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Islamic Government (Persian: حکومت اسلامی, romanized: Ḥokūmat-i Eslāmī),[2] or Islamic Government: Jurist's Guardianship (Persian: حکومت اسلامی ولایت فقیه, romanized: Ḥokūmat-i Eslāmī Wilāyat-i Faqīh)[3] is a book by the Iranian cleric, Islamic jurist and revolutionary, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. First published in 1970, it is perhaps the most influential document written in modern times in support of theocratic rule.

The book argues that government should be run in accordance with traditional Islamic law (sharia), and for this to happen, a leading Islamic jurist (faqīh) must provide political "guardianship" (wilayat in Arabic, velāyat in Persian) over the people and nation. Following the Iranian Revolution, a modified form of this doctrine was incorporated into the 1979 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran.[4] Drafted by an assembly made up primarily of disciples of Khomeini, it stipulated that he would be the first faqih "guardian" (Vali-ye faqih) or "Supreme Leader" of Iran.[5]

History

[edit]

From January 21 to February 8, 1970, while in exile in Iraq in the holy city of Najaf, Khomeini gave a series of 19 lectures on Islamic Government to a group of his students. Notes of the lectures were soon made into a book that appeared under three different titles:

  • The Islamic Government,
  • Authority of the Jurist, and
  • A Letter from Imam Musavi Kashef al-Qita (titled to evade Iranian censorship).[6]

The book was smuggled into Iran and widely distributed to supporters of Khomeini before the revolution.[7]

Controversy surrounds how much of the book's success came from its persuasiveness, religiosity, etc., and how much from the success of the political movement of the author (Khomeini), who is generally considered to have been the "undisputed" leader of the Iranian revolution.[8][9]

Many observers of the revolution maintain that while the book was distributed to Khomeini's core supporters in Iran, Khomeini and his aides were careful not to publicize the book or the idea of wilayat al-faqih to outsiders,[10][11] knowing that groups crucial to the revolution's success—secular and Islamic modernist Iranians—were under the impression that the revolution was being fought for democracy, not theocracy. It was only when Khomeini's core supporters had consolidated their hold on power that wilayat al-faqih was made known to the general public and written into the country's new Islamic constitution.[12]

The book has been translated into several languages including French, Arabic, Turkish and Urdu.[2] The English translation that is most commonly found, considered to be the "only reliable" translation",[13] and that is approved by the Iranian government, is that of Hamid Algar, an English-born convert to Islam, scholar of Iran and the Middle East, and supporter of Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution.[14] It is available online,[15] and can be found in Algar's book Islam and Revolution, and in a stand-alone edition published in Iran by the "Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works",[16] which was also published by Alhoda UK.[17]

The one other English language edition of the book, also titled Islamic Government, is a stand-alone edition, translated by the U.S. government's Joint Publications Research Service. Algar considers this translation inferior to his own—being "crude" and "unreliable" and based on the Arabic translation rather than the original Persian—and claims its publication by Manor Books is "vulgar" and "sensational" in its attacks on the Ayatollah Khomeini.[18] (Whether the original language of the Islamic Government lectures was Persian or Arabic is disputed.)[13]

Contents

[edit]

Scope

[edit]

Khomeini and his supporters before the revolution were from Iran, his movement was focused on Iran, and most of his criticisms of non-Islamic government refer to the imperial government of Iran that he sought to overthrow. However, Khomeini made it clear that Islamic government was (eventually) to be universal, not limited to a single Islamic country or even to the Muslim world.[19] According to Khomeini, this would not be that difficult because if Islamic government is established, "none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate".[19]

Importance of Islamic Government

[edit]

Protecting religion

[edit]

Without a leader to serve the people as "a vigilant trustee", enforcing law and order, Islam would fall victim "to obsolescence and decay", its "rites and institutions", "customs and ordinances" disappearing or mutating as "heretical innovators", "atheists and unbelievers" subtracted and added doctrines and practices.[20]

Providing justice

[edit]

Khomeini believed that the need for governance of the faqih has "little need of demonstration, and is obvious" to good Muslims. "Anyone" with "some general awareness" of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam would "unhesitatingly give his assent" to the principle of the governance of the faqih "as soon as he encounters it."[21]

Nonetheless he provides several reasons why Islamic government is necessary:

  • to prevent encroachment by "oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak," and the plundering and corrupting of the people for the sake of "pleasure and material interest";[22]
  • to prevent "innovation" (bid'ah) in Islamic law and the legislating of "anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments";[22]
  • to preserve "the Islamic order" and keep all individuals on "the just path of Islam without any deviation";[22]
  • to "reverse" the decline of Islam brought about by the absence of "executive power" in the hands of "just fuqaha ... in the land inhabited by Muslims";[23]
  • and to destroy "the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands".[22][note 1]

The operation of Islamic government is superior to non-Islamic government in many ways. Khomeini sometimes compares it to (allegedly) un-Islamic governments in general throughout the Muslim world and more often contrasts it specifically with the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—though he never mentions the Shah by name.

Compared to the justice, impartiality, thrift, self-denial, and general virtue of the early leaders of Islam we know of from literature passed down over 1000 years, "Non-Islamic" government:

  • is mired in red tape thanks to "superfluous bureaucracies";[24]
  • suffers from "reckless" spending, and "constant embezzlement", in the case of Iran, forcing it to seek foreign aid or loans from abroad, and in so doing, "bow in submission" before America and Britain;[24]
  • has excessively harsh punishments (such as capital punishment for the possession of small amounts of heroin);[25]
  • creates an "unjust economic order" which divides the people "into two groups: oppressors and oppressed";[26]
  • does not "truly belong to the people", though it may be made up of elected representatives.[27]

While some might think the complexity of the modern world would move the Muslims of 1970 to learn from countries that have modernized ahead of them, and even borrow laws from them, this is not only un-Islamic but also entirely unnecessary. The laws of God (sharia), cover "all human affairs ... There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm."[28] As a result, Islamic government will be much easier to establish than some might think.

"The entire system of government and administration, together with necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. ... Everything is ready and waiting."[29]

For this reason, Khomeini declines "to go into details" on such things as "how the penal provisions of the law are to be implemented".[30]

Required by Islam

[edit]

In addition to the reasons above on why the guardianship of the jurist is superior to secular non-Islamic government, Khomeini also gives much space to doctrinal reasons that (he argues) establish proof that the rule of jurists is required by Islam.

No sacred texts of Shia (or Sunni) Islam include a straightforward statement that the Muslim community should be ruled over by Islamic jurists or Islamic scholars.[31] Traditionally, Shia Islam follows a pivotal Shi'i hadith where Muhammad passed down his power to command Muslims to his cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first of twelve descendants of Ali who are the"Imams" Twelve Shi'i Islam. This line of descendants were the legitimate rulers of Islam, though never in a position to actually rule, and the line stopped with the occultation (disappearance) of the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, in 939 CE (see: Muhammad al-Mahdi#Birth and early life according to Twelver Shi'a). While waiting for the reappearance of that Twelfth Imam, Shia jurists have tended to stick to one of three approaches to the state: cooperating with it, trying to influence policies by becoming active in politics, or most commonly, remaining aloof from it.[32][note 2]

In contrast, Khomeini insists there are "numerous traditions [hadith] that indicate the scholars of Islam are to exercise rule during the Occultation",[34] and tries to prove this by explicating several Quranic verses and hadith of the Shi'a Imams. The first proof he offers is an analysis of a saying attributed to the first Imam, 'Ali, who in addressing a well-connected judge he considered corrupt,[35] said:

'The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch.'[34]

While this might sound like ʿAli is simply remonstrating against the judge who had exceeded his authority and sinned, Khomeini reasons that hadith's use of the term judge must refer to a trained jurist (fuqaha), as the "function of a judge belongs to just fuqaha [plural for faqih]" ',[36] and since trained jurists are neither sinful wretches nor prophets, "we deduce from the tradition quoted above that the fuqaha are the legatees";[37] and since legatees of Muhammad, such as Imams, have the same power to command and rule Muslims as Muhammad did, it is therefore demonstrated that the saying, `The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch,` proves that Islamic jurists are the rightful rulers of Muslims and others.

Other examples the follow include:

  • "Obey those among you who have authority" (Q.4:59)

(the "authorities" in the verse referring to religious judges according to Khomeini).[38]

  • Combining two hadith of Ali:
    • "those who transmit my statements and my traditions and teach them to the people" (which must mean, according to Khomeini, trained Islamic legal scholars) are my successors;
    • "all believers" should obey my successors",
indicates to Khomeini that Ali's transmitters are jurists, and so are his successors, and so must be obeyed.
  • The Seventh Imam had praised religious judges as "the fortress of Islam",[38] which indicates not just that the fuqaha generally serve to strengthen the religion, but must mean that they are entrusted with preserving Islam, which means they have an active social role, (according to Khomeini).[39]
  • The twelfth Imam had preached that future generations should obey those who knew his teachings, since those people were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God's representative among believers.[38] This must mean that the ulama are not only "the point of reference" for points of Islamic law but also for "contemporary social problems", according to Khomeini.[39]
  • The Sixth Imam said: "The ulama are the heirs of the prophets. The prophets did not leave a single dinar or dirham for an inheritance. Rather they left knowledge as an inheritance and whosoever takes from it, has taken an abundant share". Khomeini interprets this to mean that the ulama have not only inherited knowledge from the prophets, but also "the Prophets' authority" to rule.[40]
  • God had created sharia to guide the Islamic community (ummah), the state to implement sharia, and faqih to understand and implement sharia.[38]

Not only is the rule of Islamic jurists and obedience toward them an obligation of Islam, it is as important a religious obligation as any a Muslim has. Obedience to holders of authority like Islamic jurists "is actually an expression of obedience to God."[41] Preserving Islam "is more necessary even than prayer and fasting"[42] and (Khomeini argues) without Islamic government, Islam cannot be preserved.

It is also the duty of Muslims to "destroy ... all traces" of any other sort of government other than true Islamic governance, because these are "systems of unbelief".[43]

Islamic Government

[edit]

The basis of Islamic government is said to be justice, which is defined as following sharia (Islamic law) exclusively.[31] Therefore, the theory goes, those holding government posts should have extensive knowledge of sharia (Islamic jurists being trained in sharia are such people), and the country's ruler should be a faqih[note 3] who "surpasses all others in knowledge" of Islamic law and justice[45] — known as a marja`—as well as having intelligence and administrative ability.

While this faqih rules, it might be said that the ruler is actually sharia law itself because, "the law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger [Muhammad] and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity ... "[27]

The governance of the faqih is equivalent to "the appointment of a guardian for a minor." Just as God is said to have established Muhammad as the "leader and ruler" of early Muslims, "making obedience to him obligatory", so, to (Khomeini argues), "the fuqaha (plural of faqih) must be leaders and rulers" over Muslims today.[46] Some Muslims may hesitate to put Islamic jurists on the same level as Muhammad and the Imams, but Khomeini explains while the "spiritual virtues" and "status" of Muhammad and the Imams are considered greater than those of contemporary faqih, their power is not, because Muhammad and the Imam's virtue "does not confer increased governmental powers".[47]

Khomeini states that Islamic government "truly belongs to the people", not in the sense of being made up of representatives chosen by the people through a free election, but because it enforces Islamic laws recognized by Muslims as "worthy of obedience'.[27] It is "not constitutional in the current sense of word, i.e., based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority" with executive, legislative and judicial branches of government; in an Islamic government he says the legislative assembly has been replaced by "a simple planning body" a legislature being unnecessary because "no one has the right to legislate" except "the Divine Legislator",[27] and God has already provided all the laws anyone needs in the sharia.[29][note 4]

Islamic government raises revenue "on the basis of the taxes that Islam has established", namely khums (a 20% tax on commercial profits), zakat (a tithe of 2.5%), jizya (a tax on non-Muslims), and kharaj (a tax on land owned by non-Muslims).[50] [note 5] This will be plenty because khums is a "huge source of income".[51]

Islamic Government, says Khomeini, will be just but also unsparing with "troublesome" groups that cause "corruption" in Muslim society, and damage "Islam and the Islamic state," giving the example of Muhammad, who killed the men of the Bani Qurayza tribe and enslaved the women and children after the tribe collaborated with Muhammad's enemies and then refused to convert to Islam.[52][53]

Khomeini says that Islamic government will follow 'Ali, whose seat of command was simply the corner of a mosque,[54] threatened to have his daughter's hand cut off if she did not pay back a loan from the treasury,[55] and who "lived more frugally than the most impoverished of our students".[56] The government will follow in the foot steps of "victorious and triumphant" armies of early Muslims who set "out from the mosque to go into battle" and feared "only God".[57] They will follow the Quranic command: "prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered" (Quran 8:60). In fact, (Khomeini says), "if the form of government willed by Islam were to come into being, none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate".[19]

Why has Islamic Government not been established?

[edit]

Western conspiracies

[edit]

If the need for governance of the faqih is obvious to "anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam", why has it not yet been established? Khomeini spends a large part of his book explaining why.[21]

The "historical roots" of the opposition are Western unbelievers who want

"to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands and our human resources. They want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be trapped in their misery ... they and their agents wish to go on living in huge palaces and enjoying lives of abominable luxury.[58]

Foreign experts have studied our country and have discovered all our mineral reserves -- gold, copper, petroleum, and so on. They have also made an assessment of our people's intelligence and come to the conclusion that the only barrier blocking their way are Islam and the religious leadership."[59]

These Westerners "have known the power of Islam themselves for it once ruled part of Europe, and ... know that true Islam is opposed to their activities."[60] Westerns have set about deceiving Muslims, using their native "agents" to spread the falsehood that "Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition".[61] Planning to promote the vices of fornication, alcohol drinking and charging interest on loans "in the Islamic world", Westerners have led Muslims to believe that "Islam has laid down no laws" against these practices.[62] Ignorance has reached such a state that when "Islam commands its followers to engage in warfare or defense in order to make men submit to laws that are beneficial for them and kills a few corrupt people", naive people ask why such violence is necessary.[58]

The enemies of Islam target the vulnerable young: "The agents of imperialism are busy in every corner of the Islamic world drawing our youth away from us with their evil propaganda."[63]

British and Jews

[edit]

This imperialist attack on Islam is not some ad hoc tactic to assist the imperial pursuit of power or profit, but an elaborate, 300-year-long plan.

"The British imperialists penetrated the countries of the East more than 300 years ago. Being knowledgeable about all aspects of these countries, they drew up elaborate plans for assuming control of them."[64]

In addition to the British there are the Jews:

"From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present.[65]

We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world."[63]

Local non-Muslims

[edit]

While the main danger of unbelievers comes from foreign (European and American) imperialists, non-Muslims in Iran and other Muslim countries pose a danger too,

"centers of evil propaganda run by the churches, the Zionists, and the Baha'is in order to lead our people astray and make them abandon the ordinances and teaching of Islam ... These centers must be destroyed."[66]

Clerical enemies

[edit]

The imperialist war against Islam has even penetrated, (in Khomeini's view), the seminaries where the scholars of Islam are trained. There, Khomeini notes, "If someone wishes to speak about Islamic government and the establishment of the Islamic government, he must observe the principles of taqiyya, [i.e. dissimulation, the permission to lie when one's life is in danger or in defence of Islam], and count upon the opposition of those who have sold themselves to imperialism".[58] If these "pseudo-saints do not wake up" Khomeini threatens, "we will adopt a different attitude toward them."[67] As for those clerics who serve the government, "they do not need to be beaten much," but "our youths must strip them of their turbans."[68]

Influences

[edit]

Traditional Islamic

[edit]

Khomeini himself claims Mirza Hasan Shirazi (1815-1895), Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, Kashif al-Ghita,[30] as clerics preceding him who made what were "in effect"[30] "governmental rulings" (Mirza Hasan Shirazi called for a boycott of tobacco in protest of a concession to the British), thus establishing de facto Islamic Government by Islamic jurists. Some credit "earlier notions of political and juridical authority" in Iran's Safavid period. Khomeini is said to have cited nineteenth-century Shi'i jurist Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829) and Shaikh Muhammad Hussain Naini (d. 1936) as authorities who held a similar view to himself on the political role of the ulama.[31][69] An older influence is Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, and his book, The Principles of the People of the Virtuous City, (al-madina[t] al-fadila,[note 6] which has been called "a Muslim version of Plato's Republic").[70]

Another influence is said to be Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, a cleric and author of books on developing Islamic alternatives to capitalism and socialism, whom Khomeini met in Najaf.[71][note 7]

Non-traditional and non-Islamic

[edit]

Other observers credit the "Islamic Left," specifically Ali Shariati, as the origin of important concepts of Khomeini's Waliyat al-faqih, particularly the abolition of monarchy and the idea that an "economic order" has divided the people "into two groups: oppressors and oppressed."[26][72][73] The Confederation of Iranian Students in Exile and the famous pamphlet Gharbzadegi by the ex-Tudeh writer Jalal Al-e-Ahmad are also thought to have influenced Khomeini.[74] This is in spite of the fact that Khomeini loathed Marxism in general,[75] and Shariati harshly criticized the traditional Shia clergy for (allegedly) standing in the way of the revolutionary potential of the Shi'a masses.[76] Khomeini reference to governments based on constitutions, divided into three branches, and containing planning agencies, also belie a strict adherence to precedents set by the rule of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali, 1400 years ago.[77][78]

Scholar Vali Nasr believes the ideal of an Islamic government ruled by the ulama "relied heavily" on Greek philosopher Plato's book The Republic, and its vision of "a specially educated `guardian` class led by a `philosopher-king`".[79]

Reception

[edit]

Doctrinal

[edit]

Velayat-e Faqih has been praised (by American academic Hamid Dabashi) as a "masterful construction of a relentless argument, supported by the most sacred canonical sources of Shi'i Islam ..."[80]

The response from high-level Shi'a religious scholars to Velayat-e Faqih was far less positive. Of the dozen Shia Grand Ayatollahs alive at the time of the Iranian Revolution, only one besides Khomeini — Hussein-Ali Montazeri — approved of Khomeini's concept. (He would later disavow it entirely in 1988.)[81][note 8] When Khomeini died in 1989, the Assembly of Experts of Iran felt compelled to amend the constitution to remove the requirement that his successor as Supreme Leader be one of jurists who surpass "all others in knowledge" of Islamic law and justice[45] -- i.e. one of the Marja' mentioned above), because all the senior Shi'i jurists "distrusted their version of Islam".[82] [note 9] Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qassim Khoei, the leading Shia ayatollah at the time the book was published, rejected Khomeini's argument on the grounds that

  • The authority of faqih — is limited to the guardianship of widows and orphans — could not be extended by human beings to the political sphere.
  • In the absence of the Hidden Imam (the 12th and last Shi'a Imam), the authority of jurisprudence was not the preserve of one or a few fuqaha.[84]

Another prominent Shi'i cleric who went on record about the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih was the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon -- "widely seen as the 'godfather'" of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, and one of only three Shia Maraji of Lebanon before he died in 2010. Despite having initially supported the Iranian Revolution, Fadlallah criticized what he saw as the absolute power the Iranian clergy ruled with,[85] and called for a system of checks and balances that would prevent the scholars from becoming dictators.[85] In a 2009 interview, he stated "without hesitation":

I don't believe that Welayat al-Faqih has any role in Lebanon. Perhaps some Lebanese commit themselves to the policy of the Guardian Jurist, as some of them commit themselves to the policy of the Vatican [Lebanon's large Maronite community is Catholic]. My opinion is that I don't see the Guardianship of the Jurist as the definitive Islamic regime.[86][87]

Khomeini cited two earlier clerical authorities — Mulla Ahmad Naraqi and Shaikh Muhammad Hussain Naini (mentioned above) — as holding similar views to himself on the importance of the ulama holding political power, but neither made "it the central theme of their political theory as Khomeini does," although they may have hinted "at this in their writings",[31] according to Baháʼí scholar of Shia Islam, Moojan Momen. Momen also argues that the hadith Khomeini quotes in support of his concept of velayat-e faqih, either have "a potential ambiguity which makes the meaning controversial," or are considered `weak` (da'if) by virtue of their chain of transmitters.[88]

In a religion where innovation (bid'ah) is a menace to be constantly on guard for, Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian writes that Khomeini's ideas "broke sharply" from Shi'i traditions.[89] Discussion/debate had gone on and off for "eleven centuries" over what approach Shi'a should take towards the state—aloofness or some kind of cooperation varying from grudging compliance to obedience.[32][33] But until the appearance of Khomeini's book, "no Shi'i writer ever explicitly contended that monarchies per se were illegitimate or that the senior clergy had the authority to control the state."[90] Khomeini himself had adopted the traditional Shia attitude of refraining from criticizing the monarch (let alone calling him illegitimate) for much of his career, and even after bitterly attacking Muhammad Reza Shah in the mid-1960s, didn't attack the monarchy as such until his lectures on Islamic Government in 1970.[91] Though Islamic Government implicitly threatened clerical opponents of rule by faqih, for decades before, Khomeini had been "extremely close", (serving as the teaching assistant and personal secretary), to Hossein Borujerdi, the premier Shia cleric of his age, known for being conservative and "highly apolitical".[92] Scholar of Islam Vali Nasr describes Khomeini's concept as reducing Shi'ism "to a strange (and as it would turn out violent) parody of Plato".[79]

Functional

[edit]

Islamic Government is criticized on utilitarian (as opposed to religious) grounds, by those who argue that Islamic government as established in Iran by Khomeini has simply not done what Khomeini said Islamic government by jurists would do.[93] The goals of ending poverty,[note 10] corruption, [note 11] national debt,[note 12] harsh punishments,[note 13] or compelling all other governments to surrender before the armies of the Islamic government,[note 14] have not been met. But even more modest and basic goals like downsizing the government bureaucracy,[note 15][101] using only senior religious jurists or marjas for the post of faqih guardian/Supreme Leader,[102][note 16] or implementing sharia law and protecting it from innovation,[104] have eluded the regime. While Khomeini promised, "the entire system of government and administration, together with the necessary laws, lies ready for you.... Islam has established them all,"[105] once in power Islamists found many frustrations in their attempts to implement the sharia, complaining that there were "many questions, laws and operational regulations ... that received no mention in the shari'a."[note 17] Disputes within the Islamic Government compelled Khomeini himself to proclaim in January 1988 that the interests of the Islamic state outranked "all secondary ordinances" of Islam, even "prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage."[107]

Other complaints

When a campaign started to install velayat-e faqih in the new Iranian constitution, critics complained that Khomeini had made no mention of velayat-e faqih "in the proclamations he issued during the revolution",[108] that he had become the leader of the revolution promising to advise, rather than rule, the country after the Shah was overthrown, as late as 1978 while in Paris "he explicitly stated that rather than seeking or accepting any official government position, he would confine himself to the supervisory role of a guide in order to pursue the society's best interest",[109] when in fact he had developed his theory of rule by jurists rather than by democratic elections, and spread it among his followers years before the revolution started;[110] a complaint that some continue to make.[111] The severe loss of prestige for the fuqaha (Islamic jurists) as a result of dissatisfaction with the application of clerical rule in Iran has been noted by many.[112] "In the early 1980s, clerics were generally treated with elaborate courtesy. Nowadays [in 2002], clerics are sometimes insulted by schoolchildren and taxi drivers and they quite often put on normal clothes when venturing outside" the holy city of "Qom."[113][114] According to journalist David Hirst, the Islamist government in Iran

 has turned people in ever increasing numbers not only against the mullahs but also against Islam itself. The signs are everywhere, from the fall in attendance at religious schools to the way parents give pre-Islamic, Persian names to their children. If they are looking for authenticity, Iranians now chiefly find it in nationalism, not in religion.[115]

As of early October 2022, "women and men, Persians and minorities, students and workers" in Iran are said to be "united ... against the mullahs' rule",[116] to ”have made up their minds, ... they don't want reform, they want regime change".[117]

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Islamic Government

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Islamic government, in its modern doctrinal form known as Velayat-e Faqih or , is a theocratic system of rule developed by Ruhollah Khomeini, positing that a supreme Islamic jurist (faqih) assumes comprehensive authority over state affairs to implement () during the of the infallible Twelfth Imam in . This framework subordinates legislative, executive, and judicial branches to the jurist's oversight, deriving legitimacy from God's sovereignty rather than popular will alone, and mandates enforcement of Islamic ordinances on personal conduct, economy, and . Khomeini first systematized this theory in a series of 1970 lectures compiled as Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, arguing that clerical rule fulfills the prophetic mission of enjoining good and forbidding evil, rejecting secular governance as un-Islamic. The doctrine gained traction amid opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy, culminating in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established the Islamic Republic of Iran as its archetype. In Iran's structure, the Supreme Leader—initially Khomeini, succeeded by —wields veto power over elections, appoints key judicial and military officials, and commands the armed forces, while bodies like the Guardian Council vet laws and candidates for Islamic compatibility. This system has defined Iran's post-revolutionary identity, enabling rapid consolidation of clerical power and export of revolutionary ideology via proxies, yet it has sparked internal dissent over curtailed , gender segregation, and suppression of religious minorities, as evidenced by recurrent protests and executions for or . Externally, it has fueled geopolitical tensions through state-sponsored militancy and nuclear pursuits, contrasting with Sunni models of caliphal rule that emphasize communal consensus over juristic supremacy. While proponents credit it with preserving Islamic authenticity against Western influence, critics highlight its divergence from classical Islamic governance traditions, where jurists advised rather than ruled directly.

Historical Development

Formative Period in Early Islam

The migration of and his followers from to in 622 CE marked the establishment of the first Islamic polity, transforming a religious community into a structured political entity known as . In (then Yathrib), assumed leadership over Muslim emigrants (), local converts (Ansar), and allied Jewish tribes, resolving intertribal conflicts through arbitration and forging a unified defense against external threats. This period laid the groundwork for Islamic by integrating religious authority with tribal norms, emphasizing consultation () in decision-making and oaths of allegiance () to the leader. Central to this formative governance was the , a series of pacts drafted around 622 CE that outlined mutual obligations among approximately 10,000 inhabitants, including Muslims and non-Muslims. The document designated as the ultimate arbiter and military commander, while granting religious to Jewish tribes and imposing for security and blood money (diya) payments. It functioned less as a modern constitution and more as a confederation , promoting coexistence under Islamic oversight without fully subordinating non-Muslims, though enforcement relied on the Prophet's personal authority rather than codified institutions. Historical analyses confirm its role in stabilizing amid feuds, enabling military campaigns like the in 624 CE. Governance under emphasized direct prophetic rule, with the serving as the hub for judicial rulings, public welfare distribution via (obligatory alms), and consultative assemblies for warfare and policy. involved seeking advice from companions on matters such as expeditions, as seen in preparations for the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah in 628 CE, though final decisions rested with as recipient of divine revelation. oaths formalized loyalty, initially pledged individually to the Prophet and later collectively for unity. Economic administration included regulations and of slaves, fostering social cohesion without a formalized . Following Muhammad's death in 632 CE, the absence of a designated successor triggered the Saqifah assembly, where was selected as the first caliph through among key companions, securing from the community to avert () wars. This elective process underscored early Islamic emphasis on communal consensus over hereditary rule. Under the Caliphs— (632–634 CE), (634–644 CE), (644–656 CE), and (656–661 CE)—administrative structures expanded with conquests reaching Persia and by 651 CE. introduced the diwan registry for stipends from war booty (ghanima) and taxes like on non-Muslims, appointed merit-based governors (amirs), and divided provinces into districts with qadis for justice, establishing precedents for centralized yet decentralized rule accountable to sharia-derived principles. These innovations supported rapid territorial growth from 1.5 million to over 6 million square kilometers, prioritizing fiscal equity and military mobilization over monarchical pomp.

Medieval and Ottoman Eras

The (632–661 CE), comprising the first four caliphs— (r. 632–634), ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644), ibn Affan (r. 644–656), and ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–661)—established the foundational model of Islamic governance through consultative selection () among Muhammad's companions, prioritizing enforcement of Quranic injunctions and prophetic traditions in administration, judicial rulings, and military expansion. Caliphs directly oversaw provinces via appointed governors (amirs), maintained fiscal equity through (obligatory alms) collection and (poll tax on non-Muslims), and expanded the polity from Arabia to Persia, , and , conquering over 2.2 million square miles by 651 CE while integrating conquered populations under dhimmi protections. This era emphasized personal caliphal accountability, with instituting audits of officials and public consultations, though internal fitnas (civil strife), such as the and Ali's conflicts, exposed vulnerabilities in non-hereditary succession. The (661–750 CE), initiated by Muawiya I's hereditary claim from , centralized power through dynastic succession among descendants, deploying a professional bureaucracy with diwans (administrative departments) for taxation, correspondence, and military registers, which stabilized revenue from conquests yielding annual tributes exceeding 100 million dirhams by the 8th century. Governance fused Arab tribal hierarchies with Islamic legalism, appointing qadis (judges) to apply in personal and criminal matters while sultanic edicts regulated fiscal and administrative domains; expansion reached the Indus Valley and Iberia by 711 CE, but Arab favoritism and fiscal strains fueled Abbasid revolts, culminating in the in 750 CE. Under the (750–1258 CE), authority shifted to in 762 CE, incorporating Persian administrative expertise via viziers like the , who managed expansive diwans for finance (), post (barid), and land grants (), supporting a population of up to 1 million in the capital and fostering scholarly institutions like the for (jurisprudence) development. Caliphs delegated executive functions while claiming ultimate religious , with enforced through madhabs (legal schools) and muhtasibs (market inspectors), though de facto power eroded to military sultans like the Buyids by the , fragmenting the into regional dynasties while preserving titular Islamic legitimacy until the Mongol sack of in 1258 CE. The (c. 1299–1922 CE), originating as a ghazi principality in under , formalized Islamic governance by blending sultanic absolutism with caliphal claims after seized the title from the Mamluks in 1517 CE, ruling over 5.2 million square kilometers at its 1683 peak through a recruiting Christian youths for corps and administrative roles. Sultans issued kanun (customary decrees) supplementing , administered via the (imperial council) and provincial timars (fiefs), while the ulema's sheikh al-islam issued fatwas validating rule and the millet granted semi-autonomous governance to Jewish, Christian, and other non-Muslim communities under their religious leaders for , ensuring fiscal extraction via cizye while mitigating revolts. This hybrid structure sustained expansion into Europe and the but faced decline from the due to , military stagnation, and nationalist uprisings, with the persisting symbolically until its abolition by on March 3, 1924.

20th-Century Revival and Khomeini's Formulation

The 20th-century revival of Islamic government concepts arose amid the decline of colonial empires, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, and the rise of secular nationalist regimes in Muslim-majority countries, which many Islamists viewed as eroding religious authority and failing to deliver prosperity or justice. Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, sought to restore governance aligned with Sharia through grassroots organization, education, and political activism, rejecting Western-style democracy and socialism as incompatible with divine sovereignty. Similarly, Abul A'la Maududi in British India, later Pakistan, developed the idea of a "theodemocracy" in works like his 1932 book Khilafat wa Mulukiyat (Caliphate and Monarchy), arguing for a state where sovereignty belongs to God alone, enforced by jurists and pious rulers, influencing the founding of Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941. In the Shia context, this revival challenged traditional quietism, where clerics avoided direct political power during the of the Twelfth Imam. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, exiled from Iran in 1964 after opposing Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reforms, systematized the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) in a series of lectures delivered in , , from January to 1970. These lectures, transcribed and published as Hokumat-e Islami (Islamic Government) in the same year, posited that Islamic government is a divine mandate, not optional, requiring implementation of in all spheres—political, economic, judicial, and military—to achieve justice and prevent tyranny. Khomeini contended that, in the Imam's absence, authority devolves to the most learned and just faqih, who exercises velayat (guardianship) over all , including the power to appoint officials, declare war, collect taxes like khums and zakat, and override popular will if it contradicts Islamic rulings. Khomeini's formulation diverged from Sunni Islamist models by centralizing absolute power in a single rather than a consultative or elected assembly, drawing on Shiite juristic traditions but extending them innovatively to claim comprehensive sovereignty for the faqih as the 's deputy. He dismissed secular parliaments and monarchies as illegitimate innovations (), insisting that true Islamic rule revives the Muhammad's government and the Imams' authority, with non-compliance equating to . This theory, disseminated via smuggled tapes and pamphlets during the , mobilized opposition to the Pahlavi regime, framing the struggle as religious duty against "oppression" and Western . While critics, including some Shia scholars, argued it overreached traditional limits on clerical authority, Khomeini's personal and the 1979 Revolution's success embedded velayat-e faqih in Iran's 1979 constitution as the basis for the Supreme Leader's role.

Core Principles

Scriptural and Juristic Foundations

The Qur'an establishes divine sovereignty as the ultimate basis for authority, mandating human governance to align with God's commands rather than secular or popular will alone. Surah an-Nisa 4:59 instructs: "O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more enduring." This verse delineates a chain of obedience from God through the Prophet to appointed leaders (uli al-amr), interpreted by jurists as requiring rulers to enforce shari'a to maintain communal order and prevent anarchy. Similarly, Surah al-Ma'idah 5:44 declares: "And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers," equating deviation from divine law with kufr, taghut (iniquity), or fasiq (rebellion), thus framing legitimate rule as inseparable from judicial fidelity to revelation. These Medinan verses, revealed post-Hijra around 622–632 CE, reflect the transition from prophetic to post-prophetic leadership amid tribal conflicts, emphasizing referral of disputes to scriptural sources over arbitrary human edict. The of Prophet Muhammad complements Qur'anic principles by exemplifying governance through the Medinan polity, where he served as both spiritual and temporal head, implementing contracts like the (circa 622 CE) to unify tribes under Islamic norms. Hadiths authenticated in stress obedience to amirs (commanders or rulers) to preserve unity: "It is obligatory for you to listen to the ruler and obey him in what is not sinful," narrated from . Another narration warns of errant future leaders but counsels endurance: "There will be leaders who will not be led by my guidance... Stick to the ancient horizon," advising against rebellion absent direct sin commands, to avert fitna (discord) that could fracture as occurred post-prophetic succession disputes in 632 CE. These traditions, compiled in the CE by scholars like , prioritize stability under Muslim rule—even imperfect—over chaos, deriving from the Prophet's suppression of revolts and emphasis on collective welfare over individual grievance. Classical juristic thought, spanning Sunni and Shi'i schools, formalizes these texts into theories of rulership as a collective duty (fard kifayah) to safeguard religion, enforce (penal codes), collect , and wage if needed. Sunni scholars like Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi (d. 1058 CE) in Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah defined khilafah as contractual succession to the Prophet for temporal affairs, requiring the caliph's election by qualified elites (ahl al-hall wal-aqd) and personal piety to legitimize shari'a implementation, reflecting Abbasid-era pragmatism amid dynastic shifts. (d. 1111 CE) similarly viewed the (ruler) as essential for dar al-Islam's cohesion, permitting delegation to sultans if caliphs weakened, prioritizing de facto order over ideal form. In , jurists trace (guardianship) to Qur'an 4:59's uli al-amr as the Imams, extending it during the Twelfth Imam's occultation (since 874 CE) to fuqaha via hadiths like those in Wasail al-Shi'a, where al-Rida delegates judicial and executive authority to scholars versed in shari'a. This juristic continuum underscores causal realism: absent authoritative interpreters, shari'a devolves into subjective application, risking societal fragmentation as empirically seen in early fitnas (e.g., , 656 CE). Yet interpretations vary; some modern analysts note the texts' ambiguity on institutional specifics, allowing pragmatic adaptations like elective caliphates over hereditary ones, without prescribing per se.

Objectives: Justice, Sharia Implementation, and Sovereignty

In the doctrine of Islamic government, as articulated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in his 1970 treatise Hukumat-e Islami, sovereignty is vested exclusively in God, with human authority derived solely from the enforcement of divine law rather than popular will or secular mandate. This principle rejects man-made legislation, positioning the as a mechanism to actualize God's dominion through the guardianship of qualified jurists who interpret and apply without deviation from its core imperatives. Khomeini emphasized that any governance failing to uphold this divine sovereignty constitutes from Islam, underscoring the objective of restoring the ummah's unity under God's unassailable rule. The implementation of forms the foundational objective, extending to all domains of governance including penal codes, economic transactions, , and foreign policy, with the state obligated to enact fiqh-derived rulings to supplant pre-Islamic or colonial legal systems. Khomeini's framework mandates juristic oversight to ensure comprehensive enforcement, allowing temporary suspensions of certain penalties during the of the but prohibiting alterations to Sharia's substantive content. This objective aims to eradicate (tyrannical rule) and imperial influences, fostering a society where Islamic injunctions regulate conduct and resolve conflicts per prophetic precedent. Justice, conceived as 'adl—equitable adherence to divine precepts—represents a core , with the tasked to deliver , simplified resolutions to disputes via Sharia's evidentiary standards and punishments, as Khomeini described Islamic as prioritizing ease and over procedural complexity. Empirical application in post-1979 has involved codifying Sharia-based courts to address civil and criminal matters, though juristic discretion permits adaptations deemed necessary for public welfare, such as moratoriums on or until reinforced Islamic norms prevail. This pursuit integrates retributive, restorative, and preventive elements, aiming to deter vice and promote moral order under God's sovereignty.

Governance Structure: Velayat-e Faqih and Institutions

Velayat-e Faqih, or , posits that a qualified Shia (faqih) assumes comprehensive authority over the Muslim community during the of the Twelfth , encompassing political, judicial, and executive powers to enforce . This doctrine, systematized by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in his 1970 lectures compiled as Islamic Government, argues that such guardianship mirrors the Prophet Muhammad's and Imams' roles, rejecting secular governance as illegitimate. Implemented in Iran's 1979 , it evolved into Velayat-e Motlaqeh Faqih (Absolute Guardianship) by 1988, granting the Supreme Leader unrestricted authority derived from divine mandate rather than popular consent alone. The Supreme Leader, as Vali-ye Faqih, holds preeminent power, serving as of the armed forces, appointing the head, six Guardian Council clerics, and overseers of state broadcasting and . Article 110 of the delineates duties including determining general policies, supervising executive branches, declaring war or peace, and mobilizing forces, with the Leader's directives binding on all institutions. Elected for life by the Assembly of Experts unless dismissed for incapacity or violation of Islamic tenets, the position ensures clerical dominance, as seen with Khomeini's tenure from to and Khamenei's since 1989. Supporting institutions reinforce this structure: the Guardian Council, comprising twelve members (six jurists appointed by the Leader and six elected by parliament but approved by the Leader's appointees), vets electoral candidates for Islamic loyalty and reviews legislation for Sharia compliance, vetoing non-conforming bills. The Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of clerics elected every eight years, selects and monitors the Leader, though its supervisory role remains limited in practice. The Expediency Council, appointed by the Leader, arbitrates disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council, while the elected President and Majlis handle administrative and legislative functions subordinate to clerical oversight. This hybrid fuses republican elements with theocratic vetoes, prioritizing juristic guardianship over democratic majoritarianism.

Implementation and Case Studies

Iranian Islamic Republic Post-1979

The culminated on February 11, 1979, with the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy, following widespread protests against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule. Ayatollah , who had been exiled since 1964, returned to Iran on February 1, 1979, and assumed leadership of the provisional government. A national referendum held on March 30-31, 1979, approved the establishment of an , with official results reporting 98.2% approval from over 20 million voters. The new , ratified via referendum on December 2-3, 1979, enshrined the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (), vesting ultimate authority in a Supreme Leader qualified in Islamic to ensure governance aligns with Shia Islamic principles derived from the , , and juristic interpretation. Under this framework, Khomeini served as the first Supreme Leader from 1979 until his death on June 3, 1989, after which , previously president from 1981 to 1989, was appointed Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader holds extensive powers, including command of the armed forces, appointment of key judicial and military officials, , and oversight of state policies to prevent deviation from Islamic law. Elected institutions include the President, selected every four years in popular elections but subject to vetting by the ; the (), a unicameral parliament of 290 members that legislates but requires approval for bills to ensure compatibility with and the constitution; and the itself, comprising 12 jurists (six appointed by the Supreme Leader and six by the ) tasked with electoral supervision and legislative review. An Expediency Council mediates disputes between the and , further centralizing clerical influence. Domestically, the regime pursued rapid Islamization, implementing Sharia-based penal codes, mandatory for women by 1983, and purges of secular elements from institutions, including the execution of thousands of officials from the prior regime in 1979-1980. The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, initiated by 's invasion on September 22, 1980, solidified revolutionary ideology, resulting in over 500,000 Iranian military deaths and economic strain, yet reinforcing the narrative of anti-imperialist defense. records include mass extrajudicial executions in 1988, where authorities killed an estimated 4,000-5,000 political prisoners, primarily from the Mujahedin-e Khalq opposition group, following Khomeini's directive during a ceasefire with . Ongoing suppression features arbitrary detentions, in facilities like , and disqualification of reformist candidates by the Guardian Council, as seen in the 2004 parliamentary elections where over 2,000 aspirants were barred. Foreign policy emphasizes export of the revolution, hostility toward the —labeled the "Great Satan" since 1979—and support for Shia militias and proxies, including in (founded 1982 with Iranian backing) and in Gaza, via the (IRGC), established post-revolution to counter internal threats and project power. Iran provided training, funding, and weapons to these groups, contributing to regional conflicts such as the killing 241 U.S. personnel. Economically, real GDP growth averaged 4.6% annually from 1960-2002, but non-oil sectors stagnated under mismanagement and sanctions; U.S.-led sanctions from 2012-2015 reduced non-oil GDP growth to near zero, exacerbating inflation exceeding 30% in recent years and around 25%. Despite claims of and resistance to Western dominance, empirical outcomes include persistent corruption, as ranked 149th out of 180 in Transparency International's 2023 index, and brain drain, with over 1.5 million educated Iranians emigrating since 1979. Security has been maintained through IRGC dominance, but at the cost of internal dissent, including the 2009 Movement protests suppressed with hundreds killed and thousands arrested.

Other Attempts: Taliban Afghanistan and Comparisons

The Taliban established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996, implementing a governance model rooted in a strict interpretation of Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence influenced by Deobandi scholarship and Pashtun tribal codes (Pashtunwali), which emphasized direct application of Sharia without a formal constitution or elective institutions. Following their return to power on August 15, 2021, after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces, the regime reinstated this structure under Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, who holds absolute authority as Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), overseeing a prime minister (Hasan Akhund since 2021) and ministerial councils that enforce edicts via religious police and provincial governors. Unlike Iran's Velayat-e Faqih, which institutionalizes clerical oversight through elected bodies vetted by a Guardian Council, the Taliban's system lacks any participatory mechanisms, relying instead on consultative shuras (councils) of clerics and commanders, resulting in decentralized enforcement prone to local variations and tribal influences. In comparison to Iran's post-1979 , the 's model diverges fundamentally in sectarian foundations—Sunni Hanafi versus Twelver Shia—leading to differing emphases in application: the prioritize punishments (e.g., amputations for , documented in 1996–2001 and revived post-2021) and impose blanket bans on female and most employment since August 2021, affecting over 1 million girls by 2024, whereas Iran permits limited female access (about 60% of students) under male guardianship laws but with more bureaucratic integration into the . Both regimes claim through over popular will, yet Iran's hybrid system incorporates revenue from exports (averaging $50–70 billion annually pre-sanctions) to sustain welfare and institutions, contrasting with 's agrarian and opium-dependent , which contracted 20–30% in real GDP from 2021–2023 due to aid suspension and banking freezes, pushing 24 million people into acute by 2024. Iran's model has endured through alliances and nuclear negotiations, while the 's refusal of recognition (no state acknowledges it as of 2025) stems from its overt support for transnational jihadists and intra-Islamic sectarian tensions, including clashes with Shia . Empirically, the Taliban's implementation has prioritized territorial control and moral policing over institutional development, achieving relative internal stability by suppressing ISIS-K rivals (e.g., reducing attacks from 2021 peaks) but at the cost of systemic exclusion: women's public life is curtailed to domestic roles, with over 80 decrees since 2021 enforcing veiling and segregation, compared to Iran's gender segregation in public spaces but allowance for roles under ideological supervision. This absolutist approach, lacking Iran's clerical for jurisprudential , has yielded no economic diversification—agriculture shrank 10% post-2021—and heightened risks, underscoring causal links between rejection of modern and resource scarcity, unlike Iran's partial industrialization despite sanctions. Pragmatic bilateral ties with , focused on border security and water rights rather than ideological convergence, highlight mutual interests amid Sunni-Shia divides, with providing limited electricity and trade despite historical animosities.

Achievements and Functional Outcomes

Claims of Religious Protection and Anti-Imperialism

Proponents of Islamic government, particularly Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, assert that it serves as a bulwark against the erosion of Islamic doctrine by secularism and foreign cultural incursions, ensuring the comprehensive application of as a divine safeguard for religious integrity. In his 1970 treatise Islamic Government, Khomeini contended that imperialist agents propagate the falsehood that Islam lacks ordinances for governance and societal organization, thereby justifying secular alternatives that undermine faith; he positioned jurist-led rule (velayat-e faqih) as the mechanism to refute this by establishing a state where Islamic laws prevail unadulterated, protecting believers from "the impositions of ." This framework, implemented in after 1979, is claimed to preserve ritual practices, moral codes, and clerical authority against Western liberal influences, such as through mandatory veiling laws and of media deemed corrosive to piety, framed as defenses of communal religious identity rather than restrictions. Regarding anti-imperialism, advocates maintain that Islamic government embodies resistance to Western hegemony, exemplified by Iran's 1979 Revolution expelling U.S. military advisors and oil interests, which Khomeini decried as puppetry under the Shah that subordinated national sovereignty to foreign powers. The system's export of revolutionary ideals—via support for groups like Hezbollah since 1982 and Hamas— is presented as liberating oppressed Muslims from Zionist and U.S.-backed dominance, aligning with Khomeini's call for unity against oppressors who fragmented the Islamic ummah through colonial divisions post-World War I. Iran's adherence to a "neither East nor West" foreign policy, enshrined in its 1979 Constitution's Article 152, is cited as empirical proof of independence, enduring sanctions imposed after the 1979 hostage crisis and rejecting normalization with Israel, thereby modeling self-reliance for Muslim-majority states. These positions, rooted in Khomeini's anti-imperialist rhetoric tracing to 19th-century precedents like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, frame the regime as a vanguard halting cultural and economic colonization, though critics from within Islamic scholarship question the doctrinal basis for clerical overreach in temporal affairs.

Empirical Economic and Social Results

In the of Iran, established following the 1979 revolution, has significantly underperformed compared to the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi era. During 1962-1972, Iran's GDP expanded at over 10% annually, doubling , driven by oil revenues and modernization policies; post-1979, average annual real GDP growth from 1960-2002 was 4.6%, with per capita growth at only 2%, hampered by institutional disruptions, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), , and state-controlled inefficiencies. Over the subsequent four decades, rose by a factor of 1.5 in real terms, versus 3.2 times in the three decades prior, reflecting persistent reliance on oil (which accounted for most value added in 1978/79 but declined relatively) and macroeconomic volatility including and currency . Unemployment remains structurally high, particularly among , with rates of 34.6% for men and 45.7% for women aged 25-29 as of the 2016-2017 , exacerbated by , inefficient state dominance in key sectors, and sanctions limiting foreign investment and . Income inequality decreased post-, with the falling by about three points due to the war and disproportionately affecting higher earners rather than uplifting the poor, though this masked broader stagnation and persistence amid oil windfalls that failed to diversify the economy. Social indicators show mixed outcomes, with gains in basic human development but persistent and disparities under theocratic governance. Literacy rates surged, with female increasing 2.5 times since 1979—from around 35% in 1976 to over 85% by recent measures—through state campaigns and , alongside university enrollment where women now comprise a of students. Life expectancy rose substantially, from 58 years for women in 1979 to 78 in 2020, attributed to investments and reduced , though these trends partially continued pre-revolutionary modernization efforts funded by oil. Gender equality lags, with women facing legal guardianship, mandatory veiling, and barriers to fields like or sports, despite educational advances; female labor participation remains low at under 20%, contributing to high and social unrest. In Taliban-ruled since 2021, an attempted Islamic emirate model precipitated economic collapse, with GDP contracting 27% initially, leading to chronic stagnation, soaring affecting millions, and over half a million additional people in acute amid frozen assets, aid disruptions, and policies restricting women's and . Modest recovery to 2.5% GDP growth in 2024 reflects informal sector resilience but underscores isolation and fiscal pressures without institutional reforms.

Security and Stability Assessments

The Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained political stability since its establishment in 1979, with no successful coups or regime changes despite periodic large-scale protests, such as those in 2009, 2019, and 2022-2023 triggered by economic grievances and the death of Mahsa Amini. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij militia have proven effective in restoring order through coordinated crackdowns, preventing protests from escalating into existential threats to the regime. Iran's intentional homicide rate stands at approximately 3 per 100,000 population, lower than regional averages in parts of the Middle East like Iraq (10+) but higher than Saudi Arabia's 1.04. In the 2024 Global Peace Index, Iran ranks 133rd out of 163 countries with a score of 2.682, reflecting moderate internal peacefulness marred by militarization and societal safety concerns, though improved from prior years. The Fragile States Index for 2024 places Iran at 82.9 (rank 43), indicating elevated vulnerability due to demographic pressures and uneven cohesion, yet the regime's endurance amid U.S. sanctions and internal dissent underscores resilience derived from ideological control and security apparatus loyalty. Under Taliban rule since August 2021, has experienced a sharp decline in overall conflict-related deaths compared to the prior intra-Afghan war era, with U.S. State Department reports noting reduced terrorist attacks on civilians, mosques, and public spaces by 2023. forces have consolidated territorial control, eliminating rival factions like the former Afghan National Army remnants, which contributed to relative domestic stability absent the scale of pre-2021 bombings and ground engagements. However, persistent ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) insurgency poses ongoing threats, including high-profile attacks such as the 2021 airport bombing and subsequent strikes in 2023-2024, exploiting ethnic and sectarian divides. 's 2024 score of 103.9 (rank 7) highlights extreme fragility, driven by , flows, and weak state legitimacy, though 's suppression of production and cross-border militancy has curbed some transnational risks. Comparative assessments reveal that Islamic governments prioritize internal security through parallel military structures like the IRGC or enforcers, yielding low conventional crime and short-term order but at the cost of high repression, including 's leading global executions (at least 314 in recent years). Stability metrics show outperforming in peace indices due to institutional depth and resource base, yet both face causal pressures from ideological rigidity limiting adaptive governance and external isolation exacerbating internal fractures. Empirical data from UNODC homicide studies confirm regionally subdued under Sharia-influenced policing, but sustainability hinges on addressing underlying grievances like and gender restrictions, which fuel recurrent unrest.

Criticisms and Controversies

Doctrinal Challenges from Within Islam

Within Shia Islam, the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), as articulated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in his 1970 treatise Islamic Government, has faced significant doctrinal opposition from traditionalist scholars who adhere to the principle of quietism. This longstanding Shia position posits that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam (Muhammad al-Mahdi, believed hidden since 874 CE), comprehensive political authority resides solely with the infallible Imam upon his return, limiting clerics to roles in religious guidance, dispute mediation, and guardianship of orphans or the vulnerable rather than sovereign rule. Critics argue that Khomeini's extension of juristic authority to encompass absolute political, military, and judicial control represents an innovation (bid'ah) unsupported by core Shia texts, diverging from the Twelver doctrine that reserves full governance for divinely appointed Imams. Prominent examples include Kazem Shariatmadari, a senior marja' al-taqlid (source of emulation) and Khomeini's former mentor, who rejected the totalitarian implications of Velayat-e Faqih in favor of a constitutional framework where clerics provide oversight but not direct rule, emphasizing through elected assemblies aligned with . Shariatmadari's 1979 proposal for a "leadership council" of five clerics to advise rather than dominate the state was sidelined, leading to his house arrest in 1982 and reported death under suspicious circumstances in 1986, highlighting tensions between quietist traditionalism and Khomeinist activism. Similarly, Muhammad al-Shirazi denounced Velayat-e Faqih as usurping the Imam's authority, advocating decentralized clerical influence without monopolizing state power, a view echoed by other marja's in and who prioritize (independent reasoning) on limited (jurisprudence) matters over political supremacy. From a broader Islamic doctrinal lens, including Sunni perspectives, challenges center on the absence of explicit ic endorsement for jurist-led , with verses like 42:38 prescribing shura (mutual consultation) among believers as the mechanism for governance rather than hierarchical clerical dominion. Sunni scholars historically viewed the as a consultative elected by consensus (bay'ah), not an inherited or juristic mandate, rendering Shia models of faqih sovereignty incompatible with the precedent where Abu Bakr's selection in 632 CE emphasized communal agreement over divine proxy rule. Critics within both sects contend that conflating religious scholarship with political absolutism risks taqlid (blind imitation) overriding ijma' (consensus) and (analogy), potentially violating the Prophetic emphasizing justice and counsel: "The best of your rulers are those whom you love and who love you, upon whom you invoke blessings and who invoke blessings upon you" ( 1853a). These internal critiques underscore a doctrinal preference for hybrid or limited Islamic governance, where serves as a moral framework but not an enforced totality, as articulated by reformist thinkers like (d. 1905) who argued for adaptive caliphates responsive to societal rather than rigid . Such positions maintain that true Islamic rule derives from God's (hakimiyyah) manifested through accountable leadership, not clerical substitutes, a view substantiated by the historical dissolution of the in 1258 CE without precipitating doctrinal crisis.

Authoritarianism and Human Rights Violations

The implementation of under doctrines like Velayat-e Faqih in has centralized absolute authority in the Supreme Leader, enabling systematic suppression of political dissent and limiting through institutions such as the Guardian Council and militia. This structure, justified as guardianship over Islamic society, has resulted in 's classification as "not free" by , with a 2024 political rights score of 0 out of 40, reflecting rigged elections, absence of electoral pluralism, and dominance by unelected clerical bodies. Human rights violations in Iran include rampant use of the death penalty, with at least 975 executions carried out in 2024—the highest annual figure since 2015 and positioning Iran as the world's top per capita executioner—often for drug offenses, moharebeh (enmity against God), or political charges lacking due process. Executions surged further in 2025, with a 75% increase in the first four months compared to the prior year, involving public hangings and reports of torture to extract confessions. Systemic ill-treatment, including solitary confinement and forced confessions, accompanies these practices, as documented in UN and NGO monitoring. Suppression of protests exemplifies authoritarian control, as seen in the 2022-2023 uprising following Mahsa Amini's for non-compliance, where security forces killed at least 551 protesters, including 68 minors and 49 women, across 26 provinces using live ammunition and beatings. Over 22,000 arrests followed, with ongoing for perpetrators and reprisals against victims' families. Media censorship and shutdowns further entrench this control, with ranking among the most repressive online environments globally. In Taliban-ruled since 2021, Islamic government enforcement via strict interpretation has imposed gender apartheid, constituting through systematic denial of . Bans on female secondary and higher education, affecting over 1 million girls as of 2024, alongside prohibitions on women's employment in most sectors and public movement without male guardians, have devastated access to healthcare and economic participation. Public punishments like floggings for moral offenses and arbitrary detentions persist, with no accountability for enforcers despite thousands of reported abuses. These cases illustrate how theocratic prioritizes doctrinal over , leading to empirical outcomes of and isolation, as evidenced by low human development metrics and tied to such violations. While regime apologists claim these measures protect Islamic purity, data from multiple monitoring bodies consistently refute efficacy in fostering security, instead correlating with heightened unrest and .

Economic Inefficiencies and Corruption

In the of Iran, established following the , economic growth has significantly underperformed compared to the pre-revolutionary period, averaging less than 2% annually over four decades versus 9.1% from to , with per capita income growth stalling at a factor of about 1.3 times since compared to 3.2 times in the prior three decades. This decline stems from structural inefficiencies inherent to the system's centralized control, including heavy reliance on oil revenues, which account for over 50% of , and pervasive state interference that stifles private enterprise and . Massive subsidies on and , estimated at $100 billion annually, distort , encourage waste, and contribute to fiscal deficits exceeding 5% of GDP in recent years, while failing to address underlying productivity issues. Corruption exacerbates these inefficiencies, with scoring 23 out of 100 on the 2024 —its lowest ever—ranking 151st out of 180 countries, reflecting systemic where parastatal entities like bonyads (foundations) control up to 20-60% of the economy, operating tax-exempt and with minimal oversight. These bonyads, such as the and those under the Supreme Leader's control, engage in , asset expropriation, and monopolistic practices, enabling elite clerics and Guards (IRGC) affiliates to amass wealth while shielding operations from accountability. For instance, U.S. designations in 2021 highlighted how these entities facilitate by exploiting economic sectors like and manufacturing, diverting resources from public welfare. The IRGC's economic dominance, through conglomerates like Khatam al-Anbiya, further entrenches , leading to project delays, cost overruns, and industrial decline due to unqualified prioritized over merit. In Taliban-ruled since 2021, similar patterns emerge, with GDP contracting by about 20-30% in the first two years post-takeover amid banking freezes and aid cuts, compounded by governance inefficiencies like bans on female that reduce participation by an estimated 25% and hinder sectors such as and healthcare. While the reduced some overt from the prior —such as customs bribes and checkpoint —new kleptocratic networks have formed, relying on illicit (generating $1-2 billion annually) and unregulated taxation that yields short-term but deters due to arbitrary enforcement and lack of transparency. Economic isolation and primitive fiscal policies perpetuate , with over 90% of the population below the poverty line by 2023, underscoring how ideological restrictions and centralized fiat override market signals, mirroring Iran's command-style deviations from free enterprise. Across these implementations, the fusion of religious authority with state economic control fosters and , where loyalty to the regime trumps efficiency, as evidenced by Iran's chronic exceeding 40% in 2023-2024 and Afghanistan's stalled reconstruction, despite resource potentials like Iran's vast reserves. Internal analyses, including from regime officials, admit that and mismanagement—not solely external sanctions—drive these outcomes, with bonyad-like structures enabling plunder akin to a "plunder " rather than productive allocation.

Alternative Models in Islamic Thought

Sunni Caliphate Traditions

In Sunni Islamic political thought, the (khilāfah) originated as the institution to succeed the Muhammad in temporal leadership following his death on June 8, 632 CE, when senior companions convened in the Saqifah of the Banu Sa'idah to elect as the first caliph through consultative assembly (shūrā), prioritizing communal consensus over familial claims. This model emphasized the caliph's role as successor (khalīfah) to the in governing , administering justice, and defending the faith, while prophetic ceased, leaving religious authority derived solely from the and . Classical Sunni jurists, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi (d. 1058 CE), formalized the as an obligatory institution for maintaining Islamic unity and law, distinguishing it from Shia concepts of divinely guided by rejecting infallible hereditary descent in favor of . Selection of the caliph traditionally proceeds via shūrā among ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqd—qualified representatives comprising jurists, tribal leaders, and military commanders—who nominate candidates and deliberate to achieve ijmaʿ (consensus), culminating in bayʿah () from the broader Muslim community to legitimize rule. This process, exemplified by Abu Bakr's election and ibn al-Khattab's designation by his predecessor in 634 CE followed by communal affirmation, underscores accountability, as the caliph's authority derives from adherence to rather than personal sovereignty. Al-Mawardi outlined seven essential qualifications: innate traits including free Muslim male status, tribal descent (per hadith in 9.89.254 linking leadership to Quraysh), maturity, , and sensory acuity; and acquired virtues such as justice ('adl), physical courage for , jurisprudential knowledge for , and rhetorical skill for public address. These criteria aimed to ensure capable guardianship of the deen, with deviations (e.g., non-Qurayshi rulers post-Abbasids) reflecting pragmatic adaptations amid political fragmentation. The caliph's duties, as articulated in Sunni fiqh texts like al-Mawardi's Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, encompass preserving tawḥīd and implementation, leading Friday prayers and military expeditions () against threats, appointing qāḍīs (judges) and governors, collecting zakāt and jizyah for fiscal equity, and suppressing bidʿah or to safeguard . Unlike , the caliph remains bound by divine law, subject to removal (via shūrā or in cases of manifest fisq) if he abandons , as theorized by later scholars like Abu Hamid (d. 1111 CE), who prioritized religious duties over territorial expansion. Historical exemplars include the era (632–661 CE), where caliphs like expanded the dar al-Islam to Persia and while decentralizing administration through provincial wulāt accountable to , fostering economic prosperity via conquest spoils and equitable land grants documented in early fiscal records. Subsequent dynasties—Umayyad (661–750 CE), Abbasid (750–1258 CE), and Ottoman (1517–1924 CE)—retained caliphal titles but often devolved into hereditary sultanates, with Abbasid caliphs post-945 CE reduced to figureheads under Buyid Shiite tutelage until Seljuk restoration of Sunni orthodoxy. This evolution highlighted tensions between ideal consultative caliphate and realpolitik, yet Sunni tradition persisted in viewing the khilāfah as the optimal framework for ummah cohesion, rejecting secular alternatives as incompatible with naṣṣ (Quranic injunctions like 4:59 on obedience to uli al-amr). The Ottoman abolition on March 3, 1924, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk marked the formal end, prompting debates among revivalists like Rashid Rida (d. 1935 CE) on reinstating consultative variants amid colonial fragmentation.

Reformist and Secular Interpretations

Reformist interpretations of Islamic government emphasize the compatibility of core Islamic principles with democratic mechanisms through renewed ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) and reinterpretation of texts to prioritize timeless ethical norms over context-specific historical practices. Proponents argue that shura (consultation), as referenced in the Quran (e.g., Surah 42:38), supports collective decision-making and elected representation, while popular sovereignty aligns with human agency under divine moral guidance, rejecting imposed religious guardianship absent public consent. This approach distinguishes unchangeable ethical imperatives, such as justice and equality, from mutable political forms, enabling adaptation to modern governance without contradicting Islamic foundations. Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), a Pakistani modernist scholar, advanced this by viewing shura as implying participatory governance and democratic education, where ongoing ijtihad resolves contemporary issues like pluralism and rights through rational engagement with revelation's intent rather than literalism. Similarly, Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush has theorized "religious democracy," positing an institutional separation between clerical authority and religious influence, with democracy ensuring individual rights and freedom from theocratic coercion while allowing faith to inform societal values voluntarily. Soroush's framework, developed in post-1979 Iran, critiques the fusion of religion and state as distorting faith, advocating pluralism and human rights as extensions of prophetic ethics. Secular interpretations, by contrast, advocate explicit separation of and state, asserting that Islamic sources neither mandate nor endorse theocratic rule. Egyptian scholar Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's 1925 book Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm argued, based on Quranic analysis, , and early caliphal history, that the Prophet Muhammad established no political system for perpetuity, rendering the a human political construct rather than a religious ; functions as spiritual guidance, not governmental blueprint. This thesis, which cited the absence of state prescriptions in revelation and the elective nature of the caliphs, provoked Al-Azhar University's condemnation and Raziq's dismissal from scholarly ranks in 1926, highlighting orthodox resistance to desacralizing politics. Contemporary Sudanese-American legal scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im extends this by proposing constitutional secularism as the optimal framework for Sharia's ethical realization, arguing that state enforcement of religious law historically breeds coercion and hypocrisy, contrary to Islam's voluntary ethos (Quran 2:256: "no compulsion in religion"). Drawing on pre-modern Islamic polities where rulers lacked divine mandate and Sharia applied primarily personally, An-Na'im contends a neutral state enables genuine faith adherence and citizenship equality, averting the authoritarianism seen in self-proclaimed Islamic republics. These views, while influential in academic and dissident circles, remain marginal amid dominant traditionalist and Islamist paradigms that prioritize divine sovereignty in legislation.

Hybrid Systems in Muslim-Majority States

In Muslim-majority states, hybrid systems blend Islamic constitutional provisions—such as designating as the and incorporating as a partial source of —with democratic institutions like elected parliaments and constitutional checks on executive authority. These arrangements often limit Sharia's application to personal and for , while retaining secular codes for commercial, criminal, and spheres, reflecting pragmatic adaptations to modern state functions amid diverse populations. Unlike unitary theocracies, hybrids permit political pluralism and periodic elections, though outcomes frequently favor entrenched elites or Islamist-leaning parties, with varying degrees of . Empirical assessments, such as those from the , classify several as "defective democracies" due to executive dominance and restricted opposition. Malaysia exemplifies this model through its federal established by the 1957 Constitution, which declares the religion of the while guaranteeing non-Muslims' freedoms. Hereditary sultans serve as custodians of in their states, with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong—elected every five years from among them—acting as ceremonial and 's nominal protector. courts, operating alongside civil courts, enforce Islamic , , and religious offenses for Muslims, as empowered by state enactments under federal oversight; for instance, in 2024, the Federal Court struck down 16 criminal provisions in state, underscoring jurisdictional tensions. features multi-party elections for a bicameral , with the drawn from the majority coalition, though Barisan Nasional's dominance until 2018 illustrated hybrid authoritarian leanings. Morocco's system centers on the Alawite king's dual role as secular sovereign and Commander of the Faithful (), a title invoking descent from the Prophet to legitimize religious oversight. The 2011 Constitution, ratified post-Arab Spring amid protests, affirms as and as a foundational legislative source, primarily for personal status codes reformed in 2004 to enhance . The king appoints the from parliamentary majorities, chairs the on key issues, and can dissolve the legislature, balancing elected bicameral bodies with monarchical vetoes; the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist group, governed from 2011 to 2021 without upending the hybrid structure. This framework has sustained stability but drawn criticism for limiting judicial independence and press freedoms, as evidenced by Morocco's 2024 score of 38/100. Pakistan's 1973 Constitution formalizes an with parliamentary democracy, mandating that all laws conform to Quranic and principles while the head of state must be Muslim. The reviews legislation for Islamic compliance, and provincial Sharia councils advise on policy, with governing Muslim personal laws via parallel courts; secular , inherited from British rule, prevails in federal matters. Elected assemblies select the , with a directly elected president holding ceremonial powers post-18th in 2010, though interventions—such as the 1999 coup—have disrupted democratic continuity. Islamist parties like participate in elections, securing about 10-15% of seats in recent polls, reflecting negotiated coexistence amid blasphemy laws that have fueled , with over 1,500 incidents recorded since 1987.
CountryKey Islamic ProvisionsDemocratic MechanismsNotable Challenges
MalaysiaIslam as state religion; state Sharia courts for MuslimsElected federal parliament; rotating monarchyDominant coalitions; Sharia-civil court conflicts
MoroccoKing as Commander of the Faithful; Sharia in personal lawBicameral parliament; post-2011 electionsMonarchical prerogatives; limited pluralism
PakistanLaws must align with Islam; Federal Shariat CourtParliamentary elections; prime ministerial governmentMilitary influence; blasphemy enforcement
These systems demonstrate causal trade-offs: Islamic elements provide cultural legitimacy and social cohesion in homogeneous societies, yet often constrain full democratic contestation, as hybrid regimes score lower on indices (e.g., at 0.42 in V-Dem 2024) compared to secular peers. Reforms, such as Morocco's 2004 family code, illustrate incremental adaptation, but persistent —'s 2023 CPI score of 29/100—and undermine efficacy.

Modern Reception and Global Impact

Adoption and Resistance in Muslim Societies

The doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, central to Iran's Islamic government, was enshrined in the 1979 constitution following the revolution, vesting supreme authority in a qualified jurist to oversee state affairs and ensure adherence to Islamic principles. This model has not been replicated as a state system elsewhere, but Iran has sought to extend its influence through allied Shia networks. In , formally accepts Velayat-e Faqih, aligning its strategic decisions with Iran's Supreme Leader while retaining tactical independence, a stance formalized since the amid Iran's support for the group against Israeli occupation. Similarly, in and , pro-Iranian militias such as and Syrian brigades have incorporated the doctrine, enabling coordinated operations under Tehran's oversight, with providing training and funding to over 50,000 fighters by 2016. These adoptions remain sub-state, often tied to resistance against perceived external threats like U.S. or Israeli presence, rather than broad societal endorsement. Resistance has been pronounced within Shia clerical establishments outside Iran. Grand Ayatollah , Iraq's preeminent marja' taqlid with millions of followers, rejects absolute Velayat-e Faqih, advocating clerical advisory roles and separation of religious authority from direct governance to prevent theocratic overreach. Other Shia scholars, including those in and dissidents, critique the doctrine as an innovation diverging from traditional Twelver Shia emphasis on awaiting the Hidden , limiting its appeal to a minority of clerics. In Sunni-majority societies, comprising over 85% of , the model encounters doctrinal incompatibility and sectarian suspicion, with Khomeini's universalist appeals dismissed as Persian-Shia hegemony rather than authentic Islamic revival. Sunni states like and prioritize monarchical or republican implementations over jurist rule, viewing Iran's export as a that exacerbated regional divides, as seen in the 1980s condemnations and ongoing proxy conflicts. No Sunni polity has adopted it, preferring historical caliphal models or hybrid systems. Even in , adoption faces internal pushback, with protests in 2009, 2019, and 2022 reflecting widespread disillusionment with the system's rigidity, economic failures, and suppression of , signaling eroding legitimacy among youth and urban populations. This resistance underscores the model's confinement to 's borders and select proxies, constrained by theological disputes and geopolitical rivalries.

International Critiques and Geopolitical Ramifications

The United Nations and Western governments have issued repeated critiques of Iran's Velayat-e Faqih system for enabling systemic human rights violations, including widespread executions, arbitrary arrests, and gender-based discrimination enforced through religious jurisprudence. In its 2024 annual report, the U.S. Department of State documented over 800 executions in 2023, primarily for drug offenses and dissent-related charges, alongside torture in prisons and suppression of protests following the 2022 death of Mahsa Amini. The UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review in January 2025 highlighted Iran's non-compliance with prior recommendations on women's rights and minority protections, with over 50 countries urging reforms to Sharia-based penal codes that conflict with international standards. UN General Assembly Resolution 78/220, adopted in December 2023, expressed grave concern over the regime's use of the death penalty—exceeding 853 cases that year—and called for alignment with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran ratified in 1975 but routinely violates under theocratic oversight. Geopolitically, the doctrine's emphasis on clerical guardianship has fueled perceptions of as a revisionist actor, prompting multilayered sanctions from the U.S., EU, and UN to counter , tests, and support for non-state . U.S. sanctions, initiated post-1979 embassy and expanded via 13599 in 2012, target the Iranian government's assets and prohibit nearly all trade, citing the regime's ideological export of revolution as enabling terrorism financing for groups like , which received an estimated $700 million annually from as of 2020. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, endorsing the 2015 nuclear deal, imposed restrictions on Iran's enrichment and arms transfers until its snapback provisions expired in October 2025, amid critiques that Velayat-e Faqih's absolutist structure impedes verifiable compliance. These measures have isolated economically, reducing oil exports by up to 80% at peaks and contracting GDP by 6-7% annually during intensification phases, while reinforcing adversarial alignments with and for sanctions evasion. The system's ramifications extend to heightened regional tensions, as Iran's clerical-directed proxies exacerbate sectarian conflicts in , , and , contributing to over 377,000 deaths in alone since 2014 per UN estimates, partly attributable to Houthi arms supplied via . Sunni states like view Velayat-e Faqih as a direct ideological threat, spurring counter-alliances such as the and Gulf normalization with to contain Iranian influence. This theocratic model has thus perpetuated a cycle of proxy warfare and nuclear brinkmanship, undermining stability in the and complicating global non-proliferation efforts, as evidenced by Iran's stockpile of 60% exceeding JCPOA limits by 30 times as of mid-2024.

Recent Developments and Future Prospects

In , the has encountered mounting internal and external pressures. In June 2025, Israeli strikes targeted the nuclear enrichment facility and killed senior military leaders, exacerbating regime vulnerabilities amid ongoing and domestic unrest. Executions reached the highest level in at least 17 years during 2024, with authorities arresting activists and restricting freedoms of expression and assembly. Iran's regional influence waned significantly in 2024, as proxy networks like and suffered setbacks from Israeli operations, diminishing the "axis of resistance." In , the Taliban's Islamic , established in August 2021, has intensified repressive policies by 2025, including severe restrictions on women's access to , healthcare, and public life, alongside marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities. remains centralized under unaccountable clerical oversight, lacking a coherent economic or developmental vision, which has prolonged humanitarian crises and isolated the regime internationally. Globally, Islamist movements face setbacks, with the maintaining insurgent capabilities but no territorial control as of 2025, while groups linked to the encounter designations as terrorist entities, such as in in September 2025. Prospects for Islamic government models appear constrained by empirical failures in delivering and stability. Authoritarian clerical alliances have perpetuated and resistance to democratic reforms in Muslim-majority states, as evidenced by persistent low growth and deficits in theocracies like and . Political Islam's electoral gains post-Arab Spring have eroded amid governance shortcomings, with trends toward hybrid secular-Islamist systems or outright secularization in countries like and . While jihadist ideologies sustain low-level conflicts, broader adoption of pure theocratic rule diminishes due to youth disillusionment, economic inefficiencies, and geopolitical isolation, favoring pragmatic adaptations over rigid implementations.

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