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Islamic feminism
Islamic feminism
from Wikipedia

Islamic feminism is a form of feminism concerned with the role of women in Islam. It aims for the full equality of all Muslims, regardless of gender, in public and private life. Islamic feminists advocate for women's rights, gender equality, and social justice grounded in an Islamic framework. Although rooted in Islam, the movement's pioneers have also utilized secular, Western, or otherwise non-Muslim feminist discourses, and have recognized the role of Islamic feminism as part of an integrated global feminist movement.

Advocates of the movement seek to highlight the teachings of equality in the religion, and encourage a questioning of patriarchal interpretations of Islam by reinterpreting the Quran and Hadith.

Prominent thinkers include Begum Rokeya, Amina Wadud, Leila Ahmed, Fatema Mernissi, Azizah al-Hibri, Riffat Hassan, Asma Lamrabet, and Asma Barlas.

Definition and background

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Islamic feminists

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Since the mid-nineteenth century, Muslim women and men have been critical of restrictions placed on women regarding education, seclusion, veiling, polygyny, slavery, and concubinage. Modern Muslims have questioned these practices and advocated for reform.[1] There is an ongoing debate about the status of women in Islam. Conservative Islamic feminists use the Quran, the Hadith, and prominent women in Muslim history as evidence for the discussion on women's rights. Feminists argue that early Islam represented more egalitarian ideals, while conservatives argue that gender asymmetries are "divinely ordained".[2]

Islamic feminists are Muslims who interpret the Quran and Hadith in an egalitarian manner and advocate for women's rights and equality in the public and personal sphere. Islamic feminists critique patriarchal, sexist, and misogynistic understandings of Islam.[3] Islamic feminists understand the Qur'an as advocating gender equality.[4] Islamic feminism is anchored within the discourse of Islam with the Quran as its central text.[5] The historian Margot Badran states that Islamic feminism "derives its understanding and mandate from the Qur’an, seeks rights and justice for women, and for men, in the totality of their existence."[6][4]

Islamists are advocates of political Islam, the notion that the Quran and hadith mandate an Islamic government. Some Islamists advocate women's rights in the public sphere but do not challenge gender inequality in the personal, private sphere.[7] Su'ad al-Fatih al-Badawi, a Sudanese academic and Islamist politician, has argued that feminism is incompatible with taqwa (the Islamic conception of piety), and thus Islam and feminism are mutually exclusive.[8] Badran argues that Islam and feminism are not mutually exclusive.[9]

Islamic feminists have differed in their understandings and definitions of Islamic feminism. Islamic scholar Asma Barlas shares Badran's views, discussing the difference between secular feminists and Islamic feminism and in countries where Muslims make up 98% of the population, it is not possible to avoid engaging “its basic beliefs.”[10] The major distinction between the two facets of the gender based hypothesis is the fact that Islamic feminism engages with the theology and draws from the qur’anic verses of equality. This postulate is often misinterpreted and confused with the term fundamentalism by the west; which it is also battling at the same time . Fundamentalism can be explained as active contemporary movements organised in order to shield a perceived assault on the religious foundation of the social order.[11] It is fuelled with the basic assumption stating that modernism and secularism is to blame for society’s moral degeneration. It stands as, “a protest against the assault on patriarchal structural principles”.[12]

Elizabeth Segran states that just talking about human rights mentioned in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) does not create immediate resonance with ordinary Muslim women; since Islam is the source of their values, integrating human rights frameworks with Islam makes sense.[13]

South African Muslim scholar Fatima Seedat agrees with both Barlas and Badran about the importance of feminism in the Islamic world. However, she debates the term “Islamic Feminism” is unnecessary since feminism is a “social practice, not merely of personal identity.”[14] Seedat believes the convergence of both Islamic and feminism creates more conflict and opens more doors for “Islamists” to interpret or misinterpret the Qur'an to suit their political needs. She believes it is important to speak about and illustrate how feminism has existed in the lines of the Qur'an. By separating the two and giving their own space, it will be more inclusive to everyone (men, women, Muslims and non-Muslims). In the same article, “Feminism, and Islamic Feminism: Between Inadequacy and Inevitability,” Seedat explains that the existence of such a term separates Muslims and isolates them from the rest of the world and the universal feminist movement. She states in her essay the importance of sharing with the rest of the world what Islam has to offer feminism, and to show the true image of Islam by not referring to themselves as Islamic feminists.

Some Muslim women writers and activists have eschewed identifying themselves as Islamic feminists out of a belief Western feminism is exclusionary to Muslim women and women of color more generally.[15] Azizah al-Hibri, a Lebanese-American Muslim scholar, has identified herself as a "womanist".[16]

Islamic feminism and the Quran

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Islamic feminists understand the Quran as advocating gender equality.[4] In the view of feminist legal scholar Azizah al-Hibri, the Quran teaches all human beings are creations of God from one soul, who were divided into nations and tribes to know each other, and the most honored individuals are those who are the most pious. Therefore, al-Hibri writes that the Quran recognizes differences between human beings while asserting their natural equality and no man is recognized as superior by their gender alone.[17]

According to Aysha Hidayatullah, many feminist interpreters of the Quran use the historical context of a verse's revelation in order to determine whether a verse's command was specific to the situation of its revelation or intended as general instruction. For many feminist exegetes, reading the former as the latter risks universalising the historical situation of seventh century Arabia, including the sexism present in that society, as such verses do not directly state the Quran's universal principles but rather apply them to specific situations at the time of revelation. Amina Wadud uses historical contextualisation to critique interpretations of verse 4:34 that take it to assert men's superiority, arguing for a reading that insists on mutuality between men and women. For Wadud, the verse does not assert men's superiority, nor does it universally assign men the role of provider. As cited by Hidayatullah, Wadud understands the verse as prescribing men's responsibility to ensure "that the woman is not burdened with additional responsibilities [in the context of childbearing]." However, the male role of "qiwamah" or economic provider does not always reflect modern social reality. Yet, the verse depicts as ideal an "equitable and mutually dependent relationship" which demonstrates a Quranic insistence on "mutual responsibility between males and females". Such mutual responsibility is not limited to a specific time or place, and can be applied in modern societies.[18]

Early Muslims and modern Islamic feminists

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Modern Muslim feminists and progressive Muslims have taken early figures in Islamic history as role models including Khadijah,[19] Aisha, Hafsa, Umm Salama, Fatima, and Zaynab bint Ali. Zainab Alwani cites Aisha as an empowered and intelligent woman who repeatedly confronted the misogyny of other sahaba.[20] Moroccan feminist Asma Lamrabet has also argued Aisha was an empowered female intellectual against what Lamrabet sees as a misogynistic intellectual history.[21] Lamrabet has also praised Umm Salama as a feminist figure.[22]

Iranian revolutionary thinker Ali Shariati wrote Fatemeh is Fatemeh, a biography of Muhammad's daughter Fatima, that holds her as a role model for women.[23] Ednan Aslan suggests Fatima is an example of female empowerment in early Islam, as she was not afraid to oppose Abu Bakr and demand her inheritance.[24]

Some Muslim feminists have asserted Muhammad himself was a feminist.[25]

History

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In the past 150 years or so, many scholarly interpretations have developed from within the Islamic tradition itself that seek to redress social wrongs perpetrated against Muslim women.[26] For example, new Islamic jurisprudence is emerging that seeks to forbid practices like female genital mutilation, equalize family law, support women as clergy and in administrative positions in mosques, and supports equal opportunities for Muslim women to become judges in civil as well as religious institutions.[26] Modern feminist Islamic scholars perceive their work as restoration of rights provided by God and Muhammad but denied by society.[26]

Nineteenth century

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Begum Rokeya was one of the earliest Islamic feminist thinkers.

The modern movement of Islamic feminism began in the nineteenth century.

Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, also known as Begum Rokeya (1880 - 1932) was a writer, educator and the earliest intellectual of Islamic feminism from Bengal. She struggled women's education and advocated for gender-based equality amongst Bengali Muslims, a community that was socio-economically and culturally deeply maginalised in colonial Bengal. Through her writings and activism, she sharply criticized the entrenched patriarchy of South Asian society and condemned the practice of purdah, the veiling and segregation of women.[27] In works such as Sultana’s Dream (1905), the earliest utopian Islamic feminist science fiction and Abarodhbasini (1931), she imagined alternatives to male-dominated social orders and exposed the injustices faced by women in seclusion.[28] In 1911, she established the first ever girls' school, Sakhawat Memorial Girls’ School in Calcutta to provide formal education for Muslim girls, often persuading conservative families to enroll their daughters by agreeing to preserve cultural customs within the classroom.[29][30] She was very influential amongst Bengalis and her legacy is celebrated in modern-day Bangladesh.[29]

Aisha Taymur (1840 - 1902) was a prominent writer and early activist for women's rights in Egypt. Taymur's writings criticized male domination over women and celebrated women's intellect and courage.[31]

Another early Muslim feminist activist and writer was Zaynab Fawwaz (1860 - 1914). Fawwaz argued for women's social and intellectual quality with men and wrote a book of biographies of famous women.[32]

Egyptian jurist Qasim Amin, the author of the 1899 pioneering book Women's Liberation (Tahrir al-Mar'a), is often described as the father of the Egyptian feminist movement. In his work, Amin criticized some of the practices prevalent in his society at the time, such as polygyny, the veil, and purdah, i.e. sex segregation in Islam. He condemned them as un-Islamic and contradictory to the true spirit of Islam. His work had an enormous influence on women's political movements throughout the Islamic and Arab world, and is read and cited today.[citation needed]

Despite Qasim Amin's effects on modern-day Islamic feminist movements, present-day scholar Leila Ahmed considers his works both androcentric and colonialist.[33] Muhammad 'Abdu, an Egyptian nationalist[34] and proponent of Islamic modernism, could easily have written the chapters of his work that show honest considerations of the negative effects of the veil on women.[35] Amin even posed many male-centered misconceptions about women, such as their inability to experience love, that women needlessly talk about their husbands outside their presence, and that Muslim marriage is based on ignorance and sensuality, of which women were the chief source.[36]

Lesser known, however, are the women who preceded Amin in their feminist critique of their societies. The women's press in Egypt started voicing such concerns since its very first issues in 1892. Egyptian, Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese women and men had been reading European feminist magazines even a decade earlier, and discussed their relevance to the Middle East in the general press.[37]

Twentieth century

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Aisha Abd al-Rahman, writing under her pen name Bint al-Shati ("Daughter of the Riverbank"), was one of the first to undertake Quranic exegesis, and though she did not consider herself to be a feminist, her works reflect feminist themes. She began producing her popular books in 1959, the same year that Naguib Mahfouz published his allegorical and feminist version of the life of Muhammad.[38] She wrote biographies of early women in Islam, including the mother, wives and daughters of Muhammad, as well as literary criticism.[39]

Queen Soraya of Afghanistan headed reform so that women could get an education and the right to vote. The Syrian-born queen of Afghanistan believed that women should be equal to men. A women's magazine and a women's organization to protect girls and women from abuse and domestic violence were also founded by Queen Soraya, argued by some to be the Muslim world's first feminist. She also arranged for young Afghan men and women to take higher education abroad. The liberal reforms were not received kindly by the ultra-conservative Islamists who orchestrated a widespread rebellion in 1928. In order to spare the country and people from the horrors of a long civil war, King Amanullah, and Queen Soraya abdicated and went into exile with their family in 1929 to Rome.

Moroccan writer and sociologist, Fatema Mernissi was a prominent Muslim feminist thinker. Her book Beyond the Veil explores the oppression of women in Islamic societies and sexual ideology and gender identity through the perspective of Moroccan society and culture.[40] Mernissi argued in her book The Veil and the Male Elite that the suppression of women's rights in Islamic societies is the result of political motivation and its consequent manipulative interpretation of hadith, which runs counter to the egalitarian Islamic community of men and women envisioned by Muhammad.[41] Mernissi argued that the ideal Muslim woman being "silent and obedient" has nothing to do with the message of Islam. In her view, conservative Muslim men manipulated the Quran to preserve their patriarchal system in order to prevent women from sexual liberation; thus enforcing justification of strict veiling and limiting their rights.[40]

A later 20th-century Islamic feminist is Amina Wadud. Wadud was born into an African-American family and converted to Islam. In 1992, Wadud published Quran and Woman, a work that critiqued patriarchal interpretations of the Quran.[42]

Some strains of modern Islamic feminism have opted to expunge hadith from their ideology altogether in favor of a movement focusing only on Qur'anic principles. Riffat Hassan has advocated one such movement, articulating a theology wherein what are deemed to be universal rights for humanity outlined in the Qur'an are prioritized over contextual laws and regulations.[43] She has additionally claimed that the Qur'an, taken alone as scripture, does not present females either as a creation preceded by the male or as the instigator of the "Fall of Man".[44] This theological movement has been met with criticism from other Muslim feminists such as Kecia Ali, who has criticized its selective nature for ignoring elements within the Muslim tradition that could prove helpful in establishing more egalitarian norms in Islamic society.[45]

Twenty-first century

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Islamic feminist scholarship and activism has continued into the 21st century.

In 2015, a group of Muslim activists, politicians, and writers issued a Declaration of Reform which, among other things, supports women's rights and states in part, "We support equal rights for women, including equal rights to inheritance, witness, work, mobility, personal law, education, and employment. Men and women have equal rights in mosques, boards, leadership and all spheres of society. We reject sexism and misogyny."[46] The Declaration also announced the founding of the Muslim Reform Movement organization to work against the beliefs of Middle Eastern terror groups.[47] Asra Nomani and others placed the Declaration on the door of the Islamic Center of Washington.[47]

Feminism in the Middle East is over a century old, and having been impacted directly by the war on terror in Afghanistan, continues to grow and fight for women's rights and equality in all conversations of power and everyday life.[48]

Muslim feminist writers today include Aysha Hidayatollah, Kecia Ali, Asma Lamrabet, Olfa Yousef, and Mohja Kahf.

Muslim women in politics

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Muslim majority countries have produced several female heads of state, prime ministers, and state secretaries such as Lala Shovkat of Azerbaijan, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Mame Madior Boye of Senegal, Tansu Çiller of Turkey, Kaqusha Jashari of Kosovo, and Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia. In Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia was elected the country's first female prime minister in 1991, and served as prime minister until 2009, when she was replaced by Sheikh Hasina, who made Bangladesh the country with the longest continuous female premiership (2009-2024), marked by an era of authoritarianism.[49]

Muslim feminist groups and initiatives

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Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan

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Meena Keshwar Kamal (1956 - 1987), founder of RAWA

The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) is a women's organization based in Quetta, Pakistan, that promotes women's rights and secular democracy. The organization aims to involve women of Afghanistan in both political and social activities aimed at acquiring their human rights and continuing the struggle against the government of Afghanistan based on democratic and secular - not fundamentalist - principles, in which women can participate fully.[50]

The organization was founded in 1977 by a group of intellectuals led by Meena (she did not use a last name). They founded the organization to promote equality and education for women; it continues to "give voice to the deprived and silenced women of Afghanistan". Before 1978, RAWA focused mainly on women's rights and democracy, but after the coup of 1978, directed by Moscow, and the 1979 Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, "Rawa became directly involved in the war of resistance, advocating democracy and secularism from the outset".[51] In 1979 RAWA campaigned against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and organized meetings in schools to mobilize support against it, and in 1981, launched a bilingual feminist magazine, Payam-e-Zan (Women's Message).[51][52][53] RAWA also founded Watan Schools to aid refugee children and their mothers, offering both hospitalization and the teaching of practical skills.[53][54]

Sisters in Islam

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Zainah Anwar

Sisters in Islam (SIS) is a Malaysian civil society organization committed to promoting the rights of women within the frameworks of Islam and universal human rights. SIS work focuses on challenging laws and policies made in the name of Islam that discriminate against women. As such it tackles issues covered under Malaysia's Islamic family and syariah laws, such as polygamy,[55] child marriage,[56] moral policing,[57] Islamic legal theory and jurisprudence, the hijab and modesty,[58] violence against women and hudud.[59] Their mission is to promote the principles of gender equality, justice, freedom, and dignity of Islam and empower women to be advocates for change.[60] They seek to promote a framework of women's rights in Islam which take into consideration women's experiences and realities; they want to eliminate the injustice and discrimination that women may face by changing mindsets that may hold women to be inferior to men; and they want to increase the public knowledge and reform laws and policies within the framework of justice and equality in Islam.[60] Prominent members are Zainah Anwar[61] and co-founder amina wadud.[62]

Musawah

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In 2009, twelve women from the Arab world formed the global movement Musawah, whose name means "equality" in Arabic. Musawah advocates for feminist interpretations of Islamic texts and calls on nations to abide by international human rights standards such as those promulgated in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Musawah's approach is modeled after that of Sisters in Islam. Secular feminists have criticized Musawah, arguing that Islam is shaky ground on which to build a feminist movement, given that interpretation of Islamic sources is subjective.[13]

Sister-hood

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Sister-hood is an international platform for the voices of women of Muslim heritage founded in 2007 by Norwegian film-maker and human rights activist Deeyah Khan through her media and arts production company Fuuse.[63]

Sister-hood was relaunched in 2016 as a global online magazine and live events platform promoting the voices of women of Muslim heritage. Sister-hood magazine ambassadors include Farida Shaheed from Pakistan, Egyptian Mona Eltahawy, Palestinian Rula Jebreal, Leyla Hussein of Somali heritage and Algerian Marieme Helie Lucas.

Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML)

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Women Living Under Muslim Laws is an international solidarity network established in 1984 that advocates for both Muslim and non-Muslim women who live in states governed by Islamic law. The group does research on Islamic law and women and advocacy work.[64]

Muslim Women's Quest for Equality

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Muslim Women's Quest for Equality is an Indian activist group that petitioned the Supreme Court of India against the practices of talaq-e-bidat (triple talaq), nikah halala and polygyny under the Muslim personal laws as being illegal and unconstitutional[65][66] in September 2016.

Ni Putes Ni Soumises

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Ni Putes Ni Soumises, whose name translates to Neither Whores nor Submissives, is a French feminist organization founded by Samira Bellil and other young women of African backgrounds, to address the sexual and physical violence that women in Muslim majority neighborhoods in France faced.[67]

International conferences on Islamic feminism

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Few international conferences on Islamic feminism have taken place. One international congress on Islamic feminism was held in Barcelona, Spain in 2008.[68] Musawah ('equality'; in Arabic: مساواة) is a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family, led by feminists since 2009, "seeking to reclaim Islam and the Koran for themselves".[69]

Musawah movement operates on the principle that patriarchy within Muslim countries is a result of the way male interpreters have read Islamic texts,[69] and that feminists can progressively interpret the Quran to achieve the goal of international human rights standards.[69] The first female Muslim 'ulema congress was held in Indonesia in 2017.[70] The women ulema congress issued a fatwa to lift the minimum age for girls to marry to 18.[70] Malaysian feminist Zainah Anwar informed the congress that women have an equal right to define Islam and that women need to fight against male domination in Quranic interpretations.[70] During the congress, Nur Rofiah, a professor in Quranic studies, stated that, Islam asks every human being to elevate the status of humankind, and polygamy does not, and that polygamy is not the teaching of Islam[70]

Areas of campaign

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Personal law

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Manal al-Sharif speaking at the Oslo Freedom Forum in 2012 about the #Women2Drive campaign she co-founded.

One of such controversial interpretations involve passages in the Quran that discuss the idea of a man's religious obligation to support women.[71] Some scholars, such as anthropologist Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban in her work on Arab-Muslim women activists' engagement in secular religious movements, argue that this assertion of a religious obligation "has traditionally been used as a rationale for the social practice of male authority."[71] In some countries the legislative and administrative application of male authority is used to justify denying women access to the public sphere through the "denial of permission to travel or work outside the home, or even drive a car."[71] On Sept. 26, 2017 Saudi Arabia announced it would end its longstanding policy banning women from driving in June 2018.[72] Various female activists had protested the ban, among them Saudi women's rights activists Manal al-Sharif,[73] by posting videos of them driving on social media platforms. One of the women's rights activists from Saudi Arabia, Loujain al-Hathloul had been imprisoned for more than 3 years and was sentenced on 28 December 2020 to a total of 5 years and 8 months in prison for allegedly conspiring against the kingdom in alignment with foreign nations following her protest against the ban on driving for women in Saudi. Two years and ten months of her prison sentence was reduced leaving only 3 months of time left to serve. However, the charges against her were false and the authorities denied arresting her for protesting against driving ban on women in Saudi Arabia. The prosecutors who were charged with torturing her during detention; sexually and otherwise, were cleared of charges by the government stating lack of evidence.[74]

Islamic feminists have objected to the MPL legislation in many of these countries, arguing that these pieces of legislation discriminate against women. Some Islamic feminists have taken the attitude that a reformed MPL which is based on the Quran and sunnah, which includes substantial input from Muslim women, and which does not discriminate against women is possible.[75] Such Islamic feminists have been working on developing women-friendly forms of MPL. (See, for example, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women for argument based on the Qur'an and not on what they call medieval male consensus.) Other Islamic feminists, particularly some in Muslim minority contexts which are democratic states, argue that MPL should not be reformed but should be rejected and that Muslim women should seek redress, instead, from the civil laws of those states.

Islamic feminists have been active in advocating for women's rights in the Islamic world. In 2012, Jordanian women protested against laws that allowed the dropping of charges if a rapist marries his victim, Tunisian women marched for equality for women in a new constitution, Saudi women protested against the ban against car driving, and Sudanese women created a silent wall of protest demanding freedom for arrested women.[13]

Equality in the mosque

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Woman sitting at the threshold of the main building of Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar as the sign on the gate reads "Ladies Are Not Allowed"

A survey by the Council on American Islamic Relations showed that two out of three mosques in 2000 required women to pray in a separate area, up from one out of two in 1994.[76] Islamic feminists have begun to protest this, advocating for women to be allowed to pray beside men without a partition, as they do in Mecca.[77][78] In 2003, Asra Nomani challenged the rules at her mosque in Morgantown, West Virginia, that required women to enter through a back door and pray in a secluded balcony.[76] She argued that Muhammad didn't put women behind partitions, and that barriers preventing women from praying equally with men are just sexist man-made rules.[76] The men at her mosque put her on trial to be banished.[76]

In 2004, some American mosques had constitutions prohibiting women from voting in board elections.[79] In 2005, following public agitation on the issue, Muslim organizations that included the CAIR and the Islamic Society of North America issued a report on making mosques "women-friendly", to assert women's rights in mosques, and to include women's right to pray in the main hall without a partition.[76]

In 2010, American Muslim Fatima Thompson and a few others organized and participated in a "pray-in" at the Islamic Center of Washington in D.C.[76] Police were summoned and threatened to arrest the women when they refused to leave the main prayer hall. The women continued their protest against being corralled in what they referred to as the "penalty box" (a prayer space reserved for only women). Thompson called the penalty box "an overheated, dark back room."[76] A second protest also staged by the same group on the eve of International Women's Day in 2010 resulted in calls to the police and threats of arrest again.[76] However, the women were not arrested on either occasion.[76] In May 2010, five women prayed with men at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque, one of the Washington region's largest Islamic centers.[77] After the prayers, a member of the mosque called Fairfax police who asked the women to leave.[77] However, later in 2010, it was decided that D.C. police would no longer intervene in such protests.[80]

In 2015 a group of Muslim activists, politicians, and writers issued a Declaration of Reform which states in part, "Men and women have equal rights in mosques, boards, leadership and all spheres of society. We reject sexism and misogyny."[46] That same year Asra Nomani and others placed the Declaration on the door of the Islamic Center of Washington.[47]

Equality in leading prayer

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In 'A Survey and Analysis of Legal Arguments on Woman-Led Prayer in Islam named "I am one of the People"' Ahmed Elewa states that not because of external expectation but in due course with enlightened awareness Muslim communities should adopt women lead mixed gender prayers. In the same research paper Silvers emphasizes on example of Umm Salama who insisted that women are 'one of the people' and suggests women to assert their inclusion with equal rights. Elewa and Silvers research calls contemporary prohibitions of women lead prayer frustrating.[26]

According to currently existing traditional schools of Islam, a woman cannot lead a mixed gender congregation in salat (prayer). Traditionalists like Muzammil Siddiqi states that women are not supposed to lead prayer because "It is not permissible to introduce any new style or liturgy in Salat." In other words, there must be no deviation from the tradition of men teaching.[81] Some schools make exceptions for Tarawih (optional Ramadan prayers) or for a congregation consisting only of close relatives. Certain medieval scholars—including Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (838–923), Abu Thawr (764–854), Isma'il Ibn Yahya al-Muzani (791–878), and Ibn Arabi (1165–1240) considered the practice permissible at least for optional (nafl) prayers; however, their views are not accepted by any major surviving group. Islamic feminists have begun to protest this.

On March 18, 2005, Amina Wadud led a mixed-gender congregational Friday prayer in New York City. It sparked a controversy within the Muslim community because the imam was a woman, Wadud, who also delivered the khutbah.[82] Moreover, the congregation she addressed was not separated by gender. This event that departed from the established ritual practice became an embodied performance of gender justice in the eyes of its organizers and participants. The event was widely publicized in the global media and caused an equally global debate among Muslims.[82] However, many Muslims, including women, remain in disagreement with the idea of a woman as imam. Muzammil Siddiqi, chairman of the Fiqh Council of North America, argued that prayer leadership should remain restricted to men.[82] He based his argument on the longstanding practice and thus community consensus and emphasized the danger of women distracting men during prayers.

The events that occurred in regards to equality in the mosque and women leading prayers, show the enmity Muslim feminists may receive when voicing opposition toward sexism and establishing efforts to combat it. Those who criticize Muslim feminists state that those who question the faith's views on gender segregation, or who attempt to make changes, are overstepping their boundaries and are acting offensively. On the other hand, people have stated that Islam does not advocate gender segregation. Britain's influential Sunni imam, Ahtsham Ali, has stated, "gender segregation has no basis in Islamic law" nor is it justified in the Quran.[83] Elewa and Silvers deduce that with lack of any explicit evidence to contrary one ought to assume, women lead prayer adds nothing new to God established worship but just a default state of command expects men and women both to lead the prayer.[26]

Internet & social media impact

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Internet & social media debates opened up easy access to religious texts for Muslim women which helps them understand scriptural backing for the gender equality rights they which they fight for.[84]

Dress code

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Another issue that concerns Muslim women is dress code. Islam requires both men and women to dress modestly, but there is a difference in opinion about what type of dress is required. according to Leila Ahmed, during Muhammad's lifetime, the veil was observed only by his wives; its spread to the wider Muslim community was a later development.[85]

Islamic feminist Asma Barlas says that the Quran only requires women to dress modestly, but it doesn't require them to veil.[86]

Despite the controversy over hijab in sections of Western society, the veil is not controversial in mainstream Islamic feminist discourse, except in those situations where it is the result of social pressure or coercion. There is in fact strong support from many Muslim feminists in favor of the veil, though they generally believe that it should be voluntarily chosen.

Many Muslim men and women now view the veil as a symbol of Islamic freedom.[87] While there are some Islamic scholars who interpret Islamic scripture as not mandating hijab,[88] many Islamic feminists still observe hijab as an act of religious piety or sometimes as a way of symbolically rejecting Western culture by making a display of their Muslim identity. Such sentiment was expressed, among others, by Muslim U.S. Congresswoman Ilhan Omar who stated in an interview with Vogue, "To me, the hijab means power, liberation, beauty, and resistance."[89] The annual event World Hijab Day, observed on February 1 (the anniversary of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return from exile to Iran), is also celebrated by many Islamic feminists. Meanwhile, publicist Nadiya Takolia stated that she had actually adopted hijab after becoming a feminist, saying the hijab "is not about protection from men's lusts," but about "telling the world that my femininity is not available for public consumption...and I don't want to be part of a system that reduces and demeans women."[90]

On the other side, there is a section of Islamic feminists, such as Fadela Amara and Hedi Mhenni, who do oppose hijab and even support legal bans on the garment for various reasons. Amara explained her support for France's ban of the garment in public buildings: "The veil is the visible symbol of the subjugation of women, and therefore has no place in the mixed, secular spaces of France's public school system."[91] When some feminists began defending the headscarf on the grounds of "tradition", Amara said: "It's not tradition, it's archaic! French feminists are totally contradictory. When Algerian women fought against wearing the headscarf in Algeria, French feminists supported them. But when it's some young girl in a French suburb school, they don't. They define liberty and equality according to what colour your skin is. It's nothing more than neocolonialism."[91] Mhenni also expressed support for Tunisia's ban on the veil: "If today we accept the headscarf, tomorrow we'll accept that women's rights to work and vote and receive an education be banned and they'll be seen as just a tool for reproduction and housework."[92]

Sihem Habchi, director of Ni Putes Ni Soumises, expressed support for France's ban on the burqa in public places, stating that the ban was a matter of 'democratic principle' and protecting French women from the 'obscurantist, fascist, right-wing movement' that she claims the burqa represents.[93][94]

Masih Alinejad began the movement My Stealthy Freedom in protest of forced hijab policies in Iran. The movement began as a Facebook page where women uploaded pictures of themselves defying Iran's mandatory hijab laws.[95] Mahmoud Arghavan, however, noted that Islamic feminists have criticized My Stealthy Freedom as supporting Islamophobia, though Alinejad has countered this criticism.[96]

Criticism

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"Islamic feminism" as a concept has been heavily scrutinized and criticized by both Muslim and non-Muslim feminists.[97] Iranian feminist Mahnaz Afkhami, for example, stated the following about secular Muslim feminists like herself:

Our difference with Islamic feminists is that we don't try to fit feminism in the Qur'an. We say that women have certain inalienable rights. The epistemology of Islam is contrary to women's right ... I call myself a Muslim and a feminist. I am not an Islamic feminist – that’s a contradiction in terms.[97]

Hakimeh Entesari, an Iranian academic, also said, "The thoughts and writings of these people [Islamic feminists] suffer from a fundamental problem, and that is the absolute detachment of this movement from the cultural and indigenous realities of Islamic societies and countries..." She also believes that the use of the term "Islamic feminism" is wrong and it should be "Muslim feminists".[98]

Maria Massi Dakake, an American Muslim academic, criticized Asma Barlas' assertion the Quran is inherently anti-patriarchal and sought to undo patriarchal social structures. Dakake writes, "She [Asma Barlas] makes a number of important and substantial points about the limitations to traditional "patriarchal" rights of fathers and husbands in the Quran. However, the conclusion that the Qur'an is "anti-patriarchal" as such is hard to reconcile with the Quran's fairly explicit endorsement of male leadership - even if not absolute authority - over the marital unit in 4:34."[99]

Ibtissam Bouachrine, a professor at Smith College, has critiqued the writings of Fatema Mernissi. According to Bouachrine, Mernissi, in her book, The Veil and the Male Elite, critiques male interpretations of Quran 33:53, but not of Quran 24:31, "which evokes the veil in the context of the feminine body in public space." She also criticizes how Mernissi focuses on the hadith over the Quran because it is easier to criticize the hadith than the Quran which is seen as the word of God, but the hadith are the words of human beings. Bouachrine also critiques how Mernissi presents Muhammad as a "revolutionary heretic who sides with women against the Arabian male elite and their patriarchal values" but does not critique Muhammad's marriage to nine-year-old Aisha. Bouachrine also states that Mernissi does not mention that Zaynab was the former wife of Muhammad's adopted son.[100]

Bouachrine also critiques Amina Wadud's interpretation of 4:34 in Quran and Woman. According to Bouachrine, although 4:34 seems to call for men to physically discipline their wives, "Wadud argues that the Qur’an would not encourage violence against women and therefore the obedience required of women is to God not to the husband." Wadud also proposes that daraba means to set an example instead of to use physical force. According to Bouachrine, these reinterpretations do not help women in the Muslim world suffering from domestic violence.[100]

On a slightly different note, Ahmadian, head of Isfahan Institute of Theology stated:

Some have created a fake title which is called "Islamic Feminism" in order to solve the conflict between Islam and feminism, that is considered to be a paradoxical combination and its principles are not consistent with the principles of Islam religion. Based on Islamic teachings, there are differences between the roles and positions of men/women, and this distinction doesn't lower the dignity of women in any way.[101]

While Seyed Hussein Ishaghi, Ph.D. in Islamic Theology, had the following to say:

It is more appropriate to call Islamic feminism a woman-oriented interpretation of Islam religion... A group in the interaction of Islamic and Western culture faced an identity crisis; and on the other hand, in this confrontation, a group with its heart attached to Western culture denied religious teachings. That group promoted materialistic viewpoints by considering the mentioned beliefs as class or superstitious."[102]

Notable people

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World Hijab Day

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World Hijab Day is an annual event founded by Bangladeshi-American Nazma Khan in 2013,[103] taking place on 1 February each year in 140 countries worldwide.[104] Its stated purpose is to encourage women of all religions and backgrounds to wear and experience the hijab for a day and to educate and spread awareness on why hijab is worn.[105]

See also

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In particular countries

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General

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Islamic feminism refers to a reformist discourse and activist movement among Muslim women and scholars who advocate for gender justice and equality by reinterpreting core Islamic texts, such as the Qur'an and hadith, through methodologies like ijtihad (independent jurisprudential reasoning) to challenge patriarchal traditions while remaining anchored in religious orthodoxy. Emerging primarily in the late 20th century among educated urban Muslim women in contexts like Iran, Egypt, and diaspora communities in the West, it posits that historical male-dominated interpretations (tafsir) have distorted Islam's ostensibly egalitarian principles, necessitating a return to scriptural essentials for women's empowerment. Key figures include Fatima Mernissi, whose works critiqued veiling and polygamy as cultural accretions rather than divine mandates; , who in 2005 led a controversial mixed-gender in the U.S., symbolizing ritual equality; and Ziba Mir-Hosseini, who has influenced reforms by arguing for mutual consent in marriage contracts. Achievements are modest and context-specific, such as contributions to Morocco's 2004 Moudawana family code revisions, which raised the marriage age and restricted polygamy through egalitarian readings of , and Malaysia's group's advocacy against via Qur'anic equity arguments, though these gains often rely on sympathetic secular or monarchical regimes rather than widespread doctrinal acceptance. Controversies center on its purported incompatibility with fixed Sharia provisions, including women's half-share in inheritance (Qur'an 4:11), testimony valued at half a man's (Qur'an 2:282), and permissions for male polygyny (Qur'an 4:3), which critics contend cannot be substantively altered without abrogating textual literalism central to Sunni and Shia orthodoxy. Empirical outcomes in Sharia-applied states, such as persistent gender disparities in legal testimony and inheritance despite reformist efforts, underscore causal tensions between egalitarian aspirations and scriptural constraints, with orthodox scholars often dismissing such feminism as Western-influenced innovation (bid'ah) that undermines divine intent. While proponents claim it fosters authentic liberation by indigenizing rights discourse, detractors, including some secular feminists, view it as a limited strategy that perpetuates religious authority's subordination of women rather than transcending it.

Conceptual and Theological Foundations

Definition and Core Claims

Islamic feminism denotes an ideological and activist approach that seeks to advance and gender equity by drawing on reinterpretations of Islamic scriptures and traditions, asserting that arises from cultural distortions rather than inherent religious doctrine. Proponents maintain that the and , when subjected to egalitarian (independent reasoning), endorse full equality between men and women in spiritual, legal, and social domains, challenging practices such as unequal , , and gender segregation as misapplications of faith. This framework emerged prominently in the late , positioning Islam as intrinsically just toward women and critiquing both secular Western feminism for and orthodox Islamic jurisprudence for androcentric biases. Central to its claims is the argument that gender complementarity in Islam—often invoked to justify role differences—has been exaggerated by patriarchal exegeses, with verses like Quran 4:34 (describing men as qawwamun over women) interpreted contextually as mutual responsibility rather than hierarchy. Advocates, including scholars like Amina Wadud, assert scriptural support for women's leadership in prayer, political office, and testimony equivalence, dismissing fixed disparities in inheritance (Quran 4:11) or legal testimony (Quran 2:282) as adaptable through modern maqasid al-sharia (objectives of Islamic law) prioritizing equity over literalism. They further contend that pre-Islamic Arabian customs, not divine intent, entrenched male dominance, recoverable via historical-critical methods that prioritize ethical universals like adl (justice) and ihsan (excellence). Critics, including traditionalist scholars, counter that such reinterpretations selectively fragment immutable texts, contravening consensus () on Sharia's gendered prescriptions derived from explicit Quranic injunctions and prophetic , rendering Islamic feminism incompatible with by subordinating to contemporary egalitarian norms. Empirical data from Muslim-majority societies, where Sharia-influenced laws persist in areas like family codes (e.g., Morocco's 2004 Moudawana reforms retaining male guardianship elements), underscore tensions between aspirational claims and institutionalized realities, with reforms often incremental rather than transformative. This approach's reliance on subjective invites scrutiny for potential projection of external ideologies onto fixed doctrine, though proponents view it as authentic revivalism against cultural accretions.

Scriptural Reinterpretations and Principles

Islamic feminists employ hermeneutical methods to reinterpret the , emphasizing contextual, thematic, and holistic readings over traditional atomistic exegeses that they argue impose patriarchal biases. A core principle is reviving , independent reasoning by qualified scholars, which proponents like assert allows for reexamination of verses in light of the Quran's overarching ethical aims (maqasid al-sharia), such as justice () and equality, rather than rigid literalism. This approach rejects attributions of misogyny to the divine text, instead critiquing historical male-dominated (commentaries) for conflating cultural norms of 7th-century Arabia with eternal principles. A foundational reinterpretation centers on , the oneness of God, which Asma argues precludes human hierarchies, including gender-based , as divine sovereignty admits no intermediaries like male authority over women. Barlas contends that verses permitting (Quran 4:3) or unequal shares (Quran 4:11) must be read against the Quran's rejection of pre-Islamic tribal inequalities and its promotion of mutual rights in marriage (Quran 2:228), interpreting such provisions as conditional safeguards rather than endorsements of male privilege. Similarly, Riffat Hassan emphasizes the Quran's depiction of human creation from a single soul (Quran 4:1), refuting notions of female inferiority or derivative status derived from later traditions, and insists that spiritual equality before God overrides temporal disparities. Wadud's thematic analysis prioritizes relational ethics over isolated rulings, reinterpreting the testimony verse (Quran 2:282) not as inherent female deficiency but as contextual to 7th-century economic illiteracy among women, irrelevant to modern testimony equality. Proponents also distinguish between the Quran's nass (explicit, unchangeable principles like monotheism) and mutashabihat (ambiguous verses open to interpretation), applying socio-historical context to the latter to align with gender justice as an intrinsic Quranic value. These principles underpin advocacy for reforms, though critics from orthodox schools maintain that such readings selectively prioritize equity over explicit textual prescriptions.

Tensions with Traditional Islamic Jurisprudence

Islamic feminism posits that gender egalitarian principles can be derived through renewed ijtihad (independent reasoning) on Quranic texts, prioritizing the maqasid al-sharia (objectives of Islamic law) such as justice and equity over literal adherence to historical fiqh rulings. This approach directly conflicts with traditional Sunni jurisprudence, which relies on the usul al-fiqh framework—encompassing Quran, Sunnah, ijma (scholarly consensus), and qiyas (analogy)—developed by the four major madhhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali) between the 8th and 10th centuries CE, and which largely closed the "gates of ijtihad" thereafter in favor of taqlid (emulation of established precedents). Orthodox scholars argue that feminist reinterpretations dismiss the inerrancy of these sources, particularly verses establishing sexual dimorphism and role differentiation, such as Quran 4:34 designating men as qawwamun (maintainers) over women based on financial responsibility and physical capabilities. Key flashpoints include feminist challenges to inheritance laws under Quran 4:11, which allocate fixed shares granting daughters half the portion of sons to reflect familial maintenance obligations, a provision feminists seek to equalize via contextual equity arguments but which traditionalists uphold as explicit divine command immune to alteration. Similarly, provisions for polygyny (Quran 4:3, permitting up to four wives under strict equity conditions) and testimony weighting (Quran 2:282, requiring two female witnesses equivalent to one male in financial matters due to historical role divisions) are critiqued by feminists as patriarchal accretions, yet defended by jurists as reflective of complementary gender functions rather than inequality in intrinsic worth. These reform efforts provoke accusations of bid'ah (innovation verging on heresy), as they prioritize modern egalitarian norms over the Prophet Muhammad's sunnah and the ijma of early companions, potentially eroding the sharia's foundational stability. Ritual and leadership roles amplify these frictions, exemplified by Amina Wadud's March 18, 2005, leadership of a mixed-gender in , which defied orthodox prohibitions on women imams for congregations including men, drawing condemnations from scholars across Malaysia's muftis, Egypt's , and North American councils as invalid and disruptive to established gender-segregated worship norms derived from collections like . Traditional responses emphasize that such acts contravene prophetic practice, where no verified instance exists of the allowing female-led mixed prayers, and risk diluting Islam's emphasis on distinct male guardianship in public religious spheres. In sharia-applied states like post-1979 Revolution, feminist advocacy for revising personal status laws—such as easing male-initiated (talaq) advantages or challenging temporary (mut'ah)—has intersected with official codification, yielding limited reforms amid persistent tensions, as reasserted Islamic governance reinforces classical rulings while inadvertently fueling internal egalitarian discourses. Orthodox critiques, voiced by institutions like Saudi Arabia's Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta, frame Islamic feminism as externally influenced that undermines causal realities of biological and social complementarity ordained in revelation, rather than authentic revivalism.

Historical Development

Early Precursors in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries

In late 19th-century Egypt, reformist discourse on women's roles gained traction amid broader modernization efforts, with Qasim Amin's 1899 publication Tahrir al-Mar'a (The Liberation of Women) advocating for female education, limited unveiling, and legal reforms to enhance women's status, framing these as compatible with Islamic teachings and essential for national progress. Amin, influenced by European models and Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh, argued that practices like seclusion hindered societal advancement, though his work drew criticism for perceived Western bias and selective Quranic interpretation. This text ignited debates among Muslim intellectuals, positioning women's emancipation as intertwined with religious revival rather than secular abandonment. Egyptian women reformers responded actively; A'isha al-Taymur (1840–1902), an upper-class poet and scholar, critiqued restrictive gender norms in her writings, such as Mir'at al-Tamaddun (Mirror of Civilization, circa 1890s), emphasizing women's and intellectual engagement within an Islamic ethical framework. Similarly, Malak Hifni Nasif (1886–1918), known as Bahithat al-Badiya, lectured in the early 1900s on veiling's cultural rather than religious origins and pushed for girls' schooling, participating in intellectual salons that blended Islamic reform with feminist aspirations. These efforts highlighted tensions between tradition and adaptation, often invoking early Islamic history—such as the Prophet Muhammad's wives' public roles—to justify expanded opportunities. In British India, Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain (1880–1932) emerged as a pioneering voice for Muslim women's empowerment, publishing the utopian novella Sultana's Dream in 1905, which satirized purdah by depicting a society where men were secluded and women governed using science and faith. Self-taught despite familial opposition, Rokeya founded the Anjuman-e-Khawateen-e-Islam in 1916 to promote Muslim girls' education and literacy, arguing in essays like God Gives, Man Robs (1920s) that patriarchal customs, not Islam, oppressed women, and that Quranic equality demanded reform. Her work, rooted in Bengali Muslim contexts, challenged zenana seclusion while affirming religious piety, influencing subsequent South Asian Muslim women's activism. These precursors laid groundwork for later Islamic feminist reinterpretations by prioritizing scriptural equity over entrenched customs, though often amid colonial influences and elite limitations.

Mid-20th Century Influences and Post-Colonial Roots

The mid-20th century decolonization waves across Muslim-majority regions catalyzed women's activism intertwined with nationalist efforts, fostering early reinterpretations of Islamic texts to support gender reforms amid identity reconstruction. In countries emerging from colonial rule, such as Pakistan (independent 1947) and Morocco (1956), female participants in independence movements leveraged Quranic emphases on justice and equity to demand expanded roles in education and public life, countering both imported Western secularism and entrenched tribal customs. This period's influences stemmed from state-led modernization projects that selectively invoked Islamic principles to legitimize women's enfranchisement, as seen in suffrage extensions—Pakistan granted women voting rights in national elections by 1956—and legal codifications aimed at curbing arbitrary patriarchal practices while preserving religious framing. A pivotal example unfolded in with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, enacted under President Ayub Khan following the 1956 Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, which regulated through spousal consent and arbitration councils, standardized procedures, and extended shares to grandchildren of predeceased children, all rationalized as fulfilling Quranic mandates for fairness rather than Western imposition. Similarly, in Algeria's war of independence (1954–1962), an estimated 11,000 women engaged in , , and urban resistance, challenging veiling norms and embodying active agency, yet post-independence disillusionment arose as the 1984 Family Code codified male guardianship and under purported Islamic authenticity, prompting retrospective appeals to wartime egalitarian ideals rooted in anti-colonial Islamic revivalism. These reforms highlighted causal tensions: top-down initiatives advanced empirical gains in and entry—e.g., Pakistani female rose from 16% in 1961 to 25% by 1972—but often faltered against conservative clerical pushback, sowing seeds for later Islamic feminist critiques. Emerging intellectuals like Fatima Mernissi (1940–2015), raised in Fez amid Morocco's pre- and post-independence flux, drew from familial debates on seclusion and emerging state policies to later theorize patriarchal "pre-Islamic" accretions in hadith, influencing mid-century discourse by linking colonial disruption to renewed scriptural scrutiny for women's liberation. Such figures embodied post-colonial causal realism: rejecting wholesale Western models deemed culturally alienating, they prioritized indigenized reforms verifiable against primary Islamic sources, though academic sources on these origins often reflect progressive biases favoring secular narratives over empirical tracking of reform sustainability.

Late 20th and Early 21st Century Emergence

Islamic feminism gained prominence in the late 20th century through scholarly reinterpretations of Islamic texts emphasizing gender justice derived from the and . Scholars argued for equality by challenging patriarchal interpretations of , positioning as inherently egalitarian. This approach contrasted with secular , rooting advocacy in religious sources to appeal to conservative Muslim audiences. Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist, contributed significantly with works critiquing veiling and polygamy as cultural accretions rather than Quranic mandates, influencing in the 1980s and 1990s. Her book Beyond the Veil (1975, revised editions later) analyzed hadiths on women's sexuality to argue Islam's original intent supported gender equity, though her early writings blended secular socialism. Amina Wadud's Qur'an and Woman (1992) advanced egalitarian exegesis, asserting the Quran's principle implies gender neutrality in spiritual and social roles. In 1987, (SIS) formed in amid concerns over laws and family legislation disadvantaging women, advocating reforms via and frameworks. Co-founded by and others, SIS organized workshops and legal aid, producing fatwas on issues like by 1990s. This grassroots activism spread regionally, influencing policy critiques in . Early 21st-century milestones included Wadud leading a mixed-gender on March 18, 2005, in New York, symbolizing ritual reform and sparking global debate on women's . Musawah, launched February 2009 in , emerged as a transnational network compiling knowledge on family laws to push for equality in Muslim-majority contexts. By 2010, Musawah engaged over 20 countries, training activists in holistic approaches blending , , and ethics. These developments marked Islamic feminism's shift from intellectual discourse to organized, cross-border advocacy.

Key Figures, Organizations, and Movements

Influential Thinkers and Activists

, a Bengali Muslim writer and social reformer, advocated for women's education and seclusion reform in early 20th-century British India, publishing the utopian feminist novella in 1905, which envisioned a world where women held power through science while men observed . Her efforts founded schools for Muslim girls, challenging cultural norms under Islamic pretexts, though her work predates modern Islamic feminism. Fatima Mernissi (1940–2015), a Moroccan sociologist, critiqued patriarchal veiling practices in Beyond the Veil (1975), arguing that early Islamic texts supported before political influences distorted interpretations. Her scholarship emphasized historical context in authentication, influencing feminist rereadings of Islamic sources, despite orthodox rejections of her methodology as selective. Amina Wadud (born 1952), an American professor, advanced in Qur'an and Woman (1992), proposing tawhid-based equality that transcends gender hierarchies, and led the first woman-led mixed-gender congregational in New York in 2005, sparking global debate on ritual innovation. Her activism highlights tensions between egalitarian ideals and traditional , with critics from Salafi circles labeling her efforts . Asma Barlas (born 1950), a Pakistani-American political scientist, in Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'an (2002), contended that the Quran's rejects male guardianship, prioritizing divine justice over juristic precedents. Her work underscores scriptural primacy, influencing Muslim discourse, though it faces rebuttals for overlooking sharia's consensus-based evolution. Shirin Ebadi (born 1947), an Iranian lawyer and 2003 laureate, campaigned against discriminatory family laws in through the founded in 2001, advocating reforms aligned with Islamic principles while critiquing theocratic implementations. Her legal activism secured child custody adjustments in 2002, demonstrating pragmatic engagement with Islamic republics' frameworks amid state repression. Zainah Anwar (born 1954), a Malaysian activist, co-founded in 1988 to promote via , challenging laws and through petitions that influenced the 2005 domestic violence act amendments. Her efforts blend Islamic reform with constitutional rights, facing fatwas from conservative deeming the group deviant.

Prominent Organizations and Initiatives

Sisters in Islam (SIS), established in 1988 in by a group of professional women including , advocates for through reinterpretations of Islamic texts and principles, challenging discriminatory aspects of Sharia-based family laws such as , , and . The organization conducts research, provides , and engages in public education to promote within an Islamic framework, while also critiquing state-enforced interpretations that subordinate women. Despite facing accusations of Western influence and fatwas declaring their views deviant, SIS has influenced policy debates and supported over 10,000 women through helplines and advocacy since inception. Musawah, launched in 2009 as a global movement spearheaded by and building on SIS's work, seeks reform of Muslim family laws to achieve equality and justice, drawing on Quranic , international standards, and empirical evidence of harm from patriarchal rulings. Operating in over 50 countries, it produces knowledge products like comparative legal analyses and campaigns targeting 17 focal countries, including efforts to equalize marriage ages and eliminate , with documented impacts such as influencing Tunisia's 2017 personal status code reforms. Musawah emphasizes "citizen-believer" participation in , though critics from traditionalist argue it undermines divine textual intent. BAOBAB for Women's , founded in 1996 in , applies Islamic feminist approaches to harmonize Muslim personal laws with constitutional rights, offering paralegal training to over 5,000 women in northern states and litigating cases on and custody where women receive disproportionately less under classical . The organization documents discriminatory practices, such as courts favoring male testimony, and advocates for reforms based on , achieving successes like increased female access to justice in Bauchi and Kano through community sensitization programs. BAOBAB's work highlights empirical disparities, with reports showing women inheriting half of male shares in 90% of reviewed cases, prioritizing rights-based reinterpretations over uncritical adherence to . The Women's Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality (WISE), initiated in 2006 by Daisy Khan in the United States, functions as a transnational network fostering Muslim women leaders to advance justice, , and peace-building via conferences, scholarships, and curricula reforms emphasizing female scholarship. WISE has convened over 1,000 participants at global summits and supported initiatives like female imams leading mixed-gender prayers, though such practices remain marginal and contested by orthodox authorities citing prophetic precedent.

Areas of Advocacy and Reform Efforts

Personal Status Laws and Family Rights

Islamic feminists advocate for reforms to personal status laws, which in many Muslim-majority countries govern , , inheritance, , and child custody based on interpretations of , often disadvantaging women by enforcing male guardianship (qiwama), unequal inheritance shares as per Quran 4:11-12, and unilateral male rights (talaq). These advocates employ (independent reasoning) and al-sharia ('s objectives, such as justice and preservation of family) to argue that patriarchal applications contradict the Quran's emphasis on equity () and mutual rights in (Quran 4:19, 30:21). However, such reinterpretations frequently encounter resistance from orthodox scholars who view fixed Quranic injunctions, like half-shares for female heirs, as immutable. A prominent example is Morocco's 2004 revision of the Moudawana family code, influenced by state-endorsed Islamic feminist discourse under King Mohammed VI, which raised the minimum age to 18 (from puberty-based), mandated mutual for , conditioned on court approval and spousal (effectively restricting it), and expanded women's options via khul' (financial compensation) or judicial dissolution for harm. The also granted mothers priority custody of young children and equalized some spousal maintenance obligations, framing these as aligned with prophetic traditions prioritizing family welfare over rigid literalism. Despite these advances, rules retained Quranic disparities, with daughters receiving half of sons' shares, illustrating compromises in efforts. In , Islamic feminists contributed to the 2000 khul' law amendment to Law No. 1 of 2000, enabling women to initiate without husband consent or fault proof by forfeiting financial claims, addressing the prior imbalance where men could repudiate unilaterally. This built on 1985 conditional marriage contract clauses allowing women to stipulate rights, promoted by scholars like Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd who emphasized contextual Quranic . Complementary reforms included a 2008 law favoring maternal custody up to age 15 for boys and marriage for girls, though varies due to judicial discretion. Indonesia's reforms, shaped by feminist-influenced , include Circular No. 7/2021 restricting to cases of or incapacity with spousal and oversight, and decisions enforcing equitable division of marital under the 1991 Compilation of Islamic Law. Organizations like Musawah, founded in 2009, advocate globally for such changes by compiling interpretations supporting women's agency in contracts and critiquing 's social harms, though empirical data shows persistent gaps, such as only partial enforcement in Aceh's courts. These efforts often rely on transnational networks but face pushback, as seen in stalled equal inheritance proposals citing unchangeable divine text.

Religious Participation and Leadership Roles

Islamic feminists advocate for expanded roles for women in leading prayers and serving as religious authorities, drawing on reinterpretations of Quranic verses and to challenge traditional restrictions that limit women to leading all-female congregations for non-obligatory prayers. Proponents argue that spiritual equality between men and women, as referenced in 33:35, supports women delivering khutbahs (sermons) and leading mixed-gender salat (prayer), viewing patriarchal rulings as cultural accretions rather than divine mandates. A landmark event occurred on March 18, 2005, when , an professor, led a mixed-gender (jum'ah) for approximately 130 participants in , marking the first such public instance in modern times and sparking global debate. Wadud's action, supported by progressive scholars, aimed to demonstrate women's interpretive authority and was framed as a step toward gender-inclusive worship, though it faced immediate protests and fatwas condemning it as un-Islamic innovation (). Similar efforts include women leading women-only prayers in or study circles, as seen in initiatives by groups like the Inclusive Mosque Initiative, which promotes female imams for segregated settings. Beyond prayer leadership, Islamic feminists push for women's recognition as mujtahidahs (independent jurists), muftis, and scholars, citing historical figures like al-Fihri, founder of the in 859 CE, and medieval female hadith transmitters who influenced . In contemporary contexts, such as , women serve as "faith leaders" in mosques, teaching and providing counseling, though they often avoid the title "" to sidestep doctrinal conflicts. Organizations like Musawah indirectly bolster this by training women in to critique discriminatory rulings, emphasizing participatory knowledge production over male monopoly. Empirically, adoption remains marginal: in Sunni-majority countries, orthodox institutions like Al-Azhar rarely appoint female muftis for general fatwas, with women confined to advisory roles for female audiences, as in Indonesia's female (Islamic boarding schools) where over 20% of teachers are women but leadership is male-dominated. In stricter regimes, such as pre-2018 reforms, women-led initiatives faced bans, and post-reform gains like female mosque access have not extended to . Successes are more evident in communities or sects like , where women lead prayers in gender-segregated settings, but broader orthodox rebuttals persist, arguing that prophetic practice excludes women from mixed leadership to preserve congregational unity.

Dress Codes, Public Life, and Social Norms

Islamic feminists advocate reinterpreting Quranic injunctions on modesty, such as in Surah An-Nur (24:31) and Al-Ahzab (33:59), to emphasize ethical behavior over mandatory physical coverings like the hijab or niqab, positioning veiling as a contextual cultural practice rather than a universal religious obligation. Fatima Mernissi argued in The Veil and the Male Elite (1987) that veiling enforces women's seclusion from public spheres, tracing its institutionalization to early caliphal politics rather than prophetic teachings, and critiqued it as a tool of male elite control that contradicts Islam's egalitarian origins. Amina Wadud, in Inside the Gender Jihad (2006), described dress codes as "descriptive" of seventh-century modesty norms, adaptable to modern contexts without requiring head or face coverings, while she personally adopts hijab for identity and dignity but opposes its compulsion. These positions challenge state-enforced hijab laws, as in Iran where mandatory veiling since April 1983 has sparked feminist resistance framing enforcement as patriarchal distortion. In public life, Islamic feminists promote women's unrestricted access to education, employment, and mobility, citing historical precedents like Aisha's public scholarship and warfare roles to argue against guardian () requirements for travel or work. Organizations like in (founded 1988) have campaigned for legal reforms enabling women's workforce participation without male oversight, drawing on Quranic verses like 9:71 equating men and women as mutual protectors. In , while not explicitly "Islamic feminist," allied activists invoked Islamic to end the driving ban in June 2018 after decades of advocacy, increasing female labor force participation from 18% in 2017 to 33% by 2022. Empirical data from reform contexts, such as Morocco's 2004 family code revisions following women's public marches, show heightened female political engagement, with women comprising 21% of parliament by 2011. Regarding social norms, advocates critique gender segregation and interaction rules as post-prophetic accretions amplifying , not divine mandates; Mernissi linked segregation to fears of women's intellectual potency, evidenced by early Medina's mixed-gender mosques before Umayyad-era impositions. Wadud's egalitarian (divine unity) framework rejects mahram-based mixing prohibitions, advocating co-educational spaces and familial reforms to dismantle norms confining women domestically. Groups like Musawah (launched 2009) target norms like and unequal , using (independent reasoning) to align practices with Quran 4:3's conditional equity, though implementation varies; in , post-1956 reforms abolished , boosting female to 82% by 2020 amid ongoing advocacy. These efforts prioritize textual revival over secular imports, yet face orthodox counterclaims that segregation preserves fitna (social discord), as articulated in classical .

Political Engagement and Digital Activism

Islamic feminists have advocated for women's political participation by drawing on reinterpretations of Qur'anic verses and hadiths to argue that in aligns with Islamic principles, challenging traditional patriarchal exclusions. In , for example, the passage of the 18th Amendment in 2010, which devolved powers to provincial assemblies and increased local government seats reserved for women, was supported by groups like the Women's Action Forum, which incorporated Islamic arguments for female leadership drawing from historical figures such as bint Abi Bakr's political involvement. Similarly, in , the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, Islamic feminist networks influenced the electoral law establishing a 30% quota for women in legislative bodies, with activists citing (independent reasoning) to affirm women's public roles. These efforts have resulted in measurable gains, such as women comprising 20.5% of Indonesia's by 2019, though enforcement and cultural resistance persist. In the , political engagement often intersects with state-driven reforms framed as compatible with , as seen in where post-2011 activists, including those aligned with Islamic feminist thought, contributed to the 2014 constitution's guarantees of in elected assemblies, leading to women holding 31% of seats in the 2014 elections. Organizations like Morocco's Union de l'Action Féminine, active since the , have lobbied for family code reforms using egalitarian exegeses of , influencing the 2004 Moudawana revisions that expanded women's and rights. However, such advancements frequently encounter opposition from conservative clerics who maintain that political authority is male-dominated per classical , limiting the depth of reforms. Digital activism has amplified Islamic feminist voices, enabling circumvention of traditional gatekeepers through online platforms for scriptural reinterpretation and mobilization. The #MosqueMeToo campaign, launched in 2017 by Australian Muslim feminists on , exposed in religious spaces and garnered over 1,000 posts globally within weeks, prompting mosque policy reviews in the UK and by framing demands within of (adl). In Indonesia, cyber-feminist initiatives by groups like Fatayat NU have utilized and since the mid-2010s to disseminate gender-inclusive hadith analyses, reaching millions and influencing youth attitudes toward polygamy bans. Arab satellite channels and websites, such as those run by Egyptian feminists since 2010, host debates on veiling and leadership, fostering "new wave" Islamic feminism that resists both secular Western imports and rigid orthodoxy. These platforms have facilitated counterpublics, yet they face algorithmic suppression and state censorship in countries like and , where digital expression of feminist views risks arrest.

Criticisms, Debates, and Empirical Outcomes

Theological Incompatibilities and Orthodox Rebuttals

Orthodox Islamic scholars maintain that core tenets of feminism, particularly demands for absolute in roles and rights, conflict with explicit ic prescriptions establishing complementary distinctions between men and women. For instance, 4:34 designates men as qawwamun (maintainers and protectors) over women, reflecting divine wisdom in familial and social responsibilities rather than oppression, a role not reciprocated for women. Similarly, laws in 4:11 allocate shares favoring males due to their financial obligations, while testimony in financial matters ( 2:282) requires two women to one man, acknowledging contextual differences in accountability under . These provisions, derived from , preclude egalitarian reinterpretations that prioritize human reason over textual nass (clear injunctions). Islamic feminists' efforts to reinterpret such verses—often by contextualizing them historically or rejecting associated —face rebuttals from traditional Sunni authorities, who argue this constitutes (innovation) and undermines the finality of prophetic guidance. Scholars like those affiliated with Salafi and Hanbali traditions assert that only qualified male mujtahids, adhering to usul al-fiqh, may engage in , not activists imposing Western ideologies that originated as anti-religious movements. For example, critiques of figures like highlight her selective , such as dismissing on women's intellectual testimony (Sahih Bukhari 2658) as patriarchal, as a form of ta'wil that borders on rejecting , potentially leading to by subordinating divine law to egalitarian preconceptions. Further incompatibilities arise in leadership roles, where 21:7 specifies male messengers, precluding female imams in mixed congregations as practiced by some feminists, viewed by orthodox scholars as violating the prophetic model and gender-specific worship etiquettes in (e.g., 440). Rebuttals emphasize that Islam's din—a comprehensive divine system—offers equitable justice ( 3:195), not identical rights, rendering "Islamic feminism" oxymoronic as it conflates human ideology with . Sites like affirm Sharia's equitable framework over feminist equality, warning that advocacy for unrestricted roles erodes tawhid by elevating personal autonomy above Allah's decree. Critics from conservative Sunni perspectives, including Daniel Haqiqatjou, argue that feminist theology risks gradual erosion of faith, as evidenced by correlations between feminist affiliation and declining religiosity among Muslim women, ultimately corroding adherence to modesty, segregation, and family structures mandated in Quran 24:30-31 and 33:53. Orthodox rebuttals thus frame Islamic feminism not as reform but as a Western import incompatible with Sharia's immutability, urging return to classical for authentic gender equity rooted in mercy and justice.

Practical Challenges, Backlash, and Failures

Islamic feminists encounter significant practical challenges in reinterpreting foundational Islamic texts to align with egalitarian principles, as the Qur'an and contain explicit provisions—such as women's half-share in (Qur'an 4:11) and the acceptance of (Qur'an 4:3)—that orthodox scholars argue cannot be abrogated without undermining scriptural authority. These interpretive efforts often lack institutional legitimacy, since (independent reasoning) has historically been dominated by male jurists, leaving women's scholarship marginalized despite advocacy for gender-inclusive . Community-level implementation falters due to reliance on voluntary compliance rather than enforceable state mechanisms, resulting in uneven adoption even in reform-oriented contexts. Backlash from conservative religious authorities manifests in formal condemnations and legal repercussions, exemplified by the 2005 incident where led a mixed-gender in , drawing widespread denunciation from Muslim scholars who deemed it a violation of norms prohibiting women from leading men in prayer. In Malaysia, the organization has faced a 2010 fatwa from Selangor authorities labeling its promotion of as "deviant" , leading to a decade-long legal challenge; although a 2025 Federal Court ruling partially upheld their right to contest the , it criminalizes non-compliance and prompted the Selangor to urge rebranding away from "." Such reactions frame Islamic feminism as a Western import threatening doctrinal purity, fostering social ostracism and threats against activists. Efforts at have yielded mixed empirical outcomes, often stalling at partial concessions that preserve core inequalities. In , post-1979 revolutionary attempts by Islamic feminists to reinterpret for gender equity failed to dismantle mandatory enforcement or male guardianship laws, contributing to persistent restrictions; the 2022 in custody for hijab non-compliance ignited nationwide protests, underscoring the regime's resistance and the movement's inability to achieve systemic change under theocratic rule. Morocco's 2004 family code overhaul, influenced by feminist , raised the marriage age to 18 and eased for women, yet retained unilateral male repudiation rights and unequal , drawing for insufficient progress; subsequent 2023-2024 proposals encountered Islamist opposition, highlighting backlash that limits deeper . These cases illustrate how doctrinal commitments to textual literalism constrain outcomes, with women's labor force participation and legal remaining below global averages in sharia-influenced states despite .

Alternative Perspectives from Secular and Conservative Viewpoints

Secular critics of Islamic feminism, including former Muslims like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, argue that the movement is inherently self-contradictory because core Islamic doctrines—such as those permitting polygyny (Quran 4:3), mandating unequal inheritance shares favoring males (Quran 4:11), and assigning women's testimony half the weight of men's in financial matters (Quran 2:282)—embed patriarchal hierarchies that cannot be reconciled with egalitarian feminism without abandoning scriptural literalism or orthodoxy. Hirsi Ali, who renounced Islam in 2002 after fleeing Somalia and experiencing forced marriage and female genital mutilation, describes Islamic feminism as often amounting to "fake feminism" that appeases rather than challenges religious authoritarianism, citing examples like Malaysian activist Marina Mahathir's support for Sharia courts despite their enforcement of gender-discriminatory rulings. Empirical data from Pew Research Center surveys, such as the 2013 global study finding majority support in many Muslim-majority countries for Sharia as state law (e.g., 99% in Afghanistan, 84% in Pakistan), underscores what secular analysts see as systemic resistance to feminist reforms within Islamic frameworks, leading to persistent gender gaps in education and employment. Western feminists like echo this incompatibility thesis, criticizing Islamic feminism for diluting universal by prioritizing over confrontation with "Islamic gender apartheid," a term Chesler uses to describe institutionalized practices like honor killings (estimated at 5,000 annually worldwide, predominantly in Muslim contexts per UN data) and veiling mandates that she views as tools of control rather than empowerment. Chesler, drawing from her experience as a bride in purdah-observing Afghan society, contends that postmodern feminism's reluctance to critique Islam—exemplified by academic silence on fatwas against reformers like , who faced exile in 1994 for her writings—stems from ideological blind spots favoring anti-Western narratives over evidence of doctrinal . From conservative Muslim perspectives, Islamic feminism is frequently dismissed as a Western import (, or "Westoxification") that distorts divine revelation by imposing egalitarian ideals alien to the 's emphasis on complementary gender roles, where men hold qiwama (guardianship) over women ( 4:34), a position upheld by scholars like those at . Orthodox critics, such as those in the Renovatio journal affiliated with , argue that attempts to reinterpret texts for gender parity—e.g., re-reading verses as optional—ignore classical (exegesis) traditions and risk (heretical innovation), as evidenced by fatwas from bodies like Saudi Arabia's Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta condemning feminist reinterpretations as secular infiltration. In practice, this view manifests in backlash, such as the 2018 arrest in of feminist activists like for protesting compulsory , framed by regime clerics as defiance of (jurisprudence) rather than legitimate reform. Such critiques prioritize causal fidelity to prophetic over modern equity, positing that Islam's original provisions already ensure women's protection without needing feminist augmentation.

Global Variations and Impact

Case Studies in Reform-Oriented Contexts

In Morocco, Islamic feminists played a pivotal role in the reform of the Moudawana, the family code derived from Islamic jurisprudence, which raised the minimum marriage age to 18 for both genders, mandated mutual consent for marriage, imposed strict conditions on including judicial approval and proof of financial equity, and facilitated women's access to divorce through khul' procedures. These changes emerged from decades of advocacy by women's groups employing (independent reasoning) to reinterpret sources, countering conservative opposition through arguments rooted in Quranic principles of justice and equity. Despite the reforms' progressive elements, implementation has faced challenges, including under-enforcement in rural areas and ongoing backlash from Islamist groups seeking reversals. Tunisia's Code of Personal Status, enacted in 1956 under President , prohibited , established a minimum age of 17 for women and 20 for men (later equalized), required mutual , and granted women equal , marking early state-driven reforms framed as compatible with progressive Islamic interpretation. Subsequent updates, including 2017 provisions allowing Muslim women to marry non-Muslims without conversion requirements and 2018 equality in some matters, reflect ongoing advocacy by reformist scholars emphasizing maqasid al-sharia (objectives of Islamic law) like family harmony over rigid literalism. However, these advances have encountered resistance, as evidenced by the 2021 suspension of equality legislation amid conservative protests, highlighting tensions between reformist impulses and orthodox adherence in a post-Arab Spring context. In , (SIS), founded in 1988, has advocated for gender-equitable interpretations of Islamic , contributing to the 1994 Domestic Violence Act that extended protections to Muslim women under civil law and pushing for reforms limiting arbitrary and enhancing maintenance rights post-divorce. The group's efforts, grounded in Quranic exegesis promoting women's dignity, led to judicial precedents affirming women's testimony equality in some cases by 2010, though SIS faced a 2025 labeling it deviant and restrictions on operations. Empirical data from SIS's 2024 Telenisa report documents persistent gaps, with over 70% of surveyed women experiencing unequal inheritance despite advocacy, underscoring partial legal gains amid cultural and institutional resistance.

Setbacks in Strict Islamist Regimes


In strict Islamist regimes, Islamic feminism—efforts to reinterpret Islamic texts for gender equity—faces profound setbacks due to the prioritization of orthodox Sharia interpretations that entrench male guardianship and limit women's public roles. In Iran, post-1979 revolutionary policies mandated veiling and segregated spaces, suppressing reformist arguments for ijtihad (independent reasoning) on family laws, as evidenced by ongoing legal inequalities in inheritance and testimony where women's shares are halved under Article 907 of the Civil Code. These regimes view egalitarian reinterpretations as threats to divine order, leading to fatwas and state censorship that marginalize feminist scholars. Empirical data from gender inequality indices rank Iran 143rd out of 146 countries in 2023, reflecting persistent barriers despite internal advocacy.
The 2022 in morality police custody ignited nationwide protests demanding an end to compulsory , drawing on both secular and Islamic feminist critiques of state-enforced piety as un-Islamic distortion. However, the regime's response included over 22,000 arrests, at least 551 deaths, and executions of protesters, effectively quashing organized reform movements by September 2023. Iranian women's experiences highlight Islamic feminism's limitations, as strict regulations exacerbate and custody biases favoring fathers post-divorce under the Family Protection Law revisions of 2013, which failed to deliver . In Taliban-ruled since August 2021, Islamic feminist aspirations for and have been obliterated by decrees banning girls from secondary schooling and most , affecting 1.1 million girls by 2023 and enforcing (male guardian) requirements for travel. The regime's Deobandi-influenced rejects reinterpretive efforts, labeling them Western corruption, resulting in silenced female academics who previously advanced gender-sensitive exegeses of Quranic verses on equity. Protests face and , with over 80 women detained in 2022 alone, underscoring the failure of Islamic feminist frameworks to penetrate hyper-conservative governance structures. 's gender apartheid has positioned it as the world's worst for , with zero female parliamentary representation post-2021 dissolution. Historically in , pre-2018 guardianship laws exemplified similar constraints, where 1990-1991 women's driving protests led to public firings, travel bans, and annulled licenses for participants, reinforcing Wahhabi orthodoxy against reformist appeals to early Islamic precedents of female agency. Though recent reforms like 2018 driving rights indicate shifts, entrenched clerical opposition persists, illustrating how strict regimes' causal enforcement of literalist (jurisprudence) systematically undermines Islamic feminist gains elsewhere.

International Conferences and Broader Influence

The earliest notable international gatherings addressing themes central to Islamic feminism occurred in the mid-1990s. In 1994, the , organized by Iranian activist through the Sisterhood is Global Institute in Washington, D.C., brought together secular and religiously identified Muslim women alongside non-Muslim participants to discuss women's within Islamic contexts, emphasizing compatibility with universal standards in preparation for the UN's Beijing . This event bridged divides between secular feminists and those invoking religious frameworks, highlighting reinterpretations of Islamic principles to support gender equity. A landmark development came with the First International Conference on Islamic Feminism, held in , , in October 2005, organized by the Junta Islámica de Cataluña under Abdennur Prado's leadership. Attracting participants from multiple continents, including Muslim feminists, secular advocates, and male scholars, the conference focused on positioning Islamic feminism as a transnational movement through egalitarian reinterpretations of Islamic texts and practices. Outcomes included enhanced global connectivity among advocates, fostering mutual support for reformist (independent reasoning) on issues like and public participation, and challenging perceived East-West dichotomies in gender discourse. Subsequent events, such as the Second International Congress on Islamic Feminism in 2006, led to the establishment of the Observatory of Islam and Gender in , aimed at monitoring and promoting gender perspectives in Islamic contexts. These conferences contributed to broader influence by catalyzing international networks and advocacy platforms. The 2005 Barcelona gathering, for instance, amplified visibility for Islamic feminist , influencing the launch of Musawah in —a global movement founded by Malaysian activist to advance equality in Muslim family laws through knowledge-building, policy advocacy, and community mobilization. Musawah has since engaged in CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) interventions across 39 countries, producing 57 reports and training 474 individuals on reformist interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. While these efforts have supported campaigns for revising discriminatory family laws in contexts like and parts of , empirical reforms remain piecemeal and contested, with critics arguing that such initiatives sometimes portray traditional Islamic legal systems negatively without achieving widespread systemic change. Overall, the conferences have facilitated cross-border dialogues but their global impact is constrained by resistance from orthodox authorities and varying national enforcement of proposed egalitarian readings.

References

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