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Money mule
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Money mule
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A money mule, sometimes called a "smurfer",[1] is a person who transfers money acquired illegally, such as by theft or fraud. Money mules transfer funds in person, through a courier service, or electronically, on behalf of others. Typically, the mule is paid for services with a small part of the money transferred. Money mules are often recruited on-line under the guise of legitimate employment, not aware that the money they are transferring is the product of crime. Similar techniques are used to transfer merchandise illegally.

Details

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Commonly, mules are recruited with job advertisements for "payment processing agents", "money transfer agents", "local processors", and other similar titles; the real benefit to the criminals is not the work carried out by the mule, but that the criminals are distanced from the risky, visible transfer. Some money mules are recruited by an attractive member of the opposite sex. After deducting a relatively small payment for themselves, candidates are asked to accept funds and to forward them to a third party, via remote work. Legitimate companies use escrow services for this kind of work.[2] Mules recruited online are typically used to transfer the proceeds from online fraud, such as phishing scams, malware scams or scams[3] that operate around auction sites like eBay.

After money or merchandise has been stolen, the criminal employs a mule to transfer the money or goods, hiding the criminal's true identity and location from the victim of the crime and the authorities.[4] By using instant payment mechanisms such as Western Union, the mule allows the thief to transform a reversible and traceable transaction into an irreversible and untraceable one.[5]

If an innocent third party's bank details have been compromised, they can be used as a mule without their knowledge, something sometimes called "Cuckoo smurfing".[1]

Criminals trading in stolen or illegally acquired goods use similar tactics to recruit mules who receive packages and forward them to mail drops not traceable to the criminal.[6]

Bitcoin ATMs were reported by Brian Krebs in 2016 to be rising in popularity for money muling.[7]

Penalties

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Money mules are complicit and risk criminal prosecution[8] and long jail sentences.

Cases

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In 2010, The FBI Cyber Crimes Task Force, composed of Federal, State, and Local law enforcement, charged more than 37 defendants involved in a highly organized money mule scheme, facilitated by the Zeus Financial Trojan. This group of money mules opened several bank accounts, using both real and fake identification, to receive stolen funds from compromised bank accounts, withdraw the stolen money, then wire the stolen funds overseas. These money mules facilitated the theft of over $3 million from victim bank accounts.[9]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Money mule

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from Grokipedia
A money mule is an individual who receives, transfers, or moves illegally acquired funds—such as those obtained through , , or scams—on behalf of criminals, thereby facilitating while helping perpetrators obscure the origins of their proceeds. Money mules are often recruited through deceptive tactics, including fake job advertisements promising easy income for simple tasks like receiving and forwarding payments, social media posts on platforms such as or , instant messaging apps like or Telegram, email solicitations, or even in-person approaches. Other common methods involve romance scams where online relationships lead to requests for handling funds, or promises of prizes and that require transferring "winnings" to third parties. While some money mules knowingly participate for a commission, the majority are unwitting accomplices who may not realize they are aiding criminal networks, though they remain legally accountable as facilitators of and . Over 90% of identified money mule transactions in are linked to cybercrimes, including , , online auction fraud, e-commerce scams, business email compromise, and romance or holiday booking frauds. Involvement as a money mule carries severe risks, including criminal prosecution for or fraud facilitation, potential , financial losses from seized assets, and damaged or prospects due to a . International law enforcement initiatives, such as the U.S. Department of Justice's annual Money Mule Initiative, have targeted thousands of suspected mules annually—for example, over 3,000 in 2024—to disrupt these networks and raise public awareness. For instance, in 2024, 's sweep across 26 countries identified 10,759 money mules and 474 recruiters, while global reports noted nearly 2 million accounts linked to such activities. Recruitment efforts frequently target vulnerable groups, including young people under 35 and even those as young as 12 to 21, exploiting economic desperation or .

Definition and Overview

Definition

A money mule is an individual who, at the direction of a third party, receives and transfers illegally acquired funds, often as part of or schemes. These individuals typically act as intermediaries, depositing illicit proceeds into their personal bank accounts, digital wallets, or other financial instruments before forwarding the money—often minus a small commission—to accounts controlled by criminals. The funds handled by money mules commonly originate from various scams, including romance fraud, attacks, and other online confidence schemes that target victims to extract payments. Unlike direct fraudsters who perpetrate the initial scams to obtain the funds, money mules focus on the subsequent movement and of those proceeds to distance criminals from the crime's . A related technique is smurfing, where large sums are broken down into smaller transactions below reporting thresholds like the $10,000 in the United States, often involving individuals known as smurfers. The concept of money muling emerged in the 1990s alongside the proliferation of and early , evolving from traditional techniques to exploit digital s for rapid, cross-border transfers.

Role in

Money mules play a critical role in schemes by serving as intermediaries who receive, transfer, and distribute illicit funds, thereby disrupting the traceability of criminal proceeds across financial systems. This integration occurs across the three primary stages of money laundering: placement, where mules deposit dirty money into legitimate accounts to introduce it into the financial system; layering, where they execute multiple transactions to obscure the funds' origins by breaking the ; and integration, where the cleansed money is reintroduced into the economy as seemingly legitimate assets. By leveraging personal bank accounts or digital wallets, mules enable criminals to distance themselves from the illicit sources, evading detection by financial institutions and . These actors are frequently connected to underlying crimes such as advance-fee fraud, where victims are tricked into sending payments under like job offers or inheritance claims, with mules then forwarding the proceeds. Similarly, funds routed through mules often stem from , in which stolen personal information is used to open accounts or execute unauthorized transactions, and attacks, where cybercriminals demand payments in exchange for unlocking encrypted data, using mules to collect and redistribute extorted sums. In these scenarios, mules provide a buffer that allows perpetrators to operate anonymously while converting victim losses into usable capital for further criminal activities. The economic impact facilitated by money mules is substantial, contributing to the laundering of an estimated 2-5% of global GDP annually—equivalent to $2-5 trillion USD based on 2024 global GDP figures—according to assessments by international agencies. operations coordinated by agencies like the FBI and have identified thousands of such individuals handling millions in illicit transfers each year, underscoring their role in sustaining large-scale ecosystems; for example, INTERPOL's Operation HAECHI VI in 2025 recovered USD 439 million from cyber-enabled financial crimes. Historically, money mules operated primarily as physical cash couriers transporting funds across borders, but the rise of digital financial tools has transformed their function toward electronic transfers via online banking apps like and peer-to-peer platforms such as . This evolution has been accelerated by the proliferation of cryptocurrencies, which mules now use for rapid, pseudonymous layering of transactions, further complicating regulatory oversight and enabling global-scale obfuscation of illicit flows.

Recruitment and Involvement

Recruitment Methods

Criminals recruit money mules primarily through deceptive online tactics that exploit individuals' desires for easy income or emotional connections. Fake job offers are among the most prevalent methods, often advertised as "work-from-home" opportunities such as payment processors or reshipping roles on legitimate job boards and social media platforms. These postings promise commissions for simple tasks like receiving and forwarding funds, targeting unemployed individuals or students via sites like Facebook, Instagram, and email services. Romance scams represent another key approach, where fraudsters build trust over weeks or months through dating apps or social media, posing as romantic partners who then request help with financial transfers under the guise of emergencies or investments. Social media ads and direct messages further facilitate recruitment by promoting "easy money" schemes with vague details, often using pop-up advertisements or instant messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram to solicit personal and banking information. Coercion tactics, including psychological pressure or impersonation of authorities, are also employed to compel compliance, particularly in investment or impersonation scams where victims are urged to act quickly to avoid supposed penalties. Offline methods, though less common, involve in-person approaches to vulnerable groups such as the economically disadvantaged or newcomers, using flyers, word-of-mouth, or street solicitations to offer quick cash for account usage. The grooming process typically begins with low-stakes requests to establish compliance, such as sharing minor personal details or handling small transactions, before escalating to larger financial involvement; this can span days in job-related scams or extend to months in relationship-based deceptions. Such methods often result in unwitting mules, who are unaware of the illicit nature of the funds, though some are knowingly recruited for profit.

Characteristics of Recruited Individuals

Money mules are typically recruited from demographics facing economic pressures, including young adults aged 18-35, such as students seeking part-time work, unemployed individuals, and recent immigrants looking for quick opportunities. Recruitment increasingly targets young and vulnerable people, including those as young as 12-21, often via and gaming platforms. These groups often exhibit low , making them susceptible to promises of easy earnings through seemingly legitimate tasks like processing payments or reshipping packages. Housewives and workers, who may engage in online freelance platforms, are also common targets due to their availability and need for supplemental . Psychological vulnerabilities play a significant role in recruitment, with factors such as , greed for fast cash, and exploited by criminals posing as employers or romantic partners. Individuals with limited awareness of financial crimes are particularly at , as polished job advertisements or outreach create an illusion of legitimacy. Online gamers and those active in virtual communities face additional exposure, as criminals leverage gaming platforms to initiate contact under the guise of in-game transactions or sponsorships, capitalizing on trust within digital ecosystems. Most money mules are unwitting participants, often comprising the majority of cases according to assessments, as they are deceived into believing they are involved in benign activities like or administrative roles. A smaller subset acts knowingly, driven by the allure of commissions, but even these individuals may start as unaware recruits before fully committing. Geographic trends show higher prevalence in regions with elevated , such as parts of , the , , and , where economic hardship amplifies success.

Operational Processes

How Schemes Operate

Once recruited, money mules are instructed to receive illicit funds into their personal bank accounts, often via wire transfers, checks, or deposits, which originate from victims of scams or other crimes. These funds are then quickly withdrawn in cash or transferred to another account designated by the criminal organizers, typically an overseas destination to further obscure the trail. The mule retains a small commission, such as a of the amount, as payment for their role, after which the process may repeat multiple times to build volume and complicate tracking. This layering helps integrate the laundered back into the legitimate , distancing it from its criminal source. Criminals employ various tools and methods to facilitate these transfers while minimizing digital footprints. Common techniques include using prepaid debit cards, peer-to-peer payment apps like or , or money service businesses such as for rapid movement. In some cases, mules physically carry cash across borders or convert funds to cryptocurrencies via anonymous wallets. To avoid detection, organizers direct mules to use virtual private networks (VPNs) for online activities or open accounts under , such as claiming the funds represent personal loans or gifts from if questioned by bank staff. Individual transfers typically range from $500 to $10,000 to evade automated bank thresholds for suspicious activity reporting, with mules handling one or a few transactions per scheme before rotating accounts. Larger operations involve networks of dozens or hundreds of mules coordinating simultaneously to launder millions, often sustained over weeks or months through encrypted communication channels like Telegram. These coordinated efforts amplify the scheme's scale, enabling the rapid dispersal of funds across multiple jurisdictions. As of the first half of 2025, money mule networks surged 168%, with criminals increasingly exploiting existing bank accounts for transfers.

Types of Money Mules

Money mules are categorized primarily based on their level of awareness, intent, and involvement in the illicit activity, with key distinctions drawn between those who knowingly participate and those who do not. These categories help and financial institutions identify patterns and tailor prevention efforts. The primary differentiation criteria include the individual's knowledge of the funds' illegal source, their intent to assist in the scheme, and the nature of any benefit received, such as financial compensation or . Witting money mules, also known as knowing or complicit mules, are individuals who are fully aware that the funds they handle originate from and participate intentionally for personal gain. These mules are often motivated by greed and may be repeat offenders or affiliated with networks, receiving a small commission or percentage of the transferred funds as payment. They actively facilitate the laundering process, sometimes handling multiple transactions to maximize their earnings. Unwitting money mules represent the most common type, comprising a significant portion of cases where individuals are unaware of the illegality and believe they are engaging in legitimate or assistance opportunities. These participants often discover their involvement only after authorities intervene, such as during an or account freeze, having been through job offers, romance scams, or other fraudulent tactics. Unwitting mules pose a particular challenge for detection, as their actions mimic normal financial behavior initially. Other variants include coerced mules, who participate under pressure from relatives, friends, or associates, often through threats or emotional manipulation rather than financial incentive. These individuals may reluctantly allow their accounts to be used for transfers without full understanding of the consequences. Professional mules, on the other hand, specialize in high-volume digital transfers, operating as experienced facilitators who handle large-scale operations across multiple platforms, often with technical sophistication to evade detection.

Criminal Charges

Money mules face a range of criminal charges depending on their level of awareness and involvement in the scheme, with prosecutors often pursuing charges related to facilitating the movement of illicit funds. In the United States, primary charges include money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, which prohibits conducting financial transactions with proceeds of specified unlawful activities to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Additional common charges encompass wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 for transmitting fraudulent communications across state lines, bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 for schemes to defraud financial institutions, and conspiracy to commit these offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Unwitting money mules, who unknowingly transfer funds, may still be charged as accessories after the fact or for aiding and abetting if their actions objectively support the crime, even without direct intent. Internationally, charges vary by jurisdiction but center on anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks that criminalize handling criminal proceeds. In the European Union, money mules can be prosecuted under the 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/1673), which harmonizes criminal liability for money laundering across member states and extends offenses to aiding, abetting, and attempting to launder proceeds of crime, applying even to those who facilitate transfers without full knowledge if recklessness is shown. In the United Kingdom, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) forms the basis for charges, defining money laundering as any act converting, concealing, or transferring criminal property, with money mules explicitly targeted for moving or handling such proceeds on behalf of others, regardless of whether they knew the exact origin of the funds. Unknowing involvement can lead to charges of aiding or abetting under these laws if the individual fails to inquire into suspicious circumstances. In India, where cyber fraud poses significant challenges, money mules are prosecuted under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), which criminalizes dealing with proceeds of crime, as well as provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Indian Penal Code for offenses such as cheating and conspiracy. Police routinely file First Information Reports (FIRs) and arrest suspected mules in cyber fraud cases, even when suspects claim "I was not aware" or that their accounts were hacked, if investigations reveal evidence of knowing involvement such as receiving commissions or willingly providing accounts. For example, in a 2024 Pune case, Abhishekh Ranade claimed his account was hacked but was arrested after evidence showed he collaborated for payment in a scheme involving ₹24.95 lakh. In Bengaluru digital arrest scams, mules arrested in 2025 claimed unawareness but were held accountable based on traceable involvement and transactions. "Service providers," such as telecom staff illegally facilitating SIM cards used in fraud, have also been arrested; in 2026, the Central Bureau of Investigation arrested a Vodafone area sales manager for procuring over 21,000 SIM cards for cybercrimes. Prosecutors rely on specific evidentiary factors to establish culpability, particularly to prove knowledge or recklessness. Bank records, including transaction histories and account statements, are crucial for tracing the flow of funds and demonstrating patterns of unusual activity, such as rapid transfers or deposits from unknown sources. Communication logs, such as emails, text messages, and social media exchanges with recruiters, provide evidence of instructions or inducements that may indicate awareness of illegality. Fund tracing through forensic accounting further links the mule's actions to underlying crimes like fraud or trafficking, often using blockchain analysis for cryptocurrency cases or international wire transfer data. Defenses for money mules, especially unwitting ones, primarily hinge on lack of intent or knowledge, arguing that the defendant had no reasonable basis to suspect the funds were illicit. This requires presenting evidence like the absence of suspicious communications or the defendant's good-faith belief in a legitimate job opportunity, but success is rare without compelling proof, as courts often infer recklessness from ignoring red flags such as unsolicited payments or vague instructions. In practice, such defenses succeed more frequently in plea negotiations leading to reduced charges rather than full acquittals.

Penalties and Enforcement

In the United States, individuals convicted of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 face maximum penalties of up to 20 years in prison and fines of $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater. For violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which often apply to smaller-scale transactions relevant to money mule activities, penalties include up to 10 years imprisonment and fines up to $250,000. First-time unwitting money mules may receive lighter sentences, such as probation, restitution orders, or even warning letters from authorities rather than full prosecution, depending on the circumstances and cooperation. Aggravating factors significantly increase penalty severity in money laundering cases. Repeat offenses, involvement of large sums, or assuming leadership roles in schemes can lead to enhanced sentences under federal guidelines, potentially elevating base terms by multiple levels. Asset forfeiture is a common enforcement tool, allowing authorities to seize property involved in or derived from the offense, including bank accounts and vehicles used in transactions. The distinction between types of money mules, such as unwitting versus witting participants, often influences the applied severity, with knowing involvement drawing harsher punishments. Enforcement of money mule activities involves coordinated efforts by key agencies. In the US, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads investigations into money mule networks tied to fraud and laundering. Internationally, Interpol facilitates cross-border operations against these schemes by sharing intelligence on mule recruitment and fund flows. National bodies like the UK's National Crime Agency (NCA) target domestic mule operations, estimating billions laundered annually through such networks. For cross-border cases, the Egmont Group enables secure information exchange among financial intelligence units to disrupt global laundering. In India, enforcement is led by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and local cyber crime police units, which conduct operations and arrests in cyber fraud cases involving money mules and facilitators. Recent trends reflect evolving enforcement priorities. Post-2020, authorities have intensified focus on digital money mules using online platforms for recruitment and transfers, incorporating AI-driven tools for real-time bank transaction monitoring to detect suspicious patterns. In 2024-2025, penalties have heightened in response to cryptocurrency schemes, with regulatory fines for AML failures in crypto averaging $3.8 million per case and overall enforcement actions surging amid rising illicit digital asset flows.

Notable Cases and Impact

High-Profile Cases

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice, in coordination with the FBI and international partners, conducted Operation Wire Wire, dismantling a large network involved in business email compromise (BEC) and romance scams that utilized unwitting money mules to launder funds. The operation targeted fraudsters who recruited individuals through fake job offers and romantic entanglements, leading to the arrest of 74 people across the U.S., , and other countries, with 42 arrests in the U.S. alone. Authorities seized nearly $2.4 million and disrupted approximately $14 million in fraudulent transfers, highlighting how mules were often unaware they were facilitating the movement of scam proceeds totaling millions from victims including businesses and elderly individuals. A significant international effort in 2022, known as the European Money Mule Action 8 (EMMA 8) coordinated by with support, busted a widespread network of money mules across , including Eastern European operations, that laundered proceeds from BEC scams and other online frauds with €17.5 million (approximately $19 million at 2022 exchange rates) prevented from circulation. The operation identified 8,755 money mules and 222 recruiters, resulting in 2,469 arrests worldwide, with a focus on schemes where mules transferred funds rapidly through bank accounts to obscure origins from cybercrimes targeting businesses and individuals. This crackdown exposed the role of Eastern European rings in processing BEC funds, recovering assets and freezing accounts to disrupt the flow of laundered from such scams. In the UK, a 2023 conviction underscored the risks to young individuals when Xiaoyu Shu and six accomplices were sentenced in 2024 for operating a £55 million underground ring that exploited international students as unwitting mules to bypass China's foreign currency controls. The group, based in and , laundered funds through cash-heavy transactions involving student couriers who believed they were aiding legitimate remittances, leading to sentences totaling over 24 years in after a investigation uncovered the scheme's scale. This case, rooted in currency evasion, intersected with illicit activities by enabling the rapid movement of proceeds from crimes such as drug supply and , and resulted in the seizure of cash, vehicles, and properties. A crypto-specific incident in 2024 involved two California men charged by the U.S. Department of Justice in the largest NFT fraud scheme prosecuted to date, where unwitting participants were used as mules to launder over $22 million through fraudulent NFT sales and rug pulls. The defendants created fake NFT projects such as Vault of Gems and Roost Coin, luring investors into transferring cryptocurrency that was then quickly moved via blockchain mixers. This case demonstrated how digital environments facilitate mule operations, with funds dispersed across decentralized networks for anonymity. In November 2025, an Irish law student was sentenced to 21 months in prison for acting as a money mule, laundering more than €100,000 stolen through redirection scams, illustrating ongoing risks to young people recruited via online methods. In India, police routinely file FIRs and arrest money mules in cyber fraud cases, even when suspects claim unawareness of the fraud. In a 2024 case in Pune, Abhishekh Ranade was arrested for acting as a money mule after his bank account received ₹24.95 lakh from a 2023 cyber fraud. Ranade claimed his account was hacked and he was unaware, but investigations revealed he willingly provided his account details to fraudsters in exchange for commissions (promised ₹5 lakh) and filed a false hacking complaint to conceal his involvement. He was linked to approximately 80 cases across India. Additionally, facilitators such as telecom "service providers" have faced arrests. In January 2026, the Central Bureau of Investigation arrested Vodafone area sales manager Binu Vidhyadharan for allegedly facilitating the fraudulent issuance of approximately 21,000 SIM cards used in phishing and other cybercrimes, violating Department of Telecom rules. These high-profile cases reveal common lessons in money mule schemes, particularly the exploitation of gaming communities like for recruitment, where promises of easy earnings draw in unwitting participants, and the use of for rapid, hard-to-trace fund transfers that complicate efforts.

Prevalence and Societal Effects

Money muling represents a significant component of global money laundering activities, with the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimating that between 2% and 5% of global GDP—equivalent to $800 billion to $2 trillion annually—is laundered through various methods, including the use of money mules to facilitate the placement and layering of illicit funds. In the , reports that more than 90% of identified money mule transactions are linked to , contributing to the overall scale of . Prevalence is particularly high among young adults, with surveys indicating that up to one-third of individuals aged 18-24 in regions like have been approached to act as money mules, while in the , approximately 10% of young people report similar recruitment attempts. Operational efforts underscore this scope; for instance, international actions in 2023 identified over 10,000 suspected money mules across Europe. On an individual level, involvement as a money mule—whether unwitting or coerced—often leads to severe financial repercussions, including damaged ratings, frozen accounts, and long-term barriers to due to criminal records. Convicted mules may face prosecution and imprisonment, compounding economic hardship with lost earnings and ongoing scrutiny from financial institutions. Psychologically, the experience imposes a heavy toll, with many reporting anxiety, depression, and diminished trust in digital platforms, particularly when victims realize their role in enabling scams after the fact. The societal ramifications of money muling extend beyond isolated cases, eroding public confidence in financial systems by enabling the seamless movement of criminal proceeds and complicating regulatory oversight. It places substantial burdens on , as seen in coordinated operations requiring collaboration among thousands of banks to trace and disrupt mule networks. Furthermore, by disproportionately targeting vulnerable populations such as students, the unemployed, and economically disadvantaged groups, money muling exacerbates social inequalities, allowing illicit wealth to concentrate among criminals while perpetuating cycles of poverty for those exploited. Recent trends from 2020 to 2025 highlight a marked surge in money muling, driven by the expansion of , , and recruitment, which have facilitated easier access to potential mules. In the United States, financial institutions reported a 168% increase in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024 in detected money laundering accounts linked to mules, reflecting heightened vigilance amid rising cyber-enabled fraud. This escalation underscores the need for advanced detection technologies, such as models, to counter the evolving tactics of criminal networks.

References

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  53. https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2101-money-laundering-overview
  54. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-law-enforcement-takes-action-against-more-3000-money-mules-initiative-disrupt
  55. https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2023_Primer_Role.pdf
  56. https://www.justice.gov/afp
  57. https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/moneymuling
  58. https://egmontgroup.org/
  59. https://datawalk.com/combatting-money-mule-networks-the-power-of-graph-ai-in-financial-crime-detection/
  60. https://sqmagazine.co.uk/crypto-aml-fines-and-penalties-statistics/
  61. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/74-arrested-coordinated-international-enforcement-operation-targeting-hundreds-individuals
  62. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/aug/27/chinese-gang-jailed-for-operating-55m-money-laundering-ring
  63. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-california-men-charged-largest-nft-scheme-prosecuted-date
  64. https://www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/courts/2025/11/19/student-sentenced-to-21-months-in-prison-for-laundering-more-than-100000/
  65. https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/pune-news/how-money-mules-from-pune-nashik-are-aiding-cybercriminals-101708278501874.html
  66. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2024-crypto-money-laundering/
  67. https://www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/2025/09/22/almost-one-third-of-young-adults-approached-to-become-money-mules/
  68. https://clok.uclan.ac.uk/id/eprint/55295/1/Money%2520Mules%2520Report%25202024%2520%25281%2529.pdf
  69. https://www.ebf.eu/ebf-media-centre/paper-trail-ends-in-jail-time-for-1-013-money-mules-2-822-banks-and-financial-institutions-join-forces-with-law-enforcement-agencies-in-global-effort-against-money-laundering/
  70. https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/proceeds-fraud-detecting-preventing-money-mules
  71. https://verafin.com/2024/11/mule-activity-victims-pay-the-price/
  72. https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/insights/what-is-the-emotional-impact-of-fraud.html
  73. https://www.tookitaki.com/compliance-hub/the-social-costs-of-money-laundering
  74. https://affiniax.com/money-mules-and-threats-to-financial-system/
  75. https://www.biocatch.com/press-release/u.s.-financial-institutions-report-168-spike-in-detected-money-laundering-accounts
  76. https://risk.lexisnexis.com/global/en/insights-resources/article/hunting-money-mules-with-a-360-degree-view-of-identity
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