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Ernesto Alfredo Castro Aldana (born 26 May 1971) is a Salvadoran politician and businessman who currently serves as the president of the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador. Castro previously served as a secretary and private advisor to Nayib Bukele from 2012 to 2020 when he was elected as a deputy of the Legislative Assembly from San Salvador in the 2021 legislative election.

Key Information

Early career

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Ernesto Alfredo Castro Aldana[1] was born on 26 May 1971.[2][3] He has degrees in Business Administration and Marketing Studies.[4] Castro is a businessman. Before entering politics, Castro worked as an external consultant to various companies and institutions, including serving as the general director of Grupo Tres y Punto.[1] In 2006, Castro, Nayib Bukele, Karim Bukele, and Andrés García founded 503, S.A de C.V., a restaurant management company.[5][6]

Early political career

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From 2012 to 2015, Castro was Bukele's secretary and private advisor while he served as mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán from 2012 to 2015. From 2015 to 2018, Castro continued to serve as Bukele's secretary and private advisor while he was serving as mayor of San Salvador.[4][7] Castro was a founding member of Nuevas Ideas, a political party established by Bukele in 2017.[5] Castro continued to serve as Bukele's private secretary after Bukele assumed the presidency on 1 June 2019.[4][7] During the COVID-19 pandemic, Castro supported the nationwide lockdowns implemented by Bukele's government.[1] Castro resigned as Bukele's secretary and private advisor in 2020 to seek public office in the 2021 legislative election.[8]

On 20 July 2020, Castro was elected as a candidate for deputy of the Legislative Assembly as a member of Nuevas Ideas.[9] As a candidate, Castro stated that "we will attack the issue of corruption, we will consolidate the issue of transparency, we will address the issue of accountability, we will avoid and break all those oligarchic monopolies" ("vamos atacar el tema de la corrupción, vamos a consolidar el tema de la transparencia, vamos a hacer el tema de la rendición de cuentas, vamos a evitar y vamos a quebrar todos esos monopolios oligárquicos").[10] On 28 February 2021, Castro received 57,733 marks—the most of any candidate—and was elected as a deputy to the Legislative Assembly; he was one of 56 Nuevas Ideas deputies to be elected.[11]

President of the Legislative Assembly

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Prior to assuming office as a deputy, an opinion poll conducted by La Prensa Gráfica from 20 to 26 April 2021 found that 6.6 percent of respondents believed that Castro would be the best option to serve as president of the Legislative Assembly, the highest percent received by any individual.[12] Castro assumed office on 1 May 2021, and 64 out of the 84 deputies of the Legislative Assembly voted to elect Castro as the president of the Legislative Assembly.[13][a] That same day, Castro voted with the Nuevas Ideas-led Legislative Assembly to remove Attorney General Raúl Melara and five Supreme Court justices from the constitutional court.[15]

On 11 March 2022, Castro was named as the president pro-tempore of the Forum of Presidents of Legislative Branches of Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and Mexico (FOPREL) for the 2022–2023 term,[16] succeeding Sergio Gutiérrez of Mexico.[17] Castro left office on 10 March 2023 and was succeeded by his vice president pro-tempore, Alfredo Pacheco of the Dominican Republic.[18]

In December 2022, Bukele suggested reducing the total number of municipalities in El Salvador from 262 to 50.[19] In February 2023, Castro confirmed that Nuevas Ideas was not only evaluating a proposal to reduce the number of municipalities from 262 to 50, but that the party was also evaluating a proposal to reduce the number of seats on the Legislative Assembly from 84 to 64.[20] Ultimately, in June 2023, Castro voted with the Nuevas Ideas-led Legislative Assembly to reduce the number of municipalities from 262 to 44 and the number of seats on the Legislative Assembly from 84 to 60. Opposition politicians claimed that the reductions were attempts by Nuevas Ideas to consolidate power and diminish the political representation of smaller political parties.[21][22][23]

Castro with Nayib Bukele in 2023

On 20 February 2023, Castro announced that he was running for re-election to the Legislative Assembly in the 2024 legislative election. He also stated that most deputies from Nuevas Ideas would also be seeking re-election.[24] On 9 July 2023, Castro secured one of Nuevas Ideas' 16 nominations for the legislative seats of San Salvador.[25] In December 2022, Castro stated that Nuevas Ideas aimed to win 70 seats in the Legislative Assembly,[26] but after the reduction of legislative seats and municipalities, Castro stated that the party now aimed to win all 60 seats in the Legislative Assembly and all 44 municipalities.[27] Castro's projections were criticized by opposition politicians who described them as being "undemocratic" ("antidemocrática") and an attempt to "concentrate power" ("concentrar el poder").[28] In the lead up to the election, Castro attended four reunions with Salvadoran expatriates living in the United States; the four reunions Castro attended were held in Houston,[29] Los Angeles,[30] New York City,[31] and Washington, D.C.[32] Castro won re-election during the 2024 legislative election.[33]

On 1 May 2024, Castro was re-elected as the president of the Legislative Assembly.[34]

Political positions

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Castro opposes the legalization of abortion in El Salvador. In March 2023, Castro wrote on Twitter that "there is not even the slightest possibility" ("no existe ni la más mínima posibilidad") that the Nuevas Ideas-led Legislative Assembly would vote in favor of legalizing abortion.[35]

Personal life

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Castro is married to Michelle Sol. Sol succeeded Bukele as mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán, serving from 2015 to 2018; is the incumbent minister of housing, serving since 2019;[36] and is seeking election as mayor of La Libertad Este in the 2024 general election.[37] Sol is a niece of Ana Ligia Mixco Sol de Saca, the former first lady of El Salvador from 2004 to 2009.[38]

As of November 2022, Castro has a net worth of around US$881,000 and receives a monthly salary of US$5,700.[39] In February 2023, the El Faro digital newspaper revealed that Castro and Sol's cooking company, Sociedad Castro Sol S.A. de C.V., had received US$504,000 in 18 checks from Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes between September 2010 and August 2011 to provide food and cook for the Presidential Battalion. El Faro alleged that the payments came from a black budget managed by Funes during his presidency.[36]

In September 2024, Infobae published audio recordings made by Alejandro Muyshondt, the national security advisor of El Salvador from 2019 to 2023, which supposedly depicted an agreement between him and Castro to engage in espionage against four Salvadoran newspapers: El Diario de Hoy, El Faro, La Prensa Gráfica, and Revista Factum.[40] In an interview, Castro suggested that the audio was created by artificial intelligence.[41]

Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Ernesto Castro

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Ernesto Alfredo Castro Aldana is a Salvadoran and businessman serving as President of the since 1 May 2021. A graduate with higher studies in from the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Castro entered as a founding member of the party established by in 2017 and previously held roles as Bukele's and advisor starting from 2012. Re-elected to the presidency of the Assembly on 1 May 2024, he represents the department of and leads the parliamentary group of . As a close ally of President Bukele, Castro has been instrumental in enacting legislation that supports the administration's territorial control plan and the ongoing , measures that have empirically reduced El Salvador's homicide rate from over 38 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 to approximately 2.4 in 2023, transforming the country from one of the world's most violent to among the safest in the . These reforms, including constitutional amendments in 2025 permitting indefinite presidential reelection, have faced criticism from international observers and opposition figures for concentrating power, though domestic support remains strong due to tangible improvements in and . Castro also opposes efforts to legalize , aligning with the country's strict prohibitions on the practice.

Early Life and Pre-Political Career

Childhood and Education

Ernesto Alfredo Castro Aldana was born on May 26, 1971, in . Details regarding his background and early childhood remain largely private, with Castro maintaining a discreet personal profile focused on professional and political endeavors rather than public disclosure of formative years. Castro received secondary education at the Panamerican School in , where he developed early associations with future political allies, including . He later pursued higher education at , completing studies in . These academic credentials laid the groundwork for his subsequent career as a businessman before entering .

Business Ventures and Professional Background

Ernesto Alfredo Castro Aldana, born on May 26, 1971, earned degrees in and studies, providing the foundation for his professional pursuits in commerce. Prior to his involvement in politics, Castro established himself as an empresario in , focusing on sectors including and real estate. In 2006, he co-founded 503, S.A. de C.V., a company dedicated to restaurant operations, partnering with , , and . Castro has administered multiple enterprises, notably in property development. Sociedad Castro Sol S.A. de C.V., operated jointly with his wife , engaged in commercial transactions, including a 2023 sale documented in . Similarly, Mov-I, S.A. de C.V., under his management during various periods, facilitated land acquisitions and sales, such as a 2022 transaction involving a parcel purchased by for luxury apartment development.

Entry into Politics and Alignment with Bukele

Role as Private Secretary

Ernesto Castro assumed the role of to President upon the latter's inauguration on June 1, 2019, serving in this capacity through the early phase of Bukele's administration until his own election to the in February 2021. As , Castro functioned as one of Bukele's most trusted confidants, managing confidential communications, coordinating high-level internal operations, and providing direct advisory support on presidential initiatives. This position placed him at the center of executive decision-making during a period marked by efforts to consolidate administrative control and address immediate governance challenges, including the response. In February 2020, amid a legislative impasse over funding for , Castro accompanied Bukele and a delegation of officials, including legal secretary Conan Castro, into the chamber on February 9, effectively supporting the president's intervention to pressure lawmakers into approving the loans. His involvement underscored the private secretary's role in facilitating rapid executive actions during political standoffs. Throughout his tenure, Castro maintained a low public profile but wielded significant behind-the-scenes influence, bridging Bukele's prior mayoral experience in —where Castro had served as chief secretary—with national-level strategy. The role also exposed Castro to scrutiny over potential conflicts of interest; a private company co-owned by Castro and his wife, , received approximately $500,000 from former President Mauricio Funes's "" allocations prior to Bukele's term, though no direct impropriety in Castro's secretarial duties has been established by official investigations. By May 2021, following ' supermajority in the assembly elections, Castro transitioned to legislative leadership, leveraging his executive proximity to advance Bukele's agenda.

Founding and Rise in Nuevas Ideas Party

Ernesto Castro served as a founding member of the movement, established by on October 25, 2017, following Bukele's expulsion from the (FMLN). As Bukele's at the time, Castro participated in the party's early organizational efforts, including foundational gatherings that shaped its structure and platform aimed at combating and traditional political elites. The movement encountered initial hurdles in formal registration with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), achieving only on August 21, 2018, after collecting required signatures and navigating bureaucratic opposition from established parties. Castro's role during this period involved supporting Bukele's vision of a citizen-led alternative to El Salvador's duopoly of and FMLN, leveraging his position to coordinate logistics and maintain internal cohesion amid legal challenges. His proximity to Bukele positioned him as a trusted operative in building support, though deferred direct presidential candidacy in 2019, aligning instead with the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) for Bukele's successful run. Castro's ascent within accelerated as the party prepared for the 2021 legislative elections, where he emerged as a prominent figure due to his unwavering loyalty and administrative experience. The party nominated him as a deputy candidate for the , capitalizing on his reputation as Bukele's right-hand man to appeal to voters disillusioned with prior governments. In the February 28, 2021, elections, secured a of 56 out of 84 seats in the , reflecting the party's rapid mobilization under leaders like Castro and validating his contributions to its organizational maturity. This victory underscored Castro's rise from foundational insider to a key architect of the party's dominance, enabling to consolidate power and advance Bukele's agenda without reliance on coalition partners.

Legislative Career

2021 Election and Initial Role

The 2021 Salvadoran legislative elections occurred on February 28, 2021, electing all 84 deputies to the unicameral for a three-year term. Ernesto Castro was elected as a deputy representing the party in the , one of the 20 multi-member constituencies apportioned seats based on population. The elections used , with , founded by President , achieving a commanding performance by capturing 55 seats according to the final scrutiny by the Tribunal Supremo Electoral. This outcome marked a shift from the previous dominance by established parties ARENA and FMLN, granting Bukele's allies legislative control. Castro, previously Bukele's private secretary, entered as a first-term aligned with the ruling party's agenda focused on and reforms. The new convened for the first time on , 2021, when deputies, including Castro, were sworn into office, initiating the 2021–2024 term. In this initial capacity, Castro participated as a rank-and-file member amid the assembly's early priorities of supporting executive initiatives, such as the ongoing against gangs declared in March 2022 but rooted in prior policies.

Election as President of the Legislative Assembly


On May 1, 2021, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador, newly installed after the February 2021 legislative elections, elected Ernesto Castro as its president for the 2021-2024 period. Castro, a Nuevas Ideas deputy from San Salvador and former private secretary to President Nayib Bukele from June 2019 to November 2020, was nominated by his party, which held a legislative supermajority alongside allies. The election proceeded via a nominal and public vote following the constitutional oath-taking by the 84 deputies and the factions' approval of the Installation Commission's report on the assembly's organization. Castro secured 64 votes in favor, drawn from Nuevas Ideas, GANA, PDC, and PCN, with 20 abstentions recorded. Prior to the plenary session, a closed-door meeting coordinated the support among pro-government factions and Executive representatives. The new Junta Directiva, reduced from 11 to 8 members to promote efficiency, was also approved, aligning with constitutional provisions for proportionality based on seats held. Abstentions came primarily from FMLN and VAMOS deputies, who argued that the process disregarded constitutional requirements for proportionality and plurality in leadership roles. FMLN deputy Dina Argueta stated, "Proportionality and plurality, as established by the Constitution, have not been respected," while Nuevas Ideas deputy Dania González countered that the outcome reflected democratic representation given the party's dominance. Despite these objections, the vote proceeded without formal challenges, enabling Castro to assume leadership and facilitate alignment between the executive and legislative branches under Bukele's administration.

Major Legislative Initiatives Under Leadership

Security Reforms and State of Exception Support

Following a surge in gang-related homicides in late March 2022, El Salvador's , presided over by Ernesto Castro, unanimously approved President 's request for a on March 27, 2022, suspending certain constitutional rights including guarantees to enable rapid arrests of suspected members. This measure empowered security forces, such as the National Civil Police and Armed Forces, to detain individuals without warrants based on suspicion of affiliation or collaboration. By mid-2022, over 37,000 arrests had been made under the regime. Castro, as president of , has led repeated monthly extensions of the , with the tenth renewal occurring on January 12, 2023, emphasizing coordination between the executive and legislative branches to sustain gains. Further extensions were approved in September 2022, December 2022 (ninth prórroga), January 2024, and September 2024, reflecting sustained legislative backing amid claims of broad public support, with Castro citing surveys indicating 80% approval in some instances. In addition to extensions, under Castro's direction enacted complementary reforms, including enhancements to laws facilitating rapid deployment of resources to and broader authorizations for military involvement in urban policing, as part of efforts to dismantle structures. These actions have been credited by supporters with contributing to a significant reduction in , though they have drawn international scrutiny for potential rights implications.

Constitutional Amendments and Institutional Changes

Under Ernesto Castro's presidency of the , which began in May 2021, the body—dominated by the ruling party with a —initiated and approved several constitutional amendments aimed at altering term limits, electoral processes, and institutional frameworks. These changes, facilitated by a prior procedural reform, were justified by supporters as necessary modernizations to streamline governance and reflect popular will, though opponents contended they eroded checks and balances. A pivotal institutional shift occurred on May 1, 2024, when the Assembly approved an amendment to Article 248 of the Constitution, enabling "express" reforms by requiring only a three-quarters majority (56 of 84 votes) within a single legislative session, rather than the traditional two successive legislatures. This mechanism, passed with 68 votes in favor, bypassed longstanding safeguards against hasty alterations and was criticized for enabling rapid power consolidation in a legislature lacking effective opposition. Castro defended the process, stating it followed due procedure and that further modifications would address outdated provisions, including potential revisions to "petrified clauses" like those on re-election bans. Leveraging this expedited path, ratified major on July 31, 2025, with 57 votes, abolishing presidential term limits to permit indefinite re-election, extending the presidential mandate from five to six years, and eliminating second-round run-offs in elections. These reforms, detailed in Acuerdo de Reforma Constitucional No. 3, also modernized the electoral system by adjusting representation formulas and withdrawing from the (PARLACEN) via changes to Articles 80 and 133, which supporters argued reduced redundant expenditures and foreign influence. Earlier, in February 2025, a separate eliminated "political debt" obligations, freeing legislative resources for other priorities. Castro emphasized that these were targeted updates to the 1983 Constitution, not a wholesale replacement, amid accusations of authoritarian overreach.

Economic and Infrastructure Policies

Under Ernesto Castro's presidency of the , starting in May 2021, the body approved annual state that prioritized investments as a driver of economic growth. The 2022 allocated US$227 million specifically for improving road connectivity and development nationwide. Similarly, the 2024 included funding for the Los Chorros viaduct, described as the largest project in decades with costs exceeding US$300 million, aimed at enhancing transportation links. The 2025 , totaling US$9.663 billion, emphasized fiscal discipline by reducing new public debt while maintaining allocations for ongoing projects, including a US$46.9 million reduction in the assembly's own . In November 2023, passed a initiated by Castro, exempting returning from abroad to reside in the country from import taxes on up to US$100,000 and up to two vehicles, intended to encourage and economic reintegration. This built on broader incentives approved in August 2025, positioning as the first Central American nation with comprehensive protections for returning emigrants to stimulate local investment and consumption. Labor market reforms, agreed upon by the Higher Labor Council in September 2025 and supported legislatively, focused on modernization and economic reactivation through tripartite collaboration, prioritizing job creation and productivity gains. Infrastructure initiatives received substantial funding under these budgets, including a US$1.42 billion commitment announced in 2025 for eastern , targeting roads, ports, and tourism facilities to boost and GDP growth projected at up to 3% for the year. In October 2025, the assembly enacted a renewable energy law providing tax incentives for sustainable projects, user protections, and incentives for cleaner to attract green investments. Castro publicly affirmed the assembly's commitment to endorsing all executive proposals for economic upliftment, aligning legislative actions with the administration's focus on recovery and expansion post-security reforms.

Political Ideology and Positions

Views on Crime, Gangs, and Public Security

Ernesto Castro has consistently advocated for aggressive measures against gangs, framing them as terrorists responsible for widespread societal harm. In September 2025, he publicly thanked U.S. authorities for designating the Barrio 18 gang as a terrorist , highlighting its role in inflicting damage on communities in and beyond. This stance aligns with his broader portrayal of gang members as existential threats requiring unrelenting confrontation, as evidenced by his defense of during the ongoing declared in March 2022. Castro has emphasized the need to extend the indefinitely to dismantle structures, rejecting criticisms that portray arrests as overreach. In June 2022, he stated that the would not conclude soon, arguing that those denouncing members' captures were effectively shielding criminals, and underscoring that demands sustained pressure on pandillas (s). He has announced multiple legislative extensions of the emergency powers, including in July 2022, tying them directly to reforms enhancing penalties—such as up to 45 years for affiliation—and enabling mass detentions that have incarcerated over 70,000 suspected members by mid-2024. Critiquing opposition narratives, Castro has accused detractors of prioritizing protections over citizen safety, as in his response to claims by former officials who allegedly felt secure among members prior to . In a congressional address, he asserted that the nation must empower agents and soldiers to operate without interference from those enabling activities, positioning the as a defensive war rather than punitive excess. This perspective underscores his belief in causal links between lax enforcement and persistent violence, prioritizing empirical reductions in homicides—from 18 per 100,000 in 2021 to under 2 per 100,000 by 2024—as validation over procedural concerns.

Stance on Corruption and Historical Regimes

Castro has repeatedly accused previous governments, particularly those led by the and FMLN parties, of systemic that entrenched practices such as ghost positions and inflated salaries in the . In February 2022, he stated that the FMLN had established a "corruption framework" during its time in power, including the creation of fictitious jobs that allowed legislators to draw undeserved income beyond their official salaries. He has framed these actions as part of a broader pattern of from the public, asserting in 2021 that ARENA and FMLN had done "nothing" for the country over 30 years except "steal from the people." Regarding historical regimes, Castro portrays the ARENA-FMLN era as one of profound failure and damage to , characterized by ineptitude, economic mismanagement, and institutional decay. In April 2023, he declared that the harm inflicted by these parties was being rectified not by his administration but by the populace itself through electoral rejection. He has described their as leaving a "disaster of a country," reminding opponents in September 2023 that they prefer to obscure this legacy. In June 2023, Castro labeled ARENA and FMLN governments as "inept" during their tenures, contrasting their incompetence with the current focus on results over rhetoric. While Castro's rhetoric emphasizes purging the corruption of prior eras, recordings from September 2024 published by El Faro indicate he dismissed internal warnings about graft within the Bukele administration, reportedly telling advisor Alejandro Muyshondt, "Let our bad guys be our bad guys." This suggests a selective application of scrutiny, prioritizing attacks on historical opponents over addressing contemporary allegations against allies, though Castro has not publicly confirmed or denied the conversation.

Positions on Governance, Democracy, and Economic Policy

Castro has endorsed constitutional reforms to streamline structures, including the 2025 abolition of presidential term limits, framing such changes as essential for "strategic modernization" of the to align with public demands for continuity in effective . He has supported measures like indefinite reelection and standardized legislative terms, arguing they enhance institutional efficiency amid prior systemic and inefficacy under multiparty coalitions dominated by established elites. Regarding , Castro maintains that El Salvador's current framework represents a restoration and advancement of democratic principles, citing the return of electoral rights to expatriates and increased popular participation as evidence of progress over the "false democracy" of previous administrations marred by gang influence and . He has dismissed international criticisms of power concentration as foreign interference or whims, asserting that true democracy accommodates discomfort from and prioritizes citizen security and will over procedural formalities. Castro has referenced participatory elements, such as public consultations on reforms, as aligning with direct democratic ideals to bypass entrenched opposition. On economic policy, Castro has championed financial innovation through Bitcoin's initial adoption as legal tender in 2021, supporting the creation of a Bitcoin Trust Fund and related legislation to foster a "financial transformation" aimed at attracting investment and reducing remittance costs, while rejecting any de-dollarization as "madness" given the U.S. dollar's entrenched role since 2001. By 2025, he backed amendments rendering Bitcoin optional rather than obligatory for transactions and prohibiting its use for tax payments, reflecting pragmatic adjustments to sustain economic stability without volatility risks. Castro has also advocated legal frameworks to promote infrastructure and growth, linking security gains under the state of exception to investor confidence and reduced informal economy distortions.

Controversies and Criticisms

Accusations of Power Consolidation and

Critics, including organizations and opposition figures, have accused Ernesto Castro of enabling authoritarian tendencies through his role as president of El Salvador's , where the ruling party holds a . In May 2021, the assembly under Castro's leadership voted to remove the attorney general and five of Justice magistrates, actions that the government described as consolidating executive power by sidelining . These dismissals followed a legislative reform mandating retirement for judges over 60 or with 30 years of service, allowing Bukele appointees to fill vacancies and reshape the judiciary. Further measures perceived as power consolidation include the June 2023 approval of a law reducing the number of municipalities from 262 to 44, which opponents argued centralized administrative control under the executive while ostensibly aiming for efficiency. In December 2022, legislative changes also cut assembly seats from 84 to 60, facilitating ' dominance after elections that yielded them 54 seats. Critics from outlets like El Faro have framed these restructurings as strategic eliminations of opposition strongholds to entrench ruling party influence. On July 31, 2025, passed constitutional amendments abolishing presidential term limits, paving the way for indefinite reelection; Castro defended the vote as a democratic mechanism allowing popular will to determine leadership duration. This followed a January 2025 reform enabling expedited constitutional changes via simple majority in a near-single-party , which cited as eroding institutional safeguards. Such actions, according to reports from and the U.S. State Department, contribute to broader concerns over democratic , including weakened .

Responses to Opposition and Media Criticisms

Ernesto Castro has consistently defended legislative actions under his leadership by invoking the supermajority mandate secured by in the 2021 and 2024 elections, arguing that such support reflects over procedural objections from minority opposition parties like and FMLN. In response to accusations of authoritarian power consolidation via constitutional reforms enabling indefinite presidential reelection, approved on August 1, 2025, with 57 votes in favor and three against, Castro framed the changes as enhancing , stating, "The people will decide how long they want a leader to remain in office," and described them as measures for "a stronger, fairer and more efficient ." He further clarified during plenary sessions that these were targeted amendments to the 1983 Constitution, not a wholesale replacement, countering claims of illegitimacy by emphasizing adherence to existing legal processes. Castro has rebuked opposition lawmakers for what he terms "political debt" and obstructionism, as seen in February 2025 when he criticized deputy Francisco Lira's objections to reform processes, positioning ' initiatives as fulfilling voter commitments to restructure institutions undermined by prior corrupt regimes. Regarding the ongoing , renewed multiple times since March 2022 to combat gang violence, he has dismissed detractors' concerns over suspensions by highlighting empirical outcomes, such as a homicide rate drop from 38 per 100,000 in 2019 to 2.4 in 2023, asserting that neither domestic opposition nor international NGOs would derail security gains validated by public approval. In addressing personal conduct allegations from opposition figures, Castro has emphasized transparency and fiscal restraint; for instance, on October 30, 2024, responding to queries about a private trip to for a soccer match, he affirmed, "I paid with my own funds, not public ones," and stressed that his "lifestyle has not changed absolutely at all," while acknowledging the public's right to scrutinize officials. Castro's retorts to media criticisms often portray outlets like El Faro or Factum as aligned with opposition interests or disseminating unverified claims, as in September 2024 when he ambiguously addressed leaked audios alleging plans against journalists, instead redirecting focus to policy successes amid what he deems biased reporting. He has publicly denied traditional media narratives, such as in October 2022 refutations of coverage on assembly decisions, and in March 2023 declared that foreign media and NGO critiques would not impede legislative work, prioritizing voter-backed results over external narratives.

International Reactions and Human Rights Concerns

International human rights organizations, including and , have documented widespread abuses under El Salvador's regime, extended over 30 times by the under Castro's presidency since March 2022, including arbitrary detentions of more than 81,000 individuals, enforced disappearances, , and at least 261 detainee deaths in custody as of late 2024. These policies, which suspend constitutional rights like and , have been criticized for prioritizing mass incarceration over targeted , despite empirical correlations with a sharp decline in rates from 38 per 100,000 in 2019 to under 2 per 100,000 by 2024. Leaked audio recordings from 2020, reported by investigative outlet El Faro and referenced in analyses, captured discussions between Castro—then Bukele's private secretary—and former national security advisor Alejandro Muyshondt planning operations against journalists, media outlets, and political opponents using state resources. In April 2022, as president, Castro publicly denounced anthropologist and journalist Juan Martínez for coverage of gang violence, contributing to a pattern of official harassment against critical media documented in U.S. State Department reports. The Assembly's approval of the Foreign Agents Law on May 20, 2025, which mandates registration, financial reporting, and potential sanctions for NGOs, media, and individuals receiving foreign funding, drew immediate condemnation from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, , and as a violation of freedoms of association and expression under international covenants, enabling government control over and exacerbating the exile of rights defenders and journalists. Critics, including the , argued it stigmatizes independent oversight, mirroring tactics in other countries to suppress rather than address foreign influence transparently. Earlier legislative actions, such as the 2021 dismissal of judges and by the newly Nuevas Ideas-dominated Assembly (with Castro as president from June), prompted rebukes from the U.S. government, , and OAS for undermining and democratic checks, though Salvadoran officials countered that such reforms corrected prior corruption entrenched by opposition parties. U.S. congressional resolutions in 2025 invoked Section 502B of the to scrutinize El Salvador's record amid ongoing aid debates, reflecting persistent bilateral tensions over erosion.

Legacy and Impact

Achievements in Crime Reduction and Stability

Under the leadership of Ernesto Castro as president of El Salvador's since June 2021, the body approved the initial declaration of a on March 27, 2022, in an extraordinary he convened, following 62 gang-related homicides over a single weekend. This measure suspended certain constitutional rights, enabling mass arrests without warrants and facilitating the detention of over 80,000 suspected gang members by 2024. The , under Castro's presidency, subsequently extended the more than 30 times, with the 34th extension approved in January 2025, ensuring continuity of aggressive anti-gang operations. Castro publicly attributed the policy's success to its role in dismantling gang structures, stating in April that "before the regime of exception there was no peace in ," contrasting it with prior failed approaches. These extensions correlated with a sharp decline in , as empirical data show El Salvador's homicide rate falling from 38 per 100,000 inhabitants in to 1.9 in , the lowest in the . This legislative support contributed to broader stability, with total homicides dropping to a record low of 114 in 2024, enabling increased public mobility, economic activity, and tourism without the extortion and territorial control previously exerted by gangs like and Barrio 18. Castro emphasized in January 2024 that the regime "is the only thing that has worked in this country," linking sustained low homicide rates directly to the uninterrupted enforcement enabled by assembly approvals. The policy's causal impact is evidenced by the temporal alignment: pre-2022 spikes in violence prompted the , after which gang-induced murders plummeted, restoring civilian control over public spaces.

Criticisms of Democratic Erosion and Long-Term Risks

Critics, including international organizations and opposition figures, have accused Castro of facilitating democratic backsliding through his leadership of the , where holds a , by expediting approval of executive-backed reforms that diminish institutional checks on presidential power. In February 2021, following ' electoral gains, the assembly under Castro's influence ousted opposition leaders from key positions, an action decried as a consolidation of power that undermined legislative independence and pluralism. This maneuver, combined with subsequent reforms, has been cited by analysts as emblematic of gradual erosion via legal means rather than overt coups. A pivotal reform occurred on July 31, 2025, when the assembly, presided over by Castro, voted 57-3 to abolish constitutional presidential term limits, enabling indefinite re-election for President Bukele despite prior bans enacted to prevent authoritarian entrenchment. Castro defended the change as enhancing , arguing that voters should determine leadership duration without arbitrary restrictions. However, human rights groups and regional watchdogs warned that it paves the way for perpetual rule, eroding and inviting abuse akin to historical strongman regimes in . Castro's assembly has also extended the state of emergency, first invoked in March 2022 after a spike of 62 homicides in one day, over 30 times, suspending due process rights and enabling mass detentions of over 80,000 suspected gang members by mid-2025. While credited with slashing homicide rates from 38 per 100,000 in 2019 to under 2 per 100,000 by 2024, opponents contend this framework risks normalizing extrajudicial measures, with reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, and deaths in custody documented by Amnesty International in 83 testimonies. Castro has publicly denounced critical journalists, such as in April 2022 when he targeted an anthropologist reporting on gang dynamics, exacerbating concerns over media suppression. Long-term risks highlighted by observers include the entrenchment of one-party dominance, potentially stifling political competition and innovation, as the assembly's favoritism toward pro-government influencers over traditional outlets fosters echo chambers and . Think tanks warn of a trajectory toward "competitive ," where elections persist but are tilted by institutional capture, risking economic volatility from investor wariness over rule-of-law deficits and social unrest from unaddressed grievances. U.S. State Department reports note ongoing civic space contraction, with Castro's role in these dynamics amplifying fears that short-term security gains may yield enduring governance fragility.

Personal Life

Family and Relationships

Ernesto Castro is married to , who has served as El Salvador's Minister of Housing since June 2019. The couple co-owns Casol, a that received over $525,000 in contracts from the state water agency ANDA between 2020 and 2021. Castro and Sol's professional ties extend to their roles within the party structure, with Sol appointed to her ministerial post by President shortly after his inauguration. Public details on Castro's , parents, siblings, or children remain limited, with no verified reports disclosing such information in major Salvadoran media outlets or official biographies as of 2025. Castro's personal relationships are primarily documented through his alliance with Bukele's inner circle, though these appear professional rather than familial.

Public Persona and Lifestyle

Ernesto Castro projects a public persona as a steadfast ally and confidant of President , frequently characterized as his right-hand man in advancing legislative reforms aligned with ' agenda. His visibility in government circles stems from a long-standing personal and relationship with Bukele, dating back to their school days. Castro maintains an active presence on social media, utilizing platforms like and X to disseminate updates on assembly proceedings, endorse security policies, and invoke religious themes in reflecting on political challenges. This online engagement portrays him as a committed public servant emphasizing national progress and in governance. Details on Castro's remain largely private, with focusing more on his business background as co-owner of Casol alongside his wife, , who holds the position of Housing Minister. No extensive disclosures exist regarding personal hobbies or routines, suggesting a deliberate emphasis on duties over personal publicity.

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