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Sacred Union of the Nation
Sacred Union of the Nation
Sacred Union of the Nation
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Key Information

The Sacred Union of the Nation (French: Union sacrée de la nation; USN) is the ruling parliamentary coalition within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was formed in December 2020 by Felix Tshisekedi following a falling out between the Heading for Change coalition and Joseph Kabila's Common Front for Congo.[1] After the subsequent four-month-long power struggle, the coalition was able to take control of the government in April 2021.[2] By June 2023, the coalition was made up of 391 members in parliament coming from 24 different political parties.[3] Following its first general, senate, and special elections, as of December 2024, the coalition member parties hold 454 seats in the National Assembly and 95 in the Senate.[4][5][6]

Membership in the Sacred Union is often due to strategic and political motivations rather than ideological similarities with President Tshisekedi and his party.[7] Nonetheless, the coalition maintains a set of goals including security (mainly in the east), investment in infrastructure, promotion of the rule of law, improving its citizens' lives, and implementing electoral reform.[2]

Background

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2018 Election

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In 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) held a long overdue presidential election. The outcome of this election, which became a subject of widespread controversy, ultimately led to the assumption of power by Felix Tshisekedi in January 2019. It is widely speculated that Tshisekedi entered into a secret agreement with outgoing president, Joseph Kabila, just eight days prior to the official release of the election results, to overturn the election.[8]

The secret agreement between Tshisekedi and Kabila allowed for the ladder to retained significant control over governmental decision-making processes through his coalition the Common Front for Congo (FCC). Furthermore, the agreement granted immunity to Kabila and his allies, shielding them from legal repercussions, while also bestowing upon the FCC the authority to appoint important ministerial positions. Consequently, this arrangement left Tshisekedi and his coalition, the Heading for Change (CACH), with limited sway over the national assembly and the senate, both of which were predominantly dominated by the FCC.[8]

Challenging the legitimacy of Tshisekedi's victory, the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo asserted that the true winner of the election was Martin Fayulu, thereby casting doubt on the credibility of the electoral process.[8]

Tshisekedi-Kabila Split

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Much like previous power-sharing deals, the CAHA-FCC alliance proved to be ineffective in providing national security and addressing the economic challenges faced by the country such as its people's poor living conditions.[1] The alliance encountered significant internal conflicts, which emerged when Tshisekedi made critical appointments to military leadership and civilian courts without seeking the endorsement of the FCC. Furthermore, Tshisekedi's decision to appoint two constitutional court judges that were rejected by the FCC further intensified the disagreements.[8]

Another point of conflict centered around the appointment of Ronsard Malonda as the head of the Independent National Electoral Commission by the national assembly without obtaining the consent of President Tshisekedi.[8]

The FCC strongly believed that Tshisekedi's appointments were a deliberate attempt to consolidate his power and distance himself from the coalition before the upcoming 2023 elections. Tshisekedi, on the other hand, held the view that the FCC was impeding the progress of his reform agenda. Consequently, he made the decision to form his own coalition, presumably with the aim of advancing his policy objectives independently.[1][8]

History

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Formation

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On 6 December 2020, following extensive consultations with political parties and influential figures, Tshisekedi declared in an address to the nation that he planned to split off from the FCC and form a new coalition.[9] This decision was met with skepticism, as many considered it to be a risky endeavor that was bound to fail.[1] However, to ensure the success of his new coalition, Tshisekedi employed a persuasive tactic. He issued a warning that if he did not garner enough members to join his coalition, he would dissolve the parliament altogether. This threat created a sense of urgency among the members of parliament, who were concerned about the possibility of losing their jobs in a new election. Consequently, several MPs chose to switch their allegiance to Tshisekedi's newly formed coalition.[1][10]

Additionally, there were individuals who opted to align themselves with the new coalition in exchange for various benefits. Some were enticed by the prospect of gaining new positions within the government, while others were promised that their interests would be safeguarded and looked after.[10]

Government

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The president now has the constitutional court he wanted, the parliament he wanted, the same goes for the Senate, the prime minister and the government. It remains to be seen what he can do with them and how our citizens will respond.

Civil society actor in Kinshasa, [1]

In April 2021, the coalition was finally sworn into government with the approval of 412 members of parliament. The 57-member cabinet notably included 14 women and included a mix of young leaders and established political actors and allies.[1]

In 2022, 14 of the 26 governors, most of whom were members of the FCC, were dismissed by their respective provincial assemblies, which had become predominantly controlled by the Sacred Union. The special elections for the newly vacant positions were marked with irregularities and ended with the Sacred Union gaining control of 12 of the 14 governorships up for election.[11] Controversially, the election in Tshopo resulted in a tie but due to election laws the older candidate, who happened to be a member of the Sacred Union, was declared the winner.[12] The Kisangani Court of Appeals later overturned this decision and forced another election ending with a victory for an independent candidate.[13][14]

Electoral history

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Gubernatorial elections

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Election Seats +/– Position
2022 special elections
11 / 14
 Increase 11 Increase 1st

Members

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497 political parties/groups are signatory members of the USN Charter.[15]

Parties in government

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Former

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sacred Union of the Nation

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The Sacred Union of the Nation (French: Union Sacrée de la Nation, USN) is the ruling parliamentary coalition in the , comprising pro-government parties aligned with President Félix Tshisekedi's administration. Formed in late 2020 amid the dissolution of the prior coalition between Tshisekedi's CACH platform and Joseph Kabila's (FCC), the USN enabled Tshisekedi to assert greater control over the and executive branches. This shift culminated in the April 2021 announcement of a new cabinet explicitly named the "Sacred Union of the Nation" government, consisting of 57 ministers and resolving a prolonged power-sharing deadlock. The 's defining achievement has been its electoral dominance, with USN-affiliated parties capturing nearly 450 of the 500 seats in the during the December 2023 general elections, despite widespread reports of irregularities and opposition boycotts. Controversies surrounding the USN include accusations of electoral manipulation and suppression of dissent, which have strained relations with opposition groups and international observers, though the coalition maintains it represents a unified national front against fragmentation. In September 2025, the USN convened an extraordinary congress focused on refoundation, emphasizing internal cohesion, peace promotion, and countering security threats in eastern DRC amid ongoing insurgencies.

Historical Context

2018 Elections and Initial Power-Sharing

The presidential and legislative elections in the were held on December 30, 2018, following a two-year delay after President Joseph Kabila's second term expired in December 2016. Kabila, constitutionally barred from a third term, declined to run but endorsed Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary of the (FCC), his parliamentary majority coalition. Opposition candidates included of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), leading the Cap pour le Changement (CACH) alliance with , and of the Lamuka coalition. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) declared Tshisekedi the winner with 38.57% of the vote, ahead of Shadary's 23.08% and Fayulu's 20.01%, while FCC secured a legislative exceeding 70% of seats in the . Widespread allegations of undermined the results, with leaked from electronic vote tabulation systems indicating Fayulu received around 60% of votes, suggesting manipulation to favor Tshisekedi over Fayulu in a backroom arrangement with Kabila loyalists. Fayulu rejected the outcome as a "coup d'état-electoral," corroborated by parallel tallies from the and independent monitors documenting irregularities like ballot stuffing and polling station discrepancies in Kabila strongholds. Despite initial skepticism, Western governments, including the and , ultimately recognized Tshisekedi's victory to prioritize stability over contesting the flawed process. The upheld the results on January 20, , paving the way for Tshisekedi's inauguration on January 24 as the first opposition transfer of power since independence, though enabled by undemocratic concessions rather than a clear mandate. Lacking a parliamentary , Tshisekedi entered a pragmatic power-sharing with the FCC in March 2019, formalized through a secret January agreement that allocated control of key institutions. Under the arrangement, Tshisekedi retained the presidency and influence over select security appointments, while the FCC dominated the legislature, appointed the (Sylvain Ilunga in May 2019), and held most ministries, including interior, , and planning, preserving Kabila's de facto leverage. This lopsided division reflected a strategic bargain to avert post-election and deadlock, prioritizing accommodation over electoral .

Tshisekedi-Kabila Alliance and Its Fractures

The Tshisekedi-Kabila alliance, formalized after the December 2018 elections through an informal power-sharing arrangement between President Félix Tshisekedi's Cap pour le Changement (CACH) coalition and Joseph Kabila's Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), initially facilitated joint governance on key appointments and legislative matters. From early 2019, the partners collaborated on passing budgets and nominating officials to ministerial posts, with FCC's parliamentary majority enabling approval of Tshisekedi's nominees in exchange for retaining influence over revenue-generating state enterprises and security appointments. However, this cooperation masked underlying tensions rooted in competing networks, where FCC loyalists controlled access to mineral royalties and public contracts, limiting Tshisekedi's ability to redirect resources toward his reform agenda. By mid-2020, disputes intensified over control of independent institutions, particularly the , the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), and apparatus. Tshisekedi sought to replace FCC-aligned figures, including attempts to oust CENI president Corneille Nangaa, whose tenure was extended by FCC-dominated in defiance of constitutional timelines, prompting accusations of electoral manipulation risks ahead of future polls. In the , Tshisekedi's February 2020 replacement of six high-ranking judges suspected of faced resistance, escalating to October 2020 when he appointed three new judges by controversially vacating seats prematurely, a move FCC decried as unconstitutional and leading to parliamentary boycotts. Similar standoffs arose over chiefs, with Tshisekedi's efforts to remove human rights abuse-linked officers stalled by FCC vetoes in the , resulting in constitutional gridlock and protests that paralyzed in July 2020. These fractures manifested in empirical failures of governance, including persistent and resource mismanagement that undermined the alliance's viability. Anti-corruption initiatives, such as audits of state firms, stalled as FCC blocked probes into patronage-driven contracts in sectors, where illicit diversions were estimated to cost the DRC up to $2 billion annually in lost revenues during this period. Concurrently, eastern DRC insecurity surged, with over 5 million displaced by mid-2020 amid unchecked militia activities, as the coalition's divided command hindered unified military deployments and for stabilization efforts. The patronage-centric structure, prioritizing factional spoils over institutional reform, causally perpetuated these breakdowns, eroding public trust and paving the way for Tshisekedi's eventual dissolution of the pact in December 2020.

Catalyst for Coalition Realignment

In December 2020, escalating tensions within the CACH-FCC coalition culminated in parliamentary maneuvers targeting the National Assembly's leadership, which was dominated by allies of former President . On December 10, 2020, the Assembly voted 281 to 200 to oust Speaker Jeanine Mabunda, a key FCC figure whose tenure had obstructed President Félix Tshisekedi's legislative agenda, including stalled appointments and reforms. This outcome, exceeding the simple majority threshold, revealed early fissures in FCC cohesion, as the bloc—originally holding over 350 seats from the 2018 elections—failed to rally its full support, signaling opportunistic shifts among lawmakers seeking alignment with the executive amid patronage disputes. Tshisekedi capitalized on this momentum by publicly dissolving the coalition on December 6, 2020, declaring the need for a new "" to overcome the "blockage" attributed to Kabila's enduring influence through the FCC. Officially framed as a pursuit of national unity and effective governance, the move was fundamentally motivated by Tshisekedi's imperative to centralize executive authority, as the FCC's veto power over cabinet selections and policy had perpetuated a dual executive structure since 2019, prioritizing over institutional functionality. Political actors, driven by in accessing state resources and avoiding marginalization, viewed the coalition's —evident in boycotts and judicial standoffs—as a liability, prompting a realignment toward the presidency's network rather than loyalty to Kabila's platform. The ouster facilitated rapid defections, with dozens of FCC parliamentarians crossing to Tshisekedi's camp by January 2021, enabling him to assemble an absolute majority of approximately 370 seats and install a new speaker and bureau loyal to his agenda. These shifts were pragmatic responses to the FCC's weakening grip, as defectors secured ministerial posts and provincial influence in exchange for support, underscoring how elite fragmentation in fragile coalitions stems from rational calculations of power access over ideological fidelity. By late January 2021, Tshisekedi had effectively neutralized Kabila's parliamentary stranglehold, paving the way for unchecked executive dominance without immediate electoral validation.

Formation and Structure

Official Launch in Late 2020

On December 6, 2020, President Félix Tshisekedi announced the dissolution of the governing coalition between his Heading for Change (CACH) platform and Joseph Kabila's Common Front for the Congo (FCC), citing irreconcilable differences over key appointments and institutional control. In a subsequent address to the joint session of Parliament on December 14, 2020, Tshisekedi formally launched the Sacred Union of the Nation (Union Sacrée de la Nation, USN) as a "patriotic front" aimed at uniting pro-presidential forces around shared principles of sovereignty and development, explicitly excluding FCC affiliates to centralize executive authority. The USN's foundational nucleus comprised Tshisekedi's Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) party—holding approximately 40 seats in the —and surviving elements of the CACH alliance, which together provided a baseline of around 100 legislators. To rapidly build viability, Tshisekedi's administration offered incentives including ministerial positions, committee chairmanships, and financial support to entice defections from FCC lawmakers and independent parliamentarians, framing adherence as a national imperative amid ongoing instability. This strategy reflected a calculated effort to circumvent the FCC's prior dominance of over 300 Assembly seats from the elections, prioritizing loyalty to the presidency over ideological purity. By late January 2021, these maneuvers culminated in a successful vote of no confidence against FCC-aligned Prime Minister Sylvestre Ilunga on January 27, passing with 391 votes in the 500-seat National Assembly and securing USN's de facto majority. This threshold exceeded the 250-seat simple majority required for legislative control, paving the way for the appointment of Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde as prime minister on February 12, 2021, and a full government reshuffle by April, thereby enabling Tshisekedi to overhaul executive appointments without FCC veto power.

Recruitment of Defectors from FCC

The Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) achieved parliamentary dominance through targeted recruitment of defectors from the Common Front for the Congo (FCC), leveraging pragmatic incentives such as promises of ministerial posts, financial inducements, and luxury vehicles like 4x4 cars, amid allegations of cash bribes in the thousands of dollars per parliamentarian. These efforts, coordinated by figures including UDPS leader Jean-Marc Kabund, exploited internal FCC disillusionment with its leadership clique and were accelerated by President Félix Tshisekedi's December 2020 threat to dissolve the if a majority was not secured. By February 2021, approximately 200 FCC deputies had defected to the USN, often individually rather than as party blocs, enabling the coalition to surpass the 251-seat threshold for control of the 500-member . This influx reduced the FCC from its post-2018 electoral majority of around 350 seats to a diminished opposition force of just over 100 loyalists. Vital Kamerhe, Tshisekedi's jailed vice-presidential ally convicted in June 2020 on embezzlement charges related to a $50 million procurement scandal but acquitted and reintegrated in June 2021, facilitated bridging gaps with defectors through his longstanding eastern Congo networks and Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) ties, aiding retention of these recruits despite their prior Kabila loyalties. However, many defectors preserved FCC-era networks within the administration, perpetuating informal influences from the Kabila period even as formal power shifted.

Organizational Framework and Leadership

The Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) functions as a loose parliamentary rather than a centralized , relying on ad-hoc alliances and consultations among member groups to coordinate support for President Félix Tshisekedi's agenda. Initially formed without a rigid , its structure emphasizes fluidity to accommodate diverse political actors, though this has fostered internal factionalism and challenges in unified decision-making. The formalized aspects of its operations with the signing of a in April 2023 by the and party leaders, outlining basic principles for collaboration, though enforcement remains inconsistent due to the absence of binding enforcement mechanisms. At the core of USN's framework is the , a consultative body that evolved from an initial small group of around six to eight members to 40 by March 2025, as announced by Secretary Permanent André Mbata Mangu on , 2025, to broaden representation including women and youth. This expansion aimed to consolidate loyalty amid post-2023 election dynamics but has been criticized as diluting focus, resembling a "hydra with multiple heads" prone to competing interests. occurs through informal presidium meetings and bilateral talks with Tshisekedi, often leading to delays in policy alignment as factions negotiate positions. Leadership centers on Tshisekedi as the coalition's patron and de facto head, leveraging his presidential authority to mediate disputes and direct priorities, supported by key UDPS loyalists and allies such as of the MLC and . Mbata serves as Secretary Permanent, handling administrative coordination, while the presidium's diverse roster—including figures like Bahati Lukwebo—reflects efforts to balance regional and ideological inputs without a formal chain of command. This setup prioritizes political expediency over institutional permanence, enabling rapid recruitment but exposing the coalition to inefficiencies, as evidenced by Tshisekedi's February 2025 call to avoid internal quarrels distracting from national crises.

Political Composition

Dominant Parties and Ideological Base

The Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) is dominated by the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), President Félix Tshisekedi's party, which provides the coalition's foundational parliamentary presence and mobilizes its core voter base in urban centers like . Formed as a social democratic outfit in 1982 to oppose Mobutu Sese Seko's authoritarian rule, UDPS emphasizes democratic reforms and , though its practical has leaned toward patronage networks. In the 2023 legislative elections, UDPS captured 69 seats directly, but the broader USN, augmented by strategic defections from Joseph Kabila's (FCC), secured nearly 450 of the 500 seats, underscoring UDPS's pivotal role in enabling the coalition's legislative . Prominent allied platforms within USN include Ensemble pour la République, led by mining entrepreneur Moïse Katumbi, which injects economically liberal perspectives favoring private sector growth and investment liberalization, drawing from Katumbi's business background in . Remnants of the Lamuka opposition front, originally a broad anti-Kabila alliance encompassing figures like Katumbi and , have also integrated into USN, contributing regional strongholds in the east and south. These inclusions reflect opportunistic realignments post-2020, where former FCC defectors—numbering in the hundreds of parliamentarians—bolstered USN's numbers without necessitating deep programmatic convergence. The USN's ideological base remains eclectic and pragmatically thin, lacking a unified and instead coalescing around the exclusion of Kabila's FCC from power-sharing arrangements after the 2018-2019 political . While UDPS anchors center-left geared toward mass mobilization against entrenched elites, Ensemble's pro-market orientation introduces tensions with statist elements, resulting in a sustained by anti-Kabila animus and incentives rather than ideological cohesion. This fluidity has enabled electoral dominance but highlights the USN's reliance on personalist and tactical alliances over substantive policy alignment.

Inclusion of Former Opponents

The Sacred Union of the Nation incorporated numerous defectors from the Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), including lawmakers affiliated with Joseph Kabila's Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD), to consolidate its control over legislative institutions after the coalition's launch in December 2020. This strategic absorption enabled the USN to surpass the FCC's numerical advantage in the and , with reports indicating that over 300 FCC-aligned parliamentarians shifted allegiance by early 2021, often in exchange for committee roles or regional influence. A prominent example was the election of Modeste Bahati Lukwebo as Senate president on March 2, 2021, backed by USN votes despite his prior ties to FCC structures through his Alliance des Mouvements Synergie de la RDC, which had collaborated with Kabila loyalists. Lukwebo's elevation, secured with 79 out of 108 votes, exemplified how former opponents were co-opted into leadership, leveraging their regional networks in provinces like Sud-Kivu to stabilize the coalition's eastern flank. This integration diluted the USN's ideological cohesion, originally rooted in opposition to Kabila's influence, by admitting opportunists whose loyalties appeared driven by access to state resources rather than shared principles, as evidenced by subsequent factional disputes over ministerial allocations and provincial governorships. The resulting hybrid dynamic fostered patronage-based rivalries, with long-standing Tshisekedi allies from parties like the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social competing against ex-FCC elements for spoils, undermining unified policy execution on issues like security reforms.

Shifts in Membership Over Time

In early 2021, the Sacred Union of the Nation experienced a rapid expansion through the adhesion of numerous defectors from the , including 42 deputies from the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy on January 23 and 23 from the Alliance for the Development of the Republic Party around the same period, enabling it to secure a parliamentary via successful motions of no confidence against Front for Congo leadership in key assemblies. This influx, building on an estimated initial base of around 200 supporters from President Tshisekedi's core allies, marked a peak in membership breadth, driven by strategic incentives rather than uniform ideological alignment. As preparations for the 2023 elections intensified from mid-2022 onward, attrition accelerated due to internal rivalries over candidate nominations and allegations of scandals implicating coalition figures, leading to notable departures such as those from platforms like Ensemble pour la République, which withdrew three ministers and distanced itself from the Union ahead of polling. These exits reflected causal tensions from opportunistic alliances fraying under electoral pressures, reducing cohesion but not undermining the overall legislative hold, which stood at approximately 391 deputies by mid-2023. Following the Union's strong performance in the December 2023 national and provincial elections, where it expanded to over parliamentary members through reinforcements from victorious provincial affiliates, membership stabilized via targeted purges of disloyal elements, including denunciations of 173 deputies for fidelity breaches in September 2025 amid leadership contests like the resignation of Assembly President . Despite these losses, the maintained a sustained , prioritizing empirical retention of loyalists over expansive inclusivity to counter internal fractures.

Governance and Policy Implementation

Formation of Successor Governments

Following the dissolution of the cohabitation arrangement with Joseph Kabila's Common Front for the Congo (FCC) in late 2020, President appointed Jean-Michel on February 15, 2021, to lead the formation of a new aligned with the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN). The cabinet, announced on April 12, 2021, comprised 57 ministers, including 14 women, and systematically replaced FCC loyalists with USN affiliates from Tshisekedi's Cap pour le Changement (CACH) platform and allied parties. This reshuffle, delayed by four months of negotiations amid parliamentary maneuvering, marked Tshisekedi's consolidation of executive control but highlighted initial compromises, as several technocratic positions were allocated to secure broader buy-in rather than merit-based selections. After Tshisekedi's re-election in December 2023, a protracted post-electoral ensued, with cabinet formation stalled from to May 2024 due to intra-coalition disputes over ministerial allocations and demands for fiscal restraint. The new government, unveiled on May 29, 2024, under Judith Suminwa Tuluka—the country's first female —featured 54 ministers, a modest reduction from the prior 57, emphasizing youth representatives and technocrats in select roles while retaining influential USN insiders from the 2021 lineup. This resolution, achieved after pressure from international donors and domestic protests, underscored bottlenecks, as bargaining prioritized distribution over streamlining, with key portfolios like and defense held by established figures to maintain stability. Across these transitions, empirical patterns of continuity persisted, with over half of the cabinet comprising holdovers from previous administrations, including veterans from Tshisekedi's initial term and even pre-USN eras, fostering bureaucratic inertia through entrenched networks resistant to overhaul. Such retention, while stabilizing short-term alliances, perpetuated inefficiencies evident in prolonged formation timelines—averaging three to four months—and diluted commitments to renewal, as compromises diluted the influx of fresh expertise despite rhetoric around modernization.

Legislative Priorities and Reforms

The , controlled by the coalition following the 2023 elections, has focused legislative efforts on extending security measures amid persistent insurgencies in eastern provinces. Parliament has approved over 100 prorogations of the in Ituri and since its initial declaration in 2021, including the 100th extension in June 2025 and additional renewals on October 2, 2025, to bolster military operations against armed groups. These bills transfer civilian authority to military governance in affected areas, aiming to disrupt rebel networks, but assessments highlight limited territorial gains and ongoing concerns under the regime. Anti-corruption initiatives have featured prominently in the coalition's agenda, with President Tshisekedi establishing the Agency for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (APLC) in 2019 to investigate high-level graft. However, no comprehensive statute has been enacted during the era, relying instead on existing Penal Code provisions that criminalize and but suffer from weak enforcement, as evidenced by persistent systemic issues in public procurement and mining contracts reported by and the . Isolated prosecutions, such as those against former officials, have occurred, yet U.S. State Department analyses note that corruption undermines governance without structural legislative remedies. Electoral reforms have advanced slowly, with the Assembly adopting bills on seat apportionment for provincial assemblies in May 2023 to align with population updates ahead of polls. Broader proposals to revise the electoral code and restructure the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) were debated but largely stalled, contributing to an overall adoption rate of only 20% for introduced bills in the 2019–2023 legislature. Critics, including opposition groups, argue that retained provisions favor incumbent control by maintaining centralized CENI appointments, though no wholesale revisions favoring incumbents were finalized post-2023. In the mining sector, legislative activity has centered on fiscal oversight rather than code overhauls, with passing the 2023 accounts rendition law and 2024 supplementary budget adjustments that allocate increased royalties under the 2018 Mining Code to state revenues, rising from prior levels due to higher mineral es. These measures support foreign investment incentives like tax stability clauses, yet implementation decrees rather than new laws have driven adjustments, amid U.S. Geological Survey data showing and output growth but persistent illicit extraction. No major parliamentary amendments to the code occurred between 2023 and 2025, limiting reforms to executive-level enforcement.

Responses to Security and Economic Crises

The Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) coalition, under President Félix Tshisekedi's leadership, responded to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) security threats primarily through military mobilization and diplomatic appeals accusing Rwanda of sponsoring the M23 rebel group. On January 29, 2025, Tshisekedi addressed the nation, framing the conflict as "Rwanda's war of aggression" and calling for nationwide mobilization to counter advances by M23, which had captured key territories in North and South Kivu provinces. Despite these efforts, M23 expanded its territorial control more than twofold in North Kivu and South Kivu by March 2025, seizing strategic cities and prompting UN warnings of heightened regional conflict risks. The USN government relied on foreign interventions, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission (SAMIDRC), but these deployments failed to halt M23 offensives, with the group defying ceasefires and demanding political concessions like fighter amnesties. Coalition internal divisions, including delayed military reforms due to factional disputes, contributed to ineffective coordination, allowing persistent rebel dominance over mineral-rich areas. Facing economic pressures exacerbated by conflict-driven disruptions, the USN pursued macroeconomic stabilization via international financing and reforms, yet outcomes remained constrained by shortfalls and illicit resource flows. In 2024, the government secured IMF support under Extended Credit Facility and Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangements to bolster external buffers and deepen fiscal reforms, with public debt-to-GDP held below 20%. averaged 17.2% in 2024 due to base effects and breakdowns from eastern instability, though it declined to 8.6% by June 2025 amid tightened . Debt restructuring efforts focused on clearing $2.4 billion in domestic arrears, but mineral smuggling and infighting over resource revenues undermined revenue mobilization, perpetuating fiscal vulnerabilities. By February 2025, amid escalating crises, Tshisekedi proposed a broader unity government to address intertwined and economic woes, signaling recognition of USN limitations in delivering decisive reforms. Empirical persistence of high and rebel control highlights causal links to fragmented decision-making, which stalled comprehensive and initiatives despite pledges.

Electoral Performance

2023 National Elections

The 2023 general elections in the occurred on December 20, encompassing presidential, , and provincial races. Incumbent President , supported by the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) coalition, secured a in the presidential contest, with the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announcing on December 31, 2023, that he obtained 73% of the votes cast amid a reported turnout of around 43%. Opposition figures, including Moïse Katumbi (7.18%) and (5.05%), contested the outcome, denouncing it as fraudulent and demanding a , with some candidates having partially boycotted the process due to perceived CENI biases favoring the ruling coalition. Claims of irregularities extended across parties, though opposition allegations focused on ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and machine malfunctions, while ruling coalition incumbency provided logistical edges like state media access and administrative control in vote tallying. In the legislative elections, the USN coalition retained overwhelming control of the , capturing approximately 450 of the 500 seats through allied parties, despite its core Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) securing only 69 directly. This dominance stemmed from incumbency advantages, including coordinated campaigning and resource allocation in urban strongholds, though violence disrupted polling in eastern provinces like and Ituri, where armed groups exploited electoral chaos to target USN-affiliated candidates and suppress turnout. CENI-provisional results, compiled amid logistical delays, reflected the coalition's pre-election parliamentary majority, enabling seamless post-vote governance continuity without opposition veto power. Election observers from bodies like the Carter Center and missions reported pervasive irregularities, including incomplete voter lists, unauthorized device usage, and conflict-induced disruptions that invalidated results in thousands of polling stations, yet stopped short of recommending due to insufficient evidence of outcome-altering fraud. The DRC government rejected opposition rerun demands, citing logistical impossibilities and judicial validation of CENI's provisional tallies. International responses emphasized pragmatic stability over confrontation; Western governments and regional actors like the issued calls for calm and dialogue but refrained from withholding recognition, allowing Tshisekedi's January 20, 2024, inauguration to proceed amid ongoing eastern insecurity. This muted condemnation reflected concerns that invalidating results could exacerbate militia violence and state fragility, prioritizing continuity under USN leadership despite documented procedural flaws.

Provincial and Gubernatorial Outcomes

In the provincial legislative elections held on December 20, 2023, the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) captured 640 of the 780 available seats across the Democratic Republic of the Congo's 26 provincial assemblies, providing the coalition with majorities in virtually all provinces. This overwhelming control of assemblies enabled USN-aligned candidates to dominate the indirect gubernatorial elections conducted in April 2024, where governors are selected by provincial deputies. USN candidates secured all 20 governorships contested in that cycle, including in resource-rich provinces such as Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, thereby extending the coalition's influence over subnational administration and revenue allocation. These results built on earlier partial provincial gains, where USN had already claimed approximately 20 of 26 by late 2023 through a combination of assembly majorities and defections from prior ruling coalitions. However, outcomes revealed uneven dominance, particularly in Katanga-region provinces like Haut-Katanga, a historical stronghold for opposition figures such as Moïse Katumbi; there, USN Kyabula Katwe was reelected with 35 of 47 votes, indicating persistent local rivalries and fragmented support despite the coalition's national leverage. Such patterns underscore how USN's subnational hold often relied on ties and assembly arithmetic rather than broad voter popularity, as evidenced by tighter margins in opposition-leaning areas amid reports of electoral disputes. The consolidation of provincial assemblies under USN control facilitated alignment with national priorities, including for and , while granting the coalition veto power over local appointments and budgets in most jurisdictions. By mid-, this positioned USN to oversee in over 75% of provinces, enhancing its ability to counterbalance opposition enclaves through fiscal and administrative levers. Remaining governorships, delayed or held by incumbents, similarly tilted toward USN through ongoing realignments, solidifying the coalition's subnational architecture post-2023.

Post-Election Consolidation

The of the rejected legal challenges filed by opposition candidates, including Moïse Katumbi, against the provisional results, thereby confirming Félix Tshisekedi's re-election on January 9, 2024. This judicial validation, conducted by a court perceived by critics as aligned with the ruling coalition due to appointment processes favoring incumbents, effectively locked in the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN)'s executive control despite documented irregularities such as delayed polling and ballot discrepancies reported by observers. In parallel, USN-affiliated parties maintained a commanding legislative majority in the , securing over 400 of the 500 seats based on official results from the Independent National Electoral Commission, enabling unhindered passage of supportive legislation. This numerical dominance persisted amid from Katumbi, who demanded citing "massive fraud" including vote tampering and exclusion of observers, claims echoed by other opposition figures but dismissed without independent verification. The retention of this , achieved through discipline rather than broad electoral mandate, underscored USN's strategy to consolidate power via institutional entrenchment over contestation. To preempt opposition resurgence, particularly from platforms like Lamuka, security forces under government directive dispersed planned protests in and other cities following the court's ruling and Tshisekedi's January 20 inauguration, employing and arrests to suppress gatherings that could amplify dissent. These measures, which included restrictions on opposition leaders' movements, effectively neutralized immediate threats from coordinated street actions, though they drew accusations of authoritarian overreach from monitors tracking excessive force patterns in prior electoral cycles. USN bolstered its position by reinforcing intra-coalition pacts with regional power brokers, ensuring loyalty amid Lamuka's calls for rejection of the results, thereby prioritizing stability through suppression over dialogue.

Controversies and Criticisms

Accusations of Electoral Irregularities

Accusations of electoral irregularities have shadowed the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) since its formation following the disputed 2018 presidential election, where incumbent Félix Tshisekedi's victory—achieved with 38.57% of the vote amid allegations of a backroom deal with outgoing President —was marred by widespread reports of fraud, including manipulated vote tallies and suppressed opposition results. Critics, including opposition leader who claimed to have won with 61% based on leaked data, argued that the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) systematically favored the ruling coalition through ballot stuffing and irregular result compilations, practices echoing Kabila's era of electoral manipulation rather than marking a break. USN supporters countered that Tshisekedi's mandate derived legitimacy from high in urban centers and international recognition, though judicial challenges yielded limited recourse, with the upholding results despite procedural flaws. These patterns persisted into USN's tenure, particularly evident in the 2022 provincial elections, which observers described as a precursor to national polls tainted by voter list discrepancies, , and CENI operational biases that suppressed participation in opposition strongholds. By the December 20, 2023, general elections—held under USN control—CENI faced accusations of inherent partiality, with its president Denis Kadima criticized for ethnic and political alignment with Tshisekedi, enabling delays in provisional results from January 3 to January 13, 2024, attributed officially to "fraud and irregularities" in tabulation. Reports documented ballot stuffing, voter suppression via insecurity in eastern provinces where over one million potential voters were disenfranchised by conflict, and logistical failures that contributed to a historically low turnout of approximately 43%. Opposition figures like Moïse Katumbi and Martin Fayulu rejected Tshisekedi's declared 73.34% victory as an "electoral coup," alleging massive fraud including pre-marked ballots and inflated tallies in USN-dominated areas, with Katumbi calling for annulment due to "usurping of sovereignty." Fayulu's supporters clashed with police in Kinshasa, decrying CENI-orchestrated stuffing that flouted transparency, while international observers noted the absence of effective judicial remedies, as few challenges reached the courts and annulments affected only 81 National Assembly seats amid broader skepticism. USN maintained the election's validity through certified turnout and rejected re-run demands, framing irregularities as isolated rather than systemic. Freedom House and International Crisis Group reports highlighted CENI's structural biases and continuation of pre-USN malpractices, such as opaque from December 2022 to April 2023 plagued by errors excluding millions, underscoring a lack of rupture from Kabila-era controls on electoral bodies. These documented issues—ranging from preventing access in conflict zones to unaddressed complaints—fueled perceptions of stolen mandates, with minimal accountability despite opposition protests, perpetuating distrust in USN's democratic credentials.

Internal Power Struggles and Instability

The Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) experienced significant internal frictions following the December 2023 general elections, primarily driven by rivalries over ministerial allocations between the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) loyalists and coalition partners such as Vital Kamerhe's Union for Democracy and Social Progress and Jean-Pierre Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of Congo. These disputes manifested in prolonged negotiations, with key allies demanding proportional cabinet shares reflective of their parliamentary contributions, leading to accusations of UDPS dominance in post-election power distribution. A direct consequence was the five-month delay in forming a new government, from President Félix Tshisekedi's re-election on December 20, 2023, until the cabinet announcement on May 29, 2024, as factional bargaining stalled consensus on prime ministerial and ministerial nominations. Judith Suminwa Tuluka was eventually appointed , but the impasse underscored elite rivalries prioritizing patronage over governance, with reports highlighting jostling for over 50 ministerial posts amid the coalition's parliamentary majority of nearly 450 seats. This paralysis extended to operational decisions, including military responses to M23 advances in eastern provinces like , where unified command structures were undermined by unresolved internal hierarchies. By mid-2024, efforts to mitigate splits included high-level meetings to redistribute portfolios, yet of ongoing discord persisted, such as petitions against Kamerhe's speakership in November 2024, reflecting persistent UDPS-ally tensions. These dynamics contributed to policy inertia, with delayed cabinet cohesion correlating to hesitancy in authorizing large-scale offensives against eastern insurgents, as fragmented hindered and strategic coordination per contemporaneous analyses.

Failures in Delivering Stability and Development

Despite initial successes in consolidating legislative majorities by securing nearly 450 seats in the 2023 elections, thereby diminishing the influence of the opposition Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) has faced substantial criticism for failing to translate political dominance into tangible stability or development gains. Supporters of the USN emphasize assertions of national against external interference, particularly from Rwanda-backed groups, as a foundational achievement, yet empirical indicators reveal persistent stagnation in key metrics. For instance, GDP per capita declined to $627.50 in 2023 from $642.61 the previous year, reflecting broader economic underperformance amid high and reliance on volatile extractive sectors. Security breakdowns underscore these shortcomings, with the M23 rebel alliance achieving unprecedented territorial expansions under USN governance. By early 2025, M23 forces captured , the provincial capital of , on January 30, followed by in on February 16, controlling strategic mineral-rich areas and trade routes despite international condemnations and regional deployments. This advance exacerbated violence, inverting prior patterns of armed clashes and enabling resource exploitation that benefits insurgents over state coffers. Critics, including opposition figures and , attribute these losses to inadequate military reforms and overreliance on foreign troops, contrasting with USN promises of restored . Human development metrics further highlight unfulfilled commitments to and job creation. The Democratic Republic of the Congo's (HDI) stood at 0.481 in 2022, ranking 180th globally and classifying it among the lowest worldwide, with minimal improvement by 2023 despite mineral export booms. Persistent absolute affects an estimated 70 million people, projected to continue through 2025, as enables elite enrichment while initiatives—such as limited road projects—fail to scale amid fiscal mismanagement. Endemic graft, documented in recurrent scandals involving contracts and public funds, has eroded public trust and diverted resources from development, with opposition voices decrying an "authoritarian drift" that prioritizes over . Mass displacement compounds these failures, with 6.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) recorded by late 2024 and over 139,000 new outflows to neighboring countries in the first four months of 2025 alone. While USN advocates point to breaking prior political monopolies as enabling future progress, detractors argue that unmet electoral pledges for employment and security have fueled humanitarian crises, perpetuating cycles of violence and economic exclusion in eastern provinces.

Recent Developments and Current Status

Government Formation Delays in 2024

Following President Félix Tshisekedi's re-election in December 2023 and inauguration on January 20, 2024, the encountered significant delays in forming a new , extending over five months amid internal negotiations. Despite securing a substantial parliamentary majority, factional disputes within the —primarily between Tshisekedi's Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and allied regional parties—prolonged agreement on ministerial allocations, highlighting underlying fragilities in unity under post-electoral pressures. The impasse persisted from January through late May 2024, with key bottlenecks arising from haggling over cabinet positions, including demands for influence in security and economic portfolios amid ongoing eastern conflicts. On April 1, 2024, Tshisekedi appointed Judith Suminwa Tuluka as the Democratic Republic of the Congo's first female , fulfilling a campaign pledge and advancing consultations, yet full cabinet composition remained unresolved for weeks due to persistent bargaining. The deadlock concluded on May 29, 2024, when Suminwa announced the new government's lineup via official , comprising 54 members including six vice prime ministers, 12 state ministers, and 24 ministers—a marginally reduced size from the prior administration but still expansive. Notable appointments included Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita as defense minister to address eastern insurgencies, though the process underscored inefficiencies in decision-making, as technocratic and loyalist figures were prioritized over broader consensus to expedite resolution. This formation revealed the Sacred Union's vulnerability to parochial interests, potentially exacerbating governance delays in responding to and economic challenges.

Expansion of Coalition Structures in 2025

In February 2025, President proposed the formation of a government of national unity to address the intensifying security challenges in eastern , including rebel advances that had prompted widespread domestic criticism of his administration's response. The initiative involved outreach to opposition figures for inclusion in a restructured executive, coupled with pledges for a "complete overhaul" of to enhance coordination against armed groups. This move sought to expand the of the Nation's (USN) support base beyond its core parliamentary majority, framing broader coalition-building as essential for national cohesion amid territorial losses. By March 2025, the USN implemented internal restructuring, including adjustments to its organs, as part of efforts to incorporate additional political actors and stabilize operations in the face of persistent . These changes, such as enlargements to bodies like the , aimed to distribute influence more widely within the to mitigate factional risks and sustain continuity. However, the adaptations were largely reactive, triggered by immediate pressures from security deteriorations and internal frictions rather than a premeditated ideological or organizational . United Nations assessments in September 2025 underscored the empirical constraints of these expansions, reporting ongoing political instability marked by unresolved tensions within the USN that undermined its cohesion. Despite the inclusionary gestures, coalition fractures persisted, with no evident reduction in underlying divisions over and policy execution, highlighting the limits of structural broadening in addressing root causal factors like elite and regional conflicts.

Ongoing Challenges Amid National Crises

As of September 2025, the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) faces deepening internal fractures exacerbated by the rapid advances of the M23 rebel group in eastern DRC, which captured key cities including and since January 2025, displacing millions and straining the coalition's cohesion. These military setbacks, attributed by UN reports to Rwandan support for M23, have highlighted USN's governance weaknesses, including factional disputes over and , leading to public accusations of inefficacy within the ruling . Concurrent economic pressures, such as escalated public spending on conflict and a projected 4.7% GDP growth tempered by insecurity, have fueled domestic unrest, with violent protests erupting in following M23's consolidation of in late January 2025. Internationally, doubts over USN-led governance have curtailed aid flows, with entities like the and linking support to reforms amid persistent and concerns, as evidenced by sanctions on illicit mineral networks in August 2025. This hesitancy perpetuates a causal loop: weak internal unity impairs effective , eroding donor confidence and amplifying fiscal woes from disrupted revenues, which constitute over 90% of DRC exports. Domestic opposition, including rallies led by former President in October 2025 calling for resistance against perceived dictatorship, further tests USN's stability, risking broader protests over constitutional changes and economic hardship. Prospects for USN remain precarious, with President Tshisekedi's efforts at political consolidation—such as expanding structures—offering a pathway to rally support against M23, potentially stabilizing if paired with diplomatic gains like the faltering US-Qatar frameworks. However, unresolved internal power struggles and unchecked rebel momentum could revive opposition like the FCC or precipitate military coups, as historical patterns of elite fragmentation in DRC have repeatedly undermined ruling platforms during crises. Without addressing root causes like elite pact breakdowns and external meddling, USN's viability hinges on causal reforms in and , lest national disintegration accelerates.

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