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Democratization
Democratization
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Since 1900, the number of countries democratizing (yellow) has been higher than those autocratizing (blue), except in the late 1920s through 1940s and since 2010.

Democratization, or democratisation, is the structural government transition from an authoritarian government to a more democratic political regime, including substantive political changes moving in a democratic direction.[1][2]

Whether and to what extent democratization occurs can be influenced by various factors, including economic development, historical legacies, civil society, and international processes. Some accounts of democratization emphasize how elites drove democratization, whereas other accounts emphasize grassroots bottom-up processes.[3] How democratization occurs has also been used to explain other political phenomena, such as whether a country goes to a war or whether its economy grows.[4]

The opposite process is known as democratic backsliding or autocratization.

Description

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Global trend report Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2022[5]

Theories of democratization seek to explain a large macro-level change of a political regime from authoritarianism to democracy. Symptoms of democratization include reform of the electoral system, increased suffrage and reduced political apathy.

Measures of democratization

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Democracy indices enable the quantitative assessment of democratization. Some common democracy indices are Freedom House, Polity data series, V-Dem Democracy indices and Democracy Index. Democracy indices can be quantitative or categorical. Some disagreements among scholars concern the concept of democracy and how to measure democracy – and what democracy indices should be used.

Waves of democratization

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One way to summarize the outcome theories of democratization seek to account is with the idea of waves of democratization

The three waves of democracy identified by Samuel P. Huntington

A wave of democratization refers to a major surge of democracy in history. Samuel P. Huntington identified three waves of democratization that have taken place in history.[6] The first one brought democracy to Western Europe and North America in the 19th century. It was followed by a rise of dictatorships during the Interwar period. The second wave began after World War II, but lost steam between 1962 and the mid-1970s. The latest wave began in 1974 and is still ongoing. Democratization of Latin America and the former Eastern Bloc is part of this third wave.

Waves of democratization can be followed by waves of de-democratization. Thus, Huntington, in 1991, offered the following depiction.

• First wave of democratization, 1828–1926

• First wave of de-democratization, 1922–42

• Second wave of democratization, 1943–62

• Second wave of de-democratization, 1958–75

• Third wave of democratization, 1974–

The idea of waves of democratization has also been used and scrutinized by many other authors, including Renske Doorenspleet,[7] John Markoff,[8] Seva Gunitsky,[9] and Svend-Erik Skaaning.[10]

According to Seva Gunitsky, from the 18th century to the Arab Spring (2011–2012), 13 democratic waves can be identified.[9]

The V-Dem Democracy Report identified for the year 2023 9 cases of stand-alone democratization in East Timor, The Gambia, Honduras, Fiji, Dominican Republic, Solomon Islands, Montenegro, Seychelles, and Kosovo and 9 cases of U-Turn Democratization in Thailand, Maldives, Tunisia, Bolivia, Zambia, Benin, North Macedonia, Lesotho, and Brazil.[11]

By country

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Throughout the history of democracy, enduring democracy advocates succeed almost always through peaceful means when there is a window of opportunity. One major type of opportunity include governments weakened after a violent shock.[12] The other main avenue occurs when autocrats are not threatened by elections, and democratize while retaining power.[13] The path to democracy can be long with setbacks along the way.[14][15][16]

Athens

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The Athenian Revolution (508–507 BCE) was a revolt by the people of Athens that overthrew the ruling aristocratic oligarchy, establishing the almost century-long self-governance of Athens in the form of a participatory democracy – open to all free male citizens. It was a reaction to a broader trend of tyranny that had swept through Athens and the rest of Greece.[17]

Benin

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The 1989–1990 unrest in Benin was a wave of protests, demonstrations, nonviolent boycotts, grassroots rallies, opposition campaigns and strikes in Benin against the government of Mathieu Kérékou, unpaid salaries, and new budget laws.[18]

Brazil

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Diretas Já demonstration in Brasília for open elections
The redemocratization of Brazil (Portuguese: abertura política, lit.'political opening') was the 1974–1988 period of liberalization under the country's military dictatorship, ending with the decline of the regime, the signing of the country's new constitution, and the transition to democracy.[19] Then-president Ernesto Geisel began the process of liberalization (nicknamed Portuguese: distensão) in 1974, by allowing for the Brazilian Democratic Movement opposition party's participation in congressional elections. He worked to address human rights violations and began to undo the military dictatorship's founding legislation, the Institutional Acts, in 1978. General João Figueiredo, elected the next year, continued the transition to democracy, freeing the last political prisoners in 1980 and instituting direct elections in 1982. The 1985 election of a ruling opposition party marked the military dictatorship's end. The process of liberalization ultimately was successful, culminating with the promulgation of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.[20]

Chile

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The military dictatorship in Chile led by General Augusto Pinochet ended on 11 March 1990 and was replaced by a democratically elected government.[21] The transition period lasted roughly two years,[22] although some aspects of the process lasted significantly longer. Unlike most democratic transitions, led by either the elite or the people, Chile's democratic transition process is known as an intermediate transition[21] – a transition involving both the regime and the civil society.[23] Throughout the transition, though the regime increased repressive violence, it simultaneously supported liberalization – progressively strengthening democratic institutions[24] and gradually weakening those of the military.[25]

France

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The French Revolution (1789) briefly allowed a wide franchise. The French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars lasted for more than twenty years. The French Directory was more oligarchic. The First French Empire and the Bourbon Restoration restored more autocratic rule. The French Second Republic had universal male suffrage but was followed by the Second French Empire. The Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) resulted in the French Third Republic.

Germany

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Germany established its first democracy in 1919 with the creation of the Weimar Republic, a parliamentary republic created following the German Empire's defeat in World War I. The Weimar Republic lasted only 14 years before it collapsed and was replaced by Nazi dictatorship.[26] Historians continue to debate the reasons why the Weimar Republic's attempt at democratization failed.[26] After Germany was militarily defeated in World War II, democracy was reestablished in West Germany during the U.S.-led occupation which undertook the denazification of society.[27]

United Kingdom

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Magna Carta in the British Library. The document was described as "the chief cause of Democracy in England".

In Great Britain, there was renewed interest in Magna Carta in the 17th century.[28] The Parliament of England enacted the Petition of Right in 1628 which established certain liberties for subjects. The English Civil War (1642–1651) was fought between the King and an oligarchic but elected Parliament,[29] during which the idea of a political party took form with groups debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of 1647.[30] Subsequently, the Protectorate (1653–59) and the English Restoration (1660) restored more autocratic rule although Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679, which strengthened the convention that forbade detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 established a strong Parliament that passed the Bill of Rights 1689, which codified certain rights and liberties for individuals.[31] It set out the requirement for regular parliaments, free elections, rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and limited the power of the monarch, ensuring that, unlike much of the rest of Europe, royal absolutism would not prevail.[32][33] Only with the Representation of the People Act 1884 did a majority of the males get the vote.

Greece

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The Metapolitefsi (Greek: Μεταπολίτευση, romanizedMetapolítefsi, IPA: [metapoˈlitefsi], "regime change") was a period in modern Greek history from the fall of the Ioannides military junta of 1973–74 to the transition period shortly after the 1974 legislative elections.

Indonesia

[edit]

Italy

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King Charles Albert of Sardinia signs the Albertine Statute, 4 March 1848.
Constitution of the Italian Republic, came into force on 1 January 1948 after the 1946 Italian institutional referendum.

In September 1847, violent riots inspired by Liberals broke out in Reggio Calabria and in Messina in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which were put down by the military. On 12 January 1848 a rising in Palermo spread throughout the island and served as a spark for the Revolutions of 1848 all over Europe. After similar revolutionary outbursts in Salerno, south of Naples, and in the Cilento region which were backed by the majority of the intelligentsia of the Kingdom, on 29 January 1848 King Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies was forced to grant a constitution, using for a pattern the French Charter of 1830. This constitution was quite advanced for its time in liberal democratic terms, as was the proposal of a unified Italian confederation of states.[34] On 11 February 1848, Leopold II of Tuscany, first cousin of Emperor Ferdinand I of Austria, granted the Constitution, with the general approval of his subjects. The Habsburg example was followed by Charles Albert of Sardinia (Albertine Statute; later became the constitution of the unified Kingdom of Italy and remained in force, with changes, until 1948[35]) and by Pope Pius IX (Fundamental Statute). However, only King Charles Albert maintained the statute even after the end of the riots.

The Kingdom of Italy, after the unification of Italy in 1861, was a constitutional monarchy. The new kingdom was governed by a parliamentary constitutional monarchy dominated by liberals.[a] The Italian Socialist Party increased in strength, challenging the traditional liberal and conservative establishment. From 1915 to 1918, the Kingdom of Italy took part in World War I on the side of the Entente and against the Central Powers. In 1922, following a period of crisis and turmoil, the Italian fascist dictatorship was established. During World War II, Italy was first part of the Axis until it surrendered to the Allied powers (1940–1943) and then, as part of its territory was occupied by Nazi Germany with fascist collaboration, a co-belligerent of the Allies during the Italian resistance and the subsequent Italian Civil War, and the liberation of Italy (1943–1945). The aftermath of World War II left Italy also with an anger against the monarchy for its endorsement of the Fascist regime for the previous twenty years. These frustrations contributed to a revival of the Italian republican movement.[36] Italy became a republic after the 1946 Italian institutional referendum[37] held on 2 June, a day celebrated since as Festa della Repubblica. Italy has a written democratic constitution, resulting from the work of a Constituent Assembly formed by the representatives of all the anti-fascist forces that contributed to the defeat of Nazi and Fascist forces during the liberation of Italy and the Italian Civil War,[38] and coming into force on 1 January 1948.

Japan

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In Japan, limited democratic reforms were introduced during the Meiji period (when the industrial modernization of Japan began), the Taishō period (1912–1926), and the early Shōwa period.[39] Despite pro-democracy movements such as the Freedom and People's Rights Movement (1870s and 1880s) and some proto-democratic institutions, Japanese society remained constrained by a highly conservative society and bureaucracy.[39] Historian Kent E. Calder notes that writers that "Meiji leadership embraced constitutional government with some pluralist features for essentially tactical reasons" and that pre-World war II Japanese society was dominated by a "loose coalition" of "landed rural elites, big business, and the military" that was averse to pluralism and reformism.[39] While the Imperial Diet survived the impacts of Japanese militarism, the Great Depression, and the Pacific War, other pluralistic institutions, such as political parties, did not. After World War II, during the Allied occupation, Japan adopted a much more vigorous, pluralistic democracy.[39]

Voting in Valparaíso, Chile, in 1888

Madagascar

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The 1990–1992 movement in Madagascar (Malagasy: Fihetsiketsehana 1990-1992 teto Madagasikara) was a period of widespread popular unrest in Madagascar between March 1990 and August 1992. It began as a wave of strike action against the autocratic regime of President Didier Ratsiraka and culminated in the promulgation of a new constitution and a period of democratic transition leading to Ratsiraka handing the Presidency to opposition leader Albert Zafy in March 1993.[40]

Malawi

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Banda agreed to hold the referendum in response to international pressure and growing domestic unrest. Opposition groups had initially doubted the legitimacy of the process, but eventually participated once they were allowed to register as “special interest groups” and after a series of discussions led to an agreed legal framework. Major opposition participants included the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches, the United Democratic Front (representing internal opponents and dissident government officials), and the Alliance for Democracy (linked to trade unions and opposition groups in exile).[41]

Latin America

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Countries in Latin America became independent between 1810 and 1825, and soon had some early experiences with representative government and elections. All Latin American countries established representative institutions soon after independence, the early cases being those of Colombia in 1810, Paraguay and Venezuela in 1811, and Chile in 1818.[42] Adam Przeworski shows that some experiments with representative institutions in Latin America occurred earlier than in most European countries.[43] Mass democracy, in which the working class had the right to vote, become common only in the 1930s and 1940s.[44]

Portugal

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Portugal's redemocratization process started with the Carnation Revolution of 1974. It ended with the enactment of the Constitution of Portugal in 1976.

Philippines

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A picture of Corazon Aquino campaigning under the UNIDO banner during the 1986 snap elections.

In 1986, democratic institutions throughout the Philippines were reinstated during the deposition of the 20-year long Marcos regime through the People Power Revolution.

Barred constitutionally from running a third term by 1973, Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his administration announced Proclamation No. 1081 on September 23, 1972, a declaration of martial law that deliberately decreed emergency powers over every democratic functions in the country, ostensibly under the pretext of a communist overthrow. Throughout the 20-year long martial law, most civil liberties of the once democratic Philippines were suppressed, criminalized, or just plainly abolished. By 1981, the loan-reliant economy of the Marcos regime experienced unforecasted contractions when the Reagan administration announced the lowering of American interest rates during the global recession at that time, further plunging the Philippine economy into debt.

In 1983, Benigno Aquino Jr., a renowned dissident of the Marcos regime, returned to the Philippines after his self-exile in the United States. After disembarking China Airlines Flight 811 on Gate 8 at Manila International Airport, Aquino, on the service steps of his van guarded by the Aviation Security Command (AVESCOM), was shot multiple times by assailants outside the van at point blank. He died from his wounds on the way to Fort Bonifacio Hospital.

In response to the assassination of Aquino, public outrage revitalized in the form of Jose W. Diokno's nationalist liberal democrat umbrella organization, the Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan or KAAKBAY, then leading the Justice for Aquino Justice for All or JAJA movement. JAJA consisted of the social democrat-dominant August Twenty One Movement or the ATOM, led by Butz Aquino. These political movements and organizations coalesced into the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino or KOMPIL, a call for parliamentarianism and democratization during this period. In the middle of 1984, JAJA was replaced by the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD), with largely the same principles.

In November of 1985, the rapid development of opposition organizations swayed the Marcos administration, with some American intervention, to announce the Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 (National Law No. 883), a 1986 snap election, by the unicameral body, the Regular Batasang Pambansa. Immediately after the decree, the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the main opposition multi-party electoral alliance, rallied even more public support, headed by assigned party leader Corazon "Cory" Cojuangco Aquino, Benigno Aquino's wife, and Salvador "Doy" Ramon Hidalgo Laurel.

The 1986 snap election was marred with electoral fraud, as discrepant figures from both the government-sponsored election canvasser, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the publicly-accredited poll watcher, National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), finalized different tally figures. COMELEC announced a Marcos victory of 10,810,000 votes against Aquino's 9,300,000, while NAMFREL announced an Aquino victory of 7,840,000 votes against Marcos' 7,050,000. The apparent tampered snap election stirred public unrest, even prompting COMELEC technicians to proceed with a walkout mid-voting, an event cited to be the first act of civil disobedience during the People Power Revolution.

Occurring afterwards were a series of popular demonstrations against the regime occurring from February 22 to 26, referred to as the People Power Revolution, then culminating into the departure of Marcos and the non-violent transition of power, restoring democracy under Aquino's UNIDO. Immediately after Aquino's ascension, she ratified Proclamation No. 3, a law declaring a provisional constitution and government. The promulgation of the 1986 Freedom Constitution superseded many of the autocratic provisions of the 1973 Constitution, abolishing the Regular Batasang Pambansa, along with plebiscitarian dependence for the creation of a new Congress. The official adoption of the 1987 Constitution signalled the completion of Philippine democratization.

Senegal

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The Democracy in Senegal was touted as one of the more stable democracies in Africa, with a long tradition of peaceful democratic discourse. Democratization proceeded gradually from 1970s to 1990s.

Spain

[edit]

The Spanish transition to democracy, known in Spain as la Transición (IPA: [la tɾansiˈθjon]; 'the Transition') or la Transición española ('the Spanish Transition'), is a period of modern Spanish history encompassing the regime change that moved from the Francoist dictatorship to the consolidation of a parliamentary system, in the form of constitutional monarchy under Juan Carlos I.

The democratic transition began two days after the death of Francisco Franco, in November 1975.[45] Initially, "the political elites left over from Francoism" attempted "reform of the institutions of dictatorship" through existing legal means,[46] but social and political pressure saw the formation of a democratic parliament in the 1977 general election, which had the imprimatur to write a new constitution that was then approved by referendum in December 1978. The following years saw the beginning of the development of the rule of law and establishment of regional government, amidst ongoing terrorism, an attempted coup d'état and global economic problems.[46] The Transition is said to have concluded after the landslide victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) in the 1982 general election and the first peaceful transfer of executive power.[46][b]

South Africa

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F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela in July 1993, near the close of negotiations, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania wait to jointly receive the Liberty Medal.[49]
The apartheid system in South Africa was ended through a series of bilateral and multi-party negotiations between 1990 and 1993. The negotiations culminated in the passage of a new interim Constitution in 1993, a precursor to the Constitution of 1996; and in South Africa's first non-racial elections in 1994, won by the African National Congress (ANC) liberation movement.

South Korea

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Crowds gather at the state funeral of Lee Han-yeol in Seoul, July 9, 1987.
The June Democratic Struggle (Korean6월 민주 항쟁), also known as the June Democracy Movement and the June Uprising,[50] was a nationwide pro-democracy movement in South Korea that generated mass protests from June 10 to 29, 1987. The demonstrations forced the ruling authoritarian government to hold direct presidential elections and institute other democratic reforms, which led to the establishment of the Sixth Republic, the present-day government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

Soviet Union

[edit]
Demokratizatsiya (Russian: демократизация, IPA: [dʲɪməkrətʲɪˈzatsɨjə], democratization) was a slogan introduced by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in January 1987 calling for the infusion of "democratic" elements into the Soviet Union's single-party government. Gorbachev's Demokratizatsiya meant the introduction of multi-candidate—though not multi-party—elections for local Communist Party (CPSU) officials and Soviets. In this way, he hoped to rejuvenate the party with reform-minded personnel who would carry out his institutional and policy reforms. The CPSU would retain sole custody of the ballot box.[51]

Switzerland

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The rise of Switzerland as a federal state began on 12 September 1848, with the creation of a federal constitution in response to a 27-day civil war, the Sonderbundskrieg. The constitution, which was heavily influenced by the United States Constitution and the ideas of the French Revolution, was modified several times during the following decades and wholly replaced in 1999. The 1848 constitution represented the first time, other than when the short-lived Helvetic Republic had been imposed, that the Swiss had a central government instead of being simply a collection of autonomous cantons bound by treaties.

Roman Republic

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The overthrow of the Roman monarchy was an event in ancient Rome that took place between the 6th and 5th centuries BC where a political revolution replaced the then-existing Roman monarchy under Lucius Tarquinius Superbus with a republic. The details of the event were largely forgotten by the Romans a few centuries later; later Roman historians presented a narrative of the events, traditionally dated to c. 509 BC, but it is largely believed by modern scholars to be fictitious.

Tunisia

[edit]
[[File:
|thumb|]] The Tunisian revolution (Arabic: الثورة التونسية), also called the Jasmine Revolution and Tunisian Revolution of Dignity,[52][53][54] was an intensive 28-day campaign of civil resistance. It included a series of street demonstrations which took place in Tunisia, and led to the ousting of longtime dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011.[55] It eventually led to a thorough democratization of the country and to free and democratic elections, which had led to people believing it was the only successful movement in the Arab Spring.[56]

Ukraine

[edit]
From the formal establishment of the People's Movement of Ukraine on 1 July 1989 to the formalisation of the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine via referendum on 1 December 1991, a non-violent protest movement worked to achieve Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union.[57] Led by Soviet dissident Viacheslav Chornovil, the protests began as a series of strikes in the Donbas that led to the removal of longtime communist leader Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. Later, the protests grew in size and scope, leading to a human chain across the country and widespread student protests against the falsification of the 1990 Ukrainian Supreme Soviet election. The protests were ultimately successful, leading to the independence of Ukraine amidst the broader dissolution of the Soviet Union.

United States

[edit]

The American Revolution (1765–1783) created the United States. The new Constitution established a relatively strong federal national government that included an executive, a national judiciary, and a bicameral Congress that represented states in the Senate and the population in the House of Representatives.[58][59] In many fields, it was a success ideologically in the sense that a true republic was established that never had a single dictator, but voting rights were initially restricted to white male property owners (about 6% of the population).[60] Slavery was not abolished in the Southern states until the constitutional Amendments of the Reconstruction era following the American Civil War (1861–1865). The provision of Civil Rights for African-Americans to overcome post-Reconstruction Jim Crow segregation in the South was achieved in the 1960s.

Causes and factors

[edit]

There is considerable debate about the factors which affect (e.g., promote or limit) democratization.[61] Factors discussed include economic, political, cultural, individual agents and their choices, international and historical.

Economic factors

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Economic development and modernization theory

[edit]
Industrialization was seen by many theorists as a driver of democratization.

Scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset;[62] Carles Boix, Susan Stokes,[63]Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens[64] argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Initially argued by Lipset in 1959, this has subsequently been referred to as modernization theory.[65][66] According to Daniel Treisman, there is "a strong and consistent relationship between higher income and both democratization and democratic survival in the medium term (10–20 years), but not necessarily in shorter time windows."[67] Robert Dahl argued that market economies provided favorable conditions for democratic institutions.[68]

A higher GDP/capita correlates with democracy. Some Who? claim the wealthiest democracies have never been observed to fall into authoritarianism.[69] The rise of Hitler and of the Nazis in Weimar Germany can be seen as an obvious counter-example. Although, in early 1930s, Germany was already an advanced economy. By that time, the country was also living in a state of economic crisis virtually since the first World War (in the 1910s). A crisis that was eventually worsened by the effects of the Great Depression. There is also the general observation that democracy was very rare before the industrial revolution. Empirical research thus led many to believe that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy, or helps newly established democracies consolidate.[69][70]

One study finds that economic development prompts democratization but only in the medium run (10–20 years). This is because development may entrench the incumbent leader while making it more difficult for him deliver the state to a son or trusted aide when he exits.[71] However, the debate about whether democracy is a consequence of wealth is far from conclusive.[72]

Another study suggests that economic development depends on the political stability of a country to promote democracy.[73] Clark, Robert and Golder, in their reformulation of Albert Hirschman's model of Exit, Voice and Loyalty, explain how it is not the increase of wealth in a country per se which influences a democratization process, but rather the changes in the socio-economic structures that come together with the increase of wealth. They explain how these structural changes have been called out to be one of the main reasons several European countries became democratic. When their socioeconomic structures shifted because modernization made the agriculture sector more efficient, bigger investments of time and resources were used for the manufacture and service sectors. In England, for example, members of the gentry began investing more in commercial activities that allowed them to become economically more important for the state. These new kinds of productive activities came with new economic power. Their assets became more difficult for the state to count and hence, more difficult to tax. Because of this, predation was no longer possible and the state had to negotiate with the new economic elites to extract revenue. A sustainable bargain had to be reached because the state became more dependent on its citizens remaining loyal, and with this, citizens now had the leverage to be taken into account in the decision making process for the country.[74][unreliable source?][75]

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).[76] Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.[77] Andrew J. Nathan argues that China is a problematic case for the thesis that economic development causes democratization.[78] Michael Miller finds that development increases the likelihood of "democratization in regimes that are fragile and unstable, but makes this fragility less likely to begin with."[79]

There is research to suggest that greater urbanization, through various pathways, contributes to democratization.[80][81]

Numerous scholars and political thinkers have linked a large middle class to the emergence and sustenance of democracy,[68][82] whereas others have challenged this relationship.[83]

In "Non-Modernization" (2022), Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of political development "because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an 'end of history'."[84]

A meta-analysis by Gerardo L. Munck of research on Lipset's argument shows that a majority of studies do not support the thesis that higher levels of economic development leads to more democracy.[85]

A 2024 study linked industrialization to democratization, arguing that large-scale employment in manufacturing made mass mobilization easier to occur and harder to repress.[86]

Capital mobility

[edit]

Theories on causes to democratization such as economic development focuses on the aspect of gaining capital. Capital mobility focuses on the movement of money across borders of countries, different financial instruments, and the corresponding restrictions. In the past, there have been multiple theories as to what the relationship is between capital mobility and democratization.[87]

The "doomsway view" is that capital mobility is an inherent threat to underdeveloped democracies by the worsening of economic inequalities, favoring the interests of powerful elites and external actors over the rest of society. This might lead to depending on money from outside, therefore affecting the economic situation in other countries. Sylvia Maxfield argues that a bigger demand for transparency in both the private and public sectors by some investors can contribute to a strengthening of democratic institutions and can encourage democratic consolidation.[88]

A 2016 study found that preferential trade agreements can increase democratization of a country, especially trading with other democracies.[89] A 2020 study found increased trade between democracies reduces democratic backsliding, while trade between democracies and autocracies reduces democratization of the autocracies.[90] Trade and capital mobility often involve international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), which can condition financial assistance or trade agreements on democratic reforms.[91]

Classes, cleavages and alliances

[edit]
Theorists such as Barrington Moore Jr. argued that the roots of democratization could be found in the relationship between lords and peasants in agrarian societies.

Sociologist Barrington Moore Jr., in his influential Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), argues that the distribution of power among classes – the peasantry, the bourgeoise and the landed aristocracy – and the nature of alliances between classes determined whether democratic, authoritarian or communist revolutions occurred.[92] Moore also argued there were at least "three routes to the modern world" – the liberal democratic, the fascist, and the communist – each deriving from the timing of industrialization and the social structure at the time of transition. Thus, Moore challenged modernization theory, by stressing that there was not one path to the modern world and that economic development did not always bring about democracy.[93]

Many authors have questioned parts of Moore's arguments. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John D. Stephens, in Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992), raise questions about Moore's analysis of the role of the bourgeoisie in democratization.[94] Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances, the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances.[95] Samuel Valenzuela argues that, counter to Moore's view, the landed elite supported democratization in Chile.[96] A comprehensive assessment conducted by James Mahoney concludes that "Moore's specific hypotheses about democracy and authoritarianism receive only limited and highly conditional support."[97]

A 2020 study linked democratization to the mechanization of agriculture: as landed elites became less reliant on the repression of agricultural workers, they became less hostile to democracy.[98]

According to political scientist David Stasavage, representative government is "more likely to occur when a society is divided across multiple political cleavages."[99] A 2021 study found that constitutions that emerge through pluralism (reflecting distinct segments of society) are more likely to induce liberal democracy (at least, in the short term).[100]

Political-economic factors

[edit]

Rulers' need for taxation

[edit]

Robert Bates and Donald Lien, as well as David Stasavage, have argued that rulers' need for taxes gave asset-owning elites the bargaining power to demand a say on public policy, thus giving rise to democratic institutions.[101][102][103] Montesquieu argued that the mobility of commerce meant that rulers had to bargain with merchants in order to tax them, otherwise they would leave the country or hide their commercial activities.[104][101] Stasavage argues that the small size and backwardness of European states, as well as the weakness of European rulers, after the fall of the Roman Empire meant that European rulers had to obtain consent from their population to govern effectively.[103][102]

According to Clark, Golder, and Golder, an application of Albert O. Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty model is that if individuals have plausible exit options, then a government may be more likely to democratize. James C. Scott argues that governments may find it difficult to claim a sovereignty over a population when that population is in motion.[105] Scott additionally asserts that exit may not solely include physical exit from the territory of a coercive state, but can include a number of adaptive responses to coercion that make it more difficult for states to claim sovereignty over a population. These responses can include planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political arrangement of a state is a result of individuals adapting to the environment, and making a choice as to whether or not to stay in a territory.[105] If people are free to move, then the exit, voice, and loyalty model predicts that a state will have to be of that population representative, and appease the populace in order to prevent them from leaving.[106] If individuals have plausible exit options then they are better able to constrain a government's arbitrary behaviour through threat of exit.[106]

Inequality and democracy

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Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued that the relationship between social equality and democratic transition is complicated: People have less incentive to revolt in an egalitarian society (for example, Singapore), so the likelihood of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society (for example, South Africa under Apartheid), the redistribution of wealth and power in a democracy would be so harmful to elites that these would do everything to prevent democratization. Democratization is more likely to emerge somewhere in the middle, in the countries, whose elites offer concessions because (1) they consider the threat of a revolution credible and (2) the cost of the concessions is not too high.[107] This expectation is in line with the empirical research showing that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies.[69]

Other approaches to the relationship between inequality and democracy have been presented by Carles Boix, Stephan Haggard Robert Kaufman,Ben Ansell, and David Samuels.[108][109]

In their 2019 book The Narrow Corridor and a 2022 study in the American Political Science Review, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of the relationship between elites and society determine whether stable democracy emerges. When elites are overly dominant, despotic states emerge. When society is overly dominant, weak states emerge. When elites and society are evenly balance, inclusive states emerge.[110][111]

Natural resources

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The abundance of oil is sometimes seen as a curse.

Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule.[112][113][114][115][116][117][118][119][120][121] According to Michael Ross, petroleum is the sole resource that has "been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions" and is the "key variable in the vast majority of the studies" identifying some type of resource curse effect.[122] A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.[123]

Thad Dunning proposes a plausible explanation for Ecuador's return to democracy that contradicts the conventional wisdom that natural resource rents encourage authoritarian governments. Dunning proposes that there are situations where natural resource rents, such as those acquired through oil, reduce the risk of distributive or social policies to the elite because the state has other sources of revenue to finance this kind of policies that is not the elite wealth or income.[124] And in countries plagued with high inequality, which was the case of Ecuador in the 1970s, the result would be a higher likelihood of democratization.[125] In 1972, the military coup had overthrown the government in large part because of the fears of elites that redistribution would take place.[126] That same year oil became an increasing financial source for the country.[126] Although the rents were used to finance the military, the eventual second oil boom of 1979 ran parallel to the country's re-democratization.[126] Ecuador's re-democratization can then be attributed, as argued by Dunning, to the large increase of oil rents, which enabled not only a surge in public spending but placated the fears of redistribution that had grappled the elite circles.[126] The exploitation of Ecuador's resource rent enabled the government to implement price and wage policies that benefited citizens at no cost to the elite and allowed for a smooth transition and growth of democratic institutions.[126]

The thesis that oil and other natural resources have a negative impact on democracy has been challenged by historian Stephen Haber and political scientist Victor Menaldo in a widely cited article in the American Political Science Review (2011). Haber and Menaldo argue that "natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable" and find that when tests of the relationship between natural resources and democracy take this point into account "increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism."[127]

Cultural factors

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Values and religion

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It is claimed by some that certain cultures are simply more conducive to democratic values than others. This view is likely to be ethnocentric. Typically, it is Western culture which is cited as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures portrayed as containing values which make democracy difficult or undesirable. This argument is sometimes used by undemocratic regimes to justify their failure to implement democratic reforms. Today, however, there are many non-Western democracies. Examples include India, Japan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, Taiwan, and South Korea. Research finds that "Western-educated leaders significantly and substantively improve a country's democratization prospects".[128]

Huntington presented an influential, but also controversial arguments about Confucianism and Islam. Huntington held that "In practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy."[129] He also held that "Islamic doctrine ... contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy," but generally thought that Islam was an obstacle to democratization.[130] In contrast, Alfred Stepan was more optimistic about the compatibility of different religions and democracy.[131]

The compatibility of Islam and democracy continues to be a focus of discussion; the image depicts a mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia.

Steven Fish and Robert Barro have linked Islam to undemocratic outcomes.[132][133] However, Michael Ross argues that the lack of democracies in some parts of the Muslim world has more to do with the adverse effects of the resource curse than Islam.[134] Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney have linked the democratic divergence between the West and the Middle-East to the reliance on mamluks (slave soldiers) by Muslim rulers whereas European rulers had to rely on local elites for military forces, thus giving those elites bargaining power to push for representative government.[135]

Robert Dahl argued, in On Democracy, that countries with a "democratic political culture" were more prone for democratization and democratic survival.[68] He also argued that cultural homogeneity and smallness contribute to democratic survival.[68][136] Other scholars have however challenged the notion that small states and homogeneity strengthen democracy.[137]

A 2012 study found that areas in Africa with Protestant missionaries were more likely to become stable democracies.[138] A 2020 study failed to replicate those findings.[139]

Sirianne Dahlum and Carl Henrik Knutsen offer a test of the Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel revised version of modernization theory, which focuses on cultural traits triggered by economic development that are presumed to be conducive to democratization.[140] They find "no empirical support" for the Inglehart and Welzel thesis and conclude that "self-expression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies."[141]

Education

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It has long been theorized that education promotes stable and democratic societies.[142] Research shows that education leads to greater political tolerance, increases the likelihood of political participation and reduces inequality.[143] One study finds "that increases in levels of education improve levels of democracy and that the democratizing effect of education is more intense in poor countries".[143]

It is commonly claimed that democracy and democratization were important drivers of the expansion of primary education around the world. However, new evidence from historical education trends challenges this assertion. An analysis of historical student enrollment rates for 109 countries from 1820 to 2010 finds no support for the claim that democratization increased access to primary education around the world. It is true that transitions to democracy often coincided with an acceleration in the expansion of primary education, but the same acceleration was observed in countries that remained non-democratic.[144]

Wider adoption of voting advice applications can lead to increased education on politics and increased voter turnout.[145]

Social capital and civil society

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Civic engagement, including volunteering, is conducive to democratization. These volunteers are cleaning up after the 2012 Hurricane Sandy.

Civil society refers to a collection of non-governmental organizations and institutions that advance the interests, priorities and will of citizens. Social capital refers to features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that allow individuals to act together to pursue shared objectives.[8]

Robert Putnam argues that certain characteristics make societies more likely to have cultures of civic engagement that lead to more participatory democracies. According to Putnam, communities with denser horizontal networks of civic association are able to better build the "norms of trust, reciprocity, and civic engagement" that lead to democratization and well-functioning participatory democracies. By contrasting communities in Northern Italy, which had dense horizontal networks, to communities in Southern Italy, which had more vertical networks and patron-client relations, Putnam asserts that the latter never built the culture of civic engagement that some deem as necessary for successful democratization.[146]

Sheri Berman has rebutted Putnam's theory that civil society contributes to democratization, writing that in the case of the Weimar Republic, civil society facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party.[147] According to Berman, Germany's democratization after World War I allowed for a renewed development in the country's civil society; however, Berman argues that this vibrant civil society eventually weakened democracy within Germany as it exacerbated existing social divisions due to the creation of exclusionary community organizations.[147] Subsequent empirical research and theoretical analysis has lent support for Berman's argument.[148] Yale University political scientist Daniel Mattingly argues civil society in China helps the authoritarian regime in China to cement control.[149] Clark, M. Golder, and S. Golder also argue that despite many believing democratization requires a civic culture, empirical evidence produced by several reanalyses of past studies suggest this claim is only partially supported.[14] Philippe C. Schmitter also asserts that the existence of civil society is not a prerequisite for the transition to democracy, but rather democratization is usually followed by the resurrection of civil society (even if it did not exist previously).[16]

Research indicates that democracy protests are associated with democratization. According to a study by Freedom House, in 67 countries where dictatorships have fallen since 1972, nonviolent civic resistance was a strong influence over 70 percent of the time. In these transitions, changes were catalyzed not through foreign invasion, and only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary elite-driven reforms, but overwhelmingly by democratic civil society organizations utilizing nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance, such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, and mass protests.[150] A 2016 study found that about a quarter of all cases of democracy protests between 1989 and 2011 lead to democratization.[151]

Theories based on political agents and choices

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Elite-opposition negotiations and contingency

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Scholars such as Dankwart A. Rustow,[152][153] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter in their classic Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (1986),[154] argued against the notion that there are structural "big" causes of democratization. These scholars instead emphasize how the democratization process occurs in a more contingent manner that depends on the characteristics and circumstances of the elites who ultimately oversee the shift from authoritarianism to democracy.

O'Donnell and Schmitter proposed a strategic choice approach to transitions to democracy that highlighted how they were driven by the decisions of different actors in response to a core set of dilemmas. The analysis centered on the interaction among four actors: the hard-liners and soft-liners who belonged to the incumbent authoritarian regime, and the moderate and radical oppositions against the regime. This book not only became the point of reference for a burgeoning academic literature on democratic transitions, it was also read widely by political activists engaged in actual struggles to achieve democracy.[155]

Adam Przeworski, in Democracy and the Market (1991), offered the first analysis of the interaction between rulers and opposition in transitions to democracy using rudimentary game theory. and he emphasizes the interdependence of political and economic transformations.[156]

Elite-driven democratization

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Scholars have argued that processes of democratization may be elite-driven or driven by the authoritarian incumbents as a way for those elites to retain power amid popular demands for representative government.[157][158][159][160] If the costs of repression are higher than the costs of giving away power, authoritarians may opt for democratization and inclusive institutions.[161][162][163] According to a 2020 study, authoritarian-led democratization is more likely to lead to lasting democracy in cases when the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is high.[164] However, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo argue that democratizing rules implemented by outgoing authoritarians may distort democracy in favor of the outgoing authoritarian regime and its supporters, resulting in "bad" institutions that are hard to get rid of.[165] According to Michael K. Miller, elite-driven democratization is particularly likely in the wake of major violent shocks (either domestic or international) which provide openings to opposition actors to the authoritarian regime.[163] Dan Slater and Joseph Wong argue that dictators in Asia chose to implement democratic reforms when they were in positions of strength in order to retain and revitalize their power.[160]

According to a study by political scientist Daniel Treisman, influential theories of democratization posit that autocrats "deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide public goods, outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence." His study shows that in many cases, "democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that get out of hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control."[166]

Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik dispute that elite-driven democratization produce liberal democracy. They argue that low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages are necessary for liberal democracy to emerge.[167] A 2020 study by several political scientists from German universities found that democratization through bottom-up peaceful protests led to higher levels of democracy and democratic stability than democratization prompted by elites.[168]

The three dictatorship types, monarchy, civilian and military have different approaches to democratization as a result of their individual goals. Monarchic and civilian dictatorships seek to remain in power indefinitely through hereditary rule in the case of monarchs or through oppression in the case of civilian dictators. A military dictatorship seizes power to act as a caretaker government to replace what they consider a flawed civilian government. Military dictatorships are more likely to transition to democracy because at the onset, they are meant to be stop-gap solutions while a new acceptable government forms.[169][170][171]

Research suggests that the threat of civil conflict encourages regimes to make democratic concessions. A 2016 study found that drought-induced riots in Sub-Saharan Africa lead regimes, fearing conflict, to make democratic concessions.[172]

Scrambled constituencies

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Mancur Olson theorizes that the process of democratization occurs when elites are unable to reconstitute an autocracy. Olson suggests that this occurs when constituencies or identity groups are mixed within a geographic region. He asserts that this mixed geographic constituencies requires elites to for democratic and representative institutions to control the region, and to limit the power of competing elite groups.[173]

Death or ouster of dictator

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One analysis found that "Compared with other forms of leadership turnover in autocracies—such as coups, elections, or term limits—which lead to regime collapse about half of the time, the death of a dictator is remarkably inconsequential. ... of the 79 dictators who have died in office (1946–2014)... in the vast majority (92%) of cases, the regime persists after the autocrat's death."[174]

Women's suffrage

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One of the critiques of Huntington's periodization is that it doesn't give enough weight to universal suffrage.[175][176] Pamela Paxton argues that once women's suffrage is taken into account, the data reveal "a long, continuous democratization period from 1893–1958, with only war-related reversals."[177]

International factors

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War and national security

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Jeffrey Herbst, in his paper "War and the State in Africa" (1990), explains how democratization in European states was achieved through political development fostered by war-making and these "lessons from the case of Europe show that war is an important cause of state formation that is missing in Africa today."[178] Herbst writes that war and the threat of invasion by neighbors caused European state to more efficiently collect revenue, forced leaders to improve administrative capabilities, and fostered state unification and a sense of national identity (a common, powerful association between the state and its citizens).[178] Herbst writes that in Africa and elsewhere in the non-European world "states are developing in a fundamentally new environment" because they mostly "gained Independence without having to resort to combat and have not faced a security threat since independence."[178] Herbst notes that the strongest non-European states, South Korea and Taiwan, are "largely 'warfare' states that have been molded, in part, by the near constant threat of external aggression."[178]

Elizabeth Kier has challenged claims that total war prompts democratization, showing in the cases of the UK and Italy during World War I that the policies adopted by the Italian government prompted a fascist backlash whereas UK government policies towards labor undermined broader democratization.[179]

War and peace

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Two British Marine Commandos take protection behind debris during the capture of Walcheren Island during World War II. The link between war and democratization has been a focus of some theories.

Wars may contribute to the state-building that precedes a transition to democracy, but war is mainly a serious obstacle to democratization. While adherents of the democratic peace theory believe that democracy causes peace, the territorial peace theory makes the opposite claim that peace causes democracy. In fact, war and territorial threats to a country are likely to increase authoritarianism and lead to autocracy. This is supported by historical evidence showing that in almost all cases, peace has come before democracy. A number of scholars have argued that there is little support for the hypothesis that democracy causes peace, but strong evidence for the opposite hypothesis that peace leads to democracy.[180][181][182]

Christian Welzel's human empowerment theory posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization.[183] This is in agreement with theories based on evolutionary psychology. The so-called regality theory finds that people develop a psychological preference for a strong leader and an authoritarian form of government in situations of war or perceived collective danger. On the other hand, people will support egalitarian values and a preference for democracy in situations of peace and safety. The consequence of this is that a society will develop in the direction of autocracy and an authoritarian government when people perceive collective danger, while the development in the democratic direction requires collective safety.[184]

International institutions

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A number of studies have found that international institutions have helped facilitate democratization.[185][186][187] Thomas Risse wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern Europe that the EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects for the new democracies."[188] Scholars have also linked NATO expansion with playing a role in democratization.[189] international forces can significantly affect democratization. Global forces like the diffusion of democratic ideas and pressure from international financial institutions to democratize have led to democratization.[190]

Promotion, foreign influence, and intervention

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The European Union has contributed to the spread of democracy, in particular by encouraging democratic reforms in aspiring member states. Thomas Risse wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern Europe that the EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects for the new democracies."[188]

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have argued that close ties to the West increased the likelihood of democratization after the end of the Cold War, whereas states with weak ties to the West adopted competitive authoritarian regimes.[191][192]

A 2002 study found that membership in regional organizations "is correlated with transitions to democracy during the period from 1950 to 1992."[193]

A 2004 study found no evidence that foreign aid led to democratization.[194]

Democracies have often been imposed by military intervention, for example in Japan and Germany after World War II.[195][196] In other cases, decolonization sometimes facilitated the establishment of democracies that were soon replaced by authoritarian regimes. For example, Syria, after gaining independence from French mandatory control at the beginning of the Cold War, failed to consolidate its democracy, so it eventually collapsed and was replaced by a Ba'athist dictatorship.[197]

Robert Dahl argued in On Democracy that foreign interventions contributed to democratic failures, citing Soviet interventions in Central and Eastern Europe and U.S. interventions in Latin America.[68] However, the delegitimization of empires contributed to the emergence of democracy as former colonies gained independence and implemented democracy.[68]

Geographic factors

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Some scholars link the emergence and sustenance of democracies to areas with access to the sea, which tends to increase the mobility of people, goods, capital, and ideas.[198][199]

Historical factors

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Historical legacies

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In seeking to explain why North America developed stable democracies and Latin America did not, Seymour Martin Lipset, in The Democratic Century (2004), holds that the reason is that the initial patterns of colonization, the subsequent process of economic incorporation of the new colonies, and the wars of independence differ. The divergent histories of Britain and Iberia are seen as creating different cultural legacies that affected the prospects of democracy.[200] A related argument is presented by James A. Robinson in "Critical Junctures and Developmental Paths" (2022).[201]

Sequencing and causality

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Scholars have discussed whether the order in which things happen helps or hinders the process of democratization. An early discussion occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Dankwart Rustow argued that "'the most effective sequence' is the pursuit of national unity, government authority, and political equality, in that order."[202] Eric Nordlinger and Samuel Huntington stressed "the importance of developing effective governmental institutions before the emergence of mass participation in politics."[202] Robert Dahl, in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971), held that the "commonest sequence among the older and more stable polyarchies has been some approximation of the ... path [in which] competitive politics preceded expansion in participation."[203]

In the 2010s, the discussion focused on the impact of the sequencing between state building and democratization. Francis Fukuyama, in Political Order and Political Decay (2014), echoes Huntington's "state-first" argument and holds that those "countries in which democracy preceded modern state-building have had much greater problems achieving high-quality governance."[204] This view has been supported by Sheri Berman, who offers a sweeping overview of European history and concludes that "sequencing matters" and that "without strong states...liberal democracy is difficult if not impossible to achieve." [205]

However, this state-first thesis has been challenged. Relying on a comparison of Denmark and Greece, and quantitative research on 180 countries across 1789–2019, Haakon Gjerløw, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, and Matthew C. Wilson, in One Road to Riches? (2022), "find little evidence to support the stateness-first argument."[206] Based on a comparison of European and Latin American countries, Sebastián Mazzuca and Gerardo Munck, in A Middle-Quality Institutional Trap (2021), argue that counter to the state-first thesis, the "starting point of political developments is less important than whether the State–democracy relationship is a virtuous cycle, triggering causal mechanisms that reinforce each."[207]

In sequences of democratization for many countries, Morrison et al. found elections as the most frequent first element of the sequence of democratization but found this ordering does not necessarily predict successful democratization.[208]

The democratic peace theory claims that democracy causes peace, while the territorial peace theory claims that peace causes democracy.[209]

Notes

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References

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Sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Democratization is the process through which a political regime transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, marked by the institution of competitive multiparty elections, safeguards for civil liberties, and mechanisms ensuring government accountability to citizens. Such transitions hold potential for greater political freedoms, enhanced human rights protections, more open foreign relations, and renewed economic dynamism, as exemplified by South Korea and Taiwan. Yet, they may also entail risks of significant instability, regional fragmentation, economic disruption, or elite power struggles, akin to the Soviet Union's dissolution. This transformation typically involves dismantling centralized power structures and fostering institutions that distribute authority while protecting minority rights and enabling peaceful power transfers. Key theoretical frameworks distinguish between structural preconditions—such as rising per capita income and education levels that cultivate demands for participation—and volitional factors like elite bargains or external pressures that precipitate change. Historically, democratization has advanced in successive waves: a first from the mid-19th century amid European liberal reforms, a second post-World War II with decolonization, and a third from the 1970s through the 1990s, incorporating over 30 countries from Portugal to South Korea and Eastern Europe following communism's collapse. These expansions elevated the proportion of democratic regimes globally, yet empirical analyses reveal modest survival rates for new democracies, with many reverting due to weak institutions, economic shocks, or elite capture rather than inevitable progress. Recent data from 2020 onward document a halt in net gains, with autocratization affecting more countries than democratization, driven by electoral manipulations, media suppression, and polarization in both nascent and consolidated systems. Controversies persist over causal drivers, including whether cultural compatibility or resource dependencies hinder sustainability in non-Western contexts, underscoring that democratization demands ongoing vigilance against backsliding rather than a linear endpoint.

Conceptual Foundations

Definitions and Typologies

Democratization denotes the political process whereby an authoritarian or non-democratic regime transitions to a featuring competitive multiparty elections, effective guarantees of civil and political liberties, and adherence to the . This process typically unfolds in stages, commencing with —relaxation of authoritarian controls to permit limited contention—and potentially culminating in the installation of democratic institutions, though outcomes remain contingent on elite decisions and societal responses. Scholarly definitions emphasize procedural minima, such as the conduct of genuinely contested elections with broad and minimal fraud, over substantive ideals like equality or welfare provision, to facilitate empirical measurement and cross-national comparison. Typologies of democratization classify transitions according to the dynamics of regime breakdown and the roles of key actors, particularly ruling elites and opposition forces. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, in their analysis of Latin American and Southern European cases, delineate transitions as uncertain sequences initiated by regime liberalization, which may evolve into pacted reforms (elite bargains averting rupture) or abrupt breakdowns triggered by mass protests or elite defections. They stress that successful democratization hinges on provisional pacts among moderates from both sides, excluding extremists to stabilize the process, rather than revolutionary overthrows that risk chaos or renewed . Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan extend this framework by categorizing modes of authoritarian regime demise: extrication, wherein softliner elites within the regime negotiate an orderly handover (as in Spain's 1975-1982 transition); replacement, involving opposition-led overthrow without regime cooperation (exemplified by Portugal's 1974 ); regime defeat through external military loss or internal ; and foundational collapse, marked by the regime's spontaneous implosion due to economic crisis or loss of loyalty (as in parts of post-communist ). These modes influence post-transition consolidation, with pacted extrications fostering stronger democratic arenas—civil society, political society, , bureaucracy, and economic institutions—compared to violent replacements, which often yield fragile outcomes prone to . Additional typologies incorporate agency and preconditions, such as Samuel P. Huntington's emphasis on elite-initiated reforms amid legitimacy deficits in the "third wave" (1974-1990), where democratization spread via endogenous catalysts like advocacy or , distinct from earlier waves driven by or . Hybrid forms, including externally imposed transitions post-war (e.g., Allied efforts in ), highlight diffusion effects but underscore endogenous pacts as pivotal for , countering overly structural accounts that downplay political contingency. Empirical evidence from these classifications reveals no universal path, with success rates varying: pacted transitions exhibit higher consolidation probabilities (over 70% in analyzed cases) than collapses (under 50%), per regional studies.

Measures and Indices of Democracy

The Polity project assesses democratic authority through a composite score ranging from -10 (strong ) to +10 (strong ), derived from three primary components: the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, the inclusiveness and competitiveness of political participation, and the constraints on the chief executive's power. This index, covering 167 states from 1800 to 2018, emphasizes institutional patterns of authority rather than outcomes, with annual updates based on historical records and expert coding. Polity scores classify regimes as (below -5), anocracies (-5 to 5), or (6 or higher), enabling analysis of stability and transitions. Freedom House's Freedom in the World evaluates political rights and civil liberties separately on a 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest) scale, aggregating 25 indicators into a combined score that categorizes countries as free (1.0-2.5), partly free (3.0-5.0), or not free (5.5-7.0). The methodology relies on expert assessments and consultations with local analysts, focusing on real-world enjoyment of rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights framework, applied annually to 195 countries and 13 territories since 1972. Political rights cover electoral processes, pluralism, and functionality, while civil liberties include freedom of expression, associational rights, , and personal autonomy. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project produces multiple disaggregated indices, including the Electoral Democracy Index (measuring suffrage, free elections, and elected officials' centrality) and the Liberal Democracy Index (incorporating protections against state abuses and egalitarian treatment), scored from 0 to 1 using Bayesian to aggregate over 500 expert-coded indicators. Covering 202 countries from 1789 to the present, V-Dem's approach captures democracy's multidimensionality—electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian—through crowdsourced coding by over 3,500 experts, with reliability checks via inter-coder agreement and measurement models. Annual datasets, updated through 2024, allow for granular analysis of components like and media censorship. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index scores 167 countries on a 0-10 scale across 60 indicators grouped into five categories: electoral process and pluralism (weight 12.5%), (15%), functioning of government (15%), political participation (12.5%), and (12.5%). Published annually since 2006, it combines quantitative data with expert judgments, classifying regimes as full democracies (8.01-10), flawed democracies (6.01-8.00), hybrid regimes (4.01-6.00), or authoritarian (below 4.00), with the 2024 edition noting a global average score of 5.23 amid declines in participation and culture.
IndexTemporal CoverageScaleMethodology TypeKey Focus Areas
1800-2018-10 to 10Expert-coded institutional traitsExecutive recruitment, participation, constraints
1972-present1-7 (combined)Expert assessments of rightsPolitical rights,
V-Dem1789-present0-1 (multiple indices)Expert with statistical modelingElectoral, liberal, participatory aspects
EIU2006-present0-10Indicators + expert opinionElections, government function, culture
These indices converge on core elements like competitive elections and rights protections but diverge in aggregation—additive versus probabilistic—and emphasis, with prioritizing authority structures and V-Dem offering finer-grained variables. However, all incorporate subjective expert evaluations, raising concerns over inter-coder reliability and potential biases; for instance, ratings have been critiqued for favoring U.S. allies, as evidenced by regressions showing higher scores for countries receiving U.S. aid. V-Dem mitigates subjectivity through large expert pools and modeling but remains vulnerable to coders' ideological leanings, often drawn from academia where left-leaning perspectives predominate, potentially understating flaws in preferred regimes. Academic comparisons highlight measurement errors in capturing informal power dynamics or cultural variances, underscoring that no index fully resolves democracy's contested .

Historical Patterns

Waves of Democratization

The concept of waves of democratization refers to temporal clusters of democratic transitions across multiple countries, interspersed with reverse waves of democratic breakdowns or autocratization, as identified in empirical analyses of global regime changes. Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington formalized this pattern in his 1991 book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, positing three main waves based on historical data from sources like the Polity dataset, where democratization is measured by transitions to competitive elections and institutional reforms. Huntington's framework emphasizes that these waves are not random but driven by conjunctural factors like economic crises, external pressures, and demonstration effects, though subsequent research has tested this against broader datasets. The first wave began around 1828 with the expansion of male suffrage in the United States under and continued through the mid-19th century, incorporating gradual reforms in (e.g., Britain's 1832 Reform Act) and some Latin American states post-independence, resulting in approximately 30 countries achieving democratic institutions by 1922, representing about 45% of independent states at the time. This expansion reversed sharply between 1922 and 1942 amid , world wars, and the rise of authoritarian regimes in (1922), (1933), and (1936-1939), reducing democracies to roughly 20% of states by 1942. Empirical studies using extended historical data from 1800-2000 confirm this clustering, showing statistically significant surges in transitions followed by synchronized reversals, supporting the wave model's validity over random diffusion. The second wave emerged post-World War II from 1943 to 1962, fueled by Allied victories, in and , and U.S. influence via reconstruction aid, adding about 22 democracies including (1946), (1949), and (1950), peaking at around 36 electoral democracies globally. A subsequent reverse wave from 1958 to 1975 saw military coups and authoritarian consolidations, such as in (1964), (1966), and (1967), eroding gains amid proxy conflicts and oil shocks. The third wave commenced in 1974 with Portugal's , which ended its authoritarian Estado Novo regime, triggering rapid transitions in (Spain 1975-1978, 1974), followed by in the 1980s (e.g., 1983, 1985), ( 1986, 1987), and after the Soviet collapse (1989-1991, including , , and ). By 1990, over 30 countries had democratized, increasing the global share of democracies from 25% in 1973 to 45% by 2000 per Polity IV measures, with V-Dem data corroborating three distinct 20th-century waves through multidimensional indicators of electoral and . While Huntington viewed the third wave as ongoing into the , later analyses using V-Dem indices indicate a halt around 2007, with autocratization affecting 45 countries by 2025, though the wave pattern itself remains empirically robust.

Reversals, Backsliding, and Autocratization

Reversals in democratization refer to the complete breakdown of democratic regimes into autocracies, while denotes gradual erosion of democratic institutions without immediate collapse, and autocratization encompasses both processes of democratic decline. Samuel Huntington documented these phenomena as "reverse waves" following each major democratization wave, where the global number of democracies decreased due to coups, authoritarian consolidations, and institutional failures. The first reverse wave (1922-1942) saw the fall of interwar democracies in , including under Mussolini in 1922, in 1933, and in 1936-1939, amid economic crises and ideological challenges from and . The second reverse wave (1958-1975) primarily affected newly independent states in and , as well as , with military coups eroding post-colonial democracies; for instance, 1960s coups in (1966), (1964), and numerous African nations like (1966) and (1966) shifted power to juntas amid and weak institutions. This period reversed gains from the second democratization wave, reducing the number of democracies from about 36 in 1962 to 30 by 1975. Post-World War II recoveries in were more resilient, but peripheral regions experienced higher reversal rates due to elite pacts favoring authoritarianism over fragile electoral systems. Following the third wave (1974-1990), a prolonged reverse trend emerged from the late , termed the "third reverse wave" by some analysts, characterized by executive aggrandizement rather than overt coups. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset records autocratization episodes—defined as a 0.01 decline in the electoral democracy index persisting over time—increasing sharply, with 48 countries affected in 2021, encompassing 38% of the global population by 2024. Notable cases include Hungary's institutional reforms under since 2010, Poland's judicial interference from 2015-2023, Turkey's consolidation under post-2016 referendum, and Venezuela's shift under and from 1999 onward. V-Dem data from 1900-2023 indicates over half of autocratization episodes feature "U-turns," where declines are partially reversed, yet full breakdowns occurred in 7 of the top 10 autocratizing countries in the , highlighting the risk of irreversible erosion in weakly consolidated regimes.

Causal Theories and Preconditions

Economic Drivers and Modernization

The modernization hypothesis posits that fosters conditions conducive to democratic by expanding , , and a that demands political participation and . Seymour Martin Lipset articulated this in 1959, arguing that wealthier societies exhibit greater political stability and legitimacy for democratic institutions, based on cross-national comparisons showing democracies clustered among higher-income countries post-World War II. Empirical analyses confirm a robust positive between GDP and democracy indices: for instance, V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index rises monotonically with income levels, with countries above $6,000–$10,000 (in constant dollars) rarely sustaining autocracies long-term. Polity scores similarly track this pattern, where low-income nations (below $2,000 GDP ) comprise most non-democracies, while high-income ones (above $15,000) are overwhelmingly democratic as of 2020 data. Mechanisms underlying this link include industrialization's erosion of traditional hierarchies, rising literacy rates enabling informed electorates, and economic complexity generating interdependent elites less prone to coups. Longitudinal studies of transitions, such as South Korea's from 1960s amid rapid growth (GDP rising from $158 in 1960 to $1,646 by 1980) to in 1987, illustrate how sustained growth above 7% annually correlates with pressures from educated urban workers. However, causal direction remains contested: while development stabilizes existing democracies—none of the 20 wealthiest nations reverted to between 1950 and 2000 per Przeworski et al.'s of 141 countries—it does not systematically trigger initial transitions, as evidenced by no statistical link between prior growth and democratization onset in their hazard models. This suggests modernization provides requisites like reduced (under 10% threshold linked to 80% democratic survival rates) but requires proximate triggers such as elite pacts or crises. Critiques highlight exceptions undermining strict causality, notably resource-dependent economies where oil rents enable authoritarian durability via patronage, dubbed the "resource curse." Michael Ross's analysis of 113 countries from 1973–2002 shows oil exporters $2,500 poorer in non-oil GDP yet 50% less likely to democratize, as revenues fund repression without taxing consent (e.g., Saudi Arabia's oil income exceeding $20,000 sustaining ). China's post-1978 growth (GDP from $156 to $12,720 by 2023) without political exemplifies cultural or institutional barriers overriding economic thresholds, with state-controlled firms and maintaining one-party rule despite middle-class expansion to 400 million. These cases, comprising 10–15% of global GDP-rich autocracies, indicate modernization's effects are probabilistic, not deterministic, and vulnerable to rentier effects or Confucian legacies prioritizing stability over contestation—empirically, oil-producing states score 20–30 points lower on scales than non-oil peers at equivalent income. Recent scholarship refines the theory: Acemoglu et al.'s panel regressions on 184 countries (1960–2010) find boosts GDP growth by 0.5–1% annually, implying reverse , yet high income buffers against , as seen in no democratic breakdowns above $13,000 thresholds. V-Dem through affirms the persists amid global autocratization, with 70% of high-income countries democratic versus 20% of low-income ones, though disruptions like commodity booms can delay transitions. Thus, economic drivers enable but do not guarantee democratization, interacting with agency and institutions for outcomes.

Cultural and Institutional Prerequisites

Individualistic cultures, characterized by emphasis on personal , , and limited , exhibit a robust positive association with the onset and persistence of . Empirical analysis using Hofstede's index and IV scores from 1980 to 2010 demonstrates that a one-standard-deviation increase in individualism correlates with a 4-point higher average Polity score, reflecting greater democratic levels. Furthermore, such cultures experience 23-27% longer durations of democracy and lower rates of autocratic breakdowns, with individualism exerting a causal influence even after controlling for and historical factors like from the U.S. as an instrument. Collectivist orientations, by contrast, correlate with more frequent transitions between autocracies and reduced democratic stability, suggesting cultural values shape incentives for power-sharing and . Cultural prerequisites extend to values fostering and tolerance, as evidenced by data linking —prioritizing freedom, tolerance, and participation—to effective democratic functioning. Societies with higher interpersonal trust and participatory orientations sustain democracies by supporting norms of compromise and restraint, reducing risks of populist capture or factionalism. These traits, often evolving slowly through generational shifts tied to and , precondition mass support for institutional checks, though empirical critiques note that democratic experience can reciprocally reinforce such cultures rather than culture alone sufficing. Institutionally, inclusive political frameworks that broadly distribute power and constrain elites form essential preconditions for democratization, as extractive systems concentrating authority undermine electoral legitimacy. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that balanced state capacity with pluralistic power-sharing, as seen in historical paths like Britain's , enables credible commitments to property rights and prevents reversion to . The , manifested through independent judiciaries and enforceable constraints on executive power, similarly precedes and sustains by ensuring accountability and protecting ; cross-national data indicate it outperforms other factors in driving political reforms, with weak correlating to subnational "brown areas" of undemocratic even in formal democracies. Sequencing evidence from supports prioritizing development before full electoral openings to avoid . Without these, democratization risks formalistic elections lacking substantive constraints, as observed in sequencing debates where premature openings without institutional foundations lead to instability.

Elite Bargains and Political Agency

Elite bargains refer to negotiated agreements among political s that redistribute power and facilitate transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic governance, often involving compromises on institutional design, provisions, and power-sharing arrangements. These pacts typically emerge when divisions within the ruling —between hardliners committed to repression and softliners open to —intersect with moderation among opposition groups, creating windows for . In Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's framework, such explicit negotiations enhance the likelihood of reaching by mitigating risks of breakdown, as seen in their analysis of Latin American and Southern European cases where pacts balanced interests against threats. Political agency plays a central role, as elites weigh costs like economic crises, defeats, or pressures against the benefits of retaining influence through controlled transitions rather than total loss via upheaval. Huntington's examination of the third wave of democratization (1974–1990), involving over 30 countries shifting to elected governments, highlights how elite settlements—where outgoing authoritarian leaders secure guarantees—bolster consolidation by reducing incentives for coups or sabotage. Empirical studies confirm that inclusive elite bargains, incorporating diverse factions, correlate with stable outcomes, whereas exclusionary ones foster instability by alienating potential spoilers who then mobilize violence. Prominent examples include Spain's 1977 Moncloa Pacts, where reformist Prime Minister negotiated with former Francoist elites and opposition parties to enact constitutional reforms following Francisco Franco's death on November 20, 1975, averting civil conflict and enabling free elections in June 1977. In , negotiations between President and leader , initiated after de Klerk's February 2, 1990, unbanning of the ANC, culminated in the 1994 multiracial elections, with elite concessions on apartheid dismantling preserving white economic stakes amid fears of majority reprisals. Poland's 1989 Round Table Talks between communist authorities and union representatives similarly produced semi-free elections on June 4, 1989, marking a rapid shift without widespread violence. Critically, while elite-driven processes dominate third-wave successes, their causal efficacy depends on credible enforcement mechanisms, such as international oversight or economic incentives, to prevent ; failures, like in Myanmar's 2011–2021 quasi-transition where elites retained powers, illustrate how incomplete bargains enable authoritarian recapture. Research underscores that agency, informed by rational calculations of survival, often overrides structural preconditions, challenging modernization theories that prioritize societal factors over strategic choices. Academic analyses, though sometimes influenced by institutional biases favoring bottom-up narratives, consistently find pacts as the in approximately 60% of post-1974 transitions, per comparative datasets.

International and Diffusion Effects

Diffusion effects refer to the spatial and temporal contagion of democratization, where transitions in one country increase the likelihood of similar changes in neighboring or connected states through mechanisms such as emulation, learning, and competitive pressure. Empirical studies demonstrate that countries surrounded by democracies experience higher probabilities of democratization; for instance, analysis of transitions from to shows that a one-unit increase in the proportion of democratic neighbors raises the of a by approximately 0.4 log-. This spatial operates via dyadic ties, including , alliances, and cultural similarities, rather than mere geographic proximity. Temporal diffusion manifests in global waves of democratization, as conceptualized by Samuel Huntington, who identified three waves: the first from 1828 to 1926, the second post-World War II until 1962, and the third beginning in 1974, with reverse waves of autocratization following each. However, critiques highlight that these patterns may reflect statistical artifacts from small sample sizes or selection biases rather than causal diffusion, with Przeworski et al. arguing that democracies do not spread contagiously but endure better under favorable conditions. V-Dem dataset analyses confirm rapid short-run diffusion, where regional democratic increases lead to near-complete catch-up within two years, though long-run persistence depends on domestic factors. International influences extend beyond diffusion to include deliberate external pressures like economic linkages, aid conditionality, and membership incentives from organizations such as the . EU enlargement in the 2000s, for example, correlated with in through enforced reforms, with studies estimating that accession prospects raised democracy scores by 1-2 points on scales in candidate states. Conversely, evidence on foreign aid's impact is mixed; while some linkages promote reform, authoritarian s often capture assistance without yielding stable transitions, as seen in limited effects from U.S. programs post-Cold War. and international effects are conditional on regime type similarity, with breakdowns more likely to spread among autocracies than democracies imitating each other.

Empirical Case Studies

Successful Transitions in Europe and the West

The transitions to democracy in during the 1970s—, , and —stand as paradigmatic cases of successful democratization within the "third wave" identified by political scientist Samuel Huntington, marking a shift from long-standing authoritarian regimes to stable parliamentary systems without descent into prolonged civil conflict or reversal. These cases involved rapid institutional reforms, elite negotiations, and integration into Western institutions, culminating in constitutions ratified between 1975 and 1978 that enshrined multiparty elections, , and . By 1986, all three nations had acceded to the European Community (predecessor to the ), which provided economic incentives and normative pressures that reinforced , with GDP growth averaging 3-4% annually in the subsequent decade aiding middle-class expansion and reduced support for extremism. Unlike contemporaneous efforts elsewhere, these transitions avoided radical ruptures, opting for negotiated pacts that balanced accountability with stability, though critics note such compromises, including amnesty laws, deferred full justice for regime atrocities. Portugal's on April 25, 1974, initiated by mid-level military officers disillusioned with the colonial wars in , overthrew the 48-year-old Estado Novo dictatorship under in a nearly bloodless coup, leading to and the establishment of provisional governments that drafted a by 1976. Despite initial turbulence—including nationalizations, land reforms, and two coup attempts—the transition succeeded through elite moderation and free elections in 1975 and 1976, which empowered centrist forces and marginalized radical left-wing elements, resulting in a stable that has endured with ratings consistently at "free" since 1976. Key causal factors included the military's anti-colonial fatigue, which aligned with broader societal demands for modernization amid Portugal's lagging economy (per capita GDP at 60% of the EC average in 1974), and external support from allies wary of communist influence. Accession to the EC in 1986 further stabilized the regime by tying fiscal policies to market-oriented reforms, fostering 4.1% average annual growth from 1986-1990. In Spain, the death of Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975, enabled a "pacted" transition under King , who rejected a 1981 coup attempt by loyalist elements, paving the way for Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez's reforms: legalization of (including communists) in 1977, free elections that year yielding 170 seats for Suárez's centrist Union of the Democratic Centre, and ratification of a 1978 constitution via 88% approval. Success stemmed from elite bargains among former regime insiders, opposition leaders, and monarchists, which prioritized consensus over vengeance—evident in the 1977 covering Franco-era crimes—amid economic preconditions like 1960s-1970s industrialization that tripled real wages and created a comprising 40% of the population by 1975. International isolation post-Franco, coupled with EC aspirations, incentivized restraint; Spain's 1982 entry negotiations correlated with declining separatist violence and consolidated power alternation, with PSOE's victory that year marking the first peaceful government change. Empirical data from the period show coup risks dissipated after 1981, with democratic institutions enduring despite economic shocks like 1980s peaking at 22%. Greece's , or "," followed the July 1974 collapse of the (1967-1974) amid the Cyprus crisis, with Constantine Karamanlis returning from exile to lead a , hold elections on November 17, 1974 (won by his New Democracy party with 54% of votes), abolish the via 1974 (69% against), and enact a 1975 constitution emphasizing and . The transition's rapidity—142 days from junta fall to new elections—reflected junta discredit from failures and domestic repression, enabling cross-partisan agreement on democratic rules without purges, though left-wing PASOK's 1981 rise introduced clientelistic elements. post-1974, building on pre-junta growth (annual GDP per capita rise from $1,200 in 1967 to $2,500 by 1974 in constant dollars), supported consolidation, while EC entry in 1981 locked in reforms against backsliding. These cases illustrate causal realism in democratization: endogenous elite agency, preconditioned by socioeconomic modernization, proved decisive over exogenous impositions, yielding regimes resilient to , with Polity IV scores reaching +8 (full democracy) by the early 1980s and sustained through EU-vetted governance.

Post-War Reconstructions in Asia and Beyond

Following Japan's surrender on September 2, 1945, the Allied occupation under U.S. General implemented sweeping reforms from 1945 to 1952, including demilitarization, land redistribution, and the enactment of a new constitution on May 3, 1947, which established parliamentary democracy, , and renunciation of war. These changes dismantled the pre-war imperial system and fostered , with the Liberal Democratic Party dominating elections thereafter, enabling stable democratic governance amid rapid economic recovery. Economic aid via the U.S.-Japan of 1951 and export-led growth further consolidated institutions, though critics note the constitution's imposed nature limited initial public input. In , reconstruction after the (1950–1953) initially yielded authoritarian rule under until his ouster in 1960, followed by under Park Chung-hee from 1961, which prioritized over immediate democracy. U.S. military presence and aid exceeding $12 billion (in 2020s equivalent) from 1945–1970s supported infrastructure and education, creating a that fueled protests like the June Democratic Struggle of 1987, leading to direct presidential elections and constitutional amendments ending . This transition, consolidated by 1993 with Kim Young-sam's civilian government, demonstrated how authoritarian-led modernization—GDP per capita rising from $79 in 1960 to $6,000 by 1987—generated societal pressures for accountability, though elite pacts preserved continuity. Taiwan's post-WWII path under the Republic of China government, retreating from the mainland in 1949, involved from 1949 to 1987 amid U.S. alliance post-1950s, with land reforms and U.S. aid of $1.5 billion (1949–1965) spurring agricultural and industrial booms. Democratization accelerated after President Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, lifting in 1987 and legalizing opposition parties, culminating in the Democratic Progressive Party's 2000 victory and direct elections. Economic factors, including GDP growth averaging 8% annually from 1960–1990, expanded and reduced military dominance, enabling peaceful elite-driven reforms without mass upheaval, though ethnic tensions from mainlander rule persisted. Beyond , similar patterns emerged in cases like the , where U.S. occupation post-1945 independence fostered electoral institutions, but Ferdinand Marcos's 1972–1986 delayed consolidation until the 1986 restored via Corazon Aquino's presidency. These reconstructions highlight external security guarantees and economic preconditions enabling endogenous demands, contrasting with failures where weak states or resource curses hindered transitions, as causal analyses emphasize institutional capacity over imposed models alone.

Partial Successes and Failures in Latin America and Africa


The third wave of democratization swept Latin America in the late 1970s and 1980s, transitioning most countries from authoritarian regimes to electoral democracies by the early 1990s. Argentina ended military rule in 1983 after the Falklands defeat exposed regime weaknesses, Brazil followed in 1985 with the indirect election of Tancredo Neves and direct presidential votes from 1989, and Chile held its first free election in 1990, marking the end of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship. These shifts established regular elections and civilian control, but consolidation proved partial due to entrenched inequality—Gini coefficients often exceeding 0.50—and fragile institutions prone to executive overreach. V-Dem data reflects this: while electoral democracy indices rose to above 0.6 in countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica by 2000, liberal democracy scores remained below 0.5 in much of the region as of 2023, indicating deficits in rule of law and civil liberties.
Chile exemplifies relative success, achieving economic stability post-transition with GDP growth averaging 5% annually from 1990 to 2010 and peaceful power alternations, though protests in 2019 highlighted persistent social disparities. In contrast, Venezuela's democratic erosion under , elected in 1998 amid economic discontent, led to constitutional changes in 1999 that concentrated power, culminating in autocratization; its V-Dem score fell from 0.42 in 1998 to 0.08 by 2023, accompanied by exceeding 1 million percent in 2018. Similar patterns emerged in and , where indigenous mobilization and anti-corruption rhetoric masked institutional weakening, with Nicaragua's score dropping after 2006 electoral manipulations. High inequality and commodity dependence fueled populist , undermining horizontal accountability despite initial electoral gains. In Africa, post-colonial transitions yielded few enduring democracies, with most states reverting to authoritarianism after independence waves in the 1960s or multiparty reforms in the 1990s following the Cold War's end. South Africa's 1994 election, transitioning from apartheid under Nelson Mandela, represented a notable partial success, establishing a constitution with strong bill of rights protections and multiple peaceful turnovers, though ANC dominance and corruption scandals eroded public trust, with Freedom House noting declines in governance quality by 2020. Ghana achieved relative stability post-1992, recording seven elections and three power alternations by 2020, supported by economic growth averaging 6% from 2000-2019, yet ethnic patronage and judicial interference persist. V-Dem data shows sub-Saharan Africa's average liberal democracy index stagnating around 0.2-0.3 since 1990, with only outliers like Botswana (score 0.7) maintaining higher marks due to pre-existing institutional continuity. Failures dominate, often tied to neopatrimonialism, resource curses, and ethnic fractionalization; Zimbabwe's 1980 transition devolved into Robert Mugabe's one-party dominance by 1987, with land reforms post-2000 triggering (GDP contraction 40% from 2000-2008). Nigeria's 1999 return to civilian rule after military eras brought elections but entrenched corruption—losing $400 billion to oil theft since 1960—and insecurity, with displacing millions since 2009. Coups recur, as in (2012, 2020) and (2019, 2021), reflecting state fragility where weak pre-transition institutions fail to constrain elites. Across both regions, partial successes hinge on economic diversification and elite pacts enforcing checks, but causal factors like resource rents and social cleavages frequently precipitate reversals, per empirical analyses.

Post-Communist and Middle Eastern Experiments

The dissolution of communist regimes across and the from to prompted widespread attempts at democratization, with 15 former Soviet republics and several states introducing multiparty elections and market reforms. In , nations like , the , and achieved relatively stable democratic institutions by the late 1990s, facilitated by rapid "shock therapy" economic liberalizations and incentives from prospective membership, which enforced rule-of-law standards and reduced corruption. For instance, Poland's GDP per capita grew from $1,700 in 1990 to over $4,000 by 2000 in constant dollars, correlating with sustained electoral competition and political rights scores improving from 4/7 in 1990 to 1/7 by 2000. In contrast, post-communist states farther east, such as and , saw partial openings followed by consolidation of authoritarianism; Russia's 1993 constitution concentrated power in the presidency, and under and later , media controls and electoral manipulations eroded gains, with downgrading it to "not free" by 2005 after a score drop from partly free status. Empirical analyses attribute post-communist successes to factors like pre-1989 networks (e.g., Poland's movement, which mobilized over 10 million workers by 1981) and external anchors such as and accession criteria, which conditioned aid on institutional reforms, whereas failures in the former stemmed from resource rents enabling , ethnic fragmentation, and slower leading to oligarchic capture. Studies of 25 post-communist economies from 1990 to 2015 show that those implementing extensive liberalizations within the first five years achieved 1.5-2% higher annual GDP growth and higher Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) electoral democracy indices compared to gradual reformers like or . However, even successful cases faced backsliding risks; Hungary's score declined from 1/7 in 2010 to 3/7 by 2020 due to judicial interference under , highlighting vulnerabilities from populist majorities without strong constitutional checks. Overall, by 2020, eight Central European states ranked as "free" by , while most former Soviet states remained hybrid or authoritarian, underscoring the role of geographic proximity to consolidated democracies and elite commitments to depoliticized bureaucracies over ideological reversals. In the , democratization experiments, particularly during the 2010-2011 Arab Spring, yielded predominantly negative outcomes, with uprisings toppling autocrats in , , , and but failing to establish enduring liberal institutions amid , Islamist mobilizations, and military interventions. , the sole partial exception, held free elections in October 2011, adopted a in January 2014 emphasizing rights and power-sharing, and achieved a "free" rating briefly in 2015; however, (unemployment at 15% in 2020) and political enabled President Kais Saied's 2021 suspension of , reverting to "partly free" status by 2022 as eroded. 's 2012 election of affiliate gave way to a July 2013 military coup by , who suppressed opposition and rigged subsequent votes, dropping 's score from 6/7 (political rights) in 2012 to 7/7 by 2014. Libya fragmented into civil war after Muammar Gaddafi's 2011 fall, with rival factions preventing national elections and V-Dem's index plummeting to near-failed-state levels by 2020 due to tribal militias and foreign proxies. Syria's uprising escalated into a by 2012, entrenching Bashar al-Assad's regime with over 500,000 deaths and no transitional institutions. Causal factors include rentier economies (e.g., oil revenues funding repression in Gulf states, insulating rulers from public demands) and weak pre-uprising civil societies dominated by ties rather than horizontal associations, contrasting post-communist Europe's denser networks; Islamist groups like the Brotherhood prioritized theocratic agendas over pluralism, alienating secularists and justifying counter-revolutions. Analyses of Arab Barometer surveys from 2011-2019 reveal persistent public support for (over 70% in and favoring it as the best system) but low trust in institutions, exacerbated by pacts favoring stability over , leading to a regional "return of repression" where authoritarian scores worsened across 18 Arab states per Polity IV data. These cases illustrate how absent external integration mechanisms and entrenched identity cleavages hinder consolidation, with democratization waves collapsing into hybrid autocracies or state failure more readily than in post-communist contexts.

External Promotion and Interventions

Democracy Assistance and Soft Power

Democracy assistance involves the provision of financial, technical, and institutional support by donor governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental entities to recipient countries aiming to develop democratic , , electoral processes, and . These efforts, often framed as capacity-building rather than direct intervention, include training for , funding , and monitoring elections, with annual global expenditures exceeding $10 billion as of the early 2020s. In the United States, primary channels include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the (NED, established in 1983), which disbursed roughly $2.9 billion for democracy programs in fiscal year 2024. The European Union operates parallel initiatives through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), allocating hundreds of millions annually to organizations (CSOs) and human rights defenders, particularly in regions like the . Such assistance intersects with soft power, a concept introduced by in to describe a nation's capacity to influence others through cultural appeal, ideological attraction, and policy legitimacy rather than military or economic coercion. Democracy promotion leverages this by exporting norms of pluralism, , and individual rights, ostensibly enhancing the donor's global standing while fostering long-term alliances based on shared values. For instance, U.S. programs have historically emphasized reforms in post-communist states, while EU efforts prioritize enlargement conditionality, tying aid to democratic benchmarks as seen in the 1993 for accession. Proponents argue this approach amplifies diffusion effects, where exposure to democratic models encourages emulation, supported by quantitative analyses showing small but statistically significant correlations between aid inflows and improvements in democracy indices like the score. Empirical evaluations reveal mixed results, with effectiveness hinging on aid design and local contexts. Studies indicate that democracy assistance channeled through CSOs correlates positively with civil society strength and overall democratic levels, particularly when focused on governance rather than broad electoral support. For example, EU aid has been associated with incremental gains in recipient countries' Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) scores, though effects diminish in authoritarian-leaning environments. U.S.-funded programs in Eastern Europe post-1989 contributed to institutional reforms, yet aggregate data from 58 studies on U.S. aid suggest only modest impacts on human rights and democracy, often outweighed by recipient regime type and economic conditions. Critiques highlight limitations and unintended consequences, including perceptions of neo-imperialism that provoke backlash from recipient governments. Authoritarian leaders in nations such as , , and have restricted foreign-funded NGOs since the mid-2000s, viewing assistance as subversive interference that undermines . In difficult contexts like closed autocracies, aid often fails to sustain reforms without endogenous elite pacts, sometimes exacerbating polarization by empowering opposition groups at the expense of stability. Moreover, donor priorities may align more with geopolitical interests than genuine democratization, as evidenced by selective funding patterns that prioritize strategic allies over universal application. While soft power gains accrue when aid aligns with cultural resonance—such as appeals to —disjunctures, like promoting Western liberal models in value-divergent societies, can erode donor credibility and yield negligible causal impact on transitions. Thus, democracy assistance augments but does not substitute for internal drivers, with evidence underscoring its role as facilitative rather than deterministic.

Regime Change via Force: Outcomes and Lessons

Forced through military intervention, aimed at installing democratic , has historically yielded limited success and often counterproductive outcomes. Empirical analyses of post-World War II cases indicate that such interventions rarely produce sustained democratization, with targeted states experiencing on average no net improvement in democratic institutions and frequently descending into or renewed . For instance, a study of over 100 foreign-imposed s from 1800 to 2005 found that while some short-term political openings occurred, long-term failed in most instances due to power vacuums, ethnic factionalism, and lack of local legitimacy. Notable exceptions, such as the Allied occupations of and after , succeeded under unique conditions: total military defeat, pre-existing industrial modernization, ethnic homogeneity, and extensive external reconstruction efforts totaling billions in aid adjusted for inflation. These cases, however, represent outliers; subsequent U.S.-led interventions in (1983) and (1989) achieved partial electoral transitions but struggled with institutional fragility and . In contrast, superpower interventions during the and beyond, including Soviet efforts in and U.S. actions in , correlated with diminished democratic prospects five years post-intervention, as external imposition undermined endogenous elite pacts and development. Post-9/11 examples underscore these patterns. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of toppled Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime but triggered , the rise of by 2014, and a hybrid authoritarian system under subsequent governments, with democracy scores stagnating below pre-intervention levels per Polity IV metrics. Similarly, the 2001 intervention in installed a that collapsed to resurgence in August 2021 after $2.3 trillion in U.S. expenditures, yielding no enduring democratic institutions amid tribal divisions and corruption. Libya's 2011 NATO-backed overthrow of fragmented the state into militias and rival governments, fostering ongoing and hubs without viable democratic elections. Across these, civilian casualties exceeded hundreds of thousands, and targeted economies contracted sharply before partial recovery, highlighting causal links between rapid leadership decapitation and institutional collapse. Key lessons emerge from these outcomes: military force excels at regime removal but falters in , as it generates resentment, empowers spoilers, and bypasses prerequisites like rule-of-law traditions and . Success hinges on massive, long-term commitments—averaging over a decade and trillions in resources—which strain interveners' resolve and domestic support, as evidenced by U.S. withdrawal timelines in (2011) and (2021). Policymakers often overestimate transplantable models, ignoring that democratization typically requires internal mass mobilization or elite bargains rather than exogenous shocks, with interventions more likely to entrench illiberal successors. Thus, selective restraint, prioritizing and aid to receptive societies, outperforms universalist forcible approaches in fostering genuine transitions.

Critiques of Universalist Approaches

Universalist approaches to democratization assume that Western-style liberal democracy, characterized by free elections, rule of law, and individual rights, can be effectively imposed or promoted globally irrespective of local cultural, economic, or institutional variances. Critics contend this overlooks causal prerequisites, such as a pre-existing civic culture conducive to compromise and restraint, which empirical studies link to democratic stability; for instance, Almond and Verba's analysis of "civic culture" in stable democracies like the United States and United Kingdom highlighted interpersonal trust and political efficacy as foundational, absent in many transitional societies. Without these, elections often empower majoritarian factions that dismantle institutional checks, as seen in cultural contexts where primordial loyalties or religious ideologies prioritize group dominance over pluralistic governance. Economic development emerges as another contested prerequisite, with research indicating democracies rarely survive below a threshold of approximately $6,000 (in 1990 dollars), beyond which modernization fosters middle classes supportive of mechanisms. Przeworski et al. found that while does not predict democratization onset, it significantly reduces breakdown risk in nascent regimes, explaining why low-income interventions, such as in post-2001 , collapsed amid and networks incompatible with merit-based institutions. In following the U.S.-led , the abrupt imposition of electoral processes amid sectarian divisions and weak resulted in governance paralysis, enabling insurgencies and the rise of by 2014, with Polity IV scores reverting from partial democracy to autocracy equivalents. The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 further illustrate these pitfalls, where rapid transitions in and devolved into civil wars due to the absence of cross-cutting cleavages or elite pacts to mitigate winner-take-all dynamics, contrasting with Tunisia's narrower success tied to prior labor unions and secular enclaves. In , the 2012 Muslim Brotherhood electoral victory led to constitutional overhauls favoring theocratic elements, prompting military intervention in 2013 and a return to centralized rule, underscoring how universalist emphasis on balloting ignores ideological incompatibilities with liberal pluralism in Islamist-dominated polities. Peer-reviewed assessments of , including EU and U.S. aid programs, reveal limited long-term efficacy, with conditionality strategies yielding at best marginal gains in electoral competitiveness but failing to build resilient institutions against autocratic . Broader evidence from democratization waves, as analyzed by Huntington, shows third-wave advances (1974–1990) stalled post-2000, with more reversals than consolidations in non-Western contexts, attributed to overreliance on procedural universals without addressing underlying causal barriers like or resource curses in oil-dependent states. This has prompted reevaluations prioritizing sequenced reforms—rule of law preceding mass suffrage—to avoid the instability of "illiberal democracies" that erode through or , as critiqued in Lockean terms where external promotion lacks the organic consent essential for legitimacy. Academic sources advancing , often from institutions exhibiting ideological skews toward procedural optimism, underemphasize these failures, yet data from V-Dem and confirm autocratization in over 70 countries since 2010, validating precondition-based skepticism.

Contemporary Dynamics and Challenges

Democratic Consolidation Barriers

Economic instability and failure to deliver socioeconomic improvements constitute a primary barrier to in transitional regimes. New democracies often face recessions or stagnant growth, eroding public support and fostering nostalgia for authoritarian efficiency, as citizens prioritize material gains over procedural freedoms. For instance, empirical analyses indicate that economic shocks in the fragile first decade post-transition heighten risks of , with studies showing that inadequate performance in reducing or inequality undermines legitimacy. In following the 2011 revolution, persistent above 15% and slow GDP growth averaging under 2% annually contributed to widespread disillusionment, culminating in President Kais Saied's 2021 self-coup, where he suspended parliament amid protests over economic hardship. Institutional weaknesses, including underdeveloped party systems and unchecked veto players, further impede consolidation by allowing anti-democratic actors to exploit gaps in governance. In many cases, authoritarian elites or military remnants retain reserved domains of power, resisting full subordination to civilian rule and perpetuating instability through coups or interference. Latin American transitions in the 1980s and 1990s exemplified this, where military autonomy and "frozen" inequalities led to recurrent crises, as seen in Venezuela's slide under Hugo Chávez after 1999 elections, where weak institutions failed to constrain executive overreach amid oil-dependent economic volatility. Research highlights that the absence of institutionalized parties prevents the aggregation of interests, resulting in unstructured polities vulnerable to personalized rule, with data from post-communist states showing higher breakdown rates where party systems remained fluid into the 2000s. Socioeconomic inequalities exacerbate these issues by fueling exclusion and polarization, particularly when transitions fail to redistribute power or resources equitably. Severe disparities, often inherited from prior regimes, challenge representation and , as marginalized groups perceive as perpetuating dominance rather than enabling inclusion. Conference deliberations on Latin American cases in underscored how unequal economic structures institutionalize barriers, with empirical evidence from the region linking high Gini coefficients—such as Brazil's 0.53 in the 1990s—to stalled consolidation and populist backlash. Globally, V-Dem reveal that since the early 2000s, autocratization episodes in over 20 countries annually correlate with such unaddressed inequalities, underscoring the causal role of domestic spoilers and low societal trust in preventing the entrenchment of democratic norms.

Rise of Illiberalism and Populism

The phenomenon of illiberalism involves elected governments maintaining multiparty elections while systematically undermining liberal democratic institutions such as independent judiciaries, free media, and protections. This trend has accelerated since the early , coinciding with populist surges that prioritize majoritarian rule over and institutional constraints. According to the V-Dem Institute's 2025 Democracy Report, autocratization—defined as the of democratic norms—has persisted for 25 years, affecting 45 countries in recent episodes, with only 19 experiencing democratization. Similarly, Freedom House's 2024 assessment recorded global freedom declines for the 19th consecutive year, with deteriorations in 60 countries driven by executive aggrandizement and flawed electoral processes. Populism, often characterized by anti-elite rhetoric and appeals to "the people" against entrenched establishments, has fueled this shift by enabling leaders to justify institutional reforms as restorations of . Economic stagnation following the , rapid , and cultural anxieties over —exemplified by Europe's 2015 migrant influx—have amplified populist grievances, eroding trust in traditional parties and institutions. In power, such movements frequently target checks and balances; for instance, Hungary's , whose party gained a two-thirds parliamentary majority in April 2010, used it to rewrite the in 2011, centralizing control over judicial appointments and public media, resulting in Hungary's classification as a "hybrid regime" by indices tracking democratic quality. Poland's (PiS) party, elected in 2015 with 37.6% of the vote, pursued analogous judicial overhauls, including lowering the retirement age for Supreme Court judges and creating disciplinary bodies for magistrates, which prompted infringement proceedings and fines totaling over €500 million by 2021. These cases illustrate how can entrench illiberalism in consolidating democracies, particularly in post-communist where incomplete institutionalization left vulnerabilities to majoritarian capture. V-Dem data indicate that 28 of 42 autocratizing countries as of 2023 were democracies at the onset of decline, often via electoral means rather than coups. While some reforms addressed perceived or inefficiencies—such as Poland's initial measures—sustained power consolidation has correlated with measurable drops in and scores. Beyond , similar dynamics appeared in under (2019–2023), where attacks on electoral institutions culminated in the January 6, 2023, Brasília riots, and in under Narendra Modi's since 2014, amid concerns over press restrictions and minority protections, though both nations retain competitive elections. This pattern challenges democratization by substituting procedural with substantive , often without fully reverting to .

Preconditions Revisited: Why Not Everywhere?

Empirical analyses consistently demonstrate that stable requires a foundational level of , as originally argued by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1959, who found that higher , industrialization, and correlate strongly with democratic stability across 50 nations studied. Subsequent research confirms this threshold effect: democracies rarely emerge or endure in countries with GDP per capita below approximately $6,000–$7,000 (in constant dollars), with reversions to common below this level due to , weak middle classes, and insufficient public goods provision that underpin . For instance, as of 2023, over 70% of low-income countries (GNI per capita under $1,085) remain classified as or hybrid regimes by metrics like the Polity IV index, reflecting the absence of this economic base that fosters , , and demands for representation. Cultural orientations further constrain democratization in many contexts. Collectivist societies, characterized by strong conformity pressures and hierarchical norms, exhibit slower transitions to democracy compared to individualistic ones, where personal autonomy aligns with electoral accountability and pluralism. Empirical models show that cultural individualism—measured via Hofstede's indices or data—predicts earlier democratization, with collectivist polities like those in parts of or the persisting in longer, as group loyalty overrides individual rights claims. Ethnic fractionalization compounds this, eroding trust and enabling patronage networks that undermine inclusive institutions; studies of post-colonial states indicate high diversity correlates with democratic failure rates exceeding 50% in the first decade of transition. Natural resource abundance often perpetuates through the "," where rents from oil or minerals finance coercive apparatuses without taxing citizens, reducing incentives for representation. Resource-dependent economies, such as those in the Gulf states or , score 20–30% lower on than resource-poor peers at similar development levels, as elites capture windfalls to suppress opposition rather than build broad coalitions. This dynamic explains the resilience of in 15–20 oil-rich nations as of 2022, despite external aid, where resource revenues exceed 50% of GDP and correlate with military spending spikes that deter reform. Institutional legacies and structural barriers, including large militaries and absent , reinforce these preconditions' absence. Comparative data from authoritarian breakdowns reveal that without prior democratic experience or low militarization (e.g., military personnel under 1% of ), success rates drop below 40%, as power vacuums invite coups or factional violence. Weak —proxied by low NGO density or associational membership—fails to mobilize against elites, evident in regions like where post-independence ethnic sustains one-party dominance in over 60% of cases. Collectively, these factors underscore why democratization eludes roughly half the world's in 2025, clustered in low-development, resource-cursed, or culturally inegalitarian settings, necessitating endogenous growth in capacities rather than exogenous imposition.

References

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