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Holit
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Holit (Hebrew: חוֹלִית, lit. 'Dune') is a kibbutz in the Hevel Shalom region of south-west Israel. Located near Nir Yitzhak, the kibbutz is under the jurisdiction of Eshkol Regional Council. In 2023, it had a population of 244.[1]

Key Information

History

[edit]
Fields near Holit.

The kibbutz was established in 1978 as a Nahal settlement near Yamit, in the Sinai Peninsula. However, as a result of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979, Israel was required to evacuate all its settlements in the peninsula.

In 1982, the kibbutz was re-established in its current location.

The Holit attack was perpetrated by Hamas militants on 7 October 2023 in kibbutz Holit, as part of the October 7 surprise attack on Israel. Hamas killed at least 11 members of the kibbutz and two migrant workers.[2] Among the casualties were at least two American citizens.[3] A women's tank platoon of the Caracal Battalion was crucial in the recapturing of the kibbutz.[4]

Economy

[edit]

Holit's economy is based on agriculture and industry, with three main sources of income: the cattle farm, factory, and crop production. The factory produces juicers, about 50 a week.[dubious – discuss] Oranges, lemons, potatoes, mangos, nuts and carrots are all grown in the fields and orchards.

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Holit

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Holit is a in southern , located in the northwestern within the , approximately 10 kilometers west of the border. The community, whose name means "sand dune" in Hebrew, reflecting its arid, sandy terrain, was initially established in 1977 as a military outpost in the near and relocated to its current site in 1982 following the -Egypt that returned Sinai to Egyptian control. Prior to October 2023, Holit sustained a small, communal population of around 200 residents engaged primarily in , including and crop cultivation suited to conditions. On , 2023, terrorists infiltrated the as part of a coordinated on southern Israeli communities, killing 15 residents and taking at least one , in an attack that devastated the close-knit population and forced survivors into temporary displacement. The incident highlighted Holit's vulnerability due to its proximity to Gaza, prompting ongoing debates among residents about reconstruction at the original site versus relocation, with many still residing in interim housing as of late 2024. Despite its modest size and peripheral economy, Holit exemplifies the resilient, voluntary communal model of Israeli kibbutzim, which emphasize and mutual support amid regional security challenges.

Geography and Environment

Location and Borders

Holit is located in the Hevel Shalom area of the western desert, within the jurisdiction of the in southwestern . The lies adjacent to and forms part of the Gaza Envelope, a zone of communities situated within 7 kilometers of the Gaza Strip's border fence. Its geographical coordinates are approximately 31°13′48″N 34°19′36″E. The settlement's proximity to the Gaza border—estimated at under 2 kilometers in similar nearby communities—positions it on the fringe of the southern 's arid expanse, where flat, sandy terrain predominates and facilitates potential cross-border movement. Access to Holit is primarily via Route 241, a regional road connecting to broader infrastructure, while major urban centers such as lie about 55 kilometers to the northeast. This relative isolation amplifies logistical challenges, as the area's sparse and conditions limit rapid reinforcement from distant population hubs. The dynamics inherent to Holit's location expose it to empirical risks from the Gaza frontier, including the historical presence of tunnels exploited for infiltration due to the soft-soil substrata and minimal natural barriers along the fence line. Short-range rocket trajectories from Gaza also place the kibbutz within immediate threat radii, as the open terrain offers little obstruction to low-altitude launches or ground incursions breaching the perimeter. These factors underscore the site's strategic vulnerability, shaped by its placement in a contested zone rather than integrated defensive .

Climate and Terrain

Holit lies within the semi-arid transition zone between Mediterranean and desert climates typical of Israel's northwestern , characterized by prolonged hot, dry summers with average daytime highs of 30–35°C from to September and mild winters averaging 10–15°C. is sparse, averaging less than 200 mm annually and mostly occurring between and , rendering natural vegetation limited to drought-resistant shrubs and necessitating irrigation systems for any productive land use. The terrain features extensive mobile sand dunes, reflected in the kibbutz's Hebrew name "Holit," meaning "," with the area situated in a low-lying extension prone to aeolian , shifting sands, and occasional dust storms driven by prevailing westerly winds. These dunes, often stabilized partially through , contribute to soil instability and limit without intervention. Adaptations to these conditions include initiatives by Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael-Jewish National Fund (KKL-JNF), which has planted trees across the to anchor dunes, reduce wind erosion, and enhance microclimates, though persistent aridity and low soil fertility continue to challenge long-term habitability and agricultural viability.

History

Founding in Sinai and Ideological Origins

Kibbutz Holit was established in 1977 as an outpost in the , then under Israeli administration following the 1967 , when captured the territory from . The settlement formed part of a broader Israeli strategy to populate strategic frontier areas with Jewish communities, aiming to bolster territorial claims and security in arid regions adjacent to Egyptian-held lands. Founders, drawn from Zionist pioneering circles, emphasized agricultural self-sufficiency and communal living to adapt to the harsh desert environment, reflecting core principles of labor and environmental mastery. The name "Holit," meaning "sand dune" in Hebrew, directly evoked the site's sandy terrain, underscoring the settlers' intent to transform inhospitable dunes into viable habitations through irrigation and farming innovations. Ideologically rooted in , the outpost prioritized extending Jewish presence into contested territories as a means of asserting sovereignty, amid ongoing Egyptian demands for Sinai's return that dated back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and intensified after 1967. This effort aligned with post-war settlement drives near key sites like , where small groups undertook pioneering tasks such as dune stabilization and crop cultivation to demonstrate long-term viability. From , Holit's operations highlighted tensions between ideological commitment to permanent frontier expansion and pragmatic responses to geopolitical pressures, including Egyptian territorial assertions formalized in UN resolutions. Settlers focused on basic infrastructure and , embodying first-principles adaptation to while navigating the Sinai's isolation and challenges inherent to outposts in occupied zones.

Relocation to Current Site in 1982

Following Israel's completion of its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982, as required by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty stemming from the Camp David Accords, Kibbutz Holit was relocated from its original site in Sinai to its current position in the northwestern Negev Desert. The original members, who had established the kibbutz in 1977 as a Nahal military pioneering outpost, were joined by additional families to re-form the community, ensuring its survival as a collective agricultural enterprise. The selected site, approximately 2.6 kilometers from the border and near the with , aligned with Israeli efforts to populate frontier areas with civilian communities amid stabilizing relations with . Reestablishment occurred under the framework within the broader , emphasizing secular socialist principles. Initial development focused on basic communal structures, including temporary housing and facilities built around a central ash tree that served as the early gathering point, alongside setups for such as and orchards and operations. This relocation positioned Holit as a kibbutz in a region marked by proximity to Gaza, where Israeli administrative oversight did not preclude underlying tensions from Palestinian populations; protective measures, including tree plantings by the for visual screening, were implemented from the outset to mitigate potential cross-border visibility and threats. The decision reflected a policy prioritizing the perpetuation of ideology and territorial presence in peripheral zones over relocating to less exposed interiors, despite the inherent risks of heightened exposure to regional militancy dynamics that persisted beyond formal controls.

Pre-2023 Development and Daily Life

Following its relocation to the northwestern in 1982, Kibbutz Holit pursued expansion initiatives to bolster its population, targeting young singles and families amid the broader trend of modernization in . By the early 2020s, the community had grown to approximately 229 residents, reflecting incremental development in a region characterized by sparse settlement. Holit operated under a privatized communal framework, diverging from the traditional collective model prevalent in early kibbutzim; members managed individual incomes while sharing responsibility for , a shift adopted by most Israeli kibbutzim since the economic reforms of the and . This structure supported personal economic autonomy alongside collective provisions for education, healthcare, and infrastructure maintenance. Daily routines emphasized community cohesion through youth programs, educational initiatives, and shared facilities, with residents maintaining ties to adjacent border kibbutzim under the for mutual support and events. These activities were periodically disrupted by security protocols, including rocket alerts during Gaza conflicts such as Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014), which prompted the construction of bomb shelters approximately 2.6 kilometers from the Gaza border. Despite such threats, the system's deployment after 2011 reduced direct impacts, allowing continuity in agricultural and social operations.

Demographics and Community Structure

Holit, established as a in 1978 and relocated to its current site in 1982, experienced gradual population growth from a founding core of ideological pioneers to approximately 229 residents by late 2023, reflecting the slow expansion common in peripheral Israeli kibbutzim through selective absorption of gar'inim (nucleus groups) and young families. This figure encompassed around 84 adult members across 77 households, supplemented by children and participants in educational programs like pre-military training, underscoring a family-oriented structure with a higher-than-average child-to-adult ratio typical of traditional kibbutz demographics. The remained small and homogeneous, composed almost entirely of secular Jewish , with limited or diversity, which amplified vulnerabilities inherent to isolated, low-density settlements near conflict zones. Demographic trends indicated strains from an aging population, as seen in broader data where older residents outnumbered youth inflows, though Holit's emphasis on family growth mitigated this somewhat prior to 2023. Estimates from 2021 placed the total at 203, suggesting modest net gains via natural increase and recruitment efforts aimed at young singles and couples to counter stagnation. The October 7, 2023, attack precipitated a drastic decline, with the evacuated entirely and residents dispersed to temporary sites, reducing on-site presence to near zero. By August 2024, roughly 115 survivors had relocated to interim housing near Revivim, approximately 50 kilometers southeast, as rehabilitation plans grappled with the challenges of reconstituting a shrunken, traumatized . This dispersal highlighted the fragility of small-scale, cohesive groups, where collective decision-making and limited manpower hinder rapid recovery amid ongoing security threats.

Social and Political Orientation

Holit's social structure retains elements of traditional collectivism, governed by an elected secretariat that serves as the executive body, comprising the secretary as the top position alongside committee chairpersons, with decisions ratified through general assemblies of members. Shared facilities, such as dining halls and community centers, continue to foster social cohesion, though economic trends since the have introduced differential incomes and individual property rights, diluting full equality while preserving work arrangements. Politically, residents have historically aligned with left-of-center , rooted in Labor traditions emphasizing and collective self-reliance, with many supporting peace initiatives like the 1990s that sought Palestinian-Israeli coexistence. This orientation manifested in advocacy for dialogue and economic ties with Gaza neighbors, despite the kibbutz's mere 3 kilometers from the border, reflecting an optimism that prioritized ideological reconciliation over fortified deterrence. However, such views empirically underestimated the causal dynamics of Hamas's military entrenchment, enabled by disengagement policies and aid inflows, which prioritized restraint over preemptive strength and contributed to heightened vulnerabilities. Following the , 2023, events, internal viewpoints have diversified, with a notable shift among survivors toward demands for enhanced presence and of prior accommodationist strategies, mirroring Israel's broader security realism amid persistent threats from Gaza. This evolution highlights tensions between enduring collectivist ideals and pragmatic recognition that ideological advocacy, without reciprocal enforcement, fails against adversarial ideologies committed to confrontation.

Economy and Infrastructure

Agricultural and Industrial Activities

Holit’s agricultural activities formed the core of its pre-2023 economy, with a focus on production, field crops, and fruit cultivation adapted to the arid northwest environment. The kibbutz operated a large , which contributed significantly to milk output through intensive management practices common in Israeli border communities. Field crops, including grains and vegetables, were grown using systems to maximize water efficiency in the low-rainfall region, where annual averages under 200 mm. These efforts aligned with broader agricultural initiatives emphasizing sustainable . Fruit orchards specializing in and mangoes provided raw materials for processing, supporting local value-added production. The kibbutz’s Zaksenberg processed these fruits into beverages, representing a light industrial extension of its agricultural base and enabling partial self-sufficiency in output diversification. Supplementary operations included a for , though on a smaller scale compared to primary farming branches. Outputs from dairy and crops were typically channeled through regional cooperatives for distribution and export, reflecting the model’s integration with national markets. Security proximity to the Gaza border, just 2.6 km away, periodically disrupted operations through rocket alerts and restricted access, reducing labor efficiency and harvest yields in the years leading to 2023. Despite these challenges, Holit’s branches emphasized resilience via technological adaptations, such as protected cultivation for sensitive crops, tying into government-backed development programs for peripheral viability.

Privatization and Modern Adaptations

Holit, like numerous Israeli kibbutzim, adopted a privatized during the 2000s, shifting from income sharing to individual responsibility for earnings and budgeting while upholding limited communal services such as shared events. This renewal positioned Holit as a emphasizing economic independence, with members engaging in personal , particularly in agrotechnology tailored to the Negev's arid conditions. Modern adaptations included integration of , exemplified by a solar facility established in partnership with Doral Energy, marking Israel's inaugural combination of photovoltaic power generation and battery storage to enhance energy reliability in a remote, high-risk area. These efforts diversified revenue beyond , incorporating tech-driven solutions like climatetech collaborations with Ignite to advance sustainable farming innovations amid . The border location, however, amplified operational vulnerabilities, with empirical pressures from security threats contributing to elevated costs that tested the privatized model's resilience despite reduced communal subsidy dependence.

Security and Regional Context

Historical Threats and Border Proximity

Holit, situated in Israel's , lies approximately 1-2 kilometers from the border fence, positioning it among the most proximate civilian communities to the territory under control since 2007. This extreme closeness has rendered the kibbutz vulnerable to short-range threats, including mortars and unguided rockets that can traverse the distance in seconds, bypassing early warning systems limited by flight time. The , initially a basic fence upgraded over decades with sensors and cameras, has proven permeable to determined incursions, as evidenced by multiple detected breaches and overtopping attempts by militants prior to major fortifications post-2014. Since its 1982 relocation to the site, Holit has endured ongoing rocket and mortar barrages from Gaza-based groups, with escalations tied to Palestinian militant operations during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), when Qassam rockets first targeted southern , and subsequent conflicts including Operations Cast Lead (2008-2009, ~800 rockets), Pillar of Defense (2012, ~1,500 projectiles), and Protective Edge (2014, over 4,500 rockets). The Eshkol region, encompassing Holit, absorbed hundreds of such impacts annually in peak years, with the kibbutz's open agricultural fields and civilian density amplifying risks as "soft targets" in . Tunnel threats compounded this, as in 2016 when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uncovered a Hamas-dug offensive tunnel penetrating Israeli soil just hundreds of meters from Holit, intended for infiltration and attack. Similar attempts were foiled nearby, such as at Kibbutz Sufa in 2014, underscoring how proximity enabled subterranean approaches under the border. Israeli military assessments have consistently highlighted these vulnerabilities, citing Hamas's exploitation of Gaza's adjacency for low-tech, deniable attacks that evade symmetric defenses designed for state actors. In contrast, Holit's residents, many aligned with movements favoring negotiation and territorial compromise, often prioritized communal ideals over fortified isolation, viewing the location as a statement of peaceful settlement on the periphery despite empirical patterns of retaliation following Israeli operations or diplomatic stalls. Critics of such positioning, including analysts, contend it reflects a misapplication of settlement , disregarding causal links between proximity and elevated incursion rates in conflicts where adversaries prioritize terror over conventional gains, as borne out by repeated Gaza launches post-2005 disengagement.

Pre-October 7 Warnings and Preparedness

In the period leading up to , 2023, Israeli intelligence agencies, including the IDF, possessed detailed knowledge of 's "Jericho Wall" attack plan, which outlined a large-scale assault involving breaches of the Gaza border fence, infiltration into communities like Holit, and hostage-taking operations; this document had been obtained by more than a year earlier but was dismissed as aspirational rather than actionable. Surveillance soldiers monitoring the Gaza border, including areas proximate to Holit, reported heightened activity such as frequent vehicle movements and training exercises simulating assaults on Israeli positions, occurring several times weekly in the preceding months, yet these alerts were downplayed by senior commanders who prioritized other threats. Specific observations included operatives conducting rocket launches alongside tank crew attacks in training drills days before the assault, with reports from border spotters warning of unusual preparations that echoed the eventual tactics employed. Holit, situated less than a kilometer from the Gaza perimeter fence, featured a volunteer team (kitat konenut) responsible for initial response to intrusions, but this squad was equipped primarily with handguns and lacked heavier weaponry or sufficient training for sustained against organized incursions, reflecting broader restrictions on arming civilians in border kibbutzim to prevent escalation or misuse. The kibbutz maintained perimeter fencing, observation posts, and communal shelters (miklatim), yet rapid response depended heavily on external IDF forces stationed nearby, whose deployment protocols assumed limited-scale threats rather than mass breaches. Residents had periodically voiced apprehensions about fence vulnerabilities and understaffed patrols, amid ongoing low-level incidents like balloon incursions and incendiary devices from Gaza, but these were often framed within a of deterrence that underestimated Hamas's intent and capability for coordinated jihadist aggression. Critics, including former security officials, have attributed these lapses to a systemic complacency rooted in overreliance on technological barriers like the smart fence and a misconceived assessment that economic incentives and quiet-for-quiet understandings had neutralized Hamas's expansionist aims, ignoring empirical indicators of militarized buildup such as the terror group's of thousands for drills in mid-2023. This conceptual failure, sometimes termed "conceptzia," privileged diplomatic optimism over first-principles evaluation of adversarial incentives, where Hamas's charter and actions demonstrated persistent hostility despite surface-level truces. Data from communities revealed underinvestment in local defenses, with many kibbutzim like Holit operating on the assumption that IDF rapid intervention would suffice, exposing structural dependencies that proved inadequate against simultaneous multi-site penetrations.

October 7, 2023 Hamas Attack

Timeline of the Assault

The assault on Kibbutz Holit began in the early morning hours of October 7, 2023, aligning with the initial rocket barrages launched from Gaza around 6:30 a.m. that targeted southern , prompting residents to seek in safe rooms amid air raid sirens. Terrorists from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, 's military wing, breached the border security fence adjacent to the kibbutz—located just over 1 kilometer from Gaza—using methods including explosive charges, cutting tools, and motorized vehicles such as motorcycles and pickup trucks to facilitate rapid ground infiltration. Following the breach, approximately 20-30 infiltrators advanced into the kibbutz's residential zones, systematically targeting homes, the dining hall, and agricultural facilities in a house-to-house manner characteristic of the coordinated attacks on over 20 Gaza Envelope communities that day. Attackers employed fire, grenades, and incendiary devices to assault safe rooms, burn structures, and seize individuals for abduction, with some residents and security team members mounting improvised defenses using personal weapons. The violence persisted unchecked for several hours due to overwhelmed Israeli border defenses and communication disruptions caused by the terrorists, who disabled systems early in the incursion. IDF forces, including ground troops and armored units, did not reach Holit until around midday, engaging remaining attackers and securing the area after prolonged fighting that neutralized the infiltrators but left extensive destruction.

Casualties, Hostages, and Immediate Response

Fifteen residents and workers were murdered during the assault on Holit on October 7, 2023, including families killed in their homes such as Tehila Katabi, Hayim Katsman, Adi Vital-Keinan, and 91-year-old survivor Moshe Ridler. The killings involved direct shootings and , with militants systematically searching houses for victims. Four individuals—a father, Youssef Hamis Ziyadne, and his three children from the community in who were employed at the —were taken during the raid. As of October 2025, releases under agreements have accounted for many overall, though specific outcomes for this group include partial returns and intelligence-based declarations of for unreleased cases. Resident self-defense was limited, with the kibbutz's volunteer security team engaging intruders using personal firearms but unable to repel the coordinated infiltration due to numerical inferiority and surprise. Israel Defense Forces units did not secure the site for hours, as resources were stretched across dozens of simultaneous border breaches, allowing militants to operate unimpeded initially. Some residents evacuated independently via foot or vehicle, while others barricaded themselves until late afternoon when IDF forces began clearing the area. Hamas has justified the operation as armed resistance to Israeli policies, but survivor testimonies, video evidence from attackers' devices, and autopsies reveal intentional civilian executions, contradicting claims of targeting only military assets and indicating violations of .

Aftermath and Reconstruction

Evacuation and Temporary Relocation

Following the , 2023 Hamas attack, the approximately 200 residents of were evacuated en masse, with most relocating initially to a hotel at Kibbutz Ein Gedi near the Dead Sea. This displacement scattered the community across multiple sites, fracturing its tight-knit structure as families faced separations and varying living conditions. By August 2024, around 115 residents had shifted to prefabricated temporary housing adjacent to , approximately 50 kilometers southeast of , while others remained dispersed in locations such as an apartment building in in central or with relatives abroad, including a nine-month stay for some families in . Community cohesion was partially preserved through organized group activities and therapy sessions, often leveraging host resources, though the geographic fragmentation hindered full reunification. Residents encountered significant logistical and emotional hurdles, including pervasive manifesting as PTSD and heightened anxieties, compounded by family separations that exacerbated isolation. The Israeli government provided state-funded support for these interim accommodations and services, though implementation faced delays such as setbacks and like dust at the site.

Debates on Repopulation and Security Reforms

In June 2025, the Israeli government approved the immediate return of residents to seven of the 13 Gaza border communities most severely affected by the , 2023, attack, including Holit, determining no overriding security impediments existed. Despite this, Holit residents remain divided, with some citing persistent fears of resurgence and psychological trauma from the loss of 15 members—over 8% of the kibbutz's pre-attack population of about 180—while others emphasize communal resilience and historical attachment to the land. The community has tentatively scheduled a collective return for July 2026, post-school year, reflecting a cautious balance between empirical risks and sentimental ties, though individual hesitancy persists amid reports of the site evoking "ghosts and memories." Broader surveys of Gaza Envelope residents indicate high overall return intent, with 70% expressing plans to return as early as March 2024, evolving into over 90% repatriation by September 2025, bolstered by more than 2,500 newcomers to the region. However, pockets of reluctance endure in communities like Holit, where pre-return polls and resident testimonies highlight over 50% unease in hardest-hit kibbutzim due to unaddressed vulnerabilities exposed on , such as inadequate deterrence and response times. This division underscores a tension between data-driven security assessments—favoring fortified perimeters over unproven goodwill gestures—and optimistic narratives prioritizing rapid repopulation to restore normalcy, which critics argue ignores causal factors like Hamas's ideological commitment to border incursions. Security reform debates center on rectifying pre-2023 failures, including overreliance on surveillance technology and insufficient ground forces, which enabled Hamas's breach of the border fence. Residents and advocates demand permanent IDF outposts, upgraded multi-layered fencing with AI integration, and mandatory armed civilian rapid-response units, drawing from empirical lessons of delayed during the attack. Right-leaning voices, including groups, push for sustained akin to models, viewing it as essential deterrence given Gaza's demilitarization challenges. In contrast, some left-leaning former peace advocates, while acknowledging a post-attack rightward shift in views, advocate conditional returns tied to international guarantees for Gaza , though such hopes are critiqued as detached from Hamas's track record of rearming. prioritizes verifiable hardening measures, as evidenced by slowed infiltration rates post-reinforcements, over speculative diplomatic outcomes.

Recent Developments as of 2025

In October 2025, two years after the , 2023 attack, Holit residents faced ongoing deliberations about returning to the site, with Israeli authorities granting permission for re-entry despite unresolved trauma and security risks. Approximately 15 of the kibbutz's pre-attack population of around 200 were killed, and many survivors expressed hesitation due to vivid memories of , leading to continued residence in temporary northern Israeli locations. Rebuilding initiatives progressed slowly, with community leaders discussing redesigns for homes and public facilities to include bolstered defenses, amid widespread damage to infrastructure such as agricultural facilities and residences. Support from the , in partnership with entities like the Minneapolis Jewish Federation, facilitated aid for rehabilitation, including economic recovery for , , and operations that underpinned the kibbutz's pre-attack viability. No full-scale repopulation had materialized by late 2025, as partial trial returns remained unconfirmed for Holit specifically, contrasting with broader Gaza-border trends where 90% of displaced residents returned overall but hardest-hit sites lagged. Community programs emphasized trauma mitigation, with events like October 2025 commemorations in partner cities sharing survivor testimonies to foster resilience, though empirical challenges persisted: intermittent rocket fire from Gaza, numbering over 10,000 incidents since October 2023, deterred permanent resettlement, and an unspecified fraction of families cited irreversible relocation decisions. Legal pursuits against perpetrators advanced via Israeli and international channels, but recovery hinged on fortified border security absent comprehensive neutralization.

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  49. https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/10/27/israeli-volunteers-clean-up-kibbutz-attacked-by-hamas-on-october-7
  50. https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/07/17/i-cant-erase-all-the-blood-from-my-mind/palestinian-armed-groups-october-7
  51. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-3.pdf
  52. https://www.timesofisrael.com/adi-vital-kaploun-33-amazing-mother-killed-in-front-of-her-children/
  53. https://www.timesofisrael.com/kibbutz-ravaged-on-oct-7-looks-to-renewal-through-gene-edited-vegetable-trials/
  54. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hayim-katsman-32-us-israeli-scholar-and-peace-activist/
  55. https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/07/17/i-cant-erase-all-blood-my-mind/palestinian-armed-groups-october-7
  56. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/who-are-israeli-hostages-set-be-released-by-hamas-2025-10-13/
  57. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-military-kibbutz-internal-inquiry-rcna161497
  58. https://www.timesofisrael.com/state-approves-immediate-return-home-of-7-of-13-worst-hit-gaza-border-communities/
  59. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-868364
  60. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-792395
  61. https://www.timesofisrael.com/over-2500-israelis-have-moved-to-gaza-border-area-towns-in-wake-of-oct-7-report/
  62. https://newlinesmag.com/argument/how-changes-in-the-israeli-military-led-to-the-failure-of-october-7/
  63. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-859382
  64. https://www.jta.org/2025/04/18/israel/eyeing-a-new-opportunity-jewish-settlers-are-positioning-themselves-on-the-gaza-border
  65. https://my.israelgives.org/en/fundme/kibbutzholit
  66. https://tcjewfolk.com/2025/10/01/events-to-mark-oct-7-in-st-paul-and-minneapolis/
  67. https://www.timesofisrael.com/you-have-to-be-a-real-zionist-two-years-after-oct-7-new-dreamers-rebuild-kibbutzim/
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