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Hal Brands
Hal Brands
Hal Brands
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Hal Brands (born 1983) is an American columnist and scholar of US foreign policy. He is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, as well as a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.[1]

Key Information

Education

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Brands holds a BA in history and political science from Stanford University and an MA, MPhil, and PhD in history from Yale University.

Personal life

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Brands' father is the historian H. W. Brands.[2]

Publications

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Books

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  • From Berlin to Baghdad : America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (2008)[3]
  • Latin America's Cold War (2010)
  • What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014)[4]
  • (editor, with Jeremi Suri) The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (2015)
  • Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (2016)
  • American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (2018)[5]
  • (With Charles Edel) The Lessons of Tragedy (2019)[6]
  • The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (2022)[7][8][9]
  • Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (2022) (co-authored with Michael Beckley)[10]
  • The New Makers of Modern Strategy. From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (2023)[11]
  • The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World (2025)[12]

Articles

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Hal Brands

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Hal Brands is an American scholar of and , serving as the Henry A. Kissinger of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He specializes in U.S. foreign policy, great-power competition, and the historical foundations of strategy, with a focus on applying lessons from the and earlier eras to contemporary challenges such as rivalry with . Brands holds a PhD in history from (2009) and a BA in history and political science from (2005). A prolific author and commentator, Brands has written or co-authored influential books including The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry (2022), Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with (co-authored with Michael Beckley, 2019), and The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (2023). These works emphasize the need for robust American strategic responses to revisionist powers and the enduring of realist principles in statecraft. In government service, he acted as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for (2015–2016) and served as lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, shaping U.S. policy debates on military posture and deterrence. Additionally, Brands is a scholar at the , a member of the State Department's Policy Board, and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, where his analyses appear alongside contributions to outlets like and .

Early Life and Education

Childhood and Upbringing

Hal Brands was born in 1983 to the American historian , a of history at the who earned his PhD there in 1985 after earlier graduate work in and . Publicly available information on Brands' childhood and family upbringing prior to his university education remains limited, with no detailed accounts of his pre-college experiences or specific influences documented in scholarly or biographical sources.

Academic Training

Brands earned a degree from in 2005. He subsequently pursued graduate studies at , where he received a PhD in 2009. His doctoral training positioned him as a specializing in international affairs.

Professional Career

Academic Positions

Brands served as Assistant Professor of Public Policy and History at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy from July 2010 to 2016, during which time he advanced to the rank of . His research at Duke focused on U.S. foreign policy, , and historical case studies of American statecraft, including work on post-Cold War order and Latin American security dynamics. In 2016, Brands joined the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) as the Henry A. Kissinger of Global Affairs, a role he has held continuously since. At SAIS, he directs aspects of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs and teaches courses on strategy, competition, and U.S. policy. This appointment reflects his expertise in strategic history and contemporary geopolitical challenges, building on his prior academic foundation.

Policy and Think Tank Roles

Brands served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for from 2015 to 2016, during which he contributed to strategic assessments amid rising great-power competition. In this capacity, he also served as lead writer for the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which articulated a shift in U.S. priorities toward countering and as revisionist powers challenging the post-Cold War order. Subsequently, he acted as lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, an independent bipartisan panel that evaluated implementation of the strategy and recommended enhancements to U.S. defense posture, including increased funding for deterrence capabilities. In roles, Brands holds a senior fellowship at the (AEI), where his research emphasizes U.S. , defense policy, and responses to authoritarian challenges. He has produced analyses on topics such as force planning for multi-domain conflicts and the economic underpinnings of military readiness, often critiquing underinvestment in defense relative to threats. Additionally, as a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Program on , Brands examines historical precedents for contemporary security dilemmas, including lessons from containment for current rivalries. Brands' government service built on his prior designation as a International Affairs Fellow in 2015, enabling placements in policy institutions to bridge academia and executive decision-making. These positions have informed his advocacy for integrated strategies combining military, economic, and diplomatic tools to sustain U.S. primacy without overextension.

Core Intellectual Contributions

Grand Strategy Framework

Hal Brands defines as a that connects day-to-day initiatives to a nation's most enduring interests, enabling the wise use of power amid uncertainty. This approach emphasizes purposeful coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, military, and informational—to advance core objectives rather than reactive or measures. Brands argues that effective requires a coherent set of ideas about national goals and the methods to achieve them, serving as both a lodestar for and a mechanism to align potentially unlimited aspirations with limited capabilities. Central components of Brands' framework include the identification and prioritization of vital national interests and threats to them, an honest assessment of a state's capabilities and constraints, and the integration of diverse tools of statecraft to pursue long-term ends. He stresses that must begin with first-principles reasoning, such as distinguishing between peripheral and existential risks, to avoid overextension or misallocation of resources. For instance, it guides policymakers in evaluating the costs and benefits of commitments, ensuring that military deployments, alliances, and reinforce rather than undermine broader aims. Brands views this not as a rigid blueprint but as an adaptive process, akin to historical exercises like President Eisenhower's Operation Solarium in , which rigorously debated strategic alternatives to refine policy during the . In applying this framework to American statecraft, Brands examines cases from the Truman administration's doctrine, which defined Soviet expansion as the primary threat and mobilized economic aid via the alongside military deterrence through established on April 4, 1949, to the Reagan era's buildup of defense spending to 6.2% of GDP by 1986, which pressured the USSR toward collapse without direct confrontation. He critiques periods of strategic drift, such as the post-Cold War 1990s, where the absence of a unifying framework led to inconsistent responses to challenges like Saddam Hussein's invasion of on August 2, 1990, and argues that lapses in invite pitfalls like threat inflation by overly hawkish actors or underestimation of adversaries' resilience. Ultimately, Brands posits that robust fosters improvisation within bounds, enhancing a nation's ability to shape international outcomes while mitigating the risks of power's misuse.

Perspectives on Great Power Rivalry

Brands contends that the has entered a prolonged era of competition with revisionist powers like and , marking the end of the post- period of relative U.S. dominance and liberal optimism. In this environment, rivalry manifests as a multifaceted "" akin to the Cold War, characterized by ideological clashes, proxy conflicts, and efforts to expand influence without immediate all-out war. He emphasizes that such competition demands sustained strategic adaptation, including bolstering alliances, imposing costs on adversaries through indirect means, and preparing for gray-zone challenges below the threshold of major conflict. Central to Brands' analysis is the U.S.-China rivalry, which he frames not merely as a contest for geopolitical primacy but as a battle over fundamental values— versus . Co-authoring with Zack Cooper, he argues that sidelining ideological dimensions risks underestimating Beijing's efforts to promote its model globally, urging Washington to integrate values-based strategies like supporting democratic partners and countering Chinese influence operations. Brands warns that 's trajectory toward decline—evident in demographic stagnation, economic slowdowns, and internal repression—heightens risks, as declining powers often lash out aggressively to secure gains before their window closes, potentially escalating tensions in the by the late 2020s. On military and strategic preparedness, Brands critiques U.S. force planning for assuming sufficiency against a single major adversary, advocating a "multi-war" posture to deter simultaneous threats from , , and their proxies, given the interconnected nature of Eurasian theaters. He highlights the resource-intensive demands of this rivalry, projecting that prevailing will require trillions in defense spending over decades, alongside economic decoupling measures and technological edge maintenance, while cautioning against overextension in peripheral regions like where Chinese inroads exploit U.S. neglect. Overall, Brands stresses realism over retrenchment, asserting that American remains essential to forestall autocratic dominance, though domestic political divisions and fiscal constraints pose internal vulnerabilities.

Critiques of Post-Cold War US Policy

Hal Brands has argued that the , following its victory, entered a "unipolar moment" of unprecedented primacy but failed to consolidate and extend its advantages through sustained strategic investments, allowing adversaries like and to exploit periods of American distraction and retrenchment. In his analysis, U.S. policymakers in the underestimated the durability of unipolarity, assuming a "new world order" of perpetual stability rather than hedging against the resurgence of revisionist powers, as evidenced by the rapid economic and military recovery of potential rivals after the Soviet collapse. This complacency manifested in sharp defense budget reductions—from 5.2 percent of GDP in 1986 to approximately 3 percent by the early 2000s—and force structure cuts, shrinking active-duty personnel from 2.1 million in 1987 to 1.4 million by 2001, which eroded deterrence capabilities against emerging great-power threats. Brands critiques the early post-Cold War strategic planning, particularly the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance draft, which initially advocated preventing the emergence of any rival power but was diluted under domestic and allied pressure into a more cooperative, multilateral framework that prioritized stability over dominance. He contends this shift reflected an overreliance on liberal enlargement—such as expansion without robust balancing mechanisms—while neglecting power-political realities, enabling to perceive encirclement and to modernize its military unchecked during U.S. focus on peripheral interventions. Declassified records from the era, per Brands, reveal initial U.S. recognition of the need for preventive measures against peer competitors, but bureaucratic and ideological resistance led to a "" mindset that prioritized short-term savings over long-term primacy. Post-9/11 policies exacerbated these errors, according to Brands, by diverting resources into protracted campaigns in and —costing over $2 trillion and thousands of U.S. lives by 2020—while underinvesting in capabilities for great-power competition, such as advanced naval and air forces needed to counter China's anti-access/area-denial systems. The "one-war" or "two major regional contingencies" planning standards, rooted in post-Cold War assumptions of limited threats, proved mismatched for simultaneous peer challenges, leaving the U.S. overstretched and modernization lagging; for instance, by the mid-2010s, China's had surpassed the U.S. in hull numbers, a reversal Brands attributes to Washington's failure to treat as a "" requiring Cold War-style persistence. He emphasizes that while liberal internationalist goals like were defensible, their implementation ignored causal trade-offs, fostering overextension and eroding the domestic consensus for global engagement essential to sustaining U.S. power. Overall, Brands views these shortcomings as stemming from a strategic culture prone to and partisan , which prevented the U.S. from "locking in" unipolar gains through alliances, technology, and economic statecraft, ultimately hastening the return of multipolar instability by the . This critique underscores his broader call for a return to disciplined that balances with realism, drawing lessons from successes in outlasting adversaries rather than presuming their permanent defeat.

Major Publications

Key Books

What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from to (Cornell University Press, 2014) examines the role of in U.S. policy, tracing its application across presidential administrations and highlighting both its conceptual appeal and practical challenges in aligning power with national objectives. In The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (, 2022), Brands analyzes U.S. experiences during the to derive principles for competing against revisionist powers like and , stressing sustained ideological commitment, alliance management, and avoidance of overextension as critical to prevailing in prolonged rivalries. Co-authored with Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with (W.W. Norton & Company, 2022) assesses the trajectory of U.S.- relations, projecting heightened risks of confrontation due to Beijing's ambitions and Washington's deterrence gaps, while proposing targeted and economic measures to manage escalation without full decoupling. The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (, 2023), edited by Brands, compiles essays updating classical strategic thought for contemporary challenges, incorporating non-Western perspectives and technological disruptions like cyber and AI warfare to inform adaptive grand strategies.

Influential Articles and Essays

Hal Brands has authored numerous essays in prestigious outlets such as , , and , often analyzing U.S. , rivalry, and the erosion of the post-Cold War order. His contributions frequently blend historical analysis with policy prescriptions, emphasizing the need for renewed American purpose amid rising autocratic challenges from and . These pieces have influenced debates in Washington policy circles and academic forums, with Brands' arguments cited in congressional testimonies and reports for their empirical grounding in declassified documents and strategic precedents. A pivotal essay, "The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes of History," co-written with historian John Lewis Gaddis and published in Foreign Affairs in November/December 2021, posits that U.S.-China competition mirrors the ideological and geopolitical tensions of the original Cold War, urging Washington to adopt containment-like strategies rather than illusory engagement. The piece draws on archival evidence from mid-20th-century U.S. policy to argue that Beijing's ambitions necessitate a bipartisan commitment to deterrence, including alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and has been referenced in over 200 scholarly citations as of 2025 for framing the era's bipolar dynamics. In "The Age of Amorality: Can America Save the Liberal Order Through Illiberal Means?" (, February 20, 2024), Brands contends that the order's survival requires pragmatic, even ruthless tactics against revisionist powers, critiquing overly idealistic U.S. approaches post-1991 that underestimated adversaries' willingness to exploit norms. Supported by case studies of Russian and Chinese economic coercion, the essay advocates selective norm-breaking—such as secondary sanctions and covert operations—to restore balance, influencing discussions on "liberal realism" in outlets like . Brands' "The Renegade Order: How Trump Wields American Power" (, February 25, 2025) examines the second Trump administration's as a disruptive yet potentially effective counter to autocratic , using data on disruptions and alliance realignments to argue that can coerce concessions from rivals like , even if it strains traditional partnerships. This analysis, grounded in Brands' review of declassified State Department cables, challenges restraint-oriented critiques by highlighting measurable outcomes in tariff-induced shifts. Other notable essays include "The 20th Century's Lessons for Our New Era of War" (, January 17, 2025), which synthesizes Eurasian conflicts from onward to warn of escalating U.S. commitments against a Sino-Russian axis, advocating industrial mobilization based on precedents; and "Blundering Into ," an earlier critique in dissecting the 2003 Iraq invasion's strategic miscalculations through postwar metrics of instability and resource drain. These works underscore Brands' consistent theme: American strategy must prioritize power realities over ideological overreach, as evidenced by their role in shaping memos during the Biden and Trump eras.

Reception, Influence, and Debates

Achievements and Policy Impact

Hal Brands served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for from 2015 to 2016, during which he contributed to the development of U.S. defense strategy amid rising challenges from and . In this role, he helped shape internal assessments of global threats and resource allocation priorities within the Department of Defense. Brands played a key part in drafting the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), serving as a lead writer under Secretary of Defense James Mattis; the document marked a pivotal shift in U.S. by prioritizing competition over counterterrorism, influencing subsequent military budgeting, force posture decisions, and alliances such as and the Quad. This strategy's emphasis on integrated deterrence and long-term rivalry with authoritarian states has informed Biden administration approaches to security and European deterrence against . He has provided congressional testimony on multiple occasions, including before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2019 on the value of transatlantic alliances, the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2024 on global security challenges, and the House Armed Services Committee in 2018 on defense's economic and diplomatic impacts. These appearances have advanced arguments for increased defense spending and burden-sharing among allies, contributing to bipartisan consensus on countering revisionist powers. As a on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission since at least 2020, Brands has evaluated Beijing's military modernization and economic coercion tactics, recommending policies like export controls on dual-use technologies that have aligned with executive actions under both Trump and Biden administrations. His analyses, disseminated through think tanks like the and , have informed executive branch reviews of vulnerabilities and alliance revitalization efforts. Brands' advocacy for "regime realism"—prioritizing ideological competition with autocracies—has influenced policy debates on integrating into security strategies, as seen in U.S. responses to Uyghur repression and Russian aggression, though critics argue it risks overextension without sufficient domestic reforms.

Criticisms from Restraint Advocates

Restraint advocates, including scholars such as , , and Daniel Larison, have criticized Hal Brands for advocating a U.S. of sustained primacy and deep engagement, which they argue perpetuates overextension and ignores the historical costs of global commitments. In response to Brands' 2015 critique of as flawed and risky—claiming it would invite regional instability and U.S. reactive interventions—Mearsheimer and Walt defended retrenchment as a pragmatic realist approach that avoids unnecessary forward deployments, accusing proponents of primacy like Brands of underestimating the domestic political and economic burdens of maintaining a vast alliance network. They contend that Brands' emphasis on preemptive U.S. presence to deter rivals overlooks evidence from post-Cold War retrenchments in regions like , where local powers stabilized without American forces, and inflates the likelihood of power vacuums leading to global disorder. Daniel Larison, a vocal restraint proponent, has repeatedly faulted Brands for historical misrepresentations that justify interventionism, such as in a analysis of ' legacy, where Brands portrayed Adams as an early advocate of American primacy against isolationist misreadings. Larison argued that Brands selectively omits Adams' opposition to territorial expansion like the and Mexican-American War, which Adams decried as a "war of conquest," thereby twisting Adams into a neoconservative figure to undermine restraint arguments. Larison further critiqued Brands' invocation of "credibility" in U.S. commitments, as in discussions of the 2013 Syria "red line," dismissing it as a discredited rationale that exaggerates reputational costs without empirical support from non-intervention cases. On China policy, Larison accused Brands of threat inflation and sloppy analysis, as in co-authored works warning of imminent conflict, which portray Beijing's actions as unprecedented while downplaying U.S. overreach precedents and allies' reluctance for confrontation. He also challenged Brands' analogies between the and current U.S.- dynamics, arguing they nostalgically idealize past containment successes to promote escalation over de-escalation, ignoring the unique risks of and nuclear parity. Similarly, Larison rebutted Brands' claims of involuntary U.S. entanglement in the , labeling them a "popular lie" that excuses voluntary wars and alliances rather than advocating withdrawal to conserve resources. Andrew and others in the restraint camp have indirectly engaged Brands' defenses of the —dubbed the "blob"—as essential for coherent , viewing them as for elite consensus that sustains failed policies like and perpetual alliances. Critics like Larison contend that Brands' joint critiques with Peter Feaver of "so-called realists" mischaracterize restraint as radical , conflating measured retrenchment with abdication despite historical examples, such as post-1945 European self-balancing, showing viability without U.S. . These debates highlight a core divide: restraint advocates see Brands' framework as ideologically committed to primacy, risking fiscal exhaustion and strategic distraction, evidenced by U.S. defense spending exceeding the next ten nations combined in 2023, while Brands counters with data on retrenchment's past failures, like interwar .

Engagement with Contemporary Events

Brands has provided extensive analysis of Russia's full-scale invasion of beginning in February 2022, framing it as a pivotal event accelerating the return of great-power conflict and fracturing the global order. In his edited volume War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World (2024), he assembled contributions assessing the war's origins in Putin's revanchist ambitions, its tactical evolution, Western strategic responses including sanctions and , and broader implications for deterrence against authoritarian revisionism. He argued that the conflict exemplifies how economic tools like export controls have been weaponized, creating the first major nuclear crisis among great powers since the , while highlighting U.S. successes in degrading Russia's military capabilities alongside failures in anticipating the invasion's scale. In a May 2024 Bloomberg opinion piece, Brands described the Ukraine war as having evolved into a de facto , with bolstered by material support from , , and , polarizing global alignments more sharply than at any point since the and underscoring the risks of proxy dynamics in an interconnected era. He has consistently advocated for sustained Western commitment, warning in October 2024 that any would fail without robust post-conflict security architectures to counter Putin's enduring intent to subjugate , as evidenced by 's attritional gains and adaptation tactics through 2025. In a March 2025 interview, he characterized the Ukraine- standoff as America's most dangerous challenge, urging strategic clarity on escalation management and long-term over premature negotiations. On U.S.-China rivalry, Brands has critiqued American complacency amid escalating tensions, asserting in an April 2025 AEI piece that the U.S. is already losing the emerging due to 's advances in , military projection, and economic resilience, which demand a comprehensive integrating alliances, deterrence, and domestic revitalization rather than isolationist retrenchment. His October 2025 Bloomberg analysis contended that has effectively neutralized U.S. pressures under , leveraging tariffs and export controls to accelerate in semiconductors and critical minerals, while exposing vulnerabilities in Washington's "grand bargain" assumptions. In Lessons from the New Cold War (2025), he drew parallels to 20th-century , emphasizing Eurasia's centrality—linking -Russia-Iran dynamics—and arguing that prioritizing over risks ceding global leverage, as outlined in his August 2024 Bloomberg warning against an " First" pivot that could embolden autocratic coalitions. Brands has tied these events to broader prewar dilemmas, as in his January 2025 AEI article, where he described the post-2022 era as one of heightened global defense risks—exemplified by Ukraine's devastation as Europe's worst conflict since —necessitating U.S. industrial mobilization and alliance fortification to avert multi-front escalation involving simultaneous threats from and . In a 2025 Foreign Policy essay, he invoked historical precedents like Mackinder's Heartland theory to argue that 20th-century Eurasian struggles prefigure today's U.S.-led order under strain from revisionist powers, advocating adaptive focused on denying adversaries continental dominance. His June 2025 AEI publication further projected U.S.- competition unfolding in a fragmented system, influenced by events like the Ukraine war's sanction regimes and alliance realignments, requiring Washington to exploit autocratic overextension while addressing its own fiscal and military readiness gaps.

Personal Life

Family and Background

Hal Brands was born in 1983 as the son of prominent American historian , a two-time finalist for the in and holder of the Jack S. Blanton Sr. Chair in History at the University of Texas at Austin. Little public information exists regarding his mother or siblings, reflecting Brands' emphasis on professional rather than personal disclosures in available biographical sources. Brands pursued higher education at elite institutions, earning a degree in and from in 2005, followed by a , , and in from Yale University in 2009. His academic trajectory aligned with an early interest in grand strategy and U.S. foreign policy, fields that would define his scholarly career.

Public Persona and Interests

Hal Brands maintains a public persona as an influential voice in discourse, characterized by rigorous historical analysis and advocacy for assertive U.S. global engagement. He regularly authors columns for Bloomberg Opinion, where he critiques policy missteps and urges strategic adaptation to great-power competition, often drawing parallels to dynamics. His contributions to similarly emphasize empirical lessons from history, positioning him as a counterweight to restraint-oriented perspectives in academic and policy circles. Brands extends his reach through public lectures, podcasts, and congressional testimonies, delivering measured yet firm assessments of threats from adversaries like and . On X (formerly ), under the handle @HalBrands, he shares concise commentaries on unfolding events, such as escalation risks in or trade frictions with , fostering direct engagement with policymakers and commentators. This platform underscores his persona as a timely intervenor in debates, prioritizing causal mechanisms in over ideological purity. His intellectual interests center on and , reflected in works like the edited volume The New Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the AI Revolution (2023), which compiles essays on strategic thinkers across eras to inform modern challenges. Brands has expressed fascination with how past powers balanced ambition and restraint, applying first-hand archival insights to critique post-Cold War U.S. complacency. These pursuits align with his academic role but manifest publicly in efforts to bridge scholarly rigor with accessible policy advocacy.

References

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  2. https://kissinger.sais.jhu.edu/people/brands/
  3. https://www.aei.org/profile/hal-brands/
  4. https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/our-impact/people/affiliated-scholars/profiles/hal-brands.html
  5. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/hal-brands
  6. https://kirkcenter.org/reviews/geopolitics-and-the-making-of-the-modern-world/
  7. https://experts.utexas.edu/henry_brands
  8. https://www.cnas.org/people/hal-brands
  9. https://warontherocks.com/2018/12/the-historical-profession-is-committing-slow-motion-suicide/
  10. https://dukealumni-test.oit.duke.edu/magazine/articles/what-weve-learned-saddam-hussein
  11. https://nationalinterest.org/profile/hal-brands
  12. https://hub.jhu.edu/experts/profiles/hal-brands/
  13. https://www.fpri.org/contributor/hal-brands/
  14. https://uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu/people/hal-brands
  15. https://yris.yira.org/interviews/the-devil-is-in-the-details-hal-brands-on-reforming-american-grand-strategy/
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  53. https://daniellarison.substack.com/p/sloppy-analysis-is-the-bane-of-a
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  55. https://daniellarison.substack.com/p/the-us-has-never-been-dragged-into
  56. https://www.commentary.org/articles/hal-brands/saving-realism-called-realists/
  57. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/foreign-policy-realists-hit-nerve-with-establishment-elite/
  58. https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/09/professors-respond-bacevichs-hit-nerve-essay/
  59. https://www.amazon.com/War-Ukraine-Conflict-Strategy-Fractured/dp/1421449846
  60. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4200101/war-in-ukraine-conflict-strategy-and-the-return-of-a-fractured-world-the-war-fo/
  61. https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_edited_volume/chapter/3881912
  62. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2024-05-12/china-russia-iran-have-made-ukraine-a-world-war-against-us-europe
  63. https://x.com/HalBrands/status/1847246582493872593
  64. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ti4_myIHuAU
  65. https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-us-is-already-losing-the-new-cold-war-to-china/
  66. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2025-10-19/us-china-trade-war-xi-is-winning-against-trump
  67. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2024-08-25/putting-asia-first-could-cost-america-the-world
  68. https://chinabooksreview.com/2025/03/11/hal-brands/
  69. https://www.aei.org/articles/affording-defense-our-prewar-era-america-and-the-dilemmas-of-global-defense/
  70. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2025-01-05/halford-mackinder-predicted-today-s-world-over-a-century-ago
  71. https://www.un-diplomatic.com/p/the-war-lover-and-the-war-intellectualizer
  72. https://www.bookseriesinorder.com/h-w-brands/
  73. https://www.c-span.org/person/hal-brands/1026901/
  74. https://www.chinatalk.media/p/makers-of-modern-strategy-with-hal
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