Recent from talks
Nothing was collected or created yet.
Bidding
View on WikipediaThis article needs additional citations for verification. (March 2014) |
Bidding is an offer (often competitive) to set a price tag by an individual or business for a product or service or a demand that something be done.[1] Bidding is used to determine the cost or value of something.
Bidding can be performed by a person under influence of a product or service based on the context of the situation. In the context of auctions, financial transactions on international markets, or real estate, the price offer a business or individual is willing to pay is called a bid. In the context of corporate or government procurement initiatives. in Business and Law school students actively bid for high demand elective courses that have a maximum seat capacity though a course bidding process using pre allocated bidding points or e-bidding currency on course bidding systems.[2] The price offer a business or individual is willing to sell is also called a bid. The term "bidding" is also used when placing a bet in card games. Bidding is used by various economic niches for determining the demand and hence the value of the article or property, in today's world of advanced technology, the Internet is a favoured platform for providing bidding facilities; it is a natural way of determining the price of a good in a free market economy.
Many similar terms that may or may not use the similar concept have been evolved in the recent past in connection to bidding, such as reverse auction, social bidding, or many other game-class ideas that promote themselves as bidding.
Course bidding
[edit]Academic bidding is an online process that allows a student to select seats in courses or electives that have a seat availability constraint and a maximum cap enforced for each elective course.[citation needed]
The process of academic elective course bidding is extensively followed at some of the Top 100 Ranking business schools and law schools. Wherein students receive bid points (mostly uniformly or bid points are calculated on the basis of their CGPA), students may utilize these bid points to select courses and place winning bids on an online course bidding software platform during the bidding activities.
The process of bidding varies between different educational institutions, but overall the idea of winning places through an auction remains the same.
There are two main types of academic bidding
In a Closed Course bidding process students can allocate a calculated number of bidding points based on insights from historical winning bid averages. The student can then know whether his/her bid is successful only after the bidding round is complete.
The allocation of available bid points in closed bidding points thus may not be very efficient. But it allows students to place bids and participate in a bid process that has an extended time duration of a couple of hours to days.
In an Open Course bidding process, students are given insights about the exact winning bid required to win a seat at that particular moment in real-time. So they have the option to change/adjust bid points whenever necessary before a bidding round duration is complete. Hence students would be able to adjust winning bid points across high-demand courses and low-demand courses and successfully win a portfolio of courses. The bidding round durations in this case can be shorter durations from 15 minutes to 45 minutes.
The typical process sequence of conducting the course bidding activity using course bidding software includes the following rounds:
- Course Bidding Round-1(Open / Closed bidding process)
- Confirmation Round-1(Informs students on successful bids and of the winning courses )
- Course Bidding Round-2 and Confirmation Round-2 (Allows students to bid for elective seats left after the bidding round - 1 and confirmation (Result Declaration) round round - 1 )
- Waitlist Generation Round (Allows students to be on the waitlist for high-demand elective courses that they haven’t won using their leftover bids in Bidding round 1 and 2)
- Add Drop Rounds[3] (Allows performing final changes to students winning list, the student may drop some elective courses they won, the seats available in high demand courses may be given to students in waitlist order for that high demand course)
Note the Waitlist Generation might use a closed bidding process to rank students in the waitlist. The Add-Drop rounds allow efficient allocation of seats left after a bidding process.
Online bidding
[edit]Bidding performs in two ways online: unique bidding and dynamic bidding.
Unique bidding: In this case, bidders place bids that are global unique bids which means that for the bid to be eligible, no other person can place the bid in this amount and the biddings are usually secret. There are two variants of this type of bidding : highest unique bidding and lowest unique bidding.
Dynamic bidding: This is a type of bidding where one user can set his bid for the product. Whether the user is present or not for the bidding, the bidding will automatically increase up to his defined amount. After reaching his bid value, the bidding stops from his side.
Timed bidding
[edit]Timed bidding auctions allow users to bid at any time during a defined time period, simply by entering a maximum bid. Timed auctions take place without an auctioneer calling the sale, so bidders don't have to wait for a lot to be called. This means that a bidder doesn't have to keep his eye on a live auction at a specific time.
By entering a maximum bid, a user is indicating the highest he is willing to pay for a lot. An automated bidding service will bid on his behalf to ensure that he meets the reserve price, or that he always stays in the lead, up to his maximum bid. If someone else has placed a bid that is higher than the maximum bid, the will be notified, allowing he to change the maximum bid and stay in the auction. At the end of the auction, whoever's maximum bid is the most wins the lot.
Live bidding is a traditional room-based auction. These can be broadcast via a website where viewers can hear live audio and see live video feeds. The idea is that a bidder places their bid over the Internet in real-time. Effectively it is like being at a real auction, in the comfort of the home. Timed bidding, on the other hand, is a separate auction altogether, which allows bidders to participate without the need to see or hear the live event. It is another way of bidding, that is more convenient to the bidder.
Bidding in procurement initiatives
[edit]Most large organizations have formal procurement organizations that acquire goods and services on their behalf. Procurement is a component of the broader concept of sourcing and acquisition. Procurement professionals increasingly realize that their make-buy supplier decisions fall along a continuum, from buying simple transactions to buying more complex and strategic goods and services (e.g. large scale outsourcing efforts). It is important for procurement professionals to use the appropriate sourcing model. There are seven models along the sourcing/bidding continuum: basic provider, approved provider, preferred provider, performance-based/managed services model, vested business model, shared services model and equity partnerships.[5]
- Basic provider: This transactional model is generally the best for low-value items with abundant supply and little complexity. The primary purpose is to gain access to goods at the lowest cost.
- Approved provider: Second case of transactional model in which goods and services are provided by prequalified suppliers who meet certain criteria. To reach this status, suppliers often offer some advantages. Companies tend to shift to this model from the basic provider model when they seek for cooperation with fewer suppliers.
- Preferred provider: Relational model that is suited for spend categories with an increased opportunity for meeting business objectives, therefore allowing to focus on strategy.
- Performance-based/managed services model: These models combine a relational model with an output-based economic model. The widest usage is in the aerospace and defense industries.
- Vested business model: A business model and mindset for creating highly collaborative business relationships. It is used to ensure getting the best absolute value through a transparent relationship with the possibilities for innovation.
- Shared services model: Suited for large organizations with multiple business locations and units where there is opportunity to standardize and consolidate workscope.
- Equity partnerships: This is a very formal contract approach due to the ownership structure. Setting up an equity partnership can be a very complicated and costly process.
Bid construction problem
[edit]The Bid Construction Problem (BCP) or the Bid Generation Problem (BGP) is an NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem addressed by the bidder in order to determine items it is interested to bid on and the prices asked for acquiring these items. In transportation services procurement auctions, the BCP is addressed by the carrier to determine the set of profitable auctioned transportation contracts to bid on and their bidding prices.[6] We distinguish two forms of the BCP depending in the nature of its parameters: deterministic vs stochastic.
Bidding off the wall
[edit]Bidding off the wall, or taking bids from the chandelier, as it is sometime known, is where the auctioneer bids on behalf of the vendor.
This is allowed by law in some countries and states, and the auctioneer is allowed to bid on behalf of the vendor up to, but not including, the reserve price. In some cases, this may be extremely helpful for bidders because the reserve needs to be met.
For an example, suppose a property is coming up for auction and there is only one person interested in bidding for it in the room. The reserve has been set at $100,000, and this bidder is happy to buy it at $120,000. The bidding starts at $80,000. Without the auctioneer bidding on behalf of the vendor, it would never progress beyond that amount. However, because the auctioneer will take bids or generate bids of $85,000, the bidder then goes to $90,000 etc. If the bidder wants to, he may bid $100,000 and secure the property on the reserve price.
The result is that the vendor has sold the property at reserve and the purchaser has bought the property on the reserve price at less than he was prepared to pay. Without the auctioneer taking bids off the wall, this would never have happened.
All professional auctioneers do this with all types of auctions, including motor vehicles. As long as they are pushing it up towards the reserve price, then it is not an issue. If you don't want to bid at the price the auctioneer is asking, don't bid. If the goods don't meet the reserve and no-one but you wants to buy, then if the auctioneer didn't bid off the wall to meet the required price, the goods wouldn't be sold anyway.
Joint bidding
[edit]Joint bidding,[7] appearing in procurement tendering and auctions, is the practice of two or more similar firms submitting a single bid. Bidding consortia among potential competitors are the most common in public and private procurement and were used by some oil companies in U.S. auctions for offshore leases. Bidding consortia allow firms to get resources needed to formulate a valid bid. They may share information about the likely value of the contract based on forecasts or surveys, jointly bear fixed costs, or combine production facilities. In Europe, the regulation of joint bidding in procurement varies across countries. Mergers and joint ventures typically lead to a fewer number of competitors, thus resulting in higher prices for consumers.
Issues and controversies
[edit]Bid rigging
[edit]Bid rigging is a form of collusion among firms intended to raise prices or lower the quality of goods or services offered in public tenders. In spite of it being illegal, this practice costs governments and taxpayers large sums of money. That is why the fight against bid rigging is a top priority in many countries. To detect bid rigging, national competition authorities rely on leniency programs. To reduce the dependency on the external sources, COMCO (Swiss Competition Commission) decided to initiate a long-term project in 2008 to develop a statistical screening tool.[8]
This product was supposed to have the following properties: modest data requirements, simplicity, flexibility, reliable results. There are two possible approaches in general: structural methods for the empirical identification of markets prone to collusion and behavioral methods to analyze the concrete behavior of firms in specific markets. In the case of behavioral methods, a number of statistical markers are watched. The markers divide into price- and quantity-related markers.
The price-related markers use the information in the structure of the winning and losing bids to identify suspect bidding behavior. The quantity-related markers are meant to identify collusive behavior from developments in the market shares that seem not to be compatible with competitive markets. An example of a price-related marker is so called variance screen. Empirical papers show evidence that the price variability is lower in a collusive environment.
Markers are relatively easily applied even when only little information is known. On the other hand, there exist more complicated econometric detection methods which require firm-specific data.
References
[edit]- ^ "Definition of bidding in English". Oxford. Archived from the original on December 11, 2012. Retrieved 29 March 2014.
- ^ "Not Quite the Economist - Course bidding: Is auction always the best?". blogs.harvard.edu.
- ^ "Subsequent Registration Cycles | NYU School of Law". www.law.nyu.edu. Retrieved 2021-05-24.
- ^ https://www.jeffmartinauctioneers.com/what-is-a-virtual-auction-understanding-the-modern-way-to-buy-and-sell-equipment
- ^ Keith, Bonnie; et al. (2016). Strategic Sourcing in the New Economy: Harnessing the Potential of Sourcing Business Models for Modern Procurement (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1137552181.
- ^ * Hammami, Farouk; Rekik, Monia; Coelho, Leandro C. (2019). "Exact and heuristic solution approaches for the bid construction problem in transportation procurement auctions with a heterogeneous fleet". Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 127: 150–177. doi:10.1016/j.tre.2019.05.009. S2CID 182223089.
- ^ Albano, Gian L. (15 September 2008). "Regulating Joint Bidding in Public Procurement". Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 5 (2): 335–360. doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn022.
- ^ Imhof, David (25 July 2018). "Screening for Bid Rigging—Does It Work?" (PDF). Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 14 (2): 235–261. doi:10.1093/joclec/nhy006.
Further reading
[edit]- Rapoport, Amnon, Otsubo, Hironori, Kim, Bora and Stein, William E. (2007). "Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence". Retrieved 2010-01-29.
- Bonnie Keith, Kate Vitasek, Karl Manrodt, Jeanne Kling.(2016)."Strategic Sourcing in the New Economy: Harnessing the Potential of Sourcing Business Models for Modern Procurement" ISBN 978-1137552181
- Albano, G.L. (2008). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2009, Pages 335–360
- David Imhof, Yavuz Karagök, Samuel Rutz (2018). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 14, Issue 2, June 2018, Pages 235–261
- Hammami, Farouk; Rekik, Monia; Coelho, Leandro C. (2019). "Exact and heuristic solution approaches for the bid construction problem in transportation procurement auctions with a heterogeneous fleet". Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 127: 150–177. doi:10.1016/j.tre.2019.05.009. S2CID 182223089. Bidding for transportation services procurement.
Bidding
View on GrokipediaOverview and Fundamentals
Definition and Core Mechanisms
Bidding refers to the competitive process in which participants submit offers, typically specifying prices or terms, to purchase goods, services, contracts, or rights from a seller or procurer. This mechanism facilitates price discovery by allowing bidders to express their valuations or costs, enabling the allocation of resources to those placing the most favorable offers according to predefined rules, such as the highest bid in forward auctions or the lowest in reverse auctions.[6][7] Core mechanisms of bidding revolve around the structure of bid submission, evaluation, and award determination. In open or ascending auctions, bidders publicly increment their offers in real time, continuing until no further increases occur, at which point the highest bidder wins and typically pays their final bid amount.[8] Sealed-bid formats, by contrast, require simultaneous private submissions, with winners selected based on the extremal bid—highest in standard auctions or lowest in procurement—often paying either their own bid (first-price) or the next-best competing bid (second-price or Vickrey). These rules influence bidder strategies, as second-price mechanisms encourage revealing true valuations to avoid overpayment risks, while first-price setups prompt shading bids below true values to maximize surplus.[8] Additional mechanisms include bid increments to prevent minor adjustments and tie-breaking protocols, ensuring efficient resolution. In multi-item or combinatorial bidding, participants may submit packages of bids for bundles, complicating evaluation but allowing for complementary valuations.[9] Procurement bidding often incorporates qualitative criteria beyond price, such as bidder responsiveness and responsibility, with awards to the lowest qualified offer after public opening and verification.[10] Overall, these elements promote competition while mitigating issues like collusion or winner's curse, where winners overpay due to optimistic estimates.[11]Historical Origins
The earliest recorded instances of auctions, involving competitive bidding, occurred around 500 BC in Babylon, as described by the Greek historian Herodotus in his Histories. In this annual marriage market, eligible women were paraded before prospective husbands; the most attractive were auctioned first via ascending bids from highest to lowest attractiveness, while less desirable women were assigned dowries with bids descending until a suitor accepted, ensuring all were married and promoting social stability.[3][12] This reverse auction element for dowries highlighted early variations in bidding mechanisms to achieve equitable outcomes.[13] In ancient Greece, auctions emerged as a method for disposing of war spoils and captured goods following military campaigns, with open bidding allowing participants to compete by incrementally raising offers until no higher bid was forthcoming.[14] These practices, documented from around the 5th century BC, extended to public sales of property and slaves, establishing bidding as a transparent means of price discovery in competitive environments.[15] The Romans expanded auction use significantly from the 2nd century BC, applying it to liquidate debtors' estates, sell battlefield loot, and even auction public contracts like tax collection rights; notably, after Julius Caesar's assassination in 44 BC, Mark Antony oversaw auctions of elite properties to fund political alliances, demonstrating bidding's role in rapid asset distribution.[14] The Latin term auctio, meaning "an increase," directly informed the modern English "auction," reflecting the core ascending bid dynamic.[15] Bidding processes waned during the early Middle Ages amid feudal economies but revived in Europe by the 16th century for art, wine, and estate sales, influenced by Roman precedents and facilitated by emerging merchant classes.[16] By the 17th century, English coffee houses hosted informal stock and commodity auctions, laying groundwork for formalized institutions like Sotheby's (established 1744 as a bookseller with auctions) and Christie's (1766), which standardized open outcry bidding for luxury goods.[13] These developments marked the transition from ad hoc ancient sales to structured markets, underscoring bidding's enduring utility in revealing true value through competition.[12]Economic Principles
Auction Theory and Bidder Behavior
Auction theory examines the strategic interactions among bidders in auctions, focusing on how auction rules influence bidding behavior and outcomes under models of bidder valuations and information. In the independent private values (IPV) framework, each bidder possesses a private valuation for the good, drawn independently from a known distribution, with no correlation across bidders.[17] This model assumes risk-neutral bidders who aim to maximize expected surplus, leading to equilibrium strategies where bids reflect a balance between the probability of winning and the profit conditional on victory. In second-price sealed-bid auctions, also known as Vickrey auctions, the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid, creating a weakly dominant strategy for bidders to reveal their true valuation.[18] This truth-telling incentive arises because misrepresenting the value—bidding above it risks overpaying without gain, while bidding below risks losing when the true value exceeds the second bid—yields no expected benefit.[19] Conversely, in first-price sealed-bid auctions, the winner pays their own bid, prompting strategic bid shading: bidders submit offers below their true valuation to maximize surplus, with the shading amount increasing in the number of competitors due to heightened winning probability trade-offs.[20] Equilibrium bidding functions in symmetric IPV settings derive from solving the first-order conditions of expected payoff maximization, often yielding closed-form expressions for uniform distributions.[21] The revenue equivalence theorem establishes that, under IPV with symmetric risk-neutral bidders and full information about the value distribution, first-price, second-price, and English ascending auctions generate identical expected seller revenue and bidder surplus in equilibrium.[22] This holds because allocation efficiency—the good going to the highest-value bidder—remains consistent across formats, and the theorem's envelope condition ties payments to interim allocation probabilities.[23] However, deviations such as risk aversion alter behaviors: risk-averse bidders shade less in first-price auctions relative to risk-neutral counterparts, effectively bidding more aggressively to increase winning chances, which can boost seller revenue compared to second-price formats. In common value auctions, where all bidders share the same underlying value but receive imperfect signals, the winner's curse emerges as a key behavioral pitfall: aggressive bidding leads winners to overpay on average, as their signal likely overestimates the true value conditional on prevailing over others.[24] Rational bidders mitigate this by downward-adjusting bids based on anticipated competition intensity, with equilibrium strategies incorporating Bayesian updating of signals.[25] Empirical deviations from these models, such as overbidding in lab settings, highlight bounded rationality, though experienced bidders converge toward theoretical predictions over repeated play.[24]Efficiency and Market Outcomes
In auction theory, allocative efficiency occurs when a good is assigned to the bidder with the highest valuation, maximizing total social surplus by ensuring resources flow to their most valued uses. Under the independent private values (IPV) model—where bidders' valuations are drawn independently from the same distribution and remain private—standard auction formats such as the English (ascending-bid), Dutch (descending-bid), first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auctions achieve this efficient allocation in symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria, assuming risk-neutral bidders and full participation.[26] The second-price sealed-bid format is particularly incentive-compatible, as dominant-strategy bidding truthfully reveals valuations without strategic shading, directly supporting efficiency.[22] The revenue equivalence theorem further underscores these outcomes: under IPV assumptions including independent draws, risk neutrality, and the same allocation rule (highest bidder wins), all standard auctions yield identical expected seller revenue equal to the expected value of the second-highest valuation, and identical expected bidder surpluses, despite divergent bidding behaviors such as bid shading in first-price formats.[21] This equivalence implies that efficiency in allocation translates to predictable market outcomes, with total surplus partitioned consistently between seller revenue and bidder rents; deviations arise primarily from violations like affiliated values or asymmetric bidders, where first-price auctions may underperform in revenue but maintain allocation efficiency.[27] Efficiency falters in common value auctions, where valuations correlate around an unobserved true worth (e.g., oil tract values), exposing bidders to the winner's curse: aggressive bidding risks overpayment as the winner's signal may overestimate the common component, leading to ex post inefficient allocations and negative bidder rents.[28] Empirical analyses of U.S. timber auctions, prototypical common value settings, reveal persistent winner's curse effects, with winning bids exceeding post-harvest values by margins consistent with incomplete adjustment for adverse selection, reducing realized efficiency below IPV benchmarks.[29] In hybrid private-common value environments, such as offshore oil leases, auctions allocate inefficiently as bidders discount private signals insufficiently against common value uncertainty, yielding outcomes where the highest private signal holder does not always hold the ex post highest valuation.[30] Market outcomes reflect these dynamics: efficient IPV auctions approximate competitive pricing, with seller revenue approximating the second-order statistic of valuations (e.g., in two-bidder cases, expected revenue equals half the good's average value), fostering rapid price discovery and surplus extraction near theoretical maxima.[31] Real-world deviations, including bidder collusion or entry barriers, erode efficiency; for instance, ring bidding in construction procurement inflates prices by 10-20% above competitive levels, per antitrust studies, diverting surplus from allocative optima.[32] Post-auction resale markets can partially restore efficiency by allowing inefficient winners to trade to higher-valuing parties, though transaction costs and market thinness limit this, as evidenced in art and treasury bill secondary markets where resale premia signal primary misallocations.[32] Overall, while theory predicts robust efficiency in simple settings, empirical market outcomes underscore the need for format-specific designs to mitigate information asymmetries and strategic distortions.Types of Bidding Processes
Open and Competitive Bidding
 Part 14, requires clear, well-defined requirements to ensure fairness and prevent post-submission modifications, with awards typically going to the lowest-priced, technically acceptable bidder.[39] It promotes competition by concealing bids from participants, reducing opportunities for strategic adjustments based on rivals' offers, though it demands sufficient time for solicitation, submission, and evaluation—often several weeks.[40] The method excels in scenarios with standardized goods or services, such as routine construction or supply contracts, where empirical evidence from federal procurement data shows it yields transparent outcomes and minimizes subjective judgments.[41] For instance, in U.S. government projects like public facility construction, agencies issue invitations for bids (IFBs) detailing specs, after which contractors prepare fixed-price offers without negotiation.[42] Advantages include enhanced bidder equality and resistance to emotional price inflation seen in open formats, as bidders cannot gauge competitors' intentions during submission.[43] However, drawbacks arise from its rigidity: it precludes discussions for clarifications or value enhancements, potentially leading to suboptimal results if requirements evolve or non-price factors like innovation matter, and preparation can be resource-intensive due to precise cost estimations required.[44] Negotiated bidding, in contrast, permits direct discussions between the procuring entity and offerors after initial proposals, allowing refinements to terms, pricing, and technical aspects before finalizing awards, as outlined in FAR Part 15.[45] This approach suits complex procurements where specifications are ambiguous, such as research and development or architect-engineer services, enabling "best and final offers" after evaluating trade-offs beyond mere cost, like quality or delivery timelines.[46] Unlike sealed bidding's fixed-price finality at opening, negotiations foster flexibility, with federal data indicating their use in over 80% of non-sealed contracts for achieving best value through iterative bargaining.[39] Agencies opt for negotiated bidding when sealed methods fail criteria—like ill-defined needs or urgency—or to incorporate non-price evaluations, as in defense contracts requiring technical proposals alongside costs.[47] It mitigates sealed bidding's limitations by allowing clarifications that reduce errors, though it risks prolonged timelines and perceptions of favoritism if not documented rigorously.[48] Empirical comparisons in procurement literature highlight negotiated processes yielding higher satisfaction in variable-scope projects, as they align causal incentives for innovation over pure price competition.[49]| Aspect | Sealed-Bid Bidding | Negotiated Bidding |
|---|---|---|
| Submission | Confidential, fixed offers opened publicly | Initial proposals followed by discussions |
| Evaluation Focus | Primarily lowest price among compliant bids | Price, technical merit, and other factors |
| Flexibility | None post-submission | Iterative refinements allowed |
| Typical Use | Well-defined, standard requirements (e.g., supplies) | Complex or evolving needs (e.g., R&D) |
Reverse and Two-Stage Bidding
Reverse bidding, commonly implemented as a reverse auction in procurement, involves a single buyer soliciting competitive bids from multiple suppliers who progressively lower their offered prices to win the contract for goods or services.[50] The buyer establishes detailed specifications, such as quantity, quality standards, and delivery timelines, prior to inviting bids, which suppliers then undercut in real-time via electronic platforms to drive down costs.[51] This mechanism inverts traditional auctions by prioritizing price minimization over maximization, making it suitable for standardized commodities like office supplies or raw materials where quality variations are minimal.[52] For instance, in 2019, North Carolina's state procurement policy defined reverse auctions as real-time electronic competitions among responsive vendors to provide the lowest price, emphasizing their use for controlled, consistent procurements.[53] The process typically unfolds in phases: pre-bid qualification to ensure supplier capability, followed by the auction event where bids decrease iteratively until a reserve price or time limit is reached, culminating in award to the lowest qualified bidder.[54] Advantages include cost savings of 10-20% on average for eligible items, as competition intensifies among bidders, though limitations arise for complex or custom services where aggressive price cuts may compromise quality or innovation.[55] Critics note potential risks of supplier collusion or "bid shading" fatigue, where participants withhold aggressive bids to avoid unsustainable pricing, as observed in some electronic reverse auctions for construction subcontracts.[56] Two-stage bidding, prevalent in construction and complex procurement tenders, divides the process into an initial qualitative evaluation phase followed by a pricing competition among shortlisted participants.[57] In stage one, bidders submit technical proposals, including design concepts, methodologies, and capability assessments, without revealing prices; procurers select a limited pool—often 3-5 firms—based on criteria like experience, innovation, and risk management.[58] Stage two then involves competitive pricing from the prequalified group, frequently under a pre-construction services agreement that fosters collaboration on detailed design before final commitment.[59] This approach mitigates risks in projects requiring early contractor input, such as infrastructure developments, by aligning incentives for cost certainty and reducing adversarial bidding; for example, it enables contractors to contribute to value engineering, potentially lowering overall project costs by 5-15% through optimized designs.[60] The World Bank endorses two-stage bidding for information systems procurement involving technical complexity, where stage one evaluates unpriced proposals and stage two refines bids with clarified requirements, ensuring the same proposal carries through both phases to maintain integrity.[61] Drawbacks include extended timelines—often 20-30% longer than single-stage processes—and higher upfront administrative costs, though these are offset in high-value contracts exceeding $10 million where poor selection could lead to overruns.[62] In practice, two-stage methods have gained traction post-2010 in public sector projects to balance competition with expertise, as seen in UK frameworks emphasizing prequalification for collaborative outcomes.[63]Applications in Specific Contexts
Procurement and Construction Bidding
Procurement and construction bidding involves the competitive solicitation of proposals from contractors to undertake public or private projects, typically emphasizing sealed-bid formats to promote transparency and cost efficiency. In this process, owners—such as government agencies or private developers—issue invitations for bids (IFBs) detailing project specifications, scope, drawings, timelines, and evaluation criteria, inviting qualified firms to submit fixed-price offers. Bids are sealed to prevent collusion and opened publicly at a designated time, with awards generally going to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder, defined as one meeting all technical requirements and demonstrating financial and performance capability. This method aligns with first-principles of competition, where multiple offers drive down prices through rivalry, as evidenced by empirical findings that reducing the number of bidders from six to four can increase project costs by up to 10-15% due to diminished competitive pressure. In the United States, federal construction procurement is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which requires sealed bidding for contracts exceeding simplified acquisition thresholds—currently $250,000 for most actions, with construction-specific limits up to $2 million for certain micro-purchases—when requirements are clear, time permits, and discussions are unnecessary. FAR Part 14 outlines the procedure: public advertisement of IFBs via platforms like SAM.gov, a minimum 30-day response period for bids, public opening and reading of submissions, and evaluation based solely on price and responsiveness without negotiations. For major projects, a two-step process may apply, first evaluating technical proposals for feasibility before price competition among qualified offerors, as implemented by the General Services Administration (GSA) for federal buildings. This framework ensures full and open competition under FAR Part 6, barring exceptions like sole-source awards, and has been credited with securing billions in infrastructure contracts annually, though critics note that over-reliance on lowest price can lead to claims of inadequate quality controls.[38][64][65] State and local procurement mirrors federal practices but varies by jurisdiction; for instance, many require competitive bidding for public works over 100,000 to comply with statutes like California's Public Contract Code, mandating sealed bids and bonds to guarantee performance. Private construction bidding often follows similar steps—bid solicitation, pre-bid conferences for site reviews, and submission via digital platforms—but allows more flexibility, such as negotiated adjustments post-submission. Empirical analyses of design-bid-build projects, the traditional model using sealed lowest-bid awards, indicate no statistically significant cost or schedule overruns compared to best-value alternatives when bidder pools are robust, underscoring the method's reliability for straightforward projects. However, success hinges on accurate estimating; contractors typically allocate 5-10% of bid preparation time to risk assessment, factoring labor, materials, and contingencies to avoid underbidding, which accounts for 20-30% of project failures in competitive environments.[66][67] Key challenges include ensuring bidder responsibility beyond price, as low bids from unqualified firms can inflate long-term costs through delays or rework, prompting regulations like performance bonds (typically 100% of contract value) and surety requirements. In practice, procurement entities conduct responsibility determinations via financial audits and past performance reviews, rejecting non-compliant bids even if cheapest. Digital tools have modernized the process since the early 2010s, with platforms enabling electronic submissions and reducing errors, yet antitrust concerns persist, as sealed formats theoretically curb but do not eliminate collusive risks in concentrated markets like highway construction. Overall, these bidding mechanisms have facilitated trillions in global infrastructure since formalized post-World War II, balancing efficiency with accountability through verifiable competition.[44][68]Auction and Online Bidding
 or proposals (RFPs), allowing vendors to submit detailed offers evaluated on price, quality, and compliance.[81] The U.S. Department of Education maintains a portal for such contract opportunities, adhering to federal procurement regulations that prioritize fair competition.[82] In practice, educational bidding often follows structured cycles: bids are solicited, publicly opened, and awarded to the lowest responsive bidder meeting specifications, with oversight from bodies like state comptrollers to prevent irregularities.[83] For federal programs such as E-rate, which funds telecommunications for schools, applicants must post FCC Form 470 to initiate competitive bidding, selecting providers based on cost-effectiveness while documenting the process for audits.[84] This approach mitigates risks of favoritism, though empirical reviews indicate that adherence varies, with some districts documenting exemptions for non-competitive procurements when justified by unique needs.[85] Timed bidding constitutes an automated auction mechanism, predominantly in online formats, where each lot closes at a predefined end time without a live auctioneer facilitating calls.[86] Bidders submit maximum amounts in advance, with the platform incrementally adjusting bids on their behalf according to predefined increments until the limit or auction close.[87] Common in digital marketplaces, this method supports extended bidding windows—ranging from 48 hours to a week—enabling global, asynchronous participation while lots may extend sequentially or upon late bids to deter sniping.[88] For example, in timed online auctions, closing sequences often stagger lot endings to maintain bidder engagement, with no bids accepted after the final timer expires.[89] The format's efficiency stems from its automation, reducing human error and allowing bidders to strategize without real-time pressure, though it can amplify last-minute bidding dynamics.[90] Platforms implementing timed bidding, such as those for surplus educational assets, integrate features like proxy bidding to simulate competitive escalation, yielding outcomes akin to ascending auctions but with fixed durations.[91] Empirical observations from auction software deployments note higher completion rates for timed events due to predefined schedules, contrasting with indefinite live sessions.[92]Strategies and Techniques
Bid Construction and Optimization
In auction theory, bid construction entails estimating a bidder's private valuation or cost structure and adjusting the submitted bid to account for informational asymmetries, competitor behavior, and auction format. Optimization seeks to maximize expected utility by deriving bids that balance the likelihood of winning with the anticipated surplus, often through game-theoretic equilibria. For instance, in symmetric independent private values models, risk-neutral bidders construct bids by shading below their true valuation to mitigate overpayment risks.[4] A core technique in first-price sealed-bid auctions is bid shading, where bidders deliberately submit offers lower than their estimated value to optimize payoffs amid uncertainty about rivals' bids. This strategy arises because the highest bidder pays their own bid, incentivizing conservatism to avoid the winner's curse—overbidding due to overly optimistic valuation signals. Empirical models confirm that shading intensity increases with the number of competitors and decreases with bidder risk aversion; for example, in equilibrium for n identical risk-neutral bidders with uniform valuation distributions, the optimal bid function simplifies to , where is the bidder's valuation. In procurement and reverse auctions, bid optimization shifts focus to cost minimization for sellers, incorporating combinatorial elements for multi-item tenders. Bidders construct proposals by aggregating unit costs, fixed overheads, and profit margins, then optimize via linear programming or scenario analysis to evaluate trade-offs across bid packages. Studies of multi-unit procurement auctions demonstrate that discriminatory pricing formats yield higher seller revenues than uniform formats, as they allow tailored shading based on marginal costs and expected clearing prices.[93] Construction bidding emphasizes data-driven construction, where firms optimize by selecting projects via historical win rates and markup adjustments for risk factors like material volatility. Effective strategies include precise quantity takeoffs and probabilistic contingency additions, with post-bid reviews refining future optimizations; for example, firms using integrated software report 10-15% improvements in bid-hit ratios by simulating competitor responses. Regulatory constraints, such as sealed-bid requirements, further necessitate robust optimization to avoid underbidding leading to losses, as evidenced by analyses showing average project overruns of 20-30% from unoptimized low bids.[94][95] Across contexts, machine learning enhancements to bid optimization, such as predicting rival bids from past data, have gained traction; a 2024 study on transportation procurement found optimization-based auctions reduced costs by 5-12% through dynamic bid adjustments. However, over-reliance on algorithmic shading risks antitrust scrutiny if it facilitates tacit collusion, underscoring the need for transparent, verifiable construction processes.[96]Joint Bidding and Informal Methods
Joint bidding involves two or more independent entities forming a consortium to submit a single bid for a contract or auction, typically in scenarios where individual participants lack the necessary scale, expertise, or resources to compete effectively alone.[97] This practice is common in large-scale public procurement, construction projects, and spectrum auctions, where complementary capabilities—such as one firm's engineering prowess paired with another's financial backing—enable participation that might otherwise be infeasible.[98] Empirical studies indicate that joint bidding can lower procurement costs by expanding the pool of viable bidders, as evidenced in analyses of official development assistance contracts where it facilitated entry and reduced winning bid prices by up to 10-15% in certain markets.[99] However, it raises antitrust concerns when it masks collusion, such as allocating contracts among members or suppressing rival bids, which the U.S. Federal Trade Commission identifies as a form of bid rigging punishable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.[100] Legitimate joint bidding requires clear delineation of roles, such as lead bidder responsibilities and profit-sharing mechanisms, often governed by pre-bid agreements that antitrust authorities scrutinize for evidence of market division.[101] In the European Union, the European Commission's draft guidelines permit it only if it yields efficiencies like risk-sharing unavailable through solo efforts, but prohibit it if parties could bid independently or if it forecloses competition.[102] For instance, in FCC spectrum auctions, rules explicitly ban certain joint bidding arrangements between applicants to prevent strategic information exchanges that could distort outcomes.[103] Research on horizontal subcontracting post-joint bids shows that while it can incentivize aggressive initial pricing, it may also enable tacit coordination, leading regulators to favor ex-ante notifications for transparency.[104] Informal bidding methods encompass non-competitive or simplified solicitation processes used for low-value procurements, bypassing sealed bids or public advertisements to expedite purchases under predefined thresholds.[105] In U.S. federal guidelines under 2 CFR §200.320, these include micro-purchases (typically under $10,000, requiring price reasonableness checks without quotes) and small purchases (up to $250,000, involving informal quotes from at least three sources via phone, email, or catalogs). State-level implementations, such as Texas's informal bidding for goods valued between $15,000 and $50,000, mandate soliciting quotes from multiple vendors but allow verbal or written responses without formal sealing, aiming to balance efficiency with basic competition.[107] These methods reduce administrative burdens—procurement times can drop by 50-70% compared to formal processes—but risk favoritism or inflated pricing absent robust documentation, as non-competitive elements like sole-source justifications must still demonstrate no reasonable alternatives.[108] In private auctions or negotiations, informal methods extend to unsolicited proposals or handshake agreements, where bidders leverage relationships for direct offers rather than structured competitions, though this invites disputes over enforceability.[109] Empirical critiques highlight that while informal approaches suit urgent or specialized needs—e.g., emergency procurements during disasters—they correlate with higher long-term costs in datasets from local governments, underscoring the need for post-award audits to verify value.[110] Regulators like the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction emphasize documenting vendor selections to mitigate bias, ensuring informal bids align with broader competitive principles despite their streamlined nature.[105]Issues, Controversies, and Regulations
Bid Rigging and Collusive Practices
Bid rigging constitutes an antitrust violation wherein competing bidders collude to manipulate the outcome of a procurement or auction process, typically by prearranging the winning bidder or inflating prices through non-competitive submissions. This practice undermines the core purpose of competitive bidding, which relies on independent offers to achieve efficient pricing and allocation. Common forms include cover bidding, where losing bidders submit artificially high or non-compliant bids to feign competition; bid suppression, in which certain firms abstain from bidding to favor a designated winner; and bid rotation, whereby participants alternate winning contracts across tenders to share spoils without overt price competition.[100][111][112] Collusive mechanisms often extend to information sharing, such as exchanging bid details or costs prior to submission, enabling coordinated pricing that exceeds competitive levels. In construction and procurement contexts, these schemes exploit sealed-bid formats, where lack of transparency facilitates secret agreements via trade associations, social networks, or direct communications. Empirical analysis reveals that such collusion can elevate contract prices by over 20% for periods exceeding four years, as evidenced in historical cartel studies, with detection challenging due to the opacity of private negotiations.[113][114][115] Notable cases illustrate the prevalence in public procurement. In November 2022, a California construction firm owner pleaded guilty to bid rigging and bribery in schemes targeting state highway contracts, marking the third conviction in a multi-year investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice. Similarly, in March 2023, the UK's Competition and Markets Authority imposed nearly £60 million in fines on ten firms for colluding on demolition and asbestos removal bids, involving cover bids and market allocation from 2004 to 2015. U.S. federal highway procurement audits have identified complementary bidding patterns in at least one-third of contracts, correlating with a 6.9% average cost overrun attributable to reduced competition.[116][117][118] Penalties underscore the severity, with U.S. antitrust law treating bid rigging as a per se criminal offense punishable by fines up to $100 million for corporations and 10 years imprisonment for individuals, alongside civil treble damages. Internationally, bodies like the OECD highlight bid rigging's persistence in infrastructure sectors, recommending procurement designs with bidder rotation limits and data analytics to screen for anomalies like unusually consistent win rates or bid dispersion patterns. Despite enforcement, underreporting and detection lags persist, as colluders adapt to avoid empirical red flags such as phase effects in repeated tenders.[119][120][121]Regulatory Responses and Bid Protests
Regulatory authorities respond to bid rigging and other collusive bidding practices primarily through antitrust enforcement, treating such conduct as criminal violations under laws like Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the United States. The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division leads criminal prosecutions, imposing fines and prison sentences; for instance, in January 2025, four defendants pleaded guilty in the District of Maryland to schemes involving bid rigging, fraud, and bribery in U.S. Navy contracts, resulting in multimillion-dollar penalties. Similarly, in March 2025, four individuals and one company admitted guilt in separate bid rigging and wire fraud conspiracies across U.S. district courts, highlighting ongoing federal crackdowns on procurement collusion.[122] The Federal Trade Commission handles civil enforcement, focusing on deceptive practices that undermine competitive bidding.[100] To deter collusion, regulators employ leniency policies allowing self-reporting entities to avoid prosecution if they cooperate early; the DOJ's program has facilitated numerous confessions in bid rigging cases since its inception.[123] The Procurement Collusion Strike Force, launched in 2019 by the DOJ and other agencies, coordinates investigations into public contract rigging, using tools like wiretaps and whistleblower incentives, as seen in a 2024 wildfire fuel truck bidding conspiracy prosecution.[124] State attorneys general also pursue parallel actions, with increased coordination post-2020 to protect taxpayer funds in public procurements.[125] Bid protests serve as an administrative remedy for aggrieved bidders challenging perceived irregularities in government procurement processes, ensuring compliance with solicitation terms and regulations like the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).[126] In U.S. federal procurement, protests may be filed at the contracting agency, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; GAO protests, governed by 4 CFR Part 21, must demonstrate that the protester is an "interested party" with economic interest affected by the award or solicitation.[127] Protests target issues such as unequal evaluation, arbitrary awards, or solicitation flaws, with agency-level protests required before escalation to GAO in many cases.[128] GAO data indicates robust utilization: in fiscal year 2024, it received 1,803 cases (1,740 protests), down 11% from FY 2023 but reflecting sustained oversight, with a 16% sustain rate where agencies conceded errors or GAO recommended corrective action.[129] Overall effectiveness reached 52%, meaning protesters obtained relief in over half of cases via settlements or sustainments, though filings have declined 32% over the past decade amid streamlined procurements.[130] Critics note protests can delay awards—GAO resolves most within 100 days—but proponents argue they enhance transparency and deter arbitrary decisions without systemic abuse.[131] Reforms, including potential barriers to frivolous filings, remain under congressional review as of 2025.[132]Recent Developments and Empirical Critiques
In public procurement, recent advancements in detecting bid rigging have leveraged machine learning algorithms applied to electronic auction data, enabling agencies to identify collusive patterns such as bid rotation or complementary bidding with greater precision than traditional screens. A 2025 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research analyzed historical procurement datasets and found that machine learning models, when combined with statistical indicators like bid dispersion and competitor overlap, improved detection rates by up to 20% in simulated collusive environments compared to rule-based methods alone.[133] Similarly, a March 2025 analysis of digital procurement platforms highlighted the necessity of advanced tools to counter bid rigging facilitated by electronic systems, where automated bidding can mask coordination; empirical tests on European road construction tenders showed that hybrid machine learning-screening approaches flagged 15-25% more suspicious auctions than conventional variance-based screens.[134] Regulatory responses have incorporated these empirical tools into enforcement frameworks, with the OECD promoting data-screening protocols like the Bid-Rigging Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS) for real-time monitoring in public tenders as of 2022, updated in subsequent guidelines to account for AI-driven procurement trends. In 2024, UNCTAD evaluations of screening methods in infrastructure auctions demonstrated their efficacy in low-competition markets, detecting cartels in 10-15% of cases with false positive rates below 5%, though critiques noted over-reliance on historical data risks missing adaptive collusion strategies.[135][136] Empirical critiques of bidding strategies reveal deviations from theoretical predictions, particularly in procurement auctions where risk aversion and capacity constraints lead bidders to shade bids more aggressively than independent private values models assume. A 2023 peer-reviewed analysis of infrastructure procurement data across multiple countries found that collusive equilibria persisted even under sealed-bid formats designed to promote competition, with empirical bid distributions showing clustering 30-40% higher than Nash equilibrium forecasts, attributing this to unmodeled information asymmetries rather than irrationality.[137] Further, studies on online and overlapping auctions critique sniping strategies as suboptimal in high-information environments; data from e-procurement platforms in 2021-2023 indicated that late bidding increased win probabilities by only 5-10% but raised expected payments by 15% due to unobserved rival signals, challenging efficiency claims of dynamic formats.[138] In auction design, recent empirical work questions the universality of revenue equivalence, with 2025 procurement trend reports citing AI-optimized reverse auctions yielding 5-25% cost savings but only in standardized goods markets; heterogeneous projects showed persistent winner's curse effects, where overbidding by low-experience firms inflated prices by 10-20% beyond theoretical benchmarks.[139] These findings underscore causal limitations in first-bid models, as endogenous entry and affiliation among bidders' costs—evident in datasets from U.S. and EU tenders—distort outcomes, prompting calls for mechanism adjustments like reserve prices informed by machine-estimated cost distributions.[29]References
- https://dese.ade.[arkansas](/page/Arkansas).gov/Files/20201103162859_3_Bids_and_a_Buy_-_Steps_1.pdf
