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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
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Key Information

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE; Tamil: தமிழீழ விடுதலைப் புலிகள், romanized: Tamiḻīḻa viṭutalaip pulikaḷ, Sinhala: දෙමළ ඊලාම් විමුක්ති කොටි සංවිධානය, romanized: Demaḷa īlām vimukti koṭi saṁvidhānaya; also known as the Tamil Tigers) was a Tamil militant organization, that was based in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The LTTE fought to create an independent Tamil state called Tamil Eelam in the northeast of the island[7] in response to violent persecution and discriminatory policies against Sri Lankan Tamils by the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government.[8]

The leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, cited the 1958 anti-Tamil pogrom as one of the factors that led him to militancy. In 1975, he assassinated the Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah, in revenge for the 1974 Tamil conference incident. The LTTE was subsequently founded in 1976 as a reaction to the Sri Lankan Constitution of 1972 which prescribed Buddhism as the primary religion of the country, and Sinhala as its national language.[9][10][11] The LTTE was involved in attacks on government targets, policemen and local politicians and moved on to armed clashes against the armed forces. Oppression against Sri Lankan Tamils continued by Sinhalese mobs, notably during the 1977 anti-Tamil pogrom and the 1981 burning of the Jaffna Public Library. Following the watershed Black July anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983 orchestrated by members of the government, there was a dramatic growth of Tamil militant groups and a full-scale insurgency began, marking the start of the Sri Lankan civil war.[12] By 1986, the LTTE had emerged as the dominant Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka.[13] It would go on to be widely regarded as among the most effective and disciplined insurgent groups in the world.[14][15]

Initially starting out as a guerrilla force, the LTTE increasingly came to resemble conventional armed forces with a well-developed military wing that included a navy, an airborne unit,[16] an intelligence wing, and a specialised suicide attack unit. The LTTE perfected suicide bombing as a tactic. It engaged in a hybrid warfare encompassing both military and civilian targets.[15] The LTTE was also notable for using women and children in combat, and carrying out a number of high-profile assassinations, including former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.[17] The LTTE was designated as a terrorist organisation by 33 countries, including the European Union, Canada, the United States and India.

Over the course of the conflict, the LTTE frequently exchanged control of territory in the north-east with the Sri Lankan military, with the two sides engaging in intense military confrontations. It was involved in four unsuccessful rounds of peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and at its peak in 2000, the LTTE was in control of 76% of the landmass in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.[18] Prabhakaran headed the organisation from its inception until his death in 2009.[19] Between 1983 and 2009, at least 100,000 were killed in the civil war, of which many were Sri Lankan Tamils.[20][21] Many Sri Lankan Tamils also left Sri Lanka for various destinations, mainly Western countries and India, forming the pivotal Tamil diaspora estimated at one million.[22]

History

[edit]

Background

[edit]

Emergence of Tamil militancy has its roots in the political developments and ethnic tensions in post-independent Sri Lanka. Sinhalese-led governments attempted to reduce the increased presence of the Tamil minority in government jobs,[23][24] which led to ethnic discrimination, seeded hatred and divisive policies[25] including the "Sinhala Only Act" and anti-Tamil riots, which gave rise to separatist ideologies among many Tamil leaders.[9] By the late 1970s, initial non-violent political struggle for an independent Tamil state was used as justification for a secessionist insurgency led by the LTTE.[23][24]

In the early 1970s, the United Front government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike introduced the policy of standardisation to curtail the number of Tamil students selected for certain faculties in the universities.[26][27][28] In 1972, the government added a district quota as a parameter within each language. A student named Satiyaseelan formed Tamil Manavar Peravai (Tamil Students League) to counter this.[29][30] This group comprised Tamil youth who advocated the rights of students to have fair enrolment. Inspired by the failed 1971 insurrection of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, it was the first Tamil militant group of its kind.[31] It consisted of around 40 Tamil youth, including Ponnuthurai Sivakumaran (later, the leader of the Sivakumaran group), K. Pathmanaba (one of the founder members of EROS) and Velupillai Prabhakaran, an 18-year-old youth from Valvettithurai (VVT).[32]

In 1972, Prabhakaran teamed up with Chetti Thanabalasingam in Jaffna to form the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), with Thanabalasingham as its leader.[33] After he was killed, Prabhakaran took over.[34] At the same time, Nadarajah Thangathurai and Selvarajah Yogachandran (better known by his nom de guerre Kuttimani) were also involved in discussions about an insurgency.[35] They would later (in 1979) create a separate organisation named Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) to campaign for the establishment of an independent Tamil Eelam. These groups, along with another prominent figure of the armed struggle, Ponnuthurai Sivakumaran, were involved in several hit-and-run operations against pro-government Tamil politicians, Sri Lanka Police and civil administration during the early 1970s. These attacks included throwing bombs at the residence and the car of SLFP Jaffna Mayor, Alfred Duraiyappah, placing a bomb at a carnival held in the stadium of Jaffna city (now "Duraiyappah stadium") and Neervely bank robbery. The 1974 Tamil conference incident during which intervention by Sri Lankan police resulted in 11 dead[36] also sparked the anger of these militant groups. Both Sivakumaran and Prabhakaran attempted to assassinate Duraiyappah in revenge for the incident. Sivakumaran committed suicide on 5 June 1974, to evade capture by Police.[37] On 27 July 1975, Prabhakaran assassinated Duraiyappah, who was branded as a "traitor" by TULF and the insurgents alike. Prabhakaran shot and killed the Mayor when he was visiting the Krishnan temple at Ponnalai.[33][38]

Founding and rise to power

[edit]
TL: Ground Troops, TR:Air Force, BL: Black Tigers (Suicide Bombers) and BR: Naval Forces

The LTTE was founded on 5 May 1976 as the successor to the Tamil New Tigers. Uma Maheswaran became its leader, and Prabhakaran its military commander.[39] A five-member committee was also appointed. It has been stated that Prabhakaran sought to "refashion the old TNT/new LTTE into an elite, ruthlessly efficient, and highly professional fighting force",[38] by the terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna. Prabhakaran kept the numbers of the group small and maintained a high standard of training.[40] The LTTE carried out low-key attacks against various government targets, including policemen and local politicians.

TULF support

[edit]

Tamil United Liberation Front leader Appapillai Amirthalingam, who was in 1977 elected as the Opposition leader of Sri Lanka Parliament, clandestinely supported the LTTE. Amirthalingam believed that if he could exercise control over the Tamil insurgent groups, it would enhance his political position and pressure the government to agree to grant political autonomy to the Tamils. Thus, he provided letters of reference to the LTTE and to other Tamil insurgent groups to raise funds. Both Uma Maheswaran (a former surveyor) and Urmila Kandiah, the first female member of the LTTE, were prominent members of the TULF youth wing.[33] Maheswaran was the secretary of TULF Tamil Youth Forum, Colombo branch. Amirthalingam introduced Prabhakaran to N. S. Krishnan, who later became the first international representative of LTTE. It was Krishnan who introduced Prabhakaran to Anton Balasingham, who later became the chief political strategist and chief negotiator of LTTE, which split for the first time in 1979. Uma Maheswaran was found to be having a love affair with Urmila Kandiah, which was against the code of conduct of LTTE. Prabhakaran expelled him and Maheswaran formed People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in 1980.[41]

In 1980, Junius Richard Jayewardene's government agreed to devolve power by the means of District Development Councils upon the request of TULF. By this time, LTTE and other insurgent groups wanted a separate state. They had no faith in any sort of political solution. Thus the TULF and other Tamil political parties were steadily marginalized and insurgent groups emerged as the major force in the north. During this period of time, several other insurgent groups came into the arena, such as Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (1975), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (1979), PLOTE (1980), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (1980) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (1982). LTTE ordered civilians to boycott the local government elections of 1983 which TULF contested. Voter turnout became as low as 10%. Thereafter, Tamil political parties were largely unable to represent the Tamil people as insurgent groups took over their position.[33]

Thirunelveli attack, 1983

[edit]
LTTE leaders at Sirumalai camp, Tamil Nadu, India in 1984 while they are being trained by RAW (from L to R, weapon carrying is included within brackets) – Lingam; Prabhakaran's bodyguard (Hungarian AK), Batticaloa commander Aruna (Beretta Model 38 SMG), LTTE founder-leader Prabhakaran (pistol), Trincomalee commander Pulendran (AK-47), Mannar commander Victor (M203) and Chief of Intelligence Pottu Amman (M 16).

Following a Sri Lankan Army ambush in Meesalai in which two LTTE members were killed including its military commander Seelan, the LTTE sought revenge by launching its first attack on the Army. On 23 July 1983, the LTTE ambushed the Army patrol Four Four Bravo in Thirunelveli, Jaffna, and killed thirteen soldiers.[42] The ambush provided the pretext for the pre-planned Black July pogrom to be unleashed against the Tamil community in which 3,500-4,000 Tamils were killed.[43] Before the pogrom the LTTE had only 30 full-time members.[42] Subsequently, thousands of outraged Tamil youths joined Tamil militant groups to fight the Sri Lankan government, in what is considered a major catalyst to the insurgency in Sri Lanka.[12] Among the notable members to join the LTTE following the pogrom included its eastern commander Karuna Amman,[44] its police chief Balasingham Nadesan[45] and its first suicide attacker Captain Miller.[46]

Indian support

[edit]

In reaction to various geopolitical and economic factors, from August 1983 to May 1987, India, through its intelligence agency the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), provided arms, training and monetary support to six Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent groups including the LTTE. During that period, 32 camps were set up in India to train these 495 LTTE insurgents,[47] including 90 women who were trained in 10 batches.[48] The first batch of Tigers were trained in Establishment 22 based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand. The second batch, including LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman,[49] trained in Himachal Pradesh. Prabakaran visited the first and the second batch of Tamil Tigers to see them training.[50] Eight other batches of LTTE were trained in Tamil Nadu. Thenmozhi Rajaratnam alias Dhanu, who carried out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and Sivarasan, the key conspirator, were among the militants trained by RAW in Nainital, India.[51]

In April 1984, the LTTE formally joined a common militant front, the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), a union between LTTE, TELO, EROS, PLOTE and EPRLF.[52]

Clashes with other insurgent groups

[edit]

TELO usually held the Indian view of problems and pushed for India's view during peace talks with Sri Lanka and other groups. LTTE denounced the TELO view and claimed that India was only acting on its own interest.[53] As a result, the LTTE broke from the ENLF in 1986. Soon fighting broke out between the TELO and the LTTE and clashes occurred over the next few months.[54][55] As a result, almost the entire TELO leadership and at least 400 TELO militants were killed by the LTTE.[56][57][58] The LTTE attacked training camps of the EPRLF a few months later, forcing it to withdraw from the Jaffna peninsula.[52][56] Notices were issued to the effect that all remaining Tamil insurgents join the LTTE in Jaffna and in Madras, where the Tamil groups were headquartered. With the major groups including the TELO and EPRLF eliminated, the remaining 20 or so Tamil insurgent groups were then absorbed into the LTTE, making Jaffna an LTTE-dominated city.[56]

Another practice that increased support by Tamil people was LTTE's members taking an oath of loyalty which stated LTTE's goal of establishing a state for the Sri Lankan Tamils.[54][59] LTTE members were prohibited from smoking cigarettes and consuming alcohol in any form. LTTE members were required to avoid their family members and avoid communication with them. Initially, LTTE members were prohibited from having love affairs or sexual relationships as it could deter their prime motive, but this policy changed after Prabhakaran married Mathivathani Erambu in October 1984.[60]

IPKF period

[edit]

In July 1987, faced with growing anger among its own Tamils and a flood of refugees,[52] India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time by initially airdropping food parcels into Jaffna. After negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Though the conflict was between the Tamil and Sinhalese people, India and Sri Lanka signed the peace accord instead of India influencing both parties to sign a peace accord among themselves. The peace accord assigned a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas, with Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) controlling the regional council and called for the Tamil militant groups to surrender. India was to send a peacekeeping force, named the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), part of the Indian Army, to Sri Lanka to enforce the disarmament and to watch over the regional council.[61][62]

War against IPKF

[edit]

Although the Tamil militant organizations did not have a role in the Indo-Lanka agreement,[54] most groups, including EPRLF, TELO, EROS, and PLOTE, accepted it.[63][64] LTTE rejected the accord because they opposed EPRLF's Varadaraja Perumal as the chief ministerial candidate for the merged North Eastern Province.[62] The LTTE named three alternate candidates for the position, which India rejected.[63] The LTTE subsequently refused to hand over their weapons to the IPKF.[54] The LTTE's political leader for Jaffna peninsula Thileepan died during a hunger strike directed at the Indian government after it had failed to meet his demands; and on 5 October 12 LTTE cadres detained by the Sri Lankan Navy committed suicide when the Sri Lankan Army attempted to take them to Colombo for interrogation after the IPKF refused to intervene and secure their release under the accord. Major General Harkirat Singh J.N.Dixit and Depinder Singh were against handing over the LTTE cadres to the Sri Lankan Army but due to orders from New Delhi they agreed. The LTTE walked out of the accord after the mass suicide. Harkirat Singh blamed the diplomats and the Army headquarters for the turn of events leading to the conflict.[65][66][67][68][69][70][71][72]

Thus LTTE engaged in military conflict with the Indian Army, and launched its first attack on an Indian army rations truck on 8 October, killing five Indian para-commandos who were on board by strapping burning tires around their necks. The government of India stated that the IPKF should disarm the LTTE by force.[73] The Indian Army launched assaults on the LTTE, including a month-long campaign, Operation Pawan to win control of the Jaffna Peninsula. The ruthlessness of this campaign, and the Indian army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations, which included civilian massacres and rapes made it extremely unpopular among many Tamils in Sri Lanka.[74]

Premadasa government support

[edit]

The Indian intervention was also unpopular among the Sinhalese majority. Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa pledged to withdraw IPKF as soon as he was elected president during his presidential election campaign in 1988. After being elected, in April 1989, he started negotiations with LTTE. President Premadasa ordered the Sri Lanka Army to clandestinely hand over arms consignments to the LTTE to fight the IPKF and its proxy, the Tamil National Army (TNA). These consignments included RPGs, mortars, self-loading rifles, Type 81 assault rifle, T56 automatic rifles, pistols, hand grenades, ammunition, and communications sets.[75] Moreover, millions of dollars were also passed on to the LTTE.[76]

After IPKF

[edit]

The last members of the IPKF, which was estimated to have had a strength of well over 100,000 at its peak, left the country in March 1990 upon the request of President Premadasa. Unstable peace initially held between the government and the LTTE, and peace talks progressed towards providing devolution for Tamils in the north and east of the country. A ceasefire held between LTTE and the government from June 1989 to June 1990, but broke down as LTTE massacred 600 police officers in the Eastern Province.[77]

Fighting continued throughout the 1990s, and was marked by two key assassinations carried out by the LTTE: those of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, using suicide bombers on both occasions. The fighting briefly halted in 1994 following the election of Chandrika Kumaratunga as President of Sri Lanka and the onset of peace talks, but fighting resumed after LTTE sacked two SLN gunboats on 19 April 1995.[78] In a series of military operations that followed, the Sri Lanka Armed Forces recaptured the Jaffna Peninsula.[79] Further offensives followed over the next three years, and the military captured large areas in the north of the country from the LTTE, including areas in the Vanni region, the town of Kilinochchi, and many smaller towns. From 1998 onward, the LTTE regained control of these areas, which culminated in the capture in April 2000 of the strategically important Elephant Pass base complex, located at the entrance of the Jaffna Peninsula, after prolonged fighting against the Sri Lanka Army.[80]

Mahattaya, a one-time deputy leader of LTTE, was accused of treason by the LTTE and killed in 1994.[81] He is said to have collaborated with the Indian Research and Analysis Wing to remove Prabhakaran from the LTTE leadership.[82]

2002 ceasefire

[edit]
An LTTE bicycle infantry platoon north of Kilinochchi in 2004

In 2002, the LTTE dropped its demand for a separate state,[83] instead demanding a form of regional autonomy.[84] Following the landslide election defeat of Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickramasinghe coming to power in December 2001, the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire.[85] The Sri Lankan Government agreed to the ceasefire, and in March 2002 the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed. As part of the agreement, Norway and other Nordic countries agreed to jointly monitor the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.[86]

Six rounds of peace talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE were held, but they were temporarily suspended after the LTTE pulled out of the talks in 2003 claiming "certain critical issues relating to the ongoing peace process".[87][88] In 2003 the LTTE proposed an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). This move was approved of by the international community but rejected by the Sri Lankan President.[89] The LTTE boycotted the presidential election in December 2005. While LTTE claimed that the people under its control were free to vote, it is alleged that they used threats to prevent the population from voting. The United States condemned this.[90]

A mother of a dead LTTE cadre raises the Tamil Eelam flag on Maaveerar Naal 2002 in Germany

The new government of Sri Lanka came into power in 2006 and demanded to abrogate the ceasefire agreement, stating that the ethnic conflict could only have a military solution, and that the only way to achieve this was by eliminating the LTTE.[91] Further peace talks were scheduled in Oslo, Norway, on 8 and 9 June 2006, but cancelled when the LTTE refused to meet directly with the government delegation, stating its fighters were not being allowed safe passage to travel to the talks. Norwegian mediator Erik Solheim told journalists that the LTTE should take direct responsibility for the collapse of the talks.[92] Rifts grew between the government and LTTE, and resulted in a number of ceasefire agreement violations by both sides during 2006. Suicide attacks,[93] military skirmishes, and air raids took place during the latter part of 2006.[94][95] Between February 2002 to May 2007, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission documented 3,830 ceasefire violations by the LTTE, with respect to 351 by the security forces.[96] Military confrontation continued into 2007 and 2008. In January 2008 the government officially pulled out of the Cease Fire Agreement.[97]

Dissension

[edit]

In the most significant show of dissent from within the organisation, a senior LTTE commander named Colonel Karuna (nom de guerre of Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan) broke away from the LTTE in March 2004 and formed the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (later Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal), amid allegations that the northern commanders were overlooking the needs of the eastern Tamils. The LTTE leadership accused him of mishandling funds and questioned him about his recent personal behaviour. He tried to take control of the eastern province from the LTTE, which caused clashes between the LTTE and TMVP. The LTTE suggested that TMVP was backed by the government,[98] and the Nordic SLMM monitors corroborated this.[99] It was later revealed that UNP Member of Parliament Seyed Ali Zahir Moulana had played an important role in the defection of Colonel Karuna from the LTTE to the Government.[100]

Military defeat

[edit]

Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected as the president of Sri Lanka in 2005. After a brief period of negotiations, LTTE pulled out of peace talks indefinitely.[101] Sporadic violence had continued and on 25 April 2006, LTTE tried to assassinate Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka.[102] Following the attack, the European Union proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.[103] A new crisis leading to the first large-scale fighting since signing of the ceasefire occurred when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Oya (Mavil Aru) reservoir on 21 July 2006, and cut the water supply to 15,000 villages in government controlled areas.[104] This dispute developed into a full-scale war by August 2006.

After the breakdown of the peace process in 2006, the Sri Lankan military launched a major offensive against the Tigers, defeating the LTTE militarily and bringing the entire country under its control. Human rights groups criticised the nature of the victory which included the internment of Tamil civilians in concentration camps with little or no access to outside agencies.[105] Victory over the Tigers was declared by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa on 16 May 2009,[106] and the LTTE admitted defeat on 17 May 2009.[107] Prabhakaran was killed by government forces on 19 May 2009. Selvarasa Pathmanathan succeeded Prabhakaran as leader of the LTTE, but he was later arrested in Malaysia and handed over to the Sri Lankan government in August 2009.[108]

Defeat in the East

[edit]

Eelam War IV had commenced in the East. Mavil Aru came under the control of the Sri Lanka Army by 15 August 2006. Systematically, Sampoor, Vakarai, Kanjikudichchi Aru and Batticaloa also came under military control. The military then captured Thoppigala, the Tiger stronghold in Eastern Province on 11 July 2007. IPKF had failed to capture it from LTTE during its offensive in 1988.[109]

Defeat in the North

[edit]

Sporadic fighting had been happening in the North for months, but the intensity of the clashes increased after September 2007. Gradually, the defence lines of the LTTE began to fall. The advancing military confined the LTTE into rapidly diminishing areas in the North. Earlier, on 2 November 2007, S. P. Thamilselvan, who was the head of the rebels' political wing, was killed during another government air raid.[110] On 2 January 2008, the Sri Lankan government officially abandoned the ceasefire agreement. By 2 August 2008, LTTE lost the Mannar District following the fall of Vellankulam town. Troops captured Pooneryn and Mankulam during the final months of 2008.

On 2 January 2009, the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, announced that the Sri Lankan troops had captured Kilinochchi, the city which the LTTE had used for over a decade as its de facto administrative capital.[111][112][113] On the same day, President Rajapaksa called upon LTTE to surrender.[96] It was stated that the loss of Kilinochchi had caused substantial damage to the LTTE's public image,[112] and that the LTTE was likely to collapse under military pressure on multiple fronts.[114] As of 8 January 2009, the LTTE abandoned its positions on the Jaffna peninsula to make a last stand in the jungles of Mullaitivu, their last main base.[115] The Jaffna Peninsula was captured by the Sri Lankan Army by 14 January.[116] On 25 January 2009, SLA troops "completely captured" Mullaitivu town, the last major LTTE stronghold.[117]

President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared military victory over the Tamil Tigers on 16 May 2009, after 26 years of conflict.[118] The rebels offered to lay down their weapons in return for a guarantee of safety.[119] On 17 May 2009, LTTE's head of the Department of International Relations, Selvarasa Pathmanathan conceded defeat, saying in an email statement, "this battle has reached its bitter end".

Aftermath

[edit]

With the end of the hostilities, 11,664 LTTE members, including 595 child soldiers surrendered to the Sri Lankan military.[120] Approximately 150 hardcore LTTE cadres and 1,000 mid-level cadres escaped to India.[121] The government detained surrendered cadres for "rehabilitation" under a National Action Plan for the Re-integration of Ex-combatants while allegations of torture, rape and murder of detainees were reported by international human rights bodies.[122] They were divided into three categories; hardcore, non-combatants, and those who were forcibly recruited (including child soldiers). Twenty-four rehabilitation centres were set up in Jaffna, Batticaloa, and Vavuniya. Among the apprehended cadres, there had been about 700 hardcore members. Some of these cadres were integrated into the State Intelligence Service to tackle the internal and external networks of LTTE.[123] By August 2011, the government had released more than 8,000 cadres, and 2,879 remained.[124]

Continued operations

[edit]

After the death of LTTE leader Prabhakaran and the most powerful members of the organisation, Selvarasa Pathmanathan (alias KP) was its sole first generation leader left alive. He assumed duty as the new leader of LTTE on 21 July 2009. A statement was issued, allegedly from the executive committee of the LTTE, stating that Pathmanathan had been appointed leader of the LTTE.[125] 15 days after the announcement, on 5 August 2009, a Sri Lankan military intelligence unit, with the collaboration of local authorities, captured Pathmanathan in the Tune Hotel, in downtown Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.[126] Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence alleges that Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyavan of the Tamil Eelam People's Alliance (TEPA) in Norway, Suren Surendiran of British Tamils Forum (BTF), Father S. J. Emmanuel of Global Tamil Forum (GTF), Visvanathan Rudrakumaran of Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and Sekarapillai Vinayagamoorthy alias Kathirgamathamby Arivazhagan alias Vinayagam, a former senior intelligence leader are trying to revive the organisation among the Tamil diaspora.[2][127][128][129] Subsequently, in May 2011, Nediyavan, who advocates an armed struggle against the Sri Lankan state, was arrested and released on bail in Norway, pending further investigation.[130]

Divisions

[edit]
LTTE women's wing marching in a parade.

The LTTE was viewed as a disciplined and militarised group with a leader of a significant military and organisational skills.[131] Three major divisions of the LTTE were the military, intelligence, and political wings.

The military wing consisted of at least 11 separate divisions including the conventional fighting forces, Charles Anthony Regiment and Jeyanthan Regiment; the suicide wing called the Black Tigers; naval wing Sea Tigers, air-wing Air Tigers, LTTE leader Prabhakaran's personal security divisions, Imran Pandian regiment and Ratha regiment;[132] auxiliary military units such as Kittu artillery brigade, Kutti Sri mortar brigade, Ponnamman mining unit and hit-and-run squads like Pistol gang. Charles Anthony brigade was the first conventional fighting formation created by LTTE. The Sea Tiger division was founded in 1984, under the leadership of Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan alias Soosai. LTTE acquired its first light aircraft in the late 1990s. Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias Shankar was instrumental in creating the Air Tigers.[133][134] It carried out nine air attacks since 2007, including a suicide air raid targeting Sri Lanka Air Force headquarters, Colombo in February 2009. LTTE was the only rebel organisation to have an air force.[135] LTTE intelligence wing consisted of Tiger Organisation Security Intelligence Service aka TOSIS, run by Pottu Amman, and a separate military intelligence division. The LTTE cadres were required to follow a strict code of conduct which included prohibition on smoking and consumption of alcohol, with sexual relationships also being regulated. Each member carried a cyanide capsule to commit suicide in case of capture.[136]

Aircraft that had been in LTTE possession[96] by 2006
Type of Aircraft Quantity
Microlight aircraft 2
Zlín Z 143 5
Helicopters 2
Unmanned aerial vehicles 2

The LTTE operated a systematic and powerful political wing, which functioned like a separate state in the LTTE controlled area. In 1989, it established a political party named People's Front of Liberation Tigers, under Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya. It was abandoned soon after. Later, S. P. Thamilselvan was appointed the head of the political wing. He was also a member of the LTTE delegation for Norwegian brokered peace talks. After the death of Thamilselvan in November 2007, Balasingham Nadesan was appointed as its leader.[137] Major sections within the political wing include International peace secretariat, led by Pulidevan, LTTE Police, LTTE court, Bank of Tamil Eelam, Sports division and the "Voice of Tigers" radio broadcasting station of LTTE.

LTTE used female cadres for military engagements. Its women's wing consisted of Malathi and Sothiya Brigades.[138]

Governance

[edit]
Kilinochchi District court in LTTE-administered Tamil Eelam

During its active years, the LTTE had established and administered a de facto state under its control, named Tamil Eelam with Kilinochchi as its administrative capital, and had managed a government in its territory, providing state functions such as courts, a police force, a human rights organisation, and a humanitarian assistance board,[139] a health board, and an education board.[89] However, the court system, composed of young judges with little or no legal training had operated without codified or defined legal authority, and essentially operated as agents of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary.[140] It ran a bank (Bank of Tamil Eelam), a radio station (Voice of Tigers) and a television station (National Television of Tamil Eelam).[141] In the LTTE-controlled areas, women reported lower levels of domestic violence because "the Tigers had a de facto justice system to deal with domestic violence."[142] The United States Department of State described LTTE's governance as an "authoritarian military rule" that violated civil liberties and discriminated against minorities.[140]

In 2003, the LTTE issued a proposal to establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority in the eight districts of the North and East which it controlled. The ISGA was to be entrusted with powers such as the right to impose law, collect taxes and oversee the rehabilitation process until a favourable solution was reached after which elections would be held. The ISGA would consist of members representing the LTTE, GoSL and the Muslim community. According to the proposal, this LTTE administration intended to be a secular one with principal emphasis on prohibition of discrimination and protection of all communities.[7]

Local perception and support

[edit]

Due to its military victories, policies, call for national self-determination and constructive Tamil nationalist platform, the LTTE was supported by major sections of the Tamil community.[131] Based on the survey of the Jaffna population by the BBC and Reuters journalists, a U.S. diplomatic cable from 1994 stated that support for the LTTE was fairly strong among the Jaffna population who admired the discipline of the LTTE's administrative service, and that majority of Jaffna residents would choose the LTTE over the Sri Lankan Army given the choice.[143] According to the assessments by independent observers, the LTTE administration of justice gained "significant social acceptance", and its courts were broadly seen as "more efficient, less expensive, and less vulnerable to corruption than their Sri Lankan counterparts."[144] The LTTE police force also had "a high degree of legitimacy" among Tamil civilians who viewed it as "an uncorrupt and important stabilizing factor in the region."[145] A survey carried out by the Centre for Policy Alternatives in 2002 from a sample of 89 Sri Lankan Tamils found that 89% regarded the LTTE as their sole representatives.[146]

However, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), a local human rights NGO that has been accused of anti-LTTE bias by some critics, claimed that "by combination of internal terror and narrow nationalist ideology the LTTE succeeded in atomising the community. It took away not only the right to oppose but even the right to evaluate, as a community, the course they were taking. This gives a semblance of illusion that the whole society is behind the LTTE."[147] After meeting with the Tamil civil society in Jaffna in 2001, Jehan Perera, the executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, observed that fear was not the only factor that impelled civic groups in Jaffna to speak in favour of the LTTE but that the Jaffna people had recognized the LTTE's military strength and pragmatically accepted it as the main player in achieving a negotiated settlement.[148]

Ideology

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The LTTE was a self-styled national liberation organisation with the primary goal of establishing an independent Tamil state. Tamil nationalism was the primary basis of its ideology.[149] LTTE claimed to strive for a democratic, secular state that is based on socialism.[150] Its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was influenced by Indian freedom fighters such as Subhas Chandra Bose.[151] The organisation denied being a separatist movement and saw itself as fighting for self-determination and restoration of sovereignty in what it recognised as Tamil homeland.[152] Although most Tigers were Hindus, the LTTE was an avowedly secular organisation; religion did not play any significant part in its ideology.[153] Prabhakaran criticised what he saw as the oppressive features of traditional Hindu Tamil society, such as the caste system and gender inequality.[154] The LTTE presented itself as a revolutionary movement seeking widespread change within Tamil society, not just independence from the Sri Lankan state. Therefore, its ideology called for the removal of caste discrimination and support for women's liberation.[155] Prabhakaran described his political philosophy as "revolutionary socialism", with the goal of creating an "egalitarian society".[156] However, by 2002 with the shift in geopolitical climate, Prabhakaran endorsed "open market economy", but he pointed out that the question about the proper economic system can be considered only after the ethnic problem had been solved.[157]

Global network

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LTTE had developed a large international network since the days of N. S. Krishnan, who served as its first international representative. In the late 1970s, TULF parliamentarian and opposition leader A. Amirthalingam provided letters of reference for fundraising, and V. N. Navaratnam, who was an executive committee member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), introduced many influential and wealthy Tamils living overseas to Tamil insurgent leaders.[33] Navaratnam also introduced LTTE members to the members of Polisario Front, a national liberation movement in Morocco, at a meeting held in Oslo, Norway.[33] In 1978, during the world tour of Amirthalingam (with London-based Eelam activist S. K. Vaikundavasan), he formed the World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC), which was later found to be an LTTE front organisation.[158] The global contacts of LTTE grew steadily since then. At the height of its power, LTTE had 42 offices worldwide. The international network of LTTE engages in propaganda, fundraising, arms procurement, and shipping.[50]

There were three types of organisations that engage in propaganda and fund raising—Front, Cover, and Sympathetic. Prior to the ethnic riots of 1983, attempts to raise funds for a sustaining military campaign were not realised. It was the mass exodus of Tamil civilians to India and western countries following the Black July ethnic riots, which made this possible. As the armed conflict evolved and voluntary donations lessened, LTTE used force and threats to collect money.[159][160] LTTE was worth US$200–300 million at its peak.[2][3] The group's global network owned numerous business ventures in various countries. These include investment in real estate, shipping, grocery stores, gold and jewellery stores, gas stations, restaurants, production of films, mass media organisations (TV, radio, print), and industries. It was also in control of numerous charitable organisations, which included, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation.[161]

Arms Procurement and shipping activities of LTTE were largely clandestine. Prior to 1983, it procured weapons mainly from Afghanistan via the Indo-Pakistani border. Explosives were purchased from commercial markets in India. From 1983 to 1987, LTTE acquired a substantial amount of weapons from RAW and from Lebanon, Cyprus, Singapore, and Malaysia-based arms dealers. LTTE received its first consignment of arms from Singapore in 1984 on board the MV Cholan, the first ship owned by the organisation. Funds were received and cargo cleared at Chennai Port with the assistance of M. G. Ramachandran, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu.[162] In November 1994, the LTTE was able to purchase 60 tonnes of explosives (50 tonnes of TNT and 10 tonnes of RDX) from Rubezone Chemical plant in Ukraine, providing a forged Bangladeshi Ministry of Defence end-user certificate.[163] Payments for the explosives were made from a Citibank account in Singapore held by Selvarasa Pathmanathan. Consignment was transported on board MV Sewne. The same explosives were used for the Central Bank bombing in 1996. Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia remained the most trusted outposts of LTTE, after India alienated it following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

A LTTE Sea Tiger fast attack fibreglass boat passing a Sri Lankan freighter sunk by the Sea Tigers just north of the village of Mullaitivu, North-eastern Sri Lanka

According to Rohan Gunaratna, since late 1997, North Korea became the principal country to provide arms, ammunition, and explosives to the LTTE. The deal with North Korean government was carried out by Ponniah Anandaraja alias Aiyannah, a member of World Tamil Coordinating Committee of the United States and later, the accountant of LTTE.[50] According to the Sri Lankan government, he worked at the North Korean embassy in Bangkok since late 1997. LTTE had nearly 20-second-hand ships, which were purchased in Japan, and registered in Panama and other Latin American countries.[164] These ships mostly transported general cargo, including paddy, sugar, timber, glass, and fertilizer. But when an arms deal was finalized, they travelled to North Korea, loaded the cargo and brought it to the equator, where the ships were based. Then on board merchant tankers, weapons were transferred to the sea of Alampil, just outside the territorial waters in Sri Lanka's exclusive economic zone. After that, small teams of Sea Tigers brought the cargo ashore. The Sri Lanka Navy, during 2005–08 destroyed at least 11 of these cargo ships belonged to LTTE in the international waters.[165][166]

LTTE's last shipment of weapons was in March 2009, towards the end of the war. The merchant vessel Princess Iswari went from Indonesia to North Korea under captain Kamalraj Kandasamy alias Vinod, loaded the weapons and came back to international waters beyond Sri Lanka. But due to the heavy naval blockades set up by the Sri Lankan Navy, it could not deliver the arms consignment. Thus it dumped the weapons in the sea. The same ship, after changing its name to MV Ocean Lady, arrived in Vancouver with 76 migrants, in October 2009.[167] In December 2009, The Sri Lankan Navy apprehended a merchant vessel belonging to LTTE, Princess Chrisanta in Indonesia and brought it back to Sri Lanka.[168]

The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (USSFRC) and Ethiopian based Jimma Times[169] claimed that the Eritrean government had provided direct military assistance, including light aircraft to LTTE, during the 2002–03 period when the LTTE was negotiating with the Sri Lankan government via the Norwegian mediators.[170][171] It was also alleged that Erik Solheim, the chief Norwegian facilitator, helped LTTE to establish this relationship.[172] These allegations and a suspicion from within the Sri Lankan armed forces, that LTTE had considerable connections and assets in Eritrea and that its leader Prabhakaran might try to flee to Eritrea in the final stages of war, prompted the Sri Lankan government to establish diplomatic relations with Eritrea in 2009.[173]

In 2013, Thiruthanikan Thanigasalam and Sahilal Sabaratnam were sentenced to 25 years in prison in Brooklyn in connection of attempting to purchase high-powered weaponry for the LTTE. They were caught in a FBI undercover sting operation while attempting to purchase surface-to-air missiles, missile launchers, and assault rifles.[174]

Proscription as a terrorist group

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Thirty-three countries currently list the LTTE as a terrorist organization.[175][176] As of October 2019, these include:

The framing of terrorism, despite having no universally accepted definition, carries a connotation of moral illegitimacy and, as proscription, is used by states to criminalize their opponents and justify "extreme" measures against them.[186] In the Sri Lankan context, proscription is also used to delegitimize the LTTE's political objective of establishing an independent state. There is resistance in the international community to the alteration of state boundaries by force and no state recognized Tamil claim of self-determination. The proscriptions by Western states reflected their opposition to LTTE's political objective than concern about its threat to their own national security.[187] Moreover, despite its human rights abuses, Western states regarded Sri Lanka as a democratic ally in their promotion of a global liberal order and were committed to upholding its sovereignty. Hence, proscription was also used by these states to shape the conduct of the LTTE and Tamil diaspora to align with their foreign policy aims.[188]

The first country to ban the LTTE was its brief ally, India, following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.[189] The Indian change of policy came gradually, starting with the IPKF-LTTE conflict and culminating with the assassination. India opposes the proposed Tamil Eelam that LTTE wanted to establish, fearing that it would lead to Tamil Nadu's separation from India despite its integration into the national mainstream.[190] In 2012 after the LTTE's defeat, the Indian Government extended the ban on the LTTE on the grounds of its alleged "strong anti-India posture and threat to the security of Indian nationals".[189]

Sri Lanka first banned the LTTE in 1998, lifted the ban before signing the ceasefire agreement in 2002 and reintroduced the ban in 2009.[191]

The United States proscribed the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997. A U.S. ambassador later explained that the main rationale behind the ban was to prevent LTTE's fundraising and for it to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government. The Pentagon had launched a military programme in March 1996 to train the Sri Lankan military after a series of LTTE attacks which affected U.S. commercial interests on the island but it failed to weaken the LTTE due to its procurement of conventional weapons with funds raised overseas.[192] In 2003, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, urged the LTTE to renounce its armed struggle for separate state and to accept the Sri Lankan government's sovereignty in order for the proscription to be lifted.[188]

The European Union (EU) banned LTTE as a terrorist organization on 17 May 2006. In a statement, the European Parliament said that the LTTE did not represent all Tamils and called on it to "allow for political pluralism and alternate democratic voices in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka".[103] Pressure from the United States, which assisted Sri Lanka's war efforts, played a critical role in getting Canada and the EU to ban the LTTE.[193] The then Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera later recounted that there was a difficulty in adopting the ban as a unanimous decision due to the opposition from seven countries in the 25-member EU and that consensus was finally achieved only after he had met with the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice several times.[194] Swedish Major General Ulf Henricsson, the head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) whom the EU had consulted before the ban, opposed the ban, warning it gave the Sri Lankan government "carte blanche" to seek a military solution. He warned the EU in a memo that a ban would lead to an increase in attacks and violence. He later described the ban as a decision made in the "coffee shops in Brussels" where EU members had failed to read the memo carefully.[195][196] He further stated that as part of the global war on terror the EU listened to only the Sri Lankan government's version of events and that the government should have also been listed as it "used the same methods".[197]

In October 2014, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the anti-terrorism sanctions and several other restrictions placed on the LTTE in 2006. The court noted that the basis of proscribing the LTTE had been based on "imputations derived from the press and the Internet" rather than on direct investigation of the group's actions, as required by law.[198][199] Later, in March 2015, the EU reimposed the sanctions and restrictions.[200] In July 2017, the LTTE was removed from the terrorism blacklist of the EU's top court, stating that there was no evidence to show of LTTE carrying out attacks after its military defeat in 2009.[201] However, despite the ECJ ruling, the EU stated the LTTE remains listed as a terrorist organization by the EU.[202]

On 12 November 2014, the Malaysian government listed the by-then defunct LTTE as a terrorist group amid allegations of its revival attempts in the country.[185] Referring to a letter he purportedly wrote on 12 February 2020 as the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Home Affairs requesting the LTTE's removal from its list of terrorist groups, former Malaysian premier Mahathir Mohamad later explained that the LTTE had not harmed Malaysia and that a group should not be labelled as terrorists simply because other countries do so, since he had met with the leader of the Hamas despite the U.S. having banned it as a terrorist organization.[203] However, responding to the suggestion of the Attorney General (AG) to review the list of gazetted terrorist organizations after the AG dropped charges against 12 alleged LTTE sympathizers, then Minister of Home Affairs Muhyiddin Yassin stated on 22 February 2020 that the LTTE would remain listed as a terrorist organization, claiming its "ideology" posed threat to Malaysia's public order and security.[204] Yassin, a Malay nationalist,[205] has been accused of using the ban to mastermind the "politically motivated" arrests of Indian Tamil members of the Democratic Action Party over alleged LTTE links.[206]

The LTTE leader Prabhakaran contested the terrorist designation of his organization, asserting that the international community had been influenced by the "false propaganda" of the Sri Lankan state and said that there was no coherent definition of the concept of terrorism. He also maintained that the LTTE was a national liberation organization fighting against "state terrorism" and "racist oppression".[207] He urged Western powers engaged in the war on terror to provide "a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of terrorism that would distinguish between freedom struggles based on the right to self-determination and blind terrorist acts based on fanaticism." He also complained that human rights violators such as Sri Lanka joining the alliance in the war on terror posed threat to "the legitimate political struggles of the oppressed humanity".[208][209]

Suicide attacks

[edit]
Kopay memorial for fallen Tamil combatants

One of the main divisions of LTTE included the Black Tigers, an elite fighting wing of the movement, whose mission included carrying out suicide attacks against enemy targets.[17] The LTTE conducted its first suicide attack on 5 July 1987 when Captain Miller rammed a truck filled with explosives into a Sri Lankan Army base in Jaffna killing scores of soldiers. Black Tigers as a division would be established years later. Its two strategic purposes were to compensate for the LTTE's lack of heavy weaponry and to serve as a commando unit to access difficult targets. Its members were carefully selected and underwent intense training.[210]

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, LTTE was the first insurgent organization to use concealed explosive belts and vests.[211] According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, the LTTE stated that out of the deceased Black Tigers, 274 were male and 104 were female.[96] Experts estimated that the Black Tigers had carried out most of the suicide attacks recorded around the world by the time the Sri Lankan civil war ended in 2009. The LTTE is credited with popularizing the tactic globally.[212] However, most of the LTTE suicide attacks were carried out against military targets in the north and east of the country;[210] a quarter had been political assassinations and unlike other groups the LTTE primarily used such attacks as part of its insurgency strategy rather than to terrorize civilians.[213] Sometimes civilians were also killed such as in the 1998 attack on Dalada Maligawa killing eight civilians.[214]

The Black Tiger wing also carried out attacks on several high-profile political figures.[215] Three notable attacks includes the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, on 21 May 1991,[216][217] the assassination of Ranasinghe Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka, on 1 May 1993,[218] and the failed assassination attempt of Chandrika Kumaratunga, the Sri Lankan President, on 18 December 1999, which resulted in the loss of her right eye.[219]

Black Tiger cadres killed in action were highly glorified and their families were given the "Maaveerar family" status, just like normal LTTE cadres. Also, these families were honoured with the "Thamizheezha Maravar pathakkam" (Warrior medal of Tamil Eelam), one of the higher honours of Tamil Eelam.[220] Black Tiger members were given a chance to have his/her last supper with the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, which was a rare honour, motivating LTTE cadres to join the Black Tiger wing.[221]

Assassinations

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Political figures who were considered as assassinated by LTTE (Source: Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence)[96]
Position/Status Number
President of Sri Lanka 1
Ex-Prime Minister of India 1
Presidential candidate 1
Leaders of political parties 10
Cabinet ministers 7
Members of Parliament 37
Members of provincial councils 6
Members of Pradeshiya Sabha 22
Political party organisers 17
Mayors 4

The LTTE has been condemned by various groups for assassinating political and military opponents. The LTTE assassinated several leading Tamil politicians such as Appapillai Amirthalingam, the former Leader of the Opposition;[222] and the Sri Lankan government has accused the LTTE of assassinating Lakshman Kadirgamar, the former Foreign Minister whom the LTTE considered a "traitor".[223] The assassination of the Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa is attributed to LTTE. The seventh Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber Thenmozhi Rajaratnam on 21 May 1991.[224] On 24 October 1994, LTTE detonated a bomb during a political rally in Thotalanga-Grandpass, which killed most of the prominent politicians of the United National Party, including presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake MP, Cabinet ministers Weerasinghe Mallimarachchi and G. M. Premachandra, Ossie Abeygunasekara MP and Gamini Wijesekara MP.[225][226]

Specifically in relation to the TELO, the LTTE has said that it had to perform preemptive self-defence because the TELO was in effect functioning as a proxy for India.[227]

Human rights violations

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Numerous countries and international organizations have accused the LTTE of attacking civilians and recruiting children.[224]

Attacks on civilians

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The LTTE carried out several attacks on civilian targets. An early notable attack was the Anuradhapura massacre in 1985 which the LTTE stated was in retaliation to the Valvettiturai massacre of Tamil civilians.[228] Other notable attacks include the Aranthalawa massacre,[229] Kattankudy mosque massacre,[230] the Kebithigollewa massacre,[231] and the Dehiwala train bombing.[232] Civilians have also been killed in attacks on economic targets, such as the Central Bank bombing.[232][233] According to Udalagama and de Silva, between 3,700 and 4,100 civilians were killed in "terrorist acts" attributed to the LTTE, a "somewhat modest" proportion of the overall civilian death toll during the war.[234]

The LTTE leader Prabhakaran denied allegations of killing innocent Sinhalese civilians, claiming to condemn such acts of violence. In the case of Sinhalese in colonized areas, he claimed that LTTE had instead attacked armed Home Guards who were "death-squads let loose on Tamil civilians" and Sinhalese settlers who were "brought to the Tamil areas to forcibly occupy the land."[235][236] The continuous inflow of Sinhalese settlers into Tamil areas since the 1950s, encouraged by the government to undermine claims of a Tamil homeland, had become a source of inter-ethnic violence and had been one of the major grievances expressed by the LTTE.[237] The LTTE also denied massacring Muslims, stating that they were allies against the Sinhalese state.[238] LTTE sympathizers often claim that Karuna, while he was a commander, was solely responsible for many attacks, especially in the Eastern Province.[239] The LTTE also attacked unarmed civilians outside the colonized areas.[240]

Child soldiers

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The LTTE has been accused of recruiting and using child soldiers to fight against Sri Lankan government forces.[241][242] The LTTE was accused of having up to 5,794 child soldiers in its ranks since 2001.[243][244] Amid international pressure, the LTTE announced in July 2003 that it would stop conscripting child soldiers, but UNICEF[245] and Human Rights Watch[246] have accused it of reneging on its promises, and of conscripting Tamil children orphaned by the tsunami.[247] N. Malathy, the former secretary of NESOHR, accused the UNICEF of sensationalizing this issue to fundraise and falsely listing disabled and orphaned children in the LTTE orphanages as child soldiers.[248] On 18 June 2007, the LTTE released 135 children under 18 years of age. UNICEF, along with the United States, stated that there had been a significant drop in LTTE recruitment of children, but claimed in 2007 that 506 child recruits remain under the LTTE.[249] A report released by the LTTE's Child Protection Authority (CPA) in 2008 stated that less than 40 soldiers under age 18 remained in its forces.[250] In 2009 a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations said the Tamil Tigers "continue to recruit children to fight on the frontlines", and "use force to keep many civilians, including children, in harm's way".[251] During the violent parts of the war, though some children were forcefully recruited, many voluntarily joined the LTTE after witnessing or experiencing abuses by Sri Lankan security forces, seeking to "protect their families or to avenge real or perceived abuses."[252] However, the Sri Lankan government's National Child Protection Authority alleged that since the ceasefire children were more likely to be forcibly recruited.[253] In Batticaloa, many cases of child recruitment went unreported due to threats from the LTTE.[254]

The LTTE argued that instances of child recruitment occurred mostly in the eastern province, under the purview of former LTTE regional commander Colonel Karuna. After leaving the LTTE and forming the TMVP, it is alleged that Karuna continued to forcibly kidnap and induct child soldiers.[255] Soon after Karuna's defection, the LTTE began an intensive campaign to re-recruit Karuna's former cadres, including child soldiers. Many of the former child soldiers were re-recruited by the LTTE, often by force.[256]

Forced displacement

[edit]

Following the anti-Tamil violence in Trincomalee District in 1985, where security forces and Sinhalese mobs massacred about 200 Tamils and displaced their entire population from the town,[257] the LTTE carried out a series of attacks on Sinhalese in the area forcing thousands to flee in 1986.[258] In October 1987, the LTTE took advantage of communal violence in the Eastern Province, particularly in the Trincomalee District. LTTE gunmen led Tamil rioters and ordered Sinhalese to leave, threatening their lives. By 4 October, 5,000 Sinhalese were made homeless. Following the suicide of 12 LTTE detainees under the Sri Lankan Army custody, LTTE massacred Sinhalese civilians throughout the Eastern Province. By the end of the week, about 200 Sinhalese were dead and 20,000 had fled the Eastern Province.[259]

Further evictions of Muslim residents happened in the north in 1990, and the east in 1992. Yogi, the LTTE's political spokesman, stated that this expulsion was carried out in retaliation for the atrocities committed against Tamils in the Eastern Province by Muslims, who were seen by the LTTE as collaborators with the Sri Lankan Army.[260][261] Sri Lankan Defence Ministry, Human Rights Watch, among others, have described the forcible removal of Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control as "ethnic cleansing".[262][263]

During the peace talks in 2002, the LTTE formally apologised to the Muslims for the expulsion and invited them back, stating that the north-east also belonged to them.[264] In 2003, the LTTE formally recognised the rights of the Muslim and Sinhalese communities to be present in the north-east in their ISGA proposals.[7]

Mistreatment of prisoners

[edit]

Executions

[edit]

The LTTE executed prisoners of war on a number of occasions despite its declaration in 1988 that it would abide by the Geneva Conventions. One such incident was the mass murder of 600 unarmed Sri Lankan Police officers in 1990, in Eastern Province, after they surrendered to the LTTE on the request of President Ranasinghe Premadasa.[265] In 1993, LTTE killed 200 Sri Lanka Army soldiers, captured in the naval base at Pooneryn, during the Battle of Pooneryn.[266] Few months earlier they had executed an officer and several soldiers captured during the Battle of Janakapura.[267] In 1996, LTTE executed 207 military officers and soldiers who had surrendered to the LTTE during Battle of Mullaitivu (1996).[268][269] The LTTE has also been accused of executing civilian Tamils accused of dissent. Rajan Hoole of UTHR(J) claims that various dissident sources allege that the number of Tamil dissenters and prisoners from rival armed groups clandestinely killed by the LTTE in detention or otherwise ranges from 8,000 - 20,000,[270] although he later stated that western agencies dismissed his figures as exaggeration.[271]

Torture

[edit]

The LTTE tortured suspects based on the victim's refusal to co-operate and for giving information to the Sri Lankan army or IPKF.[272] Torture was also practised on child soldiers who attempted to flee military service such as by being left out in the sun.[273] Sri Lankan soldiers and police officers taken as prisoners were also tortured by the LTTE during interrogations. LTTE prison conditions were often poor and many prisoners died due to infections from their wounds.[274] Among the methods of torture included burning with heated metal, hanging the victim upside down and beating them, slashing with razors and electroshocking.[275][274]

War crimes during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war

[edit]

There are allegations that war crimes were committed by the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE during the last stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. The alleged war crimes include attacks on civilians and civilian buildings by both sides, executions of combatants and prisoners by both sides, keeping civilians as hostages by the LTTE, and recruitment of child soldiers by both the LTTE, and the TMVP, a Sri Lankan Army paramilitary group.[276][277][278][279]

A panel of experts appointed by UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon to advise him on the issue of accountability with regard to any alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the civil war found "credible allegations" which, if proven, indicated that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE.[280][281][282] The panel has called on the UNSG to conduct an independent international inquiry into the alleged violations of international law.[283][284]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, was a Tamil separatist militant organization founded in 1976 by that waged a protracted guerrilla war against the Sri Lankan government to establish an independent state of in the northern and eastern . The group, which grew to command a conventional , rudimentary air and naval wings known as the and , and specialized units including female combatants, controlled significant territory as a state for much of the conflict, administering civil services, taxation, and courts in areas like . At its peak, the LTTE pioneered tactics such as suicide bombings—carrying out over 200 such attacks, including the invention of the suicide vest—and recruited thousands of fighters, including child soldiers, to sustain its insurgency. Designated a foreign terrorist organization by the in 1997, along with entities like , the , and , the LTTE was notorious for high-profile assassinations, such as that of former Indian Prime Minister in 1991, and for expelling or massacring non-Tamil populations, including Sinhalese and Muslim civilians, from contested regions to consolidate ethnic homogeneity. Despite ceasefires and peace talks, including the 2002 accord brokered by , the group's insistence on full independence and internal authoritarianism—exemplified by Prabhakaran's cult of personality and elimination of rival Tamil groups—prolonged the civil war, which caused over 100,000 deaths. The LTTE's military defeat came in May 2009 during a final offensive by Sri Lankan forces, which killed Prabhakaran and dismantled the group's command structure, ending the 26-year conflict.

Origins and Early Development

Ethnic and Political Context in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka's population at independence in consisted primarily of Sinhalese (approximately 70-75%), with comprising about 11% and Indian (descendants of 19th-century plantation laborers from ) around 12%, alongside Moors and others. The Soulbury Constitution, enacted under British rule and retained post-independence, provided minority safeguards, including language rights and , amid Tamil overrepresentation in and professions due to English-medium education in the north. However, the government under prioritized Sinhalese interests, passing the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of , which required proof of pre-1833 residency or descent for citizenship, disenfranchising roughly 800,000-1 million Indian and rendering them stateless for decades until partial agreements with in 1964 and 1974. The rise of Sinhala nationalism, fueled by Buddhist clergy and politicians seeking electoral advantage, intensified under the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's 1956 election victory hinged on promises of Sinhala primacy, leading to the Official Language Act () that September, which designated Sinhala as the sole official language, bypassing Tamil despite its use by 25% of the population and prior bilingual administrative norms. This policy disadvantaged Tamils in and services, as they lacked Sinhala proficiency, prompting non-violent protests by the Federal Party. Rumors of Tamil violence against Sinhalese, amplified by inflammatory rhetoric, triggered the 1958 anti-Tamil riots—the first island-wide ethnic pogrom—resulting in over 300 Tamil deaths, widespread property destruction, and displacement, particularly in Sinhalese-majority areas. Subsequent SLFP governments under escalated measures perceived as discriminatory. University standardization policies introduced in 1971 adjusted admission cutoffs to prioritize district quotas and rural Sinhalese applicants, slashing Tamil enrollment from around 40% (reflecting merit-based performance from Jaffna's schools) to below 10% by the mid-1970s, despite ' raw scores often exceeding Sinhalese averages. The 1972 Republican Constitution formalized a , rejected , enshrined Buddhism's "foremost place" with state duties to protect it, and omitted Tamil as an , eroding earlier parity commitments and alienating who viewed it as codifying second-class status. These cumulative policies shifted Tamil demands from federal autonomy—articulated by the Federal Party since 1949—to , culminating in the 's Vaddukoddai Resolution of May 14, 1976, which rejected parliamentary solutions and called for a sovereign socialist in the north and east, citing failed non-violent efforts.

Formation and Initial Leadership

Velupillai , born on November 26, 1954, in the coastal town of Valvettiturai on Sri Lanka's to a modest clerk family, emerged as the founding figure of the LTTE amid escalating Tamil grievances against Sinhalese-majority policies. By his late teens, Prabhakaran had become radicalized by perceived anti-Tamil , including standardized Sinhala-language requirements in and that disadvantaged Tamil speakers. In 1972, at age 17, he formed the (TNT), a nascent armed group comprising a handful of close associates from the region, aimed at armed resistance to secure a separate Tamil state known as . On May 5, 1976, Prabhakaran reorganized the TNT into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), establishing it as a dedicated separatist with a formal structure for guerrilla operations in northern and eastern . Prabhakaran assumed overall leadership from the outset, enforcing strict discipline and a that centralized authority under him, with initial cadres numbering fewer than a dozen loyalists drawn from Tamil youth disillusioned by non-violent political avenues. Early associates included figures like (alias "Baby"), who merged his small armed faction with Prabhakaran's group during the transition, bolstering the nascent LTTE's operational base in . This formation marked a shift toward exclusive militancy, rejecting electoral participation and prioritizing armed struggle for Tamil . The LTTE's initial leadership under Prabhakaran emphasized ideological purity, with the group adopting the tiger emblem symbolizing ferocity and drawing inspiration from global revolutionary models like the , though adapted to local ethnic fault lines. Prabhakaran's authoritarian style, including oaths of personal loyalty to him, solidified control from the group's inception, distinguishing the LTTE from contemporaneous Tamil factions like the TELO by its intolerance for internal dissent. By late 1976, the organization had begun rudimentary training in forested areas near , laying the groundwork for escalation despite its limited resources and personnel at formation.

Early Militant Activities and Escalation

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged from the , a small radical group founded by in 1972, which formalized as the LTTE on May 5, 1976, marking the start of organized militant operations aimed at Tamil separatism through armed struggle. Early activities focused on assassinations of perceived Tamil collaborators with the Sri Lankan and through robberies, reflecting a strategy of and resource accumulation in strongholds. On July 27, 1975, Prabhakaran personally led the killing of Jaffna Mayor , whom the group labeled a traitor for aligning with Sinhalese-led policies, an act executed by shooting him at outside a temple and claimed as the inaugural strike against moderation within Tamil politics. From 1976 onward, the LTTE conducted a series of robberies to finance weapons procurement and cadre recruitment, including a March 1976 heist at the People's in Puttur yielding Rs. 668,000 and subsequent operations that escalated from petty theft to targeted state asset seizures. These low-intensity actions, numbering around a dozen in the late 1970s, involved small teams using homemade explosives and pistols, often evading police through local support networks amid growing Tamil youth disillusionment with non-violent . By the early 1980s, operations expanded to sporadic ambushes on police stations and rackets, with LTTE cadres receiving rudimentary training in —facilitated by Tamil Nadu's sympathetic provincial government—enhancing tactics in guerrilla hit-and-run raids. Escalation intensified in 1983 when, on July 23, LTTE militants ambushed a Sri Lankan patrol near , killing 13 soldiers in a coordinated attack using rifles and grenades, an operation designed to provoke retaliation and rally Tamil support. This incident triggered widespread anti-Tamil riots in and other Sinhalese-majority areas—known as —resulting in approximately 3,000 Tamil deaths, mass displacements of over 150,000, and destruction of Tamil properties, which the LTTE exploited to portray as evidence of genocidal intent, thereby accelerating recruitment and transforming sporadic militancy into sustained insurgency. The government's subsequent offensives into northern Tamil areas further radicalized the LTTE, shifting focus from assassinations to fortified defenses and conventional engagements by mid-decade.

Internal Power Consolidation

Rivalries with Other Tamil Militants

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), under Velupillai Prabhakaran's leadership, viewed other Tamil militant groups as existential threats to its monopoly on the armed struggle for , leading to systematic elimination campaigns in the mid-1980s. These rivalries stemmed from competition for recruits, funding from networks, and limited training opportunities provided by , which favored select groups but could not accommodate all. Prabhakaran prioritized centralized control, perceiving fragmented militancy as weakening the overall cause against Sri Lankan forces, and used assassinations and ambushes to coerce submission or destruction. The most intense clashes occurred in 1986, particularly against the (TELO), which had grown rapidly due to Indian backing and controlled key areas in . On April 24, 1986, LTTE forces launched surprise attacks on TELO positions in , killing dozens of cadres and seizing weapons caches. This escalated into open warfare, culminating in the of TELO leader Sri Sabaratnam on May 7, 1986, during an LTTE raid on his hideout, after which LTTE militants executed over 90 TELO fighters in subsequent sweeps. TELO's remnants fragmented, with survivors fleeing or defecting, allowing LTTE to consolidate territorial gains in northern . Similar violence targeted the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and (EPRLF), both of which had allied with LTTE in the 1984 Eelam National Liberation Front but later competed for influence. LTTE ambushed PLOTE units in throughout mid-1986, killing leader in an October 1986 attack, while EPRLF cadres faced forced absorption or execution for refusing LTTE oaths of loyalty. By November 1986, these operations had neutralized rival armed presence in LTTE strongholds, reducing the number of independent Tamil militant factions from over a dozen to LTTE dominance. These intra-Tamil conflicts, often termed the "Jaffna massacres" by observers, resulted in hundreds of militant deaths and alienated some Tamil civilian support, yet fortified LTTE's command structure ahead of the intervention in 1987. Prabhakaran justified the actions as necessary to prevent "traitorous" divisions exploited by Sri Lankan intelligence, though critics, including defected militants, attributed them to authoritarian consolidation rather than strategic imperatives. The eliminations ensured LTTE's unchallenged and resource extraction, setting the stage for its evolution into a proto-state apparatus.

Elimination of Competitors and Internal Purges

The LTTE pursued monopoly over Tamil militancy by launching a violent campaign against rival groups in 1986, beginning with the (TELO). In April, LTTE forces killed over 100 TELO fighters amid escalating tensions over control of resources and ideology. The offensive intensified, culminating in the of TELO leader Sri Sabaratnam on May 5, after which several hundred TELO cadres were killed by the end of the month, dismantling TELO as a coherent military entity. The LTTE extended its assaults to the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). In September, LTTE demanded PLOTE relinquish its troops, prompting PLOTE to suspend operations; by October, LTTE had banned PLOTE activities in its areas. In November, LTTE raided EPRLF training camps and distributed notices in and requiring all Tamil militants to affiliate with LTTE or face elimination. This six-month intra-Tamil conflict from April to November enabled LTTE to absorb or coerce smaller groups into submission, leveraging internal discipline and intelligence networks to overcome numerical disadvantages against combined rivals. Estimates of total rival casualties vary, with TELO losses alone cited between 127 and 600. To enforce and suppress , LTTE conducted internal purges, often framing executions as countermeasures against or with external actors like Indian intelligence. A key instance involved deputy leader Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah (), arrested in August 1993 on suspicions of leaking LTTE operational details to India's , including information leading to a January 1993 arms shipment interception. Held for over a year, was executed on December 28, 1994, following a LTTE . Dozens of his associates were detained alongside him, with many subjected to and their outcomes unreported, indicative of broader purges targeting perceived internal threats. Such actions reinforced LTTE's hierarchical control under , eliminating potential rivals within the organization through summary trials and killings.

Establishment of Centralized Control

Following the elimination of rival Tamil militant groups in 1986, consolidated internal authority within the LTTE by formalizing a highly centralized hierarchical structure, with himself as supreme leader, chairman of the Central Governing Committee, and of its forces. This committee served as the apex body for directing and coordinating the organization's , political, economic, and international wings, ensuring all operations aligned under Prabhakaran's absolute command without democratic input or shared decision-making. The authoritarian chain of command emphasized strict discipline and personal loyalty to Prabhakaran, enforced through programs, mandatory capsules for cadres symbolizing unwavering commitment, and an internal intelligence apparatus that monitored dissent and conducted purges to prevent factionalism. This structure transformed the LTTE from a loose guerrilla band into a disciplined entity capable of , with Prabhakaran personally appointing regional commanders and department heads to maintain oversight across Tamil-held territories. Centralized control extended to administrative functions in LTTE-controlled areas, where specialized departments handled , , and , all reporting directly to the , enabling efficient amid ongoing conflict but at the cost of suppressing internal debate and fostering a around Prabhakaran. By the late , this model had solidified the LTTE's operational cohesion, allowing it to challenge the Sri Lankan state more effectively while minimizing risks of internal betrayal.

Military Structure and Capabilities

Conventional and Guerrilla Forces

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) developed a hybrid military apparatus that integrated guerrilla warfare tactics with conventional formations, particularly after gaining territorial control in northern and eastern Sri Lanka during the 1980s and 1990s. Initially reliant on asymmetric guerrilla operations—such as ambushes, sniper attacks, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) executed by small, mobile cadres—the LTTE shifted toward conventional capabilities to defend held areas and launch offensives, exemplified in Eelam War III (1995–2002). This evolution enabled positional warfare, including fortified defenses and human wave assaults, which deviated from pure guerrilla hit-and-run methods by committing larger units to sustained frontal engagements against Sri Lankan Army positions. Guerrilla elements remained core to LTTE operations, emphasizing infiltration, rear-area disruptions, and attrition through mining and sabotage, often conducted by regionally organized units under five commands: , Mannar, Wanni, , and Batticaloa-Amparai. These tactics leveraged terrain familiarity and forced recruitment to maintain pressure on government forces, with cadres trained in and maneuvers. By contrast, conventional forces were structured into dedicated brigades, including the —formed on April 10, 1991, as the LTTE's inaugural elite unit, drawn primarily from northern Tamil recruits and led by commanders like —and the Jeyanthan Brigade, established in 1993 with an initial strength of about 1,500 eastern Tamil fighters specializing in and amphibious assaults. Supporting these brigades were and mortar units, such as the Kittu Artillery Brigade and Kutti Sri Mortar Brigade, which provided in conventional battles, supplemented by captured or smuggled heavy weapons including multi-barrel rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns. Total LTTE fighting strength expanded from approximately 5,000 cadres in the mid-1980s to around 10,000 by 1990, reaching a peak of over 10,000 armed combatants by the late , though estimates varied due to high attrition from combat and internal purges. This force composition allowed the LTTE to contest key battles like the 1991 Elephant Pass assault and 2000 Jaffna defenses using , blending guerrilla flexibility with brigade-level maneuvers until Sri Lankan offensives eroded these capabilities by 2009.

Specialized Units: Black Tigers, Sea Tigers, Air Tigers

The constituted the LTTE's elite suicide commando unit, specializing in high-impact assassinations and disruptive attacks using human-borne explosives. Formed in the late 1980s under LTTE leadership, the unit pioneered the tactical use of suicide vests and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, executing over 378 suicide missions attributed to the LTTE by 2009, many claimed by operatives. Their first recorded operation occurred on July 5, 1987, when an LTTE cadre drove an explosive-laden truck into the Nelliady army camp, killing 40 Sri Lankan security forces personnel. Notable actions included the May 21, 1991, assassination of former Indian Prime Minister via a equipped with a belt bomb containing 700 grams of , and the October 15, 1997, twin suicide bombings in that killed 18 civilians and injured over 100. The unit's cadre, selected for ideological commitment and trained in secrecy, often included women, with LTTE documentation emphasizing their role in asymmetric strikes to compensate for conventional military deficits. The Sea Tigers served as the LTTE's naval arm, established in the early 1980s to challenge Sri Lanka's maritime blockade and supply interdiction efforts along the northern and eastern coasts. Comprising fast attack craft, suicide boats, and rudimentary submarines, the unit conducted over 100 sea confrontations, employing swarm tactics with explosive-laden dinghies to target patrol vessels and ports. In a September 25, 2006, engagement off the eastern coast, Sri Lankan naval forces sank 11 Sea Tiger vessels carrying troops and arms during a five-hour battle, resulting in heavy LTTE losses. Other operations included the May 24, 2007, raid on a Jaffna peninsula naval base, where Sea Tiger commandos infiltrated by sea, killing at least 22 in close-quarters fighting. The unit's innovations, such as radar-evading low-profile boats, inflicted significant attrition on the Sri Lankan navy, sinking or damaging dozens of ships between 1990 and 2009, though at the cost of hundreds of Sea Tiger personnel in failed assaults. The Air Tigers represented the LTTE's nascent aerial capability, operational from 2007 onward, utilizing a small fleet of imported and modified to conduct precision strikes despite lacking formal airbases or pilot training infrastructure. Equipped with two to five Czech-made Zlin Z-143L trainers retrofitted for night bombing with 50-100 kg payloads, the unit executed at least nine missions, focusing on Sri Lankan airfields and urban targets to disrupt air superiority. The inaugural raid on August 9, 2007, involved a single aircraft bombing the airbase near , causing minor damage but demonstrating evasion of through low-altitude, radio-silent flights. Subsequent operations included the March 26, 2007, attack on Palaly airbase and the February 20, 2009, suicide raid on 's military sites, where two aircraft dropped bombs before crashing into targets, killing two Air Tigers pilots but inflicting limited structural harm. Aircraft were reportedly launched from highway strips in LTTE-held territory, with maintenance reliant on smuggled parts, underscoring the unit's role in and temporary interdiction rather than sustained air dominance.

Innovations in Asymmetric Warfare

The LTTE pioneered several tactics in asymmetric warfare, enabling a smaller force to challenge Sri Lanka's conventional military for over two decades. Central to their approach was the Black Tigers unit, which conducted over 378 suicide attacks from 1987 to 2009, accounting for a significant portion of the group's high-impact operations. These included the invention of the suicide vest or belt, allowing attackers to conceal explosives and detonate in close proximity to targets, a method first used effectively in the 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE also innovated by deploying female suicide bombers, with women comprising about one-third of Black Tiger cadres, enhancing operational surprise through societal underestimation of female combatants. In naval , the developed a fleet of , boats, and rudimentary midget to contest Sri Lanka's maritime superiority. By the mid-2000s, they operated over 10,000 personnel and dozens of vessels, including semi-submersible boats for smuggling arms and launching swarm attacks that sank over 20 Sri Lankan naval ships between 1990 and 2009. These innovations emphasized speed, low profiles, and explosive-laden vessels for , allowing the LTTE to supply lines despite lacking conventional warships. The LTTE's represented a rare insurgent development of aerial capabilities, assembling micro-light aircraft like the Czech Zlin Z 143 modified for bombing runs. Operational from , they conducted at least 10 sorties, including attacks on Colombo's and naval bases, using imported parts smuggled via routes. This air wing, though limited to 5-6 planes, demonstrated how non-state actors could achieve strategic strikes against fortified targets, forcing the Sri Lankan Air Force to divert resources. On land, the LTTE constructed extensive tunnel networks and fortified positions, spanning up to 22 kilometers in depth with command bunkers, hospitals, and weapon caches, mimicking Vietnamese Cu Chi systems but scaled for defensive . These underground complexes, often booby-trapped, enabled prolonged resistance in final battles, such as in in , by concealing movements and ambushes against advancing troops. Such fortifications, combined with human wave assaults incorporating elements, maximized casualties on superior forces while minimizing exposure.

Governance and Territorial Control

Administration in LTTE-Held Areas

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) operated a parallel civil administration in territories under its control, primarily in the Vanni region of northern , including districts such as , , and parts of Mannar. This structure emerged progressively after the withdrawal of Indian forces in , evolving into a state apparatus that managed and enforced authority through specialized departments. The political wing of the LTTE oversaw these functions, which included , judicial proceedings, , and public welfare provisions, often integrating objectives with . Key administrative departments encompassed economic affairs, finance, planning and development, health, education, and law and order. The finance department handled taxation, collecting levies from local businesses, agricultural production, and remittances to sustain operations, while the planning and development unit coordinated projects like roads and in LTTE-held areas. Law and order was maintained by the LTTE's police force, established to regulate civilian conduct, resolve disputes, and suppress dissent, operating alongside cadres. The judiciary featured a network of courts, including district-level tribunals in , which adjudicated civil and criminal matters under LTTE-prescribed laws, with structures reportedly comprising up to 17 distinct courts for trial and appeals. In , the LTTE Department of Education managed schools, curricula infused with separatist , and teacher appointments, demanding permanency for temporary staff from Sri Lankan authorities during ceasefires. Health services were administered through a dedicated department overseeing clinics and hospitals, providing basic care amid wartime constraints, though resource shortages persisted due to blockades. Postal services and labor units further supported administrative , with the latter facilitating and workforce mobilization. This model projected but relied heavily on coercive compliance, blending welfare provisions with to legitimize control in contested territories.

Economic Systems and Resource Extraction

The LTTE established a centralized economic administration in territories under its control, particularly in parts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, functioning as a state apparatus to extract revenues for military operations, welfare provisions, and . This system emphasized authoritarian oversight, with dedicated departments managing finances, akin to state bureaucracies, while prioritizing over market . Taxation was systematic, enforced through threats and a maintained database of Tamil households and businesses both domestically and abroad, enabling consistent levies regardless of consent. Resource extraction relied heavily on coercive mechanisms targeting local populations and commerce. In areas like , the LTTE imposed taxes on agricultural output, fishing yields, and smuggled goods, collecting a percentage of incoming via protection rackets and monopolies on illicit routes. targeted wealthy individuals and businesses, often under the guise of "contributions" to the cause, supplemented by direct levies on remittances from diaspora Tamils, estimated at $40–$80 monthly per person based on levels. Local taxation and generated approximately $30 million annually, administrative functions alongside needs, though this strained civilian economies by diverting resources from productive uses. Control over smuggling networks, facilitated by the , extended extraction to maritime commerce, including arms, consumer goods, and alleged narcotics transit, with internal revenues forming a smaller but critical base compared to external flows that constituted about 80% of total funding. This model prioritized wartime sustainability over long-term development, resulting in economic isolation from Sri Lanka's formal systems and dependency on coerced inflows, as evidenced by investments in proxy overseas businesses to launder and sustain operations.

Coercive Mechanisms for Civilian Compliance

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) enforced civilian compliance in territories under its control primarily through forced , which intensified during manpower shortages in the late . In the Vanni region, the LTTE targeted males born in 1990 for in 2007 and those born in 1991 in 2008, using family identity cards to identify eligible individuals, and expanded quotas to "two or more per family" based on household size, including the remobilization of former fighters. Child recruitment surged after September 2008, with the LTTE abducting 17-year-olds and younger, reporting 26 verified cases to between January and October 2008, amid 1,424 children with unknown fates by October 31, 2008, including 108 confirmed under 18. Economic coercion supplemented via mandatory labor and fees. Families were compelled to provide 5-7 days of unpaid labor per month for fortifications such as bunkers, with exemptions previously purchasable for 5,000 Sri Lankan rupees (about ) but later discontinued in some areas to heighten pressure. In LTTE-held areas, civilians faced systematic , including taxes on goods transiting checkpoints and demands from businesses, enforced through threats of ; visitors to controlled zones, such as the north, were required to report to LTTE offices within three days, surrender passports, and pay assessed sums based on time abroad (e.g., $1 per day lived in the West), with non-payment leading to detention or asset seizure. To prevent evasion, the LTTE imposed strict movement controls and . By mid-2008, it largely suspended its internal pass system, except for select medical or elderly cases, effectively trapping 230,000 to 300,000 civilians in shrinking Vanni enclaves and blocking escapes to government-held areas, where LTTE cadres fired on fleeing groups. Village-level officials monitored families for hiding recruits or dissent, prohibiting reports of abductions to external agencies like under threat of . Non-compliance triggered punitive measures targeting families to ensure adherence. For recruitment dodgers or escapees, the LTTE arrested up to 10 relatives as "guarantors," subjecting them to hazardous forced labor like trench digging until compliance was secured. Suspected informants or dissenters faced detention, with broader relying on the credible of , including asset for attempted permanent exits prior to 2008. These mechanisms, combining and familial leverage, sustained LTTE rule by prioritizing operational needs over voluntary support, as evidenced by widespread civilian rather than consent-based .

Ideology and Strategic Objectives

Separatist Goals and Tamil Eelam Vision

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sought to establish an independent sovereign state called in the Northern and Eastern , regions with historical Tamil settlement and majority populations. Formed on May 5, 1976, by , the group aimed to secure Tamil through armed struggle in response to ethnic discrimination, including the 1956 , standardized university admissions favoring Sinhalese, and pogroms such as the 1958 and 1983 anti-Tamil riots that killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands. LTTE ideology framed as a socialist free from Sinhalese majoritarian rule, blending with Marxist-Leninist principles to justify revolutionary violence as the sole path to liberation. Prabhakaran rejected federal or within a unitary , viewing such arrangements as insufficient to prevent future oppression and insisting on absolute to guarantee Tamil political, cultural, and economic . The envisioned state would centralize power under LTTE authority, with Prabhakaran positioned as its leader, and incorporate symbols like a featuring a emblem and , alongside a de facto administration issuing passports and currency in controlled territories. The territorial vision encompassed approximately 25% of Sri Lanka's land area, from the Mannar district in the northwest through Jaffna and Vanni in the north, to Batticaloa and Ampara in the east, prioritizing areas of Tamil demographic concentration despite mixed ethnic populations in the east. This claim drew from pre-colonial Tamil kingdoms and the 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution by Tamil political parties, which LTTE adopted to legitimize separatism, though the group later eliminated rival Tamil factions to monopolize the Eelam narrative. Prabhakaran's writings emphasized a disciplined, militarized society achieving Eelam as a "liberated homeland" ensuring equality and security for Tamils, without compromise on core demands.

Authoritarian and Cult-Like Elements

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) operated as a highly centralized authoritarian under the absolute leadership of , who maintained unchallenged control over military, political, and administrative decisions. This structure ensured Prabhakaran's dominance, with internal operations characterized by strict hierarchy and elimination of internal challenges, as evidenced by the LTTE's systematic destruction of rival Tamil groups between 1986 and 1987, including the TELO and EPRLF, through targeted killings and ambushes that killed hundreds. A pronounced cult of personality enveloped Prabhakaran, who was deified by followers as a near-divine figure, often invoked as Surya Devan (Sun God) in LTTE oaths and propaganda from the late 1990s onward, fostering unquestioning loyalty among cadres. Recruits swore daily oaths of allegiance not only to the Eelam cause but explicitly to Prabhakaran himself, reinforcing this devotion through mandatory rituals and imagery portraying him as infallible. This veneration extended to the LTTE's Black Tiger suicide units, whose members were glorified as ultimate devotees willing to self-immolate for the leader's vision, with Prabhakaran personally approving operations that resulted in over 378 suicide attacks between 1987 and 2009. The LTTE's manifested in coercive suppression of , including forced drives that targeted civilians, particularly and children, through abductions, , and punishments such as village blockades or family detentions. By , the group had conscripted thousands of minors under 18, often using or threats to enforce compliance, with escapees facing execution or public shaming to deter others. Cadres were required to wear capsules around their necks, a policy Prabhakaran enforced to symbolize total commitment, preferring over capture by enemies. Complementing this was a martyr cult that deified fallen fighters, institutionalized through annual (Great Heroes' Day) commemorations starting in 1989, where portraits of over 20,000 LTTE dead were displayed and ritually honored to sustain morale and recruitment. This veneration blurred lines between political ideology and religious fervor, with martyrs portrayed as reincarnating divine potency to empower the living struggle, a Prabhakaran leveraged to justify endless . Dissenters or defectors were branded traitors and executed, as in the 1980s purges of intra-Tamil critics, ensuring the cult's ideological monopoly.

Rejection of Negotiated Settlements

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) adhered to a maximalist ideology that demanded full for a separate state, rejecting any negotiated framework short of complete as a betrayal of Tamil . LTTE leader articulated this stance in public addresses, insisting that political solutions must unequivocally recognize Tamil rather than or within Sri Lanka's unitary structure. This position stemmed from the group's foundational commitment to armed struggle as the primary means to achieve , viewing compromise as weakening their leverage and exposing fighters to without guarantees. Throughout the conflict, the LTTE repeatedly undermined peace initiatives by withdrawing from talks or imposing preconditions that ensured stalemate. After the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord proposed provincial councils with enhanced powers, the LTTE rejected it outright, launching attacks on the deployed to enforce the agreement. In the early Norwegian-mediated process, the group signed a 2002 but suspended negotiations in April 2003 over disputes regarding an interim self-governing authority, boycotting the subsequent Tokyo Donors Conference on reconstruction funding. Brief talks in 2006 similarly collapsed amid mutual recriminations, with the LTTE's actions—such as conscripting child soldiers and violating ceasefire terms—eroding trust and paving the way for resumed hostilities. To eliminate perceived threats from moderation, the LTTE systematically assassinated politicians and Tamil leaders open to negotiated power-sharing. In 1989, they killed Appapillai Amirthalingam, a prominent figure who advocated dialogue with over separatism. Earlier, the 1991 suicide bombing of Indian targeted him for authorizing the intervention that challenged LTTE control. Such tactics extended to Sri Lankan figures like Foreign Minister Ranjan Wijeratne in 1991, who had engaged in indirect contacts, reinforcing the LTTE's intolerance for any dilution of their objective through diplomacy.

Key Military Engagements

Initial Insurgency and 1983 Riots

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged in the context of escalating Tamil-Sinhalese tensions in , where Tamil militants sought to counter government policies perceived as discriminatory, including language laws and policies favoring Sinhalese. The group was formally established on May 5, 1976, by in the northern Tamil-majority , splintering from earlier outfits like the to pursue armed for a sovereign . In its initial phase through the late 1970s and early 1980s, the LTTE focused on building capacity via small-scale operations, such as bank robberies for funding, assassinations of police officers, and killings of Tamil moderates labeled as collaborators, while avoiding large confrontations with the military to preserve secrecy and . These activities represented a shift from non-violent to insurgency, amid prior anti-Tamil violence like the and riots, but LTTE strength remained limited until external factors amplified its role. The LTTE's first major military engagement occurred on July 23, 1983, when approximately 20 fighters ambushed a 15-man Sri Lankan Army patrol—call sign —traveling from Madagal to in the Thinneveli region of the . Using rifles, grenades, and booby traps, the attackers killed 13 soldiers in the initial assault and mutilated the bodies, an act intended to provoke retaliation and rally Tamil support. The Sri Lankan government confirmed the deaths the following day, transporting the bodies to , where public display fueled outrage among Sinhalese crowds already resentful of Tamil militancy and economic grievances. This ambush directly ignited the riots, a week-long outburst of anti-Tamil violence from July 24 to 31, 1983, concentrated in but spreading to suburbs and provinces like and . Mobs, often organized with voter lists to identify Tamil properties, systematically looted and burned Tamil-owned shops, homes, and vehicles, targeting over 5,000 businesses and displacing around 150,000 who fled to camps or abroad. Death toll estimates diverge sharply: official Sri Lankan figures report about 350 Tamil fatalities, while Tamil organizations and independent accounts cite 1,000 to 3,000 killings, including burnings, stabbings, and shootings, with evidence of premeditation via prepared lists and transport provided to rioters. frequently stood by or participated, as documented in eyewitness reports and later inquiries, despite curfews imposed on July 25; the under President J.R. responded with emergency regulations but minimal arrests, attributing the unrest to spontaneous grief over the soldiers. Causal analysis reveals the riots as a convergence of LTTE provocation, pent-up Sinhalese nationalism, and state failure to contain ethnic reprisals, exacerbating prior grievances like Sinhala-only policies since 1956. The violence decimated Tamil economic presence in urban areas, costing an estimated $300 million in damages, and prompted a mass exodus to , where over 100,000 refugees bolstered LTTE logistics and diaspora funding. For the LTTE, Black July served as a strategic boon, framing as victims of genocide-like persecution and surging recruitment from alienated youth, transforming the group from a fringe into the dominant force by eliminating rivals and gaining control in parts of the north. This period crystallized the civil war's trajectory, with over 27,000 combat deaths to follow until 2009.

Conflicts with Indian Peacekeeping Forces

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, signed on 29 July 1987 between Indian Prime Minister and Sri Lankan President , aimed to resolve the by devolving power to Tamil-majority provinces and deploying the (IPKF) to oversee of Tamil militants and maintain order in the north and east. The LTTE, dominant among Tamil groups, initially engaged in negotiations and surrendered a limited number of weapons but refused comprehensive , arguing it would expose them to attacks from Sri Lankan forces and rival militants whom the LTTE had systematically eliminated to consolidate control. Tensions escalated into open conflict in October 1987 after LTTE ambushes on IPKF patrols. On 10 October, the IPKF initiated , a large-scale to seize the , LTTE's stronghold, involving over 50,000 troops supported by armor, artillery, and air assets against entrenched LTTE defenses. Urban guerrilla warfare ensued, with LTTE employing bunkers, snipers, booby traps, and civilian areas for cover, inflicting heavy casualties on advancing Indian forces; the IPKF captured town by early December but failed to eliminate LTTE leadership, which retreated to the Vanni region. The war expanded beyond Jaffna, with IPKF conducting counterinsurgency operations across the Northern and Eastern Provinces against LTTE , ambushes, and supply interdictions. LTTE regained footholds in eastern areas like while disrupting IPKF efforts through assassinations and sabotage; provincial council elections in November 1988 proceeded under IPKF protection but were boycotted and attacked by LTTE, underscoring their rejection of the accord's devolution framework. Indian forces reported killing hundreds of LTTE cadres in alone, though LTTE minimized losses and continued . Over the 32-month deployment from July 1987 to March 1990, the IPKF suffered 1,165 and 3,009 wounded, per official Indian disclosures, marking one of the force's costliest operations. LTTE casualties are estimated in the thousands, though precise figures remain disputed due to LTTE's secretive practices and underreporting. Civilian deaths numbered in the thousands, attributed by sources to , shelling, and atrocities on both sides, with IPKF operations often criticized for in populated areas. Political shifts, including the of anti-IPKF governments in and , prompted withdrawal requests; the IPKF began pulling out in September 1989 and completed exit by 24 March 1990, allowing LTTE to reassert control over northern territories.

Post-1987 Wars and Ceasefire Breakdowns

Following the withdrawal of the on 24 March 1990, the LTTE launched attacks on Sri Lankan security forces, overrunning more than 600 police stations in the eastern province in June 1990 and killing approximately 1,000 officers who had surrendered, thereby initiating the Second Eelam War. Intense combat ensued primarily in the , where LTTE forces employed guerrilla tactics, improvised armored vehicles, and ambushes against government troop concentrations. Peace negotiations between the Premadasa government and LTTE in 1990–1994 collapsed amid mutual distrust and LTTE demands for interim self-rule, leading to escalated LTTE offensives, including a 1991 suicide bombing that assassinated former Indian Prime Minister . The election of as president in November 1994 prompted a brief truce in January 1995, but LTTE forces abrogated it on 19 April 1995 by detonating explosives that sank two Sri Lankan Navy gunboats, killing 12 sailors and marking the onset of the Third Eelam War. Sri Lankan forces responded with Operation Riviresa, capturing the by 5 December 1995 after weeks of urban fighting that displaced over 300,000 civilians and resulted in thousands of LTTE casualties. LTTE counterattacks, including sea tiger naval raids and suicide bombings, prolonged the conflict through the late , with notable LTTE gains in the Vanni region but persistent government advances in the east; overall, the war from 1995 to 2002 inflicted an estimated 20,000–30,000 deaths on both sides. A Norwegian-brokered Agreement signed on 22 February 2002 between the Sri Lankan and LTTE prohibited offensive military actions, assassinations, and recruitment of ren under 18, with oversight by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) comprising Nordic observers. Despite initial aid flows and efforts, the LTTE committed over 313 documented recruitments and 89 abductions in 2002 alone, alongside attacks on positions and rival Tamil groups, while the faced accusations of unauthorized checkpoints; cumulative violations exceeded 5,000 by mid-2006, eroding trust. The ceasefire unraveled in 2006 when LTTE cadres closed sluice gates at the Mavil Aru reservoir, denying irrigation water to 15,000 acres of government-held farmland and affecting 50,000 Sinhalese farmers, prompting a Sri Lankan offensive that cleared LTTE from the eastern by 2007. This escalated into the Fourth Eelam War, characterized by coordinated government offensives combining infantry, artillery, air strikes, and naval blockades that severed LTTE supply lines. LTTE forces, hampered by post-9/11 that curtailed arms procurement and funding scrutiny, retreated into a shrinking 300-square-kilometer enclave in by early 2009, where over 20,000 fighters were encircled; the LTTE leadership, including Prabhakaran, was eliminated by 18 May 2009 after refusing surrender amid heavy civilian intermingling used as human shields. The government's unified command structure and domestic political resolve under President enabled this decisive outcome, contrasting prior fragmented efforts.

Terrorist Tactics and Operations

Suicide Bombings and High-Impact Attacks

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pioneered the systematic use of bombings in modern insurgent warfare through its elite unit, established to conduct high-lethality operations against military, political, and economic targets. The first recorded LTTE occurred on July 5, 1987, when Black Tiger operative Vallipuram Vasanthan, known as Captain Miller, drove an -laden truck into a Sri Lankan Army camp at Nelliady, killing 40 soldiers and demonstrating the tactic's potential for asymmetric impact. Over the course of the conflict, the LTTE executed between 200 and 378 attacks—accounting for a significant portion of global terrorism during that era—resulting in thousands of deaths, including civilians, through methods such as vehicle-borne improvised devices (VBIEDs), vests, and maritime vessel ramming. Approximately one-third of Black Tiger cadres were women, who were deployed in attacks to exploit security assumptions and increase operational surprise. High-profile political assassinations via suicide bombing underscored the LTTE's strategy of decapitating leadership to disrupt governance and negotiations. On May 21, 1991, a female Black Tiger suicide bomber detonated explosives hidden in a sandal during an election rally in , , killing former and at least 14 others; the LTTE claimed responsibility, citing retaliation for India's military intervention. In , a suicide bomber disguised as a soldier killed President and 23 others on May 1, 1993, during a procession in . President survived a suicide bombing on December 18, 1999, at a campaign rally in , which killed 26 people and cost her an eye, though the LTTE denied involvement amid ongoing peace talks. Economic and symbolic targets faced devastating high-impact strikes to undermine state infrastructure and morale. The January 31, 1996, suicide truck bombing of the in by a Black operative killed 91 and injured over 1,400, causing extensive structural damage equivalent to a tactical nuclear blast in confined urban space. On January 25, 1998, a suicide bomber attacked the in , a sacred Buddhist site, killing eight and damaging the shrine housing a relic of , in an apparent bid to provoke ethnic reprisals. Maritime high-impact operations included Sea suicide boat attacks, such as the October 2000 ramming of two Sri Lankan naval vessels near Mannar, sinking one ship and killing 11 sailors. Civilian areas were not spared, with bombings often blurring lines between and targets to maximize psychological terror. The July 2001 bombing at destroyed or damaged eight aircraft, including three Airbuses, inflicting $400 million in losses and halting operations temporarily. In Colombo's Pettah market on October 15, 1997, a bomber killed 18 civilians in a crowded . These tactics, while tactically effective in inflicting disproportionate casualties relative to resources, contributed to the LTTE's designation as a terrorist organization by over 30 countries, as they systematically violated international norms on distinguishing combatants from civilians.

Targeted Assassinations of Political Figures

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) systematically targeted political figures through assassinations to neutralize opposition to their separatist agenda, eliminate moderate Tamil voices advocating compromise, and demonstrate resolve against perceived enemies. These operations often involved bombings executed by the unit, which the LTTE established in 1987 as a specialized cadre for high-impact, self-sacrificial attacks. The tactic aimed to destabilize Sri Lankan governance, deter negotiations, and retaliate against interventions like India's military involvement. A prominent international target was former Indian Prime Minister , assassinated on May 21, 1991, in , , via a suicide bombing by LTTE operative Thenmuli Rajaratnam (also known as Dhanu). The attack killed Gandhi and at least 14 others, motivated by LTTE resentment over the Indian Peace Keeping Force's (IPKF) 1987-1990 campaign against the group, during which the LTTE suffered significant losses. In , President was killed on May 1, 1993, during a procession in by an LTTE suicide bomber disguised as a recruit, who detonated explosives amid a crowd, also wounding dozens. Premadasa had engaged in secret talks with the LTTE while pursuing military offensives, but the group viewed him as an uncompromising foe. The LTTE also assassinated opposition leader , a presidential candidate, on October 24, 1994, in , where a killed him along with 58 others at a campaign rally. Dissanayake, known for infrastructure projects in Tamil areas, represented a potential electoral during fragile efforts. To consolidate control over Tamil politics, the LTTE eliminated rivals such as TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingam, gunned down on July 13, 1989, in alongside fellow MP V. Dharmalingam. This followed the LTTE's rejection of moderate federalist approaches, prioritizing armed over parliamentary engagement. Earlier precedents included the 1974 killing of Jaffna Mayor by LTTE founder , marking the group's initial foray into .

Attacks on Civilian and Economic Targets

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) systematically targeted civilian transportation and economic to erode public morale, hinder mobility, and sabotage Sri Lanka's economy, often employing suicide bombings by their elite unit. These operations frequently resulted in high civilian casualties and significant material damage, reflecting a strategy of designed to impose psychological and financial costs on the government and Sinhalese-majority population. A prominent economic assault occurred on January 31, 1996, when LTTE operatives detonated a outside the in Colombo's financial district, killing 91 civilians and injuring more than 1,400 others. The explosion demolished parts of the bank building and surrounding structures, paralyzing banking activities for weeks and inflicting widespread disruption to the national financial system. LTTE suicide attacks on civilian transit routes exemplified their indiscriminate tactics against non-combatants. On March 5, 1998, a bomber struck a mini-bus in Colombo's Maradana area, killing 36 civilians and wounding over 270 in a densely populated urban setting. Similarly, on February 3, 2008, a female suicide bomber detonated explosives at Fort Railway Station in Colombo, resulting in 12 civilian deaths and more than 100 injuries amid peak commuter hours. Infrastructure sabotage included strikes on energy facilities and assets. On November 14, 1997, LTTE suicide bombers targeted the Kelanitissa Power Plant near , aiming to cripple and industrial output. In a major raid on July 24, 2001, an LTTE suicide squad infiltrated the adjoining and Katunayake Air Force Base, destroying eight aircraft—including civilian airliners and military jets—killing five security personnel, and inflicting economic damages exceeding $200 million through lost capacity and repairs.

Human Rights Abuses and Atrocities

Forced Recruitment Including Child Soldiers

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) systematically employed forced recruitment to bolster its ranks, particularly as voluntary enlistment waned amid prolonged conflict and high casualties, compelling civilians including minors through abductions, threats to families, and village-level quotas. Recruits were often seized from homes, schools, or displacement camps, with resistance met by violence such as beatings of parents or destruction of property to coerce compliance. This practice escalated after the 2002 ceasefire, as the LTTE faced manpower shortages, leading to widespread reports of nightly raids and forced marches of conscripts to training camps. Child soldier recruitment formed a core element of LTTE conscription, with children as young as 10 documented in forces, though most were aged 14 to 17, organized into specialized units like the "Baby Brigade" for and combat roles. documented firsthand accounts from over 30 former recruits in northern and eastern , revealing tactics including luring minors with promises of heroism before trapping them in military service, and abducting them en masse from Tamil-majority areas. Estimates indicate the LTTE forcibly recruited thousands of children since the , with monitoring verifying over 1,000 cases of or re-recruitment in alone, despite prior pledges to halt the practice. In June 2003, the LTTE signed an for Children with the Sri Lankan government and , committing to end under-18 , release minors, and cooperate with verification mechanisms, yet violations persisted, including a surge in abductions reported in 2004 amid resumed hostilities. By 2007, the LTTE continued abducting children in LTTE-controlled areas, assigning them to frontline duties, , and even units, with escape attempts punished by execution or torture. These practices violated , including the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the LTTE had informally endorsed but routinely disregarded. The of children not only sustained LTTE capacity but also perpetuated cycles of trauma, with many minors subjected to ideological portraying martyrdom as duty from an early age.

Executions, Torture, and Treatment of Prisoners

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) systematically executed captured Sri Lankan personnel, often without or adherence to international humanitarian standards, viewing them as existential threats rather than prisoners eligible for exchange or detention. In a prominent case, on June 11, 1990, LTTE forces in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province ordered over 600 unarmed police officers to surrender amid escalating conflict, only to execute them en masse after disarming, with survivors reporting shootings at close range and bodies dumped in wells or jungles; estimates of deaths range from 600 to over 700, marking one of the group's largest documented prisoner killings. This incident reflected LTTE policy, as the group rarely maintained formal prisoner-of-war camps and instead prioritized elimination to prevent intelligence leaks or escapes, a practice corroborated by defector accounts and documentation. Suspected spies, informants, or internal dissenters faced prior to execution, with LTTE maintaining clandestine facilities for using methods including beatings, electric shocks, and to extract confessions or information. Former LTTE cadre Niromi de Soyza, in her 2012 memoir based on personal experience during the 1987-1990 anti-Indian operations, described routine of alleged spies and "traitors"—often Tamil civilians or rivals—followed by summary killings, including lootings to fund operations; such practices extended to intra-group purges, where hundreds of suspected disloyalists were d and eliminated in sprawling camps. reported extrajudicial executions by LTTE of members who disobeyed orders, including public or clandestine killings to enforce , with serving as a deterrent against . These acts targeted not only military captives but also Tamil moderates and rival militants, such as executions of EPRLF cadres in the late 1980s, underscoring the group's intolerance for perceived collaboration with Sri Lankan or Indian authorities. In LTTE-controlled areas, rudimentary "courts" facilitated rapid sentencing to death for or opposition, operating without and relying on coerced testimony, effectively functioning as mechanisms for eliminating threats under the guise of justice. documented LTTE's pattern of such killings, including massacres of unarmed groups, as violations of humanitarian , with prisoners subjected to inhumane conditions—starvation, forced labor, or prolonged isolation—before disposal via or knifing. While LTTE leadership claimed these measures were necessary for survival against infiltration, evidence from witnesses and ex-combatants indicates systematic brutality, contributing to thousands of unaccounted deaths among detainees over the conflict's duration.

Ethnic Cleansing and Forced Displacement

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pursued policies aimed at creating ethnically homogeneous Tamil territories in northern and eastern , resulting in systematic against Muslim communities and of both and . In October 1990, LTTE cadres issued ultimatums ordering to vacate areas under their control, beginning with the on October 30, when residents were given 24 to 48 hours to leave, leading to the expulsion of between 70,000 and 100,000 from northern districts including , Mannar, and . This action, described by observers as , sought to eliminate non-Tamil populations from prospective territories, with LTTE leaders citing retaliation for Muslim "home guards" allegedly aiding Sri Lankan forces in eastern massacres of , though the expulsions targeted civilian concentrations regardless of individual involvement. Preceding and accompanying these expulsions, LTTE massacres intensified Muslim flight and displacement. On August 3, 1990, LTTE fighters raided mosques in , killing over 140 Muslim men and boys during prayers, an attack that prompted widespread panic and evacuation from eastern Muslim enclaves. Similarly, the Eravur massacre in June 1990 saw LTTE forces kill around 160 Muslim villagers, further eroding coexistence and forcing thousands into status in government-controlled areas or . These incidents, part of a pattern documented in U.S. government assessments, displaced Muslims repeatedly, with many remaining internally displaced persons (IDPs) for decades, barred from return by LTTE territorial claims and postwar land restrictions. LTTE practices also involved forced internal displacement of Tamil civilians to consolidate control and facilitate military operations. Throughout the conflict, the group cleared villages for buffer zones or camps, relocating residents under duress, often seizing property for cadres. In the war's final stages from to May 2009, LTTE forces herded approximately 300,000 Tamil civilians into a shrinking 20-square-kilometer "no-fire zone" in the Vanni region, preventing escapes through minefields, sniper fire, and forced marches while using the population as human shields against advancing Sri Lankan troops. This coerced confinement, criticized by monitors for endangering non-combatants, exemplified LTTE's prioritization of territorial defense over civilian welfare, contributing to high casualties among the displaced. Targeted violence against Sinhalese settlers in the north and east similarly induced displacement, though less through overt expulsions than sustained attacks to deter demographic changes. LTTE bombings and ambushes on Sinhalese farming communities, such as those in and farms during the 1980s and 1990s, killed hundreds and prompted abandonment of settlements, effectively clearing areas for Tamil dominance without formal orders akin to the Muslim case. Overall, these actions displaced over 800,000 people across ethnic lines by the war's end, with LTTE policies bearing primary responsibility for ethnic homogenization efforts in rebel-held zones.

International Network and Support

Diaspora Funding and Propaganda

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) derived a substantial portion of its operational funding from the , estimated to constitute up to two-thirds of its annual budget during the conflict's peak, through a combination of coerced collections, , and front organizations disguised as humanitarian entities. In , home to the largest Sri Lankan Tamil expatriate of approximately 200,000, LTTE operatives systematically targeted households and businesses, demanding fixed contributions such as $1,000 per family or percentages of , often enforced via threats of violence or reputational harm within tight-knit communities. Similar tactics were employed in the , , and , where diaspora remittances and mandatory "taxes" funneled millions annually to procure arms and sustain fighters, with U.S. authorities documenting cases where individuals pleaded guilty to providing over $500,000 in material support to LTTE fronts between 2002 and 2006. Front organizations played a central role in legitimizing these efforts, such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2007 as a covert LTTE conduit that transferred funds under the guise of refugee aid, and the World Tamil Movement in , which facilitated alongside collections at cultural events and temples. extended to shipping and remittance services, where Tamil-owned firms faced penalties for non-compliance, including threats or assaults, as reported in diaspora communities across and . These mechanisms persisted into the 2000s, enabling LTTE to amass resources equivalent to tens of millions of dollars yearly from abroad, despite international banking restrictions imposed after its terrorist designations. Beyond financing, the propagated LTTE through organized campaigns framing the group as liberators combating Sinhalese , including annual commemorations like Great Heroes Day (Maveerar Naal) that glorified suicide bombers as martyrs and disseminated videos justifying civilian-targeted attacks. Organizations such as the Federation of Tamil Sangams in the U.S. and British Tamil Forum lobbied host governments to restrict arms sales to and hosted events portraying LTTE in controlled areas as a state, while downplaying internal abuses like child recruitment. Post-2009 defeat, entities like the continued these efforts, coordinating media narratives and protests alleging genocide to pressure international bodies, though proscribes them as LTTE proxies sustaining . This sustained ideological commitment among expatriates, many of whom viewed financial support as obligatory duty, intertwining remittances with conflict prolongation as econometric analyses indicate diaspora inflows correlated with heightened LTTE violence intensity.

Foreign Training, Arms, and Diplomatic Efforts

The LTTE received significant foreign military training, particularly from in the early 1980s. From 1983 to 1987, India's (RAW) trained hundreds of LTTE cadres in specialized camps across states such as , , and , including facilities at and , focusing on guerrilla warfare, arms handling, and explosives. This support, initiated under Prime Minister , aimed to bolster Tamil militants against the Sri Lankan government but ended with the deployment of the in 1987 following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Later, LTTE specialized units like the underwent glider, microlight, and speedboat training in and for suicide operations, while the received underwater demolition instruction from Norwegian ex-special forces on islands. LTTE arms relied on an extensive international network, procuring weapons from multiple suppliers to sustain its . Prior to 1987, primary sources included via the Indo-Pakistani border and other clandestine routes. emerged as a key procurement hub from the mid-1980s, facilitating deals through intermediaries. supplied the majority of LTTE weaponry, including 60 tons of /TNT explosives in August 1994 via the MV Swene, while served as a principal provider of armaments. Additional sources encompassed , , Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma, and sub-Saharan African states like Liberia and Nigeria, often using front companies such as Carlton Trading, forged end-user certificates, and a fleet of flagged freighters for . Diplomatically, the LTTE established a global network of representative offices in 54 countries by 1998, with major hubs in the UK, , , , , and , to coordinate , , and through fronts. These efforts included cultivating support from NGOs like the via "peace" campaigns to legitimize their cause internationally. The group engaged in formal peace processes, notably Norwegian-facilitated talks leading to a 2002 ceasefire agreement and subsequent negotiations in and , where LTTE leaders met facilitators to negotiate political settlements, though talks repeatedly collapsed over issues like direct participation and monitoring. Despite these initiatives, designations as a terrorist organization by the in 1997 and subsequent bans in curtailed overt diplomatic activities.

Relations with State Actors and Non-State Groups

The LTTE maintained hostile relations with rival Tamil militant organizations, viewing them as competitors for leadership in the separatist movement. Between and 1986, the LTTE launched a campaign of violence to eliminate these groups, starting with a full-scale assault on the (TELO) in April 1986, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of TELO cadres and the capture or absorption of survivors. Similar operations targeted the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and (EPRLF), with the LTTE using assassinations, ambushes, and intimidation to dismantle their structures by 1987, thereby consolidating its dominance over Tamil militancy. From 1986 to 1990, the LTTE continued attacks on perceived Tamil "traitors," fully eradicating TELO and marginalizing others. Relations with state actors were pragmatic and transactional, marked by initial support followed by enmity. India's (RAW) provided military training to LTTE cadres in camps in starting in November 1983, along with arms and funding, as part of a broader effort to counterbalance Sri Lankan policies. This support ended with the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, leading to the deployment of the (IPKF), which clashed with the LTTE until its withdrawal in March 1990 after sustaining over 1,000 casualties. The LTTE retaliated by assassinating former Indian Prime Minister via suicide bombing on May 21, 1991, prompting to ban the group in and provide intelligence and training to Sri Lankan forces thereafter. The LTTE procured arms from North Korea, which emerged as a primary supplier of weapons, ammunition, and explosives from the late 1990s onward, often via clandestine sea shipments transiting the Bay of Bengal. Security analyses indicate that up to 95% of recovered LTTE weaponry originated from North Korean sources, including Chinese-manufactured items routed through Pyongyang, with motherships facilitating transfers offshore. No formal diplomatic ties existed with North Korea or other states; instead, the LTTE relied on smuggling networks for procurement, avoiding overt alliances amid international isolation as a designated terrorist entity. Other rumored state links, such as with Libya, lack corroborated evidence and appear unsubstantiated.

Designation as Terrorist Organization

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) faced proscription as a terrorist organization by multiple governments, justified primarily by its extensive record of suicide bombings—pioneering their tactical use with over 378 attacks documented between 1987 and 2009—targeted assassinations of political leaders, and indiscriminate bombings of civilian and economic infrastructure, which demonstrated intent to coerce governments through terror rather than legitimate insurgency. These acts, including the May 21, 1991, suicide assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE operative, and the May 1, 1993, bombing that killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, underscored the group's rejection of political negotiation in favor of violence to achieve a separate Tamil state. India imposed the first major ban on the LTTE in January 1992 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, directly following the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, which an Indian court in 1998 confirmed as an LTTE-orchestrated operation involving suicide bomber Thenmozhi Rajaratnam. The justification emphasized the LTTE's "strong anti-India posture," including prior attacks on Indian peacekeepers during the 1987-1990 IPKF deployment and subsequent reprisals against Indian interests, with the ban renewed every five years, most recently on May 14, 2024, citing ongoing risks of revival through diaspora networks. The designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires evidence of engaging in terrorist activities that threaten U.S. nationals or security, providing material support to such acts, or maintaining organizational capacity for . Legal rationale centered on the LTTE's innovations in suicide , including the of the suicide vest, over 200 such attacks by 2000, and assassinations of democratic leaders, which the U.S. State Department described as efforts to destabilize through civilian-targeted violence rather than military engagement with state forces. This designation enabled asset freezes and criminalized support, enforced through , targeting LTTE financing networks. The proscribed the LTTE on February 28, 2001, under the , which defines as use or threat of action causing death, injury, or disruption to coerce a government, with requiring Home Secretary certification of the group's involvement in such acts. Justifications included the LTTE's global suicide bombing campaign, forcible recruitment, and attacks on civilians, affirmed in periodic reviews, including a 2021 decision and June 2024 rejection of delisting appeals by LTTE-linked entities, citing persistent evidence of terrorist and support infrastructure. Canada listed the LTTE as a terrorist entity on , 2006, under the Criminal Code's Anti-Terrorism Act, following a 2006 announcement that highlighted the group's suicide attacks, child soldier , and of political figures as meeting criteria for knowingly participating in or facilitating . The listing, renewed in 2016 and 2024, aimed to disrupt fundraising from 's , which had channeled millions to LTTE arms procurement, justified by the need to prevent financial support for violence despite the group's 2009 military defeat. The added the LTTE to its terrorist list on May 29, 2006, under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, which authorizes asset freezes for entities involved in terrorist acts as defined by UN resolutions—indiscriminate violence against civilians to intimidate populations or compel governments. Court challenges, including LTTE appeals, were rejected based on evidence of ongoing terrorist capacity, such as sea-borne attacks and bombings post-2002 ceasefire violations, with the designation upheld in and beyond to counter revival attempts.
Country/BodyDesignation DateKey Legal Justification
January 1992Assassination of PM ; anti-India violence
October 8, 1997Suicide bombings (>200 attacks); leader assassinations; threats to security
February 28, 2001Coercive violence against civilians and government; ongoing terrorist support
June 13, 2006Facilitation of terrorism via diaspora funding; child recruitment; bombings
May 29, 2006Indiscriminate attacks per UN definitions; ceasefire violations

Evidence of Transnational Terrorism

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) exhibited transnational through its direct orchestration of violent acts beyond Sri Lanka's borders, most notably the of former Indian Prime Minister on May 21, 1991, in , . A female LTTE suicide bomber, disguised as a sympathizer offering garlands, detonated explosives hidden in a pouch, killing Gandhi, herself, and at least 14 bystanders. This operation was masterminded by LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman and executed by operatives including Sivarasan, who coordinated from safe houses in ; Indian investigations traced the plot to LTTE retaliation against India's 1987 deployment of the (IPKF) to , during which LTTE suffered heavy losses. Indian courts convicted over 25 LTTE members in , with confessions and forensic evidence linking the group to the attack's planning and funding from LTTE networks in . LTTE's transnational reach extended to arms procurement and smuggling networks spanning multiple continents, enabling sustained terrorist operations. From the 1980s onward, LTTE agents sourced weapons, explosives, and military-grade technology from suppliers in Europe, Southeast Asia, and North America, routing them through sea and air channels to Sri Lanka. U.S. authorities documented LTTE fronts in America coordinating purchases of items like GPS devices, speedboats, and missile components, with shipments valued in millions funneled via Tamil diaspora intermediaries; a 2006 U.S. Treasury designation highlighted LTTE reliance on such global logistics for attacks, including suicide bombings. In 2009, federal indictments charged LTTE leaders in the U.S. with conspiracy to smuggle over 600,000 rounds of ammunition and other materiel, demonstrating operational control over cross-border supply chains that directly supported battlefield terrorism. These activities underscored LTTE's adaptation of terrorism tactics internationally, including the export of suicide bombing expertise honed in . While primary violent incidents outside centered on , LTTE's international procurement involved threats and coercion against diaspora communities to secure funds and recruits, with documented cases of in and funding arms flows; Canadian intelligence reports from the early linked LTTE rackets to millions in coerced remittances, sustaining transnational capabilities. Such networks justified proscriptions by over 30 countries, citing LTTE's border-crossing and as threats to global security.

Counterarguments and Diaspora Responses

Supporters of the LTTE, including segments of the , have argued that the group's designation as a terrorist organization mischaracterizes it as a responding to decades of state-sponsored and violence against , such as the 1956 , which marginalized Tamil language rights, and the 1983 pogrom that killed an estimated 3,000 Tamils and displaced 150,000. These advocates contend that LTTE tactics, including , were defensive measures against a militarily superior Sinhalese-dominated government accused of and , drawing parallels to other independence struggles where violence was deemed legitimate resistance rather than terrorism. They assert that the terrorist label is politically motivated to delegitimize Tamil claims and shield from accountability for its own abuses, as evidenced by UN reports documenting government shelling of civilian areas during the final war phases in 2009. Critics of the designation, often from pro-LTTE diaspora publications, maintain that equating LTTE actions with indiscriminate ignores the context of failed negotiations, such as the breakdown of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, and the Sri Lankan state's use of tactics that blurred lines between combatants and civilians. They highlight LTTE governance in controlled areas, including taxation, courts, and , as evidence of rather than mere terror, arguing that bombings and assassinations targeted military and political figures in a protracted civil war, not civilians en masse. Such perspectives, promulgated by outlets like the Tamil Guardian—which has faced allegations of LTTE ties—emphasize that Western and Indian proscriptions post-1987 (after the IPKF intervention) served geopolitical interests, including India's regional dominance, over neutral assessment of insurgency dynamics. Tamil diaspora responses to proscriptions have included mass protests and legal challenges; for instance, after Canada's April 2006 listing of the LTTE under its Anti-Terrorism Act, thousands rallied in , decrying the move as an infringement on advocacy for Tamil rights and equating it to suppression of voices numbering over 300,000 in the city alone. In the UK, following the proscription, groups initiated applications contesting the ban's impact on humanitarian and cultural activities, framing it as an extension of Sri Lanka's "war by other means" against via laws like the Prevention of Terrorism Act. These efforts persisted post-2009 LTTE defeat, with organizations lobbying international bodies like the UN Council to recognize Tamil grievances without endorsing violence, while some faced charges for fundraising under material support statutes, as in U.S. cases targeting alleged LTTE fronts. Despite such pushback, empirical evidence of LTTE's suicide attacks—over 378 documented, including the 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister —and child recruitment has sustained designations, underscoring the tension between narrative reframing and operational records.

Defeat and Immediate Aftermath

Eastern and Northern Campaigns Leading to Collapse

The Eastern campaigns began in July 2006 after the LTTE obstructed the Mavil Aru anicut on July 21, severing water supplies to approximately 15,000 families in government-held areas of , prompting a Sri Lankan response to restore access. Sri Lankan forces launched Operation Watershed Rising, capturing the Mavil Aru area by August 14, 2006, following intense clashes that killed over 100 LTTE fighters and enabled further advances into LTTE-held territory in the Eastern Province. This operation marked the resumption of large-scale after the fragile 2002 , with Sri Lankan troops leveraging superior and air support to dislodge LTTE defenses. Subsequent offensives targeted key coastal strongholds, including Sampur, a strategic LTTE base overlooking Trincomalee harbor, which Sri Lankan forces captured on September 4, 2006, after weeks of bombardment and infantry assaults that inflicted heavy casualties on the LTTE, estimated at over 200 fighters. The loss of Sampur severed LTTE supply routes from the sea and exposed their eastern flanks. Operations continued into late 2006, culminating in the Vakarai offensive from October 30, 2006, to January 15, 2007, where Sri Lankan troops overran LTTE positions in , capturing the town on January 19, 2007, and seizing large caches of weapons abandoned in retreat. Vakarai's fall displaced thousands and fragmented LTTE command structures in the east, exacerbated by the 2004 of eastern commander Karuna, which had already eroded local recruitment and loyalty. By February 2007, Sri Lankan forces pressed into the LTTE's remaining eastern bastion at Thoppigala (also known as Baron's Cap), a forested area in used for training and logistics. The multi-phase operation, involving over 10,000 troops, methodically cleared LTTE bunkers and supply depots, leading to the capture of the area on July 11, 2007, after LTTE commander Nizam withdrew remaining forces northward. This victory restored full government control over the Eastern Province for the first time since 1993, depriving the LTTE of a critical revenue-generating region through taxes on and , while forcing the group to divert resources from the north. LTTE casualties in the east exceeded 2,500 fighters during 2006-2007, severely straining their manpower amid ongoing forced . Northern campaigns intensified in mid-2007 on multiple fronts, beginning with advances in to sever LTTE western supply lines. Sri Lankan forces captured Silavathurai in September 2007, destroying LTTE sea tiger bases and boats, which disrupted maritime logistics. By early 2008, operations expanded, with troops seizing Parappakandal in January and key bases like Vidattaltivu in July 2008, advancing over 1,300 meters in some sectors and killing dozens of LTTE cadres in . The capture of , a former Catholic shrine area held by LTTE since 1990, occurred in April 2008, further compressing LTTE territory and enabling artillery dominance over Vanni routes. Concurrent pushes from targeted LTTE defenses along the northern frontier, destroying forward trenches and bases in skirmishes throughout 2008, such as the elimination of six LTTE fighters near Chettikulam. By August 2008, Sri Lankan army units had overrun fortified positions like Kalvilan, 15 kilometers south of LTTE headquarters at , and Kokkavil on the A9 highway, isolating rebel supply corridors. These gains, supported by expanded troop numbers (reaching 300,000 by 2008) and intelligence from defectors, eroded LTTE cohesion, as losses mounted to thousands and ammunition shortages hampered their counterattacks. The progressive territorial contraction—reducing LTTE-held areas from 15,000 square kilometers in 2006 to under 2,000 by late 2008—compelled a defensive posture, prelude to encirclement and ultimate operational collapse.

Final Offensive and Prabhakaran's Death

The Sri Lankan Army's final offensive in the Northern Province intensified after the capture of , the LTTE's administrative capital, on January 2, . Forces then pressed southward, overcoming LTTE defenses to seize town—the group's primary northern base and logistical hub—on , , when the 59th Division advanced amid flooded terrain and earth barriers erected by retreating fighters. This breakthrough confined the LTTE to a narrowing coastal strip in , roughly 20 square kilometers by early May, where an estimated 100,000-300,000 civilians were trapped alongside 5,000-10,000 fighters. LTTE commanders, facing collapse, integrated civilians into their defenses, forcibly preventing evacuations to designated "no-fire" zones and executing those attempting to flee, thereby using non-combatants as human shields to deter Sri Lankan and advances. troops, employing multi-pronged assaults with ground forces, naval , and air support, methodically cleared bunkers and supply lines despite ambushes, booby traps, and sporadic counterattacks, including suicide bombings that inflicted hundreds of military casualties. By mid-May, the LTTE's command structure fragmented, with senior leaders like Pottu Amman and also killed in the shrinking enclave, culminating in the group's public admission of defeat on , 2009. Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE's founder and supreme leader, died on May 18, 2009, during an attempted breakout from the final near Nanthikadal . Traveling in a small convoy including an ambulance to evade detection, his vehicle was struck by Sri Lankan Army fire, resulting in fatal injuries; his body was subsequently recovered in a severely burned state. DNA analysis conducted by Sri Lankan military forensic experts, cross-verified against samples from Prabhakaran's family, confirmed his identity on May 25, 2009, after initial skepticism from LTTE remnants. The government declared the LTTE militarily defeated that same day, marking the end of organized resistance after 26 years of insurgency.

Surrender, Rehabilitation, and LTTE Dissolution

On May 17, 2009, , the LTTE's head of international relations, issued a statement conceding that the armed struggle had reached its "bitter end" and announcing that the group had decided to "silence our guns," effectively acknowledging defeat while appealing for international intervention to protect Tamil civilians. Following the confirmed death of LTTE leader on May 18, 2009, large-scale surrenders ensued, with the Sri Lankan military reporting 9,100 LTTE cadres having surrendered by May 26, 2009. In total, approximately 11,664 LTTE members, including around 595 child soldiers, surrendered to Sri Lankan authorities in the immediate aftermath of the military collapse. The Sri Lankan government launched a rehabilitation program for surrendered ex-LTTE combatants, focusing on , vocational skills training, counseling, and civic to facilitate reintegration into . Over 11,600 former combatants underwent this process across multiple centers, with programs emphasizing , , and community-based reintegration; by 2012, the vast majority had been released and resettled, contributing to post-conflict stability in formerly LTTE-held areas. Official figures indicate that 12,191 ex-LTTE members completed rehabilitation by early 2023, though challenges persisted for some, particularly female ex-cadres facing and limited economic opportunities. The program drew on models from other contexts but prioritized rapid processing to prevent prolonged detention, with rates remaining low due to dismantled LTTE command structures and ongoing . The LTTE's military dissolution occurred de facto with Prabhakaran's death, the loss of territorial control, and the surrenders, rendering the organization incapable of sustained operations by mid-2009. Remaining LTTE elements overseas, including Pathmanathan (who was arrested in August 2009), attempted to reframe the group as a political entity, but these efforts failed amid international designations and lack of domestic support. President formally declared the civil war's end in parliament on , 2009, marking the cessation of LTTE hostilities, though sympathizers continued non-violent advocacy without reforming a cohesive armed structure.

Post-Defeat Legacy and Remnants

Impact on Sri Lankan Reconciliation and Security

The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 ended three decades of armed conflict but entrenched divisions that continue to impede reconciliation between Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. The group's strategy of assassinating moderate Tamil leaders, such as TULF parliamentarian A. Amirthalingam in 1989 and EPRLF leader A. Thiagarajah in 1990, eliminated potential bridges for dialogue and fostered a culture of zero-sum separatism among some Tamils, making compromise politically toxic. Post-war, LTTE-linked narratives propagated by diaspora networks have sustained demands for a separate Tamil Eelam, rejecting devolution within a unitary state and portraying the Sri Lankan government as inherently genocidal, which undermines local efforts at inter-ethnic trust-building. Government initiatives, including the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission established in 2010, faced criticism for lacking enforcement mechanisms and failing to address accountability for LTTE atrocities, such as the 1996 Aranthalawa massacre of 33 Buddhist monks, perpetuating mutual recriminations. Persistent challenges include land disputes in the Northern Province, where over 100,000 acres remained under control as of 2022, delaying resettlements and fueling perceptions of Sinhalese colonization, though LTTE's wartime scorched-earth tactics had displaced hundreds of thousands of and alike. Lack of political consensus across parties has stalled constitutional reforms for power-sharing, with Tamil parties fragmented and Sinhalese nationalists viewing concessions as rewarding , a dynamic exacerbated by LTTE's historical rejection of accords like the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and 2002 Ceasefire, which it violated through over 3,800 breaches. efforts, such as trilingual pilots and inter-community sports events since 2015, show incremental progress in urban areas like , but rural north-eastern regions report ongoing ethnic enclaves and low intermarriage rates below 1%, reflecting LTTE's enduring ethnic polarization. On security, the LTTE's military collapse dismantled its conventional capabilities, including the ' naval assets and 14,000-strong cadre, enabling to maintain internal stability without major insurgent resurgence for over 15 years. However, remnants and sympathizers pose low-level threats through financing and , with Sri Lankan authorities arresting over 200 LTTE-linked individuals annually in the for activities like explosives or commemorating "martyrs," as in the 2014 detention of financier Nanthagopan, who raised funds for potential revival. Post-2009, the group's shifted to covert networks, including cyber-radicalization and small-cell plots, prompting enhanced measures such as the 2021 border security upgrades and intelligence sharing with partners like and the . No large-scale attacks have occurred since the war, but vigilance persists amid economic crises diverting resources, with officials warning in 2023 of LTTE ideology's appeal to disaffected Tamil youth via online forums. Demobilization programs rehabilitated approximately 11,664 ex-LTTE cadres by 2017 through vocational training and , reducing risks, though monitoring continues for returnees.

Ongoing Diaspora Activities and Revived Sentiments

The , estimated at over one million individuals primarily in , the , the , and parts of , has sustained commemorative activities honoring LTTE cadres since the group's military defeat in May 2009. Annual events such as (Great Heroes' Day), observed on November 27, involve rallies, vigils, and cultural performances in cities like , , and Toronto, where participants display LTTE symbols and flags despite proscriptions in host countries. These gatherings often feature speeches reiterating demands for Tamil and for alleged crimes during the final offensive, drawing thousands and reinforcing transnational networks. Political mobilization has shifted toward lobbying and institutional , with organizations like the (TGTE), established in 2009 as an LTTE successor entity, operating from exile to promote a on independence. In the United States, Congressman introduced House Resolution 1230 on May 15, 2024, endorsing efforts for Tamil and addressing grievances from the era, reflecting targeted influence on Western legislatures. Similarly, the Global Tamil Forum organized the Global Tamil Summit in , in 2025, aiming to unite groups for on recognition and cultural preservation tied to aspirations. Funding for these activities reportedly sustains through remittances, events, and merchandise sales linked to Eelam symbolism, though overt LTTE financial support has declined post-defeat. Revived sentiments have surfaced amid Sri Lanka's 2022 economic crisis and subsequent political upheaval, with some factions interpreting domestic instability as an opportunity to rekindle , evidenced by increased online campaigns and protests demanding LTTE delisting. As of May 30, 2025, eight groups, including LTTE remnants and TGTE affiliates, remain proscribed by for alleged transnational activities supporting , prompting to reimpose bans on over 500 individuals and entities in June 2024. Second-generation in host countries exhibit adapted expressions of identity, blending LTTE heroism narratives with while navigating legal constraints, though overt revival of armed struggle appears improbable due to diminished resources and internal divisions. These dynamics underscore persistent ideological commitment among a vocal minority, counterbalanced by host-state designations of LTTE-linked groups as terrorist entities under laws like Canada's since 2006 and the UK's since 2001.

Lessons for Counterinsurgency and Global Terrorism

The defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 by Sri Lankan forces after 26 years of conflict provides empirical evidence that determined states can militarily eradicate resilient insurgent-terrorist organizations through sustained application of overwhelming force, strategic adaptation, and interdiction of external support, challenging doctrines emphasizing protracted "hearts and minds" approaches over decisive kinetic operations. Unlike prior ceasefires that allowed LTTE reconstitution, the government's rejection of negotiations in 2006 enabled a focused offensive that dismantled the group's conventional capabilities in the Eastern Province by mid-2007 and encircled its Northern strongholds by early 2009. This outcome underscores the causal efficacy of political will prioritizing enemy elimination, as evidenced by President Mahinda Rajapaksa's administration expanding the military from 100,000 to over 300,000 personnel between 2005 and 2009, supported by procurement of artillery, aircraft, and naval vessels that shifted the balance against LTTE's hybrid tactics combining guerrilla ambushes, suicide bombings, and semi-conventional maneuvers. A core lesson for lies in integrating all elements of , including robust intelligence-driven operations and maritime denial, to sever insurgent ; Sri Lanka's navy conducted over 1,000 interdictions from 2006 to 2009, sinking or capturing LTTE supply vessels and reducing sea tiger resupply by 90 percent, which starved the group's 10,000-15,000 fighters of arms and fuel essential for sustaining urban defenses in and . Ground forces adapted by forming deep-penetration units and long-range teams that exploited LTTE's rigid command structure under Vellupillai Prabhakaran, leading to the neutralization of key commanders and erosion of morale without relying on foreign intervention, which LTTE leadership had anticipated amid global sympathy for Tamil separatism pre-9/11. This contrasts with analyses from Western academies, which often overemphasize population-centric strategies; Sri Lanka's success derived from treating LTTE as a adversary amenable to attrition, achieving territorial control over 95 percent of contested areas by May 2009 through phased offensives that prioritized via engineering and firepower over minimizing . For global terrorism, the LTTE case illustrates that diaspora funding—estimated at $300 million annually from Tamil expatriates in , the , and elsewhere—must be disrupted through and legal proscriptions, as post-2001 international designations isolated LTTE networks previously reliant on arms from and . Such groups' innovation in tactics, including pioneering vests used in over 378 attacks killing 1,000 s and personnel from 1987 to 2009, demands counter-strategies emphasizing and supply over ideological alone, as LTTE's around Prabhakaran prevented splintering despite military setbacks. The absence of negotiated power-sharing, which had empowered LTTE in prior rounds, highlights the risks of concessions legitimizing terror; Sri Lanka's model suggests that states facing analogous threats, such as remnants or narco-insurgents, benefit from unified command avoiding bureaucratic inertia, though at the cost of international criticism over estimated deaths in the final phase, per UN figures contested by as inflated LTTE human shielding tactics. Overall, the defeat affirms that terrorism's defeat requires rejecting stalemate doctrines, as hybrid threats yield to superior state coercion when external patrons wane and internal resolve persists.

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