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The floating man, flying man, or man suspended in air argument is a thought experiment by the Persian philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna) which argues for the existence of the soul.[1] This thought experiment is used to argue in favor of knowledge by presence.[2][3]

Background

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Ibn Sina wrote the argument while imprisoned in the castle of Fardajan in the Iranian province of Hamadan. He concluded that the soul is immaterial and substantial. He also claimed that no human could deny their own consciousness or awareness.[4] According to Ibn Sina, the floating man could attain the concept of being without any sense experience.[5]

Using his knowledge, Ibn Sina saved one of the Iranian rulers, Shams al-Dawla, from death, which caused the envy of many of the courtiers. As a result, after the death of Shams al-Dawla, Ibn Sina was arrested and imprisoned in a castle between the Iranian provinces of Hamadan and Isfahan, where he supposedly wrote the floating man argument.[citation needed] The name of that castle is recorded in the old books as "Fardjan," "Mazdjan," or "Mazdavan."

Concept

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The floating man argument considers a man who falls or floats freely in the air, unable to touch or perceive anything (as in a modern sensory deprivation chamber). This subject lacks any sensory perception data about the material world, yet is still self-aware, and is able to think to himself.

The Floating Man argument that is known today is the product of three distinct yet related versions. In the early days of its creation, Ibn Sina attempts to prove the dissociability of a consciousness and its physical body. In doing so, this initial version focuses on the principle of existential separability, the self and its ability to conceptualize its existence. In an attempt to solidify his argument, Sina expands his argument into what is known as the second version. In this updated version, Sina creates a new ideology, namely conceptual separability, which details that because the body and self are perceptible, one is able to conceptualize the self without the associated bodily parts. In the final edition of his argument, Sina brings into question self-awareness and the continuity of consciousness.[6]

Ibn Sina states that the eyes are the only thing preventing them from seeing anything externally, and he further describes that the floating man is created in the air, like a vacuum. Thus, this is to make sure that nothing was to overlap, allowing him the form to continue connecting with no issues. Additionally, he suggests that his extremities are separate and not interlocked. Therefore, since they are separate, Ibn Sina believes that he has no consciousness of his limbs, innards, heart or anything external to him that is truly there. Although he won't know his exact length, breadth, or depth, he will be aware of the existence of his essence. Even if he were to be conscious of his extremities, for instance, he still would perceive them as an essence of a condition of his essence. Therefore, he is warned and instructed to pay attention to the existence of his soul as something separate from his body and immaterial.

Existential separability

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This form of separability concentrates on the unavoidable truth that exists within the self. The concept deals with the affirmation of the self, independent of anything - a certainty that exists naturally. Sina uses the word ānniyya to describe individual existence or quiddity, and declares its independence from the physical realm. Sina asserts the intrinsic essence of the ānniyya, regardless of its quantitative and qualitative characteristics.[6]

Conceptual separability

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This version of separability expands on the ability to conceptualize the body and to conceive the self as a separate entity accordingly. When defining the ānniyya as a separate entity from the body, Sina believes it is essential to distinguish the external limbs and parts from the internal organs, specifically the brain. This is primarily due to the impossibility of determining whether the self would even be conceivable without the brain as a vessel. Sina argues that there must be a relationship between the intellect and the brain. However, none between the self and sensory stimuli or the external body.[6]

The immediateness and constancy of self-awareness

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Sina argues that the self is immediate and is determined by no preceding action or activity. He states that no measure or operation could produce self-awareness. Similarly, Sina proclaims the continuity of self-awareness and that there is never a point at which the mind is unaware of itself. He insists that a circumstance whereupon the absolute state of self-awareness would be interrupted, is impossible.[6]

Premises of the argument

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According to Ibn Sina, we cannot deny the consciousness of the self. His argument is as follows:

One of us must suppose that he was just created at a stroke, fully developed and perfectly formed but with his vision shrouded from perceiving all external objects – created floating in the air or in the space, not buffeted by any perceptible current of the air that supports him, his limbs separated and kept out of contact with one another, so that they do not feel each other. Then let the subject consider whether he would affirm the existence of his self. There is no doubt that he would affirm his own existence, although not affirming the reality of any of his limbs or inner organs, his bowels, or heart or brain or any external thing. Indeed he would affirm the existence of this self of his while not affirming that it had any length, breadth or depth. And if it were possible for him in such a state to imagine a hand or any other organ, he would not imagine it to be a part of himself or a condition of his existence.

— Ibn Sina, quoted in Goodman (2013, pp. 155–156) [7]

We can deconstruct Ibn Sīnā's Floating Man argument into the following points:

1. The Floating Man is conscious of the existence of his soul without being conscious of the existence of his body.

2. The Floating Man validates the existence of his soul without validating the existence of his body.

3. When the Floating Man is taken out of his body; all that is left is his soul, which is validated in itself.[8]

Therefore, one may determine that:

4. Rejecting the existence of his soul is unimaginable, since it is necessary for his existence.

5. Rejecting the existence of his body is plausible, since it is not necessary condition to validate his existence.

6. Following the points 4 and 5: validating the existence of the soul without validating the existence of the body is plausible.[9]

This argument relies on an introspective thought experiment. We have to suppose a man who comes into existence fully developed and formed, but he does not have any relation with sensory experience of the world or of his own body. There is no physical contact with the external world at all. According to Ibn Sina, this subject is, nonetheless, necessarily conscious of himself. In other words, such a being possesses the awareness of his own existence. He thereby believes that the soul has an unmediated and reflexive knowledge of its own existence.[10] Thus appealing to self-consciousness, Ibn Sina tries to prove the existence of soul, or Nafs. Some scholars like Wisnovsky believe that the flying man argument proved the substantiality of the soul.[11] Ibn Sina believes that innate awareness is completely independent of sensory experience.[12][full citation needed]

Dualist perspective

[edit]

The Floating Man argument is a dualist argument, supporting the idea that the mental realm is separate from the physical world (such as the physical body). In the argument of the floating man, Ibn Sina affirms the existence of a mental self, even without any physical perception. Many dualist philosophers have used this thought experiment to confirm the essence of the soul and other arguments of dualist origin.[13]

Descartes' famous phrase "Cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am") bears resemblance to the Floating Man argument, and some even believe Descartes to be inspired by Ibn Sina in that both argue for knowledge by presence. Whether these similarities are deep or trivial is a matter of scholarly disagreement.[11][clarification needed]

Criticism

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Adamson[14] claims that even if the man floating in air were aware of himself, the argument fails to prove that the soul (the seat of that awareness) is something separate from the body: one could argue that self-awareness is seated in the brain. In being self-aware, the floating man is aware only through a property of his nervous system, whether or not he is aware of his nervous system.[14]

Ibn Sina's argument is not supported by the concept of substance in metaphysics. This experiential field shows that the self is not consequently a substance and thereby there is no subjectivity.[15]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Floating man

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The Floating Man, also known as the Flying Man, is a formulated by the 11th-century Persian philosopher (Ibn Sina) to demonstrate the immaterial nature of the and its capacity for independent of the body. In the scenario, Avicenna posits the instantaneous creation of a fully formed adult human suspended in or thin air, with limbs outstretched and separated to prevent any tactile sensation, all senses—including sight and touch—rendered inactive so that no perception of the external world, the body, or even internal organs occurs. Despite this complete , the individual would immediately affirm the existence and essence of their own self or , without any awareness of bodily attributes or extension. This argument, presented in the first chapter of the psychology section (De Anima) of 's encyclopedic work Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (The Book of Healing), serves to establish the soul as a distinct, incorporeal substance that does not depend on physical embodiment for its self-knowledge, thereby supporting a form of substance dualism. uses the experiment epistemologically to show that the soul's becomes evident through direct , even in the absence of empirical input, challenging materialist views of prevalent among some contemporaries. The has profoundly influenced philosophical discourse on , , and the mind-body problem, appearing in later in both Islamic and Latin traditions while continuing to inform modern debates in .

Historical Context

Avicenna's Philosophical Framework

, known as Ibn Sīnā (c. 980–1037 CE), was a pivotal figure in the , renowned as a whose philosophical and medical contributions synthesized Greek, Persian, and Islamic intellectual traditions. His encyclopedic work (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ), composed primarily between 1014 and 1027 CE, systematically covers logic, , mathematics, and metaphysics, establishing a comprehensive framework for understanding reality. Within the natural philosophy section, particularly the treatise on the soul (De anima), Avicenna articulates the "floating man" argument around 1020 CE to illustrate the soul's capacity for self-awareness devoid of bodily or sensory mediation. Avicenna's metaphysical system masterfully integrates Aristotelian hylomorphism—the doctrine that natural substances consist of matter informed by form—with Neoplatonic emanation, envisioning the universe as a hierarchical overflow from the Necessary Existent (God). In this synthesis, the cosmos unfolds through a chain of intellects and souls emanating successively, where each level receives existence from the prior while actualizing potentialities in the subsequent. Hylomorphism applies to corporeal beings, but Avicenna elevates the human soul above mere composition, defining it as an immaterial, subsistent substance that perfects the body as its form without being reducible to it. This conception of the soul as immaterial underpins 's broader anthropology in , where the floating man serves as a key demonstration of the soul's independent existence and self-perception, thereby supporting its by exempting it from the corruptibility inherent in material composites. Through this argument, aims to affirm the soul's substantial unity and autonomy, positioning it within the eternal emanative order rather than the transient physical realm.

Origins in Earlier Traditions

The thought experiment known as the floating man has deep roots in ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle's De Anima, where the soul is conceptualized as the form and actuality of the body, enabling its functions while suggesting the potential separability of the rational intellect from corporeal matter. Aristotle's treatment of the soul's operations, especially the active intellect as immaterial and eternal, provided a foundational framework for later discussions on the soul's independence, influencing Islamic philosophers who sought to reconcile this with theological concerns about immortality and divine creation. Neoplatonic ideas, transmitted through Plotinus's (particularly books IV–VI, adapted in the Arabic Theology of Aristotle), further shaped these by portraying the soul's descent into material embodiment as a temporary veiling of its higher, immaterial nature, with possibilities for ascent and self-recognition beyond sensory constraints. This emanationist view of the soul's unity and its potential for awareness without bodily mediation echoed in Islamic adaptations, emphasizing the soul's intrinsic connection to divine intellects. Early Islamic thinkers like (d. c. 870) built upon these Greek foundations, positing the soul as an immortal, created entity with a rational faculty capable of transcending empirical data through immaterial , divided into stages that enable self-knowledge independent of the body. (c. 870–950) advanced this by describing the theoretical intellect as a separable substance that achieves perfection via conjunction with the external Agent , allowing for awareness of universals without reliance on sensory input, thus reinforcing the soul's in . Avicenna innovated upon these traditions by transforming abstract discussions of soul separability into a concrete imaginative construct, using it to demonstrate intuitive self-knowledge as an immediate, non-empirical certainty, thereby synthesizing Aristotelian , Neoplatonic emanation, and his predecessors' emphasis on immaterial into a proof of the soul's substantial existence.

Description of the Thought Experiment

The Hypothetical Scenario

Avicenna presents the floating man thought experiment as a vivid hypothetical to isolate the immediate of one's own from any sensory or bodily input. In this , one is to imagine a being created instantaneously and fully formed, all at once, as a complete adult. This individual is suspended in the air or in a void, with no sensation of support from the surrounding medium, such that the air or does not impinge upon the body in any perceptible way. The senses are entirely deprived: the eyes are veiled, preventing any visual perception of external objects; the ears hear no sounds; and there is no tactile contact with the environment or one's own body. The limbs are outstretched and separated from one another, ensuring they neither touch nor rub against each other, nor do they come into contact with any internal organs like the heart or brain in a way that would register sensation. This setup eliminates all possible avenues of sensory awareness, both external and internal, leaving the individual in complete isolation from the physical world and their own corporeality. Despite this profound , asserts that the person would immediately and indubitably affirm their own . Upon reflection, the individual would declare, "I am," without any doubt regarding the reality of their or selfhood, even though they would not affirm the existence of their limbs, internal organs, or any external entities. In the original from (al-Shifāʾ, section on the soul), emphasizes: "He will not have a doubt in affirming the existence of his , yet he will not along with this affirm [the existence of] the extremities of his limbs, nor his innards, his heart, or anything external to him. Instead, he will affirm [the existence] of his , without affirming that it has length, breadth or depth." This serves to demonstrate as an intrinsic, immediate that arises independently of bodily sensations or external dependencies, highlighting the direct of one's existence in isolation.

Underlying Premises

Avicenna's floating man rests on several key premises that underpin its conclusion regarding the soul's independent subsistence. The first premise posits that does not eliminate internal self-perception, since the senses are oriented solely toward external objects and cannot serve as the medium for apprehending the . In the scenario, the floating man, isolated from all sensory input, remains incapable of affirming the existence of his limbs or body, yet this isolation highlights that operates independently of such faculties. The second premise asserts that the soul's inherently encompasses innate , which is not contingent upon the body's composition or any corporeal intermediary. argues that accompanies the soul's very existence, as articulated in his al-Taʿliqāt, where he states, "When the self exists, exists with it." This intrinsic quality ensures that the soul grasps its own directly, without derivation from physical elements. The third premise emphasizes the immediacy of the —"I am"—which demonstrates the soul's subsistence without requiring the body as a mediating factor. As explains in al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, this awareness is unconditioned and requires no additional faculty, allowing the floating man to affirm his existence instantaneously despite total sensory absence. These premises form a logical structure of argument by elimination, systematically removing potential sources of doubt—such as sensory perception, bodily sensation, or external corroboration—to isolate the soul's direct, unmediated knowledge of itself. By conceiving a situation where all bodily dependencies are nullified, concludes that the soul's self-perception persists unaffected, thereby establishing its essential independence.

Core Philosophical Concepts

Existential Separability of Soul and Body

Existential separability in Avicenna's philosophy refers to the soul's being (wujud) as a self-subsistent entity not contingent upon the body's existence; it subsists per se as an immaterial substance independent of corporeal form. This concept underscores that the soul's essence does not require bodily organs or sensory interaction for its affirmation, positioning it as ontologically distinct from physical matter. Avicenna's floating man argument illustrates this separability by positing a hypothetical individual created fully formed yet suspended in air, with limbs outstretched and unable to touch or sense the body or external world. In this state, the individual immediately affirms their own existence through an intrinsic self-awareness (shuhud dhati), without reliance on bodily faculties or body-soul interaction, thereby demonstrating the soul's prior and inherent independence from the body. This self-affirmation reveals the soul's essence as separate from its corporeal instrument, implying that the soul's existence precedes and transcends physical embodiment. In contrast to Aristotelian , where the functions as the actualizing matter in an inseparable unity, maintains that the rational is a distinct substance that governs the body like a rider controls a mount, rather than being inherently bound to it. Aristotle's view ties the 's realization to the body's potentiality, rendering separation inconceivable, whereas 's framework allows the rational to persist as a self-subsisting entity, free from matter's limitations. The argument's implication for immortality follows directly: since the soul is existentially separable in principle—as evidenced by the thought experiment—it remains viable in reality after bodily death, continuing its self-aware existence without corporeal support. This separability thus establishes the soul's eternal subsistence, independent of the body's dissolution.

Conceptual Separability and Self-Awareness

In Avicenna's Floating Man , conceptual separability refers to the capacity to conceive of the as an independent entity without simultaneously conceiving of the body or its parts, thereby establishing the mind's from physical form. As described in his al-Risālat al-aḍḥawiyya, even if one imagines a person suspended in the air with limbs outstretched and disconnected from all sensory contact, the individual would still affirm the existence of their "I" through direct conception, excluding any bodily attributes. This mental exercise demonstrates that self-conception is not contingent on corporeal or extension, proving the soul's epistemological independence. The immediateness of in this scenario underscores its direct, unmediated nature, free from inference, sensory data, or external validation. argues in al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt that awareness of the self occurs "without an intermediary," as the grasps its own instantaneously upon , without reliance on the body's perceptual faculties. This primitive form of self-knowledge, illustrated by the Floating Man, is innate and unconditioned, distinguishing it from acquired knowledge that depends on or reasoning. Unlike sensory perceptions, which fluctuate with environmental changes, exhibits constancy, remaining present and undeniable across all states of . In al-Taʿliqāt, notes that "the self is aware of itself always and not intermittently," persisting even during sleep, intoxication, or as in the . This unwavering presence highlights selfhood as a fundamental, non-episodic reality, immune to the variability of bodily experiences. Avicenna distinguishes this self-awareness as an "inner sense" or intuitive knowledge known as ḥads, a unique faculty inherent to the soul's essence that enables immediate apprehension without conceptual intermediaries. In the Floating Man, this ḥads operates as the soul's primary mode of self-cognition, where "our awareness of ourselves is our very existence," affirming the mind's self-sufficient epistemological domain.

Interpretations and Implications

Dualist Interpretations

In Avicenna's philosophy, the floating man thought experiment serves as a key demonstration of substance dualism, positing the human soul as an immaterial and incorporeal substance that exists independently of the body. The scenario illustrates that even without sensory perception or bodily awareness, the soul grasps its own existence, thereby establishing the soul's ontological priority and separability from physical matter. This aligns with Avicenna's broader metaphysical framework, where the soul is not composed of bodily elements but interacts with the body as a temporary vessel, enabling cognition and volition without being reducible to it. A specific textual foundation for this dualist interpretation appears in Avicenna's Pointers and Reminders (al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt), where the concludes the first chapter , reinforcing the soul's as evidence of its immaterial nature. Here, argues that the floating man's intuitive certainty of his "I" underscores the soul's substantial reality apart from corporeal form, countering materialist views that equate the self with bodily functions. This emphasis on direct, non-inferential knowledge of the soul's existence highlights its incorruptibility and independence, key tenets of Avicennian dualism. The experiment's implications extend to the mind-body problem by resolving potential issues of interaction through the soul's primacy: the body serves as an instrument for the soul's manifestation in the material world, but the soul remains unaffected by bodily dissolution. Unlike purely physicalist accounts, this dualist reading posits that mental acts originate in the soul's essence, allowing for unity without fusion. It echoes later Cartesian dualism in affirming self-certainty, though Avicenna prioritizes intuitive apprehension over methodical doubt, providing a foundational proof for the soul's distinct substance.

Influence on Later Philosophy

Avicenna's floating man thought experiment was transmitted to the Latin West through translations of his works, such as De anima, influencing medieval discussions on the soul's immateriality and its relation to the body. Early interpreters like Dominicus Gundissalinus and William of Auvergne employed it as an ontological proof for the soul's independent existence, emphasizing its essence separate from corporeal senses. By the late , the argument evolved into an epistemological tool for direct , particularly among Franciscan thinkers who adapted it to explore . Thomas Aquinas engaged with Avicenna's ideas on soul-body separability via Latin sources, incorporating them into his hylomorphic framework while critiquing the thought experiment's core premise of non-sensory . In works like Summa theologiae (I, q. 75, a. 2; I, q. 87, a. 1), Aquinas argued that the soul's intellectual nature requires embodiment for full operation, rejecting Avicenna's notion of innate, supraconscious self-knowledge as incompatible with Aristotelian , though he retained elements of the soul's substantial unity with the body. This selective integration marked a pivotal adaptation in scholastic philosophy, blending Avicennian separability with . Within , the floating man informed later thinkers' explorations of self-knowledge, with critiquing Avicenna's framework in his . Averroes rejected the implication of an overly independent soul essence, arguing that human intellect requires corporeal faculties, thus emphasizing over pure abstraction. challenged Avicenna's rationalism in , critiquing aspects of his philosophy on the soul while emphasizing direct, non-discursive knowledge of the divine self in works like The Revival of the Religious Sciences. In the Renaissance and early modern periods, the floating man found parallels in ' Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), where the cogito argument similarly establishes self-existence through introspective , independent of sensory . Scholars note structural similarities: both experiments isolate to affirm the mind's distinct , with predating Descartes by over six centuries, though without direct historical transmission. This resemblance underscores the thought experiment's enduring role in dualist epistemologies. The 20th century saw revivals of the floating man in phenomenology and , particularly through Edmund Husserl's epoche or phenomenological reduction, which brackets sensory phenomena to access pure self-experience, mirroring Avicenna's abstraction of bodily input. In analytic contexts, it informs debates on and , relating to Galen Strawson's concept of the "minimal self" as a pre-reflective, first-person devoid of diachronic or agential features, highlighting tensions between disembodied and embodied . These adaptations affirm the experiment's legacy in probing the foundations of subjective experience.

Criticisms and Modern Perspectives

Traditional Objections

(d. 1111), a prominent 11th-century theologian, critiqued Avicenna's views on the soul's independence from the body in his Incoherence of the Philosophers, arguing that human is inherently tied to the body's role in divine creation, rendering the isolation of the soul from bodily involvement logically untenable. He contended that the soul's essence cannot be grasped independently, as God's act of creating the human being encompasses both soul and body as an integrated whole, challenging the premise of existential separability. Averroes (Ibn Rushd, d. 1198), following Aristotle's hylomorphic framework, rejected Avicenna's implication of the soul's full separability from the body, insisting instead on their essential unity where the soul serves as the actualizing the body's potential. In his commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima, argued that Avicenna's view overemphasizes the soul's independence, leading to an erroneous dissociation that contradicts the organic interdependence required for human and existence. Avicenna's , including ideas of , provoked theological objections within Islamic , particularly regarding its apparent conflict with the of bodily (al-ba'th), where in the demands the body's restoration as essential to the soul's continuity and recognition. Critics, including later Ash'arite theologians, viewed the soul's potential without body as undermining scriptural emphasis on corporeal recompense, potentially implying a purely spiritual incompatible with Qur'anic descriptions of physical reward and punishment. Medieval scholars further highlighted logical flaws in the experiment's assumption of total sensory isolation, contending that complete detachment from bodily awareness is impossible, as internal faculties like the estimative power (wahm) or innate sense of position would imply minimal proprioceptive connection to the body. For instance, Latin interpreters such as Peter Olivi (d. 1298) argued that the soul's powers, even in hypothetical deprivation, remain oriented toward the body, preventing the pure self-affirmation described.

Contemporary Analyses

Contemporary scholars in have revisited Avicenna's floating man to explore the nature of subjective experience, emphasizing the irreducibility of first-person without sensory or bodily . This highlights the experiment's enduring in debates over whether requires sensory grounding or emerges from an intrinsic, pre-reflective structure of the . From a neuroscientific viewpoint, the floating man prompts debates on the minimal requirements for , particularly whether it depends on brain activity tied to . Studies on , such as those using flotation tanks, demonstrate that even in near-total isolation, participants report heightened interoceptive —sensations of internal bodily states—suggesting that complete sensory elimination is challenging and that self-perception may persist through residual neural signals in areas like the insula and . Experiments like the further illustrate how in the premotor and parietal cortices constructs bodily , yet Avicenna's challenges materialist accounts by implying a form of minimal that operates independently of such integration. Researchers argue that while structure provides the temporal and structural basis for this , from cases shows cognitive processes enduring without full sensory feedback, aligning with but not fully resolving Avicenna's claim of sensory-independent affirmation. In comparative ethics, particularly within AI consciousness debates, the floating man raises questions about whether non-bodily entities can possess an "I am" awareness akin to human self-affirmation. Philosophers and scientists invoke to probe if disembodied systems, like advanced neural networks, could exhibit primitive self-knowledge without sensory embodiment, echoing 's separation of essence from physical form. This perspective informs discussions on machine qualia, where the absence of biological senses does not preclude potential intrinsic self-reference, though critics contend that AI lacks the natural, pre-reflective attributes to the soul.

References

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  23. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314639665_Sources_of_the_Self_in_the_Arabic_Tradition_Remarks_on_the_Avicennan_Turn
  24. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-influence/
  25. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-rushd-natural/
  26. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9200096/
  27. https://ap.isu.ac.ir/article_77090.html?lang=en
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  31. https://www.jneuropsychiatry.org/peer-review/trilogy-a-new-paradigm-of-consciousness-17097.html
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