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Primeiro Comando da Capital
The taijitu is used as the PCC emblem.[1]
Founded31 August 1993; 32 years ago (1993-08-31)
Founders
  • Geleião
  • Césinha
  • Miza
  • Isaías Esquisito
  • Paixão
  • Du Cara Gorda
  • Bicho Feio
  • Dafé
[2]
Founding locationTaubaté House of Custody and Treatment, Taubaté, São Paulo, Brazil
Years active1993–present
TerritoryMain territory:[3][4]

Main routes/Significant influence:[3][4][5]

Significant activity:[3][6][7][8][9][10][11]

Other activity also registered throughout Europe and Africa[3][6]
EthnicityBrazilians (predominantly) Paraguayans, Venezuelans, Argentines
Membership40,000 lifetime members + 60,000 "contractors" (2023)[6]
Leaders
Criminal activitiesDrug trafficking, carjacking, murder, fraud, arms trafficking, extortion, money laundering, illegal logging, wildlife trafficking, illegal gold mining, smuggling, kidnapping, robbery, bribery and narcoterrorism
AlliesAmigos dos Amigos, Terceiro Comando Puro, Tren de Aragua, Paraguayan People's Army, Primer Cartel Uruguayo, Insfrán Clan, Jalisco New Generation Cartel,[14] 'Ndrangheta, Balkan mafias (including Šarić Clan, Group America), Hezbollah[7][15][16]
Chinese triads[17]
RivalsBrazil Government of Brazil, Uruguay Government of Uruguay, Argentina Government of Argentina, Paraguay Government of Paraguay, Comando Vermelho, Família do Norte, Rotela Clan, Militias[18][19][20][17] Irmandade de Resgate do Bonde Cerol Fininho[21][22]

The Primeiro Comando da Capital[Note 2] (PCC; lit. 'Capital's First Command'),[Note 3] is a Brazilian organized crime syndicate. According to a 2023 The Economist report, the PCC is Latin America's biggest drug gang, with a membership of 40,000 lifetime members plus 60,000 "contractors".[6] Its name refers to the São Paulo state capital, the city of São Paulo.

The group is based in the state of São Paulo and is active throughout Brazil, South America, West Africa and Europe. An international expansion fueled by the cocaine trade made the PCC establish a profitable partnership with the Italian 'Ndrangheta and, as of 2023, run over 50% of Brazil's drug exports to Europe. Through the cocaine trade routes to Europe, the PCC also established itself as a central player in the West African cocaine trade, with its members being able to exert control over neighbourhoods in cities such as Lagos and Abuja.[6][23] According to a leaked Portuguese intelligence report, the group also has around 1,000 associates in Lisbon.[6]

Historically, the PCC has been responsible for several criminal activities such as murders, prison riots, drug trafficking, bank and highway robberies, protection rackets, pimping, kidnappings-for-ransom, money laundering, bribery, loan sharking, and obstruction of justice, with an expansion focused on drug trafficking since the 2010s. As of 2023, the PCC is currently transitioning into a global mafia, being able to influence politics and penetrate the legal economy.[6] According to São Paulo state authorities, the group has had a yearly revenue of at least R$4.9 billion (US$909.09 million) since 2020.[24] In August 2025, the Brazilian Federal Revenue revealed that the organization controlled at least R$30 billion (US$5.57 billion) in property investments.[25]

The PCC is often mentioned to have a different doctrine to other Brazilian cartels, with a business model that favors the quiet expansion of markets over violent and expensive turf wars[3] and confrontations with the state that would draw unwanted attention.[26] The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime noted that the PCC's ability to negotiate with rivals rather than expelling them has permitted the group to make use of preestablished criminal networks and preexisting logistics know-how along the cocaine value chain, encouraging peaceful cooperation between different groups and producing greater economic efficiency by reducing operating costs.[3][26] However, the group has been responsible for waves of extreme violence, including targeted political violence and terrorism, upon having their interests threatened.[27]

History and operations

[edit]

Founding

[edit]

The PCC was founded on August 31, 1993, by eight prisoners at Taubaté Penitentiary, called "Piranhão" ("Big Piranha"), in the state of São Paulo. At the time, this was considered the safest jail in the state.[28]

The group initially got together during a football game. The prisoners had been transferred from the city of São Paulo to the Piranhão as punishment for bad behavior, and they decided to name their team the Capital Command—a name which would stick, as the game was followed by the brutal killing and decapitation of both the deputy director and a prisoner with special privileges, with the head of the latter being put on a stake.[29]

The initial members were Misael "Misa" Aparecido da Silva, Wander Eduardo "Cara Gorda" Ferreira, Antônio Carlos Roberto da Paixão, Isaías "Esquisito" Moreira do Nascimento, Ademar "Dafé" dos Santos, Antônio "Bicho Feio" Carlos dos Santos, César "Césinha" Augusto Roris da Silva and José "Geleião" Márcio Felício.

PCC, which was also formerly referred to as the "Party of Crime", and as "15.3.3" (following the order of the letters "P" and "C" in the former Portuguese alphabet), was founded with a clear agenda, to "fight the oppression inside the São Paulo penitentiary system" and to "avenge the death of 111 prisoners": the victims of the previous year's Carandiru massacre, when the São Paulo State Military Police stormed the now-defunct Carandiru Penitentiary and massacred prisoners in the 9th cell block.

The group had the slogan "Peace, Justice and Freedom"[2] and made use of the Chinese taijitu ("yin and yang symbol") as their emblem, claiming it represented a "way to balance good and evil with wisdom".[1] In February 2001, Idemir "Sombra" Carlos Ambrósio became the most prominent leader of the organization when he coordinated, by cell phone, simultaneous rebellions in 29 São Paulo state prisons, in which 16 prisoners were killed. "Sombra", also referred to as "father", was beaten to death in the Piranhão five months later by five PCC members in an internal struggle for the general command of the group. The PCC was led by "Geleião" and "Cesinha", who were responsible for an alliance with another criminal organization, Rio de Janeiro's Red Command (CV). At the time, the gang adopted the CV's far-left beliefs and began advocating for revolution and the destruction of Brazil's capitalist system.[30]

Geleião and Cesinha, from the Bangu Penitentiary where they were held, went on to coordinate violent attacks against public buildings. Considered radicals by another moderate current of the PCC, they used terrorism to intimidate authorities of the prison system and were withdrawn from leadership in November 2002, when the leadership was taken over by the current leader of the organization, Marcos "Marcola" Willians Herbas Camacho. Marcola would eventually order the deaths of Geleião and Cesinha for having testified to the police and for creating the Terceiro Comando da Capital (Third Capital Command, TCC).

"Trade union of crime"

[edit]

The PCC first appeared as an entity capable of maintaining order in the lawless Brazilian prison system, providing protection to prisoners, imposing rules and punishing crimes such as rapes, murders and extortions, as well as seeking a peaceful resolution to conflicts between inmates. In return, members would be charged a monthly fee to pay for lawyers, provide aid to families in need and to pay for items for arrested members.[2]

In the late 1990s, the São Paulo State Government sought to separate the PCC leadership in order to dismantle the organization, sending leaders to different penitentiaries across the countries. The action backfired however, as the leaders' "trade union discourse" resonated with inmates across the country, expanding the group in the process.[2] In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the PCC became notorious for high-profile bank robberies and prison rebellions, including the largest bank robbery in the country's history, where armed gunmen carried out a heist on the central Banco Banespa branch in São Paulo, escaping with R$32.5 million.[2]

Under the leadership of Marcola, also known as "Playboy", currently serving a 232-year sentence, the PCC took part in the March 2003 murder of Judge Antônio José Machado Dias, who ran the Penitentiary Readaptation Center (CRP) from Presidente Bernardes, São Paulo, then Brazil's most strict supermax-style prison. The PCC also announced its objective to use prison uprisings as a way to demoralize the government and to destroy the CRP.

In May 2006, the PCC carried out its biggest attacks, in retaliation against an attempt to transfer the PCC leadership to high-security prisons. The attacks lasted for 4 days and caused 564 deaths.[31] According to the São Paulo State prosecutor Márcio Christino, PCC founders Cesinha and Geleião were more extreme in their methods, intending to use car bombs to blow up the São Paulo Stock Exchange building. Marcola disagreed, believing the PCC had more to gain by keeping a low profile. Such belief was strengthened after Marcola was imprisoned in the same facility as the Chilean guerilla fighter Mauricio Hernández Norambuena in 2006, who taught Marcola not to carry out pointless attacks to the detriment of the civilian population, as those would only facilitate state repression.[31]

Expansion into domestic drug trafficking

[edit]

From the early 2000s, the PCC started consolidating its power outside of the prison system, expanding its influence as providers of order and conflict solvers into low-income neighbourhoods throughout São Paulo, known as favelas. During its early expansion phase, the PCC sold drugs at cost price to lesser drug dealers, helping expand their reach, and eventually taking over their drug dens when collecting debts (using a strategy akin to debt-trap diplomacy). This allowed the gang to form a cartel that dominated the city of São Paulo. Eventually, every drug den in SP came to be under the PCC's control, being either owned or "licensed" by the PCC, in a consignment model where an independent dealer exclusively buys drugs supplied by the group.[31]

One of the main differences between the PCC and other Brazilian criminal groups is that territorial control is enforced without the open brandishing of firearms ("ostentação", or ostentation) that characterizes groups such as the CV in Rio de Janeiro. Individuals that fail to comply with the group's "discipline" are judged by the "crime courts", with sentences that can range from beatings to summary executions.[31] Rather than expanding by territorial conquest alone, the PCC is able to develop its illicit activities more efficiently by focusing on the regulation and control of markets combined with a monopoly on violence and discipline.[32] The PCC's expansion and dominion over the state of São Paulo is seen by researchers as one of the reasons behind the sharp decrease in the state's homicide rate since the 2000s. The criminal group's reasoning is that murders attract police attention and, consequently, cause problems in drug sales.[31]

In 2014, the Brazilian Federal Police launched Operation Oversea, which first identified the PCC's cocaine shipments to Europe, before the group had consolidated drug trade routes or perfected money laundering schemes.[31]

Control over Paraguayan drug trafficking routes and focus on export market

[edit]

A turning point for the PCC was set in 2014 when it pivoted away from domestic sales and turned towards the more lucrative export market. The group cemented its influence over the Port of Santos, the biggest port in South America, and evolved into a multinational organization with presence and influence across five continents through alliances with other groups such as the 'Ndrangheta as well as Mexican, Colombian, Russian and African criminal networks. GI-TOC fieldwork highlighted that the value chain often starts with stolen or second-hand vehicles in Brazil exchanged for drugs in countries such as Bolivia and Paraguay.[3]

From 2016, the group cemented its influence over the Paraguayan border, an important trade route for cocaine supplied from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia and for arms trafficked from Paraguay and the United States. It involved the murder of Jorge Rafaat, a Brazilian drug lord of Lebanese ancestry. Rafaat's armored Hummer truck was ambushed in Pedro Juan Caballero by more than 100 mercenaries, including a Toyota SW4 featuring a concealed Browning .50 MG which fired more than 400 rounds into the drug lord's truck. The 10-minute shootout left Rafaat dead and 8 more injured.[33] About 40 of his associates were subsequently murdered.[34] This allowed for a major expansion in the following years, with the Brazilian Public Prosecutor's Office estimating that the PCC had reached over 30,000 'baptized' members in 2018, with at least 2 million more allied to the group.[3]

In 2016, the breakdown of a 20-year truce between the PCC and the Red Command (CV) led to a massive uptick in violence across Brazil, with the PCC embarking on an aggressive expansion campaign by absorbing less organized gangs and financing local groups to operate as proxies against the CV across the country, such as the B13 gang in Acre and the CV's rivals in Rio de Janeiro.[35][36]

In early 2017, a series of gruesome prison riots made headlines worldwide as the PCC fought for control of the North Region against the Família do Norte (FDN), erstwhile allies with the Red Command. On January 1, dozens of PCC prisoners were massacred at the Anísio Jobim Penitentiary Complex in Manaus after a prison riot, with the PCC retaliating in prison riots in Boa Vista and in Natal in the same week. Dismemberments, beheadings and prisoners being burned alive were commonplace during all three prison riots.[37][31]

In 2020, Ryan C. Berg of the Center for Strategic International Studies reported on the importance of the Solimões River drug trade route, calling it a "Latin American Silk Road for drug trafficking" connecting Peru and Colombia to the Atlantic Ocean. The region was violently contested by the PCC, CV and FDN, as well as their local proxies, in a three-way conflict. As a result of fierce domestic competition, the PCC's overseas operations became key to its expansion, turning control over the Solimões river into a strategic objective.[38]

In 2021, the "King of the Frontier" Fahd Jamil Georges, who ruled over drug trafficking and the jogo do bicho in the Ponta Porã region for over five decades, turned himself in to authorities seeking protection, claiming that the PCC was after him.[34][39]

Over the next months, a wave of contract killings fueled fears that Paraguay might become a narcostate. In May 2022, the Paraguayan prosecutor Marcelo Pecci was shot dead while on honeymoon with his wife in Baru, a tourist island off Cartagena, Colombia. Initial investigations raised the possibility of the PCC being behind the hit, until Paraguayan and Uruguayan cartels allied to the PCC were implicated in the murder.[40] A year earlier, the mayor of Pedro Juan Caballero, José Carlos Acevedo, had also been murdered when leaving the city hall.[41][34][42]

[edit]
The Port of Santos is a key asset in the PCC's overseas expansion.

On 15 December 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions against organized crime actors worldwide such as the PCC, along with Mexican cartels and Chinese groups linked to the fentanyl trade.[43]

The PCC's deals with Western European criminal organizations, especially the 'Ndrangheta, have facilitated exports into Europe, including through West Africa, from where the group has become a central player in supplying Africa's cocaine market. The 2020 arrest of a Brazilian drug trafficker linked to the 'Ndrangheta and to senior PCC members in Maputo has also contributed to evidence that the group had been active in southern and eastern Africa for years.[3] The PCC has been noted for its ability to create ad hoc and structured business partnerships with other Brazilian groups (including private entities and the state) as well as with foreign criminal networks such as Nigerian, Cape Verdean, Mozambican, Lebanese, Russian, Italian and Eastern European mafias.[3]

By 2022, the PCC had become one of the world's most complex criminal organizations, able to operate across a spectrum of illicit supply chains including drugs, firearms, illegal gold mining[44] and vehicles.[3] Those operations are rooted in an extensive financial infrastructure that has penetrated the legal economy in businesses such as public transport, trash disposal and real estate investment[6] and that extends to legal and financial support to its members through different divisions, called sintonias. This organizational flexibility, combined with a high degree of commercial autonomy for its members, has underpinned the PCC's expansion.[3][26]

By late 2024, several investigations pointed to an increased sophistication in the group's money laundering operations and involvement with sports, including making use of online gambling websites and investing into Portuguese third division football clubs.[45][46] According to deceased PCC informant Antônio Gritzbach, Danilo Lima de Oliveira, a sports agent who took part in Emerson Royal's transfer to Barcelona FC, had been previously involved with the criminal organization.[47]

In mid-2023 and early 2024, deaths of ROTA policemen in the Baixada Santista region, considered a PCC stronghold, led the São Paulo state government to crack down on organized crime in the area.[48][49][50] In November 2023, the Brazilian Navy also took up an anti-narcotics role in the Port of Santos, employing divers and dogs in an attempt to locate drugs hidden in hard to reach places such as inside the hull in sea chests.[51] During the crackdown, the RFB also detected an increase in drug seizures on ships heading to Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia and Taiwan, determining that docked vessels with those destinations should also undergo scans for illegal narcotics. Previously, scans were only required for vessels heading to Africa and Europe.[52]

In February 2024, Brazilian media reported on a split taking place among the PCC leadership, known as the "Sintonia geral final" ("general final syntony"). Two PCC leaders, Roberto "Tiriça" Soriano and Abel "Vida Loka" Andrade ordered Marcola's death for supposedly snitching after Marcola referred to Tiriça as a "psychopath" in a recorded conversation with federal officers, due to Tiriça having ordered the death of a female federal officer, Melissa Araújo, who worked as a psychologist in a federal penitentiary, in 2017. The recording was used by the prosecution during Tiriça's trial, in which he was sentenced to 31 years in prison.[13][53] By 27 March, it was reported that Marcola's allies had quelled the insurrection within the PCC, with Tiriça and Vida Loka having been expelled, having their deaths ordered and losing ownership over cars, mansions, drug sales points and stakes in money-laundering companies. As a result, preliminary information obtained by the São Paulo Civil Police pointed to Tiriça and Vida Loka seeking the creation of a new criminal faction in São Paulo, called the Primeiro Comando Puro ("Pure First Command"), as well as seeking alliances with the CV.[53][54]

Structure

[edit]
Example of baseline PCC structure

The PCC is organized through several divisions, called "Sintonias" ("Syntonies"), each responsible for a specific subsection or region of the group's operation. At the top level, all syntonies must answer to the "Sintonia geral final" ("General final syntony"), a group of incarcerated PCC leaders to which Marcola belongs. The group's structure follows a modular design, with regional sintonias each having their own substructure.

Berg notes that the PCC's decentralized structure has enabled rapid expansion opportunities through a franchise model in which "entrepreneurial inmates" who wish to establish a local PCC branch must be baptized, abide by the group's rules and pay "union dues" to the central organization, who maintains control over the most important elements of strategy through the sintonia geral final. An emphasis on equality and on the sharing of managerial decision-making power, as well as a general readiness to assume positions of leadership, allows the organization to establish a command even without clearly defined commanders. Outside prisons, the decentralized structure helps maximize profits by enabling the PCC to have its drug trafficking network follow a consignment basis, driving down the cost as lesser gangs and individual dealers engage in competitive bidding for the right to sell PCC goods.[55]

Though often inconsistent due to the group's clandestine nature and autonomy, sources converge on a general management structure consisting of six "syntonies":[56][57][58]

Sintonia geral final

[edit]

The "Final General Syntony" is the supreme PCC leadership. All of its members, including Marcola, are incarcerated. This group maintains constant contact with several subordinate sintonias, who are in turn responsible for running the group's operations:

Sintonia dos Gravatas

[edit]

The "Syntony of the Ties" is responsible for hiring lawyers and maintaining the PCC's legal support network.

Sintonia Restrita

[edit]

The "Restricted Syntony" is akin to an intelligence agency, sintonia restrita members are responsible for the surveillance and assassination of targets marked for death by the sintonia geral final, mapping their routes and day-to-day activities before eventually conducting assassination attempts. Furthermore, the group is responsible for producing intelligence relating to the laundering, moving and safekeeping of large sums of money, having members dedicated to preparing vehicles and safehouses with that objective in mind.[59]

A technical report by the São Paulo Public Prosecutor's Office described how sintonia restrita members also employed a "sophisticated" communications network, described as a "compartmentalized closed network" where, periodically, several cellphones were acquired by the PCC and a specific person was responsible for their configuration prior to their distribution amongst sintonia restrita's members. During operations, individuals executing orders were only able to communicate with the contacts present on their phone, using end-to-end encrypted applications such as WhatsApp and Surespot.[59]

Sintonia Financeira

[edit]

The "Financial Syntony" runs the PCC's accounting, finances, and commands several subordinate sintonias responsible for all of the group's commercial operations ranging from drug sales points to marijuana and cocaine exports and lotteries, as well as the money laundering.

Sintonia do Cadastro

[edit]

The "Registration Syntony" is responsible for organizational records management. A PCC member who falls out of line, fails to communicate or pay his fees is considered "out of syntony", being expelled and added to the "Black Book". Out of syntony members are required to pay their dues until a specific deadline before being blacklisted. If blacklisted, a member is permanently expelled and marked for death by the registration syntony.[60]

Sintonia da Ajuda

[edit]

The "Help Syntony" distributes aid such as pensions and staple food.

Overseas alliances

[edit]

'Ndrangheta

[edit]
Main article: 'Ndrangheta

The 'Ndrangheta has operated in Brazil since the 1970s, but an alliance between various 'ndrine clans and the Primeiro Comando da Capital since the mid-2010s has increased the mafia's presence in the country. A reliable stream of cocaine from Brazil is crucial to the 'Ndrangheta's grip on the European cocaine market, and the alliance has enabled a massive overseas expansion for the PCC through access to different markets across Africa, Europe and Asia.[3] A share of cocaine exported by the PCC and the 'Ndrangheta moves through West Africa, and international and regional law enforcement investigations have implicated 'Ndrangheta elements in cocaine trafficking in several countries across the region, including Senegal, Niger, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. 'Ndrine clans operate in West Africa through the stable presence of individuals in certain countries, as well as through trusted brokers established through visits by 'Ndrangheta clan family members.[3][61][62]

Several important 'Ndrangheta bosses have been arrested in Brazil, such as Domenico Pelle, Nicola Assisi and Rocco Morabito.[63][64]

According to investigations, Morabito is considered one of the main associates of André Macedo Oliveira (known as "André do Rap"), considered one of the current leaders of the PCC.[65]

Hezbollah

[edit]
Main article: Hezbollah

According to the Brazilian Federal Police, the PCC maintains commercial relations with the Lebanese organization and militant group Hezbollah,[66] specifically in illegal cigarette contraband, arms trafficking and money laundering schemes. Cooperation between the two groups happens mostly in the Triple Frontier area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.[67][68]

In June 2023, the São Paulo Civil Police arrested Garip Uç, a Turkish chemist associated with Hezbollah during an operation in Praia Grande. Investigations later pointed to Moroccan hashish being imported to Brazil by a criminal network that involved the PCC, 'Ndrangheta, the Balkan Mafia and Hezbollah, by way of Barakat clan entrepreneurs who operated in the Triple Frontier.[7]

High-profile incidents

[edit]

2006 attacks

[edit]
Main article: 2006 São Paulo violence outbreak
Sites in São Paulo State attacked by PCC in 2006.

The PCC received countrywide attention with a series of attacks that took place from May 12 to May 17, 2006. The main targets were public establishments such as police stations, justice forums, buses, inter alia. The attacks took place as a response to a state government plan to transfer prisoners to a high-security prison in Presidente Venceslau and represented the bloodiest assault of its kind in the history of Brazil's richest state, São Paulo. The attacks were organized by gang members in prison via cell phone.[69]

2012 attacks

[edit]

By June 2012, another wave of attacks against the police began. On May 28, six PCC members were killed in a shootout with ROTA members. However, investigations later showed that one suspect, 31-year old Anderson Minhano, was taken from the scene alive and placed in a ROTA cruiser, where it was discovered that he was wanted for the point-blank murder of a police officer two months earlier. The PCC member was then taken to Ayrton Senna highway where he was tortured and executed on the side of the road, an action witnessed by a civilian passerby. As a result, the PCC leadership ordered retaliation against military police officers, allowing members with debts to the organization to clear their slates by murdering police officers.[70][26][71][72]

Throughout the next few months, off-duty police were targeted while driving to and from work, grocery shopping or moonlighting, and buses were set on fire. Police retaliated, with the number of killings by police increasing dramatically, as well as reports of multiple homicides at drug sale points by police vigilante groups.[26]

By December, the wave of violence had subsided. By the end of 2012, 106 police officers[73] had been killed throughout the year, with 775[74] civilians being killed as a result of police intervention, 84 of those by ROTA.[75]

2017 Paraguay heist

[edit]

In April 2017 the company Prosegur located in Ciudad del Este, in the Triple Frontier of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, was robbed by a group of at least 30 men carrying heavy firepower.[76] Early reports said 40 million dollars were stolen, although this was later revised to eight million.[77][78] The group used automatic rifles, infrared sights, anti-aircraft guns, explosives, bullet-proof getaway cars, speedboats and blocked avenues with torched cars and trucks. Locals described the heist as "movie-like".[79] Since the Modus operandi was similar to that of past robberies in Campinas, Ribeirão Preto and Santos in 2015 and 2016, the PCC was the main suspect for the heist, but this was never confirmed.[80] It was the biggest robbery in the history of Paraguay.[81] A police officer was killed and four people were injured.[82][83]

2023 foiled terror attacks

[edit]

On 22 March 2023, the Federal Police (PF) launched Operation Sequaz, which sought to apprehend 11 PCC members across four states who had planned to assassinate several Brazilian authorities, such as Senator and former Lava Jato judge Sergio Moro and São Paulo state prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya. As Minister of Justice in the Bolsonaro administration, Moro had been responsible for the transfer of Marcola and 21 other senior PCC members from state to federal penitentiaries. Incumbent Minister of Justice Flávio Dino commemorated the operation, "sending his regards to the Federal Police for their important work".[84] Brazilian President Lula da Silva questioned the operation, calling it "another one of Moro's setups".[85]

With intelligence collected during Operation Sequaz, the PF also learned that the PCC had sent a three-man team to Brasília to plan for "a mission in the Federal District". Among the cellphones of the suspects that were seized during the operation, the Federal Police found pictures of residences belonging to Arthur Lira, President of the Chamber of Deputies, and Rodrigo Pacheco, President of the Federal Senate. The leader for Moro's planned assassination, Janerson Aparecido Mariano Gomes ("Nefo"), claimed that the PCC had created a division ("sintonia", or "syntony") responsible for high-secrecy and high-risk operations in 2014, called the Sintonia Restrita ("restricted syntony"). Sintonia Restrita members would be trained by the Paraguayan People's Army and operate under direct orders from the PCC leadership, known as the Sintonia Geral Final ("general final syntony"), mainly in attacks against authorities including politicians and members of the Judiciary.[27] The planned terror attacks sought to retaliate for the 2017 prohibition of intimate visits in federal penitentiaries, as well as Law 13,964/2019, proposed by Moro. Dubbed the "anticrime package", Law 13,964 modified 14 laws and hardened the Brazilian prison system, making it harder for PCC leaderships to command gangs from inside prisons. On 19 July, the PF also found rock blasting explosives in a house belonging to PCC members in Curitiba, to be used in an attack against Moro.[27]

Statute

[edit]
Portuguese Wikisource has original text related to this article:

The Primeiro Comando da Capital has a statute with various rules for the criminal organization. Disobeying the rules, says the statute, carries a penalty of death. On May 16, 2006, a couple was arrested with a copy of the statute.[86]

Infighting

[edit]

Since February 2024, it has been widely reported in the media that the Primeiro Comando da Capital is currently in a bloody infighting between the current top leader of the PCC, Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (aka "Marcola") and five high-ranking leaders, Roberto Soriano (aka "Tiriça" or "Beto Tiriça"), Abel Pacheco de Andrade (aka "Vida Loka") and Wanderson Nilton de Paula Lima (aka "Andinho"), Daniel Vinicius Canônico (aka "Cego") and Valdeci Alves dos Santos (aka "Colorido"), since Vida Loka, Andinho, Cego and Colorido are on Tiriça's side in the bloody feud against Marcola.[87]

The reasons that led to this bloody split within the First Command of the Capital are varied, but some of the most serious are:

  • On 14 September, a dialogue was recorded between Marcola and agents inside the Federal Penitentiary of Porto Velho (RO) in which Marcola claims that Tiriça would be a “psychopath” (because Tiriça allegedly ordered the murder of 37-year-old criminal psychologist Melissa de Almeida Araújo in May 2017, in the city of Cascavel, in the state of Paraná) and which was used as evidence to sentence Tiriça to a more severe prison sentence, which led Tiriça's allies to accuse Marcola of being a traitor.[88]
  • Tiriça is very furious with Marcola for having ordered the murder of some of Tiriça's allies in recent years, such as Edilson Borges Nogueira (aka "Biroska"), Rogério Jeremias de Simone (aka "Gegê do Mangue") and Fabiano Alves de Souza (aka "Paca").
  • In retaliation for the deaths of Gegê do Mangue and Paca, a hitmen team allegedly linked to Tiriça executed with rifle shots the mastermind behind the murders of the two, Wagner Ferreira da Silva (aka "Cabelo Duro") on February 22, 2018, in front of Blue Tree Towers Anália Franco, a luxury hotel located in the city of São Paulo. It is widely believed that Cabelo Duro was ordered to kill Gegê do Mangue and Paca by Gilberto Aparecido dos Santos (aka "Fuminho"), a close ally of Marcola.[89]

As a consequence of the bloody internal conflict within the Primeiro Comando da Capital, two important allies of Marcola were murdered within weeks:

  • Donizete Apolinário da Silva (aka "Prata"), 55 years old, was shot dead on February 25, 2024, in Mauá (a city in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo) after returning from a baby shower. His pregnant 29-year-old wife and 10-year-old stepdaughter were injured in the shooting.[90]
  • Cristiano Lopes Costa (aka "Meia Folha"), 41 years old, was killed on March 12, 2024, while he was in a snack bar in Vicente de Carvalho, a district of the city of Guarujá, in Baixada Santista, São Paulo.[91]

Notable leaders and members

[edit]
  • Marco Willians Herbas Camacho, "Marcola"[Note 4][92] (Incarcerated) [93]
  • Alejandro Juvenal Herbas Camacho Júnior, "Marcolinha"[Note 5]/Little Marcola (Incarcerated)[93]
  • César Augusto Roriz Silva, "Cesinha" (Deceased)[Note 6][94]
  • Reinaldo Teixeira dos Santos, "Funchal" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Júlio César Guedes de Moraes, "Carambola" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Daniel Vinícius Canônico, "O Cego" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Márcio Luciano Neves Soares, "Pezão" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Alessandro Garcia de Jesus Rosa, "Pulft" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Lourinaldo Gomes Flor, "Lori" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Antônio José Muller Júnior, "Granada" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Lucival de Jesus Feitoza, "Val do Bristol" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Patric Velinton Salomão, "Forjado" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Fernando Gonçalves dos Santos, "Colorido" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Pedro Luiz da Silva Soares, "Chacal" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Luiz Eduardo Marcondes Machado de Barros, "Dú da Bela Vista" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • Alexandre Cardozo da Silva, "Bradok" (Incarcerated)[93]
  • André Macedo Oliveira, "André do Rap" (Fugitive)[Note 7][95][96][97]
  • Gilberto Aparecido dos Santos, "Fuminho" (Incarcerated)[98][99][100][101]
  • Idemir Carlos Ambrósio, a.k.a. "Sombra" (Deceased)[102]
  • Marcos Roberto de Almeida, "Tuta" (Fugitive)[Note 8][103]
  • Rogério Jeremias de Simone, "Gegê do Mangue" (Deceased)[104]
  • Fabiano Alves de Souza, "Paca" (Deceased)[104]
  • Wagner Ferreira da Silva, "Cabelo Duro" (Deceased)[Note 9][105][106]
  • Marcio Vinicius da Paixão Vieira, "Pica-Pau" (Incarcerated)[Note 10][107]
[edit]

In the HBO series Pico da Neblina and in the Netflix series Sintonia, some characters have criminal activities based on PCC.

The Netflix series Irmandade is about a prison crime organization based on PCC.

Notes

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See also

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Primeiro Comando da Capital

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The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), also known as the First Capital Command, is a Brazilian criminal organization founded in within São Paulo's prison system as a group in response to the October 1992 Carandiru massacre, during which killed 111 inmates. Initially focused on prisoner rights and resistance to perceived state brutality, the PCC developed a horizontal, consensus-based structure governed by internal statutes that prioritize discipline, mutual protection, and profit-sharing from illicit activities. It has since expanded into one of Brazil's dominant factions, controlling drug trafficking networks from production in and through São Paulo ports to international markets, including and , while enforcing territorial monopolies that have empirically reduced rates in controlled areas by curbing rival violence. Key events include the coordinated attacks on police and , which killed dozens and highlighted the group's capacity to mobilize thousands of affiliates against state forces. Despite lacking a centralized hierarchy, the PCC operates with mafia-like efficiency, funding operations through exports estimated in billions annually and maintaining influence over prisons nationwide.

Origins

Founding and Initial Objectives

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) emerged in August 1993 within Taubaté prison in São Paulo state, Brazil, as a direct reaction to the systemic brutality of the state's penitentiary system, exemplified by the Carandiru prison massacre on October 2, 1992, in which military police killed 111 inmates during a riot suppression. Eight prisoners transferred to Taubaté in the massacre's aftermath took the lead in forming the group, drawing from experiences of overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, routine torture by guards, and unchecked violence among inmates. The PCC's initial objectives focused on self-protection and mutual defense, aiming to shield members from reprisals by prison authorities, police, and rival factions while establishing internal rules to curb abuses like and within the inmate population. It sought justice for Carandiru victims and broader prison reforms to end arbitrary punishments and improve living conditions, positioning itself as a to state-imposed rather than an external criminal enterprise. Expressing ideological alignment with the Rio de Janeiro-based , the PCC adopted its slogan of "peace, , and ," framing its efforts as a against the capitalist system and the dehumanizing prison regime. This foundational emphasized collective solidarity and orderly conduct among members, with early statutes prohibiting internal betrayals and promoting equitable resource sharing to foster stability amid chaos.

Early Prison Conflicts and Consolidation

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) originated on August 31, 1993, when eight inmates at the prison's "Piranhão" annex formed the group to protest harsh prison conditions and demand reforms following the October 1992 Carandiru massacre, where state forces killed 111 prisoners. Early efforts focused on internal discipline, with members targeting assassinations of the most violent and feared inmates in to neutralize threats and secure allegiance from the broader prison population, establishing the PCC as a stabilizing force amid chaos. Unlike prior prison factions reliant on pervasive violence for dominance, the PCC enforced a strict estatuto—a of 16 articles prohibiting internal betrayals, drug use within ranks, and gratuitous conflicts—reserving lethal force for exceptional cases like defiance or with authorities, which fostered through predictable order rather than . This approach enabled gradual expansion via inmate transfers across São Paulo's penitentiary system during the , as protected members recruited others by offering collective defense against guard abuses and rival predation. Consolidation accelerated amid leadership transitions and coordinated actions. In July 2001, internal rifts led to the killing of co-founder Idemir Carlos Ambrósio (Sombra) during a factional dispute in , highlighting early power struggles. That same year, the PCC orchestrated uprisings in 29 São Paulo state facilities, holding hostages and issuing demands for better conditions, which demonstrated unified command and control over disparate prison units without widespread anarchy. Under emerging leader Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (), who assumed dominance post-2002 by expelling original figures like Geleião and Cesinha for ideological deviations, the group shifted toward pragmatic criminal governance, solidifying hegemony in state by prioritizing operational efficiency over purely political rhetoric.

Expansion Phases

Domestic Growth and Drug Market Dominance

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) transitioned from prison-based operations to broader domestic influence in the early 2000s, using its control over São Paulo's penitentiary system—encompassing 90% of state prisons—to orchestrate street-level activities through affiliated networks known as sintonias. By 2001, this enabled coordinated rebellions across 29 facilities, resulting in 16 deaths and reinforcing internal discipline via a strict called proceder. The PCC's street expansion accelerated following state crackdowns, culminating in the May 2006 Levante attacks, a synchronized wave of violence across São Paulo that killed over 500 civilians and police officers, exposing command over thousands of external operatives and paralyzing urban infrastructure. This event marked a pivotal consolidation, allowing the group to extend into peripheral neighborhoods and favelas, where it entered roughly 510 communities between February 2005 and September 2009, with entries surging post-2006. Prison transfers to other states further propagated influence, establishing dominance in facilities across Paraná, , and by the late 2000s. In the drug market, the PCC achieved retail dominance in São Paulo's favelas by imposing exclusive distribution monopolies, eliminating intra-favela rivals and channeling wholesale supplies from border routes like the Rota Caipira. This structure suppressed unauthorized violence, reducing overall crime rates in controlled areas by 9.7% to 16.3%, as the group mediated disputes ranging from drug sales to petty theft, functioning as a parallel authority. By the 2010s, the PCC controlled up to 60% of Brazil's trade, deriving primary revenue from domestic retail points while overseeing logistics through Santos port, where seizures represented 25% of national totals in 2019 (105 tons). Membership tripled to approximately 30,000 between 2015 and 2017, underpinning nationwide expansion while maintaining as its core, where it regulated even non-drug conflicts to preserve operational stability.

International Reach and Diversification

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has expanded its operations transnationally since the early , transitioning from a primarily domestic prison-based network to a sophisticated criminal enterprise with footholds in , , , and the . In neighboring , the PCC has consolidated control over cocaine production and export routes, exploiting the country's porous s and growing role as a hub for processing Bolivian paste into destined for European markets; by 2023, Paraguayan authorities linked PCC affiliates to multiple labs and trafficking cells near the Brazilian . Similar incursions occurred in and , where PCC operatives hijacked small aircraft in 2023–2024 to transport loads directly from remote airstrips, bypassing ground routes vulnerable to . This regional dominance stems from strategic alliances with local gangs and investments in , enabling the PCC to source over 70% of its cocaine from South American producers before shipment abroad. Further afield, the PCC has penetrated European markets by leveraging ports in , , and the as entry points for multi-ton cocaine consignments, with shipments increasing amid Europe's rising demand; Portuguese seizures in 2024 traced over 10 tons to PCC-linked vessels from and . In , transit hubs like serve as reloading points for onward delivery to , while in the United States, PCC members established cells by 2024 to launder proceeds through and facilitate arms back to , evading domestic crackdowns. Overall, federal police assessments indicate PCC operations spanned 28 countries by mid-2025, supported by a decentralized structure of "contractors" numbering around 60,000 globally. Diversification beyond core trafficking includes arms procurement, via cryptocurrencies and front businesses, and rackets in communities abroad, reducing reliance on volatile drug routes. A 2025 Brazilian investigation into PCC financier Ruy Ferraz Fontes revealed expanded portfolios in legitimate markets like for laundering, following his assassination amid internal purges over these ventures. In , PCC groups branched into illicit logging and by 2024 to generate supplementary funds and launder drug profits, mirroring tactics in Brazil's Amazon frontiers. These adaptations reflect pragmatic responses to enforcement pressures, prioritizing resilience through multi-modal revenue streams over singular geographic monopolies.

Adaptation to State Responses

In response to state efforts to disrupt its operations through prison leader transfers in the early , the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) strengthened alliances with other criminal groups and expanded its influence beyond prisons, forging a more networked structure that facilitated nationwide growth. This adaptation proved resilient, as evidenced by the PCC's coordinated response to further transfers in February 2006, when it orchestrated attacks across over 70 s and more than 150 killings in , paralyzing public infrastructure and compelling temporary state negotiations on prison conditions. Post-2006, the PCC evolved tactically to counter intensified state repression, including operations like in 2016 and federal penitentiary transfers of leaders such as Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho () in 2019, by decentralizing command through autonomous "" cells that coordinated prison-to-street activities via smuggled cell phones and written messages, minimizing vulnerability to decapitation strikes. Membership surged from approximately 8,000 in 2012 to 32,000 by 2018 across all 26 Brazilian states, with one-third remaining in São Paulo, underscoring the limits of state isolation tactics. The group also dispersed financial operations into mutual aid networks among members, evading asset seizures that totaled R$2.68 billion () between 2010 and 2019. To mitigate domestic pressures from localized policing and —Brazil's facilities operating at 174% capacity—the PCC pursued since the mid-2000s, establishing presences in 16 countries by 2020, including recruitment of ex-FARC dissidents for drug routes from , , and to via Brazilian ports like Santos. In , PCC membership reached 500 by 2012, enabling a 2020 breakout of 75 inmates and diversification into new smuggling corridors, such as routes organized via . This outward shift reduced reliance on São Paulo, where the PCC strategically curtailed overt violence to preserve drug trade stability, contributing to a rate drop to 10 per 100,000 by 2017 despite ongoing territorial control. Further adaptations included selective alliances, such as with the Guardiões do Estado group in to counter rivals, and a business-oriented prioritizing —estimated at R$200–300 million (US$50–80 million) annually from drugs—over provocation, allowing survival amid federal intercepts and expulsions of dissenting leaders like Tiriça and Vida Loka by 2024. These measures have sustained PCC dominance, even as state responses like 2023 firearm restrictions under President Lula da Silva prompted further route diversification to and direct European outposts, with around 1,000 affiliates in .

Organizational Framework

Hierarchical Command Structure

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) maintains a command structure that combines centralized top-level authority with decentralized operational cells, enabling both strategic coordination and local autonomy. At the apex is the Sintonia Final Geral, the highest command body comprising approximately 12 key leaders, many of whom are incarcerated, responsible for overarching decisions on finances, discipline, and expansion. , known as "Marcola," serves as the primary leader since assuming a prominent role in 1999, directing activities from prison through compartmentalized layers that include , drug , and . This upper echelon oversees a network of sintonias, functional commissions that handle specific domains rather than enforcing rigid vertical control at street levels. These include the Sintonia da Disciplina for internal , Sintonia Financeira for monetary oversight, and Sintonia do Progresso for drug trafficking operations, with monthly dues—approximately R$800 per member in —funding , weapons, and family support. The structure features administrative sintonias like Sintonia do Cadastro for membership tracking via detailed ledgers, and prisoner-focused ones such as Sintonia das Gravatas for legal representation, promoting institutionalization over . Lower tiers operate through autonomous núcleos or cells, comprising small groups of members, associates, and kin engaged in localized crimes like retail and arms handling, with limited direct oversight to mitigate disruptions. hierarchies reinforce this, with roles such as faxinas for maintenance, pilotos for coordination, and torres for security, extending influence via transferred inmates acting as regional ambassadors. This layered, semi-military framework, evolved since the PCC's founding in 1993, balances discipline—enforced by "salves" or communiqués—with flexibility, allowing adaptation across and into 11 other Latin American countries by the late .

Key Operational Divisions

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) structures its operations through specialized units called sintonias, which function as semi-autonomous cells handling distinct aspects of criminal activities, logistics, and internal governance. These thematic sintonias operate under the oversight of higher command bodies like the Sintonia Geral Final (SGF), enabling decentralized execution while maintaining centralized strategic control. This division of labor enhances operational efficiency and resilience against disruptions. Key thematic sintonias include the Sintonia do Progresso, which coordinates drug trafficking by managing supply chains, point-of-sale operations (known as fms), and distribution networks across neighborhoods (ruas). The Sintonia Financeira oversees revenue collection, including mandatory member dues (cebola), financial flows from illicit activities, and basic to sustain the organization's coffers. Support-oriented units such as the Sintonia dos Gravatas procure and fund legal representation for incarcerated members, while the Sintonia da Ajuda provides welfare assistance to prisoners' families, fostering loyalty and . Operational logistics are handled by sintonias like the Paiol, responsible for weapons procurement and armories, and the Restrita, which directs military-style actions including attacks on or state targets during escalations. Human resources fall under the Sintonia do Cadastro, maintaining member registries, vetting recruits, and enforcing disciplinary codes to track an estimated network exceeding affiliates nationwide. Other specialized cells manage (Cigarro), marijuana (Bob), and (100%) distribution, reflecting the PCC's emphasis on commoditized drug markets. These divisions adapt dynamically, with roles rotating based on member reliability, though internal rifts—such as leadership expulsions in 2024—have occasionally strained coordination.

Criminal Enterprises

Drug Trafficking Operations

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) generates its primary revenue through cocaine trafficking, estimated at approximately $1 billion annually, primarily via international exports from Brazil. The organization dominates wholesale and retail distribution within São Paulo state, enforcing a near-monopoly on drug sales in favelas and urban peripheries since consolidating power in the early 2000s, which reduced local violence by regulating market competition. Sourcing occurs mainly from coca production regions in Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay, where PCC operatives purchase cocaine at $1,200–$1,800 per kilogram before transporting it to Brazilian processing labs or directly to export points. Domestically, PCC operations extend to marijuana cultivation and distribution in the Amazon region, where it contests routes with rivals like , leading to clashes such as those in northern in 2016 over smuggling paths. The group maintains control through a network of affiliated factions handling , enforcement, and , often imposing "taxes" on smaller dealers to fund operations. trafficking remains marginal compared to , with PCC focusing on synthetics sporadically but prioritizing high-margin flows. Internationally, PCC facilitates exports via maritime routes from ports like Santos, concealing multi-ton shipments in shipping containers bound for and since the mid-2000s. Key corridors include trans-Atlantic paths to as a transit hub before onward movement to , and the Lusophone route via and , leveraging linguistic and logistical ties. is sold in for up to €35,000 per (reaching €80,000 in markets like ), yielding multimillion-dollar monthly profits. Methods emphasize containerized shipping and alliances with groups like Italy's for secure transshipment, as evidenced by joint operations uncovered in the early 2010s. Brazilian authorities reported heightened seizures at Santos port in 2023–2024, attributing surges to PCC's expanding influence, including over 1 ton intercepted in single hauls linked to the group.

Other Illicit Activities

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) engages in rackets targeting businesses, prisons, and communities in and beyond, often enforcing payments through threats of violence or service disruptions. In controlled territories, the group has established monopolies over utilities such as internet services, , and public transportation, demanding tribute from operators in exchange for "." These activities generate steady streams supplementary to core operations, with PCC enforcing compliance via its prison-based networks that extend influence outside incarceration facilities. PCC operatives facilitate arms trafficking, sourcing weapons domestically and internationally to arm affiliates and support territorial disputes. Federal Police operations in Paraná state, a key corridor for contraband, have linked PCC cells to smuggling firearms alongside other goods, underscoring the group's role in arming Brazil's criminal ecosystem. A 2021 joint U.S.-Brazilian effort disrupted PCC-linked arms flows tied to narcotics distribution in Rio de Janeiro's Rocinha favela, highlighting the integration of weapons procurement with broader illicit logistics. Money laundering constitutes a critical PCC function, with operatives converting and proceeds through low-tech methods like cash-intensive businesses and . A Brazilian court documented one PCC figure laundering 1.2 billion reals (approximately $240 million USD) via layered financial schemes, prompting U.S. Treasury sanctions in March 2024. Such operations enable capital recirculation into expansion efforts, including prison infrastructure and external alliances. The PCC pioneered specialized syndicates in , executing high-profile heists that rival international standards in and yield. In December 2023, PCC-affiliated robbers conducted the nation's largest armed in , Santa Catarina, stealing 125 million reals ($23 million USD) from multiple vaults using coordinated tactics inspired by cinematic depictions. These "Novo " style operations, involving elite crews with engineering and explosives expertise, have included vehicle theft and cloning for logistics, as seen in pre-heist preparations documented in congressional inquiries. Robberies fund PCC , reducing reliance on volatile street-level . Additional ventures include prostitution rings in peripheral regions like indigenous territories, where PCC exploits vulnerabilities for sexual exploitation alongside resource crimes. The group also dabbles in contraband of non-drug goods, such as and cigarettes, leveraging border routes in states like Paraná. These diversified rackets, while secondary to primary revenue sources, enhance PCC resilience against pressures by spreading operational risks.

Alliances and Partnerships

Ties with Italian Mafia Groups

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has established operational alliances with Italy's 'Ndrangheta mafia primarily through the transatlantic trade, where the PCC supplies large quantities of from Brazilian ports and South American production hubs, while the 'Ndrangheta manages importation and distribution networks in . These partnerships emerged in the late 2000s and intensified by the , enabling the PCC to export multi-ton shipments annually, with the 'Ndrangheta leveraging its entrenched European logistics to minimize risks for both groups by segregating control over respective trafficking segments. Evidence of these ties includes repeated arrests of 'Ndrangheta operatives in facilitating procurement deals, such as brokers negotiating directly with PCC-linked suppliers for volumes destined for Italian ports like , a key 'Ndrangheta stronghold. In 2021, Brazilian authorities captured Italian mafia figure Rocco Morabito, linked to 'Ndrangheta routes from , highlighting overlapping supply chains that suggest tacit agreements between the groups for mutual benefit in evading interdiction. Further, joint investigations have uncovered PCC involvement in laundering proceeds from these trades through European financial channels controlled by Italian syndicates, though the relationship remains pragmatic and non-hierarchical, focused on profit division rather than territorial overlap. These connections have drawn international scrutiny, with operations like Brazil's 2024 arrests of suspects in Italy-linked rings underscoring the PCC's role as a pivotal South American supplier to European mafias, contributing to Europe's record inflows exceeding 1,000 tons annually by the early . While no formal merger exists, the alliance exemplifies how prison-originated groups like the PCC have professionalized into global players by partnering with established mafias, prioritizing reliability in high-volume drug flows over confrontation.

Connections to Middle Eastern Networks

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has been linked to Hezbollah operatives primarily through Brazilian Federal Police investigations into drug trafficking and arms procurement. These connections involve Lebanese traffickers affiliated with Hezbollah facilitating the PCC's acquisition of weapons and the sale of explosives, as detailed in federal police documents reported in 2014. Such ties reportedly enable the PCC to access restricted materiel for its operations in Brazil and beyond, though these allegations stem from intercepted communications and intelligence rather than public convictions. In the realm of narcotics, the PCC's cocaine export networks have intersected with Hezbollah-linked cells in , where the latter launder funds through illicit trade routes overlapping with Brazilian syndicates. Brazilian authorities have documented joint ventures in toward and the , leveraging Hezbollah's established maritime and financial conduits. These partnerships are opportunistic, driven by mutual interests in evading , but evidence remains circumstantial, based on patterns in seized shipments and debriefs rather than direct organizational mergers. Broader Middle Eastern crime syndicates beyond show no verified PCC affiliations in available intelligence; Iranian state proxies operate indirectly via Hezbollah proxies, but PCC engagements appear confined to this Shia militant network's commercial arms. These links raise concerns, as Hezbollah's ideological motivations could exploit PCC logistics for non-criminal ends, though no such escalations have materialized publicly as of 2023. Brazilian officials classify these interactions as criminal rather than terroristic, limiting formal designations and prosecutions.

Relations with Domestic Rivals

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) achieved dominance within São Paulo's prison system by systematically eliminating or absorbing rival factions during the 1990s, including through targeted assassinations of key figures in facilities like prison, which solidified its hierarchical control and reduced intra-state competition. By the early 2000s, internal dissidents formed splinter groups such as the Terceiro Comando Capital (TCC) after expulsions of leaders like Geleião and Cesinha, but these remained marginal and were largely subdued. Nationally, the PCC's primary domestic rival has been the Rio de Janeiro-based (CV), with conflicts escalating as both vied for control of drug trafficking corridors, particularly in the Amazon region and northern states. A longstanding truce between the groups, lasting approximately 20 years until late 2016, broke down amid disputes over smuggling routes, triggering widespread that resulted in hundreds of deaths across facilities in states like Amazonas and . Key incidents included the January 1, 2017, riot at ' Instituto Penal de Monte Cristo, where PCC inmates killed 56 members of the allied Família do Norte (FDN)—a CV proxy—through beheadings and dismemberments, and a January 6, 2017, clash in Roraima's Agricultural Penitentiary of Monte Cristo, where PCC-affiliated prisoners executed 33 rivals, many by or evisceration. These events spilled into street-level turf wars, with PCC challenging CV in Rio and allied factions like the Pure Third Command (TCP) gaining ground against CV in contested areas. Tensions persisted into the 2020s, punctuated by opportunistic alliances; for instance, PCC supported CV adversaries such as militias and TCP in Rio favelas while co-opting CV members in drug zones. In February 2025, PCC leader Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho () and CV leader Márcio dos Santos Nepomuceno (Marcinho VP) brokered a top-down truce from maximum-security prisons to curb violence, facilitate joint route control (e.g., the Caipira and Solimões paths), and ease prison restrictions, following negotiations initiated in 2019. However, the agreement collapsed by April 28, 2025, after less than three months, undermined by structural mismatches—PCC's centralized command versus CV's decentralized franchises—and localized rejections, particularly in where CV cells in cities like Ubatã and Jequié resumed hostilities. This led to renewed clashes in , , and , though temporary reductions occurred in Acre and during the truce period, highlighting how bottom-up factional disputes often override national pacts.

Governance and Internal Rules

Statutory Principles and Discipline

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) maintains internal cohesion through its foundational Estatuto do PCC, a bylaws document originating from the organization's establishment in 1993 at , which articulates principles of liberdade (liberty), justiça (justice), and paz (peace) as countermeasures to state in Brazil's system. The statute, comprising approximately 18 articles, mandates unwavering loyalty, respect, and solidarity among members toward the "Party" (a self-referential term for the PCC), while prohibiting internal divisions, personal debts between affiliates, and actions that invite excessive state intervention, such as uncontrolled violence or drug use in operational contexts. These principles prioritize collective welfare over individual gain, requiring support for imprisoned members through , financial contributions, and coordinated resistance, with the explicit goal of reforming conditions nationwide. Enforcement of these statutes relies on a decentralized disciplinary apparatus, including "disciplinas"—dedicated units of members tasked with mediating disputes, conducting internal audits, and adjudicating violations through structured "debates" akin to trials. Rules extend beyond members to populations in PCC-dominated areas, banning , intra-group , and child exploitation, with violations triggering graduated punishments: minor infractions like poor conduct may warrant "toaladas" (beatings with wet towels) or reassignment within facilities, while severe breaches such as , unauthorized killings, or cooperation with authorities often result in permanent expulsion ("exílio") or execution, sometimes decided by consensus among affected parties. This rigorous code, adapted from earlier groups like , has enabled the PCC to supplant chaotic prison violence with a bureaucratic order, collecting "dues" (e.g., via "rifa" lotteries or "cebola" debt systems) to fund operations and legitimacy efforts, thereby minimizing conflicts that could provoke crackdowns. The emphasis on fosters a merit-based where advancement depends on adherence rather than raw , with local affiliates required to affirm through "" rituals and remit portions of illicit revenues to central . Breaches undermine this system, as seen in cases where leaders face the same tribunals as rank-and-file members, reinforcing mutual . Over time, this framework has evolved to regulate not only prisons but also street-level activities, mediating civilian disputes to project and sustain territorial control without excessive bloodshed.

Informal Justice System

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) maintains an informal justice system to enforce discipline among its members, resolving internal disputes and infractions through structured proceedings known as debates or disciplinas. These mechanisms originated in São Paulo's prisons during the late , evolving from the need to regulate behavior in overcrowded facilities where state authority was minimal. Designated PCC affiliates, often senior imprisoned figures coordinated via sintonias (regional committees), adjudicate cases, drawing on the organization's Estatuto do PCC—a codified set of approximately 45 rules that prioritize , mutual , and collective while prohibiting , , , use by members, and unauthorized violence against affiliates. Disciplinary proceedings emphasize procedural fairness, including witness testimonies, defendant defenses, and opportunities for appeals to higher sintonias. Violations are categorized by severity, with enforcement relying on meticulous recordkeeping in internal ledgers termed "criminal criminal records," which document members' histories, debts, and prior sanctions. Common infractions handled include interpersonal debts (e.g., one 2016 case involving 2,000 Brazilian reais or approximately $600 owed, and another 27,000 reais or $8,200), within the group, domestic squabbles, and breaches of operational quotas like rifa ( contributions) or cebola (onion-shaped tithes on drug sales). Punishments are predominantly nonviolent and graduated to incentivize compliance without disrupting operations: short suspensions of 15-20 days predominate for minor offenses, escalating to 90-day isolations, permanent expulsions, or territorial banishment for repeated or grave violations under a "three strikes" policy for issues like debt default. Physical penalties, such as execution, are exceptional; analysis of seized PCC documents from September 2011 to October 2012 recorded 203 sanctions, with only one resulting in death, reflecting a strategic aversion to intra-group killings that could provoke retaliation or erode cohesion. Flexibility is applied in cases of external setbacks, such as arrests impeding debt repayment, to preserve long-term adherence. This system extends beyond prisons to street-level operations in PCC-dominated favelas, mediating not only member conflicts but also tensions with rival groups or external actors, thereby regulating and projecting legitimacy. Empirical from confiscated records indicate it supports order by stigmatizing offenders and tying sanctions to transparent norms, contributing to broader reductions in homicides—such as an 83% decline in São Paulo's peripheral areas from 65 per 100,000 in 1999 to 10.6 per 100,000 in 2016—while funding welfare provisions like visitation (costing around 85,000 reais monthly).

Major Violent Episodes

2006 São Paulo Attacks

The 2006 São Paulo attacks consisted of a coordinated wave of violence initiated by the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) against state authorities, beginning on May 12, 2006. The immediate trigger was the transfer of high-ranking PCC members, including leaders, to remote maximum-security prisons as part of a government effort to disrupt the organization's internal command structure and reduce its influence within the prison system. These transfers, involving over 700 inmates, were perceived by the PCC as an aggressive state intervention, prompting a retaliatory strategy planned from within prisons to paralyze public order in São Paulo state. From May 12 to May 19, PCC inmates seized control of more than 70 prisons, initiating riots, taking guards and staff hostage, and coordinating external operations through smuggled communications. Outside the facilities, PCC operatives executed 293 attacks targeting police stations, courthouses, public buses, and other symbols of authority, including arson on dozens of vehicles and drive-by shootings against law enforcement. The assaults effectively disrupted transportation and commerce, confining millions of residents indoors and exposing the PCC's capacity for synchronized urban warfare despite incarcerated leadership. Casualties mounted rapidly, with at least 150 people killed during the initial phase, including 31 police officers, 8 prison agents, and several civilians or targeted attacks. By May 17, the death toll exceeded 115, encompassing security personnel, attackers, and bystanders, though subsequent police countermeasures contributed to higher overall figures through reported reprisals and intensified patrols. The PCC's actions demonstrated its operational resilience, leveraging prison-based networks to project power externally, while underscoring systemic and corruption that facilitated such coordination. State response involved deploying thousands of to quell the unrest, restoring order by late May but at the cost of allegations of excessive force and extrajudicial executions, with civilian deaths from surging in the following months. The episode marked a pivotal escalation in PCC-state antagonism, affirming the group's role as a parallel authority capable of challenging governmental in .

2012 Escalations

In late 2012, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) orchestrated a sustained campaign of targeted assassinations against police officers in São Paulo state, marking a significant escalation in hostilities between the organization and law enforcement. This undeclared war, believed to stem from PCC retaliation against intensified police operations and arrests of key members, resulted in the deaths of over 100 police officers throughout the year, with a sharp spike in October and November. The violence peaked in a two-week period in early November, claiming at least 140 lives, including civilians caught in crossfire or reprisal killings. Orders for the attacks were primarily issued from within prisons, where incarcerated PCC leaders exploited smuggled cell phones to coordinate hits on officers via street-level affiliates. Victims included on-duty and off-duty personnel, with ambushes occurring in urban neighborhoods and even residential areas; for instance, on November 9, 2012, at least 13 additional deaths were reported in a single day of clashes, pushing the toll from recent weeks beyond 130. The PCC's strategy emphasized psychological intimidation, aiming to deter aggressive policing and assert control over territories dominated by its drug trafficking networks. São Paulo authorities attributed the surge to the PCC's organizational discipline, which enabled rapid mobilization of hitmen armed with handguns and automatic weapons. State responses involved heightened patrols, intelligence operations targeting PCC communications in prisons, and temporary restrictions on police leave, though the violence exposed vulnerabilities in officer protection and prison oversight. By year's end, the rate for police had risen nearly 40 percent from 2011, underscoring the PCC's capacity to wage against the state while minimizing direct confrontations. This episode contrasted with the more indiscriminate 2006 attacks by focusing on selective eliminations, reflecting the PCC's evolution toward mafia-like precision in enforcing its code against perceived threats.

Cross-Border Operations like 2017 Paraguay Heist

On April 24, 2017, approximately 40 to 60 heavily armed assailants launched a coordinated assault on the Prosegur armored transport company's offices in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, a city adjacent to the Brazilian border in the Triple Frontier region. The robbers, using automatic rifles, grenades, and explosives including dynamite, first attacked a nearby police station to divert authorities, killing one officer and injuring others, before breaching the Prosegur facility by blasting through armored doors and vault walls. They escaped with an estimated $40 million in cash—later revised by Prosegur to about $11.7 million—loading it into five armored vehicles and fleeing across the Friendship Bridge into Brazil, where they dispersed the loot and vehicles. The operation resulted in four deaths, including two Prosegur guards, and was dubbed the "heist of the century" by Paraguayan officials due to its scale and military precision. Brazilian authorities attributed the robbery to the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), identifying participants including Luciano Castro de Oliveira, alias "Zequinha," a confirmed PCC member arrested shortly after in Brazil's Paraná state alongside 13 others. Investigations revealed the gang's use of cross-border logistics, with robbers entering Paraguay from Brazil and leveraging the porous Triple Frontier for escape and laundering. This heist exemplified PCC's expansion beyond Brazil, exploiting weak border controls for high-value thefts to fund narcotics operations. Beyond the 2017 incident, PCC has conducted similar cross-border activities, including arms and trafficking routes through and . In , the group maintains logistical hubs for transporting Bolivian northward to Brazilian ports, often clashing with rivals over border territories. Operations in involve securing production and transit points, with PCC cells coordinating shipments via Paraguay's riverine and land corridors, as evidenced by multi-ton seizures linked to in the region. These efforts reflect PCC's strategic use of neighboring states' instability to diversify revenue streams, with serving as a key node for both violent extractions and sustained networks.

Recent Foiled Plots and 2023-2025 Incidents

In March 2023, Brazilian Federal Police launched Operation Sequaz to dismantle a PCC-orchestrated plot targeting high-profile authorities, including Senator and prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya, alongside plans for homicides, for , and an attempt to rescue imprisoned PCC leader Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (Marcola). The operation executed 11 arrest warrants (seven preventive and four temporary) and 24 search warrants across four states, resulting in the capture of nine PCC members; authorities seized jewelry, a luxury vehicle, and cash, while evidence showed surveillance of Moro's family in since January 2023 using nearby rented properties. In January 2025, a federal judge convicted eight of the plotters on charges including through kidnapping, noting the plan's intent to execute Moro had been thwarted only by intervention. On October 24, 2025, authorities foiled another PCC assassination scheme led by the group's elite intelligence unit, Sintonia Restrita, which targeted prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya—known for probing PCC finances—and prison system coordinator Roberto Medina, involving surveillance via a dedicated house, drone, , and even a for monitoring. The plot, ordered through PCC's internal "" decree (a binding command), aimed to eliminate officials obstructing faction operations; investigators arrested suspects including key operative VH (alias Falcão), disrupting the cell's tactics derived from prior failed efforts like a 2018 rescue involving mercenaries and helicopters. Sintonia Restrita, subordinate to the PCC's top Sintonia Final leadership, specializes in such targeted killings using heavy weaponry and has executed past hits, including state agent Henry Charles Gama Filho in 2017. Beyond foiled schemes, PCC-linked violence persisted through 2023-2025, including the June 2025 threat by a PCC-affiliated inmate to assassinate Governor , intercepted by prosecutors amid escalating faction pressure on state officials. In October 2024, a PCC subgroup killed four police officers along the coastline, part of broader retaliatory actions against . The faction culminated a 15-year vendetta in 2025 by executing retired police delegate Ruy Ferraz Fontes, a former anti-PCC operations chief, with arrests of nine suspects by October 25 confirming PCC orchestration; this hit underscored the group's infiltration and use of persistent targeting against perceived threats.

Leadership Dynamics

Prominent Figures

Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, known as , born in 1968 in to a Bolivian father and Brazilian mother, serves as the PCC's maximum leader, exerting influence from where he is serving sentences exceeding 200 years for crimes including drug trafficking and orchestrating violence. Orphaned young and initiated into crime as a petty thief—earning his alias from inhaling glue—he joined the PCC in the , rising to lead it around through strategic expansion into drug and arms networks rather than brute force alone. Key actions under his direction include a 1999 bank heist netting 32 million reais (approximately $18.3 million at the time) and the 2006 attacks, which caused over 150 deaths amid coordinated breaks and urban assaults. The PCC maintains a collegial yet hierarchical leadership via the Sintonia Final Geral (General High Command), a small of "sintas" advising on operations funded by trafficking proceeds used for legal defenses, bribes, weapons, and drugs. As of 2025, Marcola's inner circle includes figures like Cláudio Barbará da Silva (Barbará), Reinaldo Teixeira dos Santos (Funchal), Antônio José Muller (Granada), Eric Oliveira Farias (Eric Gordão), Márcio Luciano Neves Soares (Pezão), and Júlio César Guedes de Moraes (Julinho Carambola), who filled vacancies after purges. Internal tensions peaked in 2024 when a leaked recording exposed rifts, leading to the expulsion of high-ranking sintas (Tiriça), Abel Pacheco (Vida Loka), and Wanderson Nilton de Paula Lima (Andinho) for alleged disloyalty and psychopathic tendencies; Marcola's faction marked them for elimination while securing loyalty from most field operatives. These ousters underscore Marcola's enduring dominance despite isolation tactics like transfers to federal facilities in 2019, though earlier founding sintas such as José Marcio Felicio (Geleião) and César Augusto Roriz da Silva (Cesinha) had been expelled years prior for similar fractures.

Infighting and Power Struggles

Despite its emphasis on internal discipline and collective governance, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has experienced notable power struggles, often resolved through expulsions and targeted killings to maintain hierarchical control. In 2002, founding leaders José Márcio Felício ("Geleião") and César Augusto Roriz da Silva ("Cesinha") were expelled amid disputes over command, leading them to form the rival Terceiro Comando da Capital (TCC); this purge allowed ("Marcola") to consolidate authority within the PCC. The most severe internal crisis erupted in 2024, triggered by a leaked recording in which labeled ("Tiriça") a "psychopath," escalating tensions among high-ranking members. Tiriça, alongside Abel de ("Vida Loka") and Wanderson Nilton de Paula Lima ("Andinho"), demanded Marcola's removal from leadership, prompting the PCC's general command to expel the trio for slander and treason, issuing orders for their elimination. On February 25, 2024, Donizete Apolinário da Silva ("Prata"), a Marcola ally, was assassinated in Mauá, , allegedly on orders from the dissidents, sparking street-level violence and rumors of a broader rift. Although the 2024 schism represented the PCC's deepest division in three decades—according to São Paulo prosecutors—the organization's rigid and franchise-like facilitated containment, with leadership prioritizing the elimination of challengers to preserve unity, as seen in prior purges during crises in 2006, 2012, and 2018. By mid-2025, the conflict remained unresolved, with Tiriça and Vida Loka formally expelled and retaining significant support from street-level operators despite questions over his authority from some prison-based leaders. Analysts assess that such infighting, while disruptive, rarely fractures the PCC's over 30,000-member network due to its emphasis on loyalty and swift internal justice over personal ambitions.

Societal and Political Ramifications

Claims of Order and Violence Regulation

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) originated in 1993 following the prison massacre, positioning itself as a response to state-perpetrated abuses and arbitrary violence within Brazil's correctional system, with its foundational estatuto outlining rules to enforce internal discipline and curtail unchecked killings among inmates. The organization's bylaws explicitly prohibit unauthorized lethal violence, mandating collective approval for disciplinary actions and emphasizing mediation through "sintonias" (coordinating bodies) to resolve disputes, thereby claiming to supplant chaotic environments with a structured . This self-proclaimed regulatory framework extends to prohibiting practices like and debt-related within controlled facilities, purportedly fostering safer visitation conditions for families and reducing overall mortality rates post-consolidation in the early . In favelas and peripheral territories under PCC influence, the group asserts a monopoly on force to regulate the drug trade, imposing taxes on traffickers and intermediaries while suppressing intra-gang conflicts that could escalate into broader turf wars, which proponents attribute to lower baseline levels compared to rival faction zones. Empirical analyses, such as those examining São Paulo's decline from 2001 onward, estimate that PCC dominance contributed to roughly 7% of reductions in areas by centralizing authority and minimizing disorganized vendettas, akin to patterns observed in mafia-governed regions elsewhere. However, this "order" relies on selective enforcement, where violations of PCC edicts—such as collaborating with police or rival groups—trigger sanctioned reprisals, including executions, underscoring that regulation serves organizational interests rather than impartial governance. Critics, including security analysts, contend that PCC's violence-regulation claims mask a profit-driven , as evidenced by coordinated attacks like the 2006 São Paulo wave, which killed over 40 agents in retaliation for arrests disrupting their control, revealing that "" fractures when state incursions threaten monopoly rents. While some ethnographic accounts note stabilized routines in PCC-held prisons—such as regulated canteen access and reduced guard brutality—these benefits accrue primarily to compliant members, with external violence exported to border regions or against competitors like the , sustaining regional instability despite localized order. Quantitative data from São Paulo's forensic institute corroborates episodic drops in prison homicides under PCC sway but highlights spikes during inter-factional escalations, indicating that self-regulation prioritizes stability over absolute non-violence.

Criticisms of State Complicity and Failures

Critics have pointed to systemic failures in Brazil's prison system as a primary enabler of the PCC's formation and expansion, arguing that , inadequate oversight, and harsh policies created conditions ripe for criminal organization. The PCC emerged in 1993 following the 1992 Carandiru massacre, where state forces killed 111 inmates during a suppression, an event that galvanized inmates toward self-protection groups amid perceived state brutality. Accelerated prison population growth—driven by stringent anti-drug laws—exacerbated , with facilities often operating at double capacity, leading to precarious living conditions and lapses in inmate control that allowed the PCC to establish internal governance structures. Government decisions, such as transferring PCC leaders to prisons nationwide, inadvertently facilitated the group's nationwide spread rather than containment. Allegations of state complicity through have intensified scrutiny, with reports indicating PCC infiltration of police and public institutions via bribes and , undermining enforcement efforts. Experts have noted the PCC's strategy of corrupting state elements, including , to protect operations, as evidenced by investigations into networks involving former officers. In São Paulo, journalistic probes have mapped organized crime's influence on politics and , highlighting how enables for PCC activities like drug trafficking and . has criticized state negligence in prisons as tantamount to facilitating , where lack of political will allows factions to dominate facilities unchecked. Broader criticisms target the Brazilian state's fragmented and reactive responses, which have failed to dismantle the PCC despite its evolution into a resilient network. Operations against the group often provoke retaliatory violence without addressing root causes like economic infiltration or international expansion, as seen in the PCC's endurance post-2006 attacks. Prison riots in 2017, killing over 120 inmates, underscored penitentiary system breakdowns tied to factional wars, with successive governments faulted for inadequate intelligence sharing and reform. Analysts argue that without integrated strategies targeting and , state efforts remain ineffective against the PCC's adaptive model, which exploits institutional weaknesses for sustained dominance.

Broader Impacts on Brazilian Security

The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has profoundly eroded the Brazilian state's monopoly on legitimate violence, particularly through its dominance of the system, where it enforces internal rules, arbitrates conflicts, and coordinates external criminal operations, rendering many facilities ungovernable by authorities. This parallel authority was starkly illustrated in the 2016–2017 prison riots triggered by the PCC's rupture of a truce with the rival (CV), resulting in over 120 deaths across at least seven states and exposing systemic failures in incarceration management. Such control facilitates the PCC's oversight of drug trafficking and networks, amplifying threats to public order beyond prison walls and necessitating specialized counter-strategies beyond conventional policing. Beyond prisons, the PCC's territorial expansion into urban peripheries and drug corridors has fueled escalating violence in contested regions, particularly the North and Northeast, where disputes contributed to a 41.5% higher rate in the North compared to national averages in 2023. In states like , PCC involvement in turf wars with CV affiliates has driven youth rates to 73 per 100,000 inhabitants under age 29 as of 2024, exacerbating vulnerabilities through sustained low-intensity conflicts that overwhelm local . While the PCC's imposition of "codes of conduct" in São Paulo—prohibiting practices like drive-by shootings—correlated with a sharp decline from 1999 onward, dropping rates across most municipalities, this localized stability masks broader destabilization, as expansionist rivalries export violence nationwide and undermine federal cohesion. The PCC's operational sophistication, including targeted attacks on , has further compromised state authority, as seen in the 2006 São Paulo assaults—retaliatory strikes following leader transfers—that burned over 80 buses, assaulted police stations, and temporarily paralyzed urban infrastructure, killing dozens and highlighting the group's capacity for coordinated urban disruption. These incidents, coupled with ongoing and of officials, have fostered a climate of , with the PCC's infiltration of legal economies and political spheres amplifying long-term risks to institutional integrity and border security. Despite national reductions to around 19 per 100,000 by 2023, the PCC's resilience against mass incarceration policies underscores a policy paradox: prisons inadvertently bolster its command structure, perpetuating cycles of organized violence that demand integrated reforms over reactive suppression.

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