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Fidel Castro
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This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. When this tag was added, its readable prose size was 15,600 words. (July 2025) |
Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz[a] (13 August 1926 – 25 November 2016) was a Cuban politician and revolutionary who was the leader of Cuba from 1959 to 2008, serving as the prime minister of Cuba from 1959 to 1976 and president from 1976 to 2008. Ideologically a Marxist–Leninist and Cuban nationalist, he also served as the first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba from 1965 until 2011. Under his administration, Cuba became a one-party communist state; industry and business were nationalized, and socialist reforms were implemented throughout society.
Key Information
Born in Birán, the son of a wealthy Spanish farmer, Castro adopted leftist and anti-imperialist ideas while studying law at the University of Havana. After participating in rebellions against right-wing governments in the Dominican Republic and Colombia, he planned the overthrow of Cuban president Fulgencio Batista, launching a failed attack on the Moncada Barracks in 1953. After a year's imprisonment, Castro travelled to Mexico where he formed a revolutionary group, the 26th of July Movement, with his brother, Raúl Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Returning to Cuba, Castro took a key role in the Cuban Revolution by leading the Movement in a guerrilla war against Batista's forces from the Sierra Maestra. After Batista's overthrow in 1959, Castro assumed military and political power as Cuba's prime minister. The United States came to oppose Castro's government and unsuccessfully attempted to remove him by assassination, economic embargo, and counter-revolution, including the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961. Countering these threats, Castro aligned with the Soviet Union and allowed the Soviets to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, resulting in the Cuban Missile Crisis—a defining incident of the Cold War—in 1962.
Adopting a Marxist–Leninist model of development, Castro converted Cuba into a one-party, socialist state under Communist Party rule, the first in the Western Hemisphere. Policies introducing central economic planning and expanding healthcare and education were accompanied by state control of the press and the suppression of internal dissent. Abroad, Castro supported anti-imperialist revolutionary groups, backing the establishment of Marxist governments in Chile, Nicaragua, and Grenada, as well as sending troops to aid allies in the Yom Kippur, Ogaden, and Angolan Civil War. These actions, coupled with Castro's leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement from 1979 to 1983 and Cuban medical internationalism, increased Cuba's profile on the world stage. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Castro led Cuba through the economic downturn of the "Special Period", embracing environmentalist and anti-globalization ideas. In the 2000s, Castro forged alliances in the Latin American "pink tide"—namely with Hugo Chávez's Venezuela—and formed the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas. In 2006, Castro transferred his responsibilities to Vice President Raúl Castro, who was elected to the presidency by the National Assembly in 2008. Castro died at the age of 90 from natural causes in November 2016.
The longest-serving non-royal head of state in the 20th and 21st centuries, Castro polarized world opinion. His supporters view him as a champion of socialism and anti-imperialism whose revolutionary government advanced economic and social justice while securing Cuba's independence from American hegemony. His critics view him as a dictator whose administration oversaw human rights abuses, the exodus of many Cubans, and the impoverishment of the country's economy.
Early life and career
[edit]Youth: 1926–1947
[edit]

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was born out of wedlock at his father's farm on 13 August 1926.[2] His father, Ángel Castro y Argiz, was a migrant to Cuba from Galicia, northwest Spain.[3] After the collapse of his first marriage he took his household servant, Lina Ruz González—of Canarian ancestry—as his mistress and later second wife; together they had seven children, among them Fidel.[4] At age six, Castro was sent to live with his teacher in Santiago de Cuba,[5] before being baptized into the Catholic Church at the age of eight.[6] His baptism allowed Castro to attend the La Salle boarding school in Santiago, and was later sent to the Jesuit-run Dolores School in Santiago.[7]
In 1942, Castro transferred to the Jesuit-run El Colegio de Belén in Havana.[8] In 1945, Castro began studying law at the University of Havana[9] where he became embroiled in student activism[10] and the violent gangsterismo culture within the university.[11] After becoming passionate about anti-imperialism and opposing US intervention in the Caribbean,[12] he unsuccessfully campaigned for the presidency of the Federation of University Students.[13] Castro became critical of the corruption and violence of President Ramón Grau's government, delivering a public speech on the subject in November 1946 that received coverage on the front page of several newspapers.[14]
In 1947, Castro joined the Party of the Cuban People (Partido Ortodoxo), founded by Eduardo Chibás. Though Chibás came third in the 1948 general election, Castro remained committed to working on his behalf.[15] Student violence escalated when Grau employed gang leaders as police officers, and Castro received a death threat urging him to leave the university, but he refused and began to carry a gun and surround himself with armed friends.[16] Anti-Castro dissidents accused him of committing gang-related assassinations at the time, but these accusations remain unproven.[17]
Rebellion and Marxism: 1947–1950
[edit]I joined the people; I grabbed a rifle in a police station that collapsed when it was rushed by a crowd. I witnessed the spectacle of a totally spontaneous revolution ... [T]hat experience led me to identify myself even more with the cause of the people. My still incipient Marxist ideas had nothing to do with our conduct—it was a spontaneous reaction on our part, as young people with Martí-an, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and pro-democratic ideas.
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In June 1947, Castro joined a planned expedition to overthrow the government of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.[19][20] The military force intended to sail from Cuba in July 1947, but Grau's government stopped the invasion under US pressure, and Castro evaded arrest.[21] Returning to Havana, Castro took a leading role in student protests against the killing of a high school pupil by government bodyguards.[22] The protests and subsequent crackdown on suspected communists led to violent clashes between activists and police in February 1948, in which Castro was badly beaten. His subsequent public speeches took a leftist slant, condemning social and economic inequality in Cuba.[23]
In April 1948, Castro travelled to Bogotá, Colombia, leading a Cuban student group sponsored by President Juan Perón's Argentine government. There, the assassination of leftist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala led to rioting and clashes between the governing Conservatives—backed by the army—and leftist Liberals.[24] Castro joined the Liberal cause by stealing guns from a police station; subsequent police investigations concluded that he had not been involved in killings.[24] In April 1948, the Organization of American States was founded at a summit in Bogotá, leading to protests, which Castro joined.[25]
Marxism taught me what society was. I was like a blindfolded man in a forest, who doesn't even know where north or south is. If you don't eventually come to truly understand the history of the class struggle, or at least have a clear idea that society is divided between the rich and the poor, and that some people subjugate and exploit other people, you're lost in a forest, not knowing anything.
Returning to Cuba, Castro became a prominent figure in protests against government attempts to raise bus fares.[27] He married Mirta Díaz Balart, through whom he was exposed to the lifestyle of the Cuban elite.[28] The subsequent election was won by Partido Auténtico's new candidate, Carlos Prío Socarrás.[29] Castro had moved further to the left and interpreted Cuba's problems as an integral part of capitalist society, or the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie", rather than the failings of corrupt politicians, and adopted the Marxist view that meaningful political change could only be brought about by proletariat revolution. Visiting Havana's poorest neighbourhoods, he became active in the student anti-racist campaign.[30]
In September 1949, Mirta gave birth to a son, Fidelito, so the couple moved to a larger Havana flat.[31] Castro continued to put himself at risk, staying active in the city's politics and joining the 30 September Movement, which contained within it both communists and members of the Partido Ortodoxo. The group's purpose was to oppose the influence of the violent gangs within the university; despite his promises, Prío had failed to control the situation, instead offering many of their senior members jobs in government ministries.[32]
Castro volunteered to deliver a speech for the Movement on 13 November, exposing the government's secret deals with the gangs and identifying key members. Attracting the attention of the national press, the speech angered the gangs and Castro fled into hiding, first in the countryside and then in the US.[33] Returning to Havana several weeks later, Castro laid low and focused on his university studies, graduating as a Doctor of Law in September 1950.[34]
Career in law and politics: 1950–1952
[edit]
Castro co-founded a legal partnership that primarily catered to poor Cubans, albeit it proved a financial failure.[35] Caring little for money or material goods, Castro failed to pay his bills; his furniture was repossessed and electricity cut off, distressing his wife.[36] He took part in a high school protest in Cienfuegos in November 1950, fighting with police to protest the Education Ministry's ban on student associations; he was arrested and charged for violent conduct, but the magistrate dismissed the charges.[37] His hopes for Cuba still centered on Chibás and the Partido Ortodoxo, and he was present at Chibás' politically motivated suicide in 1951.[38]
Seeing himself as Chibás' heir, Castro wanted to run for Congress in the June 1952 elections, though senior Ortodoxo members feared his radical reputation and refused to nominate him.[39] He was instead nominated as a candidate for the House of Representatives by party members in Havana's poorest districts and began campaigning.[39] The Ortodoxo had considerable support and was predicted to do well in the election.[40]
During his campaign, Castro met with General Fulgencio Batista, the former president who had returned to politics with the Unitary Action Party. Batista offered him a place in his administration if he was successful; although both opposed Prío's administration, their meeting never got beyond polite generalities.[41] On 10 March 1952, Batista seized power in a military coup, with Prío fleeing to Mexico. Declaring himself president, Batista cancelled the planned presidential elections, describing his new system as "disciplined democracy"; Castro was deprived of being elected in his run for office by Batista's move, and like many others, considered it a one-man dictatorship.[42]
Batista moved to the right, solidifying ties with both the wealthy elite and the United States, severing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, suppressing trade unions and persecuting Cuban socialist groups.[43] Intent on opposing Batista, Castro brought several legal cases against the government, but these came to nothing, and Castro began thinking of alternative ways to oust the regime.[44]
Cuban Revolution
[edit]The Movement and the Moncada Barracks attack: 1952–1953
[edit]Castro formed a group called "The Movement" which operated along a clandestine cell system, publishing underground newspaper El Acusador (The Accuser), while arming and training anti-Batista recruits.[45] From July 1952 they went on a recruitment drive, gaining around 1,200 members in a year, the majority from Havana's poorer districts.[46] Although a revolutionary socialist, Castro avoided an alliance with the communist Popular Socialist Party (PSP), fearing it would frighten away political moderates, but kept in contact with PSP members like his brother Raúl.[47] Castro stockpiled weapons for a planned attack on the Moncada Barracks, a military garrison outside Santiago de Cuba, Oriente. Castro's militants intended to dress in army uniforms and arrive at the base on 25 July, seizing control and raiding the armoury before reinforcements arrived.[48] Supplied with new weaponry, Castro intended to spark a revolution among Oriente's impoverished cane cutters and promote further uprisings.[49] Castro's plan emulated those of the 19th-century Cuban independence fighters who had raided Spanish barracks; Castro saw himself as the heir to independence leader José Martí.[50]

Castro gathered 165 revolutionaries for the mission,[51] ordering his troops not to cause bloodshed unless they met armed resistance.[52] The attack took place on 26 July 1953, but ran into trouble; 3 of the 16 cars that had set out from Santiago failed to get there. Reaching the barracks, the alarm was raised, with most of the rebels pinned down by machine gun fire. Four were killed before Castro ordered a retreat.[53] The rebels suffered 6 fatalities and 15 other casualties, whilst the army suffered 19 dead and 27 wounded.[54] Meanwhile, some rebels took over a civilian hospital; subsequently stormed by government soldiers, the rebels were rounded up, tortured and 22 were executed without trial.[55] Accompanied by 19 comrades, Castro set out for Gran Piedra in the rugged Sierra Maestra mountains several kilometres to the north, where they could establish a guerrilla base.[56] Responding to the attack, Batista's government proclaimed martial law, ordering a violent crackdown on dissent, and imposing strict media censorship.[57] The government broadcast misinformation about the event, claiming that the rebels were communists who had killed hospital patients, although news and photographs of the army's use of torture and summary executions in Oriente soon spread, causing widespread public and some governmental disapproval.[57]
Over the following days, the rebels were rounded up; some were executed and others—including Castro—transported to a prison north of Santiago.[58] Believing Castro incapable of planning the attack alone, the government accused Ortodoxo and PSP politicians of involvement, putting 122 defendants on trial on 21 September at the Palace of Justice, Santiago.[59] Acting as his own defence counsel, Castro cited Martí as the intellectual author of the attack and convinced the three judges to overrule the army's decision to keep all defendants handcuffed in court, proceeding to argue that the charge with which they were accused—of "organizing an uprising of armed persons against the Constitutional Powers of the State"—was incorrect, for they had risen up against Batista, who had seized power in an unconstitutional manner.[60] The trial embarrassed the army by revealing that they had tortured suspects, after which they tried unsuccessfully to prevent Castro from testifying any further, claiming he was too ill.[61] The trial ended on 5 October, with the acquittal of most defendants; 55 were sentenced to prison terms of between 7 months and 13 years. Castro was sentenced on 16 October, during which he delivered a speech that would be printed under the title of History Will Absolve Me.[62] Castro was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment in the hospital wing of the Model Prison (Presidio Modelo), a relatively comfortable and modern institution on the Isla de Pinos.[63]
Imprisonment and 26 July Movement: 1953–1955
[edit]Imprisoned with 25 comrades, Castro renamed his group the "26th of July Movement" (MR-26-7) in memory of the Moncada attack's date, and formed a school for prisoners.[64] He read widely, enjoying the works of Marx, Lenin, and Martí but also reading books by Freud, Kant, Shakespeare, Munthe, Maugham, and Dostoyevsky, analysing them within a Marxist framework.[65] Corresponding with supporters, he maintained control over the Movement and organized the publication of History Will Absolve Me.[66] Initially permitted a relative amount of freedom within the prison, he was locked up in solitary confinement after inmates sang anti-Batista songs on a visit by the president in February 1954.[67] Meanwhile, Castro's wife Mirta gained employment in the Ministry of the Interior, something he discovered through a radio announcement. Appalled, he raged that he would rather die "a thousand times" than "suffer impotently from such an insult".[68] Both Fidel and Mirta initiated divorce proceedings, with Mirta taking custody of their son Fidelito; this angered Castro, who did not want his son growing up in a bourgeois environment.[68]

In 1954, Batista's government held presidential elections, but no politician stood against him; the election was widely considered fraudulent. It had allowed some political opposition to be voiced, and Castro's supporters had agitated for an amnesty for the Moncada incident's perpetrators. Some politicians suggested an amnesty would be good publicity, and the Congress and Batista agreed. Backed by the US and major corporations, Batista believed Castro to be no threat, and on 15 May 1955, the prisoners were released.[69] Returning to Havana, Castro gave radio interviews and press conferences; the government closely monitored him, curtailing his activities.[70] Now divorced, Castro had sexual affairs with two female supporters, Naty Revuelta and Maria Laborde, each conceiving him a child.[71] Setting about strengthening the MR-26-7, he established an 11-person National Directorate but retained autocratic control, with some dissenters labelling him a caudillo (dictator); he argued that a successful revolution could not be run by committee and required a strong leader.[72]
In 1955, bombings and violent demonstrations led to a crackdown on dissent, with Castro and Raúl fleeing the country to evade arrest.[73] Castro sent a letter to the press, declaring that he was "leaving Cuba because all doors of peaceful struggle have been closed to me ... As a follower of Martí, I believe the hour has come to take our rights and not beg for them, to fight instead of pleading for them."[74] The Castros and several comrades travelled to Mexico,[75] where Raúl befriended an Argentine doctor and Marxist–Leninist named Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was working as a journalist and photographer for "Agencia Latina de Noticias".[76] Fidel liked him, later describing him as "a more advanced revolutionary than I was".[77] Castro also associated with the Spaniard Alberto Bayo, who agreed to teach Castro's rebels the necessary skills in guerrilla warfare.[78] Requiring funding, Castro toured the US in search of wealthy sympathizers, there being monitored by Batista's agents, who allegedly orchestrated a failed assassination attempt against him.[79] Castro kept in contact with the MR-26-7 in Cuba, where they had gained a large support base in Oriente.[80] Other militant anti-Batista groups had sprung up, primarily from the student movement; most notable was the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE), founded by José Antonio Echeverría. Antonio met with Castro in Mexico City, but Castro opposed the student's support for indiscriminate assassination.[81]
After purchasing the decrepit yacht Granma, on 25 November 1956, Castro set sail from Tuxpan, Veracruz, with 81 armed revolutionaries.[82] The 1,900-kilometre (1,200 mi) crossing to Cuba was harsh, with food running low and many suffering seasickness. At some points, they had to bail water caused by a leak, and at another, a man fell overboard, delaying their journey.[83] The plan had been for the crossing to take five days, and on the Granma's scheduled day of arrival, 30 November, MR-26-7 members under Frank País led an armed uprising in Santiago and Manzanillo. However, the Granma's journey ultimately lasted seven days, and with Castro and his men unable to provide reinforcements, País and his militants dispersed after two days of intermittent attacks.[84]
Guerrilla war: 1956–1959
[edit]The Granma ran aground in a mangrove swamp at Playa Las Coloradas, close to Los Cayuelos, on 2 December 1956. Fleeing inland, its crew headed for the forested mountain range of Oriente's Sierra Maestra, being repeatedly attacked by Batista's troops.[86] Upon arrival, Castro discovered that only 19 rebels had made it to their destination, the rest having been killed or captured.[87] Setting up an encampment, the survivors included the Castros, Che Guevara, and Camilo Cienfuegos.[88] They began launching raids on small army posts to obtain weaponry, and in January 1957 they overran the outpost at La Plata, treating any soldiers that they wounded but executing Chicho Osorio, the local mayoral (land company overseer), who was despised by the local peasants and who boasted of killing one of Castro's rebels.[89] Osorio's execution aided the rebels in gaining the trust of locals, although they largely remained unenthusiastic and suspicious of the revolutionaries.[90] As trust grew, some locals joined the rebels, although most new recruits came from urban areas.[91] With volunteers boosting the rebel forces to over 200, in July 1957 Castro divided his army into three columns, commanded by himself, his brother, and Guevara.[92] The MR-26-7 members operating in urban areas continued agitation, sending supplies to Castro, and on 16 February 1957, he met with other senior members to discuss tactics; here he met Celia Sánchez, who would become a close friend.[93]

Across Cuba, anti-Batista groups carried out bombings and sabotage; police responded with mass arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions.[94] In March 1957, the DRE launched a failed attack on the presidential palace, during which Antonio was shot dead.[94] Batista's government often resorted to brutal methods to keep Cuba's cities under control. In the Sierra Maestra mountains, Castro was joined by Frank Sturgis who offered to train Castro's troops in guerrilla warfare. Castro accepted the offer, but he also had an immediate need for guns and ammunition, so Sturgis became a gunrunner. Sturgis purchased boatloads of weapons and ammunition from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) weapons expert Samuel Cummings' International Armament Corporation in Alexandria, Virginia. Sturgis opened a training camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains, where he taught Che Guevara and other 26 July Movement rebel soldiers guerrilla warfare.[95] Frank País was also killed, leaving Castro the MR-26-7's unchallenged leader.[96] Although Guevara and Raúl were well known for their Marxist–Leninist views, Castro hid his, hoping to gain the support of less radical revolutionaries.[97] In 1957 he met with leading members of the Partido Ortodoxo, Raúl Chibás and Felipe Pazos, authoring the Sierra Maestra Manifesto, in which they demanded that a provisional civilian government be set up to implement moderate agrarian reform, industrialization, and a literacy campaign before holding multiparty elections.[97] As Cuba's press was censored, Castro contacted foreign media to spread his message; he became a celebrity after being interviewed by Herbert Matthews, a journalist from The New York Times.[98] Reporters from CBS and Paris Match soon followed.[99]

Castro's guerrillas increased their attacks on military outposts, forcing the government to withdraw from the Sierra Maestra region, and by spring 1958, the rebels controlled a hospital, schools, a printing press, slaughterhouse, land-mine factory and a cigar-making factory.[100] By 1958, Batista was under increasing pressure, a result of his military failures coupled with increasing domestic and foreign criticism surrounding his administration's press censorship, torture, and extrajudicial executions.[101] Influenced by anti-Batista sentiment among their citizens, the US government ceased supplying him with weaponry.[101] The opposition called a general strike, accompanied by armed attacks from the MR-26-7. Beginning on 9 April, it received strong support in central and eastern Cuba, but little elsewhere.[102]
Batista responded with an all-out-attack, Operation Verano, in which the army aerially bombarded forested areas and villages suspected of aiding the militants, while 10,000 soldiers commanded by General Eulogio Cantillo surrounded the Sierra Maestra, driving north to the rebel encampments.[103] Despite their numerical and technological superiority, the army had no experience with guerrilla warfare, and Castro halted their offensive using land mines and ambushes.[103] Many of Batista's soldiers defected to Castro's rebels, who also benefited from local popular support.[104] In the summer, the MR-26-7 went on the offensive, pushing the army out of the mountains, with Castro using his columns in a pincer movement to surround the main army concentration in Santiago. By November, Castro's forces controlled most of Oriente and Las Villas, and divided Cuba in two by closing major roads and rail lines, severely disadvantaging Batista.[105]
The US instructed Cantillo to oust Batista due to fears in Washington that Castro was a socialist,[106] which were exacerbated by the association between nationalist and communist movements in Latin America and the links between the Cold War and decolonization.[107] By this time the great majority of Cuban people had turned against the Batista regime. Ambassador to Cuba, E. T. Smith, who felt the whole CIA mission had become too close to the MR-26-7 movement,[108] personally went to Batista and informed him that the US would no longer support him and felt he no longer could control the situation in Cuba. General Cantillo secretly agreed to a ceasefire with Castro, promising that Batista would be tried as a war criminal;[106] however, Batista was warned, and fled into exile with over US$300 million on 31 December 1958.[109] Cantillo entered Havana's Presidential Palace, proclaimed the Supreme Court judge Carlos Piedra to be president, and began appointing the new government.[110] Furious, Castro ended the ceasefire,[111] and ordered Cantillo's arrest by sympathetic figures in the army.[112] Accompanying celebrations at news of Batista's downfall on 1 January 1959, Castro ordered the MR-26-7 to prevent widespread looting and vandalism.[113] Cienfuegos and Guevara led their columns into Havana on 2 January, while Castro entered Santiago and gave a speech invoking the wars of independence.[114] Heading toward Havana, he greeted cheering crowds at every town, giving press conferences and interviews.[115] Castro reached Havana on 9 January 1959.[116]
Provisional government
[edit]This section may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. When this tag was added, its readable prose size was 5,000 words. (September 2025) |
Consolidating leadership: 1959
[edit]At Castro's command, the politically moderate lawyer Manuel Urrutia Lleó was proclaimed provisional president, but Castro announced falsely that Urrutia had been selected by "popular election". Most of Urrutia's cabinet were MR-26-7 members.[117] Entering Havana, Castro proclaimed himself Representative of the Rebel Armed Forces of the Presidency, setting up home and office in the penthouse of the Havana Hilton Hotel.[118] Castro exercised a great deal of influence over Urrutia's regime, now ruling by decree. He ensured the government implemented policies to cut corruption and fight illiteracy, and that it attempted to remove Batistanos from positions of power by dismissing Congress and barring all those elected in the rigged elections of 1954 and 1958 from future office. He then pushed Urrutia to issue a temporary ban on political parties; he repeatedly said that they would eventually hold multiparty elections.[119] Although repeatedly denying that he was a communist to the press, he began clandestinely meeting members of the PSP to discuss the creation of a socialist state.[120]
We are not executing innocent people or political opponents. We are executing murderers and they deserve it.
In suppressing the revolution, Batista's government had killed thousands of Cubans; Castro and influential sectors of the press put the death toll at 20,000, but a list of victims published shortly after the revolution contained only 898 names—over half of them combatants.[122] More recent estimates place the death toll between 1,000[123] and 4,000.[124] In response to popular uproar, which demanded that those responsible be brought to justice, Castro helped to set up many trials, resulting in hundreds of executions. Although popular domestically, critics—in particular the US press, argued that many were not fair trials. Castro responded that "revolutionary justice is not based on legal precepts, but on moral conviction."[125] Acclaimed by many across Latin America, he travelled to Venezuela where he met with President-elect Rómulo Betancourt, unsuccessfully requesting a loan and a new deal for Venezuelan oil.[126] Returning home, an argument between Castro and senior government figures broke out. He was infuriated that the government had left thousands unemployed by closing down casinos and brothels. As a result, Prime Minister José Miró Cardona resigned, going into exile in the US and joining the anti-Castro movement.[127]
On 16 February 1959, Castro was sworn in as Prime Minister of Cuba.[128] Castro also appointed himself president of the National Tourist Industry, introducing unsuccessful measures to encourage African-American tourists to visit, advertising Cuba as a tropical paradise free of racial discrimination.[129] Judges and politicians had their pay reduced while low-level civil servants saw theirs raised,[130] and in March 1959, Castro declared rents for those who paid less than $100 a month halved.[131] The Cuban government also began to expropriate the casinos and properties from mafia leaders and taking millions in cash. Before his death, Russian-American gangster Meyer Lansky said Cuba "ruined" him.[132]
On 9 April, Castro announced that the elections, which the 26th of July Movement had promised would occur after the revolution, would be postponed, so that the provisional government could focus on domestic reform. Castro announced this electoral delay with the slogan: "revolution first, elections later".[133][134][135]
Later in April, he visited the US on a charm offensive where President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not meet with him, but instead sent Vice President Richard Nixon, whom Castro instantly disliked.[136] After meeting Castro, Nixon described him to Eisenhower: "The one fact we can be sure of is that Castro has those indefinable qualities which made him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere. He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline-my guess is the former...His ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries. But because he has the power to lead...we have no choice but at least try to orient him in the right direction".[137]

Proceeding to Canada,[138][139][140] Trinidad, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, Castro attended an economic conference in Buenos Aires, unsuccessfully proposing a $30 billion US-funded "Marshall Plan" for Latin America.[141] In May 1959, Castro signed into law the First Agrarian Reform, setting a cap for landholdings to 993 acres (402 ha) per owner and prohibiting foreigners from obtaining Cuban land ownership. Around 200,000 peasants received title deeds as large land holdings were broken up; popular among the working class, it alienated the richer landowners, including Castro's own mother,[142] whose farmlands were taken.[143] Within a year, Castro and his government had effectively redistributed 15 per cent of the nation's wealth, declaring that "the revolution is the dictatorship of the exploited against the exploiters."[144]

In the summer of 1959, Fidel began nationalizing plantation lands owned by American investors as well as confiscating the property of foreign landowners. He also seized property previously held by wealthy Cubans who had fled.[145][146][147] He nationalized sugar production and oil refinement, over the objection of foreign investors who owned stakes in these commodities.[148][149]
Although then refusing to categorize his regime as socialist and repeatedly denying being a communist, Castro appointed Marxists to senior government and military positions. President Urrutia increasingly expressed concern with the rising influence of Marxism. Angered, Castro in turn announced his resignation as prime minister on 18 July—blaming Urrutia for complicating government with his "fevered anti-Communism". Over 500,000 Castro-supporters surrounded the Presidential Palace demanding Urrutia's resignation, which he submitted. On 23 July, Castro resumed his premiership and appointed Marxist Osvaldo Dorticós as president.[150]
On October 19, 1959, army commander Huber Matos wrote a resignation letter to Fidel Castro, complaining of Communist influence in government.[151] Matos lamented in his resignation that communists were gaining positions of power that he felt were undeserved for having not participated in the Cuban Revolution.[152] Matos planned for his officers to also resign en masse in support.[153] Two days later, Castro sent fellow revolutionary Camilo Cienfuegos to arrest Matos.[154][155] The same day Matos was arrested, Cuban exile Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz, a former air force chief of staff under Castro and friend of Huber Matos, flew from Florida and dropped leaflets into Havana that called for the removal of all Communists from the government. In response, Castro held a rally where he called for the reintroduction of revolutionary tribunals to try Matos and Diaz for treason.[156][155] Shortly after Hubert Matos' detention various other disillusioned economists would send in their resignations. Felipe Pazos would resign as head of the National Bank and be replaced within a month by Che Guevara. Cabinet members Manuel Ray and Faustino Perez also resigned.[157][158]
Castro's government continued to emphasise social projects to improve Cuba's standard of living, often to the detriment of economic development.[159] Major emphasis was placed on education, and during the first 30 months of Castro's government, more classrooms were opened than in the previous 30 years. The Cuban primary education system offered a work-study program, with half of the time spent in the classroom, and the other half in a productive activity.[160] Health care was nationalized and expanded, with rural health centers and urban polyclinics opening up across the island to offer free medical aid. Universal vaccination against childhood diseases was implemented, and infant mortality rates were reduced dramatically.[159] A third part of this social program was the improvement of infrastructure. Within the first six months of Castro's government, 1,000 km (600 mi) of roads were built across the island, while $300 million was spent on water and sanitation projects.[159] Over 800 houses were constructed every month in the early years of the administration in an effort to cut homelessness, while nurseries and day-care centers were opened for children and other centers opened for the disabled and elderly.[159]
Diplomatic and political shifts: 1960
[edit]
Castro used radio and television to develop a "dialogue with the people", posing questions and making provocative statements.[161] His regime remained popular with workers, peasants, and students, who constituted the majority of the country's population,[162] while opposition came primarily from the middle class; thousands of doctors, engineers and other professionals emigrated to Florida in the US, causing an economic brain drain.[163] Productivity decreased and the country's financial reserves were drained within two years.[131] After conservative press expressed hostility towards the government, the pro-Castro printers' trade union disrupted editorial staff, and in January 1960 the government ordered them to publish a "coletilla" (clarification) written by the printers' union at the end of articles critical of the government.[164] Castro's government arrested hundreds of counter-revolutionaries,[165] many of whom were subjected to solitary confinement, rough treatment, and threatening behaviour.[166] Militant anti-Castro groups, funded by exiles, the CIA, and the Dominican government, undertook armed attacks and set up guerrilla bases in Cuba's mountains, leading to the six-year Escambray Rebellion.[167]
At the time, 1960, the Cold War raged between two superpowers: the United States, a capitalist liberal democracy, and the Soviet Union (USSR), a Marxist–Leninist socialist state ruled by the Communist Party. Expressing contempt for the US, Castro shared the ideological views of the USSR, establishing relations with several Marxist–Leninist states.[168] Meeting with Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, Castro agreed to provide the USSR with sugar, fruit, fibres, and hides in return for crude oil, fertilizers, industrial goods, and a $100 million loan.[169] Cuba's government ordered the country's refineries—then controlled by the US corporations Shell and Esso—to process Soviet oil, but under US pressure they refused. Castro responded by expropriating and nationalizing the refineries. Retaliating, the US cancelled its import of Cuban sugar, provoking Castro to nationalize most US-owned assets on the island, including banks and sugar mills.[170]

Relations between Cuba and the US were further strained following the explosion of a French vessel, the La Coubre, in Havana harbour in March 1960. The ship carried weapons purchased from Belgium, and the cause of the explosion was never determined, but Castro publicly insinuated that the US government was guilty of sabotage. He ended this speech with "¡Patria o Muerte!" ("Fatherland or Death"), a proclamation that he made much use of in ensuing years.[171] Inspired by their earlier success with the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, in March 1960, US President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to overthrow Castro's government. He provided them with a budget of $13 million and permitted them to ally with the Mafia, who were aggrieved that Castro's government closed down their brothel and casino businesses in Cuba.[172]
During a May Day speech in 1960, Fidel Castro announced that all future elections would be cancelled.[135][134][133] Castro proclaimed that his administration was a direct democracy, in which Cubans could assemble at demonstrations to express their will, thus there was no need for elections, claiming that representative democratic systems served the interests of socio-economic elites.[173] US Secretary of State Christian Herter announced that Cuba was adopting the Soviet model of rule, with a one-party state, government control of trade unions, suppression of civil liberties, and the absence of freedom of speech and press.[174]

In September 1960, Castro flew to New York City for the General Assembly of the United Nations. Staying at the Hotel Theresa in Harlem, he met with journalists and anti-establishment figures like Malcolm X. Castro had decided to stay in Harlem as a way of expressing solidarity with the poor African-American population living there, thus leading to an assortment of world leaders such as Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India having to drive out to Harlem to see him.[175] He also met Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, with the two publicly condemning the poverty and racism faced by Americans in areas like Harlem.[175] Relations between Castro and Khrushchev were warm; they led the applause to one another's speeches at the General Assembly.[176] The opening session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960 was a highly rancorous one with Khrushchev famously banging his shoe against his desk to interrupt a speech by Filipino delegate Lorenzo Sumulong, which set the general tone for the debates and speeches.[175] Castro delivered the longest speech ever held before the United Nations General Assembly, speaking for four and a half hours in a speech mostly given over to denouncing American policies towards Latin America.[177][178] Subsequently, visited by Polish first secretary Władysław Gomułka, Bulgarian first secretary Todor Zhivkov, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru,[179] Castro also received an evening's reception from the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[180]
Back in Cuba, Castro feared a US-backed coup; in 1959 his regime spent $120 million on Soviet, French, and Belgian weaponry and by early 1960 had doubled the size of Cuba's armed forces.[181] Fearing counter-revolutionary elements in the army, the government created a People's Militia to arm citizens favourable to the revolution, training at least 50,000 civilians in combat techniques.[182] In September 1960, they created the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), a nationwide civilian organization which implemented neighbourhood spying to detect counter-revolutionary activities as well as organizing health and education campaigns, becoming a conduit for public complaints. By 1970, a third of the population would be involved in the CDR, and this would eventually rise to 80%.[183] On 13 October 1960, the US prohibited the majority of exports to Cuba, initiating an economic embargo. In retaliation, the National Institute for Agrarian Reform INRA took control of 383 private-run businesses on 14 October, and on 25 October a further 166 US companies operating in Cuba had their premises seized and nationalized.[184] On 16 December, the US ended its import quota of Cuban sugar, the country's primary export.[185]
Bay of Pigs Invasion and "Socialist Cuba": 1961–1962
[edit]There was ... no doubt about who the victors were. Cuba's stature in the world soared to new heights, and Fidel's role as the adored and revered leader among ordinary Cuban people received a renewed boost. His popularity was greater than ever. In his own mind he had done what generations of Cubans had only fantasized about: he had taken on the United States and won.
In January 1961, Castro ordered Havana's US Embassy to reduce its 300-member staff, suspecting that many of them were spies. The US responded by ending diplomatic relations, and it increased CIA funding for exiled dissidents; these militants began attacking ships that traded with Cuba, and bombed factories, shops, and sugar mills.[187] Despite internal tensions, and diplomatic tensions, Castro garnered support in New York City. On 18 February 1961, 400 people—mainly Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and college students—picketed in the rain outside of the United Nations rallying for Castro's anti-colonial values and his effort to reduce the United States' power over Cuba. The protesters held up signs that read, "Mr. Kennedy, Cuba is Not For Sale.", "Viva Fidel Castro!" and "Down With Yankee Imperialism!". Around 200 policemen were on the scene, but the protesters continued to chant slogans and throw pennies in support of Fidel Castro's socialist movement. Some Americans disagreed with President John F. Kennedy's decision to ban trade with Cuba, and outwardly supported his nationalist revolutionary tactics.[188]
Both President Eisenhower and his successor President Kennedy supported a CIA plan to aid a dissident militia: the Democratic Revolutionary Front, to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro; the plan resulted in the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. On 15 April, CIA-supplied B-26s bombed three Cuban military airfields; the US announced that the perpetrators were defecting Cuban air force pilots, but Castro exposed these claims as false flag misinformation.[189] Fearing invasion, he ordered the arrest of between 20,000 and 100,000 suspected counter-revolutionaries,[190] publicly proclaiming, "What the imperialists cannot forgive us, is that we have made a Socialist revolution under their noses", his first announcement that the government was socialist.[191]

The CIA and the Democratic Revolutionary Front had based a 1,400-strong army, Brigade 2506, in Nicaragua. On the night of 16 to 17 April, Brigade 2506 landed along Cuba's Bay of Pigs and engaged in a firefight with a local revolutionary militia. Castro ordered Captain José Ramón Fernández to launch the counter-offensive, before taking personal control of it. After bombing the invaders' ships and bringing in reinforcements, Castro forced the Brigade to surrender on 20 April.[192] He ordered the 1189 captured rebels to be interrogated by a panel of journalists on live television, personally taking over the questioning on 25 April. Fourteen were put on trial for crimes allegedly committed before the revolution, while the others were returned to the US in exchange for medicine and food valued at US$25 million.[193] Castro's victory reverberated around the world, especially in Latin America, but it also increased internal opposition primarily among the middle-class Cubans who had been detained in the run-up to the invasion. Although most were freed within a few days, many fled to the US, establishing themselves in Florida.[194]
After the banning of the film P.M., film critics hotly debated censorship in Cuba, which then caused the intervention of Castro, who met with the contesting writers and delivered his famed "Words to the Intellectuals" speech;[195] which he delivered in June 1961. In the speech, Castro commented on Cuba's censorship policy, stating:[196]
This means that within the Revolution, everything goes; against the Revolution, nothing. Nothing against the Revolution, because the Revolution has its rights also, and the first right of the Revolution is the right to exist, and no one can stand against the right of the Revolution to be and to exist, No one can rightfully claim a right against the Revolution. Since it takes in the interests of the people and Signifies the interests of the entire nation.[196]
In an effort to consolidate "Socialist Cuba", Castro united the MR-26-7, PSP and Revolutionary Directorate into a governing party based on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, what resulted was the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas – ORI), eventually renamed the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution (PURSC) in 1962.[197] The ORI began shaping Cuba using the Soviet model, persecuting political opponents and perceived social deviants such as prostitutes and homosexuals; Castro considered same-sex sexual activity a bourgeois trait.[198] Although the USSR was hesitant regarding Castro's embrace of socialism,[199] relations with the Soviets deepened. Castro sent Fidelito for a Moscow schooling,[200] Soviet technicians arrived on the island,[200] and Castro was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize.[201]
In order to plan the Cuban economy, the commission JUCEPLAN was tasked with creating a four year plan. Regino Boti, the head of JUCEPLAN, announced in August 1961, that the country would soon have a 10% rate of economic growth, and the highest living standard in Latin America in 10 years.[202] The plan drafted by JUCEPLAN in 1961, was a four year plan devised to be implemented in 1962 through 1965. It stressed agricultural diversification and rapid industrialization via Soviet assistance.[203] In September 1961, Castro publicly complained that the industrialization plan had stalled because of lazy uncooperative workers.[204]
In December 1961, Castro admitted that he had been a Marxist–Leninist for years, and in his Second Declaration of Havana he called on Latin America to rise up in revolution.[205] In response, the US successfully pushed the Organization of American States to expel Cuba; the Soviets privately reprimanded Castro for recklessness, although he received praise from China.[206] Despite their ideological affinity with China, in the Sino-Soviet split, Cuba allied with the wealthier Soviets, who offered economic and military aid.[207]
By 1962, Cuba's economy was in steep decline, a result of poor economic management and low productivity coupled with the US trade embargo. Food shortages led to rationing, resulting in protests in Cárdenas.[208] Security reports indicated that many Cubans associated austerity with the "Old Communists" of the PSP, while Castro considered a number of them—namely Aníbal Escalante and Blas Roca—unduly loyal to Moscow. In March 1962 Castro removed the most prominent "Old Communists" from office, labelling them "sectarian".[209] On a personal level, Castro was increasingly lonely, and his relations with Guevara became strained as the latter became increasingly anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese.[210]
Cuban Missile Crisis and furthering socialism: 1962–1968
[edit]
Militarily weaker than NATO, Khrushchev wanted to install Soviet R-12 MRBM nuclear missiles on Cuba to even the power balance.[211] Although conflicted, Castro agreed, believing it would guarantee Cuba's safety and enhance the cause of socialism.[212] Undertaken in secrecy, only the Castro brothers, Guevara, Dorticós and security chief Ramiro Valdés knew the full plan.[213] Upon discovering it through aerial reconnaissance, in October the US implemented an island-wide quarantine to search vessels headed to Cuba, sparking the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US saw the missiles as offensive; Castro insisted they were for defence only.[214] Castro urged that Khrushchev should launch a nuclear strike on the US if Cuba were invaded, but Khrushchev was desperate to avoid nuclear war.[215][216] Castro was left out of the negotiations, in which Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles in exchange for a US commitment not to invade Cuba and an understanding that the US would remove their MRBMs from Turkey and Italy.[217] Feeling betrayed by Khrushchev, Castro was furious and soon fell ill.[218] Proposing a five-point plan, Castro demanded that the US end its embargo, withdraw from Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, cease supporting dissidents, and stop violating Cuban air space and territorial waters. He presented these demands to U Thant, visiting Secretary-General of the United Nations, but the US ignored them. In turn Castro refused to allow the UN's inspection team into Cuba.[219]
In May 1963, Castro visited the USSR at Khrushchev's personal invitation, touring 14 cities, addressing a Red Square rally, and being awarded both the Order of Lenin and an honorary doctorate from Moscow State University.[220] Castro returned to Cuba with new ideas; inspired by Soviet newspaper Pravda, he amalgamated Hoy and Revolución into a new daily, Granma,[221] and oversaw large investment into Cuban sport that resulted in an increased international sporting reputation.[222] Seeking to further consolidate control, in 1963 the government cracked down on Protestant sects in Cuba, with Castro labelling them counter-revolutionary "instruments of imperialism"; many preachers were found guilty of illegal US links and imprisoned.[223] Measures were implemented to force perceived idle and delinquent youths to work, primarily through the introduction of mandatory military service.[224] In September, the government temporarily permitted emigration for anyone other than males aged between 15 and 26, thereby ridding the government of thousands of critics, most of whom were from upper and middle-class backgrounds.[225] In 1963, Castro's mother died. This was the last time his private life was reported in Cuba's press.[226] In January 1964, Castro returned to Moscow, officially to sign a new five-year sugar trade agreement, but also to discuss the ramifications of the assassination of John F. Kennedy.[227] Castro was deeply concerned by the assassination, believing that a far-right conspiracy was behind it but that the Cubans would be blamed.[228] In October 1965, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations was officially renamed the "Cuban Communist Party" and published the membership of its Central Committee.[229]
Beginning in 1965,[230] gay men were forced into the Military Units to Aid Production (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción – UMAP). However, after many revolutionary intellectuals decried this move, the UMAP camps were closed in 1967, although gay men continued to be imprisoned.[231]
The greatest threat presented by Castro's Cuba is as an example to other Latin American states which are beset by poverty, corruption, feudalism, and plutocratic exploitation ... his influence in Latin America might be overwhelming and irresistible if, with Soviet help, he could establish in Cuba a Communist utopia.
Despite Soviet misgivings, Castro continued to call for global revolution, funding militant leftists and those engaged in national liberation struggles. Cuba's foreign policy was strongly anti-imperialist, believing that every nation should control its own natural resources.[233] He supported Che Guevara's "Andean project", an unsuccessful plan to set up a guerrilla movement in the highlands of Bolivia, Peru and Argentina. He allowed revolutionary groups from around the world, from the Viet Cong to the Black Panthers, to train in Cuba.[234] He considered Western-dominated Africa to be ripe for revolution and sent troops and medics to aid Ahmed Ben Bella's socialist regime in Algeria during the Sand War. He also allied with Alphonse Massamba-Débat's socialist government in Congo-Brazzaville. In 1965, Castro authorized Che Guevara to travel to Congo-Kinshasa to train revolutionaries against the Western-backed government.[235] Castro was personally devastated when Guevara was killed by CIA-backed troops in Bolivia in October 1967 and publicly attributed it to Guevara's disregard for his own safety.[236]
In 1966, Castro staged a Tri-Continental Conference of Africa, Asia and Latin America in Havana, further establishing himself as a significant player on the world stage.[237] From this conference, Castro created the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), which adopted the slogan of "The duty of a revolution is to make revolution", signifying Havana's leadership of Latin America's revolutionary movement.[238]

Castro's increasing role on the world stage strained his relationship with the USSR, now under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. Asserting Cuba's independence, Castro refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, declaring it a Soviet-US attempt to dominate the Third World.[239] Diverting from Soviet Marxist doctrine, he suggested that Cuban society could evolve straight to pure communism rather than gradually progress through various stages of socialism.[240] In turn, the Soviet-loyalist Aníbal Escalante began organizing a government network of opposition to Castro, though in January 1968, he and his supporters were arrested for allegedly passing state secrets to Moscow.[241] Recognising Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviets, Castro relented to Brezhnev's pressure to be obedient, and in August 1968 he denounced the leaders of the Prague Spring and praised the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.[242][243]
Influenced by China's Great Leap Forward, in 1968 Castro proclaimed a Great Revolutionary Offensive, closing all remaining privately owned shops and businesses and denouncing their owners as capitalist counterrevolutionaries.[244] The severe lack of consumer goods for purchase led productivity to decline, as large sectors of the population felt little incentive to work hard.[245] This was exacerbated by the perception that a revolutionary elite had emerged, consisting of those connected to the administration; they had access to better housing, private transportation, servants, and the ability to purchase luxury goods abroad.[246]
Grey years and Third World politics: 1969–1974
[edit]
Castro publicly celebrated his administration's 10th anniversary in January 1969; in his celebratory speech he warned of sugar rations, reflecting the nation's economic problems.[247] The 1969 crop was heavily damaged by a hurricane, and to meet its export quota, the government drafted in the army, implemented a seven-day working week, and postponed public holidays to lengthen the harvest.[248] When that year's production quota was not met, Castro offered to resign during a public speech, but assembled crowds insisted he remain.[249] Despite the economic issues, many of Castro's social reforms were popular, with the population largely supportive of the "Achievements of the Revolution" in education, medical care, housing, and road construction, as well as the policies of "direct democratic" public consultation.[250] Seeking Soviet help, from 1970 to 1972 Soviet economists re-organized Cuba's economy, founding the Cuban-Soviet Commission of Economic, Scientific and Technical Collaboration, while Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin visited in October 1971.[251] In July 1972, Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), an economic organization of socialist states, although this further limited Cuba's economy to agricultural production.[252]

In May 1970, the crews of two Cuban fishing boats were kidnapped by Florida-based dissident group Alpha 66, who demanded that Cuba release imprisoned militants. Under US pressure, the hostages were released, and Castro welcomed them back as heroes.[253] In April 1971, Castro was internationally condemned for ordering the arrest of dissident poet Heberto Padilla who had been arrested 20 March; Padilla was freed, but the government established the National Cultural Council to ensure that intellectuals and artists supported the administration.[254]
In November 1971, Castro visited Chile, where Marxist President Salvador Allende had been elected as the head of a left-wing coalition. Castro supported Allende's socialist reforms but warned him of right-wing elements in Chile's military. In 1973, the military led a coup d'état and established a military junta led by Augusto Pinochet.[255] Castro proceeded to Guinea to meet socialist President Sékou Touré, praising him as Africa's greatest leader, and there received the Order of Fidelity to the People.[256] He then went on a seven-week tour visiting leftist allies: Algeria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, where he was given further awards. On each trip, he was eager to visit factory and farm workers, publicly praising their governments; privately, he urged the regimes to aid revolutionary movements elsewhere, particularly those fighting the Vietnam War.[257]
In September 1973, he returned to Algiers to attend the Fourth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Various NAM members were critical of Castro's attendance, claiming that Cuba was aligned to the Warsaw Pact and therefore should not be at the conference.[258] At the conference he publicly broke off relations with Israel, citing its government's close relationship with the US and its treatment of Palestinians during the Israel–Palestine conflict. This earned Castro respect throughout the Arab world, in particular from the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who became a friend and ally.[259] As the Yom Kippur War broke out in October 1973 between Israel and an Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria, Cuba sent 4,000 troops to aid Syria.[260] Leaving Algiers, Castro visited Iraq and North Vietnam.[261]
Cuba's economy grew in 1974 as a result of high international sugar prices and new credits with Argentina, Canada, and parts of Western Europe.[262] A number of Latin American states called for Cuba's re-admittance into the Organization of American States (OAS), with the US finally conceding in 1975 on Henry Kissinger's advice.[263] Cuba's government underwent a restructuring along Soviet lines, claiming that this would further democratization and decentralize power away from Castro. Officially announcing Cuba's identity as a socialist state, the first National Congress of the Cuban Communist Party was held, and a new constitution drafted that abolished the position of president and prime minister. Castro remained the dominant figure in governance, taking the presidency of the newly created Council of State and Council of Ministers, making him both head of state and head of government.[264]
Castro considered Africa to be "the weakest link in the imperialist chain", and at the request of Agostinho Neto he ordered 230 military advisers into Angola in November 1975 to aid Neto's Marxist MPLA in the Angolan Civil War. When the US and South Africa stepped up their support of the opposition FLNA and UNITA, Castro ordered a further 18,000 troops to Angola, which played a major role in forcing a South African and UNITA retreat.[265] The decision to intervene in Angola has been a controversial one, all the more so as Castro's critics have charged that it was not his decision at all, contending that the Soviets ordered him to do so.[266] Castro always maintained that he took the decision to launch Operation Carlota himself in response to an appeal from Neto and that the Soviets were in fact opposed to Cuban intervention in Angola, which took place over their opposition.[267]
Traveling to Angola, Castro celebrated with Neto, Sékou Touré and Guinea-Bissaun president Luís Cabral, where they agreed to support Mozambique's Marxist–Leninist government against RENAMO in the Mozambican Civil War.[268] In February, Castro visited Algeria and then Libya, where he spent ten days with Gaddafi and oversaw the establishment of the Jamahariya system of governance, before attending talks with the Marxist government of South Yemen. From there he proceeded to Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola where he was greeted by crowds as a hero for Cuba's role in opposing apartheid South Africa.[269] Throughout much of Africa he was hailed as a friend to national liberation from foreign dominance.[270] This was followed with visits to East Berlin and Moscow.[271]
Constitutional government
[edit]Institutionalization and interventions: 1976-1979
[edit]
Up until 1976, Cuba had been managed by a provisional government, headed by Fidel Castro, without a constitution. Cuba then adopted a new constitution in 1976, based on the 1936 Soviet Constitution. This adoption marked the end of 16 years of non-constitutional government.[272][273] Up until this point, Castro had simply ruled by decree, but after the 1976 constitution, the Communist Party became the official decision-making body in Cuba.[274][275] Some scholars like Peter Roman, Nino Pagliccia, and Loreen Collin have written books concluding that the system that developed after the 1976 constitution, particularly the National Assembly of People's Power, are part of a highly participatory democracy. Julio Cesar Guache offers a critical view of the "democracy" that developed, and argues it is informally controlled by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, who vet candidates.[276] Samuel Farber argues that the National Assembly of People's Power is legally prohibited form political debate, and that real decision-making power lied for a long time with the Castro brothers as heads of the Communist Party of Cuba. Farber mentions that the Communist Party often passes legislation without any consideration from the National Assembly of People's Power.[277] Fidel Castro would remain in the leadership position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba for 49 years, until stepping down in 2011.[278]
There is often talk of human rights, but it is also necessary to talk of the rights of humanity. Why should some people walk barefoot, so that others can travel in luxurious cars? Why should some live for thirty-five years, so that others can live for seventy years? Why should some be miserably poor, so that others can be hugely rich? I speak on behalf of the children in the world who do not have a piece of bread. I speak on the behalf of the sick who have no medicine, of those whose rights to life and human dignity have been denied.
In 1977, the Ogaden War broke out over the disputed Ogaden region as Somalia invaded Ethiopia; although a former ally of Somali president Siad Barre, Castro had warned him against such action, and Cuba sided with Mengistu Haile Mariam's Marxist government of Ethiopia. In a desperate attempt to stop the war, Castro had a summit with Barre where he proposed a federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen as an alternative to war.[280] Barre who saw seizing the Ogaden as the first step towards creating a greater Somalia that would unite all of the Somalis into one state rejected the federation offer and decided upon war.[280] Castro sent troops under the command of General Arnaldo Ochoa to aid the overwhelmed Ethiopian army. Mengistu's regime was barely hanging on by 1977, having lost one-third of its army in Eritrea at the time of the Somali invasion.[281] The intervention of 17,000 Cuban troops into the Ogaden was by all accounts decisive in altering a war that Ethiopia was on the brink of losing into a victory.[282] After forcing back the Somalis, Mengistu then ordered the Ethiopians to suppress the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, a measure Castro refused to support.[283]

On 22 December 1977, the Cuban exile group known as the "Antonio Maceo Brigade" took their first trip to Cuba, with the aim of cultural and political reconciliation.[284] This visit came at the request of the Cuban government, after President Jimmy Carter briefly lifted the travel ban with Cuba.[285] The brigade consisted of 55 Cuban exiles, who toured Cuba for two weeks.[284] After the visit, Fidel Castro would call for dialogues with Cuban exiles abroad. These dialogues resulted in the release of political prisoners, family unifications, and relaxing of restrictions to visit Cuba.[285]
Castro extended support to Latin American revolutionary movements, namely the Sandinista National Liberation Front in its overthrow of the Nicaraguan rightist government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979.[286] Castro's critics accused the government of wasting Cuban lives in these military endeavours; the anti-Castro Center for a Free Cuba has claimed that an estimated 14,000 Cubans were killed in foreign Cuban military actions.[287] When American critics claimed that Castro had no right to interfere in these nations, he countered that Cuba had been invited into them, pointing out the US's own involvement in various foreign nations.[288] Between 1979 and 1991 about 370,000 Cuban troops together with 50,000 Cuban civilians (mostly teachers and doctors) served in Angola, representing about 5% of Cuba's population.[289] The Cuban intervention in Angola was envisioned as a short-term commitment, but the Angolan government used the profits from the oil industry to subsidize Cuba's economy, making Cuba as economically dependent upon Angola as Angola was militarily dependent upon Cuba.[289]
In the late 1970s, Cuba's relations with North American states improved during the period with Mexican president Luis Echeverría, Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau,[290] and US president Jimmy Carter in power. Carter continued criticizing Cuba's human rights abuses but adopted a respectful approach which gained Castro's attention. Considering Carter well-meaning and sincere, Castro freed certain political prisoners and allowed some Cuban exiles to visit relatives on the island, hoping that in turn Carter would abolish the economic embargo and stop CIA support for militant dissidents.[291] Conversely, his relationship with China declined, as he accused Deng Xiaoping's Chinese government of betraying their revolutionary principles by initiating trade links with the US and attacking Vietnam.[292] In 1979, the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was held in Havana, where Castro was selected as NAM president, a position he held until 1982. In his capacity as both president of the NAM and of Cuba he appeared at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1979 and gave a speech on the disparity between the world's rich and poor. His speech was greeted with much applause from other world leaders,[293] though his standing in NAM was damaged by Cuba's refusal to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.[294]
Reagan and Gorbachev: 1980–1991
[edit]
By the 1980s, Cuba's economy was again in trouble, following a decline in the market price of sugar and 1979's decimated harvest.[295] For the first time, unemployment became a serious problem in Castro's Cuba, with the government sending unemployed youth to other countries, primarily East Germany, to work there.[296] Desperate for money, Cuba's government secretly sold off paintings from national collections and illicitly traded for US electronic goods through Panama.[297] Increasing numbers of Cubans fled to Florida but were labelled "scum" and "lumpen" by Castro and his CDR supporters.[298] In one incident, 10,000 Cubans stormed the Peruvian Embassy requesting asylum, and so the US agreed that it would accept 3,500 refugees. Castro conceded that those who wanted to leave could do so from Mariel port. In what was known as the Mariel boatlift, hundreds of boats arrived from the US, leading to a mass exodus of 120,000; Castro's government took advantage of the situation by loading criminals, the mentally ill, and homosexuals onto the boats destined for Florida.[299] The event destabilized Carter's administration[citation needed], and later, in 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected US president.
Reagan's administration adopted a hard-line approach against Castro, making its desire to overthrow his regime clear.[300] In late 1981, Castro publicly accused the US of biological warfare against Cuba by orchestrating a dengue fever epidemic.[301] Cuba's economy became even more dependent on Soviet aid, with Soviet subsidies (mainly in the form of supplies of low-cost oil and voluntarily buying Cuban sugar at inflated prices) averaging $4–5 billion a year by the late 1980s.[302] This accounted for 30–38% of the country's entire GDP.[303] Soviet economic assistance had not helped Cuba's long-term growth prospects by promoting diversification or sustainability. Although described as a "relatively highly developed Latin American export economy" in 1959 and the early 1960s, Cuba's basic economic structure changed very little between then and the 1980s. Tobacco products such as cigars and cigarettes were the only manufactured products among Cuba's leading exports and were produced using an expensive and labor-intensive pre-industrial process. The Cuban economy remained highly inefficient and over-specialized in a few highly subsidized commodities exported primarily to the Soviet bloc countries.[304]

Although despising Argentina's right-wing military junta, Castro supported them in the 1982 Falklands War against Britain and offered military aid to the Argentinians.[305] Castro supported the leftist New Jewel Movement that seized power in Grenada in 1979, befriending Grenadine president Maurice Bishop and sending doctors, teachers, and technicians to aid the country's development. When Bishop was executed in a Soviet-backed coup by hard-line Marxist Bernard Coard in October 1983, Castro condemned the killing but cautiously retained support for Grenada's government. However, the US used the coup as a basis for invading the island. Cuban soldiers died in the conflict, with Castro denouncing the invasion and comparing the US to Nazi Germany.[306] In a July 1983 speech marking the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, Castro condemned Reagan's administration as a "reactionary, extremist clique" who were waging an "openly warmongering and fascist foreign policy".[307] Castro feared a US invasion of Nicaragua and sent Ochoa to train the governing Sandinistas in guerrilla warfare but received little support from the USSR.[308]
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party; a reformer, he implemented measures to increase freedom of the press (glasnost) and economic decentralization (perestroika) in an attempt to strengthen socialism. Like many orthodox Marxist critics, Castro feared that the reforms would weaken the socialist state and allow capitalist elements to regain control.[309] Gorbachev conceded to US demands to reduce support for Cuba,[310] with Soviet-Cuban relations deteriorating.[311] On medical advice given him in October 1985, Castro gave up regularly smoking Cuban cigars, helping to set an example for the rest of the populace.[312] Castro became passionate in his denunciation of the Third World debt problem, arguing that the Third World would never escape the debt that First World banks and governments imposed upon it. In 1985, Havana hosted five international conferences on the world debt problem.[297]

By November 1987, Castro began spending more time on the Angolan Civil War, in which the Marxist MPLA government had fallen into retreat. Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos successfully appealed for more Cuban troops, with Castro later admitting that he devoted more time to Angola than to the domestic situation, believing that a victory would lead to the collapse of apartheid. In response to the siege of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987–1988 by South African–UNITA forces, Castro sent an additional 12,000 Cuban Army troops to Angola in late 1987.[313] From afar in Havana, Castro was closely involved in the decision-making about the defence of Cuito Cuanavle and came into conflict with Ochoa, whom he criticized for almost losing Cuito Cuanavle to a South African-UNITA assault on 13 January 1988 despite warning for almost two months prior that such an attack was coming.[314] On 30 January 1988, Ochoa was summoned to a meeting with Castro in Havana where he was told that Cuito Cuanavale must not fall and to execute Castro's plans for a pull-back to more defensible positions over the objections of the Angolans.[315] The Cuban troops played a decisive role in the relief of Cuito Cuanavale, breaking the siege in March 1988, which led to the withdrawal of most of the South African troops from Angola.[313] Cuban propaganda turned the siege of Cuito Cuanavle into a decisive victory that changed the course of African history and Castro awarded 82 soldiers medals of the newly created Medal of Merit for the Defense of Cuito Cuanavle on 1 April 1988.[316] Tensions were increased with the Cubans advancing close to the border of Namibia, which led to warnings from the South African government that they considered this an extremely unfriendly act, causing South Africa to mobilize and call up its reserves.[313] In the spring of 1988, the intensity of South African-Cuban fighting drastically increased with both sides taking heavy losses.[317]
The prospect of an all-out Cuban-South African war served to concentrate minds in both Moscow and Washington and led to an increased push for a diplomatic solution to the Angolan war.[313] The cost of Cuba's wars in Africa were paid for with Soviet subsidies at a time when the Soviet economy was badly hurt by low oil prices while the apartheid government of South Africa had by the 1980s become a very awkward American ally as much of the American population, especially black Americans, objected to apartheid. From the viewpoint of both Moscow and Washington, having both Cuba and South Africa disengage in Angola was the best possible outcome.[313] The low oil prices of the 1980s had also changed the Angolan attitude about subsidizing the Cuban economy as dos Santos found the promises made in the 1970s when oil prices were high to be a serious drain upon Angola's economy in the 1980s.[289] South African whites were vastly outnumbered by South African blacks, and accordingly the South African Army could not take heavy losses with its white troops as that would fatally weaken the ability of the South African state to uphold apartheid.[318] The Cubans had also taken heavy losses while the increasing difficult relations with dos Santos who become less generous in subsidizing the Cuban economy suggested that such losses were not worth the cost.[319] Gorbachev called for a negotiated end to the conflict and in 1988 organized a quadripartite talk between the USSR, US, Cuba and South Africa; they agreed that all foreign troops would pull out of Angola while South Africa agreed to grant independence to Namibia. Castro was angered by Gorbachev's approach, believing that he was abandoning the plight of the world's poor in favour of détente.[320]
When Gorbachev visited Cuba in April 1989, he informed Castro that perestroika meant an end to subsidies for Cuba.[321] Ignoring calls for liberalization in accordance with the Soviet example, Castro continued to clamp down on internal dissidents and in particular kept tabs on the military, the primary threat to the government. A number of senior military officers, including Ochoa and Tony de la Guardia, were investigated for corruption and complicity in cocaine smuggling, tried, and executed in 1989, despite calls for leniency.[322] In Eastern Europe, socialist governments fell to capitalist reformers between 1989 and 1991 and many Western observers expected the same in Cuba.[323] Increasingly isolated, Cuba improved relations with Manuel Noriega's right-wing government in Panama—despite Castro's personal hatred of Noriega—but it was overthrown in a US invasion in December 1989.[324] In February 1990, Castro's allies in Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas, were defeated by the US-funded National Opposition Union in an election.[325] With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the US secured a majority vote for a resolution condemning Cuba's human rights violations at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Switzerland. Cuba asserted that this was a manifestation of US hegemony and refused to allow an investigative delegation to enter the country.[326]
Special Period: 1992–2000
[edit]
With favourable trade from the Soviet bloc ended, Castro publicly declared that Cuba was entering a "Special Period in Time of Peace". Petrol rations were dramatically reduced, Chinese bicycles were imported to replace cars, and factories performing non-essential tasks were shut down. Oxen began to replace tractors; firewood began being used for cooking and electricity cuts were introduced that lasted 16 hours a day. Castro admitted that Cuba faced the worst situation short of open war, and that the country might have to resort to subsistence farming.[327] By 1992, Cuba's economy had declined by over 40% in under two years, with major food shortages, widespread malnutrition and a lack of basic goods.[328] Castro hoped for a restoration of Marxism–Leninism in the USSR but refrained from backing the 1991 coup in that country.[329] When Gorbachev regained control, Cuba-Soviet relations deteriorated further, and Soviet troops were withdrawn in September 1991.[330] In December, the Soviet Union was officially dissolved as Boris Yeltsin abolished the Soviet Communist Party and introducing a capitalist multiparty democracy. Yeltsin despised Castro and developed links with the Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation.[331] Castro tried improving relations with the capitalist nations. He welcomed Western politicians and investors to Cuba, befriended Manuel Fraga and took a particular interest in Margaret Thatcher's policies in the UK, believing that Cuban socialism could learn from her emphasis on low taxation and personal initiative.[332] He ceased support for foreign militants, refrained from praising FARC on a 1994 visit to Colombia and called for a negotiated settlement between the Zapatistas and Mexican government in 1995. Publicly, he presented himself as a moderate on the world stage.[333]
In 1991, Havana hosted the Pan American Games, which involved construction of a stadium and accommodation for the athletes; Castro admitted that it was an expensive error, but it was a success for Cuba's government. Crowds regularly shouted "Fidel! Fidel!" in front of foreign journalists, while Cuba became the first Latin American nation to beat the US to the top of the gold-medal table.[334] Support for Castro remained strong, and although there were small anti-government demonstrations, the Cuban opposition rejected the exile community's calls for an armed uprising.[335] In August 1994, Havana witnessed the largest anti-Castro demonstration in Cuban history, as 200 to 300 young men threw stones at police, demanding that they be allowed to emigrate to Miami. A larger pro-Castro crowd confronted them, who were joined by Castro; he informed media that the men were anti-socials misled by the US. The protests dispersed with no recorded injuries.[336] Fearing that dissident groups would invade, the government organized the "War of All the People" defence strategy, planning a widespread guerrilla warfare campaign, and the unemployed were given jobs building a network of bunkers and tunnels across the country.[337]
We do not have a smidgen of capitalism or neo-liberalism. We are facing a world completely ruled by neo-liberalism and capitalism. This does not mean that we are going to surrender. It means that we have to adopt to the reality of that world. That is what we are doing, with great equanimity, without giving up our ideals, our goals. I ask you to have trust in what the government and party are doing. They are defending, to the last atom, socialist ideas, principles and goals.
Castro believed in the need for reform if Cuban socialism was to survive in a world now dominated by capitalist free markets. In October 1991, the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party was held in Santiago, at which a number of important changes to the government were announced. Castro would step down as head of government, to be replaced by the much younger Carlos Lage, although Castro would remain the head of the Communist Party and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Many older members of government were to be retired and replaced by their younger counterparts. A number of economic changes were proposed, and subsequently put to a national referendum. Free farmers' markets and small-scale private enterprises would be legalized in an attempt to stimulate economic growth, while US dollars were also made legal tender. Certain restrictions on emigration were eased, allowing more discontented Cuban citizens to move to the United States. Further democratization was to be brought in by having the National Assembly's members elected directly by the people, rather than through municipal and provincial assemblies. Castro welcomed debate between proponents and opponents of the economics reforms—although over time he began to increasingly sympathise with the opponent's positions, arguing that such reforms must be delayed.[339]
Castro's government diversified its economy into biotechnology and tourism, the latter outstripping Cuba's sugar industry as its primary source of revenue in 1995.[340] The arrival of thousands of Mexican and Spanish tourists led to increasing numbers of Cubans turning to prostitution; officially illegal, Castro refrained from cracking down on prostitution in Cuba, fearing a political backlash.[341] Economic hardship led many Cubans toward religion, both in the form of Catholicism and Santería. Although long thinking religious belief to be backward, Castro softened his approach to religious institutions and religious people were permitted for the first time to join the Communist Party.[342] Although he viewed the Catholic Church as a reactionary, pro-capitalist institution, Castro organized a visit to Cuba by Pope John Paul II for January 1998; it strengthened the position of both the Cuban Church and Castro's government.[343]
In the early 1990s Castro embraced environmentalism, campaigning against global warming and the waste of natural resources and accusing the US of being the world's primary polluter.[344] In 1994 a ministry dedicated to the environment was established, and new laws established in 1997 that promoted awareness of environmental issues throughout Cuba and stressed the sustainable use of natural resources.[345] By 2006, Cuba was the world's only nation which met the United Nations Development Programme's definition of sustainable development, with an ecological footprint of less than 1.8 hectares per capita and a Human Development Index of over 0.8.[346] Castro also became a proponent of the anti-globalization movement, criticizing US global hegemony and the control exerted by multinationals.[344] Castro maintained his strong stance against apartheid, and at the 26 July celebrations in 1991, he was joined onstage by Nelson Mandela, recently released from prison. Mandela praised Cuba's involvement in battling South Africa during the Angolan Civil War and thanked Castro personally.[347] Castro later attended Mandela's inauguration as President of South Africa in 1994.[348] In 2001, Castro attended the Conference Against Racism in South Africa at which he lectured on the global spread of racial stereotypes through US film.[344]
Battle of Ideas: 2000–2006
[edit]
Mired in economic problems, Cuba was aided by the election of Hugo Chávez to the Venezuelan Presidency in 1999. Castro and Chávez developed a close friendship, with the former acting as a mentor and father-figure to the latter,[349] and together they built an alliance that had repercussions throughout Latin America.[350] In 2000, they signed an agreement through which Cuba would send 20,000 medics to Venezuela, in return receiving 53,000 barrels of oil per day at preferential rates; in 2004, this trade was stepped up, with Cuba sending 40,000 medics and Venezuela providing 90,000 barrels a day.[351][352] Meanwhile, in 1998, Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien arrived in Cuba to meet Castro and highlight their close ties. He was the first Canadian government leader to visit the island since Pierre Trudeau was in Havana in 1976.[353]
After a spontaneous march for the return of Elián González, in December 2000, a youth group named: "Group of the Battle of Ideas", was formed by the Young Communist League and the Federation of University Students. The group began organizing demonstrations across Cuba for the return of Elián González. After González's return, the group began regularly meeting with Fidel Castro to oversee various construction projects and government meetings in Cuba. Fidel Castro ensured that the group had special authorities, and could bypass the approval of various ministries.[354] Along with domestic projects, the wider campaign known as the "Battle of Ideas" included attempts to provide medical aid to various pink tide governments.[355][356]
In 2002, former US president Jimmy Carter visited Cuba, where he highlighted the lack of civil liberties in the country and urged the government to pay attention to the Varela Project of Oswaldo Payá.[357]
Economic problems remained in Cuba, and in 2004, Castro shut down 118 factories, including steel plants, sugar mills and paper processors to compensate for a critical shortage of fuel.[358] In September 2005, Castro established a group of medical professionals, known as the Henry Reeve Brigade, with the mission of international medical solidarity. The group were sent throughout the world to carry out humanitarian missions on behalf of the Cuban government.[359]


Cuba and Venezuela became the founding members of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).[350] ALBA's origins lay in a December 2004 agreement signed between the two countries and was formalized through a People's Trade Agreement also signed by Evo Morales' Bolivia in April 2006. Castro had also been calling for greater Caribbean integration since the late 1990s, saying that only strengthened cooperation between Caribbean countries would prevent their domination by rich nations in a global economy.[360][361] Cuba has opened four additional embassies in the Caribbean Community including: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Suriname, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This development makes Cuba the only country to have embassies in all independent countries of the Caribbean Community.[362]
In contrast to the improved relations between Cuba and a number of leftist Latin American states, in 2004 it broke off diplomatic ties with Panama after centrist President Mireya Moscoso pardoned four Cuban exiles accused of attempting to assassinate Castro in 2000. Diplomatic ties were reinstalled in 2005 following the election of leftist President Martín Torrijos.[363] Castro's improving relations across Latin America were accompanied by continuing animosity towards the US. However, after massive damage caused by Hurricane Michelle in 2001, Castro successfully proposed a one-time cash purchase of food from the US while declining its government's offer of humanitarian aid.[364] Castro expressed solidarity with the US following the 2001 September 11 attacks, condemning Al-Qaeda and offering Cuban airports for the emergency diversion of any US planes. He recognized that the attacks would make US foreign policy more aggressive, which he believed was counterproductive.[365] Castro criticized the 2003 invasion of Iraq, saying that the US-led war had imposed an international "law of the jungle".[366]
Final years
[edit]Stepping down: 2006–2008
[edit]Castro underwent surgery for intestinal bleeding, and on 31 July 2006, delegated his presidential duties to Raúl Castro.[367] In February 2007, Raúl announced that Fidel's health was improving and that he was taking part in important issues of government.[368] Later that month, Fidel called into Hugo Chávez's radio show Aló Presidente.[369] On 21 April, Castro met Wu Guanzheng of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee,[370] with Chávez visiting in August,[371] and Morales in September.[372] That month, the Non-Aligned Movement held its 14th Summit in Havana, there agreeing to appoint Castro as the organization's president for a year's term.[373]
Commenting on Castro's recovery, US president George W. Bush said: "One day the good Lord will take Fidel Castro away." Hearing about this, the atheist Castro replied: "Now I understand why I survived Bush's plans and the plans of other presidents who ordered my assassination: the good Lord protected me." The quote was picked up on by the world's media.[374]
In a February 2008 letter, Castro announced that he would not accept the positions of President of the Council of State and Commander in Chief at that month's National Assembly meetings,[375] remarking, "It would betray my conscience to take up a responsibility that requires mobility and total devotion, that I am not in a physical condition to offer".[376] On 24 February 2008, the National Assembly of People's Power unanimously voted Raúl as president.[377] Describing his brother as "not substitutable", Raúl proposed that Fidel continue to be consulted on matters of great importance, a motion unanimously approved by the 597 National Assembly members.[378]
Retirement: 2008–2016
[edit]Following his retirement, Castro's health deteriorated; international press speculated that he had diverticulitis, but Cuba's government refused to corroborate this.[379] He continued to interact with the Cuban people, published an opinion column titled "Reflections" in Granma, used a Twitter account, and gave occasional public lectures.[379] In January 2009 Castro asked Cubans not to worry about his lack of recent news columns and failing health, and not to be disturbed by his future death.[380] He continued meeting foreign leaders and dignitaries, and that month photographs were released of Castro's meeting with Argentine president Cristina Fernández.[381]

In July 2010, he made his first public appearance since falling ill, greeting science center workers and giving a television interview to Mesa Redonda in which he discussed US tensions with Iran and North Korea.[382] On 7 August 2010, Castro gave his first speech to the National Assembly in four years, urging the US not to take military actions against those nations and warning of a nuclear holocaust.[383] When asked whether Castro may be re-entering government, culture minister Abel Prieto told the BBC, "I think that he has always been in Cuba's political life but he is not in the government... He has been very careful about that. His big battle is international affairs."[384] In August 2010, Castro accepted responsibility for persecuting gay men in the 1960s and 70s, which included imprisonment in forced labor camps.[385]
On 19 April 2011, Castro resigned from the Communist Party central committee,[386] thus stepping down as First Secretary. Raúl was selected as his successor.[387] Now without any official role in the country's government, he took on the role of an elder statesman. In March 2011, Castro condemned the NATO-led military intervention in Libya.[388] In late March 2012, Pope Benedict XVI visited Cuba for three days, during which time he briefly met with Castro despite the Pope's vocal opposition to Cuba's government.[379][389]
Later in 2012, it was revealed that along with Hugo Chávez, Castro had played a significant behind-the-scenes role in orchestrating peace talks between the Colombian government and the far left FARC guerrilla movement to end the conflict which had raged since 1964.[390] During the North Korea crisis of 2013, he urged both the North Korean and US governments to show restraint. Calling the situation "incredible and absurd", Castro maintained that war would not benefit either side, and that it represented "one of the gravest risks of nuclear war" since the Cuban missile crisis.[391]
In December 2014, Castro was awarded the Chinese Confucius Peace Prize for seeking peaceful solutions to his nation's conflict with the US and for his post-retirement efforts to prevent nuclear war.[392] In January 2015, he publicly commented on the "Cuban Thaw", an increased normalization between Cuba-US relations, by stating that while it was a positive move for establishing peace in the region, he mistrusted the US government.[393] He did not meet with US president Barack Obama on the latter's visit to Cuba in March 2016, although sent him a letter stating that Cuba "has no need of gifts from the empire".[394]
In April 2016, he gave his most extensive public appearance in many years when addressing the Communist Party. Highlighting that he was soon to turn 90 years old, he noted that he would die in the near future but urged those assembled to retain their communist ideals.[395] In September 2016, Castro was visited at his Havana home by the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani,[396] and later that month was visited by Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe.[397] In late October 2016, Castro met with the Portuguese president Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, who became one of the last foreign leaders to meet him.[398]
Death
[edit]
Castro died in Havana on the night of 25 November 2016 at the age of 90.[399][400] The cause of death was not disclosed.[401]
His brother, President Raúl Castro, confirmed the news in a brief speech: "The commander in chief of the Cuban revolution died at 22:29 [EST] this evening."[402][403][404]
Fidel Castro was cremated the next day.[402] A funeral procession travelled 900 kilometres (560 mi) along the island's central highway from Havana to Santiago de Cuba, tracing in reverse the route of the "Freedom Caravan" of January 1959.
After nine days of public mourning, his ashes were entombed in the Santa Ifigenia Cemetery in Santiago de Cuba.[405]
Fidel's death came nine months after his older brother Ramón died at the age of 91 in February.
Ideology
[edit]
Castro proclaimed himself to be "a Socialist, a Marxist, and a Leninist",[406] and publicly identified as a Marxist–Leninist from December 1961 onward.[407] Castro sought to transform Cuba from a capitalist state to a socialist society and ultimately to a communist society. Influenced by Guevara, he suggested that Cuba could evade most stages of socialism and progress straight to communism.[240] According to Castro, a country could be regarded as socialist if its means of production were controlled by the state. In this way, his understanding of socialism was less about who controlled power in a country and more about the method of distribution.[408]
Castro's government was also nationalistic[409] and drew upon a longstanding tradition of Cuban nationalism.[410] Historian Richard Gott remarked that one of the keys to Castro's success was his ability to use the "twin themes of socialism and nationalism" and keep them "endlessly in play".[411] Castro described Karl Marx and Cuban nationalist José Martí as his main political influences,[412] although Gott believed that Martí ultimately remained more important than Marx in Castro's politics.[411]
Theodore Draper described Castro's approach as "Castroism", viewing it as a blend of European socialism with the Latin American revolutionary tradition.[413] Political scientist Paul C. Sondrol described the approach as "totalitarian utopianism",[414] with leadership that drew upon the wider Latin American phenomenon of the caudillo.[415] Castro drew inspiration from the wider Latin American anti-imperialist movements of the 1930s and 1940s, including Argentina's Perón and Guatemala's Jacobo Árbenz.[416] Castro took a relatively socially conservative stance on many issues, opposing drug use, gambling, and prostitution, which he viewed as moral evils. He advocated hard work, family values, integrity, and self-discipline.[417] Although his government repressed homosexual activity for decades, he later described this persecution as a "great injustice".[418]
Personal life
[edit]Religious beliefs
[edit]Castro's religious beliefs have been a matter of some debate; he was baptized and raised as a Catholic. He criticized the use of the Bible to justify the oppression of women and Africans,[419] but commented that Christianity exhibited "a group of very humane precepts" which gave the world "ethical values" and a "sense of social justice", relating, "If people call me Christian, not from the standpoint of religion but from the standpoint of social vision, I declare that I am a Christian."[420] During a visit of American minister and activist Jesse Jackson, Castro accompanied him to a Methodist church service where he even spoke from the pulpit with a Bible before him, an event that marked a beginning of increased openness towards Christianity in Cuba.[421] He promoted the idea that Jesus Christ was a communist, citing the feeding of the 5,000 and the story of Jesus and the rich young man as evidence.[422]
Wealth
[edit]Forbes magazine ranked Castro as the seventh wealthiest ruler in the world at an estimated personal wealth of approximately 900 million US dollars in 2006, going from 550 million US dollars in their 2005 list. The estimate is based on the magazine's assumption that Castro had economic control over a network of state-owned companies, including CIMEX, Medicuba, the Havana Convention Palace, and the assumption that a portion of their profits went to Castro through investments.[423] Suggesting that Castro's fortune multiplied, growing from 103 million to 850 million euros, equivalent to 900 million dollars, in just three years,[424][425][426] the Forbes article also referred to rumours of Castro's Swiss bank accounts with "large stashes" of this fortune.[423] According to Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a former personal bodyguard of Castro, his assets included Cayo Piedra, a private island; over twenty mansions; a marina with yachts; encrypted bank accounts; and a gold mine.[424][425][426]
Marital history
[edit]
The Cuban government has never published an official marital history of Castro, with most information coming from defectors and scarce details published in state media.[427][428] In his earlier years in power, he showcased some of his family life, in particular his eldest son Fidelito to portray himself as a regular "family man" to the apprehensive American audience, but abandoned that as he became more concerned about his safety.[429] Throughout his rule, Castro never named an official "First Lady" and when the need for such a public female companion was necessary, Celia Sánchez or Raúl's wife, Vilma Espín, would play such a role of la primera dama.[430]
Castro's first wife was Mirta Díaz-Balart, whom he married in October 1948. She is the only spouse of Castro acknowledged by the Cuban Government. She was a student at the University of Havana, where she met and married Castro. She divorced him later, in 1955, while he was in prison due to the attacks on the Moncada Barracks. They had one son, Fidel Ángel "Fidelito" Castro Díaz-Balart, born in September 1949.[431]
During his first marriage, Castro briefly encountered Maria Laborde, an admirer from Camagüey, of whom very little is known and who has long been deceased. They had one son, Jorge Ángel Castro, born on 23 March 1949. It was long believed that his birth was in 1956, but Sánchez and another defector uncovered that he was born earlier than Fidelito. This was confirmed by Alina Fernández, who claimed that Fidelito told her that Jorge Angel was the "around the same age as him".[432][433][434] While married to Mirta, Castro had an affair with Natalia "Naty" Revuelta Clews who gave birth to his daughter, Alina Fernández Revuelta,[435] in 1956.
Castro's second and longest marriage was with Dalia Soto Del Valle, an admirer who met Castro during a speech in Villa Clara in 1961. She moved to Havana on Castro's initiative and later moved in with him at Punto Cero. Her relationship with Castro was kept secret until 2006 when she was photographed.[436] Castro and Dalia had five sons, Alexis,[437] Alex, Alejandro,[438] Antonio,[439] and Angelito.[440] After the 1970s, Castro began a long relationship with Juanita Vera, a Colonel in the foreign intelligence service who joined his escort unit as his English interpreter. She and Castro had one son, Abel Castro Vera, born in 1983.[441]
Castro had another daughter, Francisca Pupo, born 1953, the result of a one-night affair. Pupo and her husband now live in Miami.[442] Another son known as Ciro was born in the early 1960s, the result of another brief fling, his existence confirmed by Celia Sánchez.[433]

Reception and legacy
[edit]Within Cuba, Fidel's domination of every aspect of the government and the society remains total. His personal needs for absolute control seems to have changed little over the years. He remains committed to a disciplined society in which he is still determined to remake the Cuban national character, creating work-orientated, socially concerned individuals ... He wants to increase people's standard of living, the availability of material goods, and to import the latest technology. But the economic realities, despite rapid dramatic growth in the gross national product, severely limit what Cuba can buy on the world market.
One of the most controversial political leaders of his era,[444] Castro inspired and dismayed people around the world during his lifetime.[445][446][447] He ruled a single-party authoritarian regime in Cuba[448][449][450] where political opposition was not permitted.[451][452][453] Censorship of information was extensive,[454][455] and independent journalism was repressed.[456]
Despite its small size and limited economic weight, Castro's Cuba gained a large role in world affairs.[457] The Castro government relied heavily on its appeals to nationalistic sentiment, in particular the widespread hostility to the US government.[458] According to Balfour, Castro's domestic popularity stemmed from the fact that he symbolized "a long-cherished hope of national liberation and social justice" for much of the population.[459] Balfour also noted that throughout Latin America, Castro served as "a symbol of defiance against the continued economic and cultural imperialism of the United States".[460] Similarly, Wayne S. Smith—the former Chief of the United States Interests Section in Havana—noted that Castro's opposition to US dominance and transformation of Cuba into a significant world player resulted in him receiving "warm applause" throughout the Western Hemisphere.[461]
Various Western governments and human rights organizations nevertheless heavily criticized Castro and he was widely reviled in the US.[462] Following Castro's death, US president-elect Donald Trump called him a "brutal dictator",[463] while the Cuban-American politician Marco Rubio called him "an evil, murderous dictator" who turned Cuba into "an impoverished island prison".[464] Castro publicly rejected the "dictator" label, stating that he constitutionally held less power than most heads of state and that his government allowed for greater democratic involvement in policy making than Western liberal democracies.[465]
Nevertheless, critics claim that Castro wielded significant unofficial influence aside from his official duties.[466] Quirk stated that Castro wielded "absolute power" in Cuba, albeit not in a legal or constitutional manner,[467] while Bourne claimed that power in Cuba was "completely invested" in Castro,[468] adding that it was very rare for "a country and a people" to have been so completely dominated by "the personality of one man".[469] Balfour stated that Castro's "moral and political hegemony" within Cuba diminished the opportunities for democratic debate and decision making.[470] Describing Castro as a "totalitarian dictator",[471] Sondrol suggested that in leading "a political system largely [of] his own creation and bearing his indelible stamp", Castro's leadership style warranted comparisons with totalitarian leaders like Mao Zedong, Hideki Tojo, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini.[472]

Noting that there were "few more polarising political figures" than Castro, Amnesty International described him as "a progressive but deeply flawed leader". In their view, he should be "applauded" for his regime's "substantial improvements" to healthcare and education, but criticized for its "ruthless suppression of freedom of expression."[474] Human Rights Watch stated that his government constructed a "repressive machinery" which deprived Cubans of their "basic rights".[475] Castro defended his government's record on human rights, stating that the state was forced to limit the freedoms of individuals and imprison those involved in counter-revolutionary activities to protect the rights of the collective populace, such as the right to employment, education, and health care.[476]
Historian and journalist Richard Gott considered Castro to be "one of the most extraordinary political figures of the twentieth century", commenting that he had become a "world hero in the mould" of Giuseppe Garibaldi to people throughout the developing world for his anti-imperialist efforts.[477] Balfour stated that Castro's story had "few parallels in contemporary history", for there existed no other "Third World [sic] leader" in the second half of the twentieth century who held "such a prominent and restless part on the international stage" or remained head of state for such a long period.[444] Bourne described Castro as "an influential world leader" who commanded "great respect" from individuals of all political ideologies across the developing world.[443]
Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau described Castro as a "remarkable leader" and a "larger than life leader who served his people."[478] The European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker said that Castro "was a hero for many."[479] Russian president Vladimir Putin described Castro as both "a sincere and reliable friend of Russia" and a "symbol of an era", while Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping similarly referred to him as "a close comrade and a sincere friend" to China.[480]
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi termed him "one of the most iconic personalities of the 20th century" and a "great friend", while South African president Jacob Zuma praised Castro for aiding black South Africans in "our struggle against apartheid".[480] He was awarded a wide variety of awards and honours from foreign governments and was cited as an inspiration for foreign leaders like Ahmed Ben Bella[473] and Nelson Mandela,[481] who awarded him South Africa's highest civilian award for foreigners, the Order of Good Hope.[482] The biographer Volker Skierka stated that "he will go down in history as one of the few revolutionaries who remained true to his principles".[483]
Notes
[edit]- ^ /ˈkæstroʊ/ KASS-troh;[1] Latin American Spanish: [fiˈðel aleˈxandɾo ˈkastɾo ˈrus]
References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ "Castro" Archived 5 August 2020 at the Wayback Machine. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.
- ^ Bourne 1986, p. 14; Coltman 2003, p. 3; Castro & Ramonet 2009, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Bourne 1986, pp. 14–15; Quirk 1993, pp. 7–8; Coltman 2003, pp. 1–2; Castro & Ramonet 2009, pp. 24–29.
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Further reading
[edit]- Benjamin, Jules R. (1992). The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-02536-0.
- Bohning, Don (2005). The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959–1965. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN 978-1-57488-676-4.
- Roman, Peter (2003). People's Power: Cuba's Experience with Representative Government. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0742525658.
- Fabian, Escalante (1996). CIA Targets Fidel: The Secret Assassination Report. PO Bo 1015, North Melbourne, Victoria 3051, Australia: Ocean Press. ISBN 978-1-875284-90-0. Retrieved 22 May 2024.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
External links
[edit]- Appearances on C-SPAN
- Fidel Castro's speeches
- Fidel Castro History Archive at Marxists Internet Archive
- Fidel Castro at IMDb
- Fidel Castro (Character) on IMDb
- Fidel Castro Records at FBI Records: The Vault
- Fidel Castro: A Life in Pictures – slideshow by BBC News
- Fidel Castro: From Rebel to El Presidente – timeline by NPR
- Fidel Castro – extended biography by Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (in Spanish)
- Say Brother; 914; Invitation From Cuba Date N/A, National Records and Archives Administration, American Archive of Public Broadcasting
Fidel Castro
View on GrokipediaEarly Life
Family Background and Childhood: 1926–1945
Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was born on August 13, 1926, near Birán in Oriente Province, Cuba, the son of Ángel Castro y Argiz, a wealthy landowner of Spanish origin, and Lina Ruz González, who served as a cook and housekeeper on his estate before becoming his common-law wife and eventually marrying him in 1943.[9][10] Ángel, born in 1875 in Láncara, Galicia, Spain, immigrated to Cuba around 1906, starting as a day laborer in the sugar fields before accumulating substantial landholdings and building a prosperous sugar plantation operation amid the industry's expansion.[11][12] The couple had seven children together, with Fidel as the third; these offspring were born out of wedlock but later received inheritance advantages comparable to legitimate heirs from Ángel's prior marriage to María Argiz, which produced two children.[13] The Castro family resided on the expansive rural plantation in Birán, a region dominated by sugarcane cultivation, where Ángel's success provided material comforts rare among most Cubans, including ample food, housing, and resources derived from sugar production.[14][15] Cuba's sugar economy, which fueled the family's wealth, underwent significant volatility during Castro's early years, with a production boom in the mid-1920s peaking at over 5 million tons before crashing in 1920-1921 and further declining amid the Great Depression of the 1930s, events tied to global market fluctuations and heavy U.S. investment in mills and exports.[16][17] This economic dependence on foreign-dominated sugar cycles exposed the household to boom-and-bust patterns, though Castro's childhood emphasized practical rural experiences over formal ideological formation.[18] Ángel's self-made affluence from immigrant labor to plantation ownership instilled in the family a sense of rugged independence, with reports indicating Fidel preferred the countryside lifestyle under his father's influence to more structured settings favored by his mother.[10] Lacking early signs of radicalism, young Castro displayed personal ambition and competitiveness, traits nurtured in a household where parental favoritism reportedly elevated his status among siblings, granting him preferential access to opportunities amid the plantation's operations.[13] The rural Catholic environment of Birán further shaped initial moral and social outlooks, with family dynamics prioritizing practical survival and enterprise over abstract grievances against American economic sway in the sector.[15]Education and Early Influences: 1945–1950
Castro completed his secondary education at the Jesuit-run Colegio de Belén in Havana, where the rigorous curriculum emphasized discipline, analytical skills, and moral formation, though it also exposed him to Cuba's social disparities between the elite student body and the surrounding poverty.[19][20] Prior Jesuit schooling at Colegio de Dolores in Santiago de Cuba similarly instilled a sense of order but highlighted inequalities, fostering an early awareness of class divides without leading to expulsion, contrary to unverified claims.[19] In September 1945, Castro enrolled in the University of Havana's Faculty of Law, pursuing degrees in law, social sciences, and diplomatic law, which he completed by 1950.[21] There, he encountered a politically charged environment marked by student activism against corruption under President Ramón Grau San Martín's administration (1944–1948), whose regime abandoned promised reforms and engaged in graft, deepening Castro's disdain for political malfeasance.[18][20] He developed admiration for Cuban independence hero José Martí, whose writings on nationalism and anti-imperialism shaped his early ideology, emphasizing Cuban sovereignty over foreign influence rather than class-based revolution.[20] During his university years, Castro participated in regional upheavals that ignited interest in Latin American anti-dictatorial struggles. In June 1947, he joined a failed expedition from Cuba aimed at invading the Dominican Republic to oust Rafael Trujillo's dictatorship, reflecting nascent pan-Latin American solidarity without ideological commitment to communism.[22] In April 1948, while in Colombia for an intercollegiate congress, he witnessed and joined the Bogotazo riots following the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, arming himself amid the chaos that killed thousands and exposed societal fractures, further fueling his focus on revolutionary nationalism over Marxist doctrine.[23] These experiences honed a causal view of corruption and tyranny as barriers to sovereignty, prioritizing empirical grievances like Grau's scandals over abstract economic theories.[20]
Entry into Politics
University Activism and Legal Career: 1950–1952
In 1950, Fidel Castro graduated from the University of Havana with a Doctor of Law degree, having completed his studies amid a period of political turbulence in Cuba.[24][25] Following graduation, he co-founded a small law firm in Havana with fellow recent graduates Jorge Azpiazu and Rafael Rodríguez, focusing primarily on representing low-income clients in labor disputes and civil cases, which allowed him to cultivate connections among urban workers and reformist circles but resulted in limited financial success due to the firm's emphasis on pro bono and low-fee work.[26][27] Castro aligned himself with the Cuban People's Party (Partido Ortodoxo), a reformist group founded by Eduardo Chibás that prioritized anti-corruption campaigns and socioeconomic overhaul, positioning himself as a vocal critic of graft within the incumbent Auténtico administration.[28][29] His involvement extended beyond legal practice into party activism, where he leveraged public speaking and organizational efforts to highlight electoral irregularities and institutional failures, reflecting growing frustration with Cuba's democratic processes that he viewed as susceptible to elite manipulation.[30] In early 1952, Castro secured the Ortodoxo nomination as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives in the scheduled June elections, aiming to advance the party's platform through legislative channels.[22] However, on March 10, 1952, Fulgencio Batista staged a military coup, suspending the constitution, dissolving Congress, and canceling the elections, which annulled Castro's candidacy and deepened his skepticism toward electoral politics as a viable path for change.[22] This event prompted Castro to initiate legal challenges against the coup's legitimacy in Cuban courts, marking his transition to more direct confrontation with Batista's regime while highlighting the limitations of judicial recourse in the face of military authority.[31]Marriage and Initial Political Involvement: 1952
In October 1948, Fidel Castro married Mirta Díaz-Balart, a philosophy student at the University of Havana from a politically prominent family in Oriente province.[32] The union connected Castro to Cuba's upper class, as Díaz-Balart's father, Rafael José Díaz-Balart, had served as mayor of Banes—Batista's birthplace—and later in Fulgencio Batista's cabinet, while her brother Rafael held positions in Batista's administration.[33] [34] The couple's son, Fidel Ángel "Fidelito" Castro Díaz-Balart, was born on September 1, 1949.[35] By early 1952, Castro had aligned with the Cuban People's Party (Ortodoxo), running as a congressional candidate amid widespread discontent with President Carlos Prío Socarrás's corruption-plagued regime.[36] On March 10, 1952, however, Batista staged a bloodless military coup, ousting Prío, suspending the 1940 constitution, and canceling scheduled June elections to consolidate power with army backing.[37] [38] This move nullified Castro's candidacy and deepened his grievances, given his in-laws' prior ties to Batista, which had once positioned him near the regime's periphery. Castro, practicing law in Havana, initially pursued constitutional remedies, filing a petition with the Court of Constitutional Guarantees accusing Batista of usurping power illegally and demanding his removal to restore electoral processes.[36] The court, aligned with the new regime, rejected the suit without hearing, prompting Castro to draft arguments outlining Batista's violations and proposing revolutionary reforms—ideas later incorporated into his 1953 trial defense, "History Will Absolve Me."[39] Frustrated by judicial inaction, Castro shifted toward insurrection, viewing legal avenues as futile against Batista's authoritarian grip.[36] In the ensuing months, Castro began quietly assembling a small core of like-minded opponents, including family members and former university associates, driven more by personal betrayal and opposition to Batista's abrogation of democratic norms than by developed ideological commitments.[36] This nascent group focused on mobilizing discontent among professionals and youth, laying groundwork for armed resistance without yet formalizing broader alliances or strategies.[40] The marriage to Díaz-Balart, strained by Castro's growing radicalism and financial disputes over inheritance, further isolated him from elite circles sympathetic to Batista, reinforcing his resolve.[33]Cuban Revolution
Moncada Barracks Attack and Imprisonment: 1953–1955
On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro led approximately 135 rebels in an assault on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, Cuba's second-largest military garrison, aiming to seize weapons and spark a popular uprising against the government of Fulgencio Batista.[41] A smaller group simultaneously targeted the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes garrison in Bayamo, but coordination failed due to delays and miscommunications.[42] The attackers, mostly young supporters lacking military experience, encountered stiff resistance; around 60 to 70 rebels were killed in the fighting or summarily executed afterward, with Batista's forces reporting only 9 deaths among their ranks.[42] [41] Castro escaped initially but surrendered days later to avoid further reprisals against civilians, framing the operation as a symbolic blow against Batista's 1952 coup despite its tactical collapse.[42] Castro and surviving participants faced trial in Santiago de Cuba starting October 1953, where he acted as his own defense, delivering elements of a prepared text later circulated as "History Will Absolve Me."[42] In the document, Castro outlined a program of five laws targeting agrarian reform, industrial growth, public utilities nationalization for housing, educational infrastructure, and profit-sharing for workers—proposals rooted in restoring the 1940 constitution rather than instituting socialism, reflecting his early nationalist-reformist stance.[43] He positioned the attack as a revolutionary necessity against Batista's authoritarianism, declaring, "Condemn me, it does not matter. History will absolve me," which transformed his personal defense into a broader indictment of the regime and elevated his profile among opponents.[42] The trial exposed government atrocities, including torture of captives, further galvanizing anti-Batista sentiment despite judicial bias favoring the prosecution.[41] In October 1953, Castro received a 15-year sentence for sedition and other charges, alongside his brother Raúl and other survivors, and was transferred to the Presidio Modelo prison on the Isle of Pines.[42] There, he endured harsh conditions but exploited relative isolation to study, write political tracts smuggled out via supporters, and recruit inmates and external contacts, methodically building the 26th of July Movement named for the attack date. This period marked the genesis of his organized opposition, as prison correspondence and manifestos disseminated his ideas, drawing in intellectuals and activists disillusioned with Batista's corruption and electoral manipulations.[42] Facing mounting protests from opposition groups, including the Orthodox Party, Batista granted a general amnesty on May 15, 1955, releasing Castro and about 25 followers as a gesture to bolster his image ahead of promised elections, though critics viewed it as a cynical ploy amid eroding legitimacy.[44] Castro's release after 22 months amplified his revolutionary stature, with the Moncada failure recast in his narrative as a foundational martyrdom that exposed regime brutality and unified disparate anti-Batista elements under his leadership.[42]Exile, Granma Landing, and Guerrilla Warfare: 1956–1959
Following his release from prison under a general amnesty in May 1955, Fidel Castro relocated to Mexico City, where he evaded extradition efforts by the Batista regime and began organizing a new expedition to Cuba.[3] There, he encountered Argentine physician Ernesto "Che" Guevara in June 1955, forging an alliance based on shared anti-imperialist views; Guevara joined the cause after Castro outlined plans for armed insurrection against Batista.[45] The group, numbering around 80 revolutionaries affiliated with the 26th of July Movement, underwent rudimentary military training in Mexico, though logistical challenges and limited resources hampered preparations.[46] On November 25, 1956, Castro and 81 others departed Tuxpan, Mexico, aboard the overcrowded 60-foot yacht Granma, designed for 20 passengers but packed with men, weapons, and supplies for a seven-day voyage to Cuba's eastern coast.[45][47] The vessel ran aground near Las Coloradas beach in Oriente Province on December 2, 1956, after delays from mechanical failures and rough seas; the rebels, weakened by seasickness and disoriented, faced immediate detection by Batista's forces.[48] In a subsequent ambush at Alegría de Pío on December 5, government troops slaughtered most of the landing party—only about 12 to 20 survivors, including Castro, his brother Raúl, and Guevara, escaped into the inhospitable mangrove swamps and sugarcane fields, their inexperience and betrayal by local contacts contributing to the near-total wipeout.[47][49] The remnants regrouped in the rugged Sierra Maestra mountains by late December 1956, establishing a base amid dense terrain that provided natural defenses against Batista's superior conventional forces, which numbered over 10,000 troops in the region.[50] Initial survival hinged on narrow escapes, such as Castro's evasion during a February 1957 government offensive, and gradual recruitment of local peasants disillusioned by Batista's corruption and repression, swelling rebel ranks to around 200 by mid-1957 despite ongoing supply shortages and ambushes.[51] A pivotal early victory came on May 28, 1957, with the assault on the El Uvero garrison, where approximately 70 rebels overran 51 soldiers, capturing arms and boosting morale, though at the cost of 11 rebel deaths—this marked the first significant demonstration of guerrilla efficacy against fixed positions.[50][52] To coordinate with urban underground networks of the 26th of July Movement, rebels launched Radio Rebelde on February 24, 1958, broadcasting propaganda from portable transmitters in the Sierra Maestra, which exaggerated rebel strength and demoralized government troops while rallying civilian support through calls for strikes and sabotage.[53] By late 1958, expanded guerrilla columns under commanders like Raúl Castro and Guevara conducted hit-and-run operations across eastern Cuba, exploiting Batista's tactical errors—such as overreliance on air strikes and conscript desertions—to erode army cohesion, with rebel forces growing to several thousand amid a collapsing rural economy.[51] Batista's failed summer 1958 offensive, involving 17,000 troops, faltered due to poor intelligence and rebel ambushes, paving the way for revolutionary advances toward Santiago de Cuba.[50] Facing imminent defeat as rebels approached Havana and a nationwide uprising erupted, Batista fled Cuba on January 1, 1959, with his inner circle, seeking asylum in the Dominican Republic amid the seizure of military garrisons by insurgents and strikers.[54][55] Castro, delaying his capital entry to consolidate control, led a triumphal convoy from Santiago de Cuba, arriving in Havana on January 8, 1959, greeted by mass crowds amid the regime's total disintegration.[54][56]Rise to Absolute Power
Overthrow of Batista and Initial Reforms: 1959
Following Fulgencio Batista's flight from Cuba on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement consolidated control, with rebel forces entering Havana on January 8, 1959.[55] On February 16, 1959, Castro was sworn in as prime minister, replacing José Miró Cardona, amid widespread celebrations that underscored his initial mass appeal as a liberator from dictatorship.[57] [58] The new government promptly initiated reforms to address rural inequality, promulgating the Agrarian Reform Law on May 17, 1959, which created the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) to oversee land redistribution.[59] The law expropriated estates larger than 1,000 acres (approximately 402 hectares), limiting individual ownership to 30 caballerías while compensating owners with bonds and redistributing surplus land to peasants via cooperatives or individual grants, aiming to end latifundia dominance and boost agricultural productivity.[60] [61] This measure affected over 1 million hectares initially, including holdings of foreign sugar companies, and was presented as fulfilling revolutionary promises to the rural poor, though implementation involved rapid seizures that disrupted established farming operations.[62] Parallel to agrarian changes, revolutionary tribunals conducted summary trials of Batista-era officials accused of corruption, torture, and war crimes, leading to the execution of hundreds by firing squad in early 1959, with estimates ranging from 200 to over 500 in the initial months.[63] [64] These proceedings, often broadcast publicly, were defended by Castro as necessary justice against regime atrocities but criticized abroad for procedural irregularities and vengeance-driven haste, exemplified by the rapid sentencing of groups like 14 officers in Santiago de Cuba.[65] Early utilities nationalization loomed as a policy threat, with Castro signaling intent to review foreign-owned services like electricity and telephones, which represented significant U.S. investments totaling around $400 million, though major expropriations occurred later amid rising expropriatory momentum from the agrarian law.[66] From April 15 to 26, 1959, Castro toured the United States, engaging in goodwill gestures such as meetings with Vice President Richard Nixon and public appearances that drew crowds, reflecting lingering optimism for U.S.-Cuba cooperation despite reform-induced frictions.[67] His charisma fueled mass mobilizations and rallies, sustaining a honeymoon period of broad domestic support where polls and observers noted he would likely win free elections handily.[68] [69]Radicalization to Communism and Power Consolidation: 1959–1961
Following the January 1959 overthrow of Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro initially projected a moderate image to garner international support, including a goodwill tour to the United States from April 15 to 26, 1959. During the visit, Castro met with Vice President Richard Nixon and addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors, but evasive responses on communist influences and land reform plans heightened U.S. suspicions, contributing to rapid deterioration in bilateral relations.[70][67] In July 1959, tensions within the revolutionary leadership escalated when Castro forced the resignation of provisional President Manuel Urrutia Lleó on July 17, after Urrutia dismissed radical ministers perceived as communist sympathizers and opposed measures like closing casinos and churches. Castro temporarily resigned as prime minister in protest, mobilizing public rallies to pressure Urrutia, who relented; Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, a more compliant figure, was appointed president on July 23. This purge removed a key moderate restraint on Castro's authority.[55][71] Further consolidation targeted dissenters from the 26th of July Movement. On October 21, 1959, Camagüey commander Huber Matos resigned and alerted Castro to communist infiltration in the military, prompting his immediate arrest by Camilo Cienfuegos; Matos was convicted of treason and sedition, receiving a 20-year sentence in a trial that exemplified the regime's intolerance for internal opposition. The 1940 Constitution remained suspended, with governance proceeding under the Fundamental Law of January 1959, which centralized executive power and enabled rule by decree without legislative checks.[72][73][74] By 1960–1961, Castro openly pivoted toward socialism, declaring Cuba a socialist state on May 1, 1961, and avowing personal adherence to Marxism-Leninism on December 2, 1961, in a televised address: "I am a Marxist-Leninist and shall be one until the end of my life." This ideological shift facilitated the July 1961 merger of the 26th of July Movement, Student Revolutionary Directorate, and Popular Socialist Party into the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), subordinating non-communist revolutionaries to a unified, Castro-dominated structure and purging rivals like Matos to enforce loyalty.[75][76]Domestic Repression and Authoritarianism
Suppression of Opposition and Trials: 1959–1960s
Following the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro's government established revolutionary tribunals to prosecute officials and supporters of the prior regime, conducting rapid trials that often resulted in executions by firing squad. These tribunals, overseen by figures like Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, targeted military officers, police, and civilian collaborators accused of war crimes and corruption, with proceedings broadcast publicly to demonstrate revolutionary justice. By mid-1959, hundreds had been executed, serving to eliminate potential centers of resistance and instill fear among remaining Batista loyalists and moderate revolutionaries.[77][64] The tribunals extended beyond strict legal accountability, functioning as ideological purges to sideline non-communist elements within the revolutionary coalition. Public show trials, including televised interrogations, pressured former allies and opposition figures to publicly affirm loyalty or face accusations of counterrevolutionary activity, effectively intimidating moderates who had supported the anti-Batista struggle but opposed Castro's shift toward Marxism-Leninism. Non-communist groups, such as remnants of the Partido Auténtico and other pre-revolutionary parties, were dissolved or subsumed, with all independent political organizations outlawed except those aligned with the emerging communist framework by late 1959.[78] An early wave of emigration ensued, as professionals, intellectuals, and middle-class Cubans—fearing reprisals and ideological conformity—fled to the United States, swelling the exile community in Florida. Over 100,000 departed in the initial years post-revolution, depriving Cuba of skilled workers in fields like medicine, engineering, and education, while the regime demanded loyalty oaths from public employees and educators, dismissing thousands who refused to endorse the revolutionary line.[79][80] Media outlets faced immediate restrictions, with new decrees in January 1959 criminalizing reporting deemed supportive of "crime" or counterrevolution, leading to self-censorship and closures of independent newspapers and radio stations critical of agrarian reforms or purges. This suppression extended to foreign correspondents, fostering an environment where dissent was equated with treason, further isolating non-aligned voices during the radicalization phase.[81][82]Political Prisons, Executions, and UMAP Camps: 1960s–1970s
Following the consolidation of power, the Cuban regime under Fidel Castro significantly expanded its network of political prisons in the 1960s, with facilities such as La Cabaña fortress repurposed for indefinite detention and summary executions of perceived counterrevolutionaries, including former Batista officials, dissidents, and ordinary citizens accused of subversion.[83] Although Ernesto "Che" Guevara oversaw operations at La Cabaña until mid-1965, during which hundreds of executions occurred as part of revolutionary tribunals, the prison's role in suppressing opposition persisted into the late 1960s, contributing to a system where political incarceration became a primary tool of control.[84] Human rights documentation indicates that by the mid-1960s, the total number of political prisoners had swelled to between 15,000 and 20,000, encompassing intellectuals, clergy, and suspected sympathizers of anti-Castro groups, often held without formal charges or trials.[85] Executions continued as a deterrent against dissent and escape attempts throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, particularly targeting individuals involved in hijackings of boats or aircraft to flee the island. For instance, on November 2, 1964, three men—Sergio Armas Ayala, Miguel Conde Green, and Abel Calante Boronat—were executed following a rapid trial for attempting to hijack a vessel to reach the United States, exemplifying the regime's policy of lethal punishment for unauthorized exits deemed "piracy" or treason.[86] Similar swift executions occurred in response to ferry hijackings, such as those in the mid-1960s, where perpetrators were shot by firing squad after abbreviated proceedings, reinforcing a climate of fear amid rising boat and plane hijacking incidents peaking between 1968 and 1972.[87] These measures, justified by the government as necessary to prevent "counterrevolutionary" sabotage, resulted in dozens of documented executions tied to escape efforts, though comprehensive tallies remain contested due to state secrecy and limited access for independent verification.[88] In 1965, the regime introduced the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP), a network of forced-labor camps operational until 1968, designed to "rehabilitate" individuals deemed socially unproductive or ideologically unreliable, including homosexuals, religious believers (such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Catholics), conscientious objectors to military service, and minor dissidents.[89] Up to 40,000 people passed through these camps, where inmates endured grueling agricultural work, minimal rations, physical abuse, and indoctrination sessions under military oversight, with the stated goal of fostering revolutionary discipline but effectively serving as punishment for nonconformity.[90] Homosexuals faced particular targeting as "deviants" incompatible with the "New Man" ideal of socialist masculinity, leading to purges involving mass roundups, public denunciations, and confinement in UMAP for "reeducation," a policy Fidel Castro later acknowledged personal responsibility for in 2010, admitting it reflected profound errors in revolutionary justice.[91] Reports from survivors detail harsh conditions resulting in deaths from exhaustion, disease, suicides, and beatings, though exact figures are elusive; estimates suggest hundreds perished, underscoring the camps' role in systemic repression before their closure amid internal criticism and international scrutiny.[92]Surveillance State and Control Mechanisms: 1960s–2000s
The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) were established on September 28, 1960, by Fidel Castro as a network of neighborhood vigilance groups to detect and report counter-revolutionary activities amid rising internal threats following nationalizations and U.S. tensions.[93] These block-level committees, organized hierarchically from streets to municipalities, mobilized civilians to monitor residents' behaviors, political loyalties, and interactions, functioning as a grassroots extension of state control by compiling dossiers on potential dissidents and enforcing ideological conformity through mandatory meetings and ideological vigilance.[94] By the 1960s, CDRs covered nearly every urban block, with membership expanding to encompass a significant portion of the population; by the early 1990s, approximately 95.8% of eligible Cubans—around 8 million people—were registered members, enabling pervasive informant networks that rivaled the East German Stasi in scope, though adapted to a revolutionary mass-mobilization model influenced by KGB tactics.[95] Between 5% and 10% of members served as active leaders or informants, reporting on neighbors' private lives, including travel, associations, and expressions of discontent, which facilitated preemptive suppression of dissent without reliance on formal arrests alone.[96] This system persisted through the 2000s, with over 8.4 million members by 2010 out of a 11.2 million population, maintaining surveillance even as economic hardships intensified self-policing incentives.[97] Complementing the CDRs, the General Directorate of State Security (G2), under the Ministry of the Interior, conducted deeper infiltration operations targeting institutions like churches, labor unions, and intellectual circles to neutralize organized opposition.[98] G2 agents embedded in these groups gathered intelligence on potential dissent, such as union leaders critical of state policies or clergy advocating human rights, leading to the disruption of independent activities through harassment, blackmail, and fabricated scandals rather than overt force.[99] This dual mechanism—CDR's broad societal watch and G2's targeted subversion—ensured comprehensive control, suppressing movements akin to the Prague Spring by isolating leaders and preempting collective action. Over decades, these structures fostered widespread self-censorship, as citizens anticipated denunciations from family or acquaintances, eroding trust and fracturing social bonds; reports from defectors and exiles describe routine family divisions where relatives avoided political discussions to evade mutual reporting obligations.[100] The resultant culture of suspicion persisted into the 2000s under Fidel and Raúl Castro, with surveillance adapting to new media while reinforcing conformity, as evidenced by ongoing CDR patrols and G2 monitoring of digital dissent, contributing to a societal environment where public criticism remained rare due to anticipated repercussions.[101][102]Economic Policies and Catastrophic Outcomes
Nationalizations, Collectivization, and Early Failures: 1959–1970s
Following the overthrow of Batista, the Cuban government under Fidel Castro initiated a series of nationalizations targeting foreign-owned enterprises, particularly those held by U.S. interests. In 1959, initial interventions included the seizure of utilities and banks, escalating in 1960 with the expropriation of oil refineries, sugar mills, and other industries without compensation; the registered value of U.S. claims for these assets exceeded $1.8 billion.[103] By mid-1960, approximately 90% of Cuba's sugar production capacity, dominated by U.S. firms, had been nationalized, disrupting supply chains and managerial expertise.[3] Complementing these measures, the Urban Reform Law of October 14, 1960, abolished private rental of urban housing, transferring ownership to tenants by allowing them to pay the equivalent of 10 years' rent over time, effectively evicting landlords from the market and prohibiting future subletting or sales for profit.[104] This policy redistributed over 300,000 properties to occupants but eliminated rental incentives, leading to maintenance neglect and housing shortages as private investment ceased.[105] In agriculture, the First Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959 limited private landholdings to 1,000 acres and redistributed estates to cooperatives and individual farmers, followed by the more radical Second Agrarian Reform Law of October 1960, which collectivized remaining large farms into state enterprises. These reforms dismantled efficient plantation systems, replacing them with centralized state farms that prioritized ideological conformity over productivity; sugar output, Cuba's economic backbone, fell 30% from 6.0 million tons in 1961 to 4.2 million tons in 1962, and further to 3.8 million tons in 1963—roughly halving pre-reform peaks due to disrupted planting cycles, loss of experienced managers, and compulsory labor mobilization.[106] Livestock slaughter in 1959–1960 exacerbated meat production declines by over 50%, as excess animals were culled amid uncertainty, compounding food shortages.[107] To address emerging scarcities, the government instituted the libreta rationing system on March 12, 1962, via Law No. 1015, distributing monthly booklets to households for subsidized allocations of staples like rice, beans, and sugar, which covered only a fraction of caloric needs and persisted as a fixture of controlled distribution.[108] The inefficiencies of these policies sparked the "Great Debate" from 1963 to 1965, pitting Economy Minister Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who championed voluntarist central planning and moral incentives to foster socialist consciousness, against advocates of material incentives and decentralized mechanisms like profit-sharing. Guevara argued that wage differentials bred inequality and that worker emulation would suffice for motivation, rejecting market signals as capitalist relics; by 1966, Castro endorsed this approach, institutionalizing budgetary central planning over enterprise autonomy, which intensified bureaucratic rigidities and contributed to sustained output shortfalls through the 1970s.[109] Empirical results vindicated critics, as agricultural yields stagnated—non-sugar crops barely recovered to 1962 levels by 1974 on a per capita basis—highlighting the causal link between disincentivized labor and production failures under enforced collectivization.[110]Soviet Subsidy Dependence and Collapse: 1970s–1991
Following the failure of the 1970 "10 Million Ton Harvest" campaign, which aimed to produce 10 million tons of sugar but yielded only 8.5 million tons due to labor shortages, technical inefficiencies in mills, and diversion of resources from other sectors, Cuba intensified its economic reliance on the Soviet Union to avert collapse.[111][112] This shortfall, exacerbated by drought and over-mobilization of the workforce—including students, artists, and bureaucrats—exposed the limits of Fidel Castro's voluntarist approach to rapid agricultural expansion, prompting a temporary offer of resignation from Castro himself amid internal recriminations over poor planning and industrial neglect.[113][114] By the mid-1970s, Cuba had formalized a dependency model under bilateral trade agreements, exporting sugar, nickel, cobalt, and later medical personnel in exchange for Soviet oil, machinery, and credits at preferential rates far below world market prices.[115] Annual Soviet subsidies, primarily through undervalued oil shipments (often 13-15 million tons yearly) and overpriced purchases of Cuban sugar, averaged $4-6 billion by the 1980s, equivalent to 10-20% of Cuba's GDP and masking chronic inefficiencies in domestic production.[116][117] The USSR treated Cuba as a strategic proxy for global influence, funding its military adventures in Africa while tolerating economic distortions; in return, Havana provided ideological loyalty and exported revolution, but this lifeline perpetuated stagnation by discouraging reforms and fostering corruption in state enterprises.[118] Attempts at industrialization under Cuba's 1971-1980 and subsequent 10-year plans faltered, with targets for diversified manufacturing unmet due to mismanagement, reliance on imported Soviet technology without adequate local adaptation, and persistent labor indiscipline.[119] Output in non-sugar sectors grew anemically, burdened by bureaucratic centralization modeled on the USSR, while sugar monoculture persisted as the export mainstay despite ideological rhetoric against it.[120] The onset of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in 1985 initiated subsidy reforms, compelling Cuba from 1989 to purchase oil at closer-to-market prices and curtailing credits amid Moscow's own fiscal crises, which unraveled Havana's concealed insolvency.[121] Cuban GDP contracted by approximately 3% in 1990 and 25% in 1991, with imports plummeting 30-40% as Soviet aid—peaking at over $6 billion annually—evaporated, exposing the economy's structural fragility propped up for decades by external patronage rather than viable productivity.[122][123] This unraveling, distinct from broader collapse effects post-1991, highlighted how dependency had subsidized inefficiency, leaving Cuba without reserves or diversification when the patron withdrew support.[124]Special Period Famine and Long-Term Stagnation: 1991–2006
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 severed Cuba's primary source of subsidies, which had previously accounted for approximately 20-25% of GDP, precipitating an economic contraction of 35-36% between 1989 and 1993.[125][126] In response, Fidel Castro declared the "Special Period in Time of Peace" on November 1, 1990, implementing austerity measures including severe rationing of food, fuel, and electricity, though the crisis intensified from 1991 onward as Soviet aid evaporated.[125] Daily caloric intake plummeted from around 3,000 to below 2,100 per person, with average protein consumption falling to 15-20 grams, resulting in population-wide weight loss of 5-25% of body mass and conditions akin to famine.[125] Fuel shortages halved transportation capacity, prompting the importation of over one million Chinese bicycles by 1993, which became the dominant mode of urban mobility amid a 70% drop in vehicle availability.[127][128] Black markets proliferated for basic goods, fueled by barter and informal networks, as state rations provided insufficient sustenance; possession of U.S. dollars remained criminalized until September 1993, after which legalization aimed to siphon hard currency from these underground economies into state coffers via tourist shops.[129] Tourism surged as a stopgap, with visitor numbers rising from 340,000 in 1990 to over 1.7 million by 2000, but benefits accrued unevenly, exacerbating inequality through dollar-based access to imports.[129] Under Raúl Castro, then Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and economy overseer, modest decentralizing measures emerged, including usufruct rights for idle state lands to boost agricultural output and limited farmers' markets permitting direct sales to consumers starting in 1994.[130][131] These were partially reversed by Fidel Castro from 2003 onward under the "Battle of Ideas" campaign, which recentralized control, curtailed private incentives, and prioritized ideological mobilization over market mechanisms, stalling productivity gains.[132][130] By 2006, Cuba's annualized GDP per capita growth from 1950 averaged just 0.8%, trailing Latin America's regional performance and leaving output levels stagnant relative to pre-crisis benchmarks.[133] The hardships triggered mass emigration attempts, culminating in the 1994 balsero crisis, where over 35,000 Cubans fled by makeshift rafts and boats from July to September, following protests in Havana and a government announcement permitting departures; U.S. interceptions led to temporary camps at Guantánamo Bay holding up to 30,000 migrants.[134][135] This exodus underscored the desperation, with thousands risking drowning in the Florida Straits amid fuel and food scarcity, though subsequent U.S.-Cuba migration accords in September 1994 formalized limited outflows to avert recurrence.[134] Persistent stagnation through 2006 entrenched poverty, with caloric deficits and infrastructure decay persisting despite partial Venezuelan aid inflows post-2000, as centralized planning inhibited diversification.[133][131]Foreign Policy and Global Interventions
Alliance with USSR, Bay of Pigs, and Missile Crisis: 1961–1962
Following the failure of initial U.S. efforts to undermine his regime through economic pressure and covert operations, Fidel Castro intensified Cuba's diplomatic outreach to the Soviet Union in early 1961, seeking military and economic aid amid escalating tensions with Washington. Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had visited Havana in February 1960 to negotiate trade agreements, including sugar exports in exchange for oil, which marked the beginning of substantive ties, but Castro's appeals for defensive support grew urgent after U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961.[136][137] By April, as intelligence indicated an imminent invasion, Castro mobilized militias and declared the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution on April 16, 1961, during a funeral oration for victims of alleged U.S.-backed sabotage, framing the revolution explicitly as a socialist endeavor opposed by imperialism.[75][138] The Bay of Pigs invasion commenced on April 17, 1961, when approximately 1,400 CIA-trained Cuban exiles from Brigade 2506 landed at Playa Girón on Cuba's southern coast, aiming to spark a popular uprising against Castro's government. Cuban forces, forewarned by intelligence and reinforced with air defenses, swiftly countered the assault; by April 19, the invaders were defeated, with Cuban casualties estimated at around 176 killed and over 300 wounded, while the brigade suffered 118 deaths, 360 wounded, and 1,202 captured. The operation's failure stemmed from inadequate U.S. air support—President John F. Kennedy withheld promised strikes—and the exiles' inability to secure local support, as Castro's propaganda portrayed the event as Yankee aggression, consolidating his domestic control and prompting him to proclaim victory over "mercenaries" on May 1, 1961.[139][136][139] Emboldened by the rout, Castro accelerated alignment with Moscow, signing a secret military aid pact with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in mid-1961 and publicly affirming his Marxist-Leninist convictions on December 2, 1961, which solidified Cuba's pivot toward the Eastern Bloc. This dependence intensified in 1962 when the Soviets, responding to Castro's fears of further U.S. incursions, began secretly deploying medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to Cuba in July, alongside IL-28 bombers and troops numbering up to 42,000 by October. U.S. U-2 spy planes detected the sites on October 14, 1962, triggering a naval "quarantine" on October 22 and bringing the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war; Castro, advocating total commitment, urged Khrushchev via cable on October 26 to launch a preemptive nuclear strike if U.S. forces invaded, revealing his willingness to risk Cuba's annihilation despite limited defensive readiness against a full-scale assault.[140][141][142] The crisis resolved on October 28, 1962, when Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and the secret withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey, though Castro felt sidelined by the deal and initially refused UN inspections. Post-crisis, Soviet troop levels in Cuba dropped from over 40,000 to about 11,000 by mid-1963, but economic subsidies from Moscow—reaching $5 billion annually by the late 1970s—ensured Cuba's viability as a Soviet proxy, while the U.S. codified a comprehensive embargo on February 7, 1962, prohibiting nearly all trade to isolate the regime.[140][143][144] This period cemented Castro's rule through external patronage, transforming Cuba into a frontline state in the Cold War while exposing the regime's strategic vulnerabilities without superpower escalation.[136]Export of Revolution and Support for Insurgencies: 1960s–1980s
Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro endorsed the foco theory of guerrilla warfare, which contended that a small, vanguard group of armed insurgents could serve as a catalytic spark for popular uprising, bypassing the need for extensive mass organization as theorized by earlier Marxist doctrines. This approach, articulated by Castro and amplified by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, inspired Cuban-backed expeditions across Latin America in the 1960s, but most proved abortive due to insufficient local peasant mobilization and hostile terrain. Guevara's 1966–1967 campaign in Bolivia, supported logistically from Cuba, collapsed amid isolation from rural populations and Bolivian army encirclement, culminating in his capture and execution on October 9, 1967; the failure stemmed from misjudging Bolivia's fragmented social structures, where no unified revolutionary base existed akin to Cuba's pre-1959 conditions.[145][146] Similar setbacks marked Cuban efforts in Venezuela, where support for the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) guerrillas in the early 1960s—via arms, training, and infiltration—fizzled by 1967 amid government crackdowns and lack of urban-rural synergy, prompting Castro to recalibrate toward protracted political subversion over pure foco adventurism. Cuba established international training facilities, such as the Point Murdock camp near Havana, where insurgents from groups including Colombian FARC precursors and Basque ETA militants received instruction in sabotage, weaponry, and ideology during the 1960s and 1970s; these programs, coordinated through entities like the National Liberation Directorate, extended to Palestinian factions tied to the PLO, fostering anti-Western networks despite operational divergences from Cuban rural foco models. By the late 1960s, reflective of these debacles, Cuban strategy evolved to prioritize elite cadre preparation over spontaneous focos, though exported violence persisted in hybrid forms.[147][148][149] In the 1970s and 1980s, Castro's regime shifted toward bolstering established insurgencies and nascent revolutionary governments, supplying Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) with military advisors, intelligence, and materiel both pre- and post-1979 triumph; by 1985, approximately 2,500 Cuban military personnel advised Sandinista forces, aiding army expansion to over 50,000 troops amid contra warfare, though exact Cuban financial outlays remain opaque beyond Soviet-channeled bloc aid exceeding $3 billion annually by mid-decade. Support extended to Grenada's New Jewel Movement under Maurice Bishop after its 1979 coup, including arms transshipments via Guyana, construction of infrastructure like the Point Salines airport with Cuban labor (over 1,000 workers by 1983), and military training that aligned the island with Havana's anti-imperial axis until Bishop's 1983 execution and subsequent U.S. intervention dismantled the regime. Cuba also harbored fugitives from Western security forces, granting asylum to Black Panther Party members like Assata Shakur in 1984 after her U.S. escape and to ETA operatives such as José Ángel Urtiaga, sheltering Basque bombers responsible for civilian attacks in Spain.[150][151][152] These initiatives yielded mixed, predominantly pyrrhic results: FARC endured as a narco-insurgent force but failed to seize state power until late 20th-century negotiations; Sandinista rule eroded under economic strain, losing power in 1990 elections; Grenada's experiment imploded internally; and myriad foco-inspired bands were eradicated by counterinsurgency. The pattern underscored causal disconnects—ideological export ignored variances in recipient societies' readiness for armed upheaval, fostering dependency on Havana's subsidies while alienating moderates. In 1982, the U.S. designated Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism, citing repeated provision of safe haven, training, and lethal aid to groups engaging in bombings, kidnappings, and subversion across the hemisphere, a status reflecting empirical documentation of Havana's role in proxy violence despite protestations of anti-colonial solidarity.[153][154]Military Adventures in Africa and Latin America: 1975–1991
Cuba initiated large-scale military interventions in Africa starting in 1975, deploying combat troops to bolster Soviet-aligned Marxist regimes amid Cold War proxy conflicts, while providing more limited advisory support in Latin America. These operations, directed by Fidel Castro, involved rotating hundreds of thousands of personnel over nearly two decades, resulting in significant Cuban casualties and resource diversion that strained the island's economy despite Soviet subsidies. The deployments aimed to counter Western and South African influence but yielded negligible long-term strategic gains for Cuba, serving primarily as extensions of ideological solidarity rather than direct national interests.[155][156] The most extensive commitment was in Angola, where Operation Carlota commenced on November 5, 1975, with Cuban forces intervening to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against South African incursions and the U.S.-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). By 1976, Cuban troop levels reached approximately 36,000, escalating to peaks of 40,000 in the mid-1980s amid intensified fighting. Over the 16-year engagement ending in 1991, roughly 337,000 Cuban military personnel rotated through Angola, alongside about 50,000 civilians in support roles. Cuban deaths exceeded 2,000, with total casualties numbering in the thousands by the conflict's close. These forces helped secure Luanda and repel South African advances but prolonged a civil war that persisted beyond Cuban withdrawal, facilitated by 1988 peace accords amid declining Soviet support.[157][155][158] In Ethiopia, Cuba dispatched combat troops during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War to assist the Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam against Somali invasion, coordinating closely with Soviet advisors who shifted allegiance from Somalia to Ethiopia. Cuban forces numbered around 16,000 at peak involvement, participating in key counteroffensives such as the Battle of Harar, where they engaged Somali troops alongside Ethiopian units backed by Soviet airpower and artillery. This intervention, peaking in early 1978, contributed to Ethiopia's recapture of the Ogaden region by March 1978, but at the cost of several hundred Cuban fatalities integrated into broader African war losses. The operation exemplified Soviet orchestration of Cuban deployments, with Moscow providing logistical and arms support valued at hundreds of millions in aid packages.[159][160][161] In Latin America, Cuban military involvement from 1975 to 1991 emphasized advisory and training roles rather than mass troop deployments, focusing on insurgent groups in countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador to export revolution without the scale seen in Africa. Castro's regime supplied arms, instructors, and limited special forces to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua post-1979 and FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador, but avoided committing regular army units en masse due to U.S. proximity and naval superiority risks. These efforts inflicted modest costs compared to African operations but faced setbacks, such as Sandinista electoral defeat in 1990, underscoring the interventions' peripheral strategic value.[162] The cumulative human toll exceeded 5,000 Cuban deaths across African theaters by the late 1970s alone, with full-period figures higher amid ongoing Angola combat. Economically, the ventures drained Cuba's limited resources, necessitating sustained Soviet funding that masked domestic shortages and rationing even during subsidy peaks; total intervention expenditures, including transport and sustainment, contributed to fiscal pressures that intensified after 1991 Soviet collapse. Withdrawals accelerated with the Cold War's end, culminating in Angola's full Cuban exit by May 1991, marking the cessation of these overseas commitments without commensurate returns for Cuba's development or security.[163][164][165]Later Governance and Institutionalization
One-Party State and Constitutional Changes: 1976–1990s
In 1976, Cuba adopted a new constitution that formalized the socialist character of the state and entrenched the monopoly of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the sole guiding force in society and government. Drafted following the First PCC Congress in 1975, the document was approved by referendum on February 24, 1976, with official turnout reported at over 97% and approval at 99%. Article 1 declared Cuba a "socialist state of workers," while Article 5 explicitly designated the PCC as the "higher leading force of society and of the State," prohibiting any competing political organizations and institutionalizing one-party rule. This framework eliminated provisions for multi-party competition or independent electoral candidacies, vesting supreme authority in the National Assembly of People's Power, whose delegates were nominated through PCC-controlled processes.[166][167][168] The 1976 constitution also concentrated executive power in Fidel Castro, who was elected President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers by the National Assembly on December 2, 1976, assuming the roles of head of state and government alongside his position as PCC First Secretary and Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. No term limits were established for these offices, enabling indefinite tenure subject only to PCC endorsement and assembly approval. Subsequent National Assembly elections in 1981, 1986, and 1993 reaffirmed Castro's positions through non-competitive processes where candidates were pre-selected by party commissions, with voter participation framed as endorsement of the revolutionary leadership rather than choice among alternatives. This structure ensured Castro's unchallenged authority, with the constitution's Article 91 granting the president broad decree powers, further centralizing control.[166][169][170] Amid economic pressures in the early 1990s, the constitution underwent amendments ratified by the National Assembly on July 12, 1992, introducing limited adjustments to religious policy and economic provisions while preserving the PCC's monopoly and socialist foundations. Article 42 was revised to remove the state's prior endorsement of "scientific materialism" (Marxist atheism), permitting religious belief among Communist Party members and declaring Cuba a secular state, though religious organizations remained barred from political activity. Economically, changes allowed foreign investment and joint ventures under state control, with Article 16 modified to recognize private cooperatives and limited self-employment, but these were subordinate to centralized planning and did not alter the prohibition on private ownership of production means. These reforms maintained the one-party framework, with Castro re-elected to his posts in the ensuing assembly cycle, underscoring the constitution's role in perpetuating authoritarian continuity.[170][171]Crises under Reagan, Gorbachev, and Post-Soviet Era: 1980s–2000
In April 1980, following protests at the Peruvian embassy in Havana, Fidel Castro permitted the Mariel boatlift, allowing approximately 125,000 Cubans to flee to the United States over the following months.[172] This exodus included an estimated 1.5 to 4 percent of participants who were convicted criminals released from Cuban prisons, a deliberate tactic by the regime to offload social undesirables including common criminals and individuals from mental institutions onto the U.S.[173] The influx strained U.S. resources in Florida, prompting tightened immigration policies under President Ronald Reagan, who assumed office in January 1981 and viewed the event as evidence of Cuban oppression.[172] Reagan escalated pressures on Cuba through ideological countermeasures, launching Radio Martí on May 20, 1985, a U.S.-funded shortwave station broadcasting uncensored news and information into Cuba to counter state propaganda.[174] Cuba responded by attempting to jam the signal and suspending a bilateral immigration agreement, further isolating the island amid ongoing U.S. economic sanctions.[174] These actions compounded Cuba's reliance on Soviet subsidies, which peaked at around $4-6 billion annually in the early 1980s but began eroding as Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika reforms from 1985 onward prioritized Soviet domestic recovery over foreign aid commitments.[118] By the late 1980s, Gorbachev's policies had significantly reduced preferential trade terms and oil shipments to Cuba, signaling the impending collapse of the subsidy system as the USSR grappled with its own economic stagnation.[175] In response to internal dissent and external vulnerabilities, Castro orchestrated the 1989 trial and execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa, a decorated military hero from Cuban interventions in Africa, along with three associates on July 13 for alleged drug trafficking and corruption—charges widely interpreted as pretexts for eliminating a potential rival amid regime paranoia.[176][177] This purge underscored Castro's intolerance for perceived disloyalty as Soviet support waned. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 triggered the "Special Period" of severe economic crisis in Cuba, characterized by shortages of fuel, food, and medicine, with GDP contracting by over 35 percent between 1990 and 1993.[118] Castro maintained power through rationing, limited private enterprise allowances, and repression of dissent, but external diplomatic overtures offered temporary respite. Pope John Paul II's visit in January 1998 drew massive crowds and prompted Castro to release over 300 political prisoners and reinstate Christmas as a holiday, though these concessions were short-lived and did not alter the one-party system's core controls.[178] By 2000, persistent U.S. pressures under the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 had further constrained foreign investment, leaving Cuba's economy in prolonged stagnation without Soviet backing.[179]Battle of Ideas and Final Reforms: 2000–2006
In the early 2000s, Fidel Castro launched the "Battle of Ideas," an ideological campaign emphasizing socialist mobilization against perceived capitalist encroachment, particularly from the United States. This initiative, which gained prominence after 2000, involved widespread public rallies, expanded state-funded programs in education and healthcare, and efforts to promote Cuban biotechnology exports, all conducted amid persistent poverty and resource shortages following the Soviet collapse. Key components included the "Yo sí puedo" adult literacy drive, which claimed to eradicate illiteracy in targeted regions, and the 2004–2006 "Energy Revolution," replacing outdated appliances with Chinese-supplied efficient models to reduce blackouts, though implementation relied heavily on imported goods and labor-intensive distributions.[180] These efforts prioritized ideological reinforcement over structural economic changes, with Castro framing them as defenses of Cuban sovereignty, yet they exacerbated fiscal strains without addressing core productivity issues. Cuba's external dependencies shifted toward Venezuela after Hugo Chávez's 1998 election, culminating in a October 2000 agreement for preferential oil sales—initially up to 53,000 barrels daily—in exchange for Cuban doctors, teachers, and technical advisors dispatched to Venezuelan "Barrio Adentro" clinics. By 2005, this "oil-for-doctors" barter supplied over 90,000 barrels per day, stabilizing energy imports and generating revenue from medical missions, which Castro touted as a model of South-South solidarity substituting lost Soviet subsidies.[181][182] The arrangement deepened through joint ventures, including literacy programs in Venezuela using Cuban methods, but tied Cuba's economy to Venezuelan stability, with medical exports comprising a growing share of hard currency earnings. Domestic dissent faced severe repression in the March 2003 "Black Spring" arrests, when state security forces detained 75 activists, journalists, and librarians over three days starting March 18, accusing them of collaborating with U.S. interests amid tightened Washington policies. Trials resulted in sentences averaging 18 years, with some exceeding 25 years, conducted under laws criminalizing unauthorized foreign funding and "enemy propaganda"; international observers, including Amnesty International, documented procedural flaws and coerced confessions.[183][184][185] The crackdown prompted European Union measures in June 2003, suspending high-level diplomatic visits and directing ambassadors to attend dissident events at receptions, which Havana denounced as interference; partial EU-Cuba dialogue resumed in 2005 after Havana pledged human rights discussions, though full sanctions lifted only in 2008.[186][187] Economic concessions remained tightly controlled, with Castro reversing select 1990s liberalizations via the Battle of Ideas framework, such as phasing out dollar-only stores in 2004 to recentralize commerce, while issuing limited new licenses for self-employment in areas like small repairs and tutoring to absorb underemployed workers without endorsing private enterprise. By 2006, these allowances numbered in the low thousands annually, far below pre-crisis peaks, reflecting Castro's insistence on state oversight to prevent "ideological contamination," as state media reported GDP growth above 10% driven by Venezuelan aid and nickel exports rather than domestic productivity gains.[188]Decline, Succession, and Death
Health Crisis and Provisional Handover: 2006
On July 31, 2006, the Cuban government announced that Fidel Castro, aged 79, had experienced a severe intestinal crisis involving sustained bleeding, necessitating emergency surgery for complications from diverticulitis, including a perforation of the large intestine.[189] [190] The condition was attributed in part to stress from a recent trip to Argentina, though Cuban authorities provided limited medical details, maintaining secrecy typical of the regime's control over information.[191] In a proclamation drafted by Castro and read on state television by Raúl Castro, Fidel provisionally delegated his responsibilities as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, President of the Council of State, and Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces to his brother Raúl, then 75 and serving as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and Vice President.[192] [190] Castro emphasized the handover's temporary nature, stating he had no intention of clinging to power and rejecting resignation, while instructing officials to avoid displays of grief or mourning that could signal finality.[190] This marked the first public transfer of authority in nearly five decades of Castro's rule, revealing pre-existing succession arrangements centered on Raúl, who had long been positioned as the regime's second-in-command through military and party roles.[193] The opacity of Castro's health status fueled U.S. intelligence assessments, which speculated on causes ranging from acute diverticulitis to possible terminal cancer based on indirect indicators like leaked photos and symptoms, but lacked definitive confirmation due to Cuba's information blackout.[194] [195] American officials viewed the crisis as potentially permanent, predicting Castro's incapacity to resume full duties, though Cuban denials and controlled releases—such as later images of a frail Castro—perpetuated uncertainty.[196] Under Raúl's acting presidency, the Cuban government maintained operational stability with no immediate policy shifts or internal upheavals, as state media portrayed continuity and downplayed the event's gravity.[197] Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage indicated Castro's absence would last "some weeks," fostering expectations of recovery, yet international observers speculated on the handover's potential permanence given Castro's age and the regime's history of concealing leader vulnerabilities.[198] This provisional arrangement underscored the centralized, familial nature of power in Cuba's one-party system, with Raúl leveraging military loyalty to ensure seamless administration amid external pressures for democratic transition.[193]Retirement under Raul and Reflections: 2006–2016
Following his provisional handover of power in July 2006 due to illness, Fidel Castro formally resigned as President of the Council of State and Prime Minister on February 19, 2008, in a letter published in the state newspaper Granma, stating he would not seek or accept another term to avoid endangering the revolution's continuity.[199][200] His brother Raúl Castro, who had assumed provisional duties, was elected to the presidency by the National Assembly on February 24, 2008, marking the first leadership transition in Cuba in nearly five decades.[9] Under Raúl Castro's leadership, Cuba pursued pragmatic economic adjustments diverging from Fidel's more orthodox socialist model, including the legalization of limited private enterprise such as self-employment in over 200 categories by 2011 and the distribution of idle state land to individuals for farming to boost agricultural output.[201] In April 2011, Raúl proposed constitutional term limits for political leaders, restricting service to no more than two five-year terms to promote "rejuvenation" of the Communist Party leadership and combat stagnation, a policy he applied to himself by stepping down as president in 2018.[202][203] These reforms aimed to address economic inefficiencies without abandoning socialism, though Fidel expressed reservations in private, viewing them as necessary concessions amid Cuba's fiscal constraints.[204] Sidelined from formal governance, Fidel maintained influence through written commentary, authoring over 300 "Reflections" columns published in Granma from 2007 to 2016, which critiqued global capitalism, U.S. imperialism, and Western policies while defending revolutionary principles.[205] Examples include warnings against neoliberal excesses in Europe and praise for anti-imperialist solidarity, such as in a 2014 reflection on Angola's role in socialist struggles.[206] He extended advice to allies like Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, sending letters in March 2015 lauding the Venezuelan armed forces' discipline against perceived U.S. threats and in December 2015 encouraging resilience after opposition electoral gains, framing such setbacks as tests of revolutionary fortitude.[207][208] Fidel adopted a low public profile, with appearances limited to rare, controlled events, such as greeting Venezuelan tourists at a Havana school on March 30, 2015—his first in 14 months—and visiting another school on April 7, 2016, to commemorate a revolutionary figure, alongside a brief showing at the Cuban Communist Party congress on December 1, 2016.[209][210][211] The Castro family's grip on security persisted, exemplified by Raúl's son Alejandro Castro Espín, a colonel in the Interior Ministry who rose to oversee military intelligence and participated in secret U.S.-Cuba negotiations by 2013, ensuring continuity in repressive apparatuses amid leadership shifts.[212][213]Death and Immediate Aftermath: 2016
Fidel Castro died on November 25, 2016, at the age of 90 from natural causes in Havana.[214] [215] His brother, President Raúl Castro, announced the death on Cuban state television that evening, stating it occurred at 22:29 local time and declaring nine days of national mourning from November 26 to December 4.[216] [215] Castro's body was cremated shortly after, and his ashes were placed in an urn that embarked on a four-day convoy journey from Havana to Santiago de Cuba, retracing in reverse the route of the 1959 revolutionary caravan, drawing crowds of supporters along the approximately 1,000-kilometer path.[217] [218] The ashes were interred on December 4 in a private ceremony at the Santa Ifigenia Cemetery in Santiago, near the mausoleum of José Martí.[219] In a speech during the funeral rites, Raúl Castro pledged fidelity to his brother's revolutionary principles, vowing to uphold the socialist system and resist any deviations toward capitalism.[220] He affirmed that no statues of Fidel Castro would be erected, no public places named after him, and no cult of personality fostered, in line with Fidel's own directives expressed in his 2010 reflection La Historia me absolverá and subsequent writings prohibiting personal veneration.[221] [222] This commitment was codified in Cuba's 2019 constitution, which bans such honors for revolutionary leaders.[220] Economic policy under Raúl showed no immediate acceleration toward market liberalization following the death; instead, the government emphasized continuity of state control, with ongoing restrictions on private enterprise and no reversal of the centralized planning model despite prior incremental reforms.[220] International responses were polarized: U.S. President Barack Obama issued a statement offering condolences to the Castro family and extending a "hand of friendship" to the Cuban people, while avoiding direct praise of Fidel's rule.[223] [224] In contrast, Cuban dissidents and exiles in Miami celebrated the event with street gatherings, viewing it as the end of an era of repression, though such expressions were limited outside Cuba.[225] Within Cuba, the regime suppressed potential dissent; prominent opposition groups like the Ladies in White canceled planned marches amid threats of arrest, and authorities detained or surveilled activists to enforce public mourning and prevent unauthorized protests.[226] [227]Ideology and Worldview
Adaptation of Marxism-Leninism
Castro's ideological framework fused Marxism-Leninism with Cuban nationalism, positing a continuity between the 19th-century independence leader José Martí's anti-imperialist thought and Marxist-Leninist principles, thereby framing the revolution as a national rather than imported doctrine.[228] This adaptation rejected a wholesale adoption of the Soviet model, instead promoting "Cuban socialism" that prioritized voluntarism and the creation of the "New Man" through ideological commitment over purely material motivations.[229] In the mid-1960s, amid the Great Debate on economic organization, Castro endorsed central planning augmented by moral incentives—such as voluntary labor brigades and socialist emulation campaigns—to foster collective consciousness, diverging from Soviet emphases on wage differentials and profit signals.[230] The consolidation of power in the 1960s marked a pivot from initial revolutionary pluralism to strict Leninist vanguardism. While early manifestos of the 26th of July Movement in 1957 promised multiparty elections and democratic reforms post-Batista, Castro's April 1961 declaration of the revolution's socialist character dissolved competing factions into unified structures under his direction.[231] By 1962, all revolutionary organizations merged into the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, evolving in 1965 into the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) as the singular vanguard of the proletariat, enforcing doctrinal orthodoxy and suppressing internal dissent.[228] This shift entrenched economic centralism, with state control over production persisting despite evident inefficiencies in output targets, as ideological purity trumped pragmatic adjustments.[230] Castro critiqued deviations from orthodox Marxism-Leninism, including Maoism and Eurocommunism, to safeguard Cuban alignment with Soviet principles while asserting autonomy. He respected Mao Zedong's revolutionary contributions but rejected aspects of Chinese policy, particularly after the 1972 Sino-U.S. rapprochement, viewing Beijing as compromising with imperialism and undermining Cuba's isolation.[232] Similarly, Castro denounced Eurocommunism's advocacy for parliamentary roads to socialism and rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat as revisionist dilutions that eroded class struggle, positioning Cuba's model as a purer adherence to Leninist discipline amid global communist fractures.[233] These stances reinforced the PCC's monopoly, blending nationalist exceptionalism with centralized authority to legitimize adaptations as contextually necessary rather than opportunistic.Anti-Imperialism, Third Worldism, and Personal Doctrines
Fidel Castro's anti-imperialist doctrine positioned the United States as an existential and perpetual adversary to Cuba and the broader Third World, framing U.S. actions as aggressive expansionism that necessitated perpetual vigilance and justified internal security measures.[234][235] In speeches such as his 1966 address to the Tricontinental Conference, Castro described imperialism as a monolithic force led by the U.S., urging revolutionary violence against it while dismissing internal dissent as complicit with external enemies.[234] This worldview, rooted in Castro's interpretation of historical U.S. interventions in Latin America, portrayed Cuba's survival as a frontline struggle that legitimized repression of opposition as defense against infiltration.[236][237] Castro elevated this anti-imperialism through leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), serving as its chairman from 1979 to 1983 after hosting the sixth summit in Havana.[238] At the 1979 opening, he assailed U.S. policies as hegemonic, using the platform to align non-aligned states against Western dominance despite Cuba's deepening Soviet ties, which strained the movement's neutrality principles.[239][240] His tenure emphasized economic demands on industrialized nations, positioning NAM as a Third World counterweight, though critics noted Castro's personal ambition amplified Cuba's role beyond its economic weight.[241] Third Worldism under Castro extended solidarity to developing nations as a mechanism for exporting revolutionary ideals, with Cuba cast as a moral vanguard against exploitation.[242] In rhetoric, Castro invoked Cuba's sacrifices—such as enduring the U.S. embargo—as emblematic of global inequities, urging unity in forums like the 1966 Tricontinental where he called for creating "two, three, many Vietnams" to bleed imperial powers.[234] This doctrine blended ideological fervor with personal narrative, as Castro's speeches often centered Cuba's disproportionate contributions to internationalism as proof of superior ethical commitment, fostering a self-image of selfless leadership amid domestic hardships.[243] Personal doctrines infused Castro's worldview with messianic elements, where his ego manifested in claims of Cuba's unique moral authority derived from revolutionary purity.[244] He frequently depicted himself and Cuba as the conscience of the oppressed, as in declarations emphasizing the revolution's prestige compelling Third World allegiance despite isolation.[243] Yet, post-Cold War realities exposed inconsistencies: while rejecting Soviet perestroika as revisionist, Castro pragmatically pursued European investments and diversified trade to sustain the regime, softening export of revolution in favor of survival without fully abandoning anti-U.S. invective.[118] This shift prioritized doctrinal rhetoric over rigid application, revealing anti-imperialism as adaptable to geopolitical necessities rather than immutable principle.[245]Personal Life
Family, Relationships, and Children
Fidel Castro married Mirta Díaz-Balart, a member of a prominent Cuban family, in October 1948; the union produced one son, Fidel Ángel "Fidelito" Castro Díaz-Balart, born on September 1, 1949, before ending in divorce in 1955 amid ideological differences and Castro's revolutionary activities.[9][246] Castro's first marriage was marked by infidelity, including an affair with Natalia Revuelta Clews beginning around 1955, which resulted in the birth of their daughter, Alina Fernández Revuelta, on March 19, 1956; Revuelta, initially a supporter of the revolution, later remained in Cuba while Alina defected to the United States in 1993, publicly criticizing her father as authoritarian and expressing no close personal bond with him.[247][248] In the early 1960s, Castro entered a long-term relationship with Dalia Soto del Valle, a schoolteacher, whom he reportedly married around 1980; they had five sons—Ángel, Antonio, Alejandro, Alexis, and Alex—born between 1962 and 1974, who maintained low public profiles and resided with their mother in relative seclusion in Havana.[9][249] Castro acknowledged at least nine children in total, though estimates suggest up to eleven from various relationships, with details often obscured by state secrecy and the regime's control over personal narratives; his eldest son, Fidelito, a nuclear physicist who briefly held government positions, faced personal struggles culminating in his suicide on February 1, 2018, reflecting broader familial tensions under the revolutionary government's pressures.[250][246] Castro's family dynamics were fractured by political divisions, as evidenced by his sister Juana "Juanita" Castro Ruz, who initially aided the revolution but broke with her brothers over communist policies, collaborating with the CIA, fleeing to exile in the United States in 1964, and maintaining no contact with Fidel for over five decades until his death.[251][252] While some relatives, including Raúl Castro's family, held influential roles in the regime, exiles like Alina and Juanita highlighted the personal costs of Castro's rule, with public accounts portraying a patriarch whose absences and ideological demands alienated kin.[248][246]Health Issues, Habits, and Lifestyle
Castro was renowned for his prodigious cigar consumption, often smoking up to a dozen Cohiba cigars daily, a habit emblematic of Cuban revolutionary culture until he abruptly quit on August 26, 1985, amid a government-led anti-smoking initiative to set a personal example for public health.[253][254] His unkempt beard, initially grown during the 1956–1959 guerrilla campaign in the Sierra Maestra due to scarce razors and soap, evolved into an enduring symbol of revolutionary authenticity and defiance, retained long after victory despite opportunities to groom.[255][256] Castro adhered to punishing work routines, routinely laboring 15 to 18 hours daily across seven days a week—often reviewing documents until dawn and sleeping only three to four hours—sustaining this pace into his later decades despite evident physical toll.[257] These habits underscored Castro's projected image of ascetic revolutionary vigor, yet his longevity amid persistent threats highlighted underlying vulnerabilities; Cuban intelligence documented over 600 assassination plots against him from 1959 onward, with declassified U.S. records confirming at least a dozen CIA-backed schemes involving poisons, explosives, and mob intermediaries between 1960 and 1965 alone.[258][259] No attempts succeeded, but the cumulative stress compounded health risks, culminating in acute diverticulitis in July 2006; emergency surgery resected portions of his colon amid perforations and hemorrhaging, triggering life-threatening infections, sepsis, and a prolonged recovery that forced provisional delegation of duties to Raúl Castro on July 31.[189][260][261] Publicly, Castro embodied socialist austerity—eschewing personal wealth claims and favoring utilitarian attire—but private accounts reveal discrepancies, including routine use of luxury yachts like the 88-foot Aquarama for coastal excursions and access to secluded retreats such as Cayo Piedra on Cuba's southern shore, equipped for leisure pursuits including dolphin interactions and gourmet provisioning unavailable to ordinary citizens.[262][263] These privileges, detailed in memoirs by close associates like bodyguard Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, contrasted sharply with the rationed existence imposed on Cubans, though Castro's regime dismissed such reports as fabrications by exiles.[264]Personal Wealth and Elite Privileges
Castro publicly maintained that his official monthly salary as Cuban leader was around 900 Cuban pesos, equivalent to roughly $38 USD at state exchange rates, positioning this as emblematic of his commitment to austerity amid the revolution's emphasis on equality.[265][266] However, this figure contrasted sharply with allegations of substantial hidden wealth; in 2006, Forbes magazine ranked him seventh among the world's richest rulers with an estimated personal fortune of $900 million, derived from presumed skimming of profits from state-controlled enterprises like sugar mills, nickel mines, and tourism operations, excluding rumored offshore holdings.[267][268] Castro dismissed these estimates as "slanderous lies" fabricated by capitalist media, insisting no evidence existed for personal enrichment and attributing any resources to state needs rather than private gain.[265][269] Defectors and biographers have detailed Castro's control over elite amenities inaccessible to the general populace, which endured rationing of basics like food and fuel for decades. Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, Castro's personal bodyguard from 1994 to 2008 who later defected and authored The Double Life of Fidel Castro, alleged that Castro oversaw approximately 20 luxury residences across Cuba, including the fortified Punto Cero compound west of Havana spanning 75 acres with a 50-foot swimming pool, private shooting range, organic farm, and menagerie of exotic animals sustained by imported feed.[270][271] These properties reportedly featured air-conditioned quarters stocked with fine liquors, gourmet foods, and luxury vehicles like Mercedes-Benzes, sourced via diplomatic channels or black-market imports while ordinary Cubans queued for meager allocations.[263][264] Sánchez further claimed Castro enjoyed a private Caribbean island retreat at Cayo Piedra south of the Bay of Pigs, equipped with a dolphin-filled pool and staffed kitchens preparing meals from rare seafood and imported ingredients, alongside an 88-foot Italian yacht named Aquarama II for personal excursions.[270][272] Cuban officials and state media rejected such accounts as defamatory exaggerations by disgruntled exiles seeking to undermine the regime, maintaining that all facilities served official or security purposes without personal extravagance.[265] While direct proof of Swiss accounts or foreign family estates remains elusive and unconfirmed by independent audits—given Cuba's opacity on leadership finances—these testimonies underscore persistent claims of hypocrisy between Castro's professed solidarity with the proletariat and the insulated privileges afforded to him and select inner-circle associates.[269][273]Legacy and Assessments
Claimed Achievements: Education, Healthcare, and Social Metrics
The Cuban government launched a national literacy campaign in 1961, mobilizing approximately 268,000 volunteers, including students and workers, to teach reading and writing skills to an estimated 707,000 illiterate individuals, primarily in rural areas.[274] This effort reportedly reduced the illiteracy rate from 23.6% in 1959—equivalent to a literacy rate of about 76.4%, which was already among the higher figures in Latin America—to under 4% by the end of the year, as verified by a United Nations study.[275] By 2021, Cuba's adult literacy rate reached 99.8%, according to World Bank data, reflecting sustained emphasis on basic education access.[276] Proponents attribute these gains to the campaign's mass mobilization and subsequent policies mandating universal free education through university level, though curricula have incorporated heavy ideological content aligned with Marxist-Leninist principles. Cuba's healthcare system, established post-1959, provides free universal coverage through a network of neighborhood clinics and polyclinics, emphasizing preventive care and community-based medicine. Life expectancy at birth rose to 78.09 years in 2023, up from approximately 64 years in 1960.[277] The infant mortality rate declined to 6.6 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2023, from around 37.5 in 1960, positioning Cuba comparably to developed nations in this metric despite economic constraints.[278] These outcomes are cited by supporters as evidence of effective resource allocation toward primary care, with a physician density of about 8.4 per 1,000 people domestically in recent years. However, the export of over 50,000 Cuban medical personnel to foreign missions as of 2015—generating revenue for the state—has contributed to periodic shortages and overburdened facilities at home.[279] Social metrics under the regime include increased female labor force participation, which grew from 13% in 1953 to 38.3% by the late revolutionary period, facilitated by policies promoting women's entry into technical and professional roles, reaching 44% overall by the 2000s.[280] On racial equality, the government claims progress through the abolition of formal discrimination and expanded access to education and jobs for Afro-Cubans, who comprised a significant portion of literacy campaign beneficiaries, building on pre-revolutionary urban advancements where Cuba already ranked high in Latin American health and education indicators, such as fourth in regional literacy and eleventh globally in doctors per capita.[5] These developments are framed by proponents as leveling longstanding disparities rooted in colonial and Batista-era inequalities, though empirical data on sustained racial parity in outcomes remains mixed.Criticisms: Human Rights Abuses, Economic Ruin, and Totalitarianism
The Castro regime's human rights record includes extensive executions, political imprisonments, and suppression of dissent. Estimates of direct and indirect deaths attributable to the regime range from 35,000 to 141,000, with a median of 73,000 according to democide scholar R.J. Rummel, encompassing executions, prison fatalities, and deaths in forced labor.[281] The Cuba Archive has documented 7,193 specific cases of deaths resulting from regime actions, including executions and killings at sea during escape attempts.[281] In the immediate post-revolutionary period from 1959 onward, approximately 5,000 individuals were executed, often after summary trials for alleged collaboration with the prior Batista government.[281] Political imprisonment affected hundreds of thousands over Castro's rule, with forced labor camps such as the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP) operating from 1965 to 1968 to reeducate perceived social deviants, including Jehovah's Witnesses, homosexuals, and intellectuals.[281] Amnesty International reports persistent patterns of torture, including beatings, prolonged isolation, and denial of medical care for political prisoners, with inhumane detention conditions exacerbating health crises like tuberculosis outbreaks.[282][283] Cuba's economy under Castro deteriorated due to centralized planning, nationalization of industries, and reliance on Soviet subsidies, which masked underlying inefficiencies until their abrupt end in 1991. This triggered a 35% contraction in GDP during the ensuing "Special Period," marked by widespread malnutrition, blackouts, and a near-collapse of basic services from 1991 to 1994.[4] Annual GDP growth averaged -1.4% from 1990 to 2000, the lowest rate across Latin America, reflecting failed agricultural collectivization and industrial mismanagement that reduced sugar production—the nation's historical mainstay—from 8 million tons in 1990 to under 4 million by 2000.[4] By 2001, Cuba ranked as the third-poorest country in Latin America by per capita GDP, trailing even nations like Haiti and Nicaragua despite pre-revolutionary advantages in infrastructure and literacy.[133] Over 2 million Cubans emigrated during and after Castro's tenure, fleeing economic hardship and repression, with notable waves including the 1980 Mariel boatlift that saw 125,000 depart in five months amid protests against shortages and confinement.[281][284] Chronic dependency cycles, including later Venezuelan oil aid, perpetuated poverty, with investment rates averaging just 12.7% of GDP over two decades—among the region's lowest—and resulting in persistent food insecurity affecting over 80% of the population by the 2010s.[285] Castro's governance entrenched totalitarianism through a one-party system dominated by the Communist Party of Cuba, established as the sole legal political entity by 1965, which monopolized power and prohibited opposition parties or independent unions.[7] Surveillance was institutionalized via the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, neighborhood watch groups formed in 1960 that by 1990 encompassed over 90% of the population in monitoring for "counter-revolutionary" behavior, fostering self-censorship and informant networks.[7] Initial revolutionary pledges for multiparty elections and a constituent assembly, articulated in Castro's 1959 manifestos, were abandoned; no competitive national elections occurred, enabling his unchallenged leadership until 2008.[286] Independent media and expression faced systematic elimination, with laws like the 1961 Revolutionary Offensive criminalizing dissent as "enemy propaganda," leading to the shutdown of non-state outlets and imprisonment of journalists. This stifled innovation and civil society, as state control over education, arts, and science prioritized ideological conformity over empirical inquiry, contributing to technological lag evidenced by Cuba's failure to develop indigenous computing or advanced manufacturing despite early literacy gains.[7][286]Diverse Viewpoints: Supporters, Exiles, and International Perspectives
Supporters in Latin America, particularly Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, have portrayed Fidel Castro as an enduring anti-U.S. imperialist icon whose legacy inspires regional alliances like ALBA. In August 2021, Maduro praised Castro's contributions to the Cuban Revolution on the occasion of his birth anniversary, emphasizing continuity in liberation struggles across the Americas. Similarly, Bolivian former President Evo Morales and Maduro jointly urged adherence to Castro's vision for Latin American sovereignty in 2021 statements. These perspectives frame Castro's doctrines as foundational to countering perceived U.S. dominance, though such views often overlook empirical evidence of economic interdependence failures within allied states like Venezuela.[287][288] Cuban exiles, concentrated in Miami's Cuban-American community, consistently depict Castro as the architect of a tyrannical regime, with viewpoints shaped by direct experiences of repression and perpetuated by post-2016 events. The 2021 protests in Cuba, which drew widespread solidarity rallies in Miami, reinforced exiles' narrative of systemic oppression inherited from Castro's rule, including over 1,000 arrests documented in the aftermath. Annual commemorations and activism, such as those marking protest anniversaries, underscore this stance, attributing ongoing hardships to the unchanged authoritarian framework established under Castro.[289][290][291] Internationally, the United Nations General Assembly's annual resolutions condemning the U.S. embargo—passing by margins like 187-2 in 2024—reflect persistent sympathy for Cuba's position, echoing Castro's anti-imperialist rhetoric and garnering support from over 180 nations. However, assessments in the 2020s, particularly following the 2021 protests triggered by acute shortages and blackouts, have highlighted regime continuity under successors as evidence of Castro's model's inherent flaws, with analysts noting suppressed dissent as a direct extension of his governance style. Approaching Castro's 2026 centenary, Cuban state media and allies promote reflections on his ideals as vital for contemporary struggles, while exile communities and independent observers cite enduring crises as indictments of his legacy's viability.[292][293][294][295]References
- https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Proclamation_of_Cuban_transfer_of_duties_2006
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