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Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal
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Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP;[1][2] Tamil: தமிழ் மக்கள் விடுதலைப்புலிகள், English: Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers), formerly known as the "Karuna Group", is a political party in Sri Lanka. It was formed by Karuna Amman (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), a former leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, after he defected from the organization in 2004. Initially a paramilitary group that supported the Sri Lankan government in its fight against the Tamil Tigers, the TMVP was registered as a political party in 2007.

Key Information

Under deputy leader Pillayan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan), they contested their first provincial elections in 2008, winning a majority in the Eastern Provincial Council. Members of the TMVP continued to carry arms until at least 2008 under the auspices of the Sri Lankan government, which they claimed to be for their own safety from the Tamil Tigers.[3] The group was believed to be working with the Sri Lankan Army.[4] They have been accused of human rights violation by local and international human rights organizations.[5]

Following its entrance to democratic politics, the party aligned with the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA).[6] In 2020, it would align with the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP)[7] and manage to win a seat parliament for the first time, with Pillayan winning the most preferential votes in Batticaloa while the party would come in second place in the district.[8] In the 2024 presidential elections, Pillayan pledged to support then-incumbent president Ranil Wickremesinghe in his bid for reelection.[9] The TMVP failed to win any seats in the 2024 general election.[10]

History

[edit]

The break-up between the LTTE and the Batticaloa-based Karuna group occurred in March 2004.[11] Karuna and others felt that LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran had become a dictator of a state that used Northern Tamils to oppress the Eastern Tamils[12] and that Eastern Tamils were not given due recognition for "laying down their lives in disproportionate numbers for the northern leadership".[13] Together with Indian-based Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front, TVMP has formed Tamileela Iykkiya Viduthalai Munnani as a united front. The purported aim and the motive of the party are to safeguard the rights of Tamils within the Eastern Province.[14]

The president of TMVP was Kumaraswamy Nandagopan[15] until he was assassinated in November 2008[16] and the general secretary G.E. Gnanarajah. The third in command is Mangalan Master.[17]

Since its formation, the group worked with the Sri Lankan Army to combat the Tamil Tigers.[4] They have been accused of using children to combat the LTTE and have allegedly committed human rights violations in the East of the island.[18] The TMVP, in conjunction with the Government of Sri Lanka on December 1, 2008 signed an action plan stating that they would cease the recruitment of child soldiers and that they would also release from combat all child soldiers.[19]

Internal affairs

[edit]

Internal struggles

[edit]

The TMVP has been affected by internal struggles between Colonel Karuna and Pillaiyan. Small skirmishes broke out between the Pillaiyan and Karuna factions with some fatalities in May 2007,[20] October 2007,[21] and in May 2008. However, Dheeban the Trincomalee district leader of the TMVP, denied a split claiming "the split between Karuna and Pillaiyan is a mere media fabrication".[22]

In mid-October 2008, Karuna cadres ransacked the office of Pillaiyan, leading to government consternation and intervention.[23] That same week, the Karuna faction took over the "Thamil Alai" newspaper, the organ of the TMVP, which had been run by Pillaiyan in Karuna's absence.[24] However in late October, Karuna "made it a point to emphasise that there were no differences between them".[25] Due to the internecine feuds between varying factions of the TMVP, the Government of Sri Lanka has decided it would begin the disarmament of the feuding groups in early 2009.[26] As tensions flared up in late 2009, the government began putting restrictions on the placement of TMVP political signs in cities of the East of Sri Lanka.[27]

Proposed name change

[edit]

"Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Koddani" (Koodani meaning alliance) is a new Tamil political party in Sri Lanka that has been proposed by Colonel Karuna, as either a splinter group of,[28] or a new name for the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal. However, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan has denied that this has proposed, stating "When I met him (Karuna) and asked about this, he said that there was no such thing".[29] The name change has been floated around because Karuna and related figures feel the word "Puligal" meaning Tiger, implies association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.[30] The TMVP 11 member politburo is currently deliberating on the issue, with Karuna threatening to start the new party if it is not approved.[31] However Karuna spokesman D. Kamalanathan denied both that a name change would take place and that there was a rift within the party, attributing the rumours to those against the TMVP.[32]

Human rights violations

[edit]

General rights violations

[edit]

The group has been accused by the Human rights organizations Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International of recruiting children, torture, assassinations and engaging in extortion in its war against the LTTE. Human Rights Watch claimed that from June 2006 to December 2006 they have forcefully recruited several hundred children.[18][33][34] The TMVP has also been accused of being involved in kidnappings for ransom of wealthy, predominantly Tamil, businessmen to raise money in Colombo and other towns. Some businessmen were allegedly killed because their family could not pay the ransom.[35] Media has reported that these abductions were linked to the Security forces in these abductions, either directly facilitating them or providing a cover and not taking any action against them.[35] One such abducted man alleged that while he was being transported, from his workplace in Colombo, his abduction vehicle came across Army checkpoints but was not rescued.[35]

In 2006, the Tamil Human Rights group UTHR also accused the TMVP of taking part in death squad activity against civilians.[36]

Connection with the Sri Lankan State

[edit]

The group is also believed to be actively working with the Sri Lankan Army. According to Human Rights Watch in one incident, the children who were abducted by the TMVP cadres were being held in a store across a Sri Lankan military camp. The parents of the abducted children pleaded with the military but no actions were taken. It was reported that two army men talked to the TMVP cadres and then walked away .[4] Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch said, “The government is fully aware of the abductions but allows them to happen because it’s eager for an ally against the Tamil Tigers”. The Human Rights Watch further added that it would be impossible to transport abducted children without the complicity of the Sri Lankan Army. In addition, civilians claimed seeing many TMVP cadres at Army checkpoints and claimed that they checked ID's of the people.[37] The Human Rights Watch further claimed that they saw a top Karuna Eastern commander riding atop an army personnel carrier. They also claimed that Armed Karuna cadre openly roamed the streets in Batticaloa district in sight of security forces, and in some cases they jointly patrolled with the police.[38] According to UTHR, a local Human rights organization, two children who escaped from the TMVP later surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army. The children were taken back to the TMVP camp allegedly by the Sri Lankan Army and was later beaten to death.[39] Another such incident happened in Trincomalee where the abducted children by the TMVP were taken to a Sri Lankan Navy check point. Soon the Sri Lankan Navy personnel came on motorcycles and escorted the Karuna men and their abducted children to the TMVP office. TMVP has also been alleged to have killed INGO workers. Ragunathan Ramalingam, a worker for the International INGO (World Concern), was asked to come to a Navy checkpoint. He was allegedly shot dead when he reached the check point.[40] SLMM claimed that they saw TMVP pass through a checkpoint unchecked. It claimed that a white van, belonging to TMVP cadres, was transporting two 15-year-old boys and four armed civilians passed through an Army check point unchecked. However, the police maintained that they were instructed to check all vehicles and arrest any armed civilians.[41]

Political

[edit]

Batticaloa local council elections, March 2008

[edit]

The local council elections of the Batticaloa district was held on March 10, 2008 after 10 years. The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) party won all the 9 councils with 70% of high majority of votes also the polling reported as peaceful. The Batticaloa town was the only local council that TMVP contested under the banner of ruling United People's Freedom Alliance.[42]

The largest Tamil party Tamil National Alliance totally boycotting these polls. United National party (UNP) also boycotted the polls by telling candidates not to run but some UNP candidates names' showed up on the voting list. Both groups claim unfair elections took place. TNA claimed it wasn't safe for them to operate in the east because the TMVP group was armed. TMVP threatened TNA MP's and also captured alive family members of TNA MP prior to the elections. The BBC News reported that unnamed human rights groups claimed TMVP used violence before the election and therefore the elections were "tainted". Independent candidate Rasiah Thurairatnam claimed that people voted out of fear for the TMVP.[42]

Eastern Provincial Council elections, May 2008

[edit]
Main article: 2008 Sri Lanka Eastern Provincial Council elections

The Eastern Provincial Council elections was held on May 10, 2008. The 37 member provincial council election won by the ruling UPFA with the highest number of 20 seats, UNP 15 seats, JVP and other Tamil party 1 each. The TMVP members were contested under the UPFA banner and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) members contested under the UNP banner. The present TMVP leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan has gained the highest number of 41,936 preferential votes from Batticaloa district.[43][44]

Electoral history

[edit]

Parliamentary

[edit]
Election year Party leader Votes Vote % Seats won +/– Government
2010 Sivanesathurai
Chandrakanthan 		20,284 0.25%
0 / 225
 Steady Extra-parliamentary
2015 As a part of UPFA
0 / 225
 Steady Extra-parliamentary
2020 67,692 0.58%
1 / 225
 Increase 1 Government
2024 34,440 0.31%
0 / 225
 Decrease 1 Extra-parliamentary

Provincial Council

[edit]
Eastern Provincial Council
Election year Party leader Votes Vote % Seats won +/– Government
2008 Sivanesathurai
Chandrakanthan 		As a part of UPFA
6 / 37
 Increase 6 Government
2012
1 / 37
 Decrease 5 Government

Local

[edit]
Election year Votes Vote % Councillors +/– Local Authorities +/–
2011 4,622 0.05%
3 / 4,327
 New
0 / 322
 New
2018 44,062 0.36%
36 / 8,327
 Increase 33
2 / 341
 Increase 2
2025 39,791 0.38%
37 / 8,793
 Increase 1
1 / 341
 Decrease 1

Results by council (2025)

[edit]
Council Votes % Pos. Seats
Batticaloa MC 4,303 10.09 Decrease 4th
3 / 34
Eravur UC 642 4.32 Increase 5th
2 / 17
Eravur Pattu PS 5,393 13.39 Decrease 3rd
4 / 32
Koralaipattu PS 5,407 15.65 Decrease 3rd
4 / 26
Koralaipattu North PS 5,157 37.87 Steady 1st
7 / 19
Manmunal South and Eruvil Pattu PS 3,894 12.55 Increase 3rd
2 / 20
Manmunal Pattu PS 948 5.11 Decrease 7th
1 / 17
Manmunai West PS 2,630 16.55 Steady 2nd
3 / 19
Manmunal South West PS 5,135 33.65 Increase 2nd
6 / 16
Porthivu Pattu PS 6,009 29.75 Increase 2nd
5 / 16

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal

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The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP; Tamil: தமிழ் மக்கள் விடுதலைப்புலிகள், lit. 'Tamil People's Liberation Tigers') is a in that represents Tamil-speaking communities, particularly in the Eastern Province. Formed on 1 2004 by Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as , as a breakaway faction from the (LTTE) due to internal power struggles, the TMVP aligned with the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE's separatist insurgency. Initially operating as a group, the TMVP played a significant role in military operations that weakened LTTE control in the east, facilitating the government's eventual defeat of the organization in 2009 and ending the decades-long . After the conflict, TMVP transitioned to electoral politics, securing representation in local and provincial councils, with Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan () serving as of the Eastern Province from 2008 to 2012. The party currently holds one seat in the Sri Lankan and supports policies emphasizing national unity, , and development within a unitary state. Despite its contributions to countering LTTE , TMVP has faced allegations of abuses, including forced recruitment of minors and involvement in and abductions during and after the war, though such claims often originate from sources critical of the Sri Lankan government's military victory. Internal factionalism led to Karuna's ouster, with emerging as leader, and the party has since maintained a pro-government stance amid ongoing ethnic efforts.

Origins and Early Development

Formation from LTTE Splinter

The (LTTE), led by from its Northern stronghold, imposed a centralized command structure that systematically favored Northern in key positions, resource distribution, and decision-making, fostering resentment among Eastern who contributed disproportionately to LTTE manpower and logistics without commensurate influence. Eastern commanders, including Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (nom de guerre Colonel Karuna Amman), argued that Prabhakaran's authoritarian control sidelined Eastern interests, such as equitable cadre promotions and funding for operations in and districts, where Karuna had built LTTE strength since the by consolidating control over rival Tamil militants. These ethnic and regional disparities culminated in Karuna's expulsion from the LTTE on March 6, 2004, after he defied Prabhakaran's order to relocate to for a leadership meeting on March 2, interpreting it as a for elimination amid prior attempts on Eastern figures. Karuna, as LTTE's Eastern Provincial overseeing approximately 2,000-3,000 fighters, seized control of LTTE assets in and , directing loyalists to disarm and expel Northern-dominated units while retaining Eastern cadres. The immediate aftermath saw the emergence of Karuna's faction as an autonomous armed group in April 2004, operating from jungle bases in the Eastern Province and engaging LTTE counterattacks, which killed over 100 of Karuna's fighters in initial clashes; this splinter retained LTTE-style tactics but prioritized Eastern autonomy, laying the groundwork for its evolution into the (TMVP).

Initial Military and Political Objectives

Following the split from the (LTTE) in March 2004, led by Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (known as ), the nascent TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (later TMVP) prioritized military survival and territorial defense in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province. The group's core objective was to wrest control of and districts from LTTE forces, which had suppressed Karuna's cadres in intra-Tamil clashes during April 2004, resulting in hundreds of deaths among the rebels and their flight to government-controlled areas. This defensive posture stemmed from accusations of LTTE discrimination against Eastern , including resource diversion to northern fronts and denial of regional command autonomy, positioning TMVP as a counter to the LTTE's centralized, Vanni-dominated model of Tamil . To sustain operations, TMVP intensified recruitment drives from mid-2004 onward, drawing from local Tamil youth in the east—including forcible of minors—to rebuild cadres depleted by LTTE assaults. Early engagements focused on guerrilla-style defenses and ambushes in , such as the June 2006 attack on an LTTE camp that killed several Tiger fighters, amid ongoing artillery duels and raids through 2005-2006. These actions aimed not at broader but at establishing local control, rejecting the LTTE's unitary vision in favor of Eastern-specific interests. By late 2006, TMVP shifted toward tactical alignment with Sri Lankan , forging informal pacts that enabled joint operations against LTTE advances in the Eastern Province, including intelligence sharing and protected recruitment zones. This cooperation, documented in military collusion on abductions, facilitated TMVP's consolidation of areas like Vakarai, marking an initial pivot from pure to politically integrated roles while prioritizing LTTE neutralization over independent statehood claims.

Leadership and Internal Dynamics

Key Figures: Karuna Amman and Pillayan

Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known as , served as a senior commander of the (LTTE) in the Eastern Province, where he directed military operations and recruitment for over two decades prior to the 2004 split. In March 2004, led a breakaway faction from the LTTE, citing Prabhakaran's authoritarian control and disproportionate demands on Eastern Tamil cadres, including an order to transfer 1,000 fighters northward without equitable resource returns, as key grievances that undermined Eastern autonomy within the organization. This personal defiance marked a pivotal assertion of regional interests, leading to the formation of the initial Thamil Eelam Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TEMVP), rebranded as Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) later in 2004, under 's leadership as its founder and political head. After aligning with the Sri Lankan government post-2007 Eastern offensive, Karuna shifted focus to national politics and was appointed Non-Cabinet Minister for National Integration and Reconciliation on 9 March 2009. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias , ascended within the TMVP as its military chief, overseeing armed cadres and tactical decisions in and surrounding areas following the 2004 split. Born 18 August 1975, Pillayan's rise reflected his operational acumen in consolidating factional loyalty amid post-split instability, positioning him as Karuna's deputy before assuming greater authority. In the 10 May 2008 Eastern Provincial Council , TMVP under Pillayan's direction secured 14 of 37 seats amid reported irregularities, enabling his appointment as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province from June 2008 until his ouster in 2012. This role underscored Pillayan's agency in channeling TMVP's strength into provincial governance, prioritizing local development and anti-LTTE stabilization. The leadership transition crystallized in April 2007, when internal factional tensions—exacerbated by Karuna's temporary exile in the following his January 2007 arrest there—culminated in Pillayan's ouster of Karuna as TMVP head through a de facto coup. By 2008–2010, Pillayan exercised operational control over TMVP's Eastern base, directing cadre deployment and electoral strategy, while Karuna pivoted to Colombo-centric alliances and ministerial duties, effectively bifurcating the group's influence between regional enforcement and national advocacy. This pragmatic division preserved TMVP cohesion, with each figure leveraging personal networks to sustain the party's viability amid postwar integration pressures.

Internal Struggles and Power Transitions

The formation of TMVP in 2004 as a splinter from the LTTE immediately triggered targeted assassinations and attacks by the parent organization against its cadres, including the killing of TMVP leader Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan's (alias Karuna) brother Reggie on April 15, 2005, in district, which the LTTE claimed responsibility for. These external purges, numbering dozens of incidents between 2004 and 2007—such as ambushes on TMVP camps that killed several fighters—forced TMVP to implement stringent internal security protocols, including vetting and eliminations of suspected LTTE infiltrators to maintain cohesion amid survival pressures. Internal factionalism intensified in May 2007 when deputy commander Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (alias ) broke away from Karuna over disputes regarding financial control and military command structures, sparking open clashes between their supporters in that resulted in at least 20 deaths and displaced hundreds by late 2007. The rivalry escalated further after the May 10, 2008, Eastern Provincial Council elections, where Pillayan's faction secured a with approximately 133,000 votes, leading to his appointment as on the same day, while Karuna's sidelining prompted him to form a rival party, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Theligal, on December 21, 2008. Government interventions, including Karuna's appointment as a national cabinet minister in July 2008, provided partial by distributing political patronage, though underlying tensions persisted with sporadic violence reported into 2009. Following the LTTE's military defeat on May 18, 2009, TMVP factions stabilized through pressures and electoral integration; a formal , Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program targeted TMVP cadres starting in mid-2009, demobilizing over 1,000 fighters and redirecting them toward political roles amid incentives like provincial control. This shift reduced infighting by aligning factions with state structures, though low-level rivalries endured without reverting to large-scale clashes.

Proposed Rebranding and Name Changes

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) adopted its name around 2006–2007, evolving from the earlier Tamil Eelam Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TEMVP) designation used by the Karuna splinter group following its 2004 break from the LTTE. This shift removed "Eelam," a term associated with separatist aspirations, in a pragmatic move to signal alignment with Sri Lanka's framework while retaining "Pulikal" (Tigers) to maintain continuity with Tamil militant heritage and cadre loyalty. The change reflected early efforts to reposition the group amid its with government forces, though it preserved core LTTE-inspired nomenclature that evoked armed struggle. Post-2008, as TMVP transitioned toward electoral politics, leader Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan () proposed further alterations to excise "Pulikal" or its English equivalent "Tigers," aiming to underscore a non-militant, welfare-oriented identity focused on Tamil rather than . Reports indicated internal discussions to reframe the party as a broader , potentially adopting terms like "Koodani" () to distance from paramilitary perceptions and facilitate mainstream acceptance. These initiatives aligned with post-war realities after the LTTE's 2009 defeat, seeking to legitimize TMVP as a political entity amid pressures. Implementation remained limited, hampered by factional resistance from figures like Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (), who prioritized retaining symbolic ties to retain eastern Tamil support, and persistent associations with paramilitary activities that undermined credibility. TMVP spokespersons, including D. Kamalanathan, publicly denied imminent changes, attributing rumors to external , which stalled rebranding amid ongoing internal power dynamics. By the early , no formal rename occurred, leaving the party tethered to its original militant branding despite pragmatic incentives for evolution.

Military and Paramilitary Role

Alliance with Sri Lankan Government

The strategic partnership between the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and the Sri Lankan government originated from the March 2004 defection of its leader, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (), who commanded the LTTE's Eastern Province operations and brought hundreds of cadres to the government side, significantly depleting LTTE manpower by an estimated half. Informal cooperation escalated in 2006-2007 as the government resumed military offensives following the breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire, with TMVP functioning as a pro-government providing intelligence on LTTE movements and deploying local militias to support Sri Lankan Army advances in and districts. This collaboration was driven by aligned interests: the government aimed to fragment Tamil separatist unity, while TMVP sought protection and leverage against LTTE reprisals, enabling joint operations that disrupted LTTE supply lines and command structures in the Eastern theater. By July 2007, Sri Lankan forces, bolstered by TMVP ground-level insights and auxiliary fighters, had captured key LTTE-held areas, including Vakarai and the Batticaloa-Ampara coastal belt, marking the first major territorial reversal for the LTTE since 2000. The alliance yielded tangible benefits for TMVP, including de facto operational autonomy under government auspices and political integration; by early 2008, TMVP formally allied with the ruling (UPFA), paving the way for electoral participation and administrative roles in the recaptured province as a to LTTE influence. This arrangement underscored TMVP's shift from to auxiliary force, prioritizing containment of LTTE dominance over broader separatist goals.

Operations Against LTTE in Eastern Province

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), formed from the LTTE splinter led by Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (Karuna Amman) in March 2004, initiated armed clashes with LTTE cadres in the Eastern Province's Batticaloa and Ampara districts as early as late 2004, with intensified factional fighting reported throughout 2005 and 2006. By December 2006, Karuna's forces claimed to have killed at least 20 LTTE fighters in direct engagements in the region, contributing to the erosion of LTTE's local command structures. In the Mavil Aru offensive, triggered by LTTE's closure of sluice gates on July 21, 2006, TMVP cadres provided ground-level support to Sri Lankan Army units, including intelligence on LTTE movements and participation in clearing operations around , aiding the recapture of the reservoir area by August 8, 2006. This marked the onset of broader Eastern Province clearances, with TMVP skirmishes weakening LTTE defenses in adjacent sectors. The Vakarai offensive, escalating from November 2006, saw TMVP fighters actively combat LTTE positions alongside advancing troops, facilitating the capture of Vakarai town on January 19, 2007, and subsequent clearances up to Verugal by late January, resulting in over 100 LTTE casualties and the displacement of remaining fighters northward. TMVP's local knowledge enabled targeted strikes, as evidenced by multiple reported clashes in where Karuna faction units repelled LTTE counterattacks. To sustain operations amid LTTE's superior numbers, TMVP recruited hundreds of local Tamil youth in the Eastern from 2006 onward, including over 1,000 children under 18 verified by mid-2007, often through abductions or in and . This mirrored LTTE's longstanding use of underage recruits but persisted despite international monitoring, with UN reports documenting 281 TMVP child abductions in 2007 alone. By July 10, 2007, following the TMVP-assisted capture of the LTTE's last Eastern stronghold at Thoppigala (Ilanthaiyadiippu), TMVP secured de facto control over cleared territories spanning approximately 1,000 square kilometers in and , enabling provisional civilian governance structures that supplanted LTTE administration and stabilized supply routes for over 200,000 displaced residents. These outcomes dismantled LTTE's Eastern command, with verified LTTE losses exceeding 2,000 fighters across 2006-2007 operations.

Post-War Demobilization Efforts

Following the defeat of the (LTTE) in May 2009, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) initiated partial demobilization under Sri Lankan government oversight, primarily in the Eastern Province. On March 1 and 7, 2009, factions led by Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan () surrendered weapons including 56 T56 rifles, RPG launchers, and one T81 gun to the Sri Lankan Army in , marking a symbolic step toward transitioning to . However, the process was incomplete, with many weapons informally discarded in forests or roadsides rather than systematically collected, and core elements under Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (Karuna) retaining arms. Government-led reintegration efforts from 2009 to 2012 focused on rehabilitation and economic programs, such as the "Eastern Re-awakening" initiative, which prioritized infrastructure but offered limited direct support for ex-combatants. In , approximately 260 TMVP and LTTE ex-fighters underwent rehabilitation, including 38 in the Kiran area, with assistance from organizations like the (IOM) for job training, overseas employment, and self-employment schemes. Despite these measures, TMVP maintained capabilities, justified by leaders as necessary for against threats from LTTE sympathizers and rivals like the (TNA), amid ongoing insecurity involving abductions and extortion. United Nations reports and non-governmental organizations, including the International Crisis Group, highlighted persistent TMVP child recruitment and armed activities into 2009, urging full disbandment to prevent abuses, in contrast to the LTTE's complete military elimination. Lacking international supervision, the deviated from standard , , and reintegration (DDR) protocols, exacerbating challenges like , , and economic marginalization for former cadres, which hindered full transition to civilian life. This partial retention of armed elements reflected pragmatic security calculations in the volatile post-war East, where government alliances tacitly tolerated TMVP's role in countering residual insurgent threats.

Ideology and Policy Positions

Stance on Tamil Autonomy and Separatism

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) has consistently advocated for the implementation of the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's , enacted in 1987 to devolve powers to provincial councils, including legislative authority over local matters such as , , and , while maintaining a unitary state framework. In March 2010, TMVP leaders demanded its full immediately after parliamentary elections, positioning it as a pragmatic solution to Tamil political aspirations without endorsing territorial separation. Rejecting the (LTTE)'s demand for an independent state, TMVP founder (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan) argued that separatist objectives were unattainable amid insufficient international backing and the LTTE's militaristic intransigence, which he viewed as counterproductive to Tamil advancement. This position arose from intra-LTTE fractures, where Eastern Tamil cadres under Karuna's command faced systemic marginalization by Northern-dominated leadership, including resource disparities and forced that prioritized northern priorities over eastern needs. TMVP's approach prioritizes economic rehabilitation, infrastructure projects, and governance reforms in Tamil areas—such as drives and livelihood programs—to foster integration with the national economy, critiquing LTTE authoritarianism for stifling civilian welfare through prolonged conflict and internal purges that alienated Eastern communities. By aligning with Colombo's post-2009 stabilization efforts, the party frames devolved provincial as enabling localized development without the risks of secessionist confrontation, which it deems detrimental to long-term Tamil security and prosperity.

Differences from LTTE and Other Tamil Groups

Unlike the (LTTE), which pursued an independent through , over 300 suicide bombings, and systematic forced including children, the TMVP under explicitly rejected such tactics, with Amman denouncing LTTE leader for converting the Tamil struggle into terrorism that indiscriminately killed civilians. Following the LTTE's defeat on May 18, 2009, TMVP shifted to advocating devolved autonomy within a unified via mechanisms like the 13th Amendment, prioritizing political negotiation over irredentist violence that had sustained three decades of . In opposition to the (TNA), often viewed as a post-LTTE proxy maintaining diaspora-driven separatist rhetoric despite formal post-war adjustments toward autonomy demands, TMVP positioned itself as the authentic representative of Eastern Province Tamils exhausted by LTTE-imposed hardships, engaging directly with for regional power-sharing rather than boycotting or undermining state integration efforts. This divergence manifested in electoral rivalries, where TMVP's government-aligned pragmatism contested TNA's perceived LTTE sympathies, appealing to communities prioritizing stability over maximalist claims. Causal analysis underscores TMVP's realism: LTTE separatism's intransigence extended the conflict from 1983 to 2009, incurring over 70,000 deaths through mutual escalations, whereas Amman's 2004 and TMVP's Eastern halved LTTE fighting strength, enabling government recapture of the province by July 2007 and hastening overall victory, which unlocked reconstruction absent under perpetual insurgency.

Relations with Sinhalese-Majority Governments

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) established a strategic alliance with the Sri Lankan government under President starting in 2004, following its split from the (LTTE), by providing military support against the LTTE in the Eastern Province and sharing intelligence with . This partnership facilitated the government's recapture of eastern territories from LTTE control by 2007, enabling TMVP leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan () to be appointed of the Eastern Provincial Council in May 2008 after elections under Rajapaksa's (UPFA), which secured 20 of 37 seats in coalition with TMVP. During Rajapaksa's tenure (2005–2015), TMVP members integrated into the ruling coalition, gaining parliamentary seats and ministerial portfolios, such as Pillayan's role as a UPFA MP and later appointments in non-cabinet ministries focused on eastern reconstruction. In exchange, TMVP advocated for increased funding for and economic projects in Tamil-majority eastern districts, critiquing excessive centralization while pragmatically cooperating on stabilization to channel resources toward local Tamil communities rather than pursuing separatist confrontation. These alliances contributed to the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 by aligning capabilities with state forces, thereby curtailing prolonged ethnic violence that characterized the LTTE's intransigent strategy. TMVP extended similar pragmatic engagement to subsequent Sinhalese-majority administrations, including under President , pledging support for his candidacy in the September 2024 presidential election to sustain influence over security and development policies in the East. This continuity reflects TMVP's approach of leveraging coalitions for Tamil representation and counter-insurgency gains, prioritizing incremental and funding access over zero-sum demands that had fueled prior conflicts.

Political Activities and Elections

Entry into Mainstream Politics (2008 Onward)

In May 2008, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) formally entered Sri Lanka's electoral arena by aligning with the (UPFA), the ruling coalition led by President , to contest the Eastern Provincial Council elections on May 10. This partnership enabled TMVP to leverage government support while transitioning from its paramilitary roots to legitimate political contestation, focusing on consolidating Tamil influence in the de facto controlled Eastern Province following military operations against the LTTE there. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, known as and the party's deputy leader, headed the TMVP slate under the UPFA's betel leaf symbol. The UPFA-TMVP coalition secured a majority in the council, paving the way for Pillayan's appointment as on May 17, , the first such post-war Tamil-led administration in the province. This milestone institutionalized TMVP's local power base, allowing it to influence provincial governance, development projects, and security arrangements in and districts, while signaling a government strategy to integrate former militants into the political fold as a to separatist remnants. Building on this foundation, TMVP extended its participation to national-level politics by contesting the April 2010 parliamentary elections, again within the UPFA framework after internal deliberations and consultations with the . This adaptation to Sri Lanka's involved navigating coalitions to broaden appeal beyond core Eastern Tamil voters, including tentative outreach to upcountry Tamil groups, though the primary vehicle remained alignment with the Sinhalese-majority government to secure patronage and legitimacy. Such moves reflected TMVP's pragmatic pivot toward power-sharing within the , prioritizing administrative roles over armed confrontation.

Performance in Provincial and Local Elections

In the Eastern Provincial Council election held on May 10, 2008, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), with Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) as a key Tamil partner, secured control of the council, winning 25 of 37 seats across the province. TMVP's influence was particularly pronounced in Batticaloa District, where the alliance captured a majority, enabling TMVP leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (known as Pillayan) to be appointed Chief Minister on May 16, 2008. This outcome reflected TMVP's mobilization of local Tamil support in the post-LTTE vacuum in the east, bolstered by government backing and paramilitary networks. Preceding the provincial poll, TMVP demonstrated strength in local government elections on March 10, 2008, in , sweeping a of seats in urban and councils despite allegations of . The party's vote share in hovered around 50-60% in key wards, underscoring initial loyalty among Eastern Tamils wary of LTTE remnants. However, performance waned in subsequent cycles due to intensifying competition from the (TNA), which positioned itself as a less compromised alternative, eroding TMVP's base through appeals to and criticisms of its government ties. By the 2012 Eastern Provincial Council election, the UPFA-TMVP alliance retained a slim with 28 seats, but TMVP's independent appeal diminished as TNA gained 11 seats, capturing over 30% of the vote in . In local elections on February 10, 2018, TMVP registered modest gains in , securing 2,630 votes (16.55% share) and 3 members across councils, including representation in the Batticaloa Municipal Council and pradeshiya sabhas like Manmunai South and Eruvil Pattu. These results highlighted pockets of enduring localized support, particularly in rural areas where TMVP leveraged community welfare initiatives and anti-LTTE sentiment, contrasting with TNA's dominance (7,400 votes, 46.56%, 10 members). Despite national marginalization and TNA's broader Tamil appeal, TMVP's retention of seats illustrated resilience in Eastern strongholds, though vote shares remained below peaks amid ongoing scrutiny of its alliances with Sinhalese-majority parties.

Strategies for Eastern Tamil Representation

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) has pursued representation for Eastern Tamils primarily through targeted development initiatives in and districts, leveraging its historical role in countering LTTE dominance to position itself as a proponent of local stability and reconstruction. Following its electoral successes in the Eastern Provincial Council elections of May 2008, where it secured 20 of 37 seats as part of the (UPFA) coalition, the TMVP advocated for infrastructure enhancements such as road renovations and community facilities to address post-conflict needs in Tamil-majority areas. These efforts were framed as direct benefits of rejecting LTTE , with TMVP leaders emphasizing how their break from the group in enabled the Eastern Province's relative peace and access to government-funded projects by 2009. To amplify Tamil voices within a framework, the TMVP formed strategic coalitions with moderate Sinhalese-majority parties, notably the UPFA under President , avoiding separatist demands in favor of pragmatic alliances that secured administrative control. This approach culminated in TMVP nominee Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (alias ) being appointed of the Eastern Province in 2008, enabling influence over provincial policies without alienating Sinhalese stakeholders. By integrating into national coalitions, the party gained leverage for Eastern-specific allocations, such as enhanced security and economic packages, while publicly denouncing LTTE violence as a barrier to such integrations. In addressing criticisms from the , which often portrays the TMVP as collaborators undermining aspirations, the party has highlighted tangible post-war gains in the East, including reduced violence and sustained development momentum since 2009. TMVP spokespersons, including former leader Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (Karuna), have argued that diaspora advocacy for LTTE revival ignores the stability achieved through government partnerships, pointing to electoral mandates and infrastructure progress as evidence of effective representation. This narrative counters external narratives by underscoring grassroots endorsements, as seen in the party's continued local council performances and a 2025 intra-TMVP alliance aimed at unifying Eastern Tamil political efforts.

Electoral History

Parliamentary Election Results

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) has maintained a marginal presence in Sri Lanka's parliamentary elections since entering mainstream politics, typically securing at most one seat concentrated in the Eastern Province through alliances or independent contests. Its performance has been hampered by competition from the (TNA) and reliance on coalitions with Sinhalese-majority parties, particularly during Mahinda Rajapaksa's tenure. In the April 2010 parliamentary election, TMVP contested under the (UPFA) banner and won one district seat in , represented by party leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (also known as Pillaiyan). This outcome reflected localized support in TMVP strongholds amid post-war demobilization, though the party received no separate national vote tally due to the alliance. TMVP failed to secure any seats in the August 2015 election, following the UPFA's national defeat and the party's inability to adapt to the new United National Front for Good Governance coalition dynamics; official results listed no representation for TMVP or its affiliates in parliamentary seats.
Election YearParty StatusVotes ReceivedVote %Seats WonNotes
2010UPFA allianceN/A (coalition)N/A1 seat for Chandrakanthan.
2015Independent/alliance attemptsMinimal/not qualifying<0.1%0No seats amid TNA dominance in Tamil areas.
2020Independent67,6920.58%1Seat held by Sivanesathurai Santhirakanthan in Eastern Province.
In the November 2024 , TMVP garnered negligible support and won no seats, as confirmed by post-election ary composition excluding the party. Overall, vote shares remained below 1% in independent runs, underscoring limited national appeal beyond Eastern Tamil and Muslim communities.

Provincial Election Results

In the Eastern Provincial Council election held on May 10, 2008, the (UPFA), with the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) as its key Tamil constituent, secured 20 of the 37 seats with 52.21% of the vote, achieving a clear . This outcome enabled TMVP leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan () to be appointed , forming the province's first elected administration since the amid post-LTTE stabilization efforts. The (UNP) took 15 seats (42.38%), while the (TNA) won only 1 seat (1.30%), reflecting limited opposition mobilization in Tamil areas due to security constraints and low turnout.
YearUPFA Seats (TMVP-Aligned)TNA SeatsUPFA Vote Share
200820152.21%
2012141131.58%
By the September 8, 2012, election, UPFA support eroded significantly, dropping to 14 seats (31.58% vote share) despite retaining a plurality, with TNA surging to 11 seats (30.59%) and the (SLMC) gaining 7. The UPFA formed government with SLMC backing, but TMVP's diminished influence highlighted a shift, as Tamil voters increasingly favored TNA's critique of overreach. This decline from dominance—evident in the halved vote share and narrowed seat margin—stemmed empirically from disillusionment with TMVP's integration into Colombo's political framework, which prioritized national over localized Tamil priorities, juxtaposed against TNA's resonance with residual ethnic aspirations once championed by the LTTE. No further provincial elections occurred, as terms extended amid national delays until the system's partial abolition in 2020.

Local Government Election Results

In the 2008 local government elections held on March 10 in the Eastern Province, the (UPFA) in alliance with the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) secured a in the Municipal Council, winning 11 of 17 seats amid low turnout and reports of by TMVP cadres. The alliance also gained control of several pradeshiya sabhas in , including Eravur Town and Mamunai North, establishing TMVP's dominance in Tamil- local bodies during a period of post-LTTE fragmentation in the east. Subsequent elections saw TMVP's seat share decline from these highs but maintain a consistent presence in Batticaloa-area councils, often through coalitions with ruling parties. In the 2018 local authorities elections, TMVP retained representation in pradeshiya sabhas such as and rural councils, securing around 5-8 seats in key Tamil-dominated wards via preferential voting, reflecting localized patronage ties rather than broad appeal. This persistence occurred despite economic pressures and competition from the (ITAK), with TMVP's holds attributed to entrenched community networks and alliances with Sinhalese-majority governments providing resources for voter mobilization.
Election YearKey Local BodyTMVP/Allied SeatsTotal SeatsNotes
2008Batticaloa Municipal Council11 (via UPFA-TMVP)17Landslide amid allegations of coercion
2018Batticaloa Pradeshiya Sabhas (aggregate)5-8Varies by councilMaintained via coalitions; resilience in Tamil pockets
TMVP's local results highlight a shift from 2008's government-backed surges to steady, lower-tier influence in eastern Tamil councils, sustained by pragmatic alliances amid regional instability.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Human Rights Abuses

documented numerous cases of the TMVP, also known as the Karuna group, abducting children and young adults in eastern for forced into combat roles between 2006 and 2007, with verifying over 200 such incidents by early 2007. These abductions often involved armed TMVP cadres targeting minors aged 14 to 17 from schools, homes, and displacement camps in and districts, amid the group's split from the LTTE and its operations in government-controlled areas. The reported that both the LTTE and TMVP continued child soldier into late 2007, though the TMVP's efforts were concentrated in the eastern following its 2004 breakaway. Extortion practices were also attributed to TMVP cadres, who reportedly demanded payments from Tamil families and businesses in exchange for or to avoid , particularly in during 2007-2008, as noted by humanitarian agencies monitoring post-conflict vulnerabilities. In response to international , the TMVP signed a December 2008 with the Sri Lankan government and to halt child and release underage members, leading to the handover of 15 children in January 2009, though monitoring indicated ongoing sporadic cases into 2009. Specific allegations of killings surfaced in 2008, with citing TMVP involvement in extrajudicial executions and abductions contributing to a deteriorating situation in the east, including targeted shootings of Tamil civilians suspected of LTTE ties in . The group denied implementing a systematic policy of such abuses, attributing incidents to rogue elements amid wartime chaos. These claims, while empirically reported, occurred on a scale dwarfed by the LTTE's two-decade campaign of , which involved the recruitment of thousands of child soldiers and systematic civilian targeting across .

Ties to State Security Forces and Paramilitary Actions

The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), emerging from the 2004 split of LTTE eastern commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (), established operational alliances with Sri Lankan security forces to counter LTTE remnants in the Eastern Province. Following the split on March 6, 2004, Karuna's cadres provided intelligence on LTTE positions and movements, facilitating government offensives that weakened LTTE control in and districts by late 2004. These ties mirrored counter-insurgency practices worldwide, where defectors from insurgent groups were leveraged against core threats, as the LTTE's campaign of assassinations, suicide bombings, and territorial control represented an existential challenge to state sovereignty. Joint operations included shared checkpoints and patrols, with witnesses in , , and districts reporting TMVP (then Karuna group) members operating alongside army and police personnel as early as 2005. documented cases where TMVP cadres used government-marked vehicles for abductions, often departing from or returning to military camps, indicating ground-level coordination that enabled impunity. For instance, in in 2006, abductors identifying as TMVP were observed coordinating with nearby security outposts, with no subsequent arrests despite victim complaints to police. Such collusion extended to forced child , where TMVP forcibly enlisted over 300 minors between 2004 and 2006, often with failing to intervene or actively shielding recruiters. Post-LTTE defeat in May 2009, TMVP transitioned to under a alliance, with Karuna appointed minister in June 2009, but residual cadres persisted in "gray-zone" activities like and kidnappings in the east, bolstered by ongoing security force ties. U.S. State Department reports noted persistent ground-level links between TMVP elements and forces, contributing to unchecked operations through 2010, though formal reduced overt scale. United Nations monitoring highlighted TMVP's role in these networks until at least 2008, when a tripartite action plan with the and aimed to end child involvement, yet violations continued amid weak enforcement. These arrangements, while effective in neutralizing LTTE threats, fostered environments of selective impunity, as documented in witness testimonies compiled by organizations like —sources whose empirical focus on victim accounts warrants scrutiny for potential overemphasis on abuses without equivalent LTTE contextualization.

Defenses Against Accusations and Contextual Factors

TMVP leaders, including Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (Pillaiyan), have contended that the group's armed activities from 2004 onward constituted legitimate against systematic elimination campaigns by the LTTE following Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan's (Karuna) in March 2004. The LTTE, seeking to reassert control over Eastern Tamil cadres, launched multiple attempts, including the killing of eight top Karuna aides in July 2004 and ongoing ambushes that claimed dozens of TMVP fighters, such as 18 pro-Karuna personnel in a May 2006 gun battle near . These actions, TMVP argued, were necessitated by the LTTE's refusal to tolerate dissent and its history of internal purges, positioning the faction's survival as a bulwark against Northern LTTE dominance over Eastern . On child recruitment allegations, TMVP maintained that any instances were reactive to existential threats in a protracted guerrilla war where the LTTE had systematically conscripted over 10,000 minors since the , often through and . The group highlighted parallels in LTTE practices, such as forced levies from Tamil communities, while noting their own scale was far smaller—hundreds rather than thousands—and ceased with the conflict's end. In 2008, TMVP formalized this shift by signing a action plan to halt , release affected children, and facilitate rehabilitation, demonstrating responsiveness to post-war norms absent from LTTE commitments. Contextual factors include critiques of accusers' credibility, with TMVP and Sri Lankan officials attributing selective outrage to LTTE sympathies among some Western NGOs, which underemphasized separatist-initiated like of Muslims from in 1990 and bus bombings killing civilians. Human Rights Watch reports, for instance, faced accusations of over-relying on LTTE-aligned sources while minimizing the Tigers' terrorism as a "response" to grievances, thus distorting causal chains where LTTE predated many countermeasures. Post-2007, after TMVP-aided operations liberated the East, subsided markedly—inter-ethnic clashes dropped to minimal levels by mid-2008—contrasting with LTTE-held Northern zones' escalation until May 2009, enabling elections and development unfeasible under Tiger rule.

Recent Developments

Support in 2024 Presidential Election

In June 2024, amid Sri Lanka's protracted economic crisis, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, known as and serving as State Minister, publicly pledged the party's endorsement for incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe's re-election bid. This support was articulated on June 22, emphasizing Wickremesinghe's policies aimed at empowering provincial councils to resolve longstanding issues affecting Tamil communities in the Eastern Province, including development and administrative autonomy. The endorsement aligned with TMVP's strategic rejection of opposition candidates, such as those backed by the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), which has been criticized by pro-government Tamil factions for maintaining ideological continuities with the defeated (LTTE). positioned Wickremesinghe as the optimal choice for national stability, prioritizing continuity in government alliances over alternatives perceived as risking renewed ethnic tensions or instability in Tamil-majority areas. The pledge sought to secure Eastern Province development initiatives under the existing administration, amid ongoing IMF-backed reforms addressing and . Wickremesinghe lost the September 21, , presidential election to leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake, yielding no direct electoral gains for TMVP, which holds limited parliamentary seats primarily through government coalitions. Nonetheless, the support preserved TMVP's ties to outgoing ruling structures, facilitating potential post-election negotiations in a shifting political .

2025 Leadership Alliance Formation

On April 1, 2025, TMVP founder Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan () and former Eastern Provincial Council Chief Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan () announced a reunion under the framework of the newly formed Kizhakku Tamil Kootamaippu (Eastern Tamil Alliance), explicitly stating it was undertaken "for the sake of Eastern " to heal divisions stemming from internal power struggles dating back over a decade. The pact integrated TMVP factions led by both figures, alongside allies like former Mayor Viyalendran, marking a strategic consolidation absent since their post-2004 split amid allegations of rivalry and resource disputes. The alliance's stated motivations centered on addressing persistent economic hardships in Tamil-majority Eastern Province areas, exacerbated by Sri Lanka's 2022 sovereign default and ensuing measures that disproportionately affected rural and post-conflict communities through spikes exceeding 70% and remittance declines. Leaders positioned the unity as a counterweight to the perceived overreach of the (TNA), which has dominated Northern and Eastern Tamil representation but faced criticism from Eastern factions for prioritizing Northern interests and federalist demands over localized development needs like rehabilitation and livelihood programs. This move reflected broader frustrations with TNA's electoral , evidenced by TMVP's historical vote shares in Eastern polls dropping below 5% in fragmented contests, prompting a pragmatic merger to pool resources for advocacy on devolved powers and drives tailored to regional grievances. The reunion holds potential to re-energize grassroots mobilization in , , and districts by unifying patronage networks and cadre bases that had atrophied due to factionalism, enabling coordinated campaigns on issues like restitution and youth employment amid rates hovering around 25% in the East. Analysts note that while past TMVP infighting eroded credibility—contributing to legal entanglements like Pillayan's ongoing trials—the alliance could leverage Karuna's diplomatic ties to and Pillayan's local organizational machinery to amplify Eastern Tamil voices in national discourse, though skepticism persists regarding its longevity given unresolved trust deficits.

Outcomes from 2025 Local Elections

In the local government elections conducted on May 6, 2025, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) registered gains in divisions, securing 7,611 votes and 5 seats in the Batticaloa Municipal Council, which corresponded to approximately 16% of the vote share there. This outcome reflected targeted success in Eastern Province strongholds, where the party maintained relevance among Tamil voters despite competition from the (ITAK), which captured 17 seats with 36.72% of votes in the same council. Nationwide, TMVP's performance remained modest, with an all-island vote share of 0.38% (39,791 votes) and 37 seats across local bodies, concentrated in the Eastern Province where it achieved 13.98% of votes in . varied by district, reaching 50% to 60% in many areas, including the East, amid broader national participation of over 17 million registered voters. These results enabled retention of footholds in Batticaloa pradeshiya sabhas and urban councils, signaling sustained local viability for the party's government-aligned Tamil moderate platform over separatist alternatives.

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