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President of Cuba
President of Cuba
President of Cuba
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President of the Republic of Cuba
Presidente de la República de Cuba
Coat of arms of Cuba
Presidential standard
since 10 October 2019
Presidential Office of Cuba
Executive branch of the Government of Cuba
StyleMr President (informal)
His Excellency (diplomatic)
TypeHead of state
Member ofNational Assembly of People's Power
Reports toCouncil of State
ResidencePalacio de la Revolución
NominatorNational Assembly of People's Power
AppointerNational Assembly of People's Power
Term lengthFive years,
renewable once[1]
Constituting instrumentConstitution of Cuba (2019)
PrecursorPresident of the Council of State
FormationApril 12, 1902
(123 years ago) (1902-04-12)
First holderTomás Estrada Palma
AbolishedDecember 1976–October 2019
DeputyVice President
WebsiteOfficial website
Politics of Cuba
Constitution
Communist Party
8th term
National Assembly
9th term
Elections and referendums
Administrative divisions
Foreign relations
Related topics
flag Cuba portal

The president of Cuba (Spanish: Presidente de Cuba), officially the president of the Republic of Cuba (Spanish: Presidente de la República de Cuba), is the head of state of Cuba. The office in its current form was established under the Constitution of 2019. The President is the second-highest office in Cuba and the highest state office. Miguel Díaz-Canel became President of the Council of State on 19 April 2018, taking over from Raúl Castro, and has been President of Cuba since 10 October 2019.

The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba continues to be the highest-ranking political position in Cuba. Fidel Castro held the position from 1976 to 2011, and Raúl Castro from 2011 until the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, held 16–19 April 2021, when he retired from office.[2]

History

[edit]

Under the 1901 constitution, Cuba had a presidential system based on that of the United States.

In 1940, a new constitution reformed the government into a semi-presidential system.

On 2 December 1976, the executive was reformed again by a new national constitution, this time in emulation of the Soviet Union. The presidential office was abolished and replaced by a collective head of state, the Council of State, elected by the National Assembly of People's Power. However, unlike the USSR's arrangements, where the chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers were distinct posts, the chairman of the Council of State also chaired the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, unlike English and Russian, Spanish does not distinguish between the terms "chairman" (Russian: председатель) and "president" (Russian: президент), translating both as "Presidente". Thus, when back-translated into English, the term used was not "Chairman" (on the precedent of similar institutions in countries whose languages have a chairman/president distinction, such as the USSR and East Germany), but rather "President", from the shared etymology with the Spanish "Presidente".

On 24 February 2019, another constitution – Cuba's current – was adopted in a referendum. Under it, the government was again re-organized, and the posts of President and Prime Minister were restored.[3] This reorganization took effect on 11 October 2019. Díaz-Canel was President of the Council of State until 10 October 2019 and President of the Republic after that date. Under the new constitution, the position of President of the Council of State continues as a separate role, subordinate to President of the Republic. The new document also limited the President to two consecutive five-year terms.

In cases of the absence, illness or death of the President of Cuba, the Vice President assumes the presidential duties.

Powers

[edit]

The President of Cuba is mandated to have the following powers as per the Constitution:

  1. Propose to the National Assembly of People's Power, once elected by that body, the Prime Minister of Cuba and the members of the Council of Ministers;
  2. Accept (based on personal preference) the resignation of the Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers or propose either to the National Assembly of People's Power or the Council of State the replacement of any of those members and, in both cases, to propose the corresponding substitutes;
  3. Receive the credentials of the heads of delegation of foreign diplomatic missions. This responsibility may be delegated to any of the Vice Presidents of the Council of State;
  4. Assume the supreme command of all armed forces and determine their general organization;
  5. Preside over the National Defense Council;
  6. Declare a state emergency in those cases provided for in this Constitution, stating his decision, as soon as the circumstances permit it, to the National Assembly of People's Power or to the Council of State if the Assembly is unable to meet, according to legal effects;
  7. Sign decree-laws and other resolutions of the Council of State and the legal provisions adopted by the Council of Ministers or its executive committee, and arrange for their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic;
  8. Assume all other duties assigned by the Constitution or by the laws of the Republic to him or her.

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

President of Cuba

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from Grokipedia
The President of the Republic of Cuba is the head of state of Cuba, a position established by the 2019 Constitution that replaced the prior office of President of the Council of State. The president is elected by the National Assembly of People's Power, Cuba's unicameral legislature controlled by the Communist Party of Cuba—the constitution's designated "superior leading force of the society and of the State"—for a five-year term renewable once, with eligibility requiring Cuban birth, age over 35, and no felony convictions. Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez has served as president since April 19, 2019, when he succeeded Raúl Castro, becoming the first leader not from the Castro family after the 1959 revolution; he was reelected without opposition in April 2023 for a second term. The office holds formal powers including proposing the to the , representing the state internationally, signing treaties and laws, serving as of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and declaring states of emergency, though ultimate authority remains vested in the Communist Party's and . Under Díaz-Canel's presidency, Cuba has grappled with acute economic contraction—GDP fell 11% in 2020 due to effects, U.S. sanctions, and internal mismanagement—leading to widespread blackouts, and medicine shortages, exceeding 30% annually, and over 500,000 emigrants fleeing since 2021, the largest exodus since the revolution. These crises have fueled protests, such as the July 2021 uprising met with arrests of over 1,300 dissidents, highlighting persistent restrictions on free speech, assembly, and enforced by state . Despite limited market-oriented reforms, the regime's centralized planning and suppression of private enterprise perpetuate inefficiency, with the presidency symbolizing continuity of one-party rule amid declining living standards and international isolation.

Historical Development

Republican Era (1902–1959)

The Republic of Cuba was proclaimed on May 20, 1902, marking the end of U.S. military occupation after the Spanish-American War and the Spanish-American Treaty of Paris in 1898, with Tomás Estrada Palma inaugurated as the first president under the 1901 Constitution. Estrada Palma, a Cuban independence leader and naturalized U.S. citizen, won the 1901 election with 90% of the vote amid limited opposition. The constitution, drafted by a Cuban convention but amended to incorporate the Platt Amendment, established a unitary presidential republic with separation of powers, where the president served as head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, elected by direct popular vote for a single four-year term. The Platt Amendment authorized U.S. intervention to preserve Cuban independence, restrict foreign debt, and prevent treaties impairing sovereignty, effectively limiting presidential autonomy in foreign affairs and enabling three U.S. occupations between 1906 and 1921. Estrada Palma's 1906 re-election, violating the no-reelection clause, triggered fraud allegations, armed revolt by the Liberal Party, and U.S. intervention in September 1906, installing a under U.S. Secretary of War briefly and then Charles Magoon until January 1909. José Miguel Gómez assumed office in 1909, benefiting from U.S.-supervised elections and sugar boom prosperity, but his administration faced scandals involving graft exceeding $20 million. Mario García Menocal (1913–1921) navigated neutrality and sugar export peaks to $1 billion annually by 1920, though his 1917 reelection sparked Liberal rebellion and U.S. Marine landings at and . Alfredo Zayas (1921–1925) contended with post-war debt crisis and lottery-funded corruption, while (1925–1933) initially promoted infrastructure like the Central Highway but extended his term unconstitutionally in 1928, imposing amid and strikes that killed over 100 by 1933, leading to his ouster in August 1933. The 1933 Sergeants' Revolt, led by , installed provisional presidents (1933) and Ramón Grau San Martín (1933–1934), who enacted 100+ reforms including labor rights and nullifying the via U.S. agreement in 1934, though wielded de facto control as army chief. José A. Barnet y Vinagoras served briefly in 1936, followed by (1936–1940), under whose term the 1940 Constitution was ratified, expanding presidential powers with reelection bans, social welfare mandates, and but subordinating executive authority to a stronger and . , elected under the new charter, governed from 1940 to 1944 with policies legalizing the and nationalizing some utilities, yielding to Grau (1944–1948) and (1948–1952), whose terms saw GDP growth to $2.5 billion by 1958 but rising graft and gangsterism. 's bloodless coup on March 10, 1952, canceled elections, suspended the constitution, and restored him as president, ruling via decree until his flight on January 1, 1959, amid Fidel Castro's revolutionary offensive that captured key garrisons and . Throughout the era, the presidency oscillated between democratic elections, authoritarian extensions, and external pressures, with U.S. economic dominance—controlling 90% of utilities and mines by 1950—undermining institutional stability and fostering cycles of revolt.

Revolutionary Transition (1959–1976)

Following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959, when fled the country, , a who had supported the revolutionaries by granting asylum to in 1956, was appointed provisional President of the Republic on January 3. , described as strongly anti-communist and pro-American, established the revolutionary government in and formed an initial cabinet on January 5 that included moderate figures like as . However, tensions arose as Castro, who entered on January 8 with his forces, maneuvered to consolidate control; on February 16, Castro replaced as , conditioning his acceptance on expanded powers for the office, which shifted effective executive authority toward him. Urrutia's brief tenure ended amid conflicts over the revolutionary direction, particularly his resistance to communist influences and attempts to dismiss ministers aligned with Castro's agenda, such as those involved in suppressing activities. On July 17, 1959, after Castro publicly accused Urrutia of obstructing the revolution and mobilized mass protests, Urrutia resigned and fled to the Venezuelan embassy, later going into in the United States. The cabinet promptly elected , a lawyer and Castro loyalist who had participated in the , as the new President on July 18, 1959. Dorticós, aged 40 at the time, served in this role until December 1976, primarily affixing his signature to decrees issued under Castro's direction, including key measures like the Agrarian Reform Law of May 17, 1959, which expropriated large landholdings, and subsequent nationalizations of industries starting in 1960. Under the Fundamental Law of the Republic promulgated on February 7, 1959, which suspended the 1940 Constitution and centralized authority in the revolutionary leadership, the presidency functioned as a ceremonial office while Castro, as Prime Minister, wielded de facto executive power, directing foreign policy alignments—such as the tilt toward the Soviet Union by 1960—and internal security operations that dismantled opposition groups through arrests and trials. This period saw the consolidation of one-party rule, with the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations formed in 1961 evolving into the Communist Party of Cuba by 1965, and no national elections held; Castro's government declared the socialist character of the revolution on April 16, 1961, ahead of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and formalized one-party dominance. Dorticós, lacking independent authority, represented Cuba internationally, such as at the United Nations, but real decision-making resided with Castro, who commanded the armed forces and controlled the Council of Ministers. The transition culminated in the 1976 Constitution, approved by on February 15 after a draft process led by the , which abolished the separate and prime ministership, replacing them with the President of the and —positions unified under Castro from December 2, 1976, elected by the newly formed . This reform institutionalized the revolutionary executive structure, emphasizing collective leadership under party supremacy, though Castro retained paramount influence, marking the end of the republican-era adapted from pre-1959 frameworks. During 1959–1976, over 100,000 Cubans emigrated amid economic nationalizations and political purges, with the government executing or imprisoning thousands accused of counter-revolutionary activities, reflecting the shift from provisional governance to entrenched socialist control.

Council of State Presidency (1976–2019)

The 1976 Constitution of Cuba, approved by referendum on February 24, 1976, and proclaimed that day, established the Council of State as the highest state organ functioning between sessions of the National Assembly of the People's Power, with its President serving as head of state and head of government. The Council comprised 31 members, including one President, one First Vice President, and five Vice Presidents, all elected by the National Assembly from among its deputies for five-year terms coinciding with those of the Assembly. This structure centralized executive authority under socialist principles, subordinating the presidency to the Cuban Communist Party's leading role as enshrined in Article 5, which defined the party as the "supreme leading force of society and of the State." Fidel Castro Ruz was elected the first President of the Council of State on December 24, 1976, by the National Assembly, consolidating his de facto leadership since the 1959 revolution into a formalized role. He held the position through multiple five-year terms, with re-elections in 1981, 1986, 1993, 1998, and 2003, the latter marking his sixth term until health issues prompted his temporary delegation of duties to brother Raúl Castro on July 31, 2006. On February 19, 2008, Fidel resigned, and the National Assembly elected Raúl Castro as President on February 24, 2008, who had already been acting in the role. Raúl served two full terms, re-elected in 2013, overseeing limited economic reforms amid persistent centralized control. The President's constitutional powers, outlined in Articles 91–94, included representing the state domestically and internationally, signing and promulgating laws and decrees, ratifying treaties, granting pardons, and commanding the Revolutionary Armed Forces, subject to oversight for major actions like declaring states of emergency or war. In practice, these functions operated within the Communist Party's monopoly, where the President's concurrent role as party First Secretary—held by Fidel until 2011 and Raúl until 2021—ensured alignment with ideological directives, rendering formal elections non-competitive and party vetoes decisive. The Council's decisions, requiring majority votes, further diffused but did not dilute the President's authority, as evidenced by its issuance of decrees-laws during Assembly recesses, totaling over 200 by the amendments. Raúl Castro's tenure emphasized continuity, with him retaining party leadership post-presidency handover. On April 19, 2018, the elected Bermúdez as President, ending the Castro family's 49-year hold on the office and signaling a generational shift, though Díaz-Canel pledged fidelity to revolutionary principles. This presidency persisted until the 2019 constitutional reform, which abolished the and retitled the head of state as , effective October 10, 2019, while preserving party supremacy. Throughout 1976–2019, the office symbolized institutionalized one-party rule, with no instances of opposition candidacy or term limits preventing indefinite incumbency for aligned leaders.

2019 Constitutional Reforms

The , ratified by on February 24, 2019, with 86.85% approval among valid votes cast (turnout 84.18%), replaced the and restructured the executive branch by abolishing the and its presidency. The document, promulgated on April 10, 2019, established the as the , elected directly by the via requiring a simple majority. This shift separated the role from legislative oversight functions previously concentrated in the , while creating a as to handle executive administration. Eligibility for the presidency mandates citizenship by birth, a minimum age of 35, and full enjoyment of , with no upper age limit specified in the text. The office carries a five-year term, limited to two consecutive terms, marking the first formal presidential term limits in Cuba's post-revolutionary . The President appoints and removes ministers upon approval, proposes the for assembly election, and represents national unity, but exercises powers subordinate to the of Cuba's defined leading role in state and society. A , also elected by the assembly, assists and replaces the President if needed. The reforms emerged from a appointed in 2018, followed by public consultations involving over 6.4 million participants, though critics noted restrictions on substantive debate and dissent. , who had succeeded as President in April 2018, was elected as the inaugural on October 10, 2019, by acclamation in the . These changes preserved the socialist framework, declaring Marxism-Leninism and the Communist Party's irreversibility, while introducing limited separations of roles without altering the one-party monopoly on power or enabling multiparty competition. Independent analyses describe the updates as incremental rather than transformative, maintaining centralized control amid economic pressures.

Powers and Functions

Formal Constitutional Powers

The President of the Republic serves as the under Title VI, Chapter XIV of the 2019 , elected by the for a five-year term, with a limit of two consecutive terms. The office entails responsibilities for representing the nation, ensuring constitutional fidelity, and exercising executive functions distinct from the , who heads the government. Article 128 delineates core powers, including directing the state's general policy in coordination with the , conducting foreign relations alongside the , and leading national defense and security strategies. As of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the President organizes and directs military preparation, presides over the National Defense Council, and possesses authority to declare states of emergency, , or disaster, subject to legislative and procedural safeguards outlined in . The President proposes the and members of the for National Assembly approval, appoints provincial governors upon recommendation, and designates key judicial and prosecutorial figures such as the President of the and , again requiring assembly consent. Additional appointment powers extend to the of the Republic, secretaries of the , and diplomatic representatives, with removals possible under similar mechanisms. Legislative involvement includes signing and promulgating laws enacted by the , vetoing bills (overridable by a two-thirds assembly vote), issuing presidential decrees-legislative for specific matters authorized by law, and initiating legislation through bill submissions to the assembly. The President also handles citizenship decisions, such as granting or revoking per legal criteria, receives foreign ' credentials, and accredits Cuban envoys abroad. Annually, the President reports to the on the ' performance, fostering accountability within the constitutional framework. These powers, while enumerated, operate within the socialist system's emphasis on collective organs like the assembly and party guidance, as stipulated in Article 5 affirming the Communist Party of Cuba's leading role.

De Facto Authority and Party Dominance

The (PCC) holds de facto supremacy over the Cuban state, including the , as enshrined in Article 5 of the 2019 Constitution, which declares the PCC "the superior leading force of the society and the State" and the organized vanguard of the nation. This provision codifies the party's monopoly on political organization and decision-making, barring any competing parties or independent political forces since the early 1960s. In practice, the functions as an executive arm subordinate to PCC organs such as the and , which set policy priorities and vet personnel for state roles, rendering the office's authority contingent on party alignment rather than autonomous power. Presidential authority is further circumscribed by the selection process, where candidates emerge from PCC-nominated slates approved through controlled municipal assemblies, culminating in endorsement by the —a unicameral body where over 80% of delegates are PCC members or affiliates as of 2023. This structure ensures that presidents, including Miguel Díaz-Canel since his 2018 election and 2023 reelection, derive legitimacy from party fidelity rather than competitive pluralism; Díaz-Canel, for instance, received 97.66% of votes in the 2023 Assembly ballot without opposition alternatives. Empirical indicators of dominance include the requirement of PCC membership for advancement to senior state positions, with the party influencing economic, military, and security apparatuses through interlocking leadership. Even after Raúl Castro's 2021 resignation as PCC First Secretary—a role historically more influential than the —the party's institutional control persists, with Díaz-Canel's dual tenure in both positions yielding policy continuity in areas like economic centralization and dissent suppression, as evidenced by the 2021 party congress's reaffirmation of socialism's irrevocability amid protests. Dissent against this dominance, such as the July 2021 demonstrations involving over 1,000 arrests, underscores the PCC's use of state mechanisms to enforce conformity, limiting the president's independent maneuvering. Thus, while the president nominally directs the and represents internationally, real causal power resides in the party's cadre selection and ideological enforcement, perpetuating a system where deviations risk removal, as seen in historical purges of non-conformist officials.

Relationship with Other Offices

The maintains a supervisory yet collaborative relationship with the , whom the President proposes for election by the for a five-year term. The , as head of the , directs the executive administration and day-to-day governance, including policy implementation across ministries, while remaining accountable to both the and the President. This division, reintroduced by the 2019 , aims to distribute executive functions more explicitly than under prior systems where power concentrated in the presidency, though the President retains authority to propose the dismissal of the , subject to approval. In practice, as seen with President Miguel Díaz-Canel's nomination of as on December 21, 2019, the two offices coordinate closely on national responses, such as joint televised addresses during crises like the October 2024 protests. The President's interactions with the are defined by mutual election and oversight dynamics. The Assembly, Cuba's unicameral , elects the President from among its deputies for a five-year term, renewable once, and the President in turn participates in Assembly sessions while the body approves key appointments like the . The President chairs the , which exercises legislative powers between Assembly sessions, including decree-laws subject to later Assembly ratification, ensuring continuity in state functions. However, the Assembly's dominance in electing and potentially removing the President underscores its superior role in formal accountability, though sessions are infrequent and controlled by party-aligned delegates. De facto, the President's authority across all offices is subordinated to the (PCC), enshrined in the as the "superior leading force of the State and society." While not an elected office, the PCC's First Secretary—often held concurrently by the President, as with Díaz-Canel since 2021—guides policy and personnel decisions, rendering other state roles implementations of directives rather than independent powers. This structure, rooted in Marxist-Leninist principles, prioritizes supremacy over constitutional separations, with historical precedents like Raúl Castro's retention of PCC leadership post-presidency illustrating how control can eclipse formal office boundaries. The President also serves as of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, coordinating with the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces under the , but ultimate loyalty aligns with PCC ideology. Vice Presidents, appointed by the President and approved by the Assembly, assist in these duties but hold limited autonomous authority.

Election and Eligibility

Selection Process

The President of the Republic of Cuba is elected by the from among its own deputies for a five-year term, requiring an absolute majority vote in a secret ballot. This process occurs upon the convening of a new legislative session following national elections, as stipulated in Article 109 of the 2019 Constitution. The , comprising 470 to 605 deputies depending on population adjustments, serves as the unicameral legislature and holds this authority exclusively, with no direct popular vote for the presidency. Eligibility criteria for the presidency, outlined in Article 127, mandate that candidates be Cuban citizens by birth, at least 35 years old but no older than 60 at the time of , possess full , and hold no foreign citizenship. Deputies eligible for nomination must first be elected to through a process involving nominations by commissions of mass organizations—such as workers' federations and student groups—and approval by municipal assemblies, followed by a non-competitive popular vote where citizens can approve or reject pre-approved slates without party alternatives. In practice, the , enshrined in Article 5 as the "leading force of society and the State," influences candidate selection at all levels, ensuring alignment with party directives. The formal election typically features a single nominee proposed by party leadership, as occurred in 2018 when received unanimous support from after Raúl Castro's . Subsequent votes, such as Díaz-Canel's 2023 re-election, follow similar patterns, with confirming the candidate by majority without public campaigning or opposition. This indirect mechanism, governed by Electoral Law No. 72 of 1992 and subsequent reforms, prioritizes continuity within the one-party framework over competitive pluralism.

Term Limits and Succession

The President of the Republic of Cuba is elected to a five-year term by the from among its deputies, requiring an absolute majority vote. Under the , the office is subject to a limit of two consecutive terms, after which the individual cannot seek reelection. This provision marks a departure from the prior Constitution, which imposed no term restrictions on the equivalent (President of the Council of State), allowing figures such as to hold power for nearly five decades without formal limits. Eligibility for the presidency further constrains potential candidates by requiring Cuban citizenship by birth, no dual nationality, full , a minimum age of 35, and a maximum age of 60 at the start of the first term. Succession occurs through election by the , which convenes to select a new president at the end of a term or upon vacancy. In cases of temporary absence, , illness, or , the First Vice President assumes duties provisionally until the Assembly acts to elect a permanent replacement. This was formalized in the 2019 reforms to promote orderly transitions, as evidenced by Miguel Díaz-Canel's uncontested election in October 2019 following the constitutional change and his reelection in April 2023 for a second term ending in 2028. Historically, provisional handovers—such as Raúl Castro's temporary assumption of duties from in 2006—relied on similar Assembly mechanisms under the earlier framework, underscoring the continuity of legislative selection despite the absence of competitive multiparty input. The 's composition, drawn from single-candidate municipal elections vetted by government commissions, ensures that prospective presidents align with the Cuban Communist Party's directives, rendering formal succession a of party-preferred continuity rather than open contestation.

Role in Cuban Governance

Head of State Duties

The of , as under the 2019 , is responsible for representing the unity of the nation and the state, ensuring the regular functioning of state organs, and overseeing compliance with the , laws, and national policies in political, economic, and social spheres. This role encompasses directing general state policies and managing foreign relations, national defense, and security matters. The also signs laws passed by the and arranges their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic. In military capacities, the President discharges duties as Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, determines their general organization, and presides over the National Defense Council. The office holder proposes declarations of war or states of emergency to the National Assembly or Council of State as required, orders general mobilization when national defense necessitates it, and declares states of emergency or disaster situations per constitutional provisions, notifying legislative bodies promptly. Promotion and cessation of high-ranking military officials follow legal procedures established by the President. Diplomatic functions include proposing designations or removals of Cuba's chiefs to the , granting or retracting ambassadorial ranks, receiving credentials of foreign mission heads (with the substituting in exceptional cases), and approving or denying foreign diplomatic heads on behalf of the . The President grants decorations, honorary titles, pardons, and, in specified cases, Cuban citizenship to foreigners; proposes amnesties to the ; and decides on renunciations or losses of citizenship. Additionally, the President may issue presidential decrees, create temporary commissions for specific projects, and propose suspensions or revocations of state organ decisions contradicting the , laws, or national interests.

Policy Influence and Decision-Making

In Cuba's socialist system, the President's policy influence is subordinate to the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which the 2019 Constitution designates as the "superior leading force of the society and of the State." The PCC's Politburo and Central Committee set the ideological and strategic direction for all major policies, with the President—also serving as PCC First Secretary—implementing these directives through the Council of State and Council of Ministers. This structure ensures that individual presidential initiatives must align with party consensus, limiting autonomous decision-making and prioritizing collective leadership over personal authority. Decision-making processes are highly centralized and bureaucratic, often involving multiple layers of and state approvals that delay implementation and stifle innovation. For instance, under President , economic policies such as the 2021 "Ordering Task" (Tarea Ordenamiento) aimed to unify dual currencies and adjust prices but resulted in exceeding 500% by 2022, attributed to rigid central that overrides market signals. Díaz-Canel has publicly emphasized continuity with prior PCC guidelines, as seen in his April 2021 address ordering the economy while reinforcing state control over key sectors, rather than pursuing . The President's role in similarly reflects PCC dominance, with decisions like maintaining alliances with and requiring party endorsement. During the July 2021 protests, Díaz-Canel's response—mobilizing supporters and blaming U.S. influence—mirrored party , underscoring how policy responses to crises are framed to preserve revolutionary principles over adaptive reforms. Critics from organizations monitoring governance note that this party veto power perpetuates inefficiencies, as evidenced by Cuba's persistent despite occasional rhetorical shifts toward private enterprise, which remain marginal (e.g., capped at under 10% of GDP contribution). Overall, the presidency's decision-making authority is ceremonial in scope, with substantive influence derived from loyalty to PCC structures rather than electoral mandate or institutional independence, a dynamic unchanged since the post-Fidel transition. This arrangement, while ensuring ideological uniformity, has been linked to policy rigidity that hampers responses to challenges like energy shortages and food insecurity, as documented in annual assessments.

Controversies and Criticisms

Lack of Democratic Legitimacy

The President of Cuba is not elected through direct popular vote but is selected by the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), a unicameral legislature comprising 470 members. This indirect process, outlined in the Cuban Constitution and electoral laws, requires a simple majority vote within the ANPP, which convenes briefly each year and operates under the dominance of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). For instance, Miguel Díaz-Canel was chosen as president on April 19, 2018, succeeding Raúl Castro in a vote that reflected preordained party consensus rather than competitive contestation. Elections for ANPP delegates occur every five years and involve nominal , but candidates are vetted and nominated by mass organizations affiliated with the PCC, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, resulting in ballots that typically present voters with single candidates or limited, pre-approved options without party affiliations listed. Voting is mandatory for citizens aged 16 and older, with turnout reported at over 90% in recent cycles, such as 92.3% in the March 26, 2023, parliamentary ; however, , blank votes, or spoiled ballots—totaling about 13% of potential voters in 2023—have been interpreted by critics as indirect expressions of dissent in a lacking genuine alternatives. Independent candidates or those from opposition groups are barred, as the Constitution's Article 5 designates the PCC as "the superior leading force of the society and the State," effectively institutionalizing a one-party monopoly that precludes multiparty competition or alternation of power. This framework undermines democratic legitimacy, as defined by standards emphasizing free association, competitive elections, and without coercion, because the PCC's control over nominations ensures continuity of ruling elites without accountability to diverse voter preferences. Since the 1959 revolution, no president has emerged from open electoral rivalry, with transitions managed internally by cadres, contrasting sharply with democratic systems where executive authority derives from verifiable popular mandates. International assessments reinforce this evaluation: Freedom House rates Cuba as "Not Free" with a political rights score of 0/40 in its 2024 report, citing the outlawing of political pluralism and suppression of opposition as core barriers to legitimate governance. Similarly, organizations monitoring electoral integrity highlight the absence of independent oversight, media freedom, or voter choice, rendering the process a mechanism for ratification rather than representation. Cuban authorities defend the system as participatory socialism, but empirical indicators—such as the imprisonment of dissidents challenging the status quo—indicate structural impediments to pluralism, prioritizing regime stability over electoral contestation.

Human Rights and Suppression of Dissent

The Cuban government under President has maintained a policy of systematic repression against , including arbitrary detentions, of activists, and of peaceful protests, as documented in multiple international reports. This includes routine use of short-term arrests to intimidate critics and long-term imprisonment for those perceived as threats to the . A pivotal event occurred on , 2021, when thousands protested nationwide against economic shortages, blackouts, and inadequate responses, marking the largest demonstrations since 1959. The regime responded with a violent crackdown involving security forces using batons, , and vehicles against crowds, resulting in over 1,300 arrests within days. Díaz-Canel publicly urged supporters to confront protesters, framing the unrest as foreign-influenced subversion, which preceded intensified repression including beatings, home raids, and internet shutdowns. Over 700 individuals from these protests remained imprisoned as of July 2025, many held incommunicado or subjected to inhumane conditions without . Political imprisonment persists as a core mechanism of control, with estimates of over 1,000 political prisoners as of late 2023, rising to 1,148 documented cases by the end of 2024 according to regional bodies. Detainees, including journalists, artists, and opposition figures, face charges such as "sedition" or "enemy propaganda" under vague penal codes, often without fair trials or access to independent lawyers. Reports detail widespread ill-treatment, including , denial of medical care, and family harassment, with the government barring international monitors from prisons. Repression extended into 2024-2025 amid ongoing economic protests, with at least 109 arbitrary detentions for participation in demonstrations and around 290 such events recorded between July 2024 and June 2025, primarily over food and power shortages. In January 2025, following Vatican-mediated talks, authorities announced the release of over 550 prisoners, including some political detainees, but independent NGOs reported hundreds remained confined, with releases often conditional on or silence pledges, failing to address underlying repressive laws. of expression remains curtailed through media monopolies and , ensuring is preemptively stifled to preserve regime stability.

Economic Policy Failures

Cuba's economy under President has experienced severe contraction and persistent shortages, with declining by 11% over the five years preceding 2025, marking ten consecutive years of macroeconomic deterioration. This decline stems from structural rigidities in the centrally planned system, including state monopolies on production and distribution that discourage private initiative and , compounded by inadequate responses to external shocks like the tourism collapse and reduced Venezuelan oil subsidies. Nominal GDP peaked around $9,232 in 2019 before stagnation and real-term erosion, with fiscal deficits expanding to 12.3% of GDP in 2024 amid ballooning expenditures and falling revenues. A pivotal policy failure was the 2021 "Tarea Ordenamiento" , which unified the dual-currency system, eliminated subsidies, and raised state wages and prices in an attempt to rationalize the . Intended to boost efficiency, it instead triggered —reaching historically unprecedented levels—without corresponding gains, as state enterprises remained inefficient and unresponsive to market signals. The reform exacerbated shortages of , , and , leading to widespread reliance and a parallel dollar , while official data showed fiscal revenues dropping to 45.6% of GDP against 59.3% expenditures in 2020-2022. These policies culminated in mass protests on July 11, 2021, driven by acute economic desperation including long lines for basics, power blackouts, and soaring prices, affecting over 140,000 migrants fleeing since late 2021. Díaz-Canel's administration has since pursued limited "structural changes," such as partial allowances, but these have failed to reverse the crisis, with ongoing high , service collapses, and exceeding 1 million since 2020 underscoring the persistence of command-economy flaws over incremental tweaks. Critics attribute the root causes to the regime's refusal to adopt market-oriented reforms, prioritizing ideological control over empirical evidence of central planning's inefficiencies, rather than solely external factors like U.S. sanctions.

Current and Recent Holders

Miguel Díaz-Canel's Tenure (2018–Present)

Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed the presidency of the Council of State on April 19, 2018, when the National Assembly of People's Power selected him as Raúl Castro's successor, ending over five decades of Castro family leadership in the role. This transition maintained the continuity of Cuba's one-party communist system, with Díaz-Canel, a long-time party loyalist, pledging to uphold revolutionary principles without introducing multiparty democracy or market-oriented reforms. In April 2019, following a constitutional referendum that preserved the Communist Party's monopoly on power while introducing nominal term limits for the presidency, Díaz-Canel's title shifted to President of the Republic, though substantive authority remained concentrated in the party leadership. Díaz-Canel's tenure has been marked by deepening economic contraction and social unrest. Cuba's GDP declined by 11% in 2020 amid the , driven by the collapse of —a key source—and tightened U.S. sanctions, though internal structural inefficiencies in the state-controlled exacerbated shortages of , , and . Inflation surged, with official rates exceeding 30% annually by 2021 and black-market estimates reaching hundreds of percent, leading to widespread and blackouts lasting up to 20 hours daily in 2024-2025. The government's response included partial private enterprise allowances in 2021, but these measures failed to reverse the fiscal deficit, which averaged over 10% of GDP from 2020-2022, as state spending on subsidies and inefficient enterprises persisted. Mass protests erupted on July 11, 2021, in multiple cities, triggered by acute shortages, power outages, and frustration over the government's management, despite the rollout of domestically developed vaccines like Abdala that achieved over 90% national coverage by late 2021.00159-6/fulltext) Díaz-Canel appeared on state television to rally supporters against the demonstrators, framing the unrest as a U.S.-orchestrated plot and authorizing security forces to "defend the revolution," resulting in over 1,300 arrests, beatings, and long prison sentences for participants under charges of . documented systematic abuses, including torture and forced exile for released prisoners, while condemned the suppression as a violation of rights to peaceful assembly. Subsequent smaller protests in 2024 faced similar crackdowns, contributing to a migration exodus of over 500,000 Cubans since 2021. In foreign policy, Díaz-Canel has deepened alliances with and to offset U.S. pressures, including oil imports from amid domestic energy shortfalls and economic cooperation with , highlighted by high-level meetings with Presidents Putin and Xi in 2025. Cuban officials attribute economic woes primarily to the U.S. embargo, yet analyses from Intelligence Unit point to policy rigidities and lack of incentives for productivity as core causes, with remittances and providing limited recovery in 2024. Re-elected unopposed by the on April 19, 2023, for a second five-year term, Díaz-Canel continues to prioritize ideological continuity over liberalization, facing ongoing challenges from , service collapses, and as of October 2025.

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