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The Free Cause Party (Turkish: Hür Dava Partisi, HÜDA PAR)[a] is a Kurdish Sunni Islamist political party in Turkey. It is centered in the city of Batman, Turkey.

Key Information

History

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Roots

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Following the decision to end armed struggle in 2002, activists of the Hizbullah's Menzil group founded an association called "Solidarity with the Oppressed" (Turkish: Mustazaflar ile Dayanışma Derneği or short Mustazaf-Der) in 2003.[b][24] It also became known as the Movement of the Oppressed (Turkish: Mustazaflar Hareketi). On 18 April 2010, Mustazaf Der organized a mass meeting in Diyarbakır to celebrate the anniversary of the Islamic prophet Muhammad's birthday (known as Mawlid). The Turkish police estimated that the event was attended by 2 million people. The organizers put the figure at over 2.5 million people.[25]

On 20 April 2010, a court in Diyarbakır ordered the closure of the Association for the Oppressed (Mustazaf-Der) on the grounds that it was “conducting activities on behalf of the terrorist organization Hizbollah.”[25] The decision was confirmed by the Court of Cassation on 11 May 2012.[26]

In late 2012, the Movement of the Oppressed announced its will to found a political party, to challenge the hegemony of the left-wing and Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party.[27] On 17 December 2012, the Free Cause Party (Hür Dava Partisi) was founded.[28] On 9 January 2013, the general headquarters in Ankara was opened.[29]

Societies affiliated with HÜDA PAR operate under the umbrella organisation Lovers of the Prophet (Turkish: Peygamber Sevdalıları, Kurdish: Evindarên Pêyxamber) particularly active in Kurdish Mawlid meetings.[30]

Following the 2014 Kobanî protests and the collapse of the 2013–2015 PKK–Turkey peace process, both part of the broader third phase of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, riots erupted across Kurdish regions of Turkey.[31][32] Amnesty International accused HÜDA PAR of collaborating with Turkish police to violently suppress these uprisings, using excessive force that resulted in numerous deaths, particularly in Batman.[33]

The party supported the ruling People's Alliance in the elections of 2023.[34] The party cooperated with AKP in some cities in the local elections of 2024.

Ideology and policies

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The party has been described as "an extreme Islamist party" and as "the political wing of the Iranian-backed Kurdish Hizbullah".[35][36] The Association for Solidarity with Mustazafs (Turkish: Oppressed) (Mustazaf-Der) was established in 2004 to support those arrested and their families as a result of the police operation named as Beykoz Operation targeting Hezbollah. The association was closed in 2012 on the grounds that it was a continuation of Hezbollah. After the association was closed, then, since it was difficult to close political parties in Turkey, Movement of the Oppressed (Turkish: Mustazaflar Hareketi) continued its activities by founding the Free Cause Party.[37][38]

Free Cause Party calls for the constitutional recognition of the Kurds and Kurdish language, mother tongue education, the end to the 10 percent election threshold, and the decentralization of state power and strengthening of local administration.[39] The party also advocates for restrictions on the freedom of religion and worship to be lifted, the headscarf ban ended, wants adultery criminalized, and religious marriages to be recognized.[40] Moreover, the party demands that the Turkish state apologize to Kurds and reinstate the original names of Kurdish-populated places.[41] The party has largely been silent on the question of Kurdish autonomy or independence from Turkey.[42] The party is opposed to LGBT rights, and routinely denounces the HDP, a left-wing party supporting Kurdish minority rights, for supporting it.[11][12] Despite forming from a splinter group that made promises to end armed struggle, third-party sources describe the party as strongly affiliated with the Kurdish Hezbollah.[43][44][45] The party denies these allegations as they have condemned violence multiple times and rejected any links with militant groups.[46] Some[who?] have pointed out that the party's abbreviation, "Hüda-Par", is synonymous with "Hezbollah", both meaning "Party of God".[47] The party accuse allegations of terrorism against HÜDA PAR and DEM Party as unlawful.[48]

Elections

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The party supported Erdoğan in the 2018 presidential elections and again in 2023.[49][50] Since its creation in 2012, HÜDA PAR has contested the two parliamentary elections of June 2015 and 2018, while it chose not to run for the November 2015 elections.[51] The party entered the 2023 Turkish general election as part of the Justice and Development Party list.[52] Four Free Cause Party members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey were elected.[53] In 2024 Turkish local elections, the party supported candidates of Justice and Development Party in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir. The party showed its strongest performance in the cities of Batman and Bingöl, gathering more than 10 percent of the votes.[54]

Election results

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Grand National Assembly of Turkey
Election Leader Votes Seats Government
# % Rank # ±
June 2015 Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu 70,121[55][56] 0.16% 11
0 / 550
 – Extra-parliamentary
2018 Mehmet Yavuz 155,539 0.31% 7th
0 / 600
 – Extra-parliamentary
2023 Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu Part of AK Party
4 / 600
 Increase4 Providing confidence and supply

Provincial results (2015 and 2018)

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Free Cause Party

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The Free Cause Party (Turkish: Hür Dava Partisi, abbreviated HÜDA PAR) is a Sunni Islamist political party in , founded on 17 December 2012 and primarily representing conservative Kurdish interests in the southeastern provinces, with its base in Batman. Emerging from the ideological legacy of the dismantled militant network, the party advocates an ummah-centered worldview that prioritizes Islamic principles over , opposing , PKK-linked , and policies perceived as undermining religious values. In the 2023 general elections, HÜDA PAR secured four seats in the Grand by contesting under the People's banner led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), marking its entry into parliament despite limited independent electoral success due to the 7% threshold. The party has faced significant controversies, including allegations of ties to violent Islamist extremism from its roots, involvement in suppressing 2014 protests against operations in that led to clashes resulting in dozens of deaths, and positions critiqued for challenging constitutional protections of and . Despite these, it maintains alliances with the ruling coalition, participating in parliamentary efforts like the 2025 "Terror-Free Türkiye" committee aimed at PKK .

History

Origins and Formation

The Free Cause Party traces its origins to the Turkish Hizbullah, a Kurdish Islamist militant organization founded in 1979 in Batman by , drawing inspiration from 's Islamic Revolution. Hizbullah promoted Salafist interpretations of Islam and engaged in armed clashes with the (PKK) from 1990 to 1995, which reportedly resulted in over 1,000 deaths. The group's activities intensified in the early , allegedly with some training from state forces and , before Velioğlu was killed in a on January 17, 2000, leading to the of approximately 3,000 members and the dismantling of its militant structure. Following the suppression of Hizbullah, surviving sympathizers pivoted to non-violent avenues, forming groups such as the Mustazaflar Association (later closed) and the Solidarity Association with the Oppressed under the influence of the Menzil faction, which emphasized preaching over violence. These efforts laid the groundwork for political organization amid Turkey's evolving landscape for Islamist and Kurdish expression. HÜDA PAR was officially established on December 19, 2012, with headquarters in but primary support in southeastern cities like and Batman. The party's name, incorporating "Hüda" (meaning divine guidance) and alluding to Hizbullah, reflects ideological continuity prioritizing Muslim identity over . It emerged as an explicitly Islamist alternative, advocating Islamic governance, Kurdish rights within Turkey's unitary framework, and opposition to and .

Early Activities and Challenges

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) was established on December 17, 2012, as the political successor to civil society organizations formed from the remnants of the Kurdish Hizbullah, an Islamist militant group active in southeastern Turkey during the 1990s that had engaged in violent clashes with the PKK, resulting in over 1,000 deaths in areas like Diyarbakır, Batman, and Mardin. Following the 2000 police operation that killed Hizbullah leader Hüseyin Velioğlu and dismantled the group's armed structure, surviving members shifted toward non-violent Islamist civil initiatives, culminating in HÜDA PAR's founding to pursue Kurdish Islamist objectives through legal political channels, including advocacy for constitutional recognition of Kurds and opposition to secularism and PKK influence. Initial activities centered on organizing in Kurdish-majority provinces, particularly Batman where the party maintains strong support, and preparing for electoral participation. In the March 2014 local elections, HÜDA PAR secured 7.8% of the vote in Batman and 4.32% in , marking modest gains as a new entrant focused on promoting Sunni Islamist values alongside Kurdish identity, while denouncing PKK-linked violence and emphasizing peaceful resolution of regional issues. The party established its headquarters in but rooted operations in southeastern cities, conducting outreach through speeches, community events, and calls for Islamic unity transcending ethnic divisions. HÜDA PAR faced significant challenges from its perceived ties to Hizbullah's violent past, with critics accusing it of continuity despite the party's claims of a complete shift to democratic , leading to public suspicion and evasive responses from leaders on the connections. Rivalries with PKK-affiliated groups escalated into street violence, including attacks on party offices and members during the 2014 Kobani protests, where clashes in Kurdish cities resulted in casualties among HÜDA PAR supporters. Within its first three years, 12 party founders were reported killed in targeted incidents attributed to rivals, underscoring the intra-Kurdish tensions and security threats that hindered organizational growth and legitimacy-building efforts.

Ideology and Positions

Core Islamist Framework

The Free Cause Party's Islamist framework is anchored in Sunni , which conceives of as an all-encompassing system governing personal conduct, social relations, and state authority, inherently rejecting the secular dichotomy between religion and politics. This perspective aligns with broader Islamist thought that positions as intrinsically political, prioritizing divine sovereignty over human-made laws and seeking to revive ethical and legal norms derived from Islamic sources. The party emerged from the ideological legacy of Turkish Hizbullah cadres, who historically pursued an Islamist vision of societal transformation through moral and political mobilization, though HÜDA PAR operates within legal political bounds. Central to this framework is the elevation of the ummah—the transnational Muslim community—as a primary , conceptualized by party leaders as a unifying force transcending ethnic or national divisions, with itself framed as the authentic form of "nationalism" for believers. Kurdish-specific grievances are subordinated to this Islamic paradigm, interpreted as injustices redressable through adherence to Sharia-derived principles of equity and communal solidarity rather than secular . features prominently, evidenced by calls for unified Muslim action, such as forming an Islamic to counter perceived threats to Muslim lands, emphasizing collective defense of the faith over fragmented state interests. The party also promotes Sunni-Shia reconciliation within an overarching Islamic unity, viewing sectarian divides as exploitable weaknesses hindering the ummah's strength. In policy terms, the framework manifests in advocacy for legal reforms safeguarding Islamic sanctities, including proposals to criminalize insults to under independent penal code articles, rejecting such acts as protected speech and demanding heightened deterrence to preserve communal and moral order. is enforced through opposition to perceived moral deviations, such as draft legislation criminalizing same-sex relations and expressions, aligned with traditional Islamic prohibitions on to protect family structures and generational continuity. While the party's official program avoids explicit endorsement of full implementation—fact-checked claims of leaders promising "we will bring Sharia" have been debunked as misrepresentations—their rhetoric consistently prioritizes Islamic norms in governance, critiquing secular constitutional clauses like those protecting as impediments to faith-based justice. This approach reflects a pragmatic adaptation of radical Islamist roots to Turkey's secular framework, focusing on incremental alignment of state policies with core Islamic tenets like , , and communal protection.

Kurdish Identity and Nationalism

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) frames Kurdish identity primarily through an Islamist lens, subordinating ethnic particularities to the broader Islamic while advocating for cultural and as matters of religious justice. The party explicitly views "Islam as ," positioning Kurdish advocacy within a framework that prioritizes transnational Muslim solidarity over secular ethnic separatism. This approach distinguishes HÜDA PAR from secular Kurdish nationalist movements like the PKK or its political affiliates, which the party criticizes for promoting irreligious ideologies and violence. HÜDA PAR leaders have condemned Turkish state policies of assimilation toward , demanding the removal of legal and practical barriers to freely expressing Kurdish identity, including linguistic and cultural practices. Party figures attribute the persistence of the Kurdish issue not to Kurdish ethnic assertions but to "" and excessive , which they argue foster division and unrest rather than ethnic identity itself. This stance reflects the party's base among Sunni in southeastern , particularly in Kurmanji-speaking communities, where it seeks to mobilize support by blending ethnic grievances with Islamist solutions. In practice, HÜDA PAR rejects Kurdish independence or federalism models that detach from Islamic unity, instead calling for resolutions grounded in sharia-compliant equity that accommodate minority rights within Turkey's existing structure. The party's formation in 2012 emerged as a political extension of earlier Kurdish Islamist networks, aiming to provide a non-violent alternative to both state repression and militant secular . By 2023, this ideology secured the party four parliamentary seats through alliances, appealing to conservative disillusioned with pro-PKK groups.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Stances

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) advocates for a domestic policy framework rooted in Islamic principles, emphasizing , family preservation, and national unity within Turkey's . On economic matters, the party promotes a "human centred policy of " designed to enhance prosperity while steering clear of the "excesses of capitalist and socialist point of views." It opposes ethnic or sectarian-based , arguing that such approaches foster and anarchy, and instead prioritizes inclusive governance that integrates Kurdish cultural elements—such as recognizing Kurdish as an alongside Turkish—while upholding the Turkish flag as the . In social and legal domains, HÜDA PAR supports conservative positions on and roles, with critics noting the party's alignment with efforts to repeal Turkey's national law and reintroduce the penalty for severe crimes, reflecting its emphasis on traditional Islamic over secular protections. The party calls for a new that eliminates "junta-era constraints," aiming for a document that is fair, inclusive, and reflective of public voices often sidelined in decision-making, including on and . Security policies focus on combating organizations like the PKK, which HÜDA PAR designates as terrorist entities undermining Kurdish and Turkish unity, while challenging the dominance of secular Kurdish parties in representing Kurdish interests. Regarding foreign policy, HÜDA PAR envisions a approach centered on the ummah (global Muslim community), promoting the "institutionalization of transnational Islam" as the ideal for Muslim states and striving to mitigate global conflicts and to foster a secure Islamic world. The party has voiced strong criticism of U.S. and Israeli policies, particularly in contexts like and broader regional aggressions, framing opposition to such actions as essential to halting "genocide" and . While supporting alliances like the People's Alliance domestically, HÜDA PAR maintains independent stances on international issues, prioritizing with Muslim nations over Western alignments.

Leadership and Internal Organization

Founding and Current Leadership

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) was officially established on December 19, 2012, following approval by Turkish authorities, with its headquarters initially set in . The party emerged from Islamist circles in southeastern , particularly , as a legal political vehicle for Sunni Islamist and Kurdish-oriented after the dismantling of the militant Turkish Hizbullah group in the early . Mehmet Hüseyin Yılmaz served as the founding chairman, overseeing the party's initial organization and registration with 45 founding members, including eight women. Leadership transitioned shortly after founding, with Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu assuming the role of chairman and serving continuously thereafter, including re-elections at party congresses such as the fifth ordinary grand congress in July 2024 where he received near-unanimous support from delegates. Yapıcıoğlu, a Batman native with a background in Islamic studies and prior involvement in Hizbullah-linked community efforts, has directed the party's strategic alignment with Turkey's conservative politics, including support for the People's Alliance in elections. As of 2025, he remains the party's general chairman, also holding a parliamentary seat won via alliance lists in the 2023 general elections.

Party Structure and Membership

The Free Cause Party maintains a centralized hierarchical structure typical of Turkish political parties, with authority vested in a General President elected by party congress delegates. Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu has served as General President since the party's founding, with re-election confirmed at the 5th Ordinary Congress held in a recent gathering where he received unanimous support from valid votes. The central executive board, known as the Genel İdare Kurulu, comprises key figures responsible for policy formulation and oversight, including Vice Presidents such as Şehzade Demir, İshak Sağlam, and Serkan Ramanlı, alongside other members like Halef Yılmaz and Hüseyin Yılmaz. Provincial and district-level organizations (il and ilçe teşkilatları) extend the party's reach, primarily in southeastern provinces with significant Kurdish populations, such as Batman—its foundational base—Şanlıurfa, and Diyarbakır, facilitating local mobilization and candidate selection. Membership is modest and concentrated among Sunni Kurdish communities opposing secular Kurdish nationalism, with 14,858 registered members as of January 2025, per official records from Turkey's Interior Ministry. The party emphasizes ideological commitment over mass recruitment, drawing adherents from conservative Islamist networks formerly associated with non-political entities, though it has expanded through alliances and electoral participation. Recruitment occurs via formal applications through provincial branches, prioritizing alignment with the party's Islamist principles and rejection of PKK-linked groups. Internal discipline is enforced via congresses and executive directives, with limited public disclosure of grassroots membership demographics beyond regional focus.

Electoral Performance

National Election Results

In the June 2015 Turkish general election, the Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) contested seats independently but failed to secure parliamentary representation, as its vote share fell below the 7% national threshold required for allocation of seats under Turkey's proportional representation system. The party similarly obtained no seats in the snap November 2015 election, again running without alliance partners. In the 2018 general election, HÜDA PAR's independent candidacy yielded negligible national impact, with support confined to select southeastern provinces and no seats won. The party's electoral breakthrough occurred in the May 14, 2023, parliamentary election, where it participated within the People's Alliance alongside the Justice and Development Party (AKP). HÜDA PAR nominated four candidates on AKP lists in districts including Istanbul and Şanlıurfa, all of whom were elected to the 600-seat Grand National Assembly. Following the vote, these parliamentarians formally affiliated with HÜDA PAR, marking the first time the party held seats in Turkey's legislature. This outcome stemmed from alliance dynamics allowing threshold circumvention, rather than standalone voter mobilization, with HÜDA PAR's backing for AKP presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aiding coordination.
Election DateAlliance StatusSeats Won
June 7, 2015Independent0
November 1, 2015Independent0
June 24, 2018Independent0
May 14, 2023People's Alliance (AKP lists)4

Local and Provincial Elections

In the March 31, 2019, local elections, the received 253,648 votes nationwide, representing 0.55% of the total valid votes for municipal mayoral positions, and won control of one belde (a small township municipality). This limited success was concentrated in southeastern Turkey, where the party's Islamist-Kurdish base provided pockets of support amid competition from larger alliances like the People's Alliance (AKP-MHP). The party fared similarly in provincial council elections held concurrently, securing a small number of seats in il genel meclisi assemblies in provinces such as Batman, though it did not dominate any provincial body. These outcomes underscored HÜDA PAR's niche appeal, often splitting conservative votes in Kurdish-majority areas without broader breakthroughs. In the March 31, 2024, local elections, HÜDA PAR ran candidates independently under its own logo across multiple provinces, including metropolitan and district municipalities, but won no mayoral seats. Vote shares remained low, typically under 1-2% in strongholds like Adıyaman (1.25%) and Diyarbakır, reflecting challenges in expanding beyond core Islamist supporters amid economic discontent and opposition gains. Provincial council representation persisted at minimal levels, with no reported dominance in any il genel meclisi. The party's decision to contest separately, rather than aligning fully with the People's Alliance, highlighted internal priorities on visibility but contributed to fragmented conservative votes.

Political Alliances and Relations

Cooperation with AKP and People's Alliance

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR) has pursued tactical cooperation with the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led lliance primarily to secure electoral representation and influence conservative Kurdish voters, without formal membership in the coalition. In the lead-up to the May 2023 Turkish general elections, HÜDA-PAR Chairperson Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu announced the party's endorsement of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for the presidential race, while emphasizing preservation of its independent identity. This support extended to HÜDA-PAR candidates running on AKP parliamentary lists as part of the expanded lliance, enabling the party to overcome the 7% national threshold barrier. This arrangement yielded four parliamentary seats for HÜDA-PAR in the 28th Grand National Assembly following the May 14, 2023, vote, marking its first direct legislative presence despite garnering only about 0.5% of the national vote independently. The alliance provided Erdoğan with additional backing from Islamist-leaning Kurdish constituencies in southeastern provinces like Şanlıurfa and Batman, where HÜDA-PAR holds localized strength, amid efforts to consolidate the conservative vote against opposition challengers. However, AKP officials, including Parliamentary Group Deputy Chair Bülent Turan, publicly clarified in April 2023 that HÜDA-PAR was not an official component of the People's Alliance, framing the collaboration as limited to electoral endorsements rather than structural integration. Prior instances of alignment include HÜDA-PAR's implicit support for Erdoğan in the 2018 elections, where it directed conservative Kurdish voters toward the AKP without formal candidacy pacts, signaling ideological affinity on issues like anti-PKK stances and Sunni Islamist values. Post-2023, the partnership has sustained informal ties, evidenced by Erdoğan's hosting of HÜDA-PAR leaders and policy overlaps on security matters, though it has drawn criticism for potentially legitimizing the party's controversial associations. This cooperation reflects pragmatic realpolitik, with HÜDA-PAR leveraging AKP's dominance for visibility while the ruling bloc accesses niche voter bases, yet it remains non-binding and subject to future electoral dynamics.

Interactions with Other Kurdish and Islamist Groups

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR) maintains a position of sharp opposition to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its affiliated political entities, such as the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and its successor DEM Party, viewing them as promoters of secular nationalism and separatism that undermine Islamic unity among Kurds. HÜDA-PAR frames Kurdish grievances as resolvable through Islamic principles and brotherhood within the Turkish state, explicitly rejecting the PKK's armed struggle and Marxist ideology as antithetical to religious values. This ideological rift traces back to the 1990s, when HÜDA-PAR's ideological precursor, the Kurdish Hizbullah, engaged in protracted violent confrontations with the PKK in southeastern Turkey, resulting in thousands of deaths on both sides as the groups vied for influence among Kurdish populations. Tensions escalated into direct clashes in 2014 amid protests over the siege of Kobani by ISIS, where pro-PKK demonstrators targeted HÜDA-PAR offices and supporters, leading to deadly street battles in cities including Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, and Cizre. On October 7, 2014, attackers assaulted a HÜDA-PAR office in Diyarbakır, prompting return fire that killed three assailants and injured others, while subsequent riots saw arson and gunfire exchanges resulting in at least 36 deaths nationwide, with HÜDA-PAR accusing PKK-linked youth groups like the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) of initiating the violence to suppress Islamist Kurdish voices. HÜDA-PAR leaders denied provoking the unrest, attributing it to PKK efforts to consolidate control during the chaos of the Kobani crisis, and the party has since condemned such actions as attempts to marginalize conservative Kurds. Similar skirmishes recurred in 2015, including a May incident in Diyarbakır where clashes between HÜDA-PAR and pro-HDP groups left two dead. Politically, HÜDA-PAR competes with PKK-aligned parties for the Kurdish electorate, positioning itself as an Islamist alternative that prioritizes religious identity over ethnic separatism and has sought to siphon votes from disillusioned conservative Kurds. During Turkey's 2013-2015 peace process with the PKK, government officials considered incorporating HÜDA-PAR into negotiations to represent pious Kurds opposed to the PKK's dominance, highlighting its role as a counterweight in intra-Kurdish dynamics. HÜDA-PAR has criticized HDP for sabotaging peace efforts by aligning too closely with the PKK, advocating instead for resolutions grounded in Islamic justice rather than autonomy demands. Interactions with smaller Kurdish Islamist formations, such as the Azadî movement, remain limited and non-confrontational, with both sharing pro-Islamic stances on Kurdish rights but lacking documented alliances or rivalries. Regarding broader Islamist groups, HÜDA-PAR aligns ideologically with Sunni Islamist currents emphasizing pan-Islamism over ethnic nationalism, but specific cooperative ties beyond its electoral pacts with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) are sparse. The party distinguishes itself from Turkish Islamist parties like Saadet by integrating Kurdish-specific advocacy within an ummah framework, yet it has not formed formal coalitions with them, focusing instead on penetrating Kurdish-majority areas where it competes indirectly for religious voters. Critics note HÜDA-PAR's emphasis on Islamic solidarity has fostered tacit sympathy among regional Islamist networks, including in Iraqi Kurdistan, but verifiable joint activities remain undocumented.

Controversies and Criticisms

Alleged Connections to Turkish Hizbullah

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR) has faced persistent allegations of serving as the political successor to Turkish Hizbullah, a Sunni Islamist militant organization active primarily in the 1990s that engaged in extrajudicial killings, torture, and clashes with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), resulting in over 2,000 deaths before its leader Hüseyin Velioğlu was killed in a 2000 police raid. Critics, including secular Turkish media and opposition figures, point to overlapping personnel as evidence, noting that HÜDA-PAR's founding in 2012 involved former Hizbullah cadres released from prison after the group's dismantling; for instance, initial party executives included individuals like İshak Sağlam, who had ties to Hizbullah's urban cells in Batman and Şanlıurfa provinces. Further substantiating claims of continuity, HÜDA-PAR's abbreviation "Hüda-Par" translates to "Party of God," mirroring Hizbullah's nomenclature, and the party has been accused of harboring ideological alignment with the militant group's anti-secular, anti-PKK stance, including glorification of Hizbullah's past resistance against Kurdish separatism. Reports from investigative outlets highlight specific instances, such as HÜDA-PAR members attending commemorations for Hizbullah figures and the party's reluctance to unequivocally condemn the group's historical violence, with leader Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu stating in 2023 that he does not view Hizbullah's actions as terrorism but as a response to PKK aggression. HÜDA-PAR has consistently denied being a direct extension of Hizbullah, asserting that while some members share a conservative Islamist background, the party rejects militancy and operates legally within Turkey's democratic framework, having condemned violence on multiple occasions since its establishment. These denials are echoed in the party's platform, which emphasizes political advocacy for Sunni Kurdish rights without endorsing armed struggle, though skeptics argue that the lack of internal purges of ex-militants undermines such claims. The allegations gained renewed attention during the 2023 elections when HÜDA-PAR's alliance with the People's Alliance amplified scrutiny, prompting protests in Kurdish-majority areas over fears of resurgent extremism.

Accusations of Anti-Secularism and Militancy

HÜDA PAR has been accused of anti-secularism primarily due to its self-identification as Turkey's first openly non-secular Islamist party, which explicitly prioritizes Islamic principles over the republic's foundational secular framework. Critics, including secular opposition groups and nationalists, argue that the party's platform seeks to erode the strict separation of religion and state established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, pointing to its advocacy for governance aligned with Sharia-derived norms rather than laïcité. In September 2024, party chairman Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu's statements calling for the removal of constitutional protections for the first four articles—which safeguard the unitary republic, its indivisibility, , and secularism—intensified these accusations. Opponents, such as Republican People's Party (CHP) lawmakers, condemned the remarks as undermining state unity and the secular order, with social media backlash framing them as an assault on republican principles. The party's program further fuels claims of anti-secular intent by portraying early 20th-century Kurdish revolts, including the 1925 , as justified reactions to forced and Turkification, rather than insurgencies against the nascent republic. Detractors interpret this as glorification of religiously motivated uprisings, suggesting an ideological preference for theocratic elements over democratic secularism. Accusations of militancy stem from perceptions of the party's rhetoric and historical associations as endorsing violent resistance to secular authority, with critics alleging it promotes an aggressive Islamist worldview incompatible with pluralistic governance. In April 2025, HÜDA PAR proposed legislation to criminalize same-sex intercourse, which opponents decried as emblematic of militant conservatism aimed at imposing religious edicts through state power, exacerbating fears of enforced moral policing. Such positions, combined with the party's defense of Islamist uprisings, have led secular analysts to warn of potential for radical mobilization against perceived irreligious policies.

Responses to Criticisms and Internal Debates

HÜDA PAR officials have repeatedly denied allegations of direct organizational links to Turkish Hizbullah, describing the party as a distinct political formation founded in 2012 to pursue Islamist objectives through legal and electoral means rather than militancy. Party spokespersons assert that while individual founders, such as former Hizbullah members, renounced violence post-2000s state crackdowns, the organization itself has no operational continuity with the militant group, emphasizing instead a commitment to democratic participation and rejection of armed struggle. In countering claims of involvement in post-2015 urban clashes, HÜDA PAR accuses Kurdish nationalist groups like the PKK of initiating violence against its offices and members, framing the party as a target of suppression rather than an aggressor. On accusations of anti-secularism and promotion of militancy, the party defends its platform as safeguarding religious freedoms and moral values within Turkey's constitutional framework, rather than seeking to dismantle secular institutions. Leaders have proposed legislation to penalize insults to Islamic beliefs, positioning such measures as responses to perceived cultural provocations, such as media depictions offensive to Muslim sensibilities, while rejecting labels of extremism as politically motivated smears by secularist opponents. HÜDA PAR argues that its advocacy for Sharia-inspired policies on family and education aligns with conservative Kurdish societal norms, not theocratic imposition, and counters militancy charges by highlighting its electoral focus since entering parliament in 2023. Internal debates within HÜDA PAR have centered on balancing ideological purity with pragmatic alliances, particularly the 2018-2023 cooperation with the AKP-led People's Alliance, which some members viewed as diluting the party's distinct Kurdish-Islamist identity. While unified on core tenets like opposition to PKK secularism and support for Islamic governance elements, discussions emerged on the risks of over-reliance on Erdoğan, leading to strategic decisions to field independent candidates in select districts to preserve autonomy. These tensions, though not publicly fracturing the party, reflect broader Islamist movement dynamics in Turkey, where former militants' shift to politics has prompted reevaluations of violence's utility amid electoral gains. No major schisms have been reported, with leadership maintaining cohesion through emphasis on anti-PKK stances and transnational Muslim solidarity.

Impact and Recent Developments

Influence on Turkish Politics

The Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) has influenced Turkish politics mainly through its integration into the People's Alliance alongside the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), providing a platform to channel Islamist and conservative Kurdish perspectives into national decision-making. Established in 2012 as Turkey's first openly non-secular Islamist party, HÜDA PAR endorsed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's candidacy in the March 2023 presidential election and fielded candidates under AKP lists in parliamentary races, securing four seats in the 600-member Grand National Assembly. This arrangement amplified the party's voice in a legislature dominated by the ruling coalition, allowing it to advocate for policies emphasizing Sunni Islamist values over ethnic separatism in Kurdish-majority regions. By aligning with the AKP, HÜDA PAR has helped consolidate conservative votes in southeastern Turkey, competing directly with the pro-PKK Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) for Kurdish support and promoting a religious-nationalist alternative to secular Kurdish nationalism. Independent electoral performance remains limited, with the party receiving fewer than 3% of votes in 2024 local elections, yet its alliance role enables tactical gains, such as influencing voter mobilization in Batman and Şanlıurfa provinces where Islamist sentiments run strong. This dynamic has shifted Kurdish political competition toward identity debates framed in religious terms, bolstering the AKP's hold on power amid declining direct appeal. HÜDA PAR's legislative initiatives further demonstrate its policy sway within the coalition, including a July 2024 bill to strip Turkish citizenship from individuals serving in the Israeli Defense Forces, which advanced to parliamentary debate, and a February 2025 proposal criminalizing LGBT expression and associations. The party has also pushed for a new constitution to dismantle "junta-era" secular restrictions from the 1982 document, critiquing it as incompatible with Islamic governance principles. These efforts, while not always enacted, inject hardline Islamist positions into mainstream discourse, pressuring the AKP to accommodate conservative demands on social, foreign, and constitutional issues. Critics from opposition circles argue that HÜDA PAR's inclusion expands Erdoğan's reliance on fringe elements to sustain coalitions, potentially eroding secular norms, though the party maintains its stances promote national unity against terrorism and Western cultural influences. Post-2023, its activities continue to shape intra-coalition negotiations, particularly on Kurdish issues and anti-PKK policies, underscoring a niche but persistent role in polarizing Turkey's conservative landscape.

Post-2023 Election Activities and Future Outlook

Following the May 2023 general elections, HÜDA PAR retained its four seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, obtained via candidate lists of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the People's Alliance framework. The party shifted focus to legislative engagement, maintaining close coordination with the AKP on policy matters. In the March 31, 2024, local elections, HÜDA PAR fielded independent candidates in select districts, particularly in southeastern provinces, but secured no municipal mayorships and garnered modest vote shares in Kurdish-populated areas, underscoring challenges in broadening its base beyond core Islamist supporters. Parliamentary efforts intensified in 2025, with MPs proposing bills to eliminate interest on credit cards (submitted June 27, 2025) and to criminalize propagandas deemed harmful to public morality. In April 2025, the party advanced amendments to the Turkish Penal Code targeting LGBTI+ related activities, framing them as threats to societal norms. By October 2025, HÜDA PAR pushed for legislation revoking citizenship from dual Turkish-Israeli nationals, citing security concerns tied to Israeli actions in Gaza. Looking ahead, party leader Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu endorsed the May 2025 initiation of PKK disarmament talks via state intelligence channels, viewing it as viable amid weakened opposition and international dynamics, while affirming ongoing AKP consultations. HÜDA PAR advocates constitutional reform to incorporate Kurdish language rights in education and citizenship definitions, alongside challenging the unamendable status of the republic's foundational articles for greater flexibility. In September 2025, Yapıcıoğlu reiterated calls for an inclusive reflecting diverse societal inputs to guide long-term governance. Sustained backing from President Erdoğan signals enduring alliance stability, positioning the party to amplify conservative Islamist priorities in coalition policymaking through the 2028 general elections.

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