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Jury
Jury
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An empty jury box at an American courtroom in Pershing County, Nevada

A jury is a sworn body of people (jurors) convened to hear evidence, make findings of fact, and render an impartial verdict officially submitted to them by a court, or to set a penalty or judgment. Most trial juries are "petit juries", and consist of up to 15 people. A larger jury known as a grand jury has been used to investigate potential crimes and render indictments against suspects, and consists of between 16 and 23 jurors.

The jury system developed in England during the Middle Ages and is a hallmark of the English common law system. Juries are commonly used in countries whose legal systems derive from the British Empire, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Ireland. They are not used in most other countries, whose legal systems are based upon European civil law or Islamic sharia law, although their use has been spreading. Instead, typically guilt is determined by a single person, usually a professional judge. Civil law systems that do not use juries may use lay judges instead.

The word jury has also been applied to randomly-selected bodies with other purposes, such as policy juries.

Types of jury

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The "petit jury" (or "trial jury", sometimes "petty jury") hears the evidence in a trial as presented by both the plaintiff (petitioner) and the defendant (respondent) (also known as the complainant and defendant within the English criminal legal system). After hearing the evidence and often jury instructions from the judge, the group retires for deliberation, to consider a verdict. The majority required for a verdict varies. In some cases it must be unanimous, while in other jurisdictions it may be a majority or supermajority. A jury that is unable to come to a verdict is referred to as a hung jury.

Grand jury

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A grand jury, a type of jury now confined mostly to federal courts and some state jurisdictions in the United States and Liberia, determines whether there is enough evidence for a criminal trial to go forward. Grand juries carry out this duty by examining evidence presented to them by a prosecutor and issuing indictments, or by investigating alleged crimes and issuing presentments. Grand juries are usually larger than trial juries: for example, U.S. federal grand juries have between 16 and 23 members. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees Americans the constitutional right to be free from charges for "capital, or otherwise infamous" crimes unless they have been indicted by a grand jury, although this right applies only to federal law, not state law.

In addition to their primary role in screening criminal prosecutions and assisting in the investigation of crimes, grand juries in California, Florida,[1] and some other U.S. states are sometimes utilized to perform an investigative and policy audit function similar to that filled by the Government Accountability Office in the United States federal government and legislative state auditors in many U.S. states.

In Ireland and other countries in the past, the task of a grand jury was to determine whether the prosecutors had presented a true bill (one that described a crime and gave a plausible reason for accusing the named person).[2]

Coroner's jury

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Another kind of jury, known as a coroner's jury can be convened in some common law jurisdiction in connection with an inquest by a coroner. A coroner is a public official (often an elected local government official in the United States), who is charged with determining the circumstances leading to a death in ambiguous or suspicious cases. A coroner's jury is generally a body that a coroner can convene on an optional basis in order to increase public confidence in the coroner's finding where there might otherwise be a controversy.[3] In practice, coroner's juries are most often convened in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety by one governmental official in the criminal justice system toward another if no charges are filed against the person causing the death, when a governmental party such as a law enforcement officer is involved in the death.[4]

Advisory jury

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An advisory jury is a non-binding jury empaneled by a judge to provide an opinion on factual issues during a trial. Unlike ordinary juries, whose verdicts are binding, an advisory jury’s findings serve only to inform the judge, who remains the final arbiter of fact and law. In the United States federal courts, advisory juries may be used in actions “not triable of right by a jury” under Rule 39(c)(1). When an advisory jury is used, the court must make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law separately, as required by Rule 52. The practice originated in the English Court of Chancery, where factual issues were sometimes referred to common law courts for a jury’s opinion, a procedure later known as the feigned issue.

Policy jury

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A session of a German citizens' assembly in 2019.

Citizens' assembly is a group of people selected by lottery from the general population to deliberate on important public questions so as to exert an influence.[5][6][7][8] Other names and variations of deliberative mini-publics include citizens' jury, citizens' panel, people's panel, people's jury, policy jury, consensus conference and citizens' convention.[9][10][11][12]

A citizens' assembly uses elements of a jury to create public policy.[13] Its members form a representative cross-section of the public, and are provided with time, resources and a broad range of viewpoints to learn deeply about an issue. Through skilled facilitation, the assembly members weigh trade-offs and work to find common ground on a shared set of recommendations. Citizens' assemblies can be more representative and deliberative than public engagement, polls, legislatures or ballot initiatives.[14][15] They seek quality of participation over quantity. They also have added advantages in issues where politicians have a conflict of interest, such as initiatives that will not show benefits before the next election or decisions that impact the types of income politicians can receive. They also are particularly well-suited to complex issues with trade-offs and values-driven dilemmas.[16]

With Athenian democracy as the most famous government to use sortition, theorists and politicians have used citizens' assemblies and other forms of deliberative democracy in a variety of modern contexts.[17][18] As of 2023, the OECD has found their use increasing since 2010.[19][20]

Historical roots

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The Jury, an 1861 painting by John Morgan of a British jury, all of whom then had to be men

The modern jury evolved out of the ancient custom of many ancient Germanic tribes whereby a group of men of certain social standing was used to investigate crimes and judge the accused.[citation needed] The same custom evolved into the vehmic court system in medieval Germany.[citation needed] In Anglo-Saxon England, juries investigated crimes. After the Norman Conquest, some parts of the country preserved juries as the means of investigating crimes.[citation needed] The use of ordinary members of the community to consider crimes was unusual in ancient cultures, but was nonetheless also found in ancient Greece.

The modern jury trial evolved out of this custom in the mid-12th century during the reign of Henry II.[21] Juries, usually 6 or 12 men, were an "ancient institution" even then in some parts of England, at the same time as Members consisted of representatives of the basic units of local government—hundreds (an administrative sub-division of the shire, embracing several vills) and villages. Called juries of presentment, these men testified under oath to crimes committed in their neighbourhood. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 caused these juries to be adopted systematically throughout the country. The jury in this period was "self-informing," meaning it heard very little evidence or testimony in court. Instead, jurors were recruited from the locality of the dispute and were expected to know the facts before coming to court. The source of juror knowledge could include first-hand knowledge, investigation, and less reliable sources such as rumour and hearsay.[22]

Between 1166 and 1179 new procedures including a division of functions between the sheriff, the jury of local men, and the royal justices ushered in the era of the English Common Law. Sheriffs prepared cases for trial and found jurors with relevant knowledge and testimony. Jurors 'found' a verdict by witnessing as to fact, even assessing and applying information from their own and community memory—little was written at this time and what was, such as deeds and writs, were subject to fraud. Royal justices supervised trials, answered questions as to law, and announced the court's decision which was then subject to appeal. Sheriffs executed the decision of the court. These procedures enabled Henry II to delegate authority without endowing his subordinates with too much power.[21]:293

In 1215 the Catholic Church removed its sanction from all forms of the ordeal—procedures by which suspects up to that time were 'tested' as to guilt (e.g., in the ordeal of hot metal, molten metal was sometimes poured into a suspected thief's hand. If the wound healed rapidly and well, it was believed God found the suspect innocent, and if not then the suspect was found guilty). With trial by ordeal banned, establishing guilt would have been problematic had England not had forty years of judicial experience. Justices were by then accustomed to asking jurors of presentment about points of fact in assessing indictments; it was a short step to ask jurors if they concluded the accused was guilty as charged.[21]:358

The so-called Wantage Code provides an early reference to a jury-like group in England, wherein a decree issued by King Æthelred the Unready (at Wantage, c. 997) provided that in every Hundred "the twelve leading thegns together with the reeve shall go out and swear on the relics which are given into their hands, that they will not accuse any innocent man nor shield a guilty one."[23] The resulting Wantage Code formally recognized legal customs that were part of the Danelaw.[24]

The testimonial concept can also be traced to Normandy before 1066, when a jury of nobles was established to decide land disputes. In this manner, the Duke, being the largest land owner, could not act as a judge in his own case.[25]

One of the earliest antecedents of modern jury systems is the jury in ancient Greece, including the city-state of Athens, where records of jury courts date back to 500 BCE. These juries voted by secret ballot and were eventually granted the power to annul unconstitutional laws, thus introducing the practice of judicial review. In modern justice systems, the law is considered "self-contained" and "distinct from other coercive forces, and perceived as separate from the political life of the community," but "all these barriers are absent in the context of classical Athens. In practice and in conception the law and its administration are in some important respects indistinguishable from the life of the community in general."[26]

In juries of the Justices in Eyre, the bailiff of the hundred would choose 4 electors who in turn chose 12 others from their hundred, and from these were selected 12 jurors.[27]

17th-18th century

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From the 17th century until 1898 in Ireland, Grand Juries also functioned as local government authorities.[28]

In 1730, the British Parliament passed the Bill for Better Regulation of Juries.[29] The Act stipulated that the list of all those liable for jury service was to be posted in each parish and that jury panels would be selected by lot, also known as sortition, from these lists. Its aim was to prevent middle-class citizens from evading their responsibilities by financially putting into question the neutrality of the under-sheriff, the official entrusted with impaneling juries. Prior to the Act, the main means of ensuring impartiality was by allowing legal challenges to the sheriff's choices. The new provisions did not specifically aim at establishing impartiality but had the effect of reinforcing the authority of the jury by guaranteeing impartiality at the point of selection.

In some American colonies (such as in New England and Virginia) and less often in England, juries also handed down rulings on the law in addition to rulings on the facts of the case.[30] The American grand jury was also indispensable to the American Revolution by challenging the Crown and Parliament, including by indicting British soldiers, refusing to indict people who criticized the crown, proposing boycotts and called for the support of the war after the Declaration of Independence.[31]

In the late 18th century, English and colonial civil, criminal and grand juries played major roles in checking the power of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.[31]

19th century

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In 1825, the rules concerning juror selection in England were consolidated. Property qualifications and various other rules were standardised, although an exemption was left open for towns which "possessed" their own courts.[32] This reflected a more general understanding that local officials retained a large amount of discretion regarding which people they actually summoned. In the late eighteenth century, King has found evidence of butchers being excluded from service in Essex;[33] while Crosby has found evidence of "peripatetic ice cream vendors" not being summoned in the summer time as late as 1923.[34][better source needed]

With the adoption of the Juries Act (Ireland) 1871, property qualifications for Irish jurors were partially standardized and lowered, so that jurors were drawn from among men who paid above a certain amount of taxes for poor relief.[2][better source needed] This expanded the number of potential jurors, even though only a small minority of Irish people were eligible to serve.[2]

Until the 1870s, jurors in England and Ireland worked under the rule that they could not leave, eat, drink, or have a fire to warm themselves by, though they could take medicine.[2] This rule appears to have been imposed with the idea that hungry jurors would be quicker to compromise, so they could reach a verdict and therefore eat.[2] Jurors who broke the rule by smuggling in food were sometimes fined, and occasionally, especially if the food were believed to come from one of the parties in the case, the verdict was quashed.[2] Later in the century, jurors who did not reach a verdict on the first day were no longer required to sleep in the courthouse, but were sometimes put up, at the expense of the parties in the trial, at a hotel.[2]

20th century

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After 1919 in England, women were no longer excluded from jury service by virtue of their sex, although they still had to satisfy the ordinary property qualifications. The exemption which had been created by the 1825 Act for towns which "possessed" their own courts meant ten towns were free to ignore the property qualifications. This amplified in these towns the general understanding that local officials had a free hand in summoning freely from among those people who were qualified to be jurors. In 1920, three of these ten towns – Leicester, Lincoln, and Nottingham – consistently empanelled assize juries of six men and six women; while at the Bristol, Exeter, and Norwich assizes no women were empanelled at all.[35][better source needed] This quickly led to a tightening up of the rules, and an abolition of these ten towns' discretion. After 1922, trial juries throughout England had to satisfy the same qualifications; although it was not until the 1980s that a centralised system was designed for selecting jurors from among the people who were qualified to serve.[36] This meant there was still a great amount of discretion in the hands of local officials.

Summoning jurors

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Notice mailed to summon a potential juror to a US court in 2007.

Potential jurors are summoned to the courthouse for service. In the past, jurors were identified manually, by local authorities making lists of men they believed to be eligible for service.[2] In 19th-century Ireland, the list of eligible jurors in each court district was alphabetized, and in the later part of the century, the sheriff was required to summon one potential juror from each letter of the alphabet, repeating as needed until a sufficient number of men had been summoned, usually between 36 and 60 men for the quarterly assizes.[2] Normally the sheriff or a constable went to each juror's home to show him the summons paperwork (venire facias de novo); it wasn't until 1871 that any Irish jurors could be summoned by mail.[2] In modern times, juries are often initially chosen randomly, usually from large databases identifying the eligible population of adult citizens residing in the court's jurisdictional area (e.g., identity cards, drivers' licenses, tax records, or similar systems), and summons are delivered by mail.

In the past, qualifications included things like being an adult male, having a good reputation in the community, and owning land. Modern requirements may include being a citizen of that country and having a fluent understanding of the language used during the trial. In addition to a minimum age, some countries have a maximum age.[2] Some countries disqualify people who have been previously convicted of a crime or excuse them on various grounds, such as being ill or holding certain jobs or offices.[2]

Serving on a jury is normally compulsory for individuals who are qualified for jury service. Skipping service may be inevitable in a small number of cases, as a summoned juror might become ill or otherwise become unexpectedly unable to appear at the court. However, a significant fraction of summoned jurors may fail to appear for other reasons. In 1874, there was a report that one-third of summoned Irish jurors failed to appear in court.[2]

When an insufficient number of summoned jurors appear in court to handle a matter, the law in many jurisdictions empowers the jury commissioner or other official convening the jury to involuntarily impress bystanders in the vicinity of the place where the jury is to be convened to serve on the jury.[37]

Trial jury size

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As the concept of a jury was spread through the British Empire, first to Ireland and then to other countries, the size of the jury was one of the details that was adapted to the local culture.[2] The tradition in England was to have twelve jurors, but other countries use smaller juries,[2] and some, such as Scotland, use larger juries.

The size of the jury is to provide a "cross-section" of the public. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a Florida state jury of six was sufficient, that "the 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of "trial by jury," and that respondent's refusal to impanel more than the six members provided for by Florida law "did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the Fourteenth."[38] In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that the number of jurors could not be reduced below six.

In Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278, the High Court of Australia unanimously held that a jury of 12 members was not an essential feature of "trial by jury" in section 80 of the Australian Constitution.

In Scotland, a jury in a criminal trial consists of 15 jurors, which is thought to be the largest in the world. In 2009 a review by the Scottish Government regarding the possibility of reduction[39] led to the decision to retain 15 jurors, with the Cabinet Secretary for Justice stating that after extensive consultation, he had decided that Scotland had got it "uniquely right".[40] Trials in the Republic of Ireland which are scheduled to last over 2 months can, but do not have to, have 15 jurors.

A study by the University of Glasgow suggested that a civil jury of 12 people was ineffective because a few jurors ended up dominating the discussion, and that seven was a better number because more people feel comfortable speaking, and they have an easier time reaching a unanimous decision.[41][42][43]

Jury selection

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About 50 prospective jurors awaiting jury selection

Jurors are expected to be neutral, so the court may inquire about the jurors' neutrality or otherwise exclude jurors who are perceived as likely to be less than neutral or partial to one side. Jury selection in the United States usually includes organized questioning of the prospective jurors (jury pool) by the lawyers for the plaintiff and the defendant and by the judge—voir dire—as well as rejecting some jurors because of bias or inability to properly serve ("challenge for cause"), and the discretionary right of each side to reject a specified number of jurors without having to prove a proper cause for the rejection ("peremptory challenge"), before the jury is impaneled.

Since there is always the possibility of jurors not completing a trial for health or other reasons, often one or more alternate jurors may be selected. Alternates are present for the entire trial but do not take part in deliberating the case and deciding the verdict unless one or more of the impaneled jurors are removed from the jury. For example, in the United Kingdom, a small number of alternate jurors may be empanelled until the end of the opening speeches by counsel, in case a juror realises they are familiar with the matters before the court.

Jurors are selected from a jury pool formed for a specified period of time—usually from one day to two weeks—from lists of citizens living in the jurisdiction of the court. The lists may be electoral rolls (i.e., a list of registered voters in the locale), people who have driver's licenses or other relevant data bases. When selected, being a member of a jury pool is, in principle, compulsory. Prospective jurors are sent a summons and are obligated to appear in a specified jury pool room on a specified date.

However, jurors can be released from the pool for several reasons including illness, prior commitments that cannot be abandoned without hardship, change of address to outside the court's jurisdiction, travel or employment outside the jurisdiction at the time of duty, and others. Often jurisdictions pay token amounts for jury duty and many issue stipends to cover transportation expenses for jurors. Work places cannot penalize employees who serve jury duty. Payments to jurors varies by jurisdiction.[44]

In the United States jurors for grand juries are selected from jury pools.

Selection of jurors from a jury pool occurs when a trial is announced and juror names are randomly selected and called out by the jury pool clerk. Prospective jurors are sent to the courtroom to participate in voir dire, pronounced [vwaʁ diʁ] in French, the oath to speak the truth in the examination testing competence of a juror, or in another application, a witness. Once the list of prospective jurors has assembled in the courtroom the court clerk assigns them seats in the order their names were originally drawn. At this point the judge often will ask each prospective juror to answer a list of general questions such as name, occupation, education, family relationships, time conflicts for the anticipated length of the trial. The list is usually written up and clearly visible to assist nervous prospective jurors and may include several questions uniquely pertinent to the particular trial. These questions are to familiarize the judge and attorneys with the jurors and glean biases, experiences, or relationships that could jeopardize the proper course of the trial.

After each prospective juror has answered the general slate of questions the attorneys may ask follow-up questions of some or all prospective jurors. Each side in the trial is allotted a certain number of challenges to remove prospective jurors from consideration. Some challenges are issued during voir dire while others are presented to the judge at the end of voir dire. The judge calls out the names of the anonymously challenged prospective jurors and those return to the pool for consideration in other trials. A jury is formed, then, of the remaining prospective jurors in the order that their names were originally chosen. Any prospective jurors not thus impaneled return to the jury pool room.

Composition

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A jury is intended to be an impartial panel capable of reaching a verdict and representing a variety of people from that area. Achieving this goal can be difficult when juror qualifications differ significantly from the people living in that area.[2] For example, in 19th-century Ireland, the qualified jurors were much wealthier, much less likely to be Roman Catholic, and much less likely to speak only the Irish language than the typical Irish person.[2] In the past, England had special juries, which empaneled only wealthier property owners as jurors.[2] Attacks on the American jury increased after the pool of jurors expanded to include newly-enfranchised women and minorities.[45]

A head juror is called the foreperson, foreman, or presiding juror. The foreperson may be chosen before the trial begins, or at the beginning of the jury's deliberations. The foreperson may be selected by the judge or by vote of the jurors, depending on the jurisdiction. The foreperson's role may include asking questions (usually to the judge) on behalf of the jury, facilitating jury discussions, and announcing the verdict of the jury.

Role

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The role of the jury is often described as that of a finder of fact, while the judge is usually seen as having the sole responsibility of interpreting the appropriate law and instructing the jury accordingly. The jury determines the truth or falsity of factual allegations and renders a verdict on whether a criminal defendant is guilty, or a civil defendant is civilly liable. Sometimes a jury makes specific findings of fact in what is called a "special verdict". A verdict without specific findings of fact that includes only findings of guilt, or civil liability and an overall amount of civil damages, if awarded, is called a "general verdict".[citation needed]

Juries are often justified because they leaven the law with community norms.[46] A jury trial verdict in a case is binding only in that case, and is not a legally binding precedent in other cases. For example, it would be possible for one jury to find that particular conduct is negligent, and another jury to find that the conduct is not negligent, without either verdict being legally invalid, on precisely the same factual evidence. Of course, no two witnesses are exactly the same, and even the same witness will not express testimony in exactly the same way twice, so this would be difficult to prove. It is the role of the judge, not the jury, to determine what law applies to a particular set of facts. However, occasionally jurors find the law to be invalid or unfair, and on that basis acquit the defendant, regardless of the evidence presented that the defendant violated the law. This is commonly referred to as "jury nullification of law" or simply jury nullification. When there is no jury ("bench trial"), the judge makes rulings on both questions of law and of fact. In most continental European jurisdictions, judges have more power in a trial and the role and powers of a jury are often restricted. Actual jury law and trial procedures differ significantly between countries.

The collective knowledge and deliberate nature of juries are also given as reasons in their favor:

Detailed interviews with jurors after they rendered verdicts in trials involving complex expert testimony have demonstrated careful and critical analysis. The interviewed jurors clearly recognized that the experts were selected within an adversary process. They employed sensible techniques to evaluate the experts’ testimony, such as assessing the completeness and consistency of the testimony, comparing it with other evidence at the trial, and evaluating it against their own knowledge and life experience. Moreover, the research shows that in deliberations jurors combine their individual perspectives on the evidence and debate its relative merits before arriving at a verdict.[47]

In the United States, juries are sometimes called on, when asked to do so by a judge in the jury instructions, to make factual findings on particular issues. This may include, for example, aggravating circumstances which will be used to elevate the defendant's sentence if the defendant is convicted. This practice was required in all death penalty cases in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), where the Supreme Court ruled that allowing judges to make such findings unilaterally violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. A similar Sixth Amendment argument in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) resulted in the Supreme Court's expansion of the requirement to all criminal cases, holding that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt".[48]

Many U.S. jurisdictions permit the seating of an advisory jury in a civil case in which there is no right to trial by jury to provide non-binding advice to the trial judge,[49] although this procedural tool is rarely used. For example, a judge might seat an advisory jury to guide the judge in awarding non-economic damages (such as "pain and suffering" damages) in a case where there is no right to a jury trial, such as (depending on state law) a case involving "equitable" rather than "legal" claims.

In Canada, juries are also allowed to make suggestions for sentencing periods at the time of sentencing. The suggestions of the jury are presented before the judge by the Crown prosecutor(s) before the sentence is handed down. In a small number of U.S. jurisdictions, including the states of Tennessee[50] and Texas,[51] juries are charged both with the task of finding guilt or innocence as well assessing and fixing sentences.

However, this is not the practice in most other legal systems based on the English tradition, in which judges retain sole responsibility for deciding sentences according to law. The exception is the award of damages in English law libel cases, although a judge is now obliged to make a recommendation to the jury as to the appropriate amount.

In legal systems based on English tradition, findings of fact by a jury, and jury conclusions that could be supported by jury findings of fact even if the specific factual basis for the verdict is not known, are entitled to great deference on appeal. In other legal systems, it is generally possible for an appellate court to reconsider both findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the trial court, and in those systems, evidence may be presented to appellate courts in what amounts to a trial de novo (new trial) of appealed findings of fact. The finality of trial court findings of fact in legal systems based on the English tradition has a major impact on court procedure in these systems. This makes it imperative that lawyers be highly prepared for trial because errors and misjudgments related to the presentation of evidence at trial to a jury cannot generally be corrected later on appeal, particularly in court systems based on the English tradition. The higher the stakes, the more this is true. Surprises at trial are much more consequential in court systems based on the English tradition than they are in other legal systems.[citation needed]

Scholarly research on jury behavior in American non-capital criminal felony trials reveals that juror outcomes appear to track the opinions of the median juror, rather than the opinions of the extreme juror on the panel, although juries were required to render unanimous verdicts in the jurisdictions studied.[52][better source needed] Thus, although juries must render unanimous verdicts, in run-of-the-mill criminal trials they behave in practice as if they were operating using a majority rules voting system.

Jury sentencing

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Jury sentencing is the practice of having juries decide what penalties to give those who have been convicted of criminal offenses. The practice of jury sentencing began in the US state of Virginia in the 18th century and spread westward to other states that were influenced by Virginia-trained lawyers.[53]

Canadian juries have long had the option to recommend mercy, leniency, or clemency, and the 1961 Criminal Code required judges to give a jury instruction, following a verdict convicting a defendant of capital murder, soliciting a recommendation as to whether he should be granted clemency. When capital punishment in Canada was abolished in 1976, as part of the same raft of reforms, the Criminal Code was also amended to grant juries the ability to recommend periods of parole ineligibility immediately following a guilty verdict in second-degree murder cases; however, these recommendations are usually ignored, based on the idea that judges are better-informed about relevant facts and sentencing jurisprudence and, unlike the jury, permitted to give reasons for their judgments.[54]

Proponents of jury sentencing argue that since sentencing involves fact-finding (a task traditionally within the purview of juries), and since the original intent of the founders was to have juries check judges' power, it is the proper role of juries to participate in sentencing.[55] Opponents argue that judges' training and experience with the use of presentence reports and sentencing guidelines, as well as the fact that jury control procedures typically deprive juries of the opportunity to hear information about the defendant's background during the trial, make it more practical to have judges sentence defendants.[56] In Canada, a faint hope clause formerly allowed a jury to be empanelled to consider whether an offender's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole ought to be reduced, but this was repealed in 2011.[54]

Sentencing is said to be more time-consuming for jurors than the relatively easy task of ascertaining guilt or innocence,[57] which means an increase in jury fees and in the amount of productivity lost to jury duty.[58] In New South Wales, a 2007 proposal by Chief Justice Jim Spigelman to involve juries in sentencing was rejected after District Court Chief Judge Reg Blanch cited "an expected wide difference of views between jurors about questions relating to sentence". Concerns about jury tampering through intimidation by defendants were also raised.[59]

Germany and many other continental European countries have a system in which professional judges and lay judges deliberate together at both the trial and sentencing stages; such systems have been praised as a superior alternative because the mixed court dispenses with most of the time‐consuming practices of jury control that characterize Anglo‐American trial procedure, yet serves the purposes of a jury trial better than plea bargaining and bench trials, which have displaced the jury from routine American practice.[60]

Experience of jurors

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The experience of individual jurors is understudied.[2] However, during times of political unrest jurors have been criminally threatened or physically harmed because of their service, and this resulted in people being less willing to serve, or to prefer the risk of judicial fines for not serving to the risk of criminal retribution if they do serve on the jury.[2]

Jurors typically take their roles very seriously.[61] According to Simon (1980), jurors approach their responsibilities as decision makers much in the same way as a court judge: with great seriousness, a lawful mind, and a concern for consistency that is evidence-based. By actively processing evidence, making inferences, using common sense and personal experiences to inform their decision-making, research has indicated that jurors are effective decision makers who seek thorough understanding, rather than passive, apathetic participants unfit to serve on a jury.[62]

Jury effectiveness

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Researchers are typically not permitted to study live criminal juries. This is because jury deliberations are conducted privately, to facilitate free and open discussion and minimise outside influence. However, this means that researchers struggle to investigate the effectiveness of real juries. One researcher has therefore suggested that there is a 'jury-shaped hole' at the centre of contemporary jury science.[63] As a result, researchers must study juries indirectly, for example by paying experimental participants to serve on 'mock juries' for the purpose of psychological study.[64]

Existing research has provided partial support for the proficiency of juries as decision makers due to taking their work seriously to get a fair outcome and by relying on the group to overcome individual biases.[65] However, the purported advantages of collective deliberation is controversial.[66] For example, group dynamics introduce various factors that can distort the reliability of individual judgment--such as interpersonal bias, information cascades, and social pressures to conform to the dominant view. Some note the imperfections in the process and advocate for amendments to the system, with only 3% of US judges favoring abolishing the jury.[65] The thoroughness of the jury trial has also been praised for providing the public with important information that is often not released in alternative procedures like arbitration or adjudication by judges or administrative agencies.[67]

Bias of jurors

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Psychological research has found that jurors can reach inaccurate decisions as a result of bias, which may include factors such as pre-trial beliefs and attitudes (both explicit and implicit), cognitive bias and biased interpretations of evidence by expert witnesses.[68][69][70] Various studies, particularly in the United States, have identified differences in the rate of conviction based on whether jurors and defendants share the same ethnicity.[71][72][73][74] Crime-type bias, where jurors' perceived strength of a prosecutor's case depends on the severity of the crime, is also common.[75]

Judge-jury agreement

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Evidence supporting jury effectiveness has also been illustrated in studies that investigate the parallels between judge and jury decision-making.[76] According to Kalven and Zeisel (1966), it is not uncommon to find that the verdicts passed down by juries following a trial match the verdicts held by the appointed judges. Upon surveying judges and jurors of approximately 8,000 criminal and civil trials, it was discovered that the verdicts handed down by both parties were in agreement 80% of the time.[76]

Suja A. Thomas argues that, "although results between judges and juries may be similar, judges and juries can disagree. If a choice must be made between a judge or a jury deciding, the diversity, availability of deliberations, the requirement for consensus, the lack of monetary or promotion incentives, and the fresh examination of evidence all make the jury the most attractive, least-biased decision-maker."[77]

Integrity

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For juries to fulfill their role of analyzing the facts of the case, there are strict rules about their use of information during the trial. Juries are often instructed to avoid learning about the case from any source other than the trial (for example from media or the Internet) and not to conduct their own investigations (such as independently visiting a crime scene). Parties to the case, lawyers, and witnesses are not allowed to speak with a member of the jury. Doing these things may constitute reversible error. Rarely, such as in very high-profile cases, the court may order a jury sequestered for the deliberation phase or for the entire trial.

Jurors are generally required to keep their deliberations in strict confidence during the trial and deliberations, and in some jurisdictions even after a verdict is rendered. In Canadian and English law, the jury's deliberations must never be disclosed outside the jury, even years after the case; to repeat parts of the trial or verdict is considered to be contempt of court, a criminal offense. In the United States, confidentiality is usually only required until a verdict has been reached, and jurors have sometimes made remarks that called into question whether a verdict was properly reached. In Australia, academics are permitted to scrutinize the jury process only after obtaining a certificate or approval from the Attorney-General.

Because of the importance of preventing undue influence on a jury, embracery, jury intimidation or jury tampering (like witness tampering) is a serious crime, whether attempted through bribery, threat of violence, or other means.[2] At various points in history, when threats to jurors became pervasive, the right to jury trial has been revoked, such as during the 1880s in Ireland.[2]

Robert Burns and Alexander Hamilton argued that jurors were the least likely decision-makers to be corrupted when compared to judges and all the political branches.[78]

Criticism

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Sentencing disparities

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Jurors, like most individuals, are not free from holding social and cognitive biases, which could result in sentencing disparities. People may negatively judge individuals who do not adhere to established social norms (e.g., an individual's dress sense) or do not meet societal standards of success. Although these biases tend to influence jurors' individual decisions during a trial,[79] while working as part of a group (i.e., jury), these biases are typically controlled.[80] Groups tend to exert buffering effects that allow jurors to disregard their initial personal biases when forming a credible group decision. Analysis of over a quarter million felony cases in USA found for grand juries no statistical significance for taste-based or statistical discrimination between black and white defendants.[81] Other studies found significant sentencing disparities related to in-group favoritism.[82]

Robert Burns cites Plato in arguing that gaining power and ruling wisely are different skillsets, making the case for a jury of those who have not sought power to create better outcomes than trials left up to judges.[83] Burns further argues that interest groups have increasing influence over political branches, including judges, and that the jury was designed to resist the new Gilded Age-level concentration of power.[84] He also cites Blackstone who argued that it was against human nature for the few (judges) to be attentive to the needs of the many.[85] He also argues the legitimacy of the judiciary increases with a more robust jury.[86] The trial also provides the public with insight into the conduct of judges and the parties involved, further encouraging good behavior.[67] Unlike in other major institutions that run on a more bureaucratic utilitarian logic, the jury checks this way of thinking by bringing common-sense and moral perspectives to bear.[87] Burns contrasts the focus on fact for a jury with other political processes like congressional forums, which he argues are undisciplined forums for overbroad abstractions.[88] Lastly, Burns argues the jury is a vote of confidence for democracy as the most democratic institution (at least in America) and one that demonstrates that it is possible to find common ground on difficult questions, especially when decisions must be unanimous.[89] Juries can show larger sentencing disparities than judges.[90]

Jurors themselves can also be held liable if they compromise their impartiality or commit juror misconduct. Depending on local law, if a juror takes a bribe, the verdict may be overturned and the juror may be fined or imprisoned.[2]

Jury nullification

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Jury nullification means the jury decides not to apply the law to the facts in a particular case. In other words, it is "the process whereby a jury in a criminal case effectively nullifies a law by acquitting a defendant regardless of the weight of evidence against him or her."[91]

In the 17th and 18th centuries, there was a series of such cases, starting in 1670 with the trial of the Quaker William Penn which asserted the (de facto) right, or at least power, of a jury to render a verdict contrary to the facts or law. A good example is the case of one Carnegie of Finhaven who in 1728 accidentally killed the Scottish Earl of Strathmore. As the defendant had undoubtedly killed the Earl, the law (as it stood) required the jury to render the verdict that the case had been "proven" and cause Carnegie of Finhaven to die for an accidental killing. Instead, the jury asserted what is believed to be their "ancient right" to judge the whole case and not just the facts and brought in the verdict of "not guilty".

Today in the United States, juries are instructed by the judge to follow the judge's instructions concerning what is the law and to render a verdict solely on the evidence presented in court. Important past exercises of nullification include cases involving slavery (see Fugitive Slave Act of 1850), freedom of the press (see John Peter Zenger), and freedom of religion (see William Penn).

In United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th. Cir. 1969), Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal unanimously ruled: "If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the right to acquit, and the courts must abide that decision." The Fully Informed Jury Association is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to informing jurors of their rights and seeking the passage of laws to require judges to inform jurors that they can and should judge the law. In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws.

Modern American jurisprudence is generally intolerant of the practice, and a juror can be removed from a case if the judge believes that the juror is aware of the power of nullification.[92]

In the United Kingdom, a similar power exists, often called jury equity. This enables a jury to reach a decision in direct contradiction with the law if they feel the law is unjust. This can create a persuasive precedent for future cases, or render prosecutors reluctant to bring a charge – thus a jury has the power to influence the law.

The standard justification of jury equity is taken from the final few pages of Lord Devlin's book Trial by Jury. Devlin explained jury equity through two now-famous metaphors: that the jury is "the lamp that shows that freedom lives" and that it is a "little parliament".[93] The second metaphor emphasises that, just as members of parliament are generally dominated by government but can occasionally assert their independence, juries are usually dominated by judges but can, in extraordinary circumstances, throw off this control.[94] Devlin thereby sought to emphasise that neither jury equity nor judicial control is set in stone.

Perhaps the best example of modern-day jury equity in England and Wales was the acquittal of Clive Ponting, on a charge of revealing secret information, under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 in 1985. Mr Ponting's defence was that the revelation was in the public interest. The trial judge directed the jury that "the public interest is what the government of the day says it is" – effectively a direction to the jury to convict. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.

Another example is the acquittal in 1989 of Michael Randle and Pat Pottle, who confessed in open court to charges of springing the Soviet spy George Blake from Wormwood Scrubs Prison and smuggling him to East Germany in 1966. Pottle successfully appealed to the jury to disregard the judge's instruction that they consider only whether the defendants were guilty in law, and assert a jury's ancient right to throw out a politically motivated prosecution, in this case, compounded by its cynical untimeliness.[95]

In Scotland (with a separate legal system from that of England and Wales) although technically the "not guilty" verdict was originally a form of jury nullification, over time the interpretation has changed so that now the "not guilty" verdict has become the normal one when a jury is not persuaded of guilt and the "not proven" verdict is only used when the jury is not certain of innocence or guilt.[96] It is absolutely central to Scottish and English law that there is a presumption of innocence. It is not a trivial distinction, since any shift in the burden of proof is a significant change which undermines the safeguard for the citizen.[97]

Trial procedures by country

[edit]

Overall, jury use has been increasing worldwide.[77]

Africa

[edit]

Ghana

[edit]

In Ghana, juries have seven members, and their sole duty is to determine whether the person is guilty.[98] They have no role in sentencing.[98]

Americas

[edit]

Brazil

[edit]

The Constitution of Brazil provides that only willful crimes against life, namely full or attempted murder, abortion, infanticide and suicide instigation, be judged by juries. Seven jurors vote in secret to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not, and decisions are taken by the majority.

Brazil stands alone among countries with jury systems in prohibiting juror deliberation. Under the "incommunicability rule" (regra da incomunicabilidade), Brazilian jurors must decide verdicts individually, without discussing the case with one another.[99]

Manslaughter and other crimes in which the killing was committed without intent, however, are judged by a professional judge instead.

Canada

[edit]

In Canada, juries are used for some criminal trials but not others. For summary conviction offences[100] or offences found under section 553 of the Criminal Code (theft and fraud up to the value of $5,000 and certain nuisance offences), the trial is before a judge alone. For most indictable offences, the accused person can elect to be tried by either a judge alone or a judge and jury.[101] In the most serious offences, found in section 469 of the Criminal Code (such as murder or treason), a judge and a jury are always used, unless both the accused and the prosecutor agree that the trial should not be in front of a jury.[102] The jury's verdict on the ultimate disposition of guilt or innocence must be unanimous,[103] but can disagree on the evidentiary route that leads to that disposition.[104][105]

Juries do not make a recommendation as to the length of sentence, except for parole ineligibility for second-degree murder (but the judge is not bound by the jury's recommendation, and the jury is not required to make a recommendation).[103]

Jury selection is in accordance with specific criteria. Prospective jurors may only be asked certain questions, selected for direct pertinence to impartiality or other relevant matters. Any other questions must be approved by the judge.

A jury in a criminal trial initially has 12 members. The trial judge has the discretion to direct that one or two alternate jurors also be appointed.[106] If a juror is discharged during the course of the trial, the trial will continue with an alternate juror, unless the number of jurors goes below 10.[107]

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that anyone tried for an offense that has a maximum sentence of five or more years has the right to be tried by a jury (except for an offence under military law).

The names of jurors are protected by a publication ban. There is a specific criminal offense for disclosing anything that takes place during jury deliberations.[103]

Juries are infrequently used in civil trials in Canada. There are no civil juries in the courts of the province of Quebec, nor in the Federal Court.

United States

[edit]

In criminal law in federal courts and a minority of state court systems of the United States, a grand jury is convened to hear only testimony and evidence to determine whether there is a sufficient basis for deciding to indict the defendant and proceed toward trial. In each court district where a grand jury is required, a group of 16–23 citizens holds an inquiry on criminal complaints brought by the prosecutor to decide whether a trial is warranted (based on the standard that probable cause exists that a crime was committed), in which case an indictment is issued. In jurisdictions where the size of a jury varies, in general the size of juries tends to be larger if the crime alleged is more serious. If a grand jury rejects a proposed indictment the grand jury's action is known as a "no bill." If they accept a proposed indictment, the grand jury's action is known as a "true bill." Grand jury proceedings are ex parte: only the prosecutor and witnesses who the prosecutor calls may present evidence to the grand jury and defendants are not allowed to present mitigating evidence or even to know the testimony that was presented to the grand jury, and hearsay evidence is permitted. This is so because a grand jury cannot convict a defendant. It can only decide to indict the defendant and proceed forward toward trial. Grand juries vote to indict in the overwhelming majority of cases, and prosecutors are not prohibited from presenting the same case to a new grand jury if a "no bill" was returned by a previous grand jury. A typical grand jury considers a new criminal case every fifteen minutes. In some jurisdictions, in addition to indicting persons for crimes, a grand jury may also issue reports on matters that they investigate apart from the criminal indictments, particularly when the grand jury investigation involves a public scandal. Historically, grand juries were sometimes used in American law to serve a purpose similar to an investigatory commission.

Both Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the Sixth Amendment require that criminal cases be tried by a jury.[108] Originally this applied only to federal courts. However, the Fourteenth Amendment extended this mandate to the states. Although the Constitution originally did not require a jury for civil cases, this led to an uproar which was followed by adoption of the Seventh Amendment, which requires a civil jury in cases where the value in dispute is greater than twenty dollars.[109] However, the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial does not apply in state courts, where the right to a jury is strictly a matter of state law.[110] However, in practice, all states except Louisiana preserve the right to a jury trial in almost all civil cases where the sole remedy sought is money damages to the same extent as jury trials are permitted by the Seventh Amendment. Under the law of many states, jury trials are not allowed in small claims cases. The civil jury in the United States is a defining element of the process by which personal injury trials are handled.

In practice, even though the defendant in a criminal action is entitled to a trial by jury, most criminal actions in the U.S. are resolved by plea bargain.[111] Only about 2% of civil cases go to trial, with only about half of those trials being conducted before juries.

In 1898 the Supreme Court held that the jury must be composed of at least twelve persons, although this was not necessarily extended to state civil jury trials.[109] In 1970, however, the Supreme Court held that the twelve person requirement was a "historical accident", and upheld six-person juries if provided for under state law in both criminal and civil state court cases. There is controversy over smaller juries, with proponents arguing that they are more efficient and opponents arguing that they lead to fluctuating verdicts.[109] In a later case, however, the court rejected the use of five-person juries in criminal cases.[109] Juries go through a selection process called voir dire in which the lawyers question the jurors and then make "challenges for cause" and "peremptory challenges" to remove jurors. Traditionally the removal of jurors based on a peremptory challenge required no justification or explanation, but the tradition has been changed by the Supreme Court where the reason for the peremptory challenge was the race of the potential juror. Since the 1970s "scientific jury selection" has become popular.[109]

Unanimous jury verdicts have been standard in US American law. This requirement was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1897, but the standard was relaxed in 1972 in two criminal cases. As of 1999 over thirty states had laws allowing less than unanimity in civil cases, but, until 2020, Oregon and Louisiana were the only states which have laws allowing less than unanimous jury verdicts for criminal cases (these laws were overturned in Ramos v. Louisiana).[109] When the required number of jurors cannot agree on a verdict (a situation sometimes referred to as a hung jury), a mistrial is declared, and the case may be retried with a newly constituted jury. The practice generally was that the jury rules only on questions of fact and guilt; setting the penalty was reserved for the judge. This practice was confirmed by rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court such as in Ring v. Arizona,[112] which found Arizona's practice of having the judge decide whether aggravating factors exist to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, to be unconstitutional, and reserving the determination of whether the aggravating factors exist to be decided by the jury. However, in some states (such as Alabama and Florida), the ultimate decision on the punishment is made by the judge, and the jury gives only a non-binding recommendation. The judge can impose the death penalty even if the jury recommends life without parole.[113]

There is no set format for jury deliberations, and the jury takes a period of time to settle into discussing the evidence and deciding on guilt and any other facts the judge instructs them to determine. Deliberation is done by the jury only, with none of the lawyers, the judge, or the defendant present. The first step will typically be to find out the initial feeling or reaction of the jurors to the case, which may be by a show of hands, or via secret ballot. The jury will then attempt to arrive at a consensus verdict. The discussion usually helps to identify jurors' views to see whether a consensus will emerge as well as areas that bear further discussion. Points often arise that were not specifically discussed during the trial. The result of these discussions is that in most cases the jury comes to a unanimous decision and a verdict is thus achieved. In some states and under circumstances, the decision need not be unanimous.

In a few states and in death penalty cases, depending upon the law, the trial jury, or sometimes a separate jury, may determine whether the death penalty is appropriate in "capital" murder cases. Usually, sentencing is handled by the judge at a separate hearing. The judge may but does not always follow the recommendations of the jury when deciding on a sentence.[114]

Asia and Oceania

[edit]

Australia

[edit]
States
[edit]

Each state may determine the extent to which the use of a jury is used. The use of a jury is optional for civil trials in any Australian state.[115] The use of a jury in criminal trials is generally by a unanimous verdict of 12 lay members of the public. Some States provide exceptions such as majority (11-to-1 or 10-to-2) verdicts where a jury cannot otherwise reach a verdict.[116] All states except Victoria allow a person accused of a criminal offence to elect to be tried by a judge-alone rather than the default jury provision.

Commonwealth (Federal)
[edit]

The Constitution of Australia provides in section 80 that 'the trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury'.[117] The Commonwealth can determine which offences are 'on indictment'.[118] It would be entirely consistent with the Constitution that a homicide offence could be tried not 'on indictment,' or conversely that a simple assault could be tried 'on indictment.' This interpretation has been criticized as a 'mockery' of the section, rendering it useless.[119]

Where a trial 'on indictment' has been prescribed, it is an essential element that it be found by a unanimous verdict of guilty by 12 lay members of the public. This requirement stems from the (historical) meaning of 'jury' at the time that the Constitution was written and is (in principle) thus an integral element of trial by jury.[120] Unlike in the Australian states, an accused person cannot elect a Judge-only trial, even where both the accused and the prosecutor seek such a trial.[121]

In November 2023, Indigenous Australian law expert Pattie Lees called for greater inclusion of First Nations people in the jury system to create a more "fair, just" system."[122]

Hong Kong

[edit]

Article 86 of the Hong Kong Basic Law assures the practice of jury trials. Criminal cases in the High Court and some civil cases are tried by a jury in Hong Kong. There is no jury in the District Court. In addition, from time to time, the Coroner's Court may summon a jury to decide the cause of death in an inquest. Criminal cases are normally tried by a 7-person jury and sometimes, at the discretion of the court, a 9-person jury. Nevertheless, the Jury Ordinance requires that a jury in any proceedings should be composed of at least 5 jurors.

Although article 86 of the basic law states that ‘the principle of trial by jury previously practiced in Hong Kong shall be maintained’, it does not guarantee that every case is to be tried by a jury. In the case Chiang Lily v. Secretary for Justice (2010), the Court of Final Appeal agreed that ‘there is no right to trial by jury in Hong Kong.’

India

[edit]

Jury trials were abolished in most Indian courts by the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure .[123][124] Nanavati Case was not the last Jury trial in India. West Bengal had Jury trials as late as 1973.[125] Juries were not mentioned in the 1950 Indian Constitution, and it was ignored in many Indian states. The Law Commission recommended their abolition in 1958 in its 14th Report. They were retained in a discreet manner for Parsi divorce courts, wherein a panel of members called 'delegates' are randomly selected from the community to decide the fact of the case. Parsi divorce law is governed by 'The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936' as amended in 1988,[123] and is a mixture of the Panchayat legal system and jury process.

New Zealand

[edit]

Juries are used in all trials involving Category 4 offences such as treason, murder and manslaughter, although in exceptional circumstances a judge-alone trial may be ordered. At the option of the defendant, juries may be used in trials involving Category 3 offences, that is, offences where the maximum penalty available is two years' imprisonment or greater. In civil cases, juries are only used in cases of defamation, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Juries must initially try to reach a unanimous verdict, but if one cannot be reached in a reasonable timeframe, the judge may accept a majority verdict of all-but-one (i.e. 11–1 or 10–1) in criminal cases and three-quarters (i.e. 9–3 or 9–2) in civil cases.[126]

Europe

[edit]

Belgium

[edit]

The Belgian Constitution provides that all cases involving the most serious crimes be judged by juries. As a safeguard against libel cases, press crimes can also only be tried by a jury. Racism is excluded from this safeguard.

Twelve jurors decide by a qualified majority of two-thirds whether the defendant is guilty or not. A tied vote result in 'not guilty'; a '7 guilty – 5 not guilty' vote is transferred to the 3 professional judges who can, by unanimity, reverse the majority to 'not guilty'. The sentence is delivered by a majority of the 12 jurors and the 3 professional judges.[127] As a result of the Taxquet ruling the juries give nowadays the most important motives that lead them to their verdict. The procedural codification has been altered to meet the demands formulated by the European Court of Human Rights.

France

[edit]
In the Cour d'assises
[edit]

Three professional judges sit alongside six jurors in first instance proceedings or nine in appeal proceedings. Before 2012, there were nine or twelve jurors, but this was reduced to cut spending. A two-thirds majority is needed in order to convict the defendant. During these procedures, judges and jurors have equal positions on questions of fact, while judges decide on questions of procedure. Judges and jurors also have equal positions on sentencing.

Germany

[edit]

Trial by jury was introduced in most German states after the revolutionary events of 1848. However, it remained controversial; and, early in the 20th century, there were moves to abolish it.[128] The Emminger Reform of January 4, 1924, during an Article 48 state of emergency, abolished the jury system and replaced it with a mixed system including bench trials and lay judges.

In 1925, the Social Democrats called for the reinstitution of the jury; a special meeting of the German Bar demanded revocation of the decrees, but "on the whole the abolition of the jury caused little commotion".[129] Their verdicts were widely perceived as unjust and inconsistent.

Today, most misdemeanors are tried by a Strafrichter, meaning a single judge at an Amtsgericht; felonies and more severe misdemeanors are tried by a Schöffengericht, also located at the Amtsgericht, composed of 1 judge and 2 lay judges; some felonies are heard by Erweitertes Schöffengericht, or extended Schöffengericht, composed of 2 judges and 2 lay judges; severe felonies and other "special" crimes are tried by the große Strafkammer, composed of 3 judges and 2 lay judges at the Landgericht, with specially assigned courts for some crimes called Sonderstrafkammer; felonies resulting in the death of a human being are tried by the Schwurgericht, composed of 3 judges and 2 lay judges, located at the Landgericht; and serious crimes against the state are tried by the Strafsenat, composed of 5 judges, at an Oberlandesgericht.[130]

In some civil cases, such as commercial law or patent law, there are also lay judges, who have to meet certain criteria (e.g., being a merchant).

Ireland

[edit]

The law in Ireland is historically based on English common law and had a similar jury system. Article 38 of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland mandates trial by jury for criminal offences, with exceptions for minor offences, military tribunals, and where "the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order".[131] In DPP v Nally [2006] IECCA 128 Kearns J set out that a jury has the right to reach a not guilty verdict even in direct contradiction of the evidence.

The principal statute regulating the selection, obligations and conduct of juries is the Juries Act 1976 as amended by the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008.[132][133][134] There is a fine of €500 for failing to report for jury service, though this was poorly enforced until a change of policy at the Courts Service in 2016.[135] Criminal jury trials are held in the Circuit Court or the Central Criminal Court.[136] Juryless trials under the inadequacy exception, dealing with terrorism or organised crime, are held in the Special Criminal Court, on application by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).[137] Juries are also used in some civil law trials, such as for defamation;[138] they are sometimes used at coroner's inquests.[139]

Normally consisting of twelve persons, juries are selected from a jury panel which is picked at random by the county registrar from Irish citizens on the Dáil electoral register.[132] Juries only decide questions of fact and have no role in criminal sentencing. It is not necessary that a jury be unanimous in its verdict.[138] In civil cases, a verdict may be reached by a majority of nine of the twelve members.[138] In a criminal case, a verdict need not be unanimous where there are not fewer than eleven jurors if ten of them agree on a verdict after considering the case for a "reasonable time".[138] Juries are not paid, nor do they receive travel expenses; however they do receive lunch for the days that they are serving.[132] The Law Reform Commission examined jury service, producing a consultation paper in 2010 and then a report in 2013.[140][141] One of its recommendations, to permit extra jurors for long trials in case some are excused, was enacted in 2013.[142][143][144] In November 2013, the DPP requested a 15-member jury at the trial of three Anglo Irish Bank executives.[144] Where more than twelve jurors are present, twelve will be chosen by lot to retire and consider the verdict.[143]

Italy

[edit]

In Italy, a civil law jurisdiction, untrained judges are present only in the Corte d'Assise, where two career magistrates are supported by six so-called lay judges, who are chosen by lot from the registrar of voters. Any Italian citizen, with no distinction of sex or religion, between 30 and 65 years of age, can be appointed as a lay judge; in order to be eligible as a lay judge for the Corte d'Assise, however, there is a minimum educational requirement, as the lay judge must have completed his/her education at the Scuola Media (junior high school) level, while said level is raised for the Corte d'Assise d'Appello (appeal level of the Corte d'Assise) to the Scuola Superiore (senior high school) degree. In the Corte d'Assise, decisions concerning both fact and law matters are taken by the stipendiary judges and "lay judges" together at a special meeting behind closed doors, named Camera di Consiglio ("Counsel Chamber"), and the Court is subsequently required to publish written explanations of its decisions within 90 days from the verdict. Errors of law or inconsistencies in the explanation of a decision can and usually will lead to the annulment of the decision. A Court d'Assise and a Court d'Assise d'Appello decides on a majority of votes, and therefore predominantly on the votes of the lay judges, who are a majority of six to two, but in fact lay judges, who are not trained to write such explanation and must rely on one or the other stipendiary judge to do it, are effectively prevented from overruling both of them. The Corte d'Assise has jurisdiction to try crimes carrying a maximum penalty of 24 years in prison or life imprisonment, and other serious crimes; felonies that fall under its jurisdiction include terrorism, murder, manslaughter, severe attempts against State personalities, as well as some matters of law requiring ethical and professional evaluations (e.g. assisted suicide), while it generally has no jurisdiction over cases whose evaluation requires knowledge of law which the "lay judges" generally do not have. Penalties imposed by the court can include life sentences.

Norway

[edit]

Juries existed in Norway as early as the year 800, and perhaps even earlier. They brought the jury system to England and Scotland. Juries were phased out as late as the 17th century, when Norway's central government was in Copenhagen, Denmark. Though Norway and Denmark had different legal systems throughout their personal union (1387–1536), and later under the governmental union (1536–1814), there was attempt to harmonize the legal systems of the two countries. Even if juries were abolished, the layman continued to play an important role in the legal system throughout in Norway.

The jury was reintroduced in 1887, and was then solely used in criminal cases on the second tier of the three-tier Norwegian court system ("Lagmannsretten"). The jury consisted of 10 people, and had to reach a majority verdict consisting of seven or more of the jurors.[145] The jury never gave a reason for its verdict, rather it simply gave a "guilty" or "non-guilty" verdict. The jury foreperson, elected by the jury on the first day, with three other jury members also made up the majority in the sentencing, if the accused were found guilty.

In Norway the term "guilty", is not used, only yes or no to the actions asked them to consider done by the accused by the prosecutor. The last jury case was in 2018, after juries were abolished after the European Court condideres that no-one should be sentenced without the considerations in the judgement.

In a sense, the concept of being judged by one's peers existed on both the first and second tier of the Norwegian court system: In Tingretten, one judge and two lay judges preside, and in Lagmannsretten two judges and five lay judges preside. The lay judges do not hold any legal qualification, and represent the peers of the person on trial, as members of the general public. As a guarantee against any abuse of power by the educated elite, the number of lay judges always exceeds the number of appointed judges. In the Supreme Court, only trained lawyers are seated.

Russia

[edit]

The right to a jury trial is provided by Constitution of Russian Federation but for criminal cases only and in the procedure defined by law. Initially, the Criminal Procedure Code, which was adopted in 2001, provided that the right to a jury trial could be realized in criminal cases which should be heard by regional courts and military courts of military districts/fleets as the courts of first instance; the jury was composed of 12 jurors. In 2008, the anti-state criminal cases (treason, espionage, armed rebellion, sabotage, mass riot, creating an illegal paramilitary group, forcible seizure of power, terrorism) were removed from the jurisdiction of the jury trial.[146] From 1 June 2018, defendants can claim a jury trial in criminal cases which are heard by district courts and garrison military courts as the courts of first instance; from that moment on, the jury is composed of 8 (in regional courts and military courts of military districts/fleets) or 6 (in district courts and garrison military courts) jurors.[147]

A juror must be at least 25 years old, legally competent, and without a criminal record.[148]

Spain

[edit]

Spain has no strong tradition of using juries. However, there is some mentions in the Bayonne Statute of 1808. Later, Article 307 of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 allowed the Cortes to pass legislation if they felt that over the time it was needed to distinguish between "judges of law" and "judges of facts". Such legislation however was never enacted.

Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution of 1837 while proclamating the freedom of the people to publicate written contents without previous censorship according to the laws also provided that "press crimes" could only be tried by juries. This meant that a grand jury would need to indict, and a petit jury would need to convict.

Juries were later abolished in 1845, but were later restored in 1869 for all "political crimes" and "those common crimes the law may deem appropriate to be so tried by a jury". A Law concerning the Jury entered into force on January 1, 1899, and lasted until 1936, where juries were again disbanded with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

The actual Constitution of 1978 permits the Cortes Generales to pass legislation allowing juries in criminal trials. The provision is arguably somewhat vague: "Article 125 – Citizens may engage in popular action and participate in the administration of justice through the institution of the Jury, in the manner and with respect to those criminal trials as may be determined by law, as well as in customary and traditional courts."

Jury trials can only happen in the criminal jurisdiction and it is not a choice of the defendant to be tried by jury, or by a single judge or a panel of judges. Organic Law 5/1995, of May 22[149] regulates the categories of crimes in which a trial by jury is mandatory. For all other crimes, a single judge or a panel of judges will decide both on facts and the law. Spanish juries are composed of 9 citizens and a professional Judge. Juries decide on facts and whether to convict or acquit the defendant. In case of conviction they can also make recommendations such as if the defendant should be pardoned if they asked to, or if they think the defendant could be released on parole, etc.

One of the first jury trial cases was that of Mikel Otegi who was tried in 1997 for the murder of two police officers. After a confused[clarification needed] trial, five jury members of a total of nine voted to acquit and the judge ordered the accused set free. This verdict shocked the nation.[150] An alleged miscarriage of justice by jury trial was the Wanninkhof murder case.

Sweden

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In press libel cases and other cases concerning offenses against freedom of the press, the question of whether or not the printed material falls outside permissible limits is submitted to a jury of 9 members which provides a pre-screening before the case is ruled on by normal courts. In these cases 6 out of 9 jurors must find against the defendant, and may not be overruled in cases of acquittal.

Sweden has no tradition of using juries in most types of criminal or civil trial. The sole exception, since 1815, is in cases involving freedom of the press, prosecuted under Chapter 7 of the Freedom of the Press Act, part of Sweden's constitution.[151] The most frequently prosecuted offence under this act is defamation, although in total eighteen offences, including high treason and espionage, are covered. These cases are tried in district courts (first tier courts) by a jury of nine laymen.

The jury in press freedom cases rules only on the facts of the case and the question of guilt or innocence. The trial judge may overrule a jury's guilty verdict, but may not overrule an acquittal. A conviction requires a majority verdict of 6–3. Sentencing is the sole prerogative of judges.

Jury members must be Swedish citizens and resident in the county in which the case is being heard. They must be of sound judgement and known for their independence and integrity. Combined, they should represent a range of social groups and opinions, as well as all parts of the county. It is the county council that have the responsibility to appoints juries for a tenure of four years under which they may serve in multiple cases. The appointed jurymen are divided into two groups, in most counties the first with sixteen members and the second with eight. From this pool of available jurymen the court hears and excludes those with conflicts of interest in the case, after which the defendants and plaintiffs have the right to exclude a number of members, varying by county and group. The final jury is then randomly selected by drawing of lots.[152][153]

Juries are not used in other criminal and civil cases. For most other cases in the first and second tier courts lay judges sit alongside professional judges. Lay judges participate in deciding both the facts of the case and sentencing. Lay judges are appointed by local authorities, or in practice by the political parties represented on the authorities.[154] Lay judges are therefore usually selected from among nominees of ruling political parties.[155]

United Kingdom

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England and Wales
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In England and Wales jury trials are used for criminal cases, requiring 12 jurors (between the ages of 18 and 75), although the trial may continue with as few as 9. The right to a jury trial has been enshrined in English law since Magna Carta in 1215, and is most common in serious cases, although the defendant can insist on a jury trial for most criminal cases. Jury trials in complex fraud cases have been described by some members and appointees of the Labour Party as expensive and time-consuming.[156] In contrast, the Bar Council, Liberty and other political parties have supported the idea that trial by jury is at the heart of the judicial system and placed the blame for a few complicated jury trials failing on inadequate preparation by the prosecution.[157]

On 18 June 2009 the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, sitting in the Court of Appeal, made English legal history by ruling that a criminal trial in the Crown Court could take place without a jury, under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.[158]

Jury trials are also available for some few areas of civil law (for example defamation cases and those involving police conduct); these also require 12 jurors (9 in the County Court). However less than 1% of civil trials involve juries.[159] At the new Manchester Civil Justice Centre, constructed in 2008, fewer than 10 of the 48 courtrooms had jury facilities.

Northern Ireland
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During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, jury trials were suspended and trials took place before Diplock Courts. These were essentially bench trials before judges only. This was to combat jury nullification and the intimidation of juries.[160][161][better source needed]

Scotland
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In Scottish criminal trials, juries are composed of fifteen residents,[162] while in civil trials there is a jury of 12 people.

Etymology

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The word jury derives from Latin iurare ("to swear"). Juries are most common in common law adversarial-system jurisdictions. In the modern system, juries act as triers of fact, while judges act as triers of law (but see nullification). A trial without a jury (in which both questions of fact and questions of law are decided by a judge) is known as a bench trial.

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
A jury is a body of ordinary citizens, typically numbering twelve in criminal trials, empaneled to hear and in a and to render an impartial on the factual issues, thereby determining guilt, liability, or damages while leaving questions of to the . This institution distinguishes systems through its adversarial process, where lay decision-makers without legal training evaluate to check potential judicial or prosecutorial overreach. Originating in medieval as a evolution from earlier panels, the jury became integral to trials by the 12th century, with its use expanding to both criminal petit juries for guilt determination and grand juries for indictments, later adopted in the United States via constitutional protections like the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. Empirical research shows juries convict at rates similar to judges in comparable cases, with agreement on verdicts reaching 78% and juries tending toward leniency in about 19% of divergences, indicating functional parity with bench trials despite criticisms of inconsistency. The system's defining strengths lie in democratizing justice and enabling , where verdicts defy strict legal application to avert perceived injustices, as historically seen in acquittals under oppressive statutes; yet it faces controversies over racial underrepresentation in jury pools leading to biased outcomes and nullification's potential to erode uniformity.

Definition and Principles

Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations

The philosophical foundations of the jury system emphasize its role as a mechanism for distributing adjudicative power away from centralized authority, thereby safeguarding individual liberty against potential tyranny. Rooted in traditions, the system posits that ordinary citizens, drawn from the community, possess an innate capacity for equitable judgment superior to that of isolated officials prone to bias or corruption. This principle gained early articulation in the of 1215, particularly Clause 39, which prohibited deprivation of liberty for free men except through "the lawful judgment of his peers or by the ," establishing a theoretical commitment to peer-based accountability over unchecked executive or judicial fiat, even if the clause addressed ordeal and more than modern petit juries. Enlightenment philosophers reinforced the jury's theoretical necessity for balanced governance. Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), analyzed the English jury as integral to separating judicial from legislative and executive functions, arguing it fosters moderation by involving the populace in fact-finding and verdict-rendering, thus preventing the absolutism observed in non-jury systems like France's. William Blackstone echoed this in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769), portraying trial by jury as the "ancient trial of this nation" and a fundamental security for personal freedom, as it embeds communal wisdom against professional judges' potential errors or partiality. American Founders like John Adams extended this rationale, declaring in 1774 that "representative government and trial by jury are the heart and lungs of liberty," underscoring the jury's function as a democratic check ensuring verdicts reflect popular sovereignty rather than elite imposition. Contemporary theoretical frameworks, such as formalized in the 18th century and elaborated in modern , provide probabilistic justification: under conditions of independent judgments where each juror exceeds 50% accuracy in discerning truth, a simple majority approaches certainty as jury size grows, modeling the system as epistemically superior to solitary decision-making for complex factual disputes. This aligns with deliberative democratic theory, viewing juries as microcosms of the polity that cultivate reasoned consensus through diverse perspectives, mitigating individual cognitive biases via collective deliberation while anchoring law application in societal norms. Empirical studies of jury behavior, though varied, generally affirm this by showing often converge on evidence-based outcomes despite initial disagreements, supporting the causal realism that decentralized, peer-driven processes enhance factual reliability over hierarchical alternatives. In systems, the primary legal function of a jury is to serve as impartial fact-finders, determining whether the establishes guilt beyond a in criminal cases or liability in civil disputes, while the instructs on the applicable . Petit juries, the standard bodies, render verdicts that conclude most federal trials since the U.S. judiciary's establishment in 1789. This division ensures that community representatives, rather than judicial authority alone, assess factual disputes, promoting fairness and reflecting societal standards in judgments. Juries function as a safeguard against governmental overreach by interposing ordinary citizens between the state and the accused, historically viewed as a bulwark against tyranny. Founding-era figures, including , described as essential to , preventing arbitrary prosecutions through collective deliberation unbound by prosecutorial or judicial bias. This protective role extends to the jury's power of nullification, where jurors may acquit despite evidence of legal violation if they deem the law unjust, a mechanism exercised in cases like resistance to fugitive slave laws, though modern courts prohibit explicit instructions on it to maintain rule-of-law consistency. In the United States, constitutional protections anchor these functions, with the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing an impartial in all federal criminal prosecutions, alongside rights to a speedy and public trial. Ratified in 1791, this provision applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment's , ensuring jury unanimity in serious offenses as affirmed by rulings like Ramos v. Louisiana (2020). The Seventh Amendment similarly preserves jury trials in federal civil suits at exceeding twenty dollars in value, barring reexamination of jury facts except under rules, though it does not bind states directly. These amendments, drawn from English traditions, embody the framers' intent to shield individual liberty from unchecked authority.

Historical Development

Ancient and Medieval Origins

In ancient , the democratic reforms of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE introduced large citizen panels known as dikastai, serving in courts called dikasteria, which functioned as the earliest jury-like institutions in Western . These panels, typically comprising 201 to 1,501 members drawn by lot from male citizens over age 30 who volunteered from a pool of about 6,000 eligible jurors annually, heard civil and criminal cases without presiding judges dominating proceedings. Litigants presented their own arguments, after which jurors voted secretly using bronze disks or pebbles deposited into urns, with decisions determined by simple majority; no collective deliberation occurred, and jurors received modest payment to ensure broad participation. Ancient Roman legal practice diverged significantly, relying primarily on a single appointed (iudex) or small panels of recuperatores for fact-finding and verdicts, rather than mass citizen juries. While assemblies like the comitia centuriata occasionally influenced major trials, Roman procedure emphasized professional magistrates and lacked the random selection and of Athenian dikasteria, prioritizing elite oversight over communal judgment. The direct antecedent of the modern common-law jury emerged in 12th-century England under King Henry II, building on Norman and Frankish traditions of sworn inquests rather than classical Greek models. The Assize of Clarendon, promulgated in 1166 at Clarendon Palace, mandated that royal justices convene juries of 12 freeholders from each hundred (a local administrative unit) and four from each tithing (a group of households), sworn to disclose known criminals and outlaws based on local knowledge, thereby initiating systematic presentment for prosecution. This "jury of presentment" shifted from accusatory ordeals or compurgation—where defendants cleared themselves via oath-helpers—to evidentiary inquiry by neighbors, addressing royal concerns over crime and feudal disorder. By the late 12th and early 13th centuries, these presentment mechanisms evolved into (petit) juries, where 12 local men, sworn (jurat) to deliver verdicts on facts they investigated independently, decided cases without relying solely on witness testimony in . The of 1215 reinforced this by stipulating in Clause 39 that no free man could be imprisoned or disseised "except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the ," embedding peer judgment against arbitrary royal power. These medieval innovations prioritized community accountability over divine or trial-by-combat proofs, laying the foundation for impartial, fact-based adjudication in English , though jurors initially faced coercion risks and possessed firsthand evidence rather than passive listening roles.

Colonial and Revolutionary Era

The jury system in the American colonies derived from English common law, where both grand and petit juries functioned to investigate accusations and determine facts in criminal and civil matters, with the Massachusetts Bay Colony convening the first colonial grand jury in 1635 to examine cases involving murder, robbery, and other grave offenses. Colonial charters, such as those of Virginia (1606) and Massachusetts (1621), explicitly preserved the right to trial by jury as a fundamental liberty, reflecting settlers' intent to maintain English procedural safeguards against unchecked authority. By the mid-17th century, juries composed of local freeholders typically numbered 12 members for felony trials, deliberating verdicts based on evidence presented in court, though property qualifications often excluded the poorest colonists from service. Tensions arose as British enforcement of trade regulations, including the of the 1660s, led to prosecutions for smuggling and evasion, but colonial juries routinely acquitted defendants they viewed as victims of overreach, exemplifying where verdicts disregarded strict legal merits in favor of community equity. This pattern intensified after the 1733 , with juries in ports like and refusing convictions against merchants, prompting to expand admiralty courts in 1768–1769, which operated without juries and under royal appointees, thereby denying colonists vicinage—the trial of locals by local peers. The 1735 trial of printer in New York marked a pivotal assertion of jury independence; charged with for criticizing William Cosby, Zenger's defense argued truth as justification despite English law's contrary stance, and the jury acquitted him after 30 minutes, effectively nullifying the charge and bolstering colonial resistance to censorship. In the lead-up to the Revolution, juries continued obstructing British revenue measures, acquitting over 90% of defendants under the 1765 and 1767 Townshend Duties in jurisdictions like , where local sentiment deemed the taxes illegitimate. British countermeasures included stacking juries with Loyalists and relocating trials to , as in the 1772 Somersett case indirectly influencing colonial views on , but these alienated moderates and fueled like the decrying jury denial as tyranny. The in 1774 petitioned King George III to restore full jury rights, citing their erosion as a core grievance alongside quartering of troops and arbitrary seizures. During wartime, revolutionary governments impaneled juries for and property disputes, often under state constitutions like Pennsylvania's 1776 frame, which mandated 12-person unanimous verdicts, reinforcing the institution as a republican bulwark against monarchical overreach. This era cemented the jury's causal role in legitimizing , as nullifications preserved economies vital to colonial autonomy and demonstrated empirically that peer judgment could counter executive fiat, influencing demands for explicit protections in the and later federal framework.

19th Century Expansion and Challenges

In the early 19th century, the jury system in underwent formalization through the Juries Act 1825, which standardized juror selection by requiring male householders aged 21 to 70 possessing freehold property valued at least £10 annually or paying rates equivalent to that amount, thereby expanding the eligible pool beyond elite classes while maintaining property-based exclusions. This reform aimed to address inconsistencies in prior selection practices and support the jury's role in an era of increasing criminal and civil litigation driven by and industrial growth. In the United States, juries retained exalted status through the mid-century, serving as a bulwark against judicial overreach in expanding federal and state courts, with the Seventh Amendment guaranteeing civil jury trials for suits over $20 in value, facilitating resolution of disputes arising from westward expansion and economic development. Expansion faced significant challenges from demographic exclusions and procedural encroachments. In the U.S., racial bias pervaded jury composition, with Black individuals systematically barred from service in Southern states through laws and practices upheld until the and subsequent , yet all-white juries persisted post-Reconstruction, often acquitting white defendants in cases involving Black victims due to shared prejudices rather than evidence. Northern juries, while less overtly exclusionary, reflected antebellum tensions, as seen in mixed verdicts on fugitive slave laws where jurors' local knowledge and sympathies influenced outcomes independently of legal instructions. Women remained ineligible nationwide until state-level changes in the late , such as Utah Territory's 1879 grant of including jury service, overturned by federal anti-polygamy laws in 1887, limiting pool diversity and embedding gender-based representational gaps. Procedural innovations diminished jury autonomy, shifting power toward judges. English reforms under the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 empowered judges to direct s or nonsuit cases lacking sufficient evidence, curtailing juries' traditional general verdict authority to encompass law and fact. Similarly, in the U.S., mechanisms like demurrers to evidence and directed s proliferated by mid-century, exemplified in cases where courts overturned jury findings on grounds of legal insufficiency, reflecting elite distrust of lay jurors' competence in complex commercial disputes amid industrialization. Peremptory challenges evolved into tools for racial and class exclusion, with practitioners' manuals from the late 19th century advising strikes based on jurors' ethnicity or occupation to secure favorable panels, exacerbating biases without judicial oversight. These developments, while streamlining dockets, undermined the jury's role as an independent fact-finder, prompting critics like to advocate reduced jury sizes or abolition in favor of professional judges for efficiency. Civil jury use declined relative to criminal, with England's County Courts Act 1846 introducing juryless small claims procedures, handling over 80% of civil matters by 1870 and reducing jury demands in routine disputes. In the U.S., equity jurisdiction growth paralleled this, bypassing juries in non-legal remedies, though criminal juries endured as constitutional safeguards, unanimous in verdicts per tradition persisting through the century. Despite these constraints, juries symbolized , influencing imperial exports like Sierra Leone's 1801 adoption of English-style grand and petit juries for colonial justice.

20th Century Reforms and Global Spread

In the United States, rulings in the mid-20th century incorporated federal jury protections to state courts and adjusted procedural standards. Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) extended the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of jury trials for serious offenses—those punishable by more than six months' imprisonment—to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's , overturning prior exemptions for non-capital cases. Williams v. Florida (1970) upheld the constitutionality of six-person juries in state non-capital trials, rejecting the historical requirement of 12 jurors as non-essential to the jury's core function of community representation and deliberation. Apodaca v. Oregon (1972), in a fragmented 4-1-4 decision, permitted states to allow non-unanimous guilty verdicts (such as 10-2 or 9-3) in criminal cases, distinguishing state practices from stricter federal unanimity requirements. These changes aimed to balance efficiency with fairness but sparked ongoing debate over dilution of traditional safeguards. Further U.S. reforms addressed selection biases. (1986) established that prosecutors' peremptory challenges excluding jurors on racial grounds violate the , requiring defendants to make a prima facie showing of and prompting prosecutors to offer race-neutral justifications subject to judicial scrutiny. In the United Kingdom, the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 abolished grand juries, eliminating their role in reviewing indictments and shifting that duty to committing magistrates or prosecutors to expedite proceedings amid criticisms of redundancy. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 removed formal barriers to women's jury service, though practical restrictions persisted into the before fuller integration. The Juries Act 1974 consolidated eligibility rules, mandating random selection from electoral rolls while disqualifying those with criminal convictions or mental incapacity to enhance impartiality and representativeness. Globally, the jury's spread, rooted in British colonialism, saw mixed 20th-century trajectories in former territories and beyond. Commonwealth nations like and retained petit juries for serious crimes post-independence, adapting selection for local demographics. , inheriting the system under British rule, discontinued it nationwide with the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, citing susceptibility to prejudice and media influence, as highlighted by the 1959 K.M. Nanavati acquittal despite evidence of guilt. In civil-law , the 1923 Jury Act introduced optional juries for capital and major offenses starting in 1928, yielding only 517 trials by 1943 before wartime abolition due to low demand and administrative burdens. suspended 19th-century juries after the 1917 Revolution under Soviet centralization but piloted their revival in 1993 for grave crimes in select regions, aiming to foster public trust amid , though implementation remained limited. These developments reflected pragmatic responses to local contexts, often prioritizing judicial efficiency over lay participation.

Types of Juries

Grand Juries

A consists of a body of citizens convened to review presented by a and determine whether exists to issue an for a offense. Unlike petit juries, which adjudicate guilt or innocence at , grand juries focus solely on preliminary matters, such as assessing whether sufficient warrants formal charges to protect against baseless prosecutions. In the United States federal system, grand jury indictment is constitutionally required for capital or infamous crimes under the Fifth Amendment, while approximately half of states retain the institution for similar purposes, with others relying on prosecutorial information or preliminary hearings. Federal grand juries comprise 16 to 23 members selected from a randomly drawn jury pool of qualified citizens, typically serving terms of 18 months, extendable to 24 months in districts with high caseloads. A quorum of at least 16 jurors is required for proceedings, and an indictment, or "true bill," demands affirmative votes from no fewer than 12 members; failure to achieve this results in a "no bill," dismissing the case without prejudice. Jurors are empaneled by a federal district court upon request from the U.S. Attorney's Office, drawn from voter rolls, driver's license records, and other sources to approximate a fair cross-section of the community, though challenges for bias or underrepresentation can arise under statutes like the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. Proceedings occur in secret sessions without the presence of the accused or defense , with the controlling evidence presentation, witness examination, and legal instructions to the jury. Grand juries possess power to compel testimony and documents, operating under rules of evidentiary admissibility relaxed compared to trials, and they may initiate independent investigations into suspected crimes, though this autonomy is infrequently exercised in modern practice due to reliance on prosecutorial referrals. Historically rooted in the 1166 under King , which formalized community accusations to curb arbitrary royal justice, the institution migrated to the American colonies, with the first colonial convened in in 1635. Empirical data indicate grand juries approve indictments in over 99 percent of cases submitted by prosecutors; for instance, federal grand juries declined to indict in only 11 of 162,351 matters in 2010. This high rate reflects prosecutors presenting only cases with substantial , yet critics contend it underscores the grand jury's into a prosecutorial tool rather than an independent check, as the format limits adversarial scrutiny and fosters potential overreach. Justice observed in 1946 that the process operates as a "one-sided affair," with grand juries serving as "prosecuting arms of the " rather than shields against , a view echoed in scholarly analyses questioning its efficacy in screening weak accusations given prosecutorial dominance. Proponents counter that the preserves witness candor and prevents retaliation, while rare no-bills demonstrate latent protective function, as in instances of overcharged cases declined in 2025. Despite such debates, the grand jury persists as a mechanism prioritizing community involvement in charging decisions, distinct from executive alone.

Trial (Petit) Juries

Trial (petit) juries, also known as petit juries, are small panels of citizens selected to hear in both criminal and civil and render verdicts on factual disputes, leaving questions of to the presiding . Unlike grand juries, which operate pre-trial to assess for indictments in criminal matters only, petit juries determine guilt or innocence in criminal cases—requiring proof beyond a —and liability or in civil cases. This distinction ensures that petit juries focus on adjudicating the merits of a case after formal charges, providing a community-based check on prosecutorial and judicial authority. In the United States federal system, petit juries for criminal trials consist of 12 members, while civil juries require at least six unless parties stipulate otherwise, with verdicts generally needing . State jurisdictions vary, often employing 12 jurors for trials but allowing six for misdemeanors or civil matters, though the U.S. has upheld that juries smaller than six impair constitutional functions. remains the federal standard for both civil and criminal verdicts, reflecting historical continuity since the Judiciary Act of 1789. Some states historically permitted non-unanimous verdicts in limited contexts, but federal precedent emphasizes consensus to safeguard against minority disenfranchisement in serious cases. During trials, petit jurors observe witness testimony, examine physical and , and receive legal instructions from the before retiring to deliberate in private. Deliberations involve discussing evidence to achieve a , which in criminal trials results in guilty or not guilty findings, and in civil trials, determinations of fault or award amounts. Special verdicts may require juries to answer specific factual questions via written , aiding appellate review. Empirical analyses of jury performance indicate substantial alignment with judicial outcomes, with studies reviewing actual trials finding juries concurring with judges on verdicts in approximately 78% of cases, though juries tend toward leniency in about 19% of disagreements. Such data, derived from archival reviews rather than simulations, suggest petit juries achieve reasonable accuracy in fact-finding despite potential influences from cognitive heuristics, as identified in on lay . These findings underscore the jury's role in mirroring expert assessments while incorporating diverse community perspectives, though they also highlight opportunities for procedural enhancements like pre-trial instructions to mitigate biases.

Special-Purpose Juries

Special juries, also termed blue-ribbon or struck juries, consist of panels drawn from lists of prospective jurors deemed more intelligent, educated, or expert in relevant fields, typically impaneled upon a party's request for cases involving complex factual issues or serious felonies. These differ from standard petit juries by prioritizing qualifications such as advanced , experience, or over random selection from the general pool, aiming to enhance in technically demanding matters. Historically, special juries trace to medieval , where they evolved to address limitations of ordinary jurors in specialized disputes, such as commercial cases requiring knowledge of mercantile custom. Codified by English in 1730, they gained prominence under Lord Mansfield from 1756 to 1788, who employed merchant special juries to integrate law merchant into precedents. In the United States, the practice imported via the , which permitted federal courts to adopt English procedures; the utilized them in early original jurisdiction cases, including Georgia v. Brailsford (1794), where 95% of the venire comprised merchants to assess foreign attachment issues. The Court's last recorded occurred in 1797, after which it shifted to special masters for fact-finding, rendering special juries obsolete at that level. Common types included expert juries tailored to subject matter, such as merchants for trade disputes; gentlemen or blue-ribbon juries of higher for high-stakes civil or criminal trials; and struck juries, formed by parties alternately eliminating names from a qualified list to minimize . These mechanisms addressed perceived inadequacies in ordinary juries, like insufficient expertise, but raised equality concerns by excluding average citizens. In under William III (1689–1702), struck variants countered sheriff partiality or juror by incorporating prominent locals. In modern common law jurisdictions, special trial juries have largely faded, supplanted by expert witnesses and administrative agencies for complexity, with U.S. statutes in most states abolishing them by the mid-20th century to uphold representative jury principles under equal protection doctrines. Residual uses persist in select contexts, such as certain state civil proceedings where courts may grant motions for qualified panels in intricate litigation. Distinct from trial variants, coroner's juries—summoned to aid inquests into unnatural deaths—remain operational in jurisdictions like parts of the U.S. and U.K., typically comprising 6–15 laypersons who determine cause and manner of death based on evidence presented by the coroner or medical examiner. For instance, Illinois statutes authorize coroner's juries for suspicious fatalities, emphasizing community input over professional judgment alone. Such bodies underscore the jury's role in public accountability for deaths in custody or unclear circumstances, though their verdicts lack binding legal force beyond factual findings.

Jury Formation and Selection

Summoning and Qualification Criteria

In the United States, jury summoning begins with courts randomly selecting potential jurors from lists of registered voters, holders, and state identification records within the relevant judicial district or county. This random selection aims to produce a fair cross-section of the community, as required by federal law under the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, which mandates the use of voter registration lists supplemented by other sources to mitigate underrepresentation. Selected individuals receive a by mail, issued by the court or U.S. Marshals Service, commanding their appearance for possible jury service on a specified date. Upon receipt, potential jurors typically complete a qualification questionnaire online or by mail to assess eligibility, with non-response or potentially leading to fines or charges. Federal qualification criteria, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1865, require jurors to be citizens at least 18 years old who have resided for within the judicial , proficient in reading, writing, understanding, and speaking English, and free from physical or mental infirmities that would prevent satisfactory service. Disqualifications include convictions where civil rights have not been restored and in the armed forces. State criteria align closely but vary; for instance, most require U.S. citizenship, residency in the summoning county, English proficiency, and no disqualifying convictions, though some states like excuse those over 70 upon request. Exemptions and excuses from jury service are granted at judicial discretion for hardships such as severe financial loss, medical conditions, or caregiving responsibilities, but no automatic exemptions exist for occupations like or attorneys in federal courts, differing from some state practices where essential workers may be deferred. In jurisdictions like , qualifications emphasize residency and lack of disqualifying convictions, with summoning via random selection from electoral registers, though exemptions apply to those over 70, the mentally ill, and certain professionals. These criteria evolved from medieval English practices, where jurors were initially local freeholders summoned by sheriff writs, transitioning to broader random selection in the to enhance and representation.

Voir Dire and Peremptory Challenges

Voir dire, derived from the French phrase meaning "to speak the truth," constitutes the preliminary examination of prospective jurors to assess their qualifications and potential biases for serving on a trial jury. In United States federal and state courts, this process involves questioning by the trial judge, attorneys for both parties, or a combination thereof, typically conducted in open court with the jury panel present. The primary objective is to identify jurors who can render an impartial verdict, free from preconceived opinions, relationships to parties or witnesses, or other factors that might impair neutrality, thereby fulfilling the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury in criminal cases and analogous due process requirements in civil matters. During , attorneys may pose targeted questions to uncover implied or actual bias, such as prior knowledge of the case, personal experiences related to the charges, or attitudes toward , while the ensures questions remain relevant and non-argumentative. Challenges for cause arise from this questioning, allowing unlimited dismissals of jurors demonstrably unfit—e.g., those admitting or failing to meet statutory qualifications like residency or status—provided the challenging party shows good cause, subject to judicial discretion. In contrast, peremptory challenges permit each side to exclude a limited number of jurors without articulating any reason, relying instead on counsel's intuitive assessment of suitability to foster mutual acceptability of the final panel. This mechanism, rooted in English and adopted in American practice by the 18th century, balances efficiency against the risk of unchecked hunches by capping the number available, typically three per side in federal civil trials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(a) and six each in federal cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3432, with states varying from three to twenty based on case gravity. Peremptory challenges serve to expedite by obviating the need to prove subtle biases that might evade for-cause scrutiny, yet their discretionary nature has invited scrutiny for enabling . In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the U.S. ruled that the prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptories to exclude jurors based on race, establishing a three-step framework: the opponent must make a showing of purposeful ; the striking party then offers a race-neutral explanation; and the trial court determines pretext. This prohibition, extended to defense counsel in Georgia v. McCollum (1992) and to gender-based strikes in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994), has not eliminated debates over enforcement, as courts must infer discriminatory intent from patterns like disparate striking rates across protected groups, amid evidence that Batson challenges succeed infrequently due to the burden on opponents to rebut neutral justifications. While peremptories remain a statutory tool rather than a constitutional mandate—upheld as permissible even if erroneously denied in Rivera v. Illinois (2009)—some jurisdictions, such as certain state reforms post-2018, have curtailed or abolished them to prioritize random selection and reduce bias risks, though federal practice retains them with Batson safeguards.

Jury Size, Deliberation Rules, and Unanimity Requirements

In English , the traditional consisted of 12 members, a practice established by the to ensure representative deliberation in criminal and civil trials. This size was carried into the , where the Sixth Amendment preserves the right to an impartial jury but does not specify the number of jurors. The U.S. has upheld juries of six as constitutionally sufficient for non-petty offenses, ruling in Williams v. Florida (1970) that smaller panels do not inherently impair the jury's fact-finding function, provided the size exceeds five members. Federal criminal trials require 12 jurors, though parties may stipulate to fewer with court approval; civil trials permit 6 to 12 jurors under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48. State courts vary: most mandate 12 for felonies but allow 6 for misdemeanors or civil cases, with 40 states adopting smaller juries for certain felonies to expedite proceedings and reduce hung juries. Internationally, jury sizes differ; for instance, some civil law systems like Russia's employ 12 jurors alongside professional judges, while others, such as Japan's, use 6 lay judges in mixed panels for serious crimes. Jury deliberations occur in private, sequestered sessions after the judge's instructions on and , with jurors electing a foreperson to facilitate discussion. Rules prohibit external influences, media exposure, or , requiring decisions based solely on trial ; discussions must include all jurors present, and verdicts are reached through open exchange aimed at consensus. In systems, sequestration—isolating jurors from outside contact—may be ordered for high-profile cases to prevent , though routine sequestration ended in many U.S. jurisdictions by the mid-20th century due to cost and practicality. Unanimity is required for guilty verdicts in U.S. federal criminal trials and, following the Supreme Court's 6-4 decision in (April 22, 2020), in state trials for serious offenses under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, overruling prior allowances for non-unanimous verdicts in states like and . This ruling aligned state practices with historical standards, where unanimity ensured collective certainty and protected against minority coercion. Civil verdicts may allow non-unanimous decisions by , often 3/4 in states, to avoid deadlocks. Hung juries, resulting from failure to reach unanimity, lead to mistrials and potential retrials, with empirical data indicating smaller juries produce fewer deadlocks but potentially less diverse perspectives.

Composition and Dynamics

Demographic Representation and Diversity

In the United States, the Sixth Amendment requires that jury pools represent a fair cross-section of the community, ensuring no systematic exclusion of cognizable groups such as racial or ethnic minorities, though it does not mandate proportional representation on the actual trial jury. This standard, articulated in cases like Duren v. Missouri (1979), demands that jury selection processes avoid substantial underrepresentation due to identifiable barriers like flawed source lists or discriminatory exemptions. Similar principles apply in other common-law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom's Jury Summoning Act 1999, which aims for random selection from electoral registers to approximate community demographics, but enforcement varies. Empirical data reveals persistent underrepresentation of minorities in U.S. jury pools. A 2020 analysis of federal jury pools found the average African American representation at under 4%, with a of 3%, far below national demographics where Black Americans comprise about 13.6% of the . In courts, a survey showed whites overrepresented by 43% and Blacks underrepresented by 42% relative to figures. Washington state data from 2018-2020 indicated Black, Native American, Asian, and Hispanic/Latinx individuals underrepresented in nearly all pools, with absolute disparities exceeding shares by factors of 2-5 in urban counties. Factors include reliance on voter rolls or databases that skew toward higher-income groups, higher non-response rates among low-mobility minorities, and disqualifications like convictions, which disproportionately affect Black Americans (e.g., 34% exclusion in one Georgia county). Studies link racial composition to verdict outcomes, with underrepresentation correlating to harsher results for minority defendants. Analysis of felony trials (2000-2010) showed all-white juries convicting defendants at rates 16% higher than diverse juries, with hung juries 4% less likely. A study estimated that unequal pool representation inflates sentences for defendants by over 50% on average. Diverse juries, per experimental and archival evidence, deliberate longer (e.g., 15-20% more discussion time), process evidence more thoroughly, and exhibit reduced racial bias in mock trials, though effects diminish in highly polarized cases. Critics note potential from selection biases, but replicated findings across jurisdictions support diversity's role in mitigating without evidence of net incompetence. Efforts to address disparities include proposals for , currently mandated in only 19 states, enabling challenges to imbalances. New Jersey's 2021 empirical review of selection practices found no intentional but recommended expanded source lists to boost minority rates by 10-15%. Internationally, Australia's use of multiple enrollment sources has achieved closer parity, reducing absolute ethnic gaps to under 2% in recent audits.

Group Decision-Making Processes

Jury deliberations typically commence after the presentation of and closing arguments, with jurors retiring to a private room to discuss the case under the guidance of a selected foreperson. The foreperson, often chosen informally by the group or designated by the , facilitates orderly discussion, ensures all voices are heard, and communicates with the on procedural matters, but holds no power or superior vote. Empirical observations indicate that effective forepersons promote equitable participation, reducing dominance by vocal jurors and mitigating premature consensus. Deliberations often follow one of two primary styles: evidence-driven or verdict-driven. In evidence-driven processes, jurors systematically review and exhibits before forming opinions, fostering recall and correction of errors, which studies link to higher decision accuracy. Verdict-driven deliberations begin with an initial poll of preferences, potentially prioritizing over facts and increasing risks of polarization or overlooking exculpatory evidence. Research from mock trials shows evidence-driven groups deliberate longer and exhibit better memory for case details, though real juries vary based on case complexity and juror expertise. Decision rules profoundly shape outcomes, with requirements—mandated in U.S. federal criminal trials and many state systems—compelling holdouts to engage minority views, yielding more thorough discussions than rules. A 2024 meta-analysis of juror behavior found reduces conviction odds by approximately 40% compared to two-thirds thresholds, attributing this to heightened scrutiny of guilt rather than leniency . Non-unanimous rules, permitted in some U.S. states for non-capital cases until recent reforms, correlate with shallower deliberations and elevated error rates, as factions may dismiss dissent without full persuasion. Psychological experiments confirm curbs by necessitating consensus-building, though it elevates risks in polarized cases, occurring in about 5-6% of trials. Group dynamics introduce both corrective and distorting forces. Jurors demonstrate strong attention to evidence during talks, collectively reconstructing events more accurately than individuals, yet susceptibility to conformity pressures—where holdouts shift under social influence—can skew verdicts toward initial majorities. Studies spanning 1955-1999, updated by subsequent reviews, reveal that while deliberations attenuate individual biases through debate, dominant personalities or implicit heuristics (e.g., story-model framing of narratives) may amplify errors in ambiguous cases. Empirical data from post-deliberation interviews underscore that diverse groups deliberate more robustly, countering homogeneity-induced errors, though academic sources occasionally overstate bias mitigation without accounting for unmeasured confounders like evidentiary strength.

Juror Experience and Psychological Impacts

Serving on a jury often involves prolonged exposure to emotionally charged , graphic , and the burden of determining guilt or , which can induce significant . Empirical studies indicate that jurors frequently report heightened anxiety, irritability, and sleep disturbances during and after service, with symptoms persisting for weeks or months in cases involving violent crimes. For instance, in trials featuring disturbing visual materials such as photos or videos, jurors exhibit elevated rates of intrusive thoughts and , akin to symptoms observed in secondary traumatic stress. Trauma-related disorders, including elements of (PTSD), have been documented among jurors, particularly in capital or high-profile cases. Research surveying former jurors found that up to 50% experienced PTSD-like symptoms such as flashbacks, avoidance behaviors, and emotional numbing, with prevalence increasing in proportion to the case's gruesomeness and duration. A 2016 study published in the Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine reported that 25-30% of jurors in serious trials displayed clinically significant trauma symptoms, including and depression, exacerbated by pre-existing vulnerabilities or prior trauma exposure. These effects stem causally from the empathetic absorption of victims' or defendants' narratives and the moral weight of deliberations, where jurors must reconcile conflicting evidence under time pressure and social scrutiny. Deliberation phases amplify psychological strain through interpersonal dynamics and . Jurors often face , where minority opinions yield to majority pressure, leading to self-doubt and resentment; psychological analyses reveal this can trigger guilt or post-verdict, contributing to long-term interpersonal and occupational disruptions. In one empirical of jury processes, 40% of participants noted persistent rumination on case details interfering with daily functioning, with higher incidences among those exposed to emotionally manipulative . While some jurors derive a of civic fulfillment, the net impact skews negative, as evidenced by elevated and therapy-seeking rates following duty, underscoring the unmitigated emotional toll absent institutional support like or counseling.

Roles and Powers

Fact-Finding and Verdict Delivery

The jury serves as the in both criminal and civil trials, tasked with evaluating to ascertain what occurred without adjudicating questions of , which remain the judge's domain. During the evidentiary phase, jurors observe witness testimony, review exhibits such as documents and physical items, and consider demonstrative aids, applying everyday reasoning to assess and resolve inconsistencies. In criminal cases, this fact-finding must establish guilt beyond a , a standard instructed by the to distinguish it from the preponderance standard in civil matters. Following closing arguments, the delivers instructions outlining applicable , burden of proof, and verdict options, after which the jury retires to a private deliberation room to discuss independently. Deliberations proceed without external influence, with jurors reviewing notes, exhibits, and testimony recollections; a foreperson, elected internally, facilitates but holds no superior vote. Federal criminal require unanimity among all 12 jurors for or , while civil may permit non-unanimous decisions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48, typically needing at least three-fourths agreement. Partial on specific counts or defendants are possible if consensus emerges during ongoing talks, potentially averting a full mistrial. Upon agreement, the jury returns to open court to deliver the verdict orally via the foreperson, specifying outcomes such as "guilty" or "not guilty" on each charge in criminal trials, or and in civil ones. Either party may request polling, where each juror affirms individually to confirm voluntariness and absence of . If unanimity fails after reasonable time—often days—the judge may declare a mistrial, allowing retrial unless bars it. This process preserves the jury's collective judgment as a safeguard against arbitrary judicial fact assessment.

Participation in Sentencing

In most jurisdictions, including , juries determine factual guilt or civil liability, while judges exercise in imposing sentences based on statutory guidelines and aggravating or mitigating factors. This division reflects a that fact-finding is a judgment, whereas sentencing requires legal expertise in proportionality and rehabilitation. In the United States, jury participation in sentencing is more extensive, particularly in criminal cases, though limited to specific contexts. In federal courts and most states, post-conviction sentencing remains primarily a judicial function, with juries occasionally providing advisory input via special verdicts on sentencing factors under rules like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, in cases across all death penalty jurisdictions, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona (2002) mandates jury involvement: any aggravating circumstance elevating the penalty to death must be found unanimously by the jury beyond a , as such findings exceed the statutory maximum for first-degree absent those facts. This ruling, building on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), ensures Sixth Amendment jury trial rights extend to penalty-enhancing elements, reversing prior state practices where judges alone weighed aggravators. A smaller number of states—Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia—extend jury sentencing to non-capital felonies, where convicted defendants face jury-determined punishments within legislatively prescribed ranges. In these systems, judges instruct jurors on applicable penalties, such as incarceration terms or fines, and the jury deliberates a recommendation, which the judge may accept or modify subject to statutory overrides (e.g., mandatory minimums). Empirical studies of these states reveal jury sentences often skew toward leniency compared to judicial ones, with lower average prison terms in comparable cases, though variability raises concerns about uniformity. Historically, jury sentencing originated in early American colonies, influenced by English practices but adapted for democratic accountability; by the 19th century, states like and formalized it for felonies to empower lay assessors in assessing community-appropriate retribution. Proponents view this as a safeguard against arbitrary judicial power, aligning with originalist interpretations of the Sixth Amendment's jury clause, while critics argue it undermines rule-of-law predictability by introducing amateur variability unsupported by expertise. In practice, jury sentencing phases mirror guilt deliberations, often featuring victim impact statements and expert testimony on recidivism risks, but jurors report challenges in balancing retribution with evidence-based alternatives like rehabilitation.

Jury Nullification as a Check on Authority

occurs when a criminal jury acquits a despite believing the establishes guilt beyond a , effectively refusing to apply the as instructed by the due to moral, equitable, or policy objections to the statute or its enforcement. This practice empowers ordinary citizens to interpose their judgment against perceived abuses of legislative or prosecutorial authority, functioning as an informal veto on laws or applications deemed tyrannical or unjust. Unlike or legislative repeal, nullification derives from the jury's power to deliver verdicts unbound by mandatory instructions, rooted in the English tradition where juries asserted independence from royal courts. In colonial America, jury nullification emerged as a direct counter to British imperial control, with juries acquitting defendants charged under the —trade restrictions intended to monopolize colonial commerce for England—thereby undermining over local affairs as early as the . A landmark instance unfolded in the 1735 trial of , a New York printer prosecuted for against colonial governor William Cosby; despite the judge's instructions that truth was no defense under , the jury acquitted Zenger based on the publication's factual accuracy, establishing a precedent for press freedom and resisting official censorship. Founding-era figures such as explicitly endorsed this capacity, describing the jury as a "licentious" check on power in his 1771 defense of the British soldiers in the trial, where acquittals on murder charges reflected community sentiment against overzealous prosecution amid tensions with Britain. similarly advocated for juries to "judge of the law, and not the fact only," viewing nullification as essential to preventing legislative despotism in the early republic. During the antebellum period, northern juries invoked nullification to obstruct the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, acquitting individuals accused of aiding escaped slaves in violation of the federal mandate to return them to bondage, thereby prioritizing moral opposition to slavery over statutory obligation and challenging Southern-dominated congressional authority. In the 20th century, Prohibition-era juries (1920–1933) frequently declined to convict bootleggers and distributors under the , contributing to widespread non-enforcement and public pressure that culminated in the 21st Amendment's repeal, demonstrating nullification's role in signaling societal rejection of moralistic overreach. Legally, U.S. courts have upheld the jury's latent power to nullify without endorsing instructions on it; in Sparf v. United States (1895), the ruled that judges must not inform juries of this option to preserve legal uniformity, yet affirmed that verdicts cannot be overturned solely for disregarding evidence or . Subsequent cases, including United States v. Moylan (1970), reiterated that while nullification lacks a "right" to judicial approval, the jury's acquittal prerogative remains inviolable, insulating it from appellate reversal and thus preserving its utility as a bulwark against prosecutorial or legislative excess. Empirical assessments of nullification's historical efficacy as an authority check are indirect, relying on archival case outcomes rather than controlled studies, but patterns indicate it has compelled shifts by aggregating community dissent into non-convictions, as seen in the cumulative acquittal rates under unpopular laws like the Fugitive Slave Act, where prosecutions often failed due to juror holdouts. Experimental research on mock juries exposed to nullification cues shows increased acquittal tendencies in scenarios involving equitable , such as victimless regulatory offenses, suggesting latent potential to mitigate harsh applications of when jurors perceive laws as disconnected from . Critics from establishment legal perspectives argue this power risks anarchy by subverting , yet proponents grounded in originalist interpretations contend it embodies the Constitution's design for distributed checks, where juries embody sovereign popular will against elite institutions. In practice, nullification's opacity—juries rarely admit it explicitly—enhances its deterrent effect on authorities wary of unpredictable public verdicts, fostering self-restraint in charging decisions for politically charged cases.

Empirical Assessment of Effectiveness

Alignment with Judicial Outcomes

In empirical evaluations, alignment between jury verdicts and judicial outcomes is primarily assessed through surveys of trial judges, who report whether they would have reached the same verdict in a bench trial for cases decided by juries. This method provides a benchmark for comparing lay decision-makers against experienced legal professionals presumed to have greater expertise in evidence evaluation and legal standards. The foundational study on this topic, conducted by Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel in the mid-1950s and published in 1966, surveyed 315 state and federal judges across the regarding 3,576 criminal jury trials. It found that judges reported agreement with jury verdicts in 78% of cases, with juries tending toward leniency: they acquitted in 19% of instances where judges would have convicted, while judges would have acquitted in only 3% of cases where juries convicted. This pattern held across diverse jurisdictions and case types, suggesting juries incorporate broader community sentiments, such as sympathy for defendants or skepticism of police testimony, leading to occasional divergences that favor acquittals. Subsequent replications have confirmed these findings with minimal variation over decades. A 2005 study by Theodore Eisenberg and colleagues, analyzing judge responses for 364 criminal jury trials from 1997–2002 in New York state courts, reported an identical 78% agreement rate, indicating stability in jury-judge alignment despite changes in legal practices and societal norms. Similarly, a 2006 analysis of National Center for State Courts data from civil and criminal cases estimated overall agreement at 77–80%, with jury errors—defined as deviations from judicial verdicts—occurring at rates implying factual accuracy exceeding 85% when weighting judicial decisions as a conservative accuracy standard. These consistencies across studies, spanning from the 1950s to the early 2000s, underscore that juries rarely deviate in ways that systematically undermine case facts, though leniency biases persist in contentious areas like victim credibility or procedural irregularities. Data on civil cases show comparable alignment, though fewer large-scale surveys exist. For instance, extrapolations from mixed civil-criminal datasets report judge-jury agreement around 75%, with divergences often tied to damage awards rather than findings. Limitations in this body of research include reliance on judges' post-trial recollections, which may introduce , and underrepresentation of hung juries or appeals, potentially overstating alignment. Nonetheless, the persistent high agreement rates—typically 75–80%—provide evidence that juries, as a , approximate judicial fact-finding without frequent errors attributable to incompetence.

Studies on Decision Accuracy and Bias

Empirical studies assessing jury decision accuracy often rely on comparisons between jury verdicts and judges' assessments, treating judicial opinions as a benchmark due to judges' legal expertise, though both can err. In a seminal of over 3,500 criminal trials, judges and juries agreed on verdicts in 78% of cases, with juries more lenient in 19% and harsher in only 3%. Subsequent reviews confirm agreement rates of 75-80% in criminal cases, with higher rates (up to 89%) estimated when accounting for strength via log-linear models. These figures suggest jury accuracy around 83-85%, slightly below judges' 87-88%, with wrongful rates estimated at 10% conditional on . In civil cases, agreement remains high at 63-78%, though juries tend to award 20% higher when is found. Archival from state courts show succeeding more often before judges (62%) than juries (47%), potentially reflecting case selection biases where stronger plaintiff cases go to juries. Disagreements cluster in "close" cases, independent of complexity, indicating juries process evidence similarly to judges but diverge on normative judgments. Limitations include non-representative samples and assumptions of judicial , which may inflate perceived jury errors. Research on biases predominantly uses mock juror simulations, which may exaggerate effects absent real deliberation. A meta-analysis of racial bias in verdicts found a small effect (d=0.09), with disparate treatment of out-group defendants but no consistent anti-Black pattern; bias varied by juror race, appearing stronger among Black participants judging White defendants. Sentencing showed a slightly larger effect (d=0.185), moderated by sample type and publication status. Ecologically valid procedures, like , reduced verdict bias. Real-world evidence suggests demographic similarity between jurors and defendants influences leniency in ambiguous cases, while pretrial publicity and inadmissible evidence consistently sway mock decisions toward guilt. Authoritarian juror traits correlate with higher conviction rates (e.g., dogmatic jurors 61% in convicting groups vs. 33% in acquitting). A 2024 meta-analysis on verdict systems (unanimous vs. majority) indicated unanimous requirements lower conviction odds by 40%, potentially enhancing accuracy by demanding consensus but risking hung juries in divided cases. Death-qualified juries convict 19% more often, biasing toward severity in capital trials. Overall, while biases exist, their magnitude is small in controlled studies, and group often mitigates individual prejudices, though systemic factors like jury composition amplify disparities in high-stakes cases.

Evidence of Competence Versus Error Rates

Empirical assessments of jury competence often rely on comparisons between jury verdicts and trial judges' independent evaluations of the same , serving as a proxy for decision accuracy since the "ground truth" of cases is rarely known definitively. Studies consistently find high congruence rates, suggesting juries perform competently in the majority of , with divergences typically attributable to differing interpretations of rather than gross incompetence. For instance, in criminal cases, juries tend to exhibit leniency biases, acquitting more frequently than judges would, which some analyses interpret as a feature of collective deliberation rather than error. The seminal study by Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel, based on surveys of over 3,500 criminal and civil trials in the , reported judge-jury agreement rates of approximately 75% in criminal cases and 78% in civil cases. Among disagreements in criminal trials, 19% involved juries acquitting whom judges would have convicted, 3% involved jury convictions against judicial preference for , and the remainder stemmed from hung juries or other factors; Kalven and Zeisel attributed most splits to "jury values" (e.g., sympathy for the ) rather than evidentiary misunderstanding, with judges citing comprehension failures in only about 5% of cases. This pattern implies low error rates driven by factual incompetence, as juries aligned with judges on assessment but diverged on normative grounds. Partial replications, such as Eisenberg et al.'s analysis of more recent data, have upheld agreement rates around 75-80%, reinforcing the stability of these findings over decades. Efforts to estimate absolute jury error rates, such as the National Center for State Courts' examination of 290 non-capital criminal trials from 2000-2001, model wrongful conviction probabilities using judge overrides and other indicators, yielding estimates of jury errors in the single-digit percentages for straightforward cases, though higher in ambiguous ones. Mock jury experiments, simulating trials with lay participants, further demonstrate competence: jurors accurately recall key evidence details and correct individual errors through deliberation, with group verdicts outperforming solo decisions in accuracy by 10-20% in controlled settings. However, these proxies have limitations; judges themselves err (e.g., via cognitive biases documented in judicial decision studies), and jury "errors" may reflect valid nullification or resistance to perceived prosecutorial overreach, challenging assumptions of judicial superiority. In technical or forensic-heavy cases, some indicates elevated error risks, as jurors undervalue probabilistic or overweight anecdotal , with mock studies showing miscalibration in assessing likelihood ratios leading to inflated probabilities. Yet, overall affirm juries' competence relative to error baselines: wrongful rates in jury trials hover around 2-5% based on databases cross-referenced with types, comparable to or lower than judge-alone systems in jurisdictions. These metrics underscore juries' reliability in aggregate, tempered by case-specific vulnerabilities.

Criticisms and Controversies

Challenges in Complex or Technical Cases

In cases involving intricate scientific, financial, or technological subject matter—such as , white-collar fraud schemes, or patent infringements—juries composed of laypersons frequently encounter barriers to accurate comprehension and application of . Empirical studies from mock trials demonstrate that jurors often misinterpret probabilistic and statistical elements of expert testimony, with comprehension rates for complex quantitative forensic explanations ranging from 25% to 50% in challenging scenarios. For instance, research on random match probabilities in DNA reveals that jurors tend to overvalue simplistic "match" while undervaluing method limitations and rates, leading to distorted assessments of evidentiary strength. This difficulty persists even with procedural aids like or transcript access, which yield only marginal improvements in recall and consistency for technical details. Judicial and academic critiques highlight how such complexities can overwhelm jurors' cognitive capacities, prompting reliance on heuristics rather than rigorous analysis, particularly when resolving conflicts between opposing experts. In mock experiments involving (mtDNA) testimony, jurors exhibited lower comprehension and higher variability in compared to judges exposed to identical , underscoring the lay jury's vulnerability to technical opacity. White-collar crime trials, characterized by voluminous documents and esoteric financial instruments, amplify these issues; critics contend that jurors struggle to discern intent amid layered corporate structures, as evidenced by post-trial analyses questioning reliability in high-profile cases like , where expert disputes dominated proceedings. Overall comprehension of in complex civil litigation hovers around 50-70%, further compounding errors in integrating specialized facts with legal standards. Reforms proposed to address these challenges include pre-trial simplification of expert reports, specialized "" juries, or bench trials, though empirical validation remains limited and debates persist over whether such measures erode democratic fact-finding without demonstrably enhancing accuracy. Studies indicate that while jurors generally avoid overweighting statistics as once feared, their underappreciation of forensic limitations can skew outcomes toward undue certainty in guilt or innocence. These findings, drawn from controlled simulations rather than real trials, suggest inherent limitations in entrusting non-s with highly specialized disputes, potentially favoring professional adjudication in domains demanding domain-specific expertise.

Alleged Biases and Disparities

Empirical research on racial bias in jury verdicts reveals inconsistent findings across mock and actual trials. A meta-analysis of studies through 2005 indicated that all-white juries exhibited greater racial bias in sentencing black defendants compared to diverse juries, particularly in cases involving white victims, though effects varied by crime type. In contrast, a comprehensive review of mock jury experiments involving over 6,700 participants found no significant overall racial bias in verdict or sentencing decisions, attributing apparent inconsistencies to methodological differences rather than pervasive prejudice. Analysis of real felony trials in Florida from 2000 to 2010 showed that including at least one black juror reduced conviction rates for black defendants by 10 percentage points (from 81% to 71%) and sentence lengths by 4 months, while having no measurable effect on white defendant outcomes, suggesting jury racial composition influences results beyond evidence alone. Disparities in jury pool composition exacerbate racial underrepresentation, with individuals often excluded at higher rates due to exemptions, failures to appear, or peremptory challenges. In criminal courts, potential jurors were underrepresented by 42% relative to population shares, while Hispanics faced 77% underrepresentation, leading to predominantly white juries that may amplify outcome disparities. Such imbalances have prompted claims of systemic harm, though critics note that underrepresentation stems partly from voluntary opt-outs and involvement rather than overt alone. Socioeconomic factors contribute to alleged class-based biases in jury selection and decisions. Higher-income jurors tend to favor prosecution verdicts, correlating with fewer acquittals in analyzed trials, while lower jurors show greater defense sympathy, potentially tied to shared experiences of institutional distrust. Juror social class influences participation rates, with wealthier individuals more likely to serve due to fewer hardships, skewing panels toward prosecution-favorable demographics and raising concerns over representativeness in verdicts affecting lower-class defendants. Gender disparities in jury outcomes remain empirically mixed, with some studies showing mock jurors assigning harsher punishments to defendants in certain scenarios, contradicting chivalry hypotheses of leniency. jurors often contribute differently in deliberations, emphasizing relational dynamics over abstract , which can alter group consensus but does not consistently predict biased verdicts by defendant . Allegations of race-based , where minority jurors purportedly acquit same-race defendants irrespective of evidence, have fueled debates but lack robust empirical validation as a widespread . Proponents argue it counters prosecutorial overreach in victimless crimes, yet analyses dismiss it as a used to erode trust in diverse juries, with actual nullification rates showing no disproportionate racial pattern in historical data.

Debates Over Decline and Erosion of Jury Use

In the United States, rates have declined sharply since the mid-20th century, with federal civil cases resolved by jury dropping from 5.5% in 1962 to 0.8% in 2013. By 2024, juries decided less than 1% of federal civil cases and only 1-2% of criminal and civil matters in most state courts, a trend reflected in federal judges handling 10 or more civil jury trials annually in the compared to 1-2 today. Nationally, the rate of jury trials per 100,000 population fell from 58.6 in 2007 to 37.7 in 2019, driven by over 90% of criminal cases ending in guilty pleas due to sentencing disparities known as the "trial penalty." Similar erosion appears in other common law systems, such as , where civil jury trials have nearly vanished since the amid efficiency reforms and procedural shifts. Criminal jury trials face mounting pressure from backlogs exceeding 73,000 cases by December 2024, with ineffective trial rates at 25% in crown courts, prompting proposals to limit or replace juries with judicial panels to clear delays. Proponents of maintaining jury use, including legal scholars citing 's observations on civic education through participation, argue the decline erodes democratic legitimacy by reducing transparency, public accountability, and safeguards like nullification against overreach. They contend fewer trials diminish citizen engagement in verifying facts and verdicts, potentially concentrating power in professional judges and prosecutors whose incentives may favor efficiency over thorough deliberation. Opponents view the trend as an adaptive response to systemic realities rather than inherent erosion, emphasizing cost savings, faster resolutions via settlements or bench trials, and procedural tools like summary judgments that filter weak claims pre-trial. Empirical factors include mandatory , damages caps, and in civil litigation, alongside plea incentives in criminal cases, which resolve disputes without the time and expense of juries—though some data suggest non-jury outcomes align closely with jury verdicts in resolved matters. The persists amid mixed on impacts, with advocates warning of long-term detachment from lay in an era of complex , while skeptics highlight historical precedents of low rates predating modern declines and question juries' edge over judges in accuracy for non-emotional cases. Reforms proposed include incentives for , such as reduced sentencing penalties or streamlined procedures, to counter perceived institutional biases toward avoidance.

International and Comparative Practices

Common Law Systems

In jurisdictions, jury trials form a cornerstone of the adversarial legal process, where lay jurors determine questions of fact while judges rule on matters of . This system originated in medieval England and spread to countries including the , , , and , emphasizing citizen participation to safeguard against arbitrary authority. Juries typically consist of 12 members selected randomly from the electorate, serving in serious criminal cases and, to varying degrees, civil matters. The employs both grand juries, which assess for indictments in cases, and petit juries for trials, with constitutional guarantees under the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments ensuring jury rights in federal criminal prosecutions and civil suits exceeding $20 in value. Verdicts require unanimity, and federal petit juries decide guilt in criminal matters or liability in civil ones. In contrast, limit jury trials primarily to indictable offenses in , with 12 jurors empaneled randomly and verdicts initially requiring unanimity but allowing majority decisions (10-2 or 11-1) after deliberation time limits to prevent hung juries. Jury service typically spans up to 10 working days, extendable for longer trials. Canada's criminal jury system mirrors the U.S. model, featuring 12 randomly selected jurors who must reach unanimous verdicts for convictions in trials for indictable offenses. Australia adopts similar procedures across states, with 12 jurors in most jurisdictions delivering unanimous or majority verdicts in serious crimes, though civil jury use has declined. These systems prioritize through random selection, exemptions for certain professions, and challenges for cause, yet —where jurors acquit contrary to evidence and law based on conscience—remains a latent power, legally recognized but judicially discouraged, as seen historically in acquittals defying unpopular statutes. Comparative data indicate high in juries within these nations, though utilization varies: the U.S. mandates broader jury involvement than the UK's more restricted application, reflecting divergences in legal and case complexity. Empirical studies affirm juries' competence in fact-finding, with error rates comparable to judges, underscoring their role as a democratic check despite debates over biases in diverse populations.

Civil Law Adaptations

In civil law systems, characterized by inquisitorial procedures and reliance on professional judges, adaptations of lay participation typically involve mixed tribunals rather than independent juries, allowing citizens to contribute to fact-finding and sentencing while judges retain oversight on legal issues. These hybrid models emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries as compromises between democratic legitimacy and judicial expertise, often limited to serious criminal cases to mitigate risks of lay incompetence in complex matters. Unlike juries, which deliberate separately and render general verdicts, mixed courts in civil law traditions integrate lay input through joint deliberation, with professionals guiding procedure and instructing on . France's Cour d'assises, established in 1790 during the Revolution, exemplifies early adaptation, handling felonies like murder and rape with a panel of one presiding judge, two professional assessors, and six jurors selected by lot from eligible citizens aged 23 and older. Jurors, drawn from annual lists proportionate to population (e.g., one per 1,300 inhabitants outside Paris), vote equally with judges on verdicts and sentences by majority, though judges preside over evidentiary rules and deliberations. Reforms in 2019 introduced optional professional-only courts for certain crimes in select departments to address juror reluctance, reflecting ongoing tensions between lay involvement and efficiency. Germany employs Schöffen (lay assessors), elected locally for four-year terms, in Schöffengerichte for mid-level offenses, pairing two Schöffen with one or three professional judges who jointly decide guilt, sentencing, and evidence admissibility. This system, standardized since , avoids separate jury verdicts; lay assessors, often numbering around 60,000 nationwide, deliberate with judges to ensure consensus, with Schöffen handling up to 750 courts but limited to trial phases without investigative roles. Italy's giudice popolare similarly mixes six lay judges, drawn by lot from voters, with two professionals for crimes carrying or at least 24 years, such as or offenses, where lay input influences both factual and penalty decisions. Beyond Europe, Japan's saiban-in system, enacted in 2004 and operational since 2009, mandates mixed panels of three professional judges and six lay judges (selected from applicants aged 20+, serving one case) for grave crimes like or causing death, with unanimous or majority decisions on guilt and penalties. This reform aimed to enhance in a judge-dominated system, prohibiting defendant waivers and emphasizing joint deliberation to balance lay perspectives with judicial control. Spain, adopting juries in 1995 via 5/1995, limits them to specific crimes like or corruption, using 12 jurors for verdicts by two-thirds majority, though implementation has been sporadic due to selection complexities and low usage rates. Belgium mirrors with mixed assize courts featuring nine jurors and three judges for felonies, underscoring a pattern where civil law adaptations prioritize integration over autonomy to align with codified legal traditions.

Emerging Reforms in Non-Western Contexts

In , the saiban-in system, a form of lay participation introduced on May 21, 2009, as part of broader judicial reforms, requires six randomly selected citizens to deliberate alongside three professional judges in trials for heinous crimes such as and , with decisions requiring a vote including at least one . By , after 15 years of operation, approximately 10,000 cases had been handled, but participation rates remain low at around 3-4% of eligible citizens responding to summonses, prompting discussions on expanding scope or incentives to address public reluctance and trial efficiency. Reforms have focused on training and procedural tweaks to mitigate lay judges' psychological burdens, though critics argue the hybrid model limits true citizen empowerment compared to full juries. South Korea's citizen participatory trial system, enacted via the Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials effective January 1, 2008, permits up to seven citizens to recommend verdicts and sentences in serious offenses, with the presiding issuing the final ruling; by 2022, over 400 such trials occurred annually, primarily for and cases. Recent evaluations highlight increased public trust in outcomes, with surveys showing 70% approval rates post-reform, though low voluntary participation—under 10% of summoned citizens—has led to proposals for mandatory service and digital enhancements for case selection. The system emphasizes advisory roles to align with civil law traditions, avoiding full nullification powers amid concerns over jurors' legal naivety in complex evidence. In , piloted a quasi-jury mixed in 2007 with lay assessors aiding professional judges, but high reversal rates of acquittals—over 90% in early years—spurred criticism of undue judicial override, leading to 2024 legislative moves toward classic jury trials where jurors independently determine guilt without presiding judge veto. Russia's post-1993 jury reinstatement, expanded to district courts by 2018, initially boosted acquittals to 20-30% versus under 1% in bench trials, viewed by authorities as undermining state control, resulting in 2017 reductions to eight jurors and exclusions for cases. These shifts reflect tensions between goals and prosecutorial dominance, with empirical data indicating juries' higher error-correction via nullification-like outcomes in politically sensitive matters.

Post-2020 Shifts in Jury Utilization

The prompted widespread suspensions of in-person jury trials in 2020 and much of 2021 across and federal courts, resulting in substantial case backlogs that persisted into subsequent years; for instance, federal courts reported ongoing disruptions, with some resuming trials only to pause again amid resurgences. To mitigate health risks upon resumption, courts implemented procedural adaptations such as mandatory masking, in jury boxes, online juror pre-screening questionnaires, reduced venire sizes, and staggered reporting times, which altered traditional jury assembly dynamics and increased administrative burdens. In parallel, the crisis accelerated experimentation with remote technologies for jury-related processes, including virtual jury selection () via video conferencing in jurisdictions like and , where courts gained statutory flexibility to conduct such proceedings without unanimous party consent under certain conditions. A limited number of fully remote civil jury trials emerged experimentally in U.S. federal districts, such as the Western District of Washington, with jurors participating from home, though empirical concerns about reduced comprehension and engagement in virtual formats limited broader adoption. These shifts reflected a pragmatic response to backlogs—exacerbated by pandemic-related lockdowns at detention facilities and juror hesitancy—but also highlighted tensions with constitutional requirements for impartial, in-person fact-finding. Jury trial volumes, already in long-term decline prior to 2020, saw further erosion post-pandemic, with courts recording only 48,764 jury trials in —a 66% drop from 148,558 in 2007—driven by plea bargaining incentives, backlog pressures favoring settlements, and juror non-response rates that threatened pool diversity and trial feasibility. In the UK, backlogs reached nearly 80,000 cases by 2025, prompting senior judicial figures like former Lord Chief Justice Lord Burnett to advocate abandoning s for select serious offenses in favor of judge-alone proceedings to avert systemic collapse, a proposal echoed in reviews amid chronic underfunding. Such reforms, while aimed at efficiency, raised debates over eroding lay participation as a democratic safeguard against state overreach. Post-2020 attitudes also shifted, with surveys indicating heightened polarization, distrust of institutions, and wariness toward expert testimony—potentially influenced by pandemic-era experiences with mandates—complicating persuasion in trials involving or policy disputes. These dynamics contributed to a broader trend of diminished jury reliance, as courts prioritized volume over traditional modes, though empirical data on long-term impacts remains preliminary and contested.

Technological and Procedural Innovations

The prompted widespread adoption of virtual jury proceedings in U.S. courts starting in 2020, enabling remote and via videoconferencing platforms to reduce health risks and backlogs. By 2022, hundreds of civil jury trials had been conducted remotely across various jurisdictions, often requiring party consent and focusing on less complex cases to mitigate concerns over witness credibility assessment and juror . Procedural guidelines emerged to standardize these processes, such as pre-trial tech checks and instructions prohibiting jurors from sharing screens or accessing external devices during deliberations. In criminal contexts, virtual innovations faced stricter scrutiny due to Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, but some federal and state courts experimented with hybrid models by 2021, combining in-person elements with remote for out-of-state or high-risk participants. Post-2020 procedural shifts included expanded use of asynchronous video recordings for and review, allowing jurors to pause and replay digital exhibits, which studies indicated improved comprehension in technical cases without altering patterns significantly. By 2025, electronic systems in hybrid courtrooms became standard in many venues, integrating touch-screen consoles for real-time and 3D visualizations to enhance juror understanding of complex data like forensic reconstructions. Emerging technologies like AI-assisted juror analytics have been piloted in since 2023, using anonymized data to flag potential biases based on demographic patterns and questionnaire responses, though implementation remains limited by privacy laws and ethical debates over algorithmic fairness. Procedural reforms have also incorporated juror feedback mechanisms, such as post-trial anonymous surveys via secure apps, to refine selection processes and reduce no-shows, with one 2024 federal report noting a 15% improvement in attendance rates in tech-enabled systems. Despite these advances, remote deliberations have largely reverted to in-person formats in most jurisdictions due to evidence that physical proximity fosters nuanced essential for consensus, as demonstrated in controlled experiments post-2020.

Ongoing Debates on Nullification and Reform

, the practice whereby jurors acquit a despite establishing guilt under the , remains a contentious issue in legal scholarship and practice, with advocates arguing it serves as a democratic check against overreach or unjust statutes, while critics contend it subverts consistent application of . Organizations such as the Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) actively promote educating potential jurors about this inherent power, emphasizing its historical role in resisting oppressive s like Prohibition-era convictions or Fugitive Slave Act prosecutions, and its modern utility in cases involving non-violent drug offenses where jurors perceive penalties as disproportionate. Defenders, including legal scholars, posit that nullification functions as a "" for mercy or moral disagreement, particularly when legislative inertia fails to address evolving societal norms, as explored in analyses of climate activism or consensual mercy killings. Opponents, including federal judges and bar associations, argue that endorsing nullification encourages arbitrary , erodes public trust in verdicts, and incentivizes strategic "stealth jurors" who conceal biases during to sway outcomes, potentially leading to acquittals in politically charged regardless of factual guilt. Courts consistently prohibit trial judges from instructing on nullification and sanction attorneys who explicitly urge it, viewing such arguments as unethical bids to induce juries to disregard their oaths, though empirical data on its frequency remains elusive due to the secrecy of deliberations. Recent scholarship highlights generational shifts, with surveys indicating younger jurors may be more receptive to nullification in contexts, such as drug or protest-related charges, raising concerns about its potential politicization amid polarized electorates. Reform proposals tied to nullification debates include legislative efforts to mandate juror education on this power, exemplified by Utah's failed 2018 bill (HB 431) that sought to affirm nullification explicitly in criminal instructions, a measure revisited in academic discourse as a means to democratize application without awaiting legislative of outdated statutes. Broader jury reforms, such as those addressing selection biases, indirectly intersect with nullification by aiming to diversify pools and reduce peremptory challenges that exclude jurors likely to nullify based on demographics, as recommended in New York's 2022 Justice Task Force report, which proposed data-driven tracking of strikes to curb racial disparities. In , 2022 amendments to court rules introduced bias-reduction protocols, including expanded questionnaires to identify prejudices pre-trial, potentially mitigating uniform nullification in ideologically homogeneous juries. Additional reforms focus on practical barriers to equitable participation, including proposals to raise juror compensation—such as Pennsylvania's pending legislation for daily fees exceeding $50—and mandate employer wage continuation for service, which proponents argue would broaden representation and reduce coerced verdicts from fatigued or resentful jurors, though evidence linking pay to nullification rates is anecdotal. Critics of expansive reforms warn they could entrench nullification by empowering activist groups to target sympathetic jurors via FIJA-style campaigns, while supporters, drawing on historical precedents, maintain that suppressing the practice risks judicial tyranny absent popular veto. These debates persist without resolution, as nullification's extralegal nature defies empirical quantification, fueling calls for pilot programs in state courts to study its incidence through anonymized post-verdict surveys.

Etymology and Terminology

The term "jury" derives from Middle English jure, adopted from Anglo-Norman French juree, signifying an "" or "," which itself stems from the Old French juree, the feminine past participle of jurer "to swear." This traces further to the Latin iurare "to swear an oath," from iūs (genitive iūris) meaning "" or "right." The earliest recorded use in English appears before 1400, referring to a body of persons sworn (iūrāta in ) to render a true on disputed facts, emphasizing the oath-bound nature of their role in resolving legal inquiries. In legal terminology, a "" (also called a jury) denotes the standard panel of laypersons—typically 6 to 12 members—who hear in a criminal or civil and determine factual guilt, liability, or based on proof beyond a or preponderance of , respectively. The term "petit" originates from Anglo-French, meaning "small," distinguishing it from larger inquisitorial bodies by its limited size and function focused solely on rather than . In contrast, a "" comprises 16 to 23 members tasked with reviewing to assess for in cases, without deciding ultimate guilt; its name reflects its greater scale compared to the petit jury, a distinction formalized in English by the 14th century under Edward III. Additional terms include "," denoting an individual serving on such a body, sworn to , and "," referring to a panel's ability to acquit against or , though not formally recognized in most jurisdictions.

References

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