Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro

The Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) is a remote, rugged jungle valley in central-southern Peru, spanning parts of the Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Junín departments at the confluence of its three namesake rivers, where illicit coca cultivation dominates the local economy and remnants of the Maoist insurgent group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) maintain operational control through narco-terrorist alliances. ^[1][2] This geographically isolated area, characterized by steep Andean slopes transitioning to Amazonian lowlands, supports dense coca plantations due to favorable climate and soil, with VRAEM accounting for approximately two-thirds of Peru's national coca leaf output as of recent surveys, much of it processed into cocaine base for export via riverine and overland routes. ^[3][4] Shining Path factions, designated as terrorist organizations by Peruvian authorities and the U.S. government, protect growers from eradication efforts in exchange for "revolutionary taxes" on harvests and trafficking, perpetuating low-level conflict despite military interventions that have reduced their numbers since the 1990s. ^[5][6] Government strategies emphasize counterinsurgency bases, forced eradication, and crop substitution programs like cacao farming, yet persistent high yields—exacerbated by global cocaine demand and limited rural alternatives—underscore the valley's role as Peru's primary illicit drug hub, with cultivation areas expanding amid enforcement challenges. ^[7][8]

Geography and Environment

Location and Administrative Divisions

The Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) occupies a strategic position in central Peru, at the ecotone between the Andean sierra and the Amazonian selva alta, encompassing the interfluvial valleys formed by the Apurímac River to the south, the Ene River to the north—where they converge to initiate the Tambo River—and extensions into the upper Mantaro River basin. This area features steep Andean foothills descending into tropical lowlands, with elevations typically between 500 and 2,000 meters, facilitating a humid subtropical climate conducive to agriculture. The region's approximate extent covers over 30,000 square kilometers of challenging terrain marked by deep canyons, dense cloud forests, and limited road access, isolating communities and complicating governance.^[1] Administratively, VRAEM is a designated geopolitical zone rather than a unified political entity, overlapping five departments: Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Junín. It includes 10 provinces and 69 districts, with key provinces comprising La Mar and Huanta in Ayacucho, Satipo in Junín, Tayacaja in Huancavelica, La Convención in Cusco, and elements of Abancay in Apurímac.^[9][10] Districts such as Ayna and San Miguel (La Mar, Ayacucho), Mazamari and Río Tambo (Satipo, Junín), Kimbiri (La Convención, Cusco), and Llochegua (Huanta, Ayacucho) exemplify the fragmented jurisdiction, where state presence is bolstered by special development projects like PROVRAEM under the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture.^[11] This multi-departmental structure stems from the zone's definition for counter-narcotics and development initiatives, reflecting historical overlaps in indigenous territories and colonial administrative lines rather than modern regional boundaries.^[12]

River Systems and Topography

The Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro derives its name from the three principal rivers that shape its hydrological framework, with the Apurímac and Mantaro rivers converging to form the Ene River, initiating a segment of the upper Amazon basin. The Mantaro River originates in the central Peruvian Andes near Lake Junín at elevations exceeding 4,000 meters above sea level and extends approximately 735 kilometers southward before its confluence, draining a basin of 34,546 square kilometers characterized by Andean plateau headwaters transitioning to narrower valleys. The Apurímac River, flowing northward from glacial sources in the southern Andes near Nevado Mismi, measures about 700 kilometers in length and contributes significant volume through its rugged Andean course before meeting the Mantaro.^[13] This confluence, occurring at roughly 468 meters elevation, gives rise to the Ene River, which spans 160-180 kilometers downstream, dropping to around 308 meters as it approaches its junction with the Perené River to form the Tambo.^{[14] [15]} The river system features dendritic drainage patterns with numerous tributaries carving steep incisions into the terrain, facilitating sediment transport and supporting localized alluvial deposits along valley floors. These waterways exhibit seasonal variability, with high discharges during Andean wet seasons (November-April) driven by rainfall and meltwater, influencing erosion and floodplain dynamics. Topographically, the VRAEM encompasses a transitional zone between the Andean cordilleras and the Amazonian selva alta, with elevations spanning from lowland riverine areas near 300 meters to highland spurs exceeding 6,000 meters in peripheral uplands, encompassing diverse ecosystems from cloud forests to tropical foothills.^[16] The landscape is predominantly rugged, featuring steep slopes, narrow V-shaped valleys, and incised canyons flanked by undulating hills and low mountains, with slope angles often exceeding 30 degrees in upper reaches, limiting accessibility and promoting terraced agriculture. Alluvial plains, though limited in extent, parallel the rivers and provide fertile, well-drained soils derived from Andean weathering, while the overall relief fosters high biodiversity through altitudinal gradients and microclimatic variation.^[15]

Climate, Soil, and Biodiversity

The Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) encompasses a diverse climatic profile due to its position in Peru's selva alta (high jungle), spanning altitudes from approximately 400 meters in the river valleys to over 1,500 meters in surrounding slopes, resulting in microclimates ranging from warm and humid lowland conditions to cooler highland areas. Valley floors experience average daytime temperatures up to 32°C with high humidity, while higher elevations can drop to 7°C during dry periods or nights, contributing to frost risks in zones like Huanta and La Mar. Precipitation is seasonal, with a wet period from November to April delivering intense rains that often exceed 200 mm monthly in lower areas, leading to river overflows, landslides, and flooding, as seen in Apurímac River desbordes affecting infrastructure and agriculture. The dry season (May to October) features lower rainfall and stable weather, supporting agricultural cycles, though overall climate stability supports multiple ecoregions including Amazonian rainforests and Yungas montane forests.^[17][16] Soils in the VRAEM are primarily alluvial and loamy deposits along river valleys, offering inherent fertility suited to perennial crops, with surface layers (0-20 cm) analyzed in 2023 across 125 coca cultivation sites revealing manageable physicochemical properties. Compared to adjacent rainforest reference soils, coca fields established less than 10 years prior show elevated pH (likely from liming) and adequate levels of total nitrogen, soil organic matter, and electrical conductivity, challenging narratives of rapid degradation under monoculture. Longer-term cultivation (>10 years) exhibits gradual declines in organic matter but retains viability for alternatives like cacao, underscoring human management practices that sustain productivity amid steep terrains and erosion risks.^[18][19][20] Biodiversity in the VRAEM is exceptionally high, driven by altitudinal gradients from 280 m to over 6,000 m in the encompassing Avireri Vraem Biosphere Reserve, which hosts 12 distinct ecosystems across Amazonian foothills, cloud forests, and Andean páramos. The area supports 257 endemic fauna species and 307 endemic or endangered flora species, including 115 fauna taxa classified as threatened on the IUCN Red List, reflecting hotspots for amphibians, birds, and insects adapted to transitional habitats. Stingless bee (meliponines) populations, vital for pollination, persist in rural communities despite cultivation pressures, while woody flora and tetrapod endemism underscore the ecoregional uniqueness, though coca expansion poses localized risks without strong deforestation correlations in this valley unlike other Peruvian Amazon zones.^[16][21][22]

Historical Development

Indigenous and Colonial Periods

The Andean portions of the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM), encompassing the Apurímac and Mantaro basins, were inhabited during the Late Intermediate Period (ca. 1000–1470 CE) by the Chanka ethnic group, known for constructing large fortified hilltop settlements amid inter-ethnic conflicts and environmental shifts that prompted abandonment of fertile valley bottoms.^[23] The Chanka, centered in Andahuaylas within modern Apurímac, expanded influence into adjacent areas, engaging in warfare that reflected broader regional power struggles.^[24] Inca expansion under Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui in the mid-15th century incorporated nearly all of the Apurímac and Mantaro basins through military conquest, defeating Chanka forces around 1438–1471 CE and integrating the territories into Tawantinsuyu via infrastructure like roads and agricultural terraces, alongside mit'a labor obligations.^[25] In contrast, the eastern lowland zones along the Ene River, home to Arawak-speaking Asháninka peoples, experienced non-violent Inca interactions characterized by ritual exchanges and ceremonial combat (tinku) rather than subjugation, with no evidence of Inca forts and evidence of linguistic and genetic admixture predating full imperial reach.^[26] These "Antis" groups maintained relative autonomy, facilitating trade in forest goods while resisting deeper Inca administrative control due to the challenging topography.^[26] The Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, culminating in Francisco Pizarro's capture of Atahualpa in 1532, extended viceregal authority over the VRAEM's Andean highlands, where Chanka descendants faced encomienda labor grants and population resettlements under the Toledo Reforms of 1569–1574 to facilitate tribute extraction.^[25] Highland valleys saw sporadic Spanish settlements and Catholic conversions, but the remote Ene lowlands remained a frontier, with Franciscan and Jesuit missions from the late 16th century achieving limited penetration among Asháninka communities amid ongoing resistance and disease impacts that depopulated indigenous groups without full colonization.^[27] Indigenous autonomy persisted in jungle areas, shaped by the terrain's isolation and groups' historical defiance of highland states.^[27]

20th-Century Agricultural Shifts

In the early 20th century, the VRAEM region featured predominantly subsistence agriculture, with small-scale cultivation of maize, bananas, and other food crops integrated into traditional practices, while coca remained a minor component grown alongside legal exports like coffee.^[28] Land allocation policies in the 1920s and 1930s distributed approximately 20,000 hectares to campesinos for tropical crops, including coca, marking initial efforts to formalize agricultural expansion in the remote jungle valleys.^[29] Post-World War II colonization initiatives accelerated settlement and crop diversification; in 1961, the Peruvian state sponsored the establishment of 500 families on 18,710 hectares in the Pichari area, promoting tropical agriculture amid broader agrarian reforms that fragmented landholdings and encouraged jungle frontier development.^[29] The 1969 agrarian reform under General Juan Velasco Alvarado further influenced the region by redistributing lands and supporting cooperative models, though its primary impact in the sierra and coast led to indirect effects in VRAEM through increased migration and smallholder fragmentation, fostering reliance on low-input cash crops like coffee and cocoa in the 1970s.^[30] These shifts initially aimed at economic integration but were constrained by poor infrastructure, limited state support, and soil degradation from slash-and-burn methods.^[28] By the late 1970s, rising international demand for cocaine drove coca expansion, supplanting traditional and alternative legal crops as hyperinflation eroded local economies from 1985 onward, with dollarized coca prices providing stable income—equivalent to family sustenance from just 0.35 hectares.^[29] The internal conflict initiated by Sendero Luminoso in the 1980s disrupted coffee and cacao production through attacks on legal agriculture, accelerating the pivot to coca as the dominant cash crop, which by the early 1990s covered 32,000 hectares and accounted for 90% of regional agricultural value.^[28] This transition entailed extensive deforestation—255,000 hectares of primary forest cleared between the 1970s and 2001, at rates reaching 7,424 hectares annually by 2001—via unsustainable shifting cultivation that prioritized short-cycle coca over soil-conserving polycultures.^[29] By 2003, VRAEM had overtaken the Alto Huallaga as Peru's primary coca zone, reflecting a causal chain of marginalization, conflict, and illicit market incentives over viable legal alternatives.^[29]

Integration into National Conflicts (1980s-2000s)

The Shining Path insurgency, initiated in May 1980 with attacks in Ayacucho department adjacent to the VRAEM, rapidly expanded into the Apurímac and surrounding valleys by the early 1980s, drawing the region into Peru's broader internal armed conflict. Operating from rural bases in Ayacucho and Apurímac, the group established operational zones through targeted assassinations of local authorities, infrastructure sabotage, and coercion of peasant communities, achieving de facto control over parts of these areas by 1982–1983. The VRAEM's topography—steep Andean slopes transitioning to remote Amazonian river valleys—provided ideal cover for guerrilla tactics, while its established coca cultivation offered a revenue stream via "revolutionary taxes" on farmers and rudimentary processing labs, estimated to generate millions annually for the insurgents by the mid-1980s.^[31][2][32] This integration intensified national conflict dynamics, as Shining Path's control over VRAEM disrupted agricultural supply lines and fueled urban bombings in Lima funded partly by valley extortion. By 1983, the Peruvian government declared a state of emergency in Apurímac and neighboring departments, deploying over 15,000 troops amid escalating violence that included massacres of villagers suspected of collaborating with authorities; the group reportedly killed hundreds in these valleys alone during the decade, contributing to the conflict's total of approximately 70,000 deaths, predominantly civilians. Local populations, reliant on coca for subsistence amid limited state presence, faced dual pressures from insurgent recruitment and forced labor in drug-related activities, embedding the region as a logistical hub for Shining Path's Maoist "strategic equilibrium" phase.^[32][31][2] The 1990s marked a partial national rollback against Shining Path following Abimael Guzmán's capture in September 1992, but VRAEM's faction—rejecting Guzmán's call for peace negotiations—persisted as a semi-autonomous stronghold, leveraging alliances with coca growers and early narco-traffickers to sustain operations. Violence patterns shifted toward protecting drug corridors along the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers, with ambushes on military patrols and selective killings of informants; by 1993, insurgents controlled segments of 114 provinces, including VRAEM, which accounted for significant portions of Peru's coca output (up to 60% of global supply at peaks). Government counterinsurgency, including arming peasant rondas (patrols), reduced urban threats but left the valleys' rugged terrain under loose insurgent influence into the early 2000s, setting the stage for narco-terror hybrids.^[2][32][31]

Coca Economy and Drug Trade

Scale of Coca Cultivation

The Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) constitutes Peru's principal hub for illicit coca bush cultivation, encompassing provinces in Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Junín departments where environmental conditions favor dense planting and multiple harvests annually.^[33] In 2022, coca cultivation spanned approximately 35,709 hectares within VRAEM, representing over one-third of Peru's national total of 95,008 hectares dedicated to the crop that year.^[34] This area supported an estimated potential yield contributing to Peru's overall cocaine production of around 870 metric tons in 2022, underscoring VRAEM's outsized role in the country's output despite comprising a shrinking proportion of total cultivation amid expansions elsewhere.^[34] Historically, coca expansion in VRAEM accelerated from the early 2000s, driven by demand for cocaine precursors and limited state presence; cultivated area grew from 11,475 hectares in 2000 to 27,944 hectares by 2020, more than doubling amid insurgency-related protections and economic incentives for farmers.^[33] By the mid-2010s, VRAEM overtook traditional zones like the Upper Huallaga Valley as Peru's top producer, with cultivation densities often exceeding national averages due to alluvial soils and consistent rainfall enabling two to three harvests per year.^[35] National monitoring by DEVIDA, Peru's anti-drug commission, documented steady increases through 2023, aligning with broader trends where Peru's coca area reached 92,784 hectares that year.^[36] In a shift reported in mid-2025, VRAEM experienced its first decline in coca cultivation after eight consecutive years of growth, with a 5% reduction in cultivated area for 2024 compared to 2023, as per DEVIDA satellite surveys and ground verification.^[37] This contraction, amid national totals falling to 89,755 hectares, reflects intensified eradication efforts in the region—previously limited due to security risks—though VRAEM remained the dominant zone, highlighting persistent challenges in displacing the crop economy.^[38] Cultivation persists at scale sufficient to sustain local processing labs, with farmers often intercropping coca alongside licit staples like coffee, perpetuating economic dependence on the bush.^[39]

Processing and Local Labor Dynamics

In the VRAEM, coca leaves are processed into cocaine paste, or pasta básica de coca, through small-scale clandestine operations utilizing maceration pits and rudimentary chemical extraction methods. Leaves are macerated with solvents such as gasoline or kerosene to release alkaloids, followed by acidification and precipitation steps to yield the paste, which contains approximately 40-70% cocaine content before further refinement into base or hydrochloride elsewhere or locally by specialized clans. These dispersed labs, often family-run and hidden in jungle terrain, enable rapid production cycles but remain vulnerable to raids, with processing capacity supporting VRAEM's role as Peru's primary source of coca base and crystallized cocaine, accounting for about 40% of national illicit cultivation in recent years.^[40][41] Local labor dynamics are characterized by economic dependence on coca amid limited alternatives, with smallholder families cultivating plots of 1-2 hectares and hiring seasonal raspachines—itinerant pickers—to harvest leaves, typically yielding 20-50 kg per worker daily during peaks. Processors, often young men from Quechua or indigenous communities, handle hazardous chemical exposure in labs, facing health risks from toxins and fumes, while wages provide 2-3 times the income of legal crops like cacao, sustaining household poverty but perpetuating informality for an estimated tens of thousands in the region. Remnants of the Shining Path's Militarized Political Party of Peru (MPCP) faction impose protection rackets and production quotas on clans, coercing participation through violence or taxation (up to 10% of output), while child labor persists in harvesting and initial processing, exposing minors to dangers without formal safeguards.^[42][40]

Trafficking Routes and Methods

Cocaine produced in the VRAEM, primarily in the form of cocaine base or paste, is transported out of the region using a combination of human couriers, vehicles, fluvial routes, and, to a lesser extent, air transport. Mochileros, or backpackers, play a central role, operating in groups of 10 to 20 individuals, each carrying approximately 15 kg of product on foot along jungle trails and Inca paths, either northward or southeast toward Cusco.^[43] These journeys span 10 to 14 days one way, covering rugged terrain with risks including falls, rival attacks, and police interdiction, often under armed escort.^[43] Larger operations may involve up to 100-150 mochileros, totaling around 200 kg per group.^[44] From collection points such as Puerto Cocos or Puerto Ene, shipments are transferred to pickup trucks (e.g., Toyota Hilux) or cargo vehicles for overland movement, often hidden in truck beds (up to 100 kg), fuel tanks (50 kg), or disguised within legitimate cargo like mining equipment.^[44] Key routes include paths from Kimbiri in Cusco province to Desaguadero on the Peru-Bolivia border via Puno, facilitating southward export.^[44] Fluvial transport along rivers like the Ene supplements these efforts, using boats for initial segments before linking to land routes.^[45] Remnants of the Shining Path provide protection for shipments exceeding 0.5 tons on controlled paths, charging $50-60 per kg.^[44] Prior to Peru's 2015 aerial shoot-down policy, small aircraft from clandestine airstrips in the VRAEM transported loads directly to Bolivia, constituting the primary export method and accounting for much of the estimated 200 tons annually exiting the region.^[44][45] The policy prompted a shift toward "ant trafficking" by mochileros and increased fluvial and land routes to Bolivia and Brazil, reducing air interdictions but sustaining overall flows, with recent trends emphasizing southern exports to Bolivia for onward processing.^[45][46] Vehicle-based smuggling has grown, blending with civilian traffic to evade detection.^[44]

Insurgency and Security Challenges

Remnants of Shining Path

The remnants of the Shining Path persist in the VRAEM as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP), a faction that diverged from the main group after the 1992 capture of founder Abimael Guzmán, which dismantled the organization's central leadership and urban operations.^[2] This VRAEM branch, rooted in the Upper Huallaga Valley's influence, shifted from ideological insurgency to pragmatic alliances with the coca economy, providing armed protection to growers and traffickers in exchange for revenue through extortion and "taxes" on production and shipments.^[2] By 2021, the MPCP controlled key drug routes in areas like Vizcatán, facilitating cocaine transport toward Brazil and Bolivia.^[2] Leadership centers on Víctor Quispe Palomino, alias Comrade José, who assumed command following the death of his brother Jorge Quispe Palomino (Comrade Raúl) in a 2021 Peruvian military operation.^[2] Quispe Palomino oversees illicit activities, including murder and forced recruitment, while maintaining a small but mobile force estimated by Peruvian authorities to number in the low hundreds of active combatants as of 2023.^[47] The group employs guerrilla tactics, such as ambushes on security forces and punitive attacks on communities resisting their control, to deter eradication efforts and maintain territorial dominance.^[48] Recent violence underscores their operational capacity. In May 2021, MPCP militants massacred 16 civilians, including two children, in the Vizcatán Valley to intimidate locals ahead of national elections.^[49] Clashes escalated in 2023, with Peruvian forces reporting four soldiers killed in September during confrontations in the VRAEM, alongside six total deaths in related engagements that highlighted the group's reliance on drug-funded armament.^[50][48] By 2024, ongoing Peruvian National Police and armed forces operations continued to target MPCP bases, though the group's integration into narco-trafficking networks sustains its resilience against eradication.^[2][47]

Narco-Terror Alliances

In the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM), remnants of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) have established symbiotic alliances with drug trafficking organizations since approximately 2000, evolving from ideological insurgency to providing armed protection and enforcement services in exchange for financial contributions that fund their operations.^[51] These pacts intensified after the decline of larger cartels like the Cali organization in the mid-1990s, allowing local "family clans" or "firmas" greater autonomy while relying on SL militias to shield coca cultivation, processing labs, and transport routes from Peruvian National Police and Armed Forces incursions.^[51][52] SL imposes systematic taxation on the cocaine trade, levying fees on cultivation, leaf purchases from farmers, processing into paste and base, and transit of finished product, which constitutes their primary revenue stream.^[53] Detained traffickers reported in 2013 that SL collected $5,000 per metric ton of cocaine moving through VRAEM, potentially generating up to $1 million annually given estimates of 200 tons produced yearly in the region.^[54] These "firmas," often led by figures such as Catalino Escalante (alias "Vampiro") and the Cárdenas brothers (Guillermo "Mosca Loca" and Jorge "Mosquito Loco," the latter arrested in 1997), in turn extort local coca growers by forcing sales at depressed prices, channeling profits into SL coffers for weapons, logistics, and recruitment.^[51] The U.S. Treasury Department formalized this narco-terror linkage in June 2015 by sanctioning SL as a narco-terrorist entity and designating key VRAEM leaders, including Víctor Quispe Palomino, for materially supporting narcotics activities through such taxing mechanisms.^[53] Operationally, SL militias—estimated at 80 core combatants plus 300-500 auxiliaries as of 2014—secure drug labs and "mochileros" (human couriers carrying cocaine loads) along riverine and overland routes, while collaborating with transnational actors like Colombian traffickers and Brazilian Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) for export facilitation.^[52] This protection racket extends to intimidating rivals and state agents, as evidenced by SL-orchestrated ambushes, such as the February 2023 attack killing nine police in VRAEM, which Peruvian officials attributed to coordinated narco-terror efforts to safeguard trafficking corridors.^[55] Similar violence in September 2023, resulting in six military deaths, underscored SL's role in enforcing no-go zones for eradication efforts, blending ideological holdouts with profit-driven defense of the coca economy.^[48] These alliances have sustained SL's viability despite leadership losses, like the 2013 killing of commander Arturo Jiménez ("Comrade Artemio"), by embedding them within VRAEM's illicit networks.^[52]

Patterns of Violence and Control

In the VRAEM, remnants of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) exert control primarily through a combination of extortion, selective assassinations, and guerrilla ambushes, targeting both state security forces and local populations perceived as disloyal. These groups impose a "revolutionary tax" on coca cultivators and processors, demanding payments equivalent to 10-20% of production value in exchange for protection from rivals or eradication efforts, enforced via threats of death or property destruction. Non-compliance often results in punitive violence, such as the execution of farmers accused of informing authorities, which sustains a climate of fear and limits community cooperation with government forces.^[2] Violence manifests in low-intensity asymmetric tactics suited to the rugged terrain, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), sniper attacks, and hit-and-run ambushes on military patrols, which minimize direct confrontations while maximizing psychological impact. For instance, on February 11, 2022, Shining Path militants ambushed Peruvian National Police in the VRAEM, killing seven officers in one of the deadliest incidents of the year. Similar patterns persisted into 2023, with a March 13 ambush in Satipo province claiming a soldier's life, followed by a September clash near Luricocha that killed four soldiers and two rebels. These actions not only disrupt state presence but also reinforce insurgent narratives of invincibility among locals.^[56][57][48] Alliances with narco-traffickers amplify control by providing revenue streams and logistical support, with Shining Path offering armed escorts for cocaine labs and shipments through VRAEM corridors in return for arms and funds. This narco-terror symbiosis enables territorial dominance in remote coca valleys like Vizcatán, where insurgents maintain strategic bases to regulate production and trafficking. A stark example occurred on May 23, 2021, when militants massacred 16 civilians—including two children—in Vizcatán del Ene, targeting a family suspected of aiding authorities, highlighting the use of mass killings to deter collaboration and assert monopoly over illicit economies. Such incidents, while sporadic compared to the 1980s-1990s internal conflict, underscore a strategy of calibrated terror to preserve operational autonomy amid ongoing military pressure.^[2][49][58] Overall, these patterns reflect an adaptive evolution from ideological insurgency to narco-protection rackets, with violence serving less as a tool for mass mobilization and more for economic coercion and territorial defense. Government reports indicate at least five Shining Path attacks in 2022 alone, predominantly in VRAEM, resulting in security force casualties and underscoring the insurgents' reliance on hit-and-fade operations to evade superior state firepower. This dynamic perpetuates a cycle where local dependence on coca sustains insurgent financing, while state incursions provoke retaliatory spikes in lethality.^[56][59]

Government Responses

Military and Police Operations

The Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police have maintained a sustained military and police presence in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) since the early 2000s to counter remnants of the Shining Path insurgency and associated drug trafficking activities. In 2008, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces established the Special Command of the VRAEM (CE-VRAEM), a dedicated unit responsible for coordinating joint operations aimed at restoring security, neutralizing terrorist threats, and disrupting illicit coca processing and trafficking.^{[60] [61]} These efforts involve intelligence-driven raids, patrols, and direct engagements, often leveraging special forces trained for counterinsurgency in rugged terrain.^[62] By 2012, the government expanded its footprint with the installation of ten new military bases to challenge Shining Path control over key areas, enabling more persistent operations against guerrilla columns and narco-terror networks.^[63] CE-VRAEM operations emphasize interagency collaboration between the army, navy, air force, and police units like DIRANDRO (anti-drug directorate) and DIRCOTE (anti-terrorism directorate), focusing on leadership decapitation, weapons seizures, and protection of local populations from extortion.^[64] Annual reports indicate consistent activity, with the Peruvian National Police and Armed Forces conducting targeted missions that have reduced Shining Path operational capacity, though the group retains an estimated 250-300 members, including 60-150 armed fighters, funded primarily through coca taxes.^[5] Notable outcomes include significant arrests and eliminations: in October 2022, security forces reported killing 15 Shining Path members during operations in VRAEM.^[59] In 2023, clashes resulted in at least six deaths in a single September engagement—four soldiers and two insurgents—amid 11 recorded terrorist incidents that year, causing 21 total fatalities, including seven police officers in a February ambush.^{[48] [5]} Police successes included June captures of leaders linked to prior attacks and a November operation arresting sons of top commanders, described by DIRCOTE as a major disruption to command structures.^[5] Despite these gains, operations face challenges from the region's dense jungle, limited infrastructure, and insurgents' alliances with drug traffickers, leading to periodic ambushes on patrols.^[57] Efforts have evolved to incorporate rules-of-engagement training for troops, as evidenced by International Committee of the Red Cross programs at VRAEM bases in 2025, aiming to minimize civilian harm amid frequent clashes.^[65] Overall, while Shining Path remnants have been confined to VRAEM without expanding beyond, complete eradication remains elusive, with operations continuing into 2025 under frameworks like Operation Tacna launched by the Joint Command.^[66]

Eradication and Crop Substitution Efforts

The Peruvian government initiated manual coca eradication in the VRAEM in 2019 under President Martín Vizcarra, breaking with prior avoidance due to Shining Path threats; this formed part of a national total of 25,526 hectares eradicated that year.^[67][41] National eradication dropped sharply to 6,273 hectares in 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic's disruptions, before rebounding in subsequent years as operations resumed with military support to counter narco-terrorist resistance.^[41][68] DEVIDA coordinates these efforts, prioritizing manual methods over phased-out aerial spraying to minimize environmental and health risks, though VRAEM's rugged terrain and insurgency limit scale and sustainability.^[69] Crop substitution initiatives, managed by DEVIDA under the Integrated and Sustainable Alternative Development framework, promote legal alternatives such as cacao, coffee, bananas, and oil palm to reduce economic dependence on coca.^[3][70] Projects like "Transforming the VRAEM: The Land of Fine Flavor Cacao" invest in farmer training for high-quality cacao production and market access, positioning it as a viable substitute given the region's soil suitability and global demand for premium varieties.^[7][71] Over 500 such programs have been deployed in substitution zones, yet farmer participation remains uneven due to coca's higher short-term profitability and coercion by armed groups.^[70][72] Despite these measures, VRAEM accounts for roughly 67% of Peru's coca leaf production, with cultivation expanding overall from 2016 to 2020 amid incomplete substitution uptake and replanting.^[3][22] National trends show a 2.3% cultivation decline in 2023 and continued reduction into 2025 per DEVIDA monitoring, attributed to intensified eradication-substitution synergies, though VRAEM's entrenchment poses ongoing causal barriers to net eradication.^[73][74]

Development and Infrastructure Projects

The Peruvian government has pursued various infrastructure initiatives in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) as part of broader efforts to foster economic alternatives to illicit coca cultivation, with investments channeled through programs like the Proyecto Especial de Desarrollo del VRAEM (PROVRAEM) and the Programa AGROVRAEM. These projects emphasize connectivity, energy access, and agricultural support, aiming to integrate the remote region into national markets. Between 2014 and 2015, the national investment portfolio for VRAEM reached approximately US$566 million, encompassing completed and ongoing works across sectors including roads and utilities.^[75][76] Road infrastructure has been a priority to improve access and reduce isolation, with the paving of a 65 km stretch in the VRAEM river valleys designed to enhance regional integration and facilitate legal commerce. Complementary efforts include irrigation systems to bolster legitimate farming, comprising 49 projects across Apurímac (23 works), Ayacucho (5), Cusco (2), and Huancavelica (19), executed with a total investment of S/13.3 million to expand cultivable land and support crop diversification.^[77][78] Electrification projects address chronic energy deficits, with six initiatives underway by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) targeting 51,000 residents through rural grid expansions and improvements. Notable among these is the Río Tambo electrification for 99 localities, involving S/53.3 million in upgrades to serve 19,172 people, part of a broader S/129 million package spanning VRAEM districts. Additionally, the proposed Santa María hydroelectric plant seeks to provide scalable power for industrial and household needs, with calls for accelerated construction to close coverage gaps.^[79][80][81] Sustainable development components integrate infrastructure with alternatives like the PROVRAEM bamboo cultivation project, launched in 2025 to promote non-coca agroforestry while leveraging existing water and road networks for processing and transport. The Proyecto de Desarrollo Territorial Sostenible (PDTS), active from 2017 to 2022, mobilized S/230 million in joint funding from the government and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), supporting rural infrastructure tied to community investments in viable crops. In 2025, the Ministry of Agrarian Development and Irrigation (MIDAGRI) advanced 19 agro-projects, seven with approved funding, focusing on infrastructure for Andean and native communities in VRAEM.^[82][83][84]

Socioeconomic Conditions

Demographics and Population

The Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) encompasses an estimated population of 654,017 inhabitants, equivalent to approximately 2% of Peru's total population, based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI).^[28] This figure reflects the area's rural character across provinces in Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Junín, and Apurímac, where settlements are dispersed due to challenging topography including steep Andean slopes and river valleys.^[10] Population density remains low, estimated below national averages owing to limited arable land and isolation, fostering small-scale farming communities rather than urban centers.^[28] Demographically, the region is predominantly indigenous, with highland Quechua groups comprising the core ethnic majority, reflecting broader patterns in Peru's Andean highlands where Quechua speakers number in the millions.^[85] These communities primarily speak Quechua as their first language, with Spanish serving as a secondary tongue, particularly in interactions with state institutions.^[10] Migration patterns show net outflows of younger residents seeking opportunities in urban areas like Lima, contributing to an aging rural demographic vulnerable to economic pressures and security issues.^[28] Recent national projections indicate Peru's overall population growth rate at about 0.9% annually, but VRAEM-specific trends likely lag due to persistent poverty and conflict-related displacement, though precise district-level updates from INEI post-2017 census remain limited in public aggregation for the valley.^[86] The population's heavy reliance on subsistence agriculture underscores a demographic profile marked by high fertility rates historically offset by infant mortality and emigration, sustaining a youthful but under-resourced base.^[28]

Economic Dependencies and Poverty

The economy of the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) remains heavily dependent on illicit coca cultivation, which provides the primary income source for much of the local population amid limited legitimate opportunities. As of 2022, the region produced approximately two-thirds of Peru's cocaine, underscoring coca's dominance in local livelihoods despite its illegality and association with narco-trafficking networks.^[87] Farmers in the VRAEM exhibit strong attachment to coca farming due to its relatively high yields and market reliability compared to alternative crops, with cultivation efficiency enabling quicker harvests and better short-term returns in a context of poor soil quality and rugged terrain.^{[28] [4]} This dependency persists even as national coca cultivation areas fluctuated, reaching a record 95,000 hectares in 2022 before a 2.3% decline in 2023, with VRAEM retaining a central role.^{[88] [73]} Persistent poverty in the VRAEM stems from the illicit nature of coca, which discourages formal investment, infrastructure development, and diversification into sustainable sectors, trapping communities in a cycle of economic vulnerability. The region's approximately 642,000 inhabitants face barriers of exclusion and underdevelopment, with coca offering temporary respite but no long-term escape, as illicit economies fail to build resilient institutions or skills transferable to legal markets.^{[89] [90]} Government initiatives for crop substitution, such as cacao production under USAID-supported projects, have yielded modest results but struggle against coca's profitability edge and logistical hurdles like remote access and volatile prices for legal goods.^[7] Eradication efforts, including 25,526 hectares destroyed nationwide in 2019, often provoke resistance and rebound planting, further entrenching reliance on the drug trade without addressing root causes like inadequate roads and education.^[67] This economic structure fosters chronic underdevelopment, where coca's cash flow sustains basic needs but correlates with elevated malnutrition, limited access to markets, and stalled human capital formation, as resources are diverted to informal survival rather than productive investment. UNODC analyses highlight how such illicit dependencies disproportionately affect impoverished rural areas, impeding broader integration into Peru's formal economy and perpetuating intergenerational poverty.^[91] Efforts to promote alternatives remain hampered by local mistrust of state-led development, rooted in historical neglect and coercive policies that prioritize prohibition over tailored economic reforms.^[4]

Social Services and Community Life

Access to social services in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) remains severely constrained by the region's remote geography, ongoing security threats from armed groups, and high poverty rates, which exacerbate vulnerabilities among the predominantly rural, Quechua-speaking population.^[92][93] As of 2017 census data, approximately 33% of the VRAEM population was under 15 years old, placing disproportionate demand on limited child-focused services amid elevated risks of malnutrition and disease.^[94] Health infrastructure is rudimentary, with communities facing serious barriers to care due to violence and isolation; the International Committee of the Red Cross has intervened to provide first aid training and support in affected areas as recently as 2024.^[92] Malaria persists as a key threat, with 158 cases reported in the VRAEM basin of La Convención province in 2024 alone.^[95] Anemia affects 35.9% of rural children, reflecting chronic undernutrition linked to inadequate sanitation and food insecurity, while adolescent health risks are compounded by exposure to conflict remnants and limited preventive services.^[96][97] Education services show incremental progress but high dropout rates, particularly in secondary levels, driven by economic pressures from illicit coca economies; government conditional cash transfers like Programa Juntos have targeted desertion in VRAEM, where complexity and poverty contribute to elevated absenteeism as of 2024.^[98] School attendance for ages 3-5 rose from 32.2% in 2007 to 68.1% in 2017, supported by infrastructure projects serving 2,597 primary and secondary students in recent years.^[99][94] Adult literacy programs, such as Educación Básica Alternativa, aid those over 15 with incomplete primary education, addressing gaps in a population where illiteracy hinders community resilience.^[100] Community life revolves around subsistence agriculture and informal networks, with residents engaging in data collection for local advocacy and behavioral change initiatives to improve nutrition and hygiene, often in coordination with NGOs.^[93] Events like the 2025 Encuentro de Líderes Comunales foster communal leadership amid vulnerabilities from armed group presence, which disrupts property rights and civilian safety.^[101][102] Incentives like the Bono VRAEM have boosted secondary completion rates among youth, indicating targeted interventions can mitigate socioeconomic isolation, though systemic underinvestment perpetuates dependence on external aid.^[103]

Controversies and Policy Debates

Effectiveness of Prohibition Strategies

Peru's prohibition strategies in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) have primarily relied on forced manual eradication of coca crops, interdiction of precursor chemicals and processed cocaine, and limited alternative development programs, often integrated with counterinsurgency operations against Shining Path remnants who derive revenue from taxing coca production.^[69] These efforts, supported by U.S. aid under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, aimed to reduce supply by targeting cultivation and trafficking, but empirical data indicate persistent high levels of coca hectarage and cocaine potential, with VRAEM accounting for a significant share of national output.^[104] For instance, despite national eradication of approximately 23,900 hectares in 2013, coca cultivation areas rebounded, reaching record highs of 95,000 hectares nationwide by 2022.^{[105] [88]} In the VRAEM specifically, eradication has been constrained by security risks posed by Shining Path militias, resulting in only 116 hectares eradicated over two decades prior to 2022, compared to the region's estimated 32,000 hectares under cultivation.^{[4] [69]} Initial attempts at forced eradication in VRAEM, such as limited operations starting around 2019, yielded modest results—part of national totals like 25,526 hectares destroyed that year—but failed to prevent replanting or displacement to adjacent areas, as farmers quickly restore crops due to coca's high profitability and short growth cycle of 8-12 months.^{[67] [104]} This pattern aligns with broader supply-side critiques, where eradication disrupts local economies temporarily but incentivizes expansion elsewhere via the balloon effect, without addressing inelastic global demand.^[106] Voluntary crop substitution initiatives, promoted as complements to prohibition, have proven ineffective in VRAEM, stalling due to lack of enforceable incentives and farmer skepticism toward unprofitable alternatives like coffee or cacao, which yield lower returns amid poor infrastructure and market access.^[72] Programs under DEVIDA (Peru's anti-drug commission) have achieved minimal uptake, with participants often reverting to coca when subsidies end, as evidenced by stalled progress in pilot areas and overall national cultivation increases.^[69] Moreover, Shining Path's control—levying 10-50% taxes on coca sales—sustains violence against eradication teams, with clashes killing personnel and deterring operations, thereby undermining prohibition's coercive core.^[51] Overall, these strategies have not curtailed VRAEM's role as Peru's primary coca hub, where potential cocaine production rose 30% from 665 metric tons in 2020 to 869 metric tons in 2021, reflecting adaptation by traffickers and growers rather than reduction.^[69] Independent analyses, including those from supply-side policy reviews, conclude that such measures fail to achieve sustained declines without comprehensive rural development, as illicit economies fill state vacuums and coca remains economically rational for impoverished farmers facing limited legal options.^{[106] [28]} While temporary dips occur post-eradication surges, long-term metrics show resilience, with VRAEM's rugged terrain and insurgent presence enabling evasion of patrols and rapid recovery.^[107]

Local Resistance and Autonomy Claims

Local communities in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) have mounted periodic resistance against state-led coca eradication campaigns, primarily through protests organized by cocalero (coca grower) associations demanding economic alternatives and policy consultation before forced interventions. In October 2021, over 300 cocaleros blocked roads near Loromayo in response to intensified eradication efforts, halting traffic and pressuring authorities to suspend operations amid claims of inadequate compensation and lack of viable substitution crops.^[108] Similar actions occurred in 2004, when cocaleros initiated an indefinite strike against eradication policies, citing mismanagement of development funds and insufficient state support for transitioning to legal agriculture.^[109] These resistances stem from deep-seated mistrust of central government initiatives, including alternative development programs that locals initially accepted but later criticized for failing to deliver sustainable livelihoods, as evidenced by stalled crop substitution efforts launched in 2014 but largely unimplemented by 2015 due to logistical and funding shortfalls.^[72] Cocalero organizations in VRAEM expressed outrage in 2020 over announcements of renewed forced eradication—the first since the early 2000s—arguing it ignored community input and exacerbated poverty without addressing root causes like limited market access for legal crops.^[110] Protests often frame demands as assertions of "the right to demand rights," seeking greater state investment in infrastructure and services rather than punitive measures, though coordinated movements remain fragmented compared to those in Bolivia or Colombia.^[111] Explicit claims for regional autonomy or self-governance are rare and unsubstantiated in primary sources, with resistance more focused on negotiated control over coca cultivation limits akin to Bolivia's community-regulated model, which some Peruvian cocaleros have advocated adapting locally through dialogue rather than separation from national authority.^[112] In areas influenced by Shining Path remnants, de facto local leverage arises from armed groups' taxation of coca production—estimated to generate millions annually for insurgents—creating informal "no-go" zones that shield growers from eradication but tie resistance to narco-terrorist dynamics rather than autonomous governance aspirations.^[113] This interplay has led to occasional cocalero-state alliances for pacification, as in post-2010 efforts where growers cooperated against Shining Path in exchange for leniency on cultivation, highlighting pragmatic resistance over ideological autonomy.^[114]

International Dimensions and Aid

The United States has provided substantial counternarcotics assistance to Peru, with a focus on the VRAEM through the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). This support includes aviation assets, training, and facilities to enable coca eradication and interdiction operations, targeting the region's role as the source of approximately two-thirds of Peru's cocaine production.^[115] In fiscal year 2023, total U.S. foreign assistance to Peru reached $193.4 million, including counternarcotics programs that facilitated the first forced eradication in the VRAEM in 2019, destroying 25,526 hectares equivalent to about 220 metric tons of potential cocaine.^[116][115] In November 2024, the U.S. announced an additional $65 million counternarcotics package to Peru, emphasizing interdiction and alternative development amid ongoing Shining Path-linked trafficking.^[117] In April 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Shining Path's VRAEM faction as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker, enabling sanctions and financial restrictions on its networks.^[118] The European Union supports Peru's anti-drug efforts through technical assistance and funding, including a €960,000 contract in recent years for advisory services on illicit trafficking, which indirectly bolsters operations in high-production areas like the VRAEM.^[119] EU programs emphasize capacity-building for law enforcement and judicial institutions, aligning with Peru's national strategy under international treaties, though specific VRAEM allocations remain limited in public reporting.^[120] Humanitarian aid in the VRAEM is constrained by persistent violence and inaccessibility, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) serving as the sole international organization with sustained operations in the valley. Since at least 2021, the ICRC has delivered first aid, improved health care access for violence-affected communities, and provided psychological support following incidents like the May 2021 San Miguel del Ene massacre.^{[92][121][122]} In February 2025, the ICRC conducted workshops on international humanitarian law for Peruvian soldiers at VRAEM bases to mitigate risks to civilians during counterinsurgency actions.^[65] Non-state actors, including Lutheran World Relief, have implemented alternative development projects since the 2010s, partnering with local women's groups like Qori Warmi to promote crop substitution and economic diversification away from coca.^[123] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) contributes monitoring and data on coca cultivation in the VRAEM, informing international policy, but does not directly fund eradication or aid programs there.^[8] Overall, international engagement underscores the VRAEM's status as a transnational security concern, with aid prioritizing supply reduction over demand-side measures, amid debates on long-term efficacy given persistent cultivation levels.^[3]

Recent Developments (2010s-2025)

Escalations in Conflict

In the 2010s, remnants of the Shining Path, operating primarily in the VRAEM under the leadership of the Quispe Palomino brothers, shifted toward a more militarized structure sustained by alliances with drug traffickers, enabling procurement of advanced weaponry and recruitment of local fighters to protect coca cultivation and processing sites. This evolution marked a departure from earlier guerrilla tactics, with the group—rebranded as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru—expanding to an estimated 250-300 armed members by the early 2020s, focusing on territorial control rather than nationwide insurgency.^[2] Government counteroperations, including the VRAEM Special Command, faced persistent ambushes, but violence intensified as the group imposed "war taxes" on farmers and eliminated perceived collaborators, resulting in sporadic but lethal engagements.^[6] A major escalation occurred on May 23, 2021, when Shining Path militants massacred 16 civilians, including two children, in the San Miguel del Ene community within Vizcatán del Ene district, attributing the attack to punishment for collaborating with authorities on coca eradication. This was the deadliest incident attributed to the group since 2003, highlighting their use of terror to deter state incursions and maintain narco-protection rackets. In response, Peruvian forces intensified patrols, but Shining Path retaliated with attacks on security personnel, including the killing of two police officers in August 2021 and assaults on military outposts in July 2021.^[49][6] Further intensifications followed in 2023, with Shining Path forces downing a Peruvian Army Mi-17 helicopter on February 28 near Pichari, wounding the crew in an anti-aircraft ambush that underscored their growing tactical capabilities funded by drug revenues. Clashes peaked again in September 2023, when confrontations in Huancavelica province—part of the broader VRAEM theater—left three soldiers and three militants dead, the second major incident that year after earlier farmer killings. These events prompted heightened military deployments, yet the group's entrenchment in remote valleys sustained low-intensity warfare, with over a dozen security force casualties reported annually in the VRAEM by mid-decade.^[57][48] By 2025, escalations persisted amid ongoing operations, including a May joint military-police raid that neutralized key Shining Path figures, but ambushes on patrols continued, reflecting the insurgents' resilience tied to unchecked coca expansion. The conflict's persistence, with violence concentrated in VRAEM's rugged terrain, has strained Peru's resources, as the group's narco-insurgency model prioritizes survival over ideological expansion.^[124][2]

Shifts in Drug Production Metrics

Coca cultivation in the VRAEM expanded from approximately 11,475 hectares in 2000 to 27,944 hectares by 2020, reflecting a long-term upward trend driven by limited enforcement and protection from armed groups like Shining Path remnants.^[33] This growth contributed to Peru's national coca area increasing by over 40% between 2016 and 2020, reaching 61,800 hectares overall, with VRAEM accounting for a substantial portion as the country's primary production zone.^[22] Eradication metrics shifted notably in 2019, when Peru conducted its first forced eradications in the VRAEM—targeting 750 hectares—breaking a prior policy of avoidance due to security risks, as part of a national total of 25,526 hectares destroyed that year.^[67] However, national eradication volumes plummeted to 6,273 hectares in 2020 amid COVID-19 disruptions and local resistance, allowing cultivation to rebound; by around 2021-2022, VRAEM estimates reached 32,000 hectares.^{[41] [69]} Potential cocaine production metrics paralleled cultivation gains, with Peru's output rising 30% from 2020 to 2021 to an estimated 869 metric tons nationally, fueled by VRAEM's role in processing and trafficking amid global demand surges.^{[41] [69]} National peaks hit record highs in 2022, with VRAEM's concentrated cultivation—often exceeding 40% of Peru's total—sustaining high yields despite intermittent interventions.^[125] Recent interventions yielded modest reversals, as national coca area declined 2.3% in 2023 and further in 2024-2025 per DEVIDA monitoring, preventing an estimated 797 tons of cocaine production through enhanced seizures and alternative development pushes.^{[73] [126] [127]} In VRAEM, however, metrics remain elevated compared to pre-2010 levels, with armed group taxation on crops constraining sustained reductions and shifting production toward more remote, forested plots to evade patrols.^[69]

Ongoing Interventions and Outcomes

The Peruvian government maintains ongoing military and police interventions in the VRAEM through joint operations by the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces targeting remnants of the Shining Path, now operating as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP), which provides protection to drug traffickers in exchange for funding.^[2] These efforts include intelligence-driven raids and ambushes, with a state of emergency renewed in August 2025 to enhance security measures, though local mayors have criticized it as ineffective and exacerbating tensions without addressing root causes like poverty and lack of services.^[128] In parallel, anti-narcotics operations focus on interdiction, with Peru co-funding eradication and alternative development under its 2030 National Drug Control Policy, supported by U.S. aviation and logistical aid.^[129] Coca eradication in the VRAEM remains challenging due to MPCP control over cultivation zones, limiting forced eradication to safer areas while emphasizing voluntary substitution; nationwide, Peru eradicated over 80,000 hectares in recent years, but VRAEM-specific efforts yielded modest reductions amid rising overall cultivation to record levels by 2023.^[129] Alternative development programs promote crops like cacao, with initiatives training farmers in high-quality production to replace coca dependency, though adoption is hindered by market access issues and historical mistrust of state-led projects dating to the 1990s.^[7] Outcomes include localized successes in cacao yields but persistent illicit economies, as evidenced by ongoing clandestine airstrips facilitating drug exports near VRAEM-adjacent areas.^[130] Security outcomes show MPCP remnants retaining influence over approximately 10,000-15,000 hectares of coca under their protection as of 2024, with clashes resulting in military casualties, such as the September 2023 incident killing six soldiers, indicating sustained low-level insurgency rather than eradication.^[48][2] Despite operational continuity into 2025, violence persists, with communities facing restricted health access and economic stagnation, underscoring limited progress in disrupting the narcoterrorist alliance despite billions in international aid.^[92] International assessments note that while interdiction seizures increased, production metrics reflect policy shortfalls, with Peru's coca cultivation expanding due to inadequate rural development integration.^[47][129]