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Sayyid Qutb, after whom Qutbism is named
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Qutbism[a] is an exonym that refers to the Sunni Islamist beliefs and ideology of Sayyid Qutb,[1] a leading Islamist revolutionary of the Muslim Brotherhood who was executed by the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966.[2] Influenced by the doctrines of earlier Islamists like Hasan al-Banna and Maududi, Qutbism advocates Islamic extremist violence in order to establish an Islamic government, in addition to promoting offensive Jihad.[3] Qutbism has been characterized as an Islamofascist and Islamic terrorist ideology.[3]

Sayyid Qutb's treatises deeply influenced numerous jihadist ideologues and organizations across the Muslim world.[1][4][5] Qutbism has gained prominence due to its influence on notable Jihadist figures of contemporary era such as Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Saif al-Adel.[4][5][6][7] Its ideas have also been adopted by the Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIL).[8] It was one inspiration that influenced Ruhollah Khomeini in the development of his own ideology, Khomeinism.[9]

Qutbist literature has been a major source of influence on numerous jihadist movements and organizations that have emerged since the 1970s.[1][4][5] These include the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya, al-Takfir wal-Hijra, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), al-Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, and the Islamic State (ISIL), and others that have sought to implement their strategy of waging offensive Jihad.[1][4][5][10][11][12]

Terminology

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While adherents of Qutbism are referred to as Qutbists or Qutbiyyun (singular: Qutbi), they rarely refer to themselves with these names (i.e. the word is not an endonym); the name was first and still is used by the sect's opponents (i.e. it is an exonym).[13]

Tenets

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The main tenet of the Qutbist ideology is that modern Muslims abandoned true Islam centuries ago, having instead reverted to jahiliyyah.[4][5][8][14] Adherents believe that Islam must be re-established by Qutb's followers.[15]

Qutb outlined his religious and political ideas in his book Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq ("Milestones").[4][5][8] Important principles of Qutbism include:[citation needed]

  • Adherence to Sharia as sacred law accessible to humans, without which Islam cannot exist
  • Adherence to Sharia as a complete way of life that will bring not only justice, but peace, personal serenity, scientific discovery, complete freedom from servitude, and other benefits;
  • Avoidance of Western and non-Islamic "evil and corruption," including socialism, nationalism and consumerist capitalism.[16]
  • Vigilance against Western and Jewish conspiracies against Islam;
  • A two-pronged attack of
    • preaching to convert and,
    • jihad to forcibly eliminate the "structures" of Jahiliyya;[17]
  • Offensive Jihad to eliminate Jahiliyya not only from the Islamic homeland but from the face of the Earth, seeing it as mutually exclusive with true Islam.[18]

Takfirism

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Qutb declared Islam "extinct," which implied that any Muslims who do not follow his teachings are not actually Muslim. This was intended to shock Muslims into religious rearmament. When taken literally, takfir refers to ex-communication, thereby declaring all non-Qutbist Muslims to be apostates in violation of Sharia law. Violating this law could potentially be punished by death, according to Islamic law.[19]

Because of these serious consequences, Muslims have traditionally been reluctant to practice takfir, that is, to pronounce professed Muslims as unbelievers, even when in violation of Islamic law.[20] This prospect of fitna, or internal strife, between Qutbists and "takfir-ed" mainstream Muslims, led Qutb to conclude that the Egyptian government was irredeemably evil. As a result, he helped to plan a thwarted series of assassinations of Egyptian officials, the discovery of which let to Qutb's trial and eventual execution.[21] Due in part to this teaching, Qutb's ideology remains controversial among Muslims.[22][23]

It is unclear whether Qutb's proclamation of jahiliyyah was meant to apply the global Muslim community or to only Muslim governments.[24]

In the 1980s and 1990s, a series of terrorist attacks in Egypt were committed by Islamic extremists believed to be influenced by Qutb.[25] Victims included Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, head of the counter-terrorism police Major General Raouf Khayrat, parliamentary speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub, dozens of European tourists and Egyptian bystanders, and over one hundred Egyptian police officers.[26] Qutb's takfir against the Egyptian government, which he believed to be irredeemably evil, was a primary motivation for the attacks.[27] Other factors included frustration with Egypt's economic stagnation and rage over President Sadat's policy of reconciliation with Israel.[28]

History

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Spread of Qutb's ideas

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Qutb's message was spread through his writings, his followers and especially through his brother, Muhammad Qutb. Muhammad was implicated in the assassination plots that led to Qutb's execution, but he was spared the death penalty. After his release from prison, Muhammad moved to Saudi Arabia along with fellow members of the Muslim Brotherhood. There, he became a professor of Islamic Studies and edited, published and promoted his brother Sayyid's works.[29][30]

Ayman al-Zawahiri

One of Qutb's key proponents was one of his students, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who went on to become a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad[31] and later a mentor of Osama bin Laden and a leading member of al-Qaeda.[32] He had been first introduced to Sayyad Qutb by his uncle, Mafouz Azzam, who was a close friend to Qutb and taught his nephew that he was an honorable man.[33] Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his work Knights under the Prophet's Banner.[34]

Qutbism was propagated by Abdullah Azzam during the Afghan-Soviet War. As the Muslim jihad volunteers from around the world exchanged religious ideas, Qutbism merged with Salafism and Wahhabism, culminating in the formation of Salafi jihadism.[35] Abdullah Azzam was a mentor of bin Laden as well.

Osama bin Laden reportedly regularly attended weekly public lectures by Muhammad Qutb at King Abdulaziz University, and to have read and been deeply influenced by Sayyid Qutb.[36]

The Yemeni Al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki also cited Qutb's writings as formative to his ideology.[37]

Many Islamic extremists consider him a father of the movement.[38][39] Ayman al-Zawahiri, former leader of Al-Qaeda, asserted that Qutb's execution lit "the jihadist fire",[38] and reshaped the direction of the Islamist movement by convincing them that the takfir against Muslim governments made them important targets.[39]

Backlash

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Following Qutb's death, his ideas spread throughout Egypt and other parts of the Arab and Muslim world, prompting a backlash by more traditionalist and conservative Muslims, such as the book Du'ah, la Qudah ("Preachers, not Judges") (1969). The book, written by Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi, attacked the idea of Takfir of other Muslims, though it was ostensibly intended as a criticism of Mawdudi.[40]

Views

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Science and learning

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On the importance of science and learning, Qutb was ambivalent.

He wrote that Muslims should learn science and develop their capabilities to fulfill their role as representatives of God.[41] He encouraged Muslims to seek knowledge in abstract sciences and arts, whether from Muslim or non-Muslim teachers, so that Muslim communities will have their own experts.[42]

However, Qutb believed that Muslims were not allowed to study some subjects, including:

the principles of economics and political affairs and the interpretation of historical processes... the origin of the universe, the origin of the life of man... philosophy, comparative religion... sociology (excluding statistics and observations)... Darwinist biology ([which] goes beyond the scope of its observations, without any rhyme or reason and only exists for the sake of expressing an opinion...).[43]

He also believed that the era of scientific discovery in the West was over, and that further scientific discovery must be reached in accordance with Sharia law.[44][45]

On philosophy and kalam

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See also: Falsafa and Kalam

Qutb also strongly opposed Falsafa and Ilm al-Kalam, which he denounced as deviations which undermined the original Islamic creed because they were based on Aristotelian logic. He denounced these disciplines as alien to Islamic traditions and called for their abandonment in favor of a literalist interpretation of Islamic scriptures.[46]

Sharia and governance

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Qutbism advocates the belief that in a sharia-based society, wonders of justice, prosperity, peace and harmony—both individually and societally—are "not postponed for the next life [i.e. heaven] but are operative even in this world".[47]

Qutb believed harmony and perfection brought by Sharia law is such that the use of offensive jihad to spread sharia-Islam throughout the non-Muslim world is not aggression but rather means of introducing "true freedom" to the masses. Because Sharia law is judged by God rather than man, in this view, enforcing Sharia frees people from servitude to each other.[45]

In other works Qutb describes the ruler of the Islamic state, as a man (never a woman) who "derives his legitimacy from his being elected by the community and from his submission to God. He has no privileges over other Muslims, and is only obeyed as long as he himself adheres to the shari‘a".[48]

Conspiracy theories

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Qutbism emphasizes what it sees as the evil designs of Westerners and Jews against Islam, and it also emphasizes the importance of Muslims not trusting or imitating them.

Non-Muslims

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Qutbisms's teachings on non-Muslims gained attention after the September 11 attacks. Qutb's writings on non-Muslims, particularly Western non-Muslims, are extremely negative. They teach that Christians and Jews are hostile to his movement "simply for being Muslims" and believing in God.[49][50] He refers to "people of the book," who are typically viewed more favorably than other non-Muslims in Islam, as "depraved" for having "falsified" their religious texts.[51]

Qutb believed Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's teachings that the realm outside of Muslim lands was Dar al-Harb ("the Abode of War"), and had to be subjugated by Muslims. Subjugation would actually be "liberation" however,[52] because it "would free men from all authority except that of God."[53] However, this view also necessitates that non-Muslims not be allowed to make law or choose representatives, lest they disobey Islamic law.[54][55]

The West

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In Qutb's view, Western imperialism is not only an economic or racial exploitation means of oppression, but rather an attempt to undermine the faith of Muslims.[56] He believed that historians lied to confuse Muslims and weaken their faith by teaching, for example, that the Crusades were an attempt by Christians to reconquer the formerly Christian-ruled holy land.[57] He believed that the ultimate goal of these efforts was to destroy Muslim society.[58]

Qutb spent two years in the U.S. in the late 1940s and he disliked it immensely.[59] Qutb wrote that he experienced "Western malevolence" during his time there, including an attempt by an American agent to seduce him, and the alleged celebration of American hospital employees upon hearing of the assassination of Egyptian Ikhwan Supreme Guide Hassan al-Banna.[60]

Qutb's critics, particularly in the West, have cast doubts upon these stories. Having not been a member of any government or political organization at the time of his visit, it is unlikely that American intelligence agents would have sought him out. Additionally, many Americans did not know who Hassan al-Banna or the Muslim Brotherhood were in 1948, making the celebration of hospital employees unlikely.[61]

Western corruption

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Further information: Sex segregation and Islam

Qutbism emphasizes a claimed Islamic moral superiority over the West, according to Islamist values. One example of the West's perceived moral decay was the "animal-like" mixing of the sexes, as well as jazz, which he found lurid and distasteful for its association with Black Americans.[62] Qutb states that while he was in America a young woman told him that ethics and sex are separate issues, pointing out that animals do not have any problems mixing freely.

Critics such as Maajid Nawaz protest by arguing that Qutb's complaint about both American racism and the "primitive inclinations" of the "Negro" are contradictory and hypocritical.[62] The place Qutb spent most of his time in was the small city of Greeley, Colorado, dominated by cattle feedlots and an "unpretentious university", originally founded as "a sober, godly, cooperative community".[63]

Jews

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Further information: Antisemitic trope, Antisemitism in Islam, Economic antisemitism, List of conspiracy theories § Antisemitism, and Stereotypes of Jews

The other anti-Islamic conspiratorial group, according to Qutb, is "World Jewry," because that it is engaging in tricks to eliminate "faith and religion", and trying to divert "the wealth of mankind" into "Jewish financial institutions" by charging interest on loans.[64] Jewish designs are so pernicious, according to Qutb's logic, that "anyone who leads this [Islamic] community away from its religion and its Quran can only be [a] Jewish agent."[65]

Criticism

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By Muslims

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While Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq [Arabic: معالم في الطريق] (Milestones) was Qutb's manifesto, other elements of Qutbism are found in his works Al-'adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi-l-Islam [Arabic: العدالة الاجتماعية في الاسلام] (Social Justice in Islam), and his Quranic commentary Fi Zilal al-Qur'an [Arabic: في ظلال القرآن] (In the shade of the Qur'an). Ideas in (or alleged to be in) those works also have been criticized by some traditionalist/conservative Muslims. They include:

  • Qutb's assertion that slavery was now illegal under Islam, as its lawfulness was only temporary, existing only "until the world devised a new code of practice, other than enslavement."[Note 1] Many contemporary Islamic scholars, however, do share the view that slavery is not allowed in Islam in modern times. On the other hand, according to Salafi critics such as Saleh Al-Fawzan, "Islam has affirmed slavery ... And it will continue so long as Jihaad in the path of Allah exists."[67]
  • Proposals to redistribute income and property to the needy. Opponents claim they are revisionist and innovations of Islam.[68][69][70]
  • Describing Moses as having an "excitable nature" – this allegedly being "mockery," and "mockery of the Prophets is apostasy in its own,'" according to Shaikh ‘Abdul-Aziz ibn Baz.[citation needed]
  • Dismissing fiqh or the schools of Islamic law known as madhhab as separate from "Islamic principles and Islamic understanding."[71]
  • Describing Islamic societies as being sunk in a state of Jahiliyyah (pagan ignorance) implying takfir. Salafi scholars like (Albani, Rabee bin Hadi, Ibn Baz, Ibn Jibreen, Ibn Uthaymeen, Saalih al-Fawzan, Muqbil ibn Hadi, etc.) would condemn Qutb as a heretic for takfiri views as well as for what they considered to be theological deviancies and these ideologies were widely refuted by Al Allāmah Rabee Ibn Hadi Al Madkhali in his books and audio tapes. They also identified his methodology as a distinct "Qutbi' manhaj", thus resulting in the labelling of Salafi-Jihadis as "Qutbists" by many of their quietist Salafist opponents.[72][73][74][75][76][77][78]

Qutb may now be facing criticism representing his idea's success or Qutbism's logical conclusion as much as his idea's failure to persuade some critics. Writing before the Islamic revival was in full bloom, Qutb sought Islamically correct alternatives to European ideas like Marxism and socialism and proposed Islamic means to achieve the ends of social justice and equality, redistribution of private property and political revolution. But according to Olivier Roy, contemporary "neofundamentalists refuse to express their views in modern terms borrowed from the West. They consider indulging in politics, even for a good cause, will by definition lead to bid'a and shirk (the giving of priority to worldly considerations over religious values.)"[79]

There are, however, some commentators who display an ambivalence towards him, and Roy notes that "his books are found everywhere and mentioned on most neo-fundamentalist websites, and arguing his "mystical approach", "radical contempt and hatred for the West", and "pessimistic views on the modern world" have resonated with these Muslims.[80]

Criticism by Americans

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James Hess, an analyst at the American Military University (AMU), labelled Qutbism as "Islamic-based terrorism".[81] In his essay criticizing the doctrines of Qutbist ideology, US Army colonel Dale C. Eikmeier described Qutbism as "a fusion of puritanical and intolerant Islamic orientations that include elements from both the Sunni and Shia sects".[82]

Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood

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The controversy over Qutbism is partially caused by two opposing factions which exist within the Islamic revival: the politically quiet Salafi Muslims, and the politically active Muslim groups which are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.[83]

Although Sayyid Qutb was never the head of the Muslim Brotherhood,[84] he was the Brotherhood's "leading intellectual,"[85] the editor of its weekly periodical, and a member of the highest branch in the Brotherhood, the Working Committee and the Guidance Council.[86]

Hassan al-Hudaybi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, argued against takfir and adopted a tolerant attitude. In response, some Qutbists concluded that the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned their ideology.[87] Ayman al-Zawahiri, a prominent Qutbist, also attacked the Muslim Brotherhood.[87]

After the publication of Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), opinion in the Brotherhood split over his ideas, though many in Egypt (including extremists outside the Brotherhood) and most of the Muslim Brotherhood's members in other countries are said to have shared his analysis "to one degree or another."[88] However, the leadership of the Brotherhood, headed by Hassan al-Hudaybi, remained moderate and interested in political negotiation and activism. By the 1970s, the Brotherhood had renounced violence as a means of achieving its goals.[89] In recent years, his ideas have been embraced by Islamic extremist groups,[90] while the Muslim Brotherhood has tended to serve as the official voice of Moderate Islamism.

Influence on Jihadist movements

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In 2005, the British author and religion academic Karen Armstrong declared, regarding the ideological framework of al-Qaeda, that al-Qaeda and nearly every other Islamic fundamentalist movement was influenced by Qutb. She proposed the term "Qutbian terrorism" to describe violence by his followers.[91]

According to The Guardian journalist Robert Manne, "there exists a more or less general consensus that the ideology of the Islamic State was founded upon the principles which were set forth by Qutb", particularly based on some sections of his treatises Milestones and In the Shade of the Qur'an.[92]

However, the self-declared Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has been described by various analysts as being more violent than al-Qaeda and closely aligned with Wahhabism,[93][94][95] alongside Salafism and Salafi jihadism.[96][97] In 2014, regarding the ideology of IS, Karen Armstrong remarked that "IS is certainly an Islamic movement [...] because its roots are in Wahhabism, a form of Islam practised in Saudi Arabia that developed only in the 18th century".[93]

Nabil Na'eem, a former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri and an ex-Islamic Jihad leader, argued that Qutb's writings were the main factor that led to the rise of Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and various Jihadist groups.[98][99]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Qutbism

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Qutbism is an Islamist ideology derived from the writings of Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), particularly his 1964 manifesto Milestones (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq), which posits that sovereignty (hakimiyyah) belongs exclusively to God and that contemporary Muslim societies, including their rulers and institutions, exist in a state of jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance or barbarism) requiring violent jihad by a vanguard of true believers to dismantle and replace with sharia-based governance.
Central to Qutbism is the doctrine of takfir, the declaration of existing Muslim governments and populations as apostates, justifying their overthrow through offensive jihad as a religious obligation rather than defensive response, a radical departure from traditional Islamic jurisprudence that influenced the formation of militant groups like Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda.
While Qutb's ideas emerged from critiques of Western materialism and Nasserist secularism during his imprisonment, Qutbism has been characterized as fusing Islamist revivalism with totalitarian methods akin to fascism, prioritizing ideological purity over democratic processes or gradual reform, and contributing causally to global jihadist movements through its emphasis on revolutionary violence against perceived internal enemies within the ummah.

Definition and Origins

Terminology and Core Concepts


Qutbism refers to the Islamist ideology articulated by Egyptian thinker (1906–1966), particularly in his 1964 work Milestones (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq), which frames modern societies—including those in Muslim-majority countries—as existing in , a state of ignorance and rebellion against divine authority traditionally associated with but expanded by Qutb to encompass any system governed by human laws rather than God's sovereignty (hakimiyyah). This redefinition posits that persists wherever (the oneness of God) is compromised by man-made governance, rendering such societies un-Islamic and requiring Muslims to reject allegiance to them. Central to Qutbist terminology is hakimiyyah, the exclusive legislative authority of , which precludes , , or as forms of shirk (associating partners with God) since they elevate human will over . Qutb emphasized dissociation (talaq or bara') from jahili institutions as a prerequisite for authentic faith, arguing that true believers must form a separate community to challenge and dismantle these structures. While Qutb avoided blanket takfir (declaration of ) for individuals, his societal critique enabled followers to apply it to rulers enforcing non-Sharia systems, justifying their removal. The pathway to an Islamic order (nizam Islami) involves a vanguard (jama'at mutaqaddimah), a small elite of rigorously trained Muslims emulating the Prophet Muhammad's early companions in Mecca, who initiate revolutionary jihad—not merely defensive but offensive—to eradicate jahiliyyah and establish Sharia-based governance ensuring justice and equality under piety rather than race, class, or nationality. This vanguard operates through phases of preaching, organization, and confrontation, viewing jihad as an eternal obligation to universalize God's rule.

Sayyid Qutb's Background and Influences


was born in 1906 in the rural village of in Egypt's province to a family rooted in conservative Islamic traditions. He began his education in local state primary schools before relocating to around 1920 for secondary studies and enrollment at Dar al-Ulum, a teacher-training institution equivalent to a college, graduating in 1933. During this period, Qutb absorbed influences from Egyptian secular and , shaping his initial literary output as a poet and critic. From 1933 to 1952, Qutb served in various roles within Egypt's Ministry of Education, including as a teacher, school inspector, and administrator, while publishing extensively on literature and social issues. In 1948, the Egyptian government sponsored his travel to the for educational studies, where he spent two years primarily in , and later in and . Qutb documented his revulsion toward aspects of American society, including perceived moral decay, racial discrimination against , consumerism, and cultural phenomena like jazz concerts and services, experiences that accelerated his rejection of Western modernity. Returning to in 1950, Qutb formally affiliated with the in 1953, rising quickly to become one of its chief propagandists and ideologues under the legacy of founder Hasan al-Banna. Key intellectual influences included Abu al-A'la Maududi's formulations of hakimiyya (divine sovereignty) and jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance applied to modern societies), which Qutb encountered around 1951 and integrated into his critique of secular regimes. His support for the 1952 Free Officers' coup against the monarchy soured into opposition to Gamal Abdel Nasser's government, leading to his arrest in 1954 amid a broader crackdown on the Brotherhood; the ensuing imprisonment until 1964, involving reported torture and harsh conditions, decisively radicalized his thought toward revolutionary . Qutb was hanged on August 29, 1966, following a for alleged conspiracy.

Ideological Tenets

Doctrine of Jahiliyyah

The doctrine of constitutes a foundational element of Qutbism, as elaborated by in his 1964 manifesto Milestones (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq). Originally denoting the era of ignorance preceding the advent of in 7th-century Arabia, Qutb reconceptualized as a perennial state characterized by the absence of God's sovereignty (hakimiyyah) over human affairs. He described it as "one man's lordship over another, and in this respect it is against the system of the universe," emphasizing that any deviation from submission to equates to rebellion against God's authority. Qutb explicitly extended this condition to the modern world, declaring that "the whole world is steeped in " due to reliance on human-derived systems of governance, law, and values. He identified in societies deriving authority from sources other than , including communist regimes denying divine existence, idolatrous systems, and Western models elevating human reason or legislation. Crucially, Qutb applied the label to contemporary Muslim-majority states, asserting that "all the existing so-called 'Muslim' societies are also jahili societies" insofar as they implement man-made laws rather than comprehensive , thereby committing shirk (associating partners with ) through partial obedience to secular authority. Under this framework, a true Islamic society demands total dedication "to submission to alone, in its beliefs and ideas... in its legal regulations," rendering partial adherence insufficient and equating non-implementation of with unbelief. Qutb viewed as an organized, self-perpetuating force that fragments faith from practice, fostering moral decay and materialistic pursuits devoid of spiritual guidance. This perspective justifies the Qutbist imperative for a of believers to reject and dismantle jahili structures via , aiming to restore God's rule as the sole path to human liberation and cosmic order.

Takfir and Declaration of Apostasy

In Qutbism, —the act of declaring a professing Muslim an unbeliever or apostate—serves as a doctrinal justification for revolutionary violence against regimes and societies that Qutb deemed to have abandoned God's sovereignty. Central to this is Sayyid Qutb's assertion in his 1964 manifesto Milestones (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq) that modern Muslim states, by legislating through human authority rather than implementing exclusively, replicate the (pre-Islamic ignorance) that originally overthrew. This condition, Qutb maintained, constitutes kufr (unbelief) and (polytheism) by elevating man-made systems above , thereby nullifying the Islamic character of the society and its adherents who acquiesce to it. Qutb did not outline a formal procedure for but implied its applicability to rulers, elites, and masses complicit in sustaining jahili governance, as their failure to enforce God's hakimiyya (rulership) equates to from the true faith. He contended that only a purified of believers, unbound by loyalty to these apostate structures, could restore Islam through —not merely defensive warfare, but offensive struggle to dismantle them. This framework provided theological license to target fellow Muslims, departing from Qutb's earlier, more restrained positions influenced by Hasan al-Banna, who emphasized gradual reform over . Qutb's expansive takfir diverged from mainstream Sunni jurisprudence, which historically limited declarations of apostasy to explicit rejections of core aqida (creedal tenets) like the oneness of God or prophecy of , often requiring judicial process to avoid fitna (civil strife). By contrast, Qutb prioritized observable political and social submission to non-divine authority as sufficient grounds, effectively broadening takfir into a tool for ideological purification and rebellion against postcolonial Muslim governments, such as Egypt's under . This innovation, rooted in Qutb's prison writings amid Nasser's 1954-1966 crackdown on Islamists, framed established Muslim polities as equivalent to idolatrous enemies, legitimizing their overthrow without the traditional Islamic prohibition on Muslim-on-Muslim fratricide. The implications of Qutb's extended to societal reconstruction, where post-jihad governance would exclude those tainted by until repentance and adherence to were demonstrated. While Qutb avoided naming specific individuals or groups as apostates in Milestones to evade , his logic inherently enabled subsequent militants to apply takfir indiscriminately, as seen in the 1970s takfiri assassinations by Egyptian extremists like Shukri Mustafa's group, who drew directly from Qutb's texts. Critics within Islamist circles, including some Brotherhood figures, later cautioned that Qutb's approach risked chaotic , yet it endured as a cornerstone of radical ideologies prioritizing doctrinal absolutism over communal harmony.

Vanguardism and Revolutionary Jihad

In Sayyid Qutb's seminal 1964 work Milestones (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq), he proposed the formation of a small group, termed the tali'a () or jama'a (committed cadre), composed of Muslims who have fully internalized Islamic principles to serve as the nucleus for reviving authentic Islamic society. This would initially focus on self-purification and education, rejecting compromise with prevailing (pre-Islamic ignorance, extended by Qutb to modern Muslim regimes), before expanding through propagation and ultimately confrontation. Qutb emphasized that such a group must operate independently, unbound by national borders or existing institutions, drawing conceptual parallels to Leninist parties that lead masses toward ideological purity and action. Qutb's vanguardism positioned this elite as the sole legitimate interpreters and implementers of divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah), tasked with dismantling apostate systems through phased escalation, culminating in armed struggle. He argued that the vanguard's role is not merely defensive but proactive, initiating jihad as a revolutionary force to overthrow rulers who enforce man-made laws over sharia, thereby restoring Islam's universal leadership. This reframing transformed traditional Islamic jihad—historically understood as defensive warfare or personal striving—into an offensive, totalizing campaign against global jahiliyyah, applicable even against Muslim-majority states like Egypt under Nasser, which Qutb deemed idolatrous for their secular nationalism. The doctrine of revolutionary under vanguard leadership rejected gradualist reforms favored by the Muslim Brotherhood's mainstream, insisting on immediate rupture and once the cadre is prepared, as passive coexistence with unbelief perpetuates servitude to false gods. Qutb specified that jihad in this context encompasses not only action but a comprehensive societal purge, with the modeling Islamic governance in isolated communities before broader conquest, echoing early Medinan precedents under . This approach influenced subsequent jihadist organizations, including —whose founder cited Milestones as pivotal—and , which adopted the model for transnational operations against perceived apostate regimes and Western powers. Critics, including some Islamist scholars like Brotherhood leader Hasan al-Hudaybi, contested Qutb's expansive (declaration of ) as enabling indiscriminate , though Qutb maintained it as a necessary diagnostic for true .

Critiques of Modern Systems

Rejection of Democracy, Nationalism, and Secularism

Qutbism posits that violates the Islamic principle of hakimiyya (divine sovereignty), as it delegates law-making authority to human majorities or representatives, thereby committing shirk (associating partners with ) by elevating man's will over Allah's. In Milestones (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq, published 1964), explicitly condemned democratic systems alongside other man-made governance models like and , arguing that true legislation derives solely from the and , rendering parliaments and elections instruments of jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance). This rejection extends to participatory elements such as voting, which Qutb viewed as legitimizing polytheistic rule by implying popular consent suffices for legitimacy absent divine sanction. Nationalism, in Qutbist thought, fosters artificial divisions within the ummah (global Muslim community) by subordinating Islamic unity to ethnic, linguistic, or territorial affiliations, which Qutb equated with idolatrous loyalty to false gods. Initially influenced by Egyptian literary in the 1930s, Qutb's views evolved post-1950s imprisonment to critique secular —epitomized by Gamal Abdel Nasser's —as a resurgence of jahiliyyah that distracted from for a caliphate-based order. He argued that such ideologies, by prioritizing nation-states over Sharia-enforced solidarity, perpetuate Muslim subjugation under non-Islamic rulers, necessitating their dismantlement through revolutionary means. Secularism is dismissed as an alien Western import that fragments Islam's holistic worldview by confining to personal while excluding it from , , and society—a separation Qutb deemed impossible under . Qutb contended that secular governance in Muslim lands equates to , as it replaces God's comprehensive rulings with human or , leading to moral decay and vulnerability to . This stance underpinned his call for a to impose Islamic rule, viewing secular constitutions and institutions as taghut (tyrannical falsehoods) that must be overthrown to restore (monotheism) in statecraft.

Views on Economics and Social Structures

Qutb rejected both and as materialistic systems incompatible with divine sovereignty, arguing that they prioritize human-made laws over and foster exploitation or atheistic class conflict. In Social Justice in Islam (1949), he critiqued for permitting usury (), which he saw as exploitative and leading to wealth concentration among elites, violating Quranic prohibitions (e.g., 2:275-281). He similarly dismissed for its denial of and emphasis on without spiritual foundation, viewing it as a form of * (pre-Islamic ignorance) that ignores God's ultimate ownership of all resources. Instead, Qutb advocated an Islamic economic order where private property serves as a stewardship (amanah) from God, rewarding individual effort while mandating redistribution through zakat (obligatory alms, typically 2.5% of wealth annually) to prevent poverty and promote communal welfare. This system, detailed in Social Justice in Islam, balances personal initiative with social justice by prohibiting hoarding, enforcing inheritance laws to avoid dynastic inequality, and ensuring resources circulate for societal benefit under Sharia governance. Qutb emphasized that true economic equity arises not from human ideologies but from submission to divine law, which integrates material prosperity with moral and spiritual upliftment. On social structures, Qutb envisioned a hierarchical yet pious organized around the as the foundational unit, where relations between sexes define a society's Islamic or jahili character. In Milestones (1964), he prescribed distinct roles: men as rational leaders responsible for affairs, , and provision; women as emotional nurturers focused on domestic duties, child-rearing, and , with spiritual equality but functional complementarity derived from natural and Quranic differences. He condemned Western social models for blurring these roles through co-mingling, sexual liberation, and , which he argued erode cohesion and propagate decay. Broader society under Qutbism rejects class or racial divisions in favor of merit based on virtue and competence, governed by (consultation among the righteous) rather than or . Enforcement of ensures moral order, with the state or vanguard correcting deviations like or false testimony through prescribed penalties (e.g., Quran 24:2), fostering unity as "one body" where members support the vulnerable. Qutb maintained that only such a divinely ordained structure achieves true liberation, contrasting it with secular systems that subordinate humans to tyrannical rulers or ideologies.

Subordination of Science, Philosophy, and Rationalism

Qutbist ideology posits that human reason, , and philosophical speculation possess inherent limitations and must be strictly subordinated to divine as conveyed in the Qur'an and . Sayyid maintained that unaided cannot access metaphysical or moral truths, as these originate solely from God's sovereignty (hakimiyyah), rendering independent intellectual pursuits as potential sources of rebellion against divine order. This framework critiques Western for elevating human intellect to a position of , which Qutb described as fostering by detaching knowledge from spiritual essence and God's laws. Physical sciences receive qualified endorsement in Qutb's writings, permissible insofar as they reveal uniform laws of nature consistent with Islamic tasawwur (comprehensive worldview) and the human role as God's (khalifah), such as advancements in without moral overreach into areas like evolutionary theory. However, Qutb warned that Western scientific detachment from sterilizes progress, perpetuating human suffering by ignoring divine harmony and prioritizing empirical utility over ethical submission to . Philosophical sciences and rationalist methodologies fare worse, viewed as fragmenting coherent knowledge foundations and introducing foreign corruptions, particularly Greek-influenced speculations that overstep 's bounds. Ultimately, Qutb advocated an intuitive grasp of eternal truths via (innate human disposition) guided by Qur'anic , dismissing autonomous as an intrusion on pure Islamic thought and subordinating all forms of to the exclusive tasawwur derived from scripture. This epistemological hierarchy ensures intellectual endeavors reinforce the rejection of (pre-Islamic ignorance) and the implementation of , with worldly knowledge valid only as secondary tools aligned to divine imperatives.

Positions on External Threats

Perceptions of Western Imperialism and Corruption

Sayyid Qutb developed a profound antagonism toward Western societies following his two-year stay in the from 1948 to 1950, where he studied education at Colorado State College of Education and observed American culture firsthand. In his 1951 essay "The America I Have Seen," Qutb portrayed the as a materialistic civilization dominated by primitive instincts, lacking genuine spiritual or emotional depth, with social interactions reduced to superficiality and hedonism. He specifically decried American women's attire and behavior as provocative and animalistic, as hypocritical barbarism despite claims of equality, and popular culture—such as jazz music and films—as tools promoting licentiousness and moral decay. Qutb extended this critique to Western imperialism, viewing it as an aggressive extension of crusader-era hostility aimed at subjugating Muslim lands through economic exploitation, , and cultural domination. In works like Social Justice in Islam (1949, revised 1956), he condemned European colonial powers—particularly Britain and —for plundering resources in Muslim-majority regions such as , , and , while fostering dependency and internal divisions to prevent unified Islamic resistance. He argued that post-colonial interventions, including U.S. support for after 1948, perpetuated this imperialism by installing secular regimes that prioritized national borders over ummah solidarity, thereby weakening Islamic governance. Central to Qutb's perception was the West's export of ideological corruption, which he saw infiltrating Muslim societies via education, media, and governance models that severed religion from public life. In Milestones (1964), he described Western "freedom" and democracy as illusions enabling moral relativism, usury, and exploitation, contrasting them with divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah) and labeling adherents as participants in modern jahiliyyah—a state of ignorant barbarism akin to pre-Islamic Arabia but amplified by industrial power. Qutb contended that this corruption manifested in the adoption of Western legal codes and consumerism in Muslim countries, eroding traditional values and paving the way for tyrannical rule under the guise of progress, as evidenced by Egypt's alignment with Western-backed policies under Nasser.

Antisemitism and Conspiracy Theories Involving Jews

Sayyid Qutb expressed pronounced convictions in his 1950 essay "Our Struggle with the Jews", framing the antagonism between and as an immutable, divinely sanctioned conflict rooted in historical and scriptural precedents. He asserted that have exhibited perpetual enmity toward since the time of Prophet Muhammad, citing Quranic accounts of their alleged treachery, such as breaking covenants, killing prophets, and rejecting divine messages. Qutb contended that this hostility stems from 's materialistic essence, which inherently opposes 's spiritual , positioning as existential foes whose subjugation or elimination is necessary for Islamic triumph. Central to Qutb's narrative were conspiracy theories depicting as architects of global subversion against Muslim societies. He accused them of masterminding secular ideologies like and to erode Islamic governance, drawing parallels to fabricated claims of Jewish of events akin to those in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, though without direct endorsement of the text. In the essay, Qutb warned that Jewish influence permeates modern crusader-Western alliances, fostering moral decay and political fragmentation to prevent the reestablishment of -based rule, a view he extended beyond the Palestinian conflict to a cosmic battle. These assertions echoed earlier rhetoric but intensified under Qutb's theological lens, attributing to Jews not only political but also an innate drive for domination that necessitates perpetual . Qutb's permeated his seminal 1964 work Milestones, where he reiterated Jews as vanguards of —the pre-Islamic ignorance he deemed characteristic of contemporary societies—collaborating with Western imperialists to suppress Islamic revival. He invoked Quranic surahs like (5:82) to substantiate claims of Jewish perfidy, urging Muslims to combat this alliance through revolutionary means. These elements became foundational to Qutbism, influencing subsequent Islamist movements by embedding antisemitic tropes into doctrines of defensive and societal purification, as seen in the ideological lineages of groups like . Qutb's theories, while grounded in selective scriptural , diverged from classical Islamic jurisprudence by universalizing enmity toward Jews irrespective of status under Islamic rule.

Treatment of Non-Muslims Under Islamic Rule

In the political theory of , as outlined in works such as Milestones (1964), the establishment of a through would impose sharia-based governance, under which non-Muslims—primarily Jews and Christians as —would receive protected status as dhimmis. This arrangement permits them to adhere to their religious creeds and perform rites, subject to limitations derived from Quranic and prescriptions, such as restrictions on public worship displays, proselytization among Muslims, and political authority over Muslims. Qutb aligns this with classical Islamic jurisprudence, emphasizing the dhimma covenant as a means of integrating non-Muslims into the ummah's domain while affirming Muslim supremacy. Central to this status is the tax, levied on able-bodied non-Muslim males in lieu of military service and obligations imposed on Muslims. Qutb justifies on three grounds: as a symbolic acknowledgment of submission to Islamic , compensation for the protection afforded by the Muslim state against external threats, and a fiscal contribution to public expenditures from which dhimmis benefit. This tax, referenced in 9:29, underscores the hierarchical relationship, with non-payment potentially voiding protections and reverting to conditions of conflict. Polytheists (mushrikin), by contrast, face a stricter Quranic mandate for combat until they convert or are subdued, though Qutb's focus in Milestones prioritizes revolutionary against over granular post-victory classifications. Qutb upholds the Quranic principle of no compulsion in religion (Quran 2:256), advocating freedom of conscience for non-Muslims within bounds, but this does not extend to equality or unrestricted propagation that challenges Islamic dominance. His commentary in on Surah at-Tawbah (revealed circa 631 CE) elaborates that fighting continues until they pay jizya "in willing humiliation" (9:29), framing it as both martial and economic subjugation to deter rebellion and ensure loyalty. Critics note that Qutb's vanguardist framework, which views global societies as jahili, implies that pre-Islamic-rule non-Muslims are combatants until the caliphate's triumph, after which applies only to survivors who submit. This doctrinal stance influenced Qutbist adherents, though practical implementations by groups like diverged toward expulsion or violence against non-Muslims deemed irreconcilable, reflecting interpretive extensions beyond Qutb's textual fidelity. Empirical historical precedents under early caliphates (e.g., Umar's pact with in 637 CE) involved similar protections alongside disabilities like distinctive clothing and bans on weapons, which Qutb implicitly endorses as divinely ordained realism rather than egalitarian accommodation.

Historical Evolution

Integration with Muslim Brotherhood

Sayyid Qutb affiliated himself with the in the early 1950s, shortly after returning from a two-year stay in the United States, where experiences deepened his disillusionment with Western and . He quickly rose to become a leading intellectual and propagandist within the organization, contributing to its publications and aligning his writings with the Brotherhood's call for against perceived moral decay in Egyptian society. Qutb's arrest in 1954 alongside thousands of Brotherhood members following an attempt on President marked a turning point. During over a decade of imprisonment, he composed his seminal work Milestones (published 1964), which radicalized Brotherhood ideology by declaring contemporary Muslim societies as jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) and calling for a of true believers to wage offensive to establish Islamic governance. These ideas, smuggled out of prison, circulated among Brotherhood inmates and sympathizers, embedding concepts of (declaring Muslims apostates) and revolutionary violence into segments of the group's thought, diverging from founder Hassan al-Banna's emphasis on gradual reform through education and social work. Following Qutb's execution on August 29, 1966, the Muslim Brotherhood's official leadership sought to distance itself from his more confrontational doctrines to mitigate regime repression and pursue pragmatic political engagement. However, Qutbism persisted as an influential undercurrent, particularly among younger members frustrated with accommodationist strategies, fostering internal tensions between elitist and broader societal reform. His brother , also a Brotherhood affiliate arrested in 1965, played a key role in preserving and disseminating these ideas post-execution, teaching them in from the 1970s onward and influencing figures who bridged Brotherhood networks to emerging jihadist groups. This integration radicalized factions, contributing to militant actions such as the 1981 by Brotherhood-linked Islamists explicitly inspired by Qutb's call to target "near enemies."

Persecution, Execution, and Immediate Aftermath (1950s-1970s)

Following the failed assassination attempt on on October 26, 1954, by a member, the Egyptian regime banned the organization in December 1954 and launched a widespread crackdown, arresting an estimated 20,000 members, including in November 1954. Qutb, a leading ideologue and propagandist for the , faced imprisonment under harsh conditions involving torture, which affected thousands of detainees and contributed to internal radicalization debates among prisoners. During his approximately ten-year incarceration at facilities like Turah Prison, Qutb composed key works such as Milestones (serialized 1964), advocating against jahiliyyah-dominated states, including Nasser's secular nationalist regime. Released in May 1964 due to deteriorating health, Qutb resumed activities but was rearrested in August 1965 amid the discovery of an alleged secret Brotherhood cell plotting to overthrow the government. Charged with and before a alongside 42 others, Qutb defended his writings as religious exhortations rather than incitements to violence, but was convicted based on interpretations of Milestones as a blueprint for armed insurrection. On August 29, 1966, he was executed by hanging along with five co-defendants, an act Nasser's government framed as justice against . Qutb's execution elevated him to martyr status among adherents, amplifying the clandestine dissemination of his texts despite ongoing suppression, which persisted under Nasser until his death in 1970. While the Brotherhood's mainstream leadership, led by Hasan al-Hudaybi, rejected Qutb's doctrines—excommunicating Muslim rulers as apostates—and emphasized in responses like Preachers Not Judges (late ), prison-hardened radicals embraced his vanguardist , sowing seeds for future splinter groups. Under from 1971, releases of thousands of Islamists facilitated a partial resurgence, allowing Qutbist ideas to influence university campuses and nascent militant networks in the , though the core Brotherhood prioritized organizational survival over immediate confrontation.

Dissemination Through Exiles and Networks (1980s-2000s)

Following intensified crackdowns in after the 1981 assassination of President by (EIJ) militants, many Qutb-influenced radicals faced imprisonment or exile, facilitating the transnational spread of Qutbist ideology. , founded in the late 1970s by former members radicalized by Qutb's concepts of jahiliyyah and , viewed 's secular government as apostate, justifying offensive to establish Islamic rule. , EIJ's leader from the mid-1980s, explicitly drew on Qutb's Milestones to frame Muslim societies as realms of ignorance requiring a to overthrow rulers. In the mid-1980s, Zawahiri and hundreds of Egyptian exiles relocated to Peshawar, Pakistan, leveraging the networks against the Soviet invasion as a base for propagation. There, EIJ established independent training camps distinct from Abdullah Azzam's more defensive-oriented Services Bureau, disseminating Qutb's call for global confrontation with "jahili" regimes through lectures, publications, and recruitment of Arab volunteers. These networks integrated Qutbist with Salafi-jihadist currents, influencing fighters who later formed transnational cells, as Qutb's emphasis on ideological purity over national loyalty resonated amid the jihad's international mobilization. Parallel dissemination occurred via , Sayyid's brother, who fled to in 1969 and taught at institutions like , mentoring students in his sibling's revolutionary . By the 1980s, Muhammad's lectures and writings amplified Qutbist critiques of , reaching Gulf youth and indirectly shaping Saudi support for Afghan , though official Wahhabi authorities critiqued Qutb's doctrinal innovations. Into the 1990s, exiles shifted to under Hassan al-Turabi's hospitality, where Zawahiri coordinated EIJ operations and forged ties with , embedding Qutbist vanguardism into emerging structures. Expelled from in 1996, these networks relocated to Taliban-controlled , intensifying propaganda via fatwas and media that applied Qutb's doctrines to distant Muslim governments. The 2001 merger of EIJ remnants with formalized Qutbism's role in global jihadist ideology, enabling its adaptation by cells in and through returning fighters and smuggled texts.

Influence on Militant Islamism

Role in Al-Qaeda and Early Global Jihad

Qutbism provided the theoretical foundation for 's ideology, emphasizing the declaration of on contemporary Muslim societies ruled by man-made laws and the imperative for a revolutionary vanguard to impose divine sovereignty through . This framework, articulated in Sayyid Qutb's Milestones published in 1964, justified (excommunication) of Muslim rulers and civilians complicit in un-Islamic governance, enabling attacks on both apostate regimes and their Western backers. Al-Qaeda leaders adapted these ideas to globalize beyond local struggles, viewing the West as the primary enabler of Muslim subjugation. Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose Egyptian Islamic Jihad (founded in 1979) drew directly from Qutb's calls for violent overthrow of secular Egyptian governments, bridged Qutbism to after merging EIJ with bin Laden's network on June 7, 2001. Zawahiri's writings and leadership echoed Qutb's , prioritizing ideological purity and offensive against "near enemy" regimes before escalating to the "far enemy" (the ). This merger formalized Al-Qaeda's commitment to Qutbist principles, with Zawahiri serving as its chief ideologue until his death in 2022. Osama bin Laden encountered Qutb's ideas through his brother , a Saudi-based scholar who lectured on Milestones and influenced Saudi students, including some of bin Laden's associates. Bin Laden's 1996 declaration of war on the U.S. and 1998 urging Muslims to kill Americans and their allies worldwide mirrored Qutb's universalist against , framing attacks like the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in and (killing 224) and the in 2000 (killing 17 sailors) as religious duties. The September 11, 2001, attacks, which killed nearly 3,000, exemplified Al-Qaeda's application of Qutbism to early global , aiming to provoke a to awaken Muslim masses.

Adaptation by ISIS and Post-2010 Groups

The (ISIS), emerging prominently after its split from around 2010–2014, adapted Qutbist principles by emphasizing to declare vast swaths of populations apostates, thereby justifying mass violence against perceived internal enemies such as Shia , rival Sunnis, and even other jihadists who rejected its authority. This built on Sayyid Qutb's doctrine in Milestones (1964), which labeled contemporary societies as jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) and advocated of rulers and elites failing to enforce pure , but ISIS operationalized it more expansively, applying not just to governments but to civilians and sects en masse, resulting in documented executions of over 1,700 Shia recruits in , , on June 12, 2014. Unlike al-Qaeda's restraint on broad to avoid alienating potential recruits, ISIS's approach, influenced by Qutb's concept, positioned itself as the sole legitimate authority, purging dissenters to consolidate control. ISIS further adapted Qutbism through its pursuit of offensive jihad to establish and expand a territorial caliphate, declaring one on June 29, 2014, in territory spanning parts of Iraq and Syria under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whom it proclaimed caliph. This reflected Qutb's call for a committed elite (tali'a) to overthrow jahili systems and impose divine sovereignty via force, but ISIS rejected al-Qaeda's phased strategy of first targeting the "far enemy" (Western powers) for Muslim unity, instead prioritizing immediate state-building, sharia enforcement (including hudud punishments like amputation and stoning), and conquest of the "near enemy" through brutal governance in held areas. By 2015, ISIS controlled approximately 100,000 square kilometers and administered services like taxation and courts, embodying Qutb's vision of an Islamic polity free from man-made laws, though its apocalyptic eschatology and sectarian extremism amplified Qutb's ideas into a millenarian framework. Post-2010 groups inspired by ISIS, such as its provincial affiliates (e.g., ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan, established 2015), extended this adaptation by replicating caliphate loyalty pledges (bay'ah) and offensive operations against "apostate" regimes, applying Qutbist takfir to local contexts like declaring Afghan Taliban leaders mushrikin (polytheists) for insufficient purism. These adaptations, while rooted in Qutbism's rejection of partial Islamic reforms, diverged by institutionalizing hyper-violence—evident in ISIS's global attacks, such as the November 2015 Paris bombings killing 130—prioritizing spectacle and recruitment over Qutb's more theoretical emphasis on moral vanguardism, leading to territorial losses by 2019 but persistent ideological influence in decentralized networks.

Persistent Legacy in Contemporary Conflicts

Qutbist ideology, emphasizing against Muslim rulers and societies deemed in and the necessity of offensive by a to establish governance, remains foundational to jihadist strategies in conflicts from the to Africa. Al-Qaeda, whose leaders including and regarded themselves as disciples of Qutb, has perpetuated this framework by targeting both "near enemies" (apostate regimes) and the "far enemy" (Western powers) to provoke global upheaval and formation. Affiliates such as (AQAP) in have operationalized excommunication to justify attacks on local governments and foreign interests, including the 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing attempt and ongoing insurgencies amid Yemen's since 2014. Similarly, Al-Shabaab in applies Qutb-inspired to dismantle secular authorities, conducting over 1,000 attacks annually in recent years while enforcing strict in controlled territories. In the , Al-Qaeda-linked groups like Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) extend this legacy by declaring Sahelian states and waging campaigns that have displaced millions since 2015, blending local grievances with transnational jihadist goals. The (ISIS), while diverging from on tactical priorities, inherits Qutb's call for immediate establishment through conquest and , evident in its 2014 declaration of a across swaths of and , where it excommunicated and massacred Shia , , and rival Sunnis as jahili apostates. This approach fueled territorial gains peaking at 100,000 square kilometers by 2015, with propaganda invoking to recruit over 40,000 foreign fighters globally. Post-territorial defeat in 2019, ISIS affiliates sustain Qutbist militancy in residual insurgencies, such as ISIS-Khorasan Province's 2021 airport bombing killing 170, and expansions in Africa's via Islamic State in the Greater , where violence has intensified intercommunal clashes since 2017. Despite ideological schisms— critiquing ISIS's hasty as overly broad—both networks uphold Qutb's rejection of gradualist reform, prioritizing revolutionary violence that has claimed tens of thousands of lives in these theaters since 2010.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Theological Rejections by Sunni Orthodox Scholars

Sunni orthodox scholars, particularly those adhering to the Salafi tradition and institutions like Al-Azhar University, have issued theological critiques of Qutbism primarily for its expansive application of takfir (declaration of apostasy) and its characterization of modern Muslim societies as jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance), which they argue deviates from established Sunni jurisprudence. In traditional Sunni doctrine, takfir is restricted to clear, individual acts of apostasy adjudicated by qualified scholars, not broadly applied to entire societies or rulers maintaining nominal adherence to Islam; Qutb's framework, as outlined in Milestones (1964), effectively permits vigilante judgments, echoing Kharijite extremism rejected in canonical texts like those of Ibn Taymiyyah. Scholars such as Abdul Aziz ibn Baz emphasized that such views undermine the unity of the ummah and contradict Quranic injunctions against division among believers (e.g., Quran 3:103). A core rejection centers on Qutb's portrayal of early Muslim figures, including Companions like Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan and , as exemplars of hypocrisy and treachery in his tafsir , which orthodox scholars view as slander (jarh) against the sahaba, whose integrity is affirmed in Sunni creed via hadiths such as Sahih al-Bukhari's narration on their collective virtue. Ibn Baz explicitly refuted these claims, arguing they introduce (innovation) by prioritizing modern political grievances over textual reverence for the al-salih (righteous predecessors). Similarly, Rabee ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, in works like his refutation of Qutb's , critiqued the for promoting khurooj ( against rulers) without fulfilling strict Shariah conditions, such as manifest kufr and absence of alternatives, thereby fostering fitnah (strife) prohibited in fatwas from Saudi Arabia's Permanent for Scholarly Research and Ifta. Al-Azhar's Grand Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyib has condemned takfir as a "danger" that fragments the community, aligning with broader orthodox Sunni positions against Qutbist-inspired groups by insisting on (consensus) that Muslim governance, even flawed, retains legitimacy under siyasah shar'iyyah (Shariah-compliant policy) rather than warranting revolutionary vanguards. These critiques underscore Qutbism's departure from athari creed, which prioritizes textual literalism without the interpretive liberties Qutb employed to justify offensive against perceived internal enemies, a stance echoed in historical fatwas against similar Murji'ite or Jahmi extremes. Orthodox scholars maintain that reform occurs through and (God-consciousness), not the coercive hizbiyyah (partisanship) Qutb advocated, preserving the madhabs' emphasis on patience amid trials as in the era of the rightly guided caliphs.

Disputes from Moderate Islamists and Brotherhood Faction

Moderate Islamists and factions within the have contested core tenets of Qutbism, particularly its expansive doctrine of —declaring contemporary Muslim societies as pagan-like and their rulers as apostates subject to (excommunication)—arguing that such views foster intra-Muslim violence and deviate from orthodox Sunni . Hasan al-Hudaybi, the 's Supreme Guide from 1951 to 1973, articulated this rejection in his 1969 treatise Du'at, la Qudat 'ala al-Nas (Preachers, Not Judges over People), written as a direct counter to Qutb's Milestones (1964), which advocated a revolutionary vanguard to overthrow "jahili" regimes through . Hudaybi maintained that only God judges faith, prohibiting Muslims from fellow believers without clear proof of apostasy, and emphasized da'wa (peaceful propagation) over violent overthrow, warning that Qutb's approach risked fitna (civil strife) and echoed Kharijite extremism historically condemned in Sunni tradition. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Brotherhood-affiliated scholar who advocated wasatiyya (centrism) as an alternative to extremism, further critiqued Qutb's takfir in analyses of Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an), noting that Qutb's blanket excommunication of Muslim societies for insufficient implementation of sharia ignored nuances in Islamic jurisprudence and fueled destructive revolutions rather than reform. Al-Qaradawi explicitly denied in 2009 that the Brotherhood followed Qutb's path, positioning the group as committed to participatory politics and electoral engagement over Qutbist insurrection, a stance he reiterated amid post-Arab Spring debates on democratic legitimacy within Islam. This critique aligns with al-Qaradawi's broader rejection of Qutb's dismissal of democracy as inherently un-Islamic, viewing it instead as a tool compatible with sharia when advancing public welfare. These disputes reflect a strategic pivot by Brotherhood leadership post-Qutb's 1966 execution, amid Nasser's crackdowns, to preserve organizational survival by renouncing radicalism; internal documents and statements from the onward prioritized societal reform through and alliances over Qutb's confrontational , which they saw as precipitating the very persecutions that decimated early membership. Moderate Islamists, including figures like al-Qaradawi, have sustained this line by promoting (independent reasoning) within established madhhabs (schools of law), rejecting Qutb's ahistorical rupture with Islamic precedent as a (innovation) that alienated potential allies and justified against Muslim states.

Secular and Western Analyses of Failures and Dangers

Secular and Western analysts, drawing on political and historical precedents, have frequently likened Qutbism to totalitarian ideologies such as and due to its binary worldview, rejection of pluralism, and endorsement of revolutionary violence to eradicate perceived jahiliyyah (ignorance). Dale C. Eikmeier, in a U.S. Army War College analysis, describes Qutbism as "Islamic-fascism," arguing that it synthesizes earlier Islamist thought with Qutb's doctrines to legitimize armed not merely for defense but for global domination under a divinely mandated , fostering a perpetual state of conflict incompatible with stable international order. This framework, Eikmeier contends, prioritizes ideological purity over pragmatic , mirroring fascist cults of action and myth over rational discourse. A core danger identified in these critiques is Qutbism's expansive application of , which declares vast swaths of Muslims and all non-Islamic societies as apostate, authorizing indiscriminate violence and eroding communal cohesion within . Paul , in examining Qutb's Milestones, portrays this as a of against , where compromise with secular systems equates to betrayal, directly inspiring al-Qaeda's operational doctrine and events like the , 2001, attacks, which killed 2,977 people and aimed to provoke a . further warns that Qutb's exaltation of martyrdom over life creates a "cult of death," psychologically unhinging adherents from empirical reality and incentivizing suicidal tactics that amplify terrorism's asymmetric threat to open societies. Such analyses highlight how Qutbism's causal logic—positing divine sovereignty as nullifying human laws—logically extends to targeting civilians, , and allies, as evidenced by al-Qaeda's 1998 against U.S. citizens. In practice, Qutbist-inspired movements have demonstrated profound failures in and , often collapsing under the weight of internal purges, economic isolation, and military overreach. The Islamic State's self-proclaimed , explicitly drawing on Qutb's and to justify territorial conquests from 2014 to 2019, controlled up to 100,000 square kilometers at its peak but disintegrated due to hyper-sectarian , governance paralysis from endless ideological vetting, and inability to foster innovation or trade beyond , ultimately losing all territory by March 2019 amid airstrikes and local revolts. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood's brief rule in from June 2012 to July 2013, influenced by Qutbist radicals within its ranks, faltered through exclusionary policies, (with GDP growth slowing to 2.2% in 2013 amid fuel and currency crises), and suppression of dissent, culminating in mass protests by millions and military ouster on July 3, 2013. Western observers attribute these outcomes to Qutbism's rejection of adaptive institutions, leading to authoritarian rigidity that alienates populations and invites counter-reaction, as seen in the Taliban's post-2021 Afghan plagued by and emigration despite ideological purity. Empirically, no Qutbist entity has achieved long-term viability, underscoring the ideology's causal flaw: absolutist prescriptions ill-suited to complex, interdependent global systems.

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  20. https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/3F/3F56ACA473044436B4C1740F65D5C3B6_Sayyid_Qutb_-_The_America_I_Have_Seen.pdf
  21. https://staging.japanhouse.illinois.edu/libweb/gA0BVU/126905/Social%2520Justice%2520In%2520Islam%2520Sayyid%2520Qutb.pdf
  22. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/wests-lessons-in-decadence-fuel-the-making-of-a-martyr/178385.article
  23. https://learninglink.oup.com/access/content/ramgotra-choat1e-resources/ramgotra-choat1e-key-thinker-sayyid-qutb
  24. https://www.hudson.org/human-rights/a-history-of-hatred-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-anti-semitism
  25. https://isgap.org/flashpoint/the-muslim-brotherhood-and-the-evolution-of-jihadist-antisemitism/
  26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42896347
  27. https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/MILESTONES.pdf
  28. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41719859
  29. https://academic.oup.com/book/11603/chapter/160467805
  30. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/05/the-muslim-brotherhoods-and-egypts-qutb-conundrum?lang=en
  31. https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2015/bulletin_e2015_6.pdf
  32. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/surviving-repression-how-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-has-carried-on?lang=en
  33. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/prison-talk-the-muslim-brotherhoods-internal-struggle-during-gamal-abdel-nassers-persecution-1954-to-1971/416F231151DDF9B02C7CD82E4FDA9B92
  34. https://sites.evergreen.edu/contested/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2014/10/Terrorism-and-Martyrdom-Powerpoint.pdf
  35. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D301-PURL-LPS67656/pdf/GOVPUB-D301-PURL-LPS67656.pdf
  36. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/egyptian-islamic-jihad
  37. https://thesoufancenter.org/tsg-intelbrief-the-lasting-legacy-of-sayyid-qutb/
  38. https://usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP66-Global-Insurgency-and-Salafi-Jihad-Movement.pdf
  39. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-ideology-strategy
  40. https://policyexchange.org.uk/blogs/ayman-al-zawahiri-got-the-death-he-deserved/
  41. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3
  42. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2725&context=parameters
  43. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/yemen-major-staging-base-for-al-qaeda/
  44. https://www.mei.edu/publications/schism-jihadism-sahel-how-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state-are-battling-legitimacy-sahelian
  45. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf
  46. http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=ndv01&articleID=NDV010007&articlePages=1
  47. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odYfLFCmwqY
  48. http://www.themadkhalis.com/md/articles/pidmx-shaykh-bin-baaz-on-sayyid-qutbs-attacks-upon-muawiyah-and-amr-ibn-al-aas-and-accusing-them-of-hypocrisy-and-treachery.cfm
  49. https://ejournal.um.edu.my/index.php/JUD/article/download/46517/17168/144300
  50. https://azhar.eg/en/Articles/Observatory/ArtMID/10868/ArticleID/2029/Danger-of-Takfir
  51. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/contextualizing-jihad-and-takfir-sunni-conceptual-framework
  52. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2070&context=etds
  53. https://academic.oup.com/book/6222/chapter/149865243
  54. https://www.dialogueacrossborders.com/en/year-2009/week-34/5-dr-yusuf-al-qaradawi-those-who-read-fi-zilal-al-qur%25E2%2580%2599-under-auspices-qur%25E2%2580%2599-sayyid?qt-articles=1
  55. https://www.globalmbwatch.com/2009/08/17/qaradawi-says-muslim-brotherhood-not-following-qutb/
  56. https://www.newageislam.com/islamterrorism-jihad/grace-mubashir-new-age-islam/a-critical-refutation-sayyid-qutbs-concept-hakimiyya-errors-misinterpretations-its-impact/d/134431
  57. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol37/iss1/4/
  58. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6247585.pdf
  59. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2014/07/the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhoods-failures?lang=en
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