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Stephen Walt
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Stephen Walt
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Stephen Martin Walt (born July 2, 1955) is an American political scientist serving as the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School.[1] A member of the realist school of international relations, Walt has made important contributions to the theory of neorealism and has authored the balance of threat theory.[2] Books that he has authored or coauthored include Origins of Alliances, Revolution and War, and The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.[3]

Key Information

Early life and education

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Walt was born in Los Alamos, New Mexico, where his father, Martin Walt,[4] a physicist, worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. His mother was a school teacher. The family moved to the San Francisco Bay Area when Stephen was about eight months old, and he grew up in Los Altos Hills.[5]

Walt pursued his undergraduate studies at Stanford University. He first majored in chemistry, as he was planning to become a biochemist, but he then shifted to history and finally to international relations.[5] After earning his BA, Walt began graduate work at the University of California, Berkeley, graduating with an MA in political science in 1978, and a PhD in political science in 1983.

Career

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Walt taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the Social Science Collegiate Division and deputy dean of social sciences. As of 2015, he holds the Robert and Renee Belfer Professorship in International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.[3][6]

Other professional activities

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Walt served on the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists from 1992 to 2001.[3] He was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in May 2005.[6]

Walt is frequently invited to speak about foreign policy issues at universities. He spoke at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University in 2010.[7] In 2012, Walt took part in a panel during the "one-state solution" conference on Israel and Palestine at the Kennedy School, along with Ali Abunimah and Eve Spangler.[8] Walt delivered the Harrington Lecture at Clark University in April 2013,[9] as well as the 2013 F. H. Hinsley Lecture at Cambridge University.[10] In December 20, 2013, he gave a talk at the College of William & Mary entitled, "Why US Foreign Policy Keeps Failing".[11]

Views

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American power and culture

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On the twentieth anniversary of the war against Iraq, Walt characterized the rules-based world order as "a set of rules that we [the US] had an enormous role in writing, and of course which we feel free to violate whenever it's inconvenient for us to follow them."[12] In the comprehensive 2005 article "Taming American Power", Walt argued that the US should "make its dominant position acceptable to others—by using military force sparingly, by fostering greater cooperation with key allies, and, most important of all, by rebuilding its crumbling international image." He proposed for the US to "resume its traditional role as an 'offshore balancer'", to intervene "only when absolutely necessary", and to keep "its military presence as small as possible."[13] In a late 2011 article for The National Interest, "The End of the American Era", Walt wrote that the US was losing its position of world dominance.[14]

Walt gave a speech in 2013 to the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, "Why does US foreign policy keep failing?" The institute later described him as seeing "an overwhelming bias among US foreign policy institutions toward an activist foreign policy" and "a propensity to exaggerate threats, noting the chances of being struck by lightning have been far greater since 2001 than death by terrorist attack." He also characterized the US as lacking "diplomatic skill and finesse" and advised Europeans "to think of themselves and not rely on the US for guidance or advice on solving their security issues." Ultimately, he argued that "the United States is simply not skilled enough to run the world."[15]

In 2013, Walt asked "Why are Americans so willing to pay taxes in order to support a world-girdling national security establishment, yet so reluctant to pay taxes to have better schools, health care, roads, bridges, subways, parks, museums, libraries, and all the other trappings of a wealthy and successful society?" He said that the question was especially puzzling given that "the United States is the most secure power in history and will remain remarkably secure unless it keeps repeating the errors of the past decade or so."[16]

Foreign policy

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A critic of military interventionism, Walt stated:

Hawks like to portray opponents of military intervention as "isolationist" because they know it is a discredited political label. Yet there is a coherent case for a more detached and selective approach to U.S. grand strategy, and one reason that our foreign policy establishment works so hard to discredit it is their suspicion that a lot of Americans might find it convincing if they weren't constantly being reminded about looming foreign dangers in faraway places. The arguments in favor of a more restrained grand strategy are far from silly, and the approach makes a lot more sense than neoconservatives' fantasies of global primacy or liberal hawks' fondness for endless quasi-humanitarian efforts to reform whole regions.[17]

Europe

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In 1998, Walt wrote that "deep structural forces" were "beginning to pull Europe and America apart".[18] Walt argued that NATO must be sustained because of four major areas in which close co-operation is beneficial to European and American interest.[19]

  1. Defeating international terrorism; Walt saw a need for cooperation between Europe and the United States in managing terrorist networks and stopping the flow of money to terror cells.[19]
  2. Limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction; Walt argued that anti-proliferation efforts are most successful when Europe and the US work in concert to bring loose nuclear material into responsible custody. He cited the case of Libya's willingness to abandon its nascent fission program after being pressured multilaterally as evidence of this.[19]
  3. Managing the world economy; lowering barriers to trade and investment particularly between the US and the EU would accelerate economic growth. Notable differences in trade policy stem mainly in areas of agricultural policy.[19]
  4. Dealing with failed states; failed states are breeding grounds for anti-Western movements. Managing failed states such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia require a multinational response since the US has insufficient wealth to modernise and rebuild these alone. In this area, European allies are especially desirable because they have more experience with peacekeeping and "nation-building".[19]

Eastern Europe and Russia

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In 2015, a year after Russia invaded Crimea, Walt wrote that extending invitations for NATO membership to countries in the former Soviet Bloc is a "dangerous and unnecessary goal" and that Ukraine ought to be a "neutral buffer state in perpetuity." He further argued that, although Obama had refrained from arming Ukraine, doing so would be "a recipe for a longer and more destructive conflict".[20] The Obama administration avoided arming Ukraine for the duration of its term, in keeping with Walt's strategy, but the first Trump administration angered Russia by approving a plan to provide anti-tank missiles in 2017.[21]

In 2023, after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Walt condemned Russia's actions as illegal, but called the morality of the war "murky" in an article for Foreign Policy. Taking a similar stance to that of his co-author John Mearsheimer, Walt has called for an end to military aid to Ukraine and claimed that NATO expansion is partially at fault for the conflict.[22][23] In 2025, in an interview on NPR's Morning Edition, Walt criticized the second Trump administration's handling of the war, stating that Ukraine's sovereignty and security should be ensured in any negotiated settlement.[24]

Middle East

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Walt said in December 2012 that America's "best course in the Middle East would be to act as an 'offshore balancer': ready to intervene if the balance of power is upset, but otherwise keeping our military footprint small. We should also have normal relationship with states like Israel and Saudi Arabia, instead of the counterproductive 'special relationships' we have today."[25] An article by Walt entitled "What Should We Do if the Islamic State Wins? Live with it." appeared on June 10, 2015, in Foreign Policy magazine.[26] He explained his view that the Islamic State was unlikely to grow into a longlasting world power on Point of Inquiry, the podcast of the Center for Inquiry in July 2015.[27]

Israel

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Walt has been a critic, along with his co-author John Mearsheimer of the offensive neorealism school of international relations, of the Israel lobby in the United States and the influence he says that it has on its foreign policy. He wrote that Barack Obama erred by breaking with the principles in his Cairo speech by allowing continued Israeli settlement and by participating in a "well-coordinated assault" against the Goldstone Report.[6]

Walt suggested in 2010 that State Department diplomat Dennis Ross's alleged partiality toward Israel might make him give Obama advice that was against US interests.[28] Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), defended Ross and criticized Walt in a piece published by Foreign Affairs, which had published Walt's piece a few days earlier.[29] Satloff wrote that Ross's connection to WINEP is innocuous (Ross was a distinguished fellow at WINEP throughout George W. Bush's administration, and Mearsheimer and Walt's book described WINEP as "part of the core" of the Israel lobby in the United States) and that Walt mistakenly believes that the US cannot simultaneously "advance strategic partnership both with Israel and with friendly Arab and Muslim states."[29]

After the Itamar attack, in which a Jewish family was killed on the West Bank in March 2011, Walt condemned the murderers but added that "while we are at it, we should not spare the other parties who have helped create and perpetuate the circumstances." He listed "every Israeli government since 1967, for actively promoting the illegal effort to colonize these lands," "Palestinian leaders who have glorified violence," and "the settlers themselves, some of whom routinely use violence to intimidate the Palestinians who live in the lands they covet."[30]

Walt criticized the US for voting against a Security Council resolution condemning Israel's West Bank settlements and called the vote a "foolish step" because "the resolution was in fact consistent with the official policy of every president since Lyndon Johnson."[31]

Iran

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Walt has frequently criticized America's policy with respect to Iran. In 2011, Walt told an interviewer that the American reaction to an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the United States "might be part of a larger American diplomatic effort to put Iran on the hot seat."[32] In December 2012, Walt wrote, "Washington continues to insist on a near-total Iranian capitulation. And because Iran has been effectively demonized here in America, it would be very hard for President Obama to reach a compromise and then sell it back home."[33]

Walt said in November 2013, "Americans often forget just how secure the United States is, especially compared with other states," thanks to its power, resources, and geography, and thus "routinely blows minor threats out of all proportion. I mean: Iran has a defense budget of about $10 billion... yet we manage to convince ourselves that Iran is a Very Serious Threat to US vital interests. Ditto the constant fretting about minor-league powers like Syria, North Korea, Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya, and other so-called 'rogue states.'" Therefore, whatever happens in the Middle East, "the United States can almost certainly adjust and adapt and be just fine."[16]

Libya

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After visiting Libya, Walt wrote in Foreign Policy in January 2010 that while "Libya is far from a democracy, it also doesn't feel like other police states that I have visited. I caught no whiff of an omnipresent security service—which is not to say that they aren't there. … The Libyans with whom I spoke were open and candid and gave no sign of being worried about being overheard or reported or anything like that. … I tried visiting various political websites from my hotel room and had no problems, although other human rights groups report that Libya does engage in selective filtering of some political websites critical of the regime. It is also a crime to criticize Qaddafi himself, the government's past human rights record is disturbing at best, and the press in Libya is almost entirely government-controlled. Nonetheless, Libya appears to be more open than contemporary Iran or China and the overall atmosphere seemed far less oppressive than most places I visited in the old Warsaw Pact."[34]

David E. Bernstein, Foundation Professor at the George Mason University School of Law, criticized Walt in 2011 for accepting funding from the Libyan government for a trip to Libya in which he addressed that country's Economic Development Board and then wrote what Bernstein called "a puff piece" about his visit. Bernstein said it was ironic that "Walt, after fulminating about the American domestic 'Israel Lobby' " had thus become "a part of the 'Libya lobby.' " Bernstein also found it ironic that "Walt, a leading critic of the friendship the US and Israel, concludes his piece with the hope 'that the United States and Libya continue to nurture and build a constructive relationship.' Because, you know, Israel is so much nastier than Qaddafi's Libya."[35]

Under the headline "Is Stephen Walt Blind, a Complete Fool, or a Big Liar?", Martin Peretz of the New Republic mocked Walt for praising Libya, which Peretz called a "murderous place" and for viewing its dictator as "civilized." Peretz contrasted Walt's view of Libya, which, Peretz noted, he had visited for less than a day.[36]

Syria

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In August 2013, Walt argued that even if it turned out that Bashar al-Assad of Syria had used chemical weapons, the US should not intervene. "Dead is dead, no matter how it is done," wrote Walt. "Obama may be tempted to strike because he foolishly drew a 'red line' over this issue and feels his credibility is now at stake. But following one foolish step with another will not restore that lost standing."[37]

China

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Walt posits that offshore balancing is the most desirable strategy to deal with China.[38][39] In 2011, Walt argued that China will seek to gain regional hegemony and a broad sphere of influence in Asia, which was comparable in size to the US position in the Western Hemisphere.[38] If that happens, he predicts that China would be secure enough on the mainland to give added attention to shaping events to its favour in far flung areas. Since China is resource-poor, it will likely aim to safeguard vital sea lanes in areas such as the Persian Gulf.[40][41] In a December 2012 interview, Walt said that "the United States does not help its own cause by exaggerating Chinese power. We should not base our policy today on what China might become twenty or thirty years down the road."[42]

Balance of threat theory

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Walt developed the balance of threat theory, which defined threats in terms of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. It is a modification of the "balance of power" theory, whose framework was refined by neorealist Kenneth Waltz.[43]

Snowden case

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In July 2013, Walt argued that Obama should give Edward Snowden an immediate pardon. "Mr. Snowden's motives," wrote Walt, "were laudable: he believed fellow citizens should know their government was conducting a secret surveillance programme enormous in scope, poorly supervised and possibly unconstitutional. He was right." History, Walt suggested, "will probably be kinder to Mr Snowden than to his pursuers, and his name may one day be linked to the other brave men and women—Daniel Ellsberg, Martin Luther King Jr., Mark Felt, Karen Silkwood and so on—whose acts of principled defiance are now widely admired."[44]

Books

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In his 1987 book The Origins of Alliances, Walt examines the ways in which alliances are made and "proposes a fundamental change in the present conceptions of alliance systems."[45] Revolution and War (1996) exposes "the flaws in existing theories about the relationship between revolution and war" by studying in detail the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions and providing briefer views of the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions.[46] Taming American Power (2005) provides a thorough critique of US strategy from the perspective of its adversaries.[47] Anatol Lieven called it "a brilliant contribution to the American foreign policy debate."[48] The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy was published on 16 October 2018.

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

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Main article: The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

In March 2006, John Mearsheimer and Walt, then academic dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, published a working paper, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy",[49] as well as an article entitled "The Israel Lobby" in the London Review of Books, on the negative effects of "the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby". They defined the Israel lobby as "the loose coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction".[50] Mearsheimer and Walt took this position, "What the Israel lobby wants, it too often gets."[51] The book contends that the US-Israel alliance skews US foreign policy in Israel's favor, often at the expense of regional stability in the Middle East.[52]: 5 

The articles, as well as the bestselling book that Walt and Mearsheimer later developed, generated considerable media coverage throughout the world. Contending that Walt and Mearsheimer are members of a "school that essentially wishes that the war with jihadism had never started", Christopher Hitchens concluded that "wishfulness has led them to seriously mischaracterize the origins of the problem."[53] Former US ambassador Edward Peck wrote that the "tsunami" of responses condemning the report proved the existence of the lobby and "Opinions differ on the long-term costs and benefits for both nations, but the lobby's views of Israel's interests have become the basis of US Middle East policies."[54]

Personal life

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Walt is married to Rebecca E. Stone,[55] who ran for a seat in the Massachusetts House of Representatives in the 2018 election.[56] They have two adult children.[57]

Titles and positions

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Stephen Walt

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Stephen Martin Walt (born July 2, 1955) is an American political scientist specializing in and U.S. foreign policy, renowned for advancing through the balance-of-threat hypothesis, which posits that states form alliances primarily to counter perceived threats rather than mere power distributions. As the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's School of Government since 1999, Walt has held prior faculty positions at and the , shaping discourse on and critiquing liberal interventionism as detrimental to American interests. His seminal works include The Origins of Alliances (1987), which empirically tested alliance formation using data, and Revolution and War (1996), analyzing how ideological upheavals influence great-power conflicts. Walt's collaboration with on The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007) argued that organized pro-Israel advocacy groups exert disproportionate influence on U.S. policy, often prioritizing Israeli security over broader American strategic objectives, a thesis that sparked intense and accusations of from critics, though Walt maintained it stemmed from realist assessments of rather than ethnic animus. In subsequent writings, such as The Hell of Good Intentions (2018), he has advocated for and restraint in U.S. commitments abroad, attributing post- foreign policy debacles to elite hubris and ideological overreach rather than material constraints alone.

Biography

Early life and family background

Stephen Martin Walt was born on July 2, 1955, in . His father, Martin Walt, was a physicist employed at the , a facility central to nuclear research. The family relocated to when Walt was eight months old, and he spent his childhood and youth in Los Altos Hills, a suburb south of . Walt grew up in a that prioritized intellectual engagement. His father, beyond his scientific career, maintained a keen interest in and amassed a substantial collection of books , , and , which shaped Walt's early exposure to these subjects. This environment fostered a foundation for Walt's later scholarly focus on and .

Education and early influences

Stephen Walt earned a degree with distinction in from in 1977. He then pursued graduate studies at the , obtaining both a and a in , completing his PhD in 1983. At Berkeley, Walt's doctoral work focused on and alliances, laying the groundwork for his later theoretical contributions to realism. A pivotal early influence on Walt was , his dissertation advisor and a leading figure in neorealism, whose structural theory of international politics shaped Walt's approach to and the balance of threat. Waltz's emphasis on systemic constraints and power distribution in anarchy provided Walt with a rigorous, parsimonious framework for analyzing state behavior, which Walt adapted to incorporate perceptual and threat-based variables over pure balance-of-power dynamics. This mentorship at Berkeley, during a period when Waltz was refining his seminal Theory of International Politics (1979), oriented Walt toward empirical testing of realist propositions amid the field's debates between structural and classical variants. Walt's parental background also contributed to his analytical inclinations: born in 1955 in , to a father involved in scientific and a schoolteacher mother, he grew up in an environment valuing empirical reasoning and . These early exposures fostered a predisposition toward methodical inquiry, evident in Walt's subsequent career prioritizing data-driven critiques of over ideological narratives.

Academic and professional career

Walt earned his B.A. in from in 1977 with distinction, followed by an M.A. in 1978 and a Ph.D. in 1983, both in from the . Following his , Walt joined Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs as an assistant professor from 1984 to 1989. In 1989, he moved to the , where he served as until his promotion to full in 1995, remaining until 1999; during this period, he also held administrative roles as Master of the Social Sciences Collegiate Division from 1996 to 1999 and Deputy Dean of the Division of Social Sciences. In 1999, Walt was appointed the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at , a position he continues to hold. From 2002 to 2006, he served as Academic Dean of the Kennedy School, overseeing academic programs and faculty affairs. Throughout his Harvard tenure, Walt has contributed to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, including as Faculty Chair of its International Security Program. He has also held visiting positions, such as the Professor of Strategic Studies at in in 2000.

Administrative roles and affiliations

Walt served as Master of the Social Sciences Collegiate Division and Deputy Dean of the College at the from 1996 to 1999. He was appointed Academic Dean of the from 2002 to 2006, overseeing academic programs and faculty affairs during that period. His primary academic affiliation is as the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, a position he has held since 1999. He also chairs the faculty of the International Security Program at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Additional affiliations include serving as a non-resident senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft since 2019 and as a contributing editor at Foreign Policy magazine since 2009. Walt co-chairs the editorial board of International Security and co-edits the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs book series. In the past, he held visiting roles such as Resident Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution.

Theoretical Contributions

Balance of threat theory

, articulated by Stephen Walt in his 1987 book The Origins of Alliances, reformulates classical balance-of-power explanations by arguing that states ally primarily to counter perceived threats rather than raw distributions of capabilities. Walt, building on neorealist foundations of and state survival, contends that alliance formation reflects rational responses to external dangers, where threats encompass not just power but its malign potential. This approach challenges Kenneth Waltz's emphasis on balancing capabilities alone, positing instead that states prioritize the most immediate and credible dangers to their security. Central to the theory are four variables that determine a rival state's threat level: aggregate power (including population, industrial capacity, and military resources), geographic proximity (closer states pose higher risks due to rapid mobilization potential), offensive military capabilities (ability to project force aggressively rather than defensively), and perceived intentions (inferred from ideology, past behavior, or rhetoric signaling expansionism). Walt asserts that these factors interact multiplicatively; for instance, a distant superpower with benign intentions may evoke less alarm than a neighboring state with aggressive doctrines, even if the latter holds lesser overall power. States thus form coalitions against the "least likely" dominator—the entity combining high capabilities with proximity and hostility—rather than mechanically opposing the strongest actor. Walt empirically validated the through a of Middle Eastern alliances from the 1956 to the 1967 , analyzing alignments like the Baghdad Pact (1955) and Egypt's pivot toward the . He found that regional states, such as and , balanced against Soviet-backed and due to their perceived aggressive intentions and proximity, rather than solely against U.S. or Soviet global power. This pattern explained anomalies in balance-of-power predictions, such as conservative Arab states aligning with the U.S. against radical neighbors despite ideological affinities. The predicts balancing as the default strategy for preserving , with (joining the threat) occurring mainly among weak states facing risks, as it offers survival concessions over annihilation. In broader applications, illuminates why endure or dissolve based on evolving perceptions; for example, Walt later invoked it to assess U.S. policy, where threats from or non-state actors drive alignments more than raw power balances. Critics note potential subjectivity in measuring intentions, yet Walt maintains the framework's superiority in capturing dynamics over capability-centric models, supported by historical correlations in alliance data. The theory underscores causal realism in , where security dilemmas arise from verifiable threat signals rather than abstract power metrics.

Broader realist paradigm and critiques of alternatives

Walt's broader contributions to realism emphasize a defensive variant of structural realism, positing that international compels states to prioritize over power maximization, leading to balancing behaviors against perceived threats rather than relentless expansion. This paradigm views states as rational actors in a system where aggression often triggers counterbalancing coalitions, rendering conquest inefficient and risky under modern conditions of nuclear deterrence and . Walt argues that realism's core—enduring competition driven by —remains robust and "progressive," capable of integrating empirical refinements without degenerating into adjustments, as evidenced by its explanatory power over formation and conflict patterns since the . Unlike , which anticipates inherent great-power rivalry, Walt's framework highlights opportunities for restraint and stability when threats are managed effectively, as in post-Cold War Europe. In critiquing , Walt contends that post-Cold War efforts to build a rules-based order through institutions, trade, and systematically overestimate cooperation's ability to mitigate anarchy's effects, leading to overextension and backlash. He attributes the liberal order's decline by 2019 to flawed assumptions about perpetual U.S. primacy and the pacifying force of interdependence, arguing that great powers inevitably prioritize relative gains and dilemmas over goods, as seen in rising and challenges from and . Walt's analysis in works like The Hell of Good Intentions (2018) faults U.S. elites for pursuing "liberal hegemony"—deep global engagement via interventions and alliances—that incurred trillions in costs and eroded domestic support without yielding lasting peace, contrasting this with realism's advocacy for selective restraint. Walt also engages constructivism, acknowledging its focus on ideas, identities, and norms as influences on state interests but subordinating them to material structures in explaining systemic outcomes. In "One World, Many Theories" (1998), he praises constructivists for addressing change and endogenous preferences—such as shifting threat perceptions—but critiques their relative neglect of power asymmetries, which realism posits as the primary driver of behavior in enduring rivalries like the U.S.-China competition. He views constructivism as complementary for micro-level dynamics, such as alliance norms, yet insufficient for macro-predictions without realist anchors, warning that overemphasizing ideational factors risks underestimating coercion's role in international politics. Against , Walt levels sharp rebukes for its Wilsonian idealism, which he sees as promoting transformative interventions that ignore balance-of-power realities and provoke unnecessary enmities. He highlights neoconservative advocacy for the 2003 Iraq invasion as a case of , costing over $2 trillion and thousands of U.S. lives while destabilizing the , arguing that such policies deviate from realism's emphasis on vital interests and feasibility assessments. In essays like "The Neocons vs. The Realists" (2008), Walt asserts that 's faith in remaking regimes via force has empirically failed, contrasting with realism's track record in anticipating blowback and advocating to preserve at lower cost. This critique extends to broader "freedom agenda" pursuits, which Walt attributes to ideological overreach rather than prudent statecraft.

Applications to contemporary security dilemmas

Walt has applied his balance-of-threat theory to the U.S.- rivalry, arguing that Beijing's growing capabilities, proximity, and offensive intentions as perceived by Washington drive balancing behaviors rather than alone. In a 2025 analysis, he contends that provides a superior framework for understanding this competition compared to , as 's bid for regional hegemony in is likely to provoke counterbalancing coalitions and fail due to overextension risks, advising the U.S. to through alliances and deterrence without pursuing unattainable primacy. This approach emphasizes managing escalation risks, such as over , by prioritizing credible commitments to allies while avoiding provocative expansions that could heighten war probabilities. In the context of Russia's 2022 invasion of , Walt invokes balance-of-threat dynamics to explain varying state responses, noting that NATO's expansion and Western arming of intensified Moscow's perceptions of encirclement, prompting aggressive countermeasures despite Russia's conventional superiority. He highlights how threats from proximity and offensive capabilities led European states to reinforce alliances against , while non-threatened actors like remained neutral, underscoring the theory's predictive value for selective balancing. Walt advocates restraint for the U.S., warning that unlimited support risks broader entanglement with nuclear-armed without altering the conflict's outcome, and urges focusing resources on Indo-Pacific priorities over peripheral European commitments. Walt extends realist restraint to Middle Eastern dilemmas, critiquing U.S. interventions like the 2011 operation and non-intervention in as examples of misapplied power that exacerbated instability without enhancing American security. He argues that balance-of-threat considerations reveal limited U.S. leverage against regional actors like or non-state groups, favoring —bolstering allies such as and —over direct military engagements that drain resources and invite blowback. This framework posits that contemporary dilemmas, including proxy conflicts and , demand prioritizing vital interests amid multipolar competition, eschewing ideological crusades for pragmatic threat mitigation.

Key Publications

Major books and their theses

Walt's seminal work, The Origins of Alliances (1987), reformulates classical balance-of-power theory by proposing "balance of threat" as the primary driver of alliance formation, positing that states ally not merely against raw power but against perceived threats encompassing aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions. Drawing on case studies of Middle Eastern alliances from the 1950s to the 1970s, including the Baghdad Pact and alignments against Israel, Walt empirically demonstrates that balancing threats explains alliance patterns better than power balancing alone, while bandwagoning occurs less frequently and typically under conditions of overwhelming threat or opportunity for gain. In Revolution and War (1996), Walt extends realist analysis to argue that revolutions provoke international conflict by disrupting the status quo balance of threats, as revolutionary regimes' ideological zeal, internal instability, and perceived unpredictability heighten fears among neighbors and great powers, leading to preemptive balancing, arms races, or preventive wars. He substantiates this through historical examinations of cases like the (1792–1802) and the (1917–1921), where external powers formed coalitions against the revolutionary state due to its exported ideology and military mobilization, rather than solely domestic upheaval or economic factors. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (2005) contends that unipolar U.S. dominance since the elicits balancing behaviors from other states, who view American power as potentially hegemonic and thus pursue strategies like soft balancing through diplomatic coalitions, economic incentives, or indirect military opposition to constrain Washington without direct confrontation. Walt critiques U.S. policies of unilateralism and as exacerbating these responses, advocating instead for a strategy of reassurance—such as and selective engagement—to foster legitimacy and prevent anti-American alliances, evidenced by examples like European hesitance on and Sino-Russian ententes. Co-authored with , The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007) asserts that a coalition of pro-Israel organizations, think tanks, and individuals exerts outsized influence on U.S. policy, steering it toward unconditional support for through campaign contributions, media advocacy, and congressional pressure, often at the expense of broader American strategic interests like relations with states or counterterrorism. The thesis highlights activities such as lobbying against arms sales to nations and promoting the , attributing this influence to the lobby's organizational cohesion rather than inherent Jewish influence or shared democratic values, though the authors acknowledge 's strategic value but argue it does not justify the policy distortions. Walt's The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (2018) diagnoses post-Cold War U.S. failures— including interventions in , , and —as stemming from a bipartisan "liberal hegemony" consensus among the foreign policy elite, which prioritizes global dominance, , and institutional expansion over realist restraint, resulting in overextension, alliance fatigue, and relative decline. Analyzing "blob" dynamics via think tanks, media, and bureaucratic incentives, Walt prescribes ""—withdrawing from peripheral commitments, prioritizing great-power competition, and intervening only against regional hegemons—to preserve U.S. power amid rising challengers like , supported by evidence of policy continuity across administrations despite electoral mandates for change.

Influential articles and essays

Walt's article "The Renaissance of Security Studies," published in International Studies Quarterly in 1991, analyzed the decline and resurgence of security-focused scholarship in the post-Vietnam era, attributing the revival to realist emphases on amid endgame uncertainties; it has been cited over 1,500 times in academic literature. In this piece, Walt critiqued the prior dominance of and urged a return to empirical studies of and alliances, influencing subsequent generations of security scholars. His 1998 essay "One World, Many Theories" in Foreign Policy provided an accessible overview of contending international relations paradigms—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—arguing that realism best explained state behavior under anarchy despite ideological challenges. Walt emphasized realism's predictive power in alliance formation and conflict, dismissing constructivist views as insufficiently grounded in material incentives, which helped popularize theoretical debates beyond academia. In "An Unnecessary War," published in Foreign Policy in November/December 2002, Walt opposed the impending U.S. invasion of , contending that Saddam Hussein's regime posed no imminent threat and that remained viable, warning of destabilizing consequences like empowered Iranian influence. Drawing on historical precedents of failed preventive wars, the essay critiqued neoconservative overreach and advocated restraint, gaining traction as events unfolded with prolonged insurgency and regional fallout. Co-authored with , "The Israel Lobby and U.S. " appeared in the London Review of Books on March 23, 2006, positing that a coalition of pro- organizations systematically shapes U.S. policy toward unconditional support for , often at odds with broader American strategic interests such as countering or stabilizing flows. The authors supported their claims with evidence of expenditures exceeding $3.8 million annually by groups like in the early 2000s, congressional aid packages totaling over $3 billion yearly to despite its nuclear capabilities, and media influence skewing public discourse; the piece ignited fierce debate, with defenders of U.S.- ties accusing it of oversimplifying alliance benefits while Walt maintained its focus on empirical mechanics over . This , downloaded over 500,000 times initially, expanded into a bestselling and prompted congressional hearings on foreign influence, though mainstream outlets like largely critiqued it for underweighting shared democratic values in the partnership.

Foreign Policy Views

Principles of U.S. grand strategy and restraint

Stephen Walt advocates for a U.S. of offshore balancing, which emphasizes selective engagement to maintain favorable balances of power in three critical regions—, the , and —while avoiding permanent military commitments, , or ideological crusades. This approach, rooted in realist principles, posits that the United States should intervene only when local powers fail to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon that could threaten American security, thereby preserving U.S. primacy at lower cost than forward-deployed forces or global policing. has historically allowed the U.S. to deter threats without overextension, as seen in its pre-World War II posture and selective interventions. Central to Walt's restraint paradigm is the rejection of liberal hegemony, the post-Cold War strategy of using American power to promote , , and open markets worldwide, which he argues has produced costly failures like the (2003) and Afghan interventions, eroding U.S. credibility and resources without enhancing security. In his 2018 book The Hell of Good Intentions, co-authored with , Walt contends that this elite-driven policy overestimated the exportability of liberal institutions and ignored , leading to unnecessary entanglements and a relative decline in U.S. primacy by the 2010s. He prioritizes core national interests—defending the homeland and preventing peer competitors—over peripheral commitments, urging allies to shoulder more defense burdens to free U.S. resources for great-power competition. Walt's principles stress in deployment, warning that unrestrained interventions foster dependency among allies and invite balancing coalitions against the U.S., as evidenced by growing anti-American sentiment in regions like the post-2003. He advocates scaling back the U.S. global footprint—reducing bases from over 800 in 2016 to essentials—to sustain long-term primacy amid fiscal strains, with defense spending at 3.1% of GDP in 2023 still insufficiently targeted. This restrained realism, Walt maintains, aligns with America's geographic advantages and power asymmetries, enabling deterrence of rivals like without mirroring past overreaches.

Analyses of American power and cultural factors

Walt has analyzed post-Cold War American power as a temporary unipolar moment characterized by overwhelming superiority but constrained by geographic, economic, and political limits that prevent indefinite dominance. In Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (), he argues that other states respond to U.S. primacy through strategies such as balancing (forming coalitions to counter U.S. influence), (aligning with the U.S. for ), or softer methods like economic and diplomatic isolation, rather than direct due to America's nuclear and conventional advantages. These responses, Walt contends, erode U.S. leverage over time, as seen in growing resistance from powers like and , which exploit U.S. overextension in regions like the . He attributes the decline of U.S. primacy not primarily to external threats but to self-inflicted wounds from misguided strategies pursued by the foreign policy elite, whom he terms the "Blob" in The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (2018). Walt documents how trillions of dollars spent on interventions in Iraq (2003–2011, costing over $2 trillion by 2018 estimates) and Afghanistan (2001–2021, exceeding $2 trillion) yielded strategic failures, fostering terrorism, regional instability, and domestic fatigue without enhancing U.S. security. This elite consensus, spanning both parties, prioritizes global primacy through liberal hegemony—promoting democracy and open markets abroad—over realist restraint, leading to unnecessary commitments that dilute American power relative to rising competitors. Regarding cultural factors, Walt critiques the pervasive belief in as a distorting lens that fosters and unrealistic ambitions. In his 2011 essay "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," he dismantles the notion of U.S. uniqueness in virtue or morality, citing historical actions such as the U.S.-backed coup in (1953), the overthrow of Guatemala's government (1954), the invasion of (2003, resulting in an estimated 200,000 civilian deaths by 2011), and support for authoritarian regimes during the as evidence that U.S. behavior mirrors that of other great powers driven by self-interest rather than transcendent ideals. This cultural self-image, rooted in narratives like the "" from Puritan origins and reinforced in presidential rhetoric (e.g., by and ), encourages missionary interventions that ignore power realities, such as the failed in (2011) where U.S.-led action toppled Gaddafi but unleashed chaos without stabilizing governance. Walt argues that exceptionalism's cultural grip, amplified by domestic institutions like think tanks and media, blinds policymakers to causal realities of , where material capabilities and alliances, not ideological appeals, determine outcomes. For instance, he notes that U.S. efforts to export post-1991, as in the (1990s interventions costing billions) or the Arab Spring (2011 responses), often backfired by empowering adversaries like in , underscoring how cultural optimism overrides empirical lessons from (1955–1975, with 58,000 U.S. deaths) about the limits of coercive transformation. Instead, Walt advocates a realist approach emphasizing restraint to preserve power, warning that unchecked cultural narratives risk further erosion of U.S. influence amid multipolar shifts, as evidenced by China's economic rise (GDP surpassing the EU's by 2014) and Russia's assertiveness in (2014 annexation of ).

Regional perspectives: Middle East, Israel, and Iran

Walt has advocated for an strategy in the , emphasizing minimal direct U.S. military involvement to preserve a balance of power among regional states and prevent any single power from achieving . In this approach, the U.S. would rely on local actors—such as allowing and to counterbalance each other after the 1991 —rather than committing ground forces or pursuing transformative interventions, which he argues have repeatedly failed to stabilize the region or advance American interests. He critiques post-Cold War U.S. policies, including the 2003 invasion and prolonged occupations, as deviations from this restraint that exacerbated instability, empowered , and drained U.S. resources without yielding sustainable security gains. Regarding Israel, Walt co-authored The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007) with , contending that a "loose " of pro- organizations, donors, and individuals exerts significant influence on U.S. policymaking, leading to "unconditional" support for that often diverges from broader American strategic interests. The authors argue this lobby has shaped policies such as the 2003 , opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal, and resistance to Palestinian statehood initiatives, thereby complicating U.S. relations with Arab states and fueling anti-American sentiment across the Muslim world. Walt maintains that while the U.S.- alliance provides some intelligence and technological benefits, its costs— including strategic entanglement and perceived bias—outweigh them under realist criteria, urging a more conditional relationship focused on mutual interests rather than ideological affinity. On , Walt has consistently favored diplomatic engagement and deterrence over military confrontation or , viewing as a rational actor whose nuclear ambitions can be managed through verifiable agreements rather than coercion. He supported the 2015 (JCPOA), arguing it verifiably rolled back 's enrichment capabilities, extended breakout timelines to at least a year, and reduced proliferation risks without requiring , while criticizing opponents' claims—often amplified by pro-Israel advocates—as exaggerated threats unsubstantiated by assessments. Walt opposed the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the deal under President Trump, predicting it would accelerate 's program, isolate America diplomatically, and strengthen hardliners in , as evidenced by 's subsequent uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels by 2021. In terms, he sees as a natural counterweight to rivals like , advocating U.S. policies that encourage regional balances rather than alignment with Sunni states against Shiite , which he warns risks broader escalation. In recent analyses of the Israel-Hamas war following the October 7, 2023, attacks, Walt has described U.S. backing of Israel's Gaza operations as a "strategic blunder wrapped in a moral disaster," arguing it undermines American credibility, alienates global partners, and fails to achieve Israel's stated goals of dismantling or securing hostages. He contends persistent instability stems not from a mythical "new order" post-Abraham Accords but from unresolved grievances, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran's proxy networks, reinforcing his call for U.S. disengagement from ideological crusades.

Views on great powers: Russia, , and

Walt applies his balance-of-threat theory to great powers, arguing that states respond primarily to perceived threats rather than raw power distributions, emphasizing geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions as key factors. In this framework, he critiques U.S. policies that overextend commitments, advocating where America maintains influence without direct involvement unless vital interests are at stake. Regarding , Walt attributes the 2022 invasion of partly to Western "liberal illusions" about NATO enlargement and the spread of , which he contends heightened Moscow's sense of and threat despite Russia's conventional military weaknesses. He argues that 's post-Cold War expansion ignored realist precepts by provoking a declining power into assertive balancing behavior, though he rejects claims that realism predicted the war's inevitability or excuses Russian aggression. Walt supports limited U.S. aid to sufficient to prevent a Russian-dictated but warns against escalation that could entangle America in a prolonged proxy conflict, prioritizing restraint to avoid draining resources needed elsewhere. On China, Walt dismisses deterministic interpretations of the "," asserting that U.S.- war is a policy choice rather than historical inevitability, driven more by American overreaction than Beijing's inherent aggression. He views as a rising but not yet hegemonic power lacking the capacity for regional dominance due to internal challenges and U.S. alliances in , urging Washington to hedge through alliances like those with and while avoiding economic decoupling or military confrontation that could accelerate rivalry. In realist terms, Walt sees China's assertiveness in the as threat-balancing against perceived U.S. , but he cautions that portraying Beijing as an existential foe inflates threats and erodes U.S. focus on core interests. Walt's analysis of emphasizes transatlantic drift, criticizing U.S. subsidization of as enabling European free-riding on defense while fraying alliances through mismatched priorities, such as Europe's focus on over . He argues that the Ukraine war underscores Europe's dependence on American capabilities, yet reveals the need for greater European self-reliance to balance without perpetual U.S. guarantees, potentially reforming into a more threat-specific entity. In offshore balancing, Walt advocates reducing U.S. troop presence in to compel burden-sharing, redirecting resources toward Asia-Pacific threats like , while noting that Europe's internal divisions and limit its utility as a to non-European powers.

Specific case studies: Libya, Syria, and Snowden

In the 2011 , Walt opposed U.S. military intervention, arguing on March 8 that America lacked vital interests at stake and that historical evidence from over 100 cases of foreign-imposed showed such efforts rarely succeeded in creating stable democracies, often leading to prolonged instability or . He emphasized that Libya's weak state institutions and tribal divisions made post- governance improbable without massive, costly commitment, predicting the intervention would entangle the U.S. in contrary to realist principles of restraint. Following NATO's bombing campaign starting March 19, which aided rebels in toppling by October 20, Walt critiqued the operation as a that validated his warnings, with descending into factional violence, militia rule, and conditions by 2014, including the rise of affiliates. Walt consistently rejected deeper U.S. involvement in the , which began with protests on March 15, 2011, and escalated into a multi-sided conflict killing over 500,000 by 2016. In a September 21, 2015, essay, he grappled with humanitarian impulses amid refugee flows exceeding 4 million but concluded that arming rebels or enforcing no-fly zones would not topple , entrench proxy wars with and , and risk broader escalation without advancing core U.S. security interests. He dismissed arguments for intervention as preserving credibility or preventing growth, noting in October 24, 2016, that non-intervention had not eroded U.S. alliances or emboldened adversaries, whereas past engagements like in 2003 had cost trillions and fueled extremism. Walt advocated limited airstrikes against targets starting September 2014 but warned against missions, attributing Syria's tragedy to local power dynamics and great-power rivalries rather than U.S. inaction. Regarding Edward Snowden's June 2013 disclosures of NSA programs, including bulk metadata collection under Section 215 of the affecting millions of Americans and allies, Walt defended the whistleblower's actions as a exposing unchecked executive overreach. On July 9, 2013, he urged President Obama to grant Snowden an immediate , reasoning that his motives—to inform citizens of secret programs violating norms—outweighed legal breaches, and prosecution would deter future without addressing systemic flaws. Walt framed this within realist of concentrated state power, arguing that democratic oversight required transparency on intelligence practices, even if they targeted foreign threats like communications post-9/11. He later greeted Snowden on July 4, 2014, as embodying American ideals of resistance to authority.

Controversies and Reception

Debates surrounding The Israel Lobby

The "The Israel Lobby and U.S. ," co-authored by and Stephen Walt and first published in the London Review of Books on March 23, 2006, argued that a loose coalition of organizations and individuals, including the , exerts significant influence on U.S. toward and the broader , often in ways that diverge from core American strategic interests. The authors cited empirical examples such as the lobby's role in securing annual U.S. aid to exceeding $3 billion as of 2006, its mobilization against the 1982 Reagan peace plan, and its opposition to arms sales to Arab states, contending that this influence stems from effective lobbying, campaign contributions totaling over $15 million from pro- PACs in the 2000-2004 election cycles, and the strategic use of accusations of to deter critics rather than from inherent Jewish control or . A longer version appeared as a faculty research in the same year, amplifying the within academic and policy circles. The paper provoked immediate and intense backlash, with prominent critics accusing it of reviving antisemitic tropes of undue Jewish influence on gentile societies. , a professor, issued a detailed 40-page in , labeling the arguments conspiratorial and factually selective, such as allegedly downplaying 's security needs in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and misrepresenting the lobby's role in the by ignoring neoconservative advocacy independent of pro-Israel groups. The (ADL), an advocacy organization focused on combating , described the paper as "a classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis invoking the canards of Jewish power and Jewish control," pointing to its portrayal of the lobby as suppressing debate on U.S.- relations through media and academic pressure. Such charges echoed broader concerns from figures like David Wurmser, who argued the thesis conflated legitimate policy with , though empirical data on AIPAC's expenditures—$3.5 million in 2005 alone—supported the authors' claims of organizational efficacy without invoking ethnic . In response, Mearsheimer and Walt published "Setting the Record Straight: A Response to Critics of 'The Israel Lobby'" in 2006, defending their thesis as a realist of interest-group akin to other lobbies (e.g., Cuban-American or ), emphasizing that they explicitly distinguished the pro- lobby—comprising , Christian Zionists, and neoconservatives—from as a whole, 40% of whom in 2006 polls opposed unconditional U.S. support for . They contended that accusations served as a deflection mechanism, noting that similar critiques of Saudi or Taiwanese lobbies rarely face such labels, and cited instances like the lobby's successful push for the resolution despite intelligence doubts, evidenced by 29 pro- organizations signing letters to Congress in 2002. Academic reception was mixed; while some, like analysts, acknowledged the lobby's tangible effects on policy (e.g., shaping U.S. stance on Iran's nuclear program), others critiqued the paper's historical narrative for bias, such as understating 's proactive defense strategies in wars like 1967. Subsequent discourse highlighted causal tensions: proponents of the thesis pointed to post-2006 events, including AIPAC's role in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal opposition, where it mobilized over 100 members of to vote against the agreement, as validation of prioritizing Israeli security over U.S. nonproliferation goals. Critics, including those from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argued the lobby reflects broad bipartisan support—59% of Americans favored in a 2006 Gallup poll—rather than manipulation, attributing U.S. policy to shared democratic values and legacies rather than lobby coercion. The debate underscored realism's emphasis on power dynamics over moral or cultural affinities, with Walt later reiterating in 2015 discussions that fear of labels stifles empirical scrutiny of policy costs, such as $100 billion in cumulative U.S. aid to from 1948-2006 yielding limited reciprocal benefits. Despite polarization, the paper catalyzed increased academic focus on ethnic lobbies' roles, evidenced by citations in over 1,000 subsequent works by 2020, though mainstream outlets often framed it through bias lenses favoring pro-Israel narratives.

Criticisms of Walt's realism and policy prescriptions

Critics of Walt's defensive realism contend that it underestimates the offensive incentives in anarchy, failing to explain the prevalence of wars driven by competition over indivisible interests such as territory or ideology, rather than mere misperceptions or security dilemmas. Defensive realism posits that states primarily seek security and can achieve it through restraint, but empirical analysis of interstate conflicts since 1816 shows that over 65% of dyadic wars between rivals involved entrenched stakes, contradicting the theory's emphasis on avoidable pathologies like domestic leadership errors. For example, the theory struggles to account for Germany's preventive motivations in World War I or the zero-sum ideological dynamics of the Cold War, where structural power shifts, not diplomacy alone, resolved rivalries. Walt's policy prescriptions, particularly , have faced rebuke for advocating U.S. retrenchment from forward deployments in favor of relying on regional balancers, which risks ceding strategic ground to adversaries like in contested areas such as the . Proponents of deeper engagement argue that this approach inconsistently aims to preserve American primacy while withdrawing from rimland commitments essential for deterrence, leaving allies like and vulnerable to abandonment fears and prompting them to pursue independent nuclear options or alignments that destabilize regions. Critics highlight the logistical challenges of reinserting forces against anti-access/area-denial capabilities post-retrenchment, noting that historical retreats, such as U.S. after , facilitated the rise of aggressors like by eroding mechanisms. Further scrutiny targets Walt's restraint-oriented grand strategy for overlooking the U.S. capacity and obligation to shape global order through active presence, potentially allowing regional hegemons to emerge unchecked and disrupting maritime commons vital for trade. In the context of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Walt's attribution of the conflict largely to NATO expansion and Western policies has been criticized for downplaying Moscow's agency and revanchist ideology, aligning defensive realism with explanations that excuse authoritarian expansionism under structural pretexts. Such views, while rooted in systemic analysis, are faulted for insufficiently integrating domestic drivers of aggression, leading to prescriptions that prioritize great-power balancing over containing ideological threats.

Academic impact and public influence

Walt's seminal 1987 book The Origins of Alliances introduced the "balance of threat" theory, refining neorealist explanations of formation by emphasizing perceived threats over mere power distributions, and has garnered over 9,000 citations as of recent metrics. This work, along with his 1991 co-authored article "The Renaissance of ," which documented the field's revival post-Cold War and received approximately 2,867 citations, established Walt as a leading figure in and structural realism. His theoretical contributions have shaped graduate curricula in , with defensive realist perspectives influencing analyses of great-power competition and durability. As Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of at since 1999, Walt held the academic deanship from 2002 to 2006 and has mentored numerous scholars in realist traditions. His recognition includes election as a of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005 and the International Studies Association's Distinguished Senior Scholar Award in 2014, underscoring his enduring academic stature. Publications like the 1998 essay "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," cited over 2,100 times, have provided accessible primers on IR paradigms, bridging scholarly and pedagogical divides. In public discourse, Walt exerts influence through regular columns in Foreign Policy magazine and contributions to Foreign Affairs, where essays such as "Should America Retrench?" advocate and restraint in U.S. grand strategy. His 2007 co-authored book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, despite polarizing reception, amassed over 2,500 citations and prompted widespread debate on interest-group effects in foreign policymaking. Later works, including The Hell of Good Intentions (2018), critiquing post-Cold War liberal interventionism, have informed realist critiques of U.S. overreach, with Walt appearing in outlets like and CFR podcasts to discuss implications for alliances and great-power rivalry. This blend of scholarship and commentary positions him as a key voice urging empirical scrutiny of ideological foreign policy drivers over unchecked primacy.

Recent Developments

Activities in the 2020s

In the 2020s, Stephen Walt sustained his academic career at Harvard Kennedy School as the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs, focusing on international security and U.S. foreign policy. He continued contributing regular columns to Foreign Policy magazine, analyzing global events through a realist lens, including the geopolitical ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. elections, and great-power competition. Early in the decade, Walt addressed the pandemic's international fallout in public forums, such as a November 12, 2020, webinar on "World Politics, U.S. and COVID-19 Pandemic" hosted by Harvard's Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government. On October 1, 2020, he delivered a virtual address to the Irish Institute of International and European Affairs titled "The World Order after the Pandemic," contending that the crisis would accelerate shifts toward multipolarity and undermine U.S. primacy. That year, he also published a policy brief, The Global Order After COVID-19, outlining expectations of fragmented alliances and rising nationalism post-crisis. Walt's commentary extended to U.S. domestic politics' foreign policy implications, exemplified by a March 7, 2025, New York Times opinion piece asserting that Trump's approach, though unpolished, embodied realist priorities like prioritizing vital interests over ideological . In August 2025, he discussed realist in a podcast, advocating and restraint amid multipolar challenges from and . Later writings critiqued escalating violence and regional conflicts; on September 18, 2025, Walt's Foreign Policy column "How Assassinations Became Normal Again" examined the normalization of targeted killings in U.S. politics and abroad, linking it to eroded norms since the post-9/11 era. In October 2025, he published "The World After Oct. 7" in Foreign Policy, arguing that the 2023 attacks and Israel's response had reshaped alliances, exposed U.S. policy contradictions, and hastened a decline in American influence in the . These pieces underscored Walt's ongoing emphasis on power dynamics over moralistic interventions.

Engagement with current events post-2020

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, Walt critiqued the dominant Western narrative framing the conflict in binary moral terms, arguing in a September 2023 column that "the morality of 's war is very murky." He contended that factors such as NATO's post-Cold War expansion, 's 2014 treatment of Russian-speaking populations in , and Kyiv's rejection of contributed to escalation, complicating claims of unprovoked aggression and necessitating a realist assessment of vital U.S. interests over idealistic solidarity. In a January 2025 piece, Walt provided a framework for evaluating potential narratives of U.S. "loss" in , emphasizing that prolonged aid risked overextension without clear strategic gains, consistent with his advocacy for to preserve American power. Walt extensively analyzed the October 7, 2023, attacks on , which killed approximately 1,200 people, and the ensuing Gaza war in subsequent columns. In November 2023, he forecasted that the conflict would erode U.S. global influence by diverting resources, straining alliances, and highlighting failures in decades of U.S.- strategy toward , including support for settlement expansion and blockade policies that empowered . By October 2025, marking the second anniversary, Walt described the war's aftermath as reinforcing a "lawless" regional order, with 's inability to eliminate or secure lasting deterrence, coupled with U.S. vetoes of UN cease-fire resolutions, damaging American credibility in the Global South and accelerating multipolar shifts. He attributed these outcomes to causal miscalculations, such as underestimating grievances and over-relying on dominance without political resolution. On U.S.-China competition, Walt warned post-2020 that intensifying rivalry, exacerbated by COVID-19's exposure of vulnerabilities, demanded pragmatic coexistence over confrontation. In a 2025 article, he questioned alarmist views of Chinese intentions, positing that seeks regional influence rather than global hegemony, and urged Washington to prioritize deterrence in Asia while avoiding entanglement in secondary theaters like the . Echoing his 2020 assessment of a post-pandemic world as more fragmented and competitive, Walt argued in 2024 analyses that U.S. overcommitments elsewhere weakened focus on core threats from , advocating selective engagement to manage escalation risks in contingencies. Walt also commented on domestic U.S. foreign policy shifts under the second Trump administration starting January 2025, predicting limited deviations from bipartisan interventionism despite rhetorical "America First" isolationism. In February 2025 remarks, he supported negotiated Ukraine settlements to avert exhaustion but cautioned against alienating European allies, viewing Trump's approach as pragmatic restraint amid fiscal constraints and public war fatigue. Overall, his post-2020 engagements reinforced realist prescriptions for U.S. retrenchment, prioritizing great-power competition and balance-of-power dynamics over moral crusades or alliance proliferation.

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