner Rey Bulay's statements warning critics of potential arrests for spreading were framed by the agency as of election code violations, such as prohibiting unfounded claims that undermine , rather than threats to free speech. Critics, including Senator , condemned these as intimidating, potentially chilling dissent during the campaign. However, such measures aligned with COMELEC's mandate to counter , as echoed in later assessments of foreign risks, without of altering verified results. In the 2025 midterm elections held on May 12, reached a record 82.2% among 68.43 million registered voters, with 57.35 million ballots cast, indicating robust participation despite complaints of automated counting machine (ACM) errors, which topped reported violations but did not invalidate nationwide tallies. secured dominance, governing 71 of 82 provinces and prevailing in most congressional races, persisting amid public anti-dynasty sentiment but reflecting entrenched patronage networks over procedural disputes. Fraud allegations from Kontra Daya cited disenfranchisement and manipulation, yet ANFREL's final observation reported resilient civic engagement and high turnout in a low-competition , attributing issues like vote-buying to systemic factors rather than COMELEC-orchestrated alterations of outcomes. A notable procedural lapse occurred in October 2025 when the , on September 30, struck down Autonomy Act No. 77 (the Redistricting Act), halting BARMM parliamentary elections scheduled for October 13 due to unconstitutional seat reallocations, forcing reliance on interim appointees. COMELEC proceeded with investigations into irregularities, such as alleged contractor donations to senatorial candidates, but these post-election probes yielded no widespread invalidations, underscoring that while lapses existed, empirical participation data and observer validations outweighed unproven claims of systemic invalidity.

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  146. https://www.inquirer.net/430662/ex-npa-members-want-comelec-to-amend-resolution-on-anti-discriminatory-guidelines/
  147. https://www.karapatan.org/media_release/karapatan-sounds-alarm-on-the-increase-of-redtagging-incidents/
  148. https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/01/10/22/comelec-investigating-alleged-data-breach-ahead-of-halalan2022
  149. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-election-body-probes-hacking-report-says-no-breach-2022-01-12/
  150. https://www.inquirer.net/429282/comelec-hacker-groups-claim-of-another-comeleak-a-hoax/
  151. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/10/29/2396214/comelec-files-misrepresentation-case-vs-alice-guo-over-2022-mayoral-bid
  152. https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2024/12/5/alice-guo-pleads-not-guilty-to-election-offense-1953
  153. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/963027/comelec-4-senate-bets-in-2025-polls-received-donation-from-contractors/story/
  154. https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/10/21/comelec-probes-alleged-donations-from-contractors-to-6-senate-bets-1100
  155. https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/10/19/news/comelec-flags-21-contractors-for-illegal-campaign-donations/2203385
  156. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-reverses-comelec-resolution-disqualifying-smartmatic-from-participating-in-public-bidding-for-elections/
  157. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/11/15/2311540/comelec-disputes-early-transmission-claim-2022-election
  158. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-denies-request-for-manual-recount-of-2022-pangasinan-election-results-affirms-constitutional-right-to-foi/
  159. https://anfrel.org/anfrel-interim-statement-2022-philippine-national-elections/
  160. https://manilastandard.net/?p=314223921
  161. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1249372
  162. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2060276/acm-errors-top-election-violations-in-2025-midterm-polls
  163. https://pcij.org/2025/05/22/philippines-governors-political-dynasties-election-result/
  164. https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/5/15/bam-kiko-wins-positive-but-dynasties-dominated-halalan-2025-makabayan-1554
  165. https://kontradaya.org/2025-kd-report/
  166. https://iag.org.ph/news/2055-full-text-supreme-court-decision-on-bangsamoro-redistricting-act-of-2025
  167. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/20251001-Press-Briefer-FINAL.pdf
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