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2012 Benghazi attack
2012 Benghazi attack
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2012 Benghazi attack
Part of the inter-civil war violence in Libya
From top to bottom, left to right: President, Vice President updated on situation night of September 11, 2012; President Obama, with Secretary Clinton, delivering statement in the Rose Garden, September 12, 2012; two photographs released through a FOIA request; Secretary Clinton testifying before the Senate Committee on January 23, 2013; portion of "wanted" poster seeking information on the attack.
Map
LocationBenghazi, Libya
DateSeptember 11–12, 2012
21:40 – 04:15 EET (UTC+02:00)
TargetUnited States diplomatic post and CIA annex
Attack type
Coordinated attack, armed assault, arson
WeaponsRocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, assault rifles, 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, truck mounted artillery, diesel canisters, mortars
DeathsUS Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens; USFS officer Sean Smith; CIA contractors Tyrone S. Woods and Glen Doherty; unknown number of Libyan attackers[clarification needed]
Injured3 Americans, 7 Libyans
Perpetrators

Members of the Islamic militant group Ansar al-Sharia carried out a coordinated attack against two United States government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012. At 9:40 p.m. local time, members of Ansar al-Sharia attacked the American diplomatic compound in Benghazi resulting in the deaths of both United States Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and U.S. Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith.[1][2] At around 4:00 a.m. on September 12, the group launched a mortar attack against a CIA annex approximately one mile (1.6 km) away, killing two CIA contractors Tyrone S. Woods and Glen Doherty[2][3][4] and wounding ten others. Initial analysis by the CIA, repeated by top government officials, indicated that the attack spontaneously arose from a protest.[5] Subsequent investigations showed that the attack was premeditated—although rioters and looters not originally part of the group may have joined in after the attacks began.[6][7][8][9]

There is no definitive evidence that al-Qaeda or any other international terrorist organization participated in the Benghazi attack.[10][11][12] The United States immediately increased security worldwide at diplomatic and military facilities and began investigating the Benghazi attack.[13][14] The Libyan Government condemned the attacks and took steps to disband the militias. 30,000 Libyans marched through Benghazi condemning Ansar al-Sharia, which had been formed after the 2011 Libyan civil war which toppled Muammar Gaddafi.[15][16][17]

Despite persistent accusations against President Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Susan Rice, ten investigations—six by Republican-controlled Congressional Committees—did not find that they or any other high-ranking Obama administration officials had acted improperly.[5][18][19][20] Four career State Department officials were criticized for denying requests for additional security at the facility prior to the attack. Eric J. Boswell, the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, resigned under pressure, while three others were suspended.[21] In her role as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton subsequently took responsibility for the security lapses.[22]

On August 6, 2013, it was reported that the United States had filed criminal charges against several individuals alleged to have been involved in the attacks, including militia leader Ahmed Abu Khattala.[23] Khattala has been described by both Libyan and United States officials as the Benghazi leader of Ansar al-Sharia. The United States Department of State designated Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist organization in January 2014.[24][25][26] Khattala was captured in Libya by United States Army Special Operations Forces, who were acting in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in June 2014.[27] Another suspect, Mustafa al-Imam, was captured in October 2017.[28][29]

Background

[edit]

American presence in Libya and Benghazi

[edit]

The US had not had regular diplomatic presence in Libya since withdrawing its ambassador in 1972 and then closing its embassy after the 1979 U.S. embassy burning in Libya, but since the early 2000s had been starting to normalise relations. During Congressional hearings, Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens' top deputy in Libya, Gregory N. Hicks, testified that Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi in 2012 because "Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton wanted the post made permanent", and it was understood that the secretary hoped to make an announcement to that effect during a visit to Tripoli later in the year.[30][31][32][33][34] He also stated that "Chris [Stevens] wanted to make a symbolic gesture to the people of Benghazi that the United States stood behind their dream of establishing a new democracy."[35][36]

In 2013, CNN reported that sources told it that around 35 US personnel were working in the diplomatic mission in Benghazi at the time of the attack, of whom around 21 were CIA agents.[37] Within months of the start of the Libyan revolution in February 2011, the CIA had begun building a covert presence in Benghazi.[38] During the war, elite counterterrorist operators from the United States Delta Force were deployed to Libya as analysts, instructing the rebels on specifics about weapons and tactics.[39]: 16 

J. Christopher Stevens was named the first liaison with the Libyan opposition in March 2011.[40] After the end of the war, both the CIA and the United States' State Department were tasked with continuing to identify and collect arms that had flooded the country during the war, particularly shoulder-fired missiles taken from the arsenal of the Gaddafi regime,[41][42] as well as securing Libyan chemical weapons stockpiles, and helping to train Libya's new intelligence service.[38]

Eastern Libya and Benghazi were key intelligence-gathering hubs for intelligence operatives. Before the attack, the CIA was monitoring Ansar al-Sharia and suspected members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as well as attempting to define the leadership and loyalty of the various militias present and their interaction with the Salafi elements of Libyan society.[38] By the time of the attack, dozens of CIA operatives were on the ground in Benghazi.[37] In addition, it has been reported that in the summer of 2012, American Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) missions had begun to target Libyan militias linked to the Al-Qaeda network of Yasin al-Suri.[39]: 58  By the time of the attack, a composite U.S. Special Operations team with two JSOC members was already in Libya working on their mission profile independently of the CIA and State Department operations.[39]: 58 [43]

There was some speculation that the diplomatic post in Benghazi was used by the CIA to smuggle weapons from Libya to anti-Assad rebels in Syria.[44][39]: 56 [37][45][46] Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh cites an anonymous former senior Defense Department Intelligence Official, saying "The consulate's only mission was to provide cover for the moving of arms. It had no real political role." The attack allegedly brought an end to the purported United States involvement, but did not stop the smuggling according to Hersh's source.[47]

In January 2014, the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence cast doubt on this alleged United States involvement and reported that "All CIA activities in Benghazi were legal and authorized. On-the-record testimony establishes that the CIA was not sending weapons ... from Libya to Syria, or facilitating other organizations or states that were transferring weapons from Libya to Syria."[48]

Instability in Benghazi

[edit]

In April 2012, two former security guards for the consulate threw an IED over the consulate fence; the incident did not cause any casualties.[49] Just four days later, a similar bomb was thrown at a four-vehicle convoy carrying the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya, exploding twelve feet (3.7 m) from the United Nations envoy's vehicle without injuring anyone.[50]

In May 2012, an Al-Qaida affiliate calling itself the "Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman" claimed responsibility for an attack on the International Red Cross (ICRC) office in Benghazi. On August 6, the ICRC suspended operations in Benghazi. The head of the ICRC's delegation in Libya said the aid group was "appalled" by the attack and "extremely concerned" about escalating violence in Libya.[51]

The Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman released a video of what it said was its detonation of an explosive device outside the gates of the U.S. consulate on June 6, which caused no casualties but blew a hole in the consulate's perimeter wall,[52][53] described by one individual as "big enough for forty men to go through".[54] The Brigades claimed that the attack was in response to the killing of Abu Yahya al Libi, a Libyan al-Qaeda leader who had just died in an American drone attack, and was also timed to coincide with the imminent arrival of a United States Diplomat.[55][56] There were no injuries, but the group left behind leaflets promising more attacks against the United States.[57]

British Ambassador to Libya Dominic Asquith survived an assassination attempt in Benghazi on June 10, 2012. Two British protection officers were injured in the attack when their convoy was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade 300 meters from their consulate office.[58] The British Foreign Office withdrew all consular staff from Benghazi in late June 2012.[59][60]

On June 18, 2012, the Tunisian Consulate in Benghazi was attacked by individuals affiliated with Ansar al-Sharia, allegedly because of "attacks by Tunisian artists against Islam".[39]: 31 

On the day of the attack, two consulate security guards spotted a man in a Libyan police uniform taking pictures of the consulate with his cell phone from a nearby building that was under construction. The security guards briefly detained the man before releasing him. He drove away in a police car and a complaint was made to the Libyan police station. Sean Smith noticed this surveillance, and messaged a friend online around noon, "Assuming we don't die tonight. We saw one of our 'police' that guard the compound taking pictures."[39]: 34 

According to a local security official, he and a battalion commander had met with United States Diplomats three days before the attack and warned the Americans about deteriorating security in the area. The official told CNN that he advised the diplomats, "The situation is frightening; it scares us."[61]

Ambassador Stevens' diary, which was later found at the compound, recorded his concern about the growing al-Qaeda presence in the area and his worry about being on an al-Qaeda hit list.[62]

United States Security Officer Eric Nordstrom twice requested additional security for the mission in Benghazi from the State Department. His requests were denied and according to Nordstrom, State Department Official Charlene Lamb wanted to keep the security presence in Benghazi "artificially low".[63]

On December 30, 2012, the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released a report, "Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi", wherein it was determined:

In the months [between February 2011 and September 11, 2012] leading up to the attack on the Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi, there was a large amount of evidence gathered by the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and from open sources that Benghazi was increasingly dangerous and unstable, and that a significant attack against American personnel there was becoming much more likely. While this intelligence was effectively shared within the Intelligence Community (IC) and with key officials at the Department of State, it did not lead to a commensurate increase in security at Benghazi nor to a decision to close the American mission there, either of which would have been more than justified by the intelligence presented. ... The RSO [Regional Security Officer] in Libya compiled a list of 234 security incidents in Libya between June 2011 and July 2012, 50 of which took place in Benghazi.[64]

The desire of the State Department to maintain a low profile in Benghazi has been cited as the reason why the State Department circumvented their own Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards for diplomatic security.[65]: 74–75  In the aftermath, Clinton sought to take responsibility for the security lapses at Benghazi and expressed personal regret.[66] In her January 2013 testimony before Congress, Secretary Clinton claimed security decisions at the Benghazi compound had been made by others, stating, "The specific security requests pertaining to Benghazi ... were handled by the security professionals in the [State] Department. I didn't see those requests, I didn't approve them, I didn't deny them."[67]

Attack

[edit]

The Benghazi attack was conducted by separate military factions on two separate United States compounds.[68] The first assault occurred at the main diplomatic compound, approximately 300 yards (270 m) long and 100 yards (91 m) wide, at about 9:40 p.m. local time (3:40 p.m. Eastern Time). A mortar fire attack on a CIA annex 1.2 miles (1.9 km) away began at about 4:00 a.m. the following morning[69] and lasted for 11 minutes.[70]

Assault on the compound

[edit]
Map of the U.S. mission main compound and annex

A Libyan guard who was wounded in the attack later said "there wasn't a single ant outside [before the attack]."[71] According to Media Matters For America, the attackers stated they were acting in response to Innocence of Muslims.[72] This was known to be false at the time and was used to support the lie and cover-up that this was a terrorist attack.[citation needed] No more than seven Americans were in the compound, including Ambassador Stevens.[citation needed]

Stevens was visiting Benghazi at the time to review plans to establish a new cultural center and modernize a hospital.[73] The ambassador also "needed to [prepare a] report ... on the physical and the political and security environment in Benghazi to support an action memo to convert Benghazi from a temporary facility to a permanent facility".[30][31][32][33][34] Surplus funds originally dedicated for use in Iran for fiscal year 2012 were to be redirected and obligated for use in Benghazi: an action that had to be completed before the end of the fiscal year—September 30, 2012.[30][31][33][34]

Stevens had his last meeting of the day with a Turkish diplomat (Consul General Ali Sait Akın), and escorted the Turkish diplomat to the main gate at about 8:30 p.m. local time. The street outside the compound was calm, and the State Department reported no unusual activity during the day outside.[74] Stevens retired to his room at about 9:00 p.m.[75]

About 9:40 p.m. local time, large numbers of armed men shouting "Allāhu Akbar" (God is great) approached the compound from multiple directions.[71][76] They then threw grenades over the wall and entered the compound with automatic weapons fire, RPGs, and heavier weapons.[77][75] A Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) agent viewed on the consulate's security cameras "a large number of men, armed men, flowing into the compound".[74] He hit the alarm and started shouting, "Attack! Attack!" over the loudspeaker.[78] Phone calls were made to the embassy in Tripoli, the Diplomatic Security Command Center in Washington, the February 17th Martyrs Brigade and a U.S. quick reaction force located at the annex compound a little more than a mile (1.6 km) away.[79][80]

Diplomatic Security Service Special Agent Scott Wickland secured Stevens and Sean Smith, an information management officer, in the main building's safe haven.[80][81] The rest of the agents left to retrieve their weapons and tried to return to the main building.[80] The attackers entered the main building and attempted to enter the safe haven.[78] They then spread diesel fuel in the room and set fires.[78][80] Stevens, Smith, and Wickland moved to the nearby bathroom, but then decided to leave the safe haven after being overcome by smoke.[81] Wickland exited through the window, but Stevens and Smith did not follow him. Wickland (who was severely wounded by gunfire) returned several times but could not find them in the smoke; he went up to the roof and radioed other agents.[81] Three agents returned to the main building in an armored vehicle, searched the building and found Smith's body, but not Stevens.[81]

According to the Annex Security Team, they had become aware of the consulate attack after 9:30 p.m. local time, and were ready to respond; however, they were delayed by "the top CIA officer in Benghazi".[82][83] The Regional Security Office sounded the alarm and called to the Benghazi CIA annex and the embassy in Tripoli. After some discussion, the CIA's Global Response Staff (GRS) at the CIA annex, which included Tyrone S. Woods, decided to attempt a rescue. By 10:05 p.m., the team was briefed and loaded into their armored Toyota Land Cruisers. By this time, communicators at the CIA annex were notifying the chain of command about current developments, and a small CIA and JSOC element in Tripoli that included Glen Doherty was attempting to find a way to Benghazi.[39]: 39–43 

The GRS team from the CIA annex arrived at the consulate and attempted to secure the perimeter and locate the ambassador and Sean Smith. Diplomatic security agent David Ubben located Smith,[84] who was unconscious and later declared dead, but the team was unable to find Stevens in the smoke-filled building. The team then decided to return to the annex with the survivors and Smith's body. While en route back to the annex, the group's armored vehicle was hit by AK-47 rifle fire and hand grenades. The vehicle was able to make it to its destination with two flat tires, and the gates to the annex were closed behind them at 11:50 p.m.[39]: 43–45 [69]

The US military had mobilized three separate teams to respond to the attack including EUCOM's CIF (Commander's-in-Extremis Force, a specialized direct action/hostage rescue team made up of US Special Forces soldiers)[85] from central Europe, a Marine Security Force Regiment team from Rota, Spain, and an unnamed special operations forces team which was in the US at the time. At the time, AFRICOM, which is responsible for operations in Africa, was the only combatant command which did not have its own CIF team thus having to request EUCOM's assistance. These teams were sent to Naval Air Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy as a staging point on the night of the attack but did not deploy to Benghazi. United States officials stated the teams arrived at Sigonella after the attack was over.[86][87]

Reaction in the United States

[edit]

Diplomatic Security Service agents/Regional Security Officers informed their headquarters in Washington about the attack just as it was beginning at about 9:40 p.m. local time (3:40 p.m. Eastern Time (ET)).[citation needed] At the time, they were informed that the attack was a "terrorist attack".[88][verification needed]

However, through September 14, CIA analysts made a contradictory assessment, stating "We believe based on currently available information that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. Consulate and subsequently its annex. The crowd almost certainly was a mix of individuals from across many sectors of Libyan society. That being said, we do know that Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa'ida participated in the attack."[89]

By 4:30 p.m. ET, Pentagon officials had informed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta about the attack. The Pentagon ordered an unmanned aerial vehicle that was in the air conducting surveillance on militant camps to fly over Benghazi. The drone arrived at 11:10 p.m. local time (5:10 p.m. ET) and began providing a video feed to Washington. At 5:41 p.m. ET, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telephoned CIA Director David Petraeus to coordinate. The CIA, which made up most of the U.S. government's presence in Benghazi, had a ten-member security team at its annex and the State Department believed that this team would assist the consulate in the event of an attack.[90]

Assault on the CIA annex

[edit]

Just after midnight, the CIA annex came under machine gun, rocket and mortar fire. The CIA defenders held off the attack until the morning.[39]: 45–46  That same morning, Libyan government forces met up with a group of Americans, reinforcements from Tripoli including Glen Doherty,[91][92] that had arrived at the Benghazi airport. The team, which included two active-duty JSOC operators and five CIA personnel, had commandeered a small jet in Tripoli by paying the pilots $30,000 and forcing them to fly to Benghazi.[39]: 43  After being held up at the airport for a few hours, the Libyan forces and newly arrived Americans went to the CIA annex at about 5:00 a.m. to assist in transporting approximately 32 Americans at the annex back to the airport for evacuation. Minutes after they drove through the gates, the annex came under heavy fire. With a lull in the fighting, Doherty began searching for his friend, Tyrone S. Woods, and he was told he was on the roof. He found Woods on the roof with two other agents. A mortar round then hit Woods' position, fatally wounding him. As Doherty attempted to reposition and take cover, a second round fell on him, killing him.[39]: 46–47 [93] 31-year-old Diplomatic Security Service Special Agent David Ubben and 46-year-old CIA contractor Mark Geist suffered shrapnel injuries and several broken bones in the mortar attacks.[94]

Immediately, several agents ran onto the roof to assess damage and help the wounded. At the same time, a JSOC operator was using a hand-held device displaying images from a Predator drone above, which had been sent by the DOD's US Africa Command after request. The defenders agreed to evacuate to the airport and were attacked with small arms fire along the route.[39]: 47–48  The evacuation of about 30 Americans included six State Department personnel and Smith's body—they were unable to locate Ambassador Stevens at the time.

Recovery of Ambassador Stevens

[edit]

Ambassador Stevens' body was found by a group of Libyans who had accessed the room through a window.[95] They were unaware of his identity, and Abdel-Qader Fadl, a freelance photographer who was with them, told the Associated Press that Stevens was unconscious and "maybe moved his head, but only once". Ahmed Shams, a 22-year-old arts student, told the Associated Press that they were happy when they found Stevens alive and tried to rescue him. A freelance videographer, Fahd al-Bakoush, later published a video[96][97] showing Libyans trying to extract the ambassador from a smoke-filled room,[98][99] where he was found unconscious. According to al-Bakoush, the Libyans saw he was alive and breathing, his eyelids flickering. Though they took him to be a foreigner, no one recognized him as Stevens.[95][96]

At around 1:00 a.m., Stevens was taken to the Benghazi Medical Center, a hospital controlled by the Ansar Al-Sharia militia,[100] in a private car as there was no ambulance to carry him.[101] There he was administered CPR for 90 minutes by Dr. Ziad Abu Zeid.[102] According to Dr. Zeid, Stevens died from asphyxiation caused by smoke inhalation, and had no other apparent injuries.[103] The doctor said he believed that officers from the Libyan Interior Ministry transported the body to the airport. State Department officials said they do not know who took Stevens to the hospital or transported the body to the airport and into U.S. custody.[103]

Evacuation

[edit]

The bodies were taken to Benina International Airport and flown to the capital, Tripoli, and then to Ramstein Air Base in Germany aboard a C-17 military transport aircraft.[104] From Germany, the four bodies arrived at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C., where President Barack Obama and members of his cabinet held a ceremony in honor of those killed.

After the attack, all diplomatic staff were moved to the capital, Tripoli, with nonessential personnel to be flown out of Libya. Sensitive documents remained missing, including documents listing the names of Libyans working with the Americans, and documents relating to oil contracts.[105]

Fatalities and injuries

[edit]
Ambassador Stevens

Four Americans died in the attack: Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, Information Officer Sean Smith,[106] and two CIA operatives,[4] Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods,[107] both former Navy SEALs.[108][109] Stevens was the first United States ambassador killed in an attack since Adolph Dubs was killed in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 1979.[110]

Responsibility

[edit]

On September 10, 2012, at least 18 hours before the attack in Benghazi, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a video to coincide with the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, which called for attacks on Americans in Libya in order to avenge the death of Abu Yahya al-Libi in a drone strike in Pakistan in June 2012.[111] It is uncertain how much prior knowledge of the attack al-Zawahiri had, though he praised the attackers on October 12, 2012, in another video.[112] On September 14, 2012, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a statement arguing the attack was revenge for the death of al-Libi, though they did not claim official responsibility for the Benghazi attack.[111] It was later reported that 3 operatives from the group did take part in the attack.[111] Furthermore, an intercepted phone call from the Benghazi area immediately after the attack reportedly linked senior Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar to the attack.[113]

David Kirkpatrick of The New York Times reported that 20-year-old neighbor Mohamed Bishari witnessed the attack. According to Bishari, it was launched without warning or protest and was led by the Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia (different from the group called Ansar al-Sharia based in Yemen designated by the U.N. and the U.S. Department of State as a terrorist organization[114]). Kirkpatrick reported that Ansar al-Sharia said they were launching the assault in retaliation for the release of the anti-Islamic video, Innocence of Muslims.[115][116] It was further reported that Ahmed Abu Khattala was called a ringleader of the attack by both witnesses and authorities, though he insisted he did not play a part in the aggression at the American compound. Witnesses, Benghazi residents, and Western news reports have described him as a leader of Ansar al-Sharia, though he stated he was close to the group but not an official part of it. He further stated he was the commander of an Islamist brigade, Abu Obaida ibn al-Jarrah, some of whose members had joined Ansar al-Sharia.[8]

The Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, a pro-al-Qaeda militia calling for the release of The Blind Sheikh, was implicated in the attack by Noman Benotman of the Quilliam Foundation.[117][118][119] CNN,[117] the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,[120] Commentary Magazine[119] and The Daily Telegraph[118] have listed this group as a chief suspect. USA Today reported that protests in Cairo that preceded the attack on Benghazi were intended to protest the imprisonment of Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman and announced as early as August 30.[121][122] Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi had called for release of the Blind Sheikh in his inaugural address.[122]

In the days and weeks following the attack, President Obama and other administration officials correctly noted that the Innocence of Muslims video had sparked violent incidents at a number of U.S. diplomatic facilities, and Susan Rice stated — based on a flawed CIA assessment[89] — that the attack "began spontaneously" after a violent protest at the American embassy in Cairo, Egypt hours earlier. During the hours before the attack, Egyptian satellite television networks popular in Benghazi had been covering the outrage over the video.[123] In a phone call with the Egyptian prime minister Kandil the day after the attack, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said "we know the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the film. It was a planned attack, not a protest."[124] This assessment reflected information in an email sent by the State Department Operations Center to the White House, Pentagon, intelligence community and FBI at 6:07pm Eastern time the night of the attack, the subject line of which read, "Update 2: Ansar al-Sharia Claims Responsibility for Benghazi Attack."[125] However, on the same day of the Clinton phone call, Ansar al-Sharia issued a statement saying it "didn't participate as a sole entity; rather, it was a spontaneous popular uprising in response to what happened by the West," an apparent reference to the release of the video.[126][127]

However, this assessment contradicted the assessment of CIA analysts, which through September 16 maintained that "the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo," at which violent protesters had scaled the embassy walls.[128] And the day after the attack, Ansar al-Sharia appeared to confirm both assessments when it issued a statement saying The [Ansar al-Shariah] Brigade didn't participate as a sole entity; rather, it was a spontaneous popular uprising in response to what happened by the West," which was an apparent reference to the Innocence of Muslims video.[127]

A later report from an independent review board concluded "there was no protest prior to the attacks."[129]

In a September 18 appearance on the Late Show with David Letterman, President Obama said, "extremists and terrorists used (the anti-Muslim YouTube video) as an excuse to attack a variety of our embassies."[130] Obama spoke accurately, because five American embassies were the sites of violent protests due to the video, but Benghazi was not an embassy, it was a "diplomatic post." In his Univision Town Hall appearance on September 20, President Obama said that the "natural protests that arose because of the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S. interests."[131] The Innocence of Muslims video triggered dozens of protests from northwest Africa to southeast Asia, including violent protests at American embassies in Tunis, Khartoum, Cairo, Sana and Jakarta.[132]

In October 2012, a Tunisian, Ali Harzi, who a U.S. intelligence official stated had links to Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, was arrested in Turkey and repatriated to Tunisia on terrorism charges and possible links to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi.[133] Ali Harzi was released by Tunisian authorities on January 8, 2013, because of a lack of evidence.[134]

Also in October, a Libyan suspect, Karim el-Azizi, who had recently returned to Egypt from Libya and was storing weapons in his hideout, detonated a bomb and was found dead in his apartment after clashes with security forces.[135] He has been linked to an Egyptian terrorist group led by Muhammad Jamal Abu Ahmad, who is suspected of training some of the terrorists responsible for the Benghazi attack in camps in the Libyan desert.[136] Jamal Abu Ahmad, a former member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, was released from Egyptian prison after the fall of the Mubarak regime, after which he began assembling a terrorist network.[137] He received financing from the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, petitioned Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to establish a new Al-Qaeda affiliate he called al-Qaeda in Egypt,[136][137] and was subsequently detained by Egyptian authorities in December 2012.[137]

On October 7, 2013, the Muhammad Jamal network (MJN) and Muhammad Jamal were designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists by the U.S. Department of State, which noted in its designation that "Jamal has developed connections with al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AQ senior leadership, and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leadership including Nasir 'Abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah al-Wahishi and Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi".[138] A few days later, on October 21, 2013, the United Nations Security Council designated the Muhammad Jamal network "as being associated with Al-Qaida".[139] The United Nations Security Council also noted, "Some of the attackers of the U.S. Mission in Benghazi on 11 September 2012 have been identified as associates of Muhammad Jamal, and some of the Benghazi attackers reportedly trained at MJN camps in Libya."[140]

In March 2013, Faraj al-Shibli was detained by Libyan authorities and questioned by the FBI because of his suspected involvement in the Benghazi attack.[141] Al-Shibli was detained after he returned from a trip to Pakistan, though his exact role in the attack is unclear. He was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which tried to overthrow the Gadhafi regime in the mid-1990s. Investigators have learned he has had contact with both the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda members in Pakistan. He was released by Libyan authorities on June 12, 2013, based on claims there was a lack of evidence to hold him in custody.[142] In July 2014 he was found dead in Libya.[143]

Aftermath

[edit]

Libyan response

[edit]
Prime Minister Abushagur

Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur's office condemned the attack and extended condolences, saying: "While strongly condemning any attempt to abuse the person of Muhammad, or an insult to our holy places and prejudice against the faith, we reject and strongly condemn the use of force to terrorize innocent people and the killing of innocent people." It also reaffirmed "the depth of relationship between the peoples of Libya and the U.S., which grew closer with the positions taken by the U.S. government in support of the revolution of February 17".[144] Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf, the President of the General National Congress of Libya, said: "We apologize to the U.S., to the American people and to the government and also to the rest of the world for what happened yesterday. And at the same time, we expect the world to cooperate with us to confront to what is meant out of this kind of act of cowardice."[145]

There were demonstrations in Benghazi[146] and Tripoli[147] on September 12, condemning the violence and holding signs such as "Chris Stevens was a friend to all Libyans", "Benghazi is against terrorism", and other signs apologizing to Americans for the actions in their name and in the name of Muslims. On the same day, Libya's Deputy Ambassador to the United Kingdom Ahmad Jibril told the BBC that Ansar Al-Sharia was behind the attack.[148][149] On September 13, at a U.S. State Department reception in Washington D.C., the Libyan ambassador to the U.S. Ali Aujali apologized to Secretary of State Clinton for "this terrorist attack which took place against the American consulate in Libya".[149][150] The ambassador further praised Stevens as a "dear friend" and a "real hero". He also urged the United States to continue supporting Libya as it went "through a very difficult time" and that the young Libyan government needed help so that it could "maintain ... security and stability in our country".[150]

In the days after the attack, The New York Times stated that young Libyans had flooded Twitter with pro-American messages after the attacks.[147] Think Progress stated that Libyans are typically more positively inclined towards the United States than their neighbors.[151] A 2012 Gallup poll noted that "A majority of Libyans (54%) surveyed in March and April 2012 approve of the leadership of the U.S.—among the highest approval Gallup has ever recorded in the ... region, outside of Israel."[152] Another poll in Eastern Libya, taken in 2011, reported that the population was at the same time both deeply religious conservative Muslims and very pro-American, with 90% of respondents reporting favorable views of the United States.[153][154]

The Libyan response to the crisis was praised and appreciated in the United States, and President Obama emphasized how the Libyans "helped our diplomats to safety" to an American audience the following day,[15] while a New York Times editorial criticized Egypt's government for not doing "what Libyan leaders did".[155]

On September 16, Libyan President Mohamed Magariaf said that the attack on the United States consulate was planned months in advance,[156] and further stated that "[t]he idea that this criminal and cowardly act was a spontaneous protest that just spun out of control is completely unfounded and preposterous. We firmly believe that this was a precalculated, preplanned attack that was carried out specifically to attack the U.S. consulate."[157]

Anti-militia demonstrations

[edit]

On September 21, about 30,000 Libyans marched through Benghazi calling for support of the rule of law and for an end to the armed militias that had formed during the Libyan Civil War to oppose Colonel Gaddafi.[16][17] After that war, the militias failed to disband, and continually menaced the Libyan government and populace.[17] Carrying signs with slogans such as "We Want Justice For Chris" and "Libya Lost a Friend", the protestors stormed several militia headquarters, including that of Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militia who some allege played a role in the attack on U.S. diplomatic personnel on September 11.[158][159] At least 10 people were killed and dozens more wounded as militiamen fired on demonstrators at the headquarters of Sahaty Brigade, a pro-government militia "operating under the authority of the ministry of defence".[16][159][160]

By early next morning, the protestors had forced militia members to flee and seized control of a number of compounds, releasing four prisoners found inside.[158][159] Protesters burnt a car and a building of at least one facility, and looted weapons.[16][17][159] The militia compounds and many weapons were handed over to Libya's national army[17] in what "appeared to be part of a coordinated sweep of militia bases by police, government troops and activists" following the earlier demonstrations.[158][159] Some militia members accused the protestors of being Gaddafi loyalists, looking to disarm the militias in the wake of the revolution.[17]

Government campaign to disband militias

[edit]

On September 23, taking advantage of the growing momentum and rising anger against the militias evinced in the earlier anti-militia demonstrations,[161] the Libyan president declared that all unauthorized militias had 48 hours to either disband or come under government control.[162][163] The government also mandated that bearing arms in public was now illegal, as were armed checkpoints.[163]

Handling the militias had been difficult as the government had been forced to rely on some of them for protection and security.[161][162] According to a Libyan interviewed in Tripoli, the government gained the ability to push back against the militias because of a "mandate of the people".[162] On September 24, the government commenced with a raid on a former military base held by a rogue infantry militia.[164]

Across the country, militias began surrendering to the government. The government formed a "National Mobile Force" for the purpose of evicting illegal militias.[165] On the same day as the declaration, various militias in Misrata held meetings, ultimately deciding to submit to the government's authority, and handed over various public facilities they had been holding, including the city's three main jails, which were handed over to the authority of the Ministry of Justice.[162] Hours before the announcement, in Derna, the two main militias (one of them Ansar al-Sharia) active in the city both withdrew, leaving both their five military bases behind.[161][162][165]

Hundreds of Libyans, mainly former rebel fighters, gathered in the city centers of Tripoli and Benghazi to hand over their weapons to the government on September 29.[166] The campaign has been less successful in other areas, such as the remote Nafusa Mountains, inhabited by the Nafusi-speaking Berber minority, where the Emirati news agency The National reported on September 23 that arms were being hoarded. The National also reported arms being hoarded in Misrata, despite simultaneous reporting by other outlets that militias were surrendering in Misrata.[167]

U.S. government response

[edit]
President Barack Obama, with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, delivering a statement at the White House on September 12, 2012, in which he condemned the attack on the U.S. consulate[168]
President Obama and Secretary Clinton honor the Benghazi attack victims at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony held at Andrews Air Force Base on September 14, 2012.

On September 12, U.S. President Barack Obama condemned "this outrageous attack" on U.S. diplomatic facilities[169] and stated that "since our founding, the United States has been a nation that respects all faiths. We reject all efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others."[169] After referring to "the 9/11 attacks", "troops who made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan", and "then last night, we learned the news of this attack in Benghazi"[169] the President urged, "As Americans, let us never, ever forget that our freedom is only sustained because there are people who are willing to fight for it, to stand up for it, and in some cases, lay down their lives for it."[169] He then went on to say,

No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation, alter that character, or eclipse the light of the values that we stand for. Today we mourn four more Americans who represent the very best of the United States of America. We will not waver in our commitment to see that justice is done for this terrible act. And make no mistake, justice will be done.[169]

After the attack, Obama ordered that security be increased at all such facilities worldwide.[13] A 50-member Marine FAST team was sent to Libya to "bolster security".[170][171] It was announced that the FBI would investigate the possibility of the attack being planned.[172] U.S. officials said surveillance over Libya would increase, including the use of unmanned drones, to "hunt for the attackers".[172]

Secretary of State Clinton also made a statement on September 12, describing the perpetrators as "heavily armed militants" and "a small and savage group—not the people or government of Libya".[173] She also reaffirmed "America's commitment to religious tolerance" and said "Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place at our Embassy in Cairo yesterday, as a response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet," but whether true or not, that was not a justification for violence.[174] The State Department had previously identified embassy and personnel security as a major challenge in its budget and priorities report.[175]

On September 12, it was reported that the United States Navy dispatched two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, USS McFaul and USS Laboon, to the Libyan coast.[176] The destroyers are equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles. American UAVs were also sent to fly over Libya to search for the perpetrators of the attack.[177]

In a speech on September 13, in Golden, Colorado, President Obama paid tribute to the four Americans "killed in an attack on our diplomatic post in Libya", stating,

We enjoy our security and our liberty because of the sacrifices they make ... I want people around the world to hear me: To all those who would do us harm, no act of terror will go unpunished. It will not dim the light of the values that we proudly present to the rest of the world.[178]

In his press briefing on September 14, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney told reporters that "we don't have and did not have concrete evidence to suggest that this [the Benghazi attack] was not in reaction to the film."[179] He went on to say:

There was no intelligence that in any way could have been acted on to prevent these attacks. It is—I mean, I think the DNI spokesman was very declarative about this that the report is false. The report suggested that there was intelligence that was available prior to this that led us to believe that this facility would be attacked, and that is false ... We have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned attack. The unrest we've seen around the region has been in reaction to a video that Muslims, many Muslims find offensive. And while the violence is reprehensible and unjustified, it is not a reaction to the 9/11 anniversary that we know of, or to U.S. policy.

On September 14, the remains of the slain Americans were returned to the U.S.; President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the ceremony. In her remarks Clinton said, "One young woman, her head covered and her eyes haunted with sadness, held up a handwritten sign that said 'Thugs and killers don't represent Benghazi nor Islam.' The President of the Palestinian Authority, who worked closely with Chris when he served in Jerusalem, sent me a letter remembering his energy and integrity, and deploring—and I quote—'an act of ugly terror.'"[150] She went on to say: "We've seen the heavy assault on our post in Benghazi that took the lives of those brave men."

On September 16, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice appeared on five major interview shows to discuss the attacks. Prior to her appearance, Rice was provided with "talking points" from a CIA memo,[180] which stated:

The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations.

This assessment may change as additional information is collected and analyzed and as currently available information continues to be evaluated.

The investigation is ongoing, and the U.S. government is working with Libyan authorities to bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of U.S. citizens.[181]

Using these talking points as a guide, Rice stated:

Based on the best information we have to date, what our assessment is as of the present is in fact what began spontaneously in Benghazi as a reaction to what had transpired some hours earlier in Cairo where, of course, as you know, there was a violent protest outside of our embassy—sparked by this hateful video. But soon after that spontaneous protest began outside of our consulate in Benghazi, we believe that it looks like extremist elements, individuals, joined in that— in that effort with heavy weapons of the sort that are, unfortunately, readily now available in Libya post-revolution. And that it spun from there into something much, much more violent. We do not—we do not have information at present that leads us to conclude that this was premeditated or preplanned. I think it's clear that there were extremist elements that joined in and escalated the violence. Whether they were al Qaeda affiliates, whether they were Libyan-based extremists or al Qaeda itself I think is one of the things we'll have to determine.[182][183][184][185][186]

Since Rice's five television appearances, there have been persistent accusations that she had intentionally and repeatedly lied. However, none of the ten Benghazi investigations determined she had. For example, the Republican-controlled House Intelligence Committee "did not conclude that Rice or any other government official acted in bad faith or intentionally misled the American people," according to the Associated Press.[5]

In a White House press briefing on September 18, press secretary Jay Carney explained the attack to reporters: "I'm saying that based on information that we—our initial information, and that includes all information—we saw no evidence to back up claims by others that this was a preplanned or premeditated attack; that we saw evidence that it was sparked by the reaction to this video. And that is what we know thus far based on the evidence, concrete evidence."[187]

On September 20, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney answered a question about an open hearing with the National Counterterrorism Center Director, Matthew G. Olsen, which referenced which extremist groups might have been involved. Carney said, "It is, I think, self-evident that what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. Our embassy was attacked violently, and the result was four deaths of American officials. So, again, that's self-evident."[188] On the same day, during an appearance on Univision, a Spanish-language television network in the United States, President Obama stated, "What we do know is that the natural protests that arose because of the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S. interests."[189][190][191][192][193]

Also on September 20, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a classified briefing to U.S. Senators,[194] which several Republican attendees criticized.[195] According to the article, senators were angered at the Obama administration's rebuff of their attempts to learn details of the Benghazi attack, only to see that information published the next day in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.

President Barack Obama addresses the United Nations General Assembly.

On September 24, advertisements condemning an anti-Islam video appeared on Pakistani television. The television ads in Pakistan (marked with the U.S. Embassy seal) feature clips of President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton during press appearances in Washington in which they condemned the video. Their words were subtitled in Urdu.[196]

On September 25, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly President Obama stated, "The attacks on our civilians in Benghazi were attacks on America ... And there should be no doubt that we will be relentless in tracking down the killers and bringing them to justice."[73][197] He referred to Innocence of Muslims as "a crude and disgusting video [that] sparked outrage throughout the Muslim world". He said, "I have made it clear that the United States government had nothing to do with this video, and I believe its message must be rejected by all who respect our common humanity."[198] He further stated, "There is no video that justifies an attack on an Embassy."[199]

On September 26, Clinton acknowledged a possible link between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Benghazi attack.[200]

On September 28, a spokesman for the Director of National Intelligence stated,

In the immediate aftermath, there was information that led us to assess that the attack began spontaneously following protests earlier that day at our embassy in Cairo. We provided that initial assessment to Executive Branch officials and members of Congress ... As we learned more about the attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists. It remains unclear if any group or person exercised overall command and control of the attack, and if extremist group leaders directed their members to participate.[201]

Also on September 28, it was reported that Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, the producer of the Innocence of Muslims video, had been arrested in California and was being held without bail for alleged probation violations stemming from a 2010 bank fraud conviction.[202]

On CNN's State of the Union with Candy Crowley on September 30, Crowley observed that "Friday we got the administration's sort of definitive statement that this now looks as though it was a pre-planned attack by a terrorist group, some of whom were at least sympathetic to al Qaeda," and asked the senior Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John McCain, "why do you think and are you bothered that it has taken them this long from September 11th to now to get to this conclusion?" to which McCain replied that "it interferes with the depiction that the administration is trying to convey that al Qaeda is on the wane ... how else could you trot out our U.N. ambassador to say this was a spontaneous demonstration? ... It was either willful ignorance or abysmal intelligence to think that people come to spontaneous demonstrations with heavy weapons, mortars, and the attack goes on for hours."[203]

On October 4, 22 days after the attack, FBI investigators were finally allowed access to the scene of the attack.[204] The crime scene was not secured during that time; neither American nor Libyan investigators were able to secure the scene. The hearing testimony revealed that "Hicks argued that Rice's comments so insulted the Libyan president—since they contradicted his Sept. 16 claims that the attack was premeditated—that it slowed the FBI's investigation. 'President Magariaf was insulted in front of his own people, in front of the world. His credibility was reduced,' Hicks said, adding that the president was apparently 'still steamed' two weeks later."[205]

To assist the Libyan government in disbanding extremist groups, the Obama administration allocated $8 million to begin building an elite Libyan commando force over the next year.[206]

In the Presidential debate of October 16, 2012, between President Obama and Mitt Romney, Romney claimed that "it took the president 14 days before he called the attack in Benghazi an act of terror." President Obama responded, "The day after the attack, governor, I stood in the Rose Garden and I told the American people and the world that we are going to find out exactly what happened," Obama said. "That this was an act of terror, and I also said that we're going to hunt down those who committed this crime."[207] When Romney challenged Obama, asking "You said in the Rose Garden the day after the attack, it was an act of terror. It was not a spontaneous demonstration, is that what you're saying?" the President responded, "Please proceed, governor" and "Get the transcript." The moderator of the debate, Candy Crowley, agreed, stating "He—he did call it an act of terror." A CNN analysis stated that Obama had indeed referred to the incident as a "terrorist attack", but that Romney was correct in noting that the administration delayed in conclusively stating that the attack was not a spontaneous protest related to the video.[208] A May 14, 2013 Fact Checker by Glenn Kesler said that "Immediately after the attack, the president three times used the phrase "act of terror" in public statements."[209]

On October 19, 2012, House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) came under fire from intelligence officials in the Obama administration when he posted, on a public website, 166 pages of sensitive but unclassified State Department communications related to Libya. According to officials, the release of the unredacted documents compromised the identities of several Libyans working with the U.S. government and placed their lives in danger.[210]

On CBS's Face the Nation on October 28, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) stated that "this is either a massive cover-up or incompetence" and suggested that it was a scandal worse than Watergate. McCain stated, "we know that there were tapes, recordings inside the consulate during this fight ... So the president went on various shows, despite what he said in the Rose Garden, about terrorist acts, he went on several programs, including The View, including Letterman, including before the UN where he continued to refer, days later, many days later, to this as a spontaneous demonstration because of a hateful video. We know that is patently false. What did the president know? When did he know it? And what did he do about it?"[211] CBS News reported earlier on October 24 that the video of the assault was not recovered until 20 days after the attack, from the more than 10 security cameras at the compound.[87] In a radio interview October 29, 2012, Senator John McCain said that the surveillance tapes had been classified top secret.[212]

Secretary Clinton was scheduled to testify before Congress on December 20 about the attack. On December 15, it was reported that she had become dehydrated from the flu, fainted, and sustained a concussion. Consequently, her testimony was postponed.[213] The incident prompted Republican Rep. Allen West to claim that the illness was a ruse intended to avoid testifying. Former UN Ambassador John Bolton called the concussion a "diplomatic illness".[214]

On January 23, 2013, during testimony at a Senate hearing on Benghazi, Clinton engaged in a heated exchange with Senator Ron Johnson. When Johnson pressed her to explain why, in the immediate aftermath, no one from the State Department had asked American evacuees if there had been a protest before the attack, Clinton replied:

With all due respect, the fact is, we had four dead Americans! Was it because of a protest or was it because of guys out for a walk one night and decided they'd go kill some Americans?! What difference, at this point, does it make?! It is our job to figure out what happened and do everything we can to prevent it from ever happening again, Senator. Now, honestly, I will do my best to answer your questions about this, but the fact is that people were trying in real time to get to the best information. The [Intelligence Community] has a process, I understand, going with the other committees to explain how these talking points came out. But you know, to be clear, it is, from my perspective, less important today looking backwards as to why these militants decided they did it than to find them and bring them to justice, and then maybe we'll figure out what was going on in the meantime.[215]

In March 2013, Representative Duncan D. Hunter introduced legislation into the 113th Congress to authorize awarding of Congressional Gold Medals to Doherty and Woods for their actions that led to their deaths.[216]

In April 2013, the Pentagon announced the activation of a USMC quick response force for North Africa that would use the range and speed of the Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey to be able to respond to similar events in the future.[217] Spain authorized the basing of the quick response force at Morón Air Base near Seville, for a temporary one-year term.[218]

On May 13, 2013, President Obama stated during a news conference, "The day after it happened, I acknowledged that this was an act of terrorism." This claim was disputed by Glenn Kessler of The Washington Post in a "Fact Checker" article, which explored at length the difference in meaning between the phrases "act of terror" and "act of terrorism."[209] In the article, Kessler accused Obama of "revisionist history" for stating he had called the attack an "act of terrorism" when in fact he had used the term "act of terror", observing that Obama had gone out of his way to avoid calling the incident an "act of terrorism" or blame the ambassador's death on terrorism.[209][219]

On July 30, 2013, Rep. Ed Royce (R, CA-39) introduced the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2014 (H.R. 2848; 113th Congress).[220] Supporters argued,

This bill advances efforts to improve the physical infrastructure at posts overseas to comply with the highest standards of protection; to increase training for those responsible for guarding our compounds and personnel; to put in place procedures that respond appropriately to threats, reducing the chances of another attack like that suffered in Benghazi, Libya; to review the policies and procedures of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; to authorize the use of best value contracting at high risk, high threat posts; to authorize security improvements at soft targets; and to provide for security enhancements in line with Accountability Review Board recommendations.[221]

Critics including Republican Party members accused the Obama White House and State Department of overemphasizing or fabricating the role of Islamic anger over the anti-Islamic movie Innocence of Muslims and alleged that the administration was reluctant to label the attack as "terrorist".[222] Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, who on September 13 said that the attacks had all the hallmarks of a coordinated attack by al-Qaeda,[223] has questioned whether there were any protests at all in Benghazi, saying: "I have seen no information that shows that there was a protest going on as you have seen around any other embassy at the time. It was clearly designed to be an attack."[224] According to critics, the consulate site should have been secured better both before and after the attack. GOP legislators also took issue with delays in the investigation, which CNN attributed to "bureaucratic infighting" between the FBI, Justice, and State. On September 26, Senator Johnny Isakson (R-Georgia) said he "cannot believe that the FBI is not on the ground yet".[222]

Testimony from top U.S. commanders after the attack revealed that the military was unprepared for conflict across Africa and the Middle East. No attack aircraft had been placed on high alert on September 11, the anniversary of the September 11 attacks in 2001, and the closest fighter planes to trouble spots in North Africa were based in Aviano, Italy. The fighter planes based in Aviano were unarmed and no aerial refueling planes were within a 10-hour flight to the base. In addition, no AC-130 gunships were within a 10-hour flight of Libya, and their crews did not reach a staging base in Italy until 19 hours after the attack began.[225]

With the attack and subsequent criticism occurring in the last two months of the 2012 U.S. presidential election, Democrats and liberal media figures accused Republicans of politicizing the attacks in an unprecedented manner.[226][227] Romney was accused by the Obama campaign of trying to exploit the attacks for political gain, leading the father of Ambassador Stevens to call for both campaigns to avoid making it a campaign issue.[228]

Robert Gates, former CIA director and Defense Secretary under Republican Presidents and then President Obama, said that some critics of the government's response have a "cartoonish" view of military capabilities. He stated that he would have responded with equal caution given the risks and the lack of intelligence on the ground, and that American forces require planning and preparation, which the circumstances did not allow for.[229]

President Obama called the criticism a "sideshow"[230] and later accused Congress of "taking its eye off the ball" on the subject of the economy and focusing on "phony scandals". White House Spokesman Jay Carney later specified that the criticism of the administration's handling of the Benghazi attacks was one of those "phony scandals".[231]

On December 10, 2014, upon publication of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on Benghazi,[232] Committee Chairman Mike Rogers wrote in an op-ed piece, "The Obama administration's White House and State Department actions before, during, and after the Benghazi terrorist attack on September 11, 2012, ranged from incompetence to deplorable political manipulation in the midst of an election season."[233] However, immediately upon release of the committee's report on November 21, 2014, the Associated Press reported that the Committee did not conclude that any "government official acted in bad faith or intentionally misled the American people."[5]

For actions in Benghazi during the attack, Marine Gunnery Sergeant Tate Jolly was awarded the Navy Cross, and Army Master Sergeant David R. Halbruner was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.[234]

In January 2020 Mustafa al-Imam, a Libyan man accused of scouting for the Benghazi attackers, was sentenced to over 19 years in prison by a federal Washington judge.[235]

U.S. media response

[edit]

The Center for Media and Public Affairs at George Mason University described the conclusions of an unpublished study on November 2, 2012. Based on a textual analysis that tallied the occurrence of certain words and phrases in news reports during the days immediately following the attack, the study concluded that leading newspapers in the U.S. framed the attack in terms of a spontaneous protest over the anti-Islamic film Innocence of Muslims as framed by the Obama administration's version, four times as often as a planned terrorist attack, which was the Republican version.[236] However, the 2014 final report by the Republican-controlled House Intelligence Committee found that during the days immediately following the attack there was confusion among intelligence analysts as to the origin of the attack, leading to an initial assessment that it was the spontaneous outcome from a protest. Obama administration officials, most notably Susan Rice, were provided this early assessment and repeated it to media outlets, only to be later contradicted as further intelligence assessments were made.[5][89] None of the ten investigations into Benghazi found that any senior Obama administration officials had acted improperly.

On September 13, Rachel Maddow, during her show on MSNBC, stated:

An organized attack. Anybody who tells you that what happened to our ambassador and our consulate in Libya was as a result of a protest over an offensive movie, you should ask them why they think that. That's the first version of events we heard. That does not seem to explain what happened that night or by the facts or the more facts we get.[237]

On the edition of October 24 of Fox News' Special Report with Bret Baier, syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer claimed that a State Department e-mail, which passed along a report from Embassy Tripoli that Ansar al-Sharia had claimed responsibility for the attack on Facebook and Twitter,[238][239] proved that the White House knew of terrorist connections to the attack almost immediately. However, the day after the Benghazi attack, Ansar al-Sharia issued a statement saying that the attack was in part "a spontaneous popular uprising in response to what happened by the West," which was an apparent reference to the Innocence of Muslims video.[240]

Conservative pundit Jonah Goldberg of the National Review stated that on NBC's Meet the Press, host David Gregory changed the subject when a guest raised the subject of the Benghazi attack, saying, "Let's get to Libya a little bit later", but never returned to the subject.[241][242]

On November 26, 2012, journalist Tom Ricks went on Fox News' Happening Now with Jon Scott to discuss the attack. While being interviewed on Fox News by Jon Scott, Ricks accused Fox News of being "extremely political" in its coverage of the attack and said that "Fox was operating as a wing of the Republican Party." Ricks accused the network of covering the story more than it needed to be. The interview was cut short and Ricks and the interview was not mentioned or covered by Fox News again. Fox News was subsequently criticized for cutting the interview short.[243][244] In an interview with the Associated Press, Fox News' White House correspondent Ed Henry suggested that he thought Benghazi was being covered too much by the network. Henry said, "We've had the proper emphasis, but I would not be so deluded to say that some of our shows, some of our commentators, have covered it more than it needed to be covered."[245][246]

Investigations

[edit]

There were ten investigations into the Benghazi matter: one by the FBI; one by an independent board commissioned by the State Department; two by Democrat-controlled Senate Committees; and six by Republican-controlled House Committees. After the first five Republican investigations found no evidence of wrongdoing by senior Obama administration officials, Republicans in 2014 opened a sixth investigation, the House Select Committee on Benghazi, chaired by Trey Gowdy. This investigation also failed to find any evidence of wrongdoing by senior Obama administration officials. A possible political motive for the investigation was revealed on September 29, 2015, when Republican House majority leader Kevin McCarthy, then vying to become Speaker of the House, told Sean Hannity on Fox News that the investigation was part of a "strategy to fight and win,' adding "Everybody thought Hillary Clinton was unbeatable, right? But we put together a Benghazi special committee, a select committee. What are her numbers today? Her numbers are dropping."[247][248]

Shortly after the Benghazi attack, Secretary of State Clinton commissioned an independent Accountability Review Board to investigate, chaired by retired ambassador Thomas R. Pickering with vice-chair retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen. The Board released their final report on December 19, 2012.[249] It made 29 recommendations to the State Department on how to improve its operations, which Clinton pledged to implement.[250] As part of this investigation, four career State Department officials were criticized for denying requests for additional security at the facility prior to the attack. By the end of 2012, Eric J. Boswell, the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, resigned under pressure, while three others were suspended.[21] None of the other Benghazi investigations identified wrongdoing by any individuals.

The House Select Committee on Benghazi's final report was released on June 28, 2016, and the committee closed down five months later.[251] It criticized the actions and speed of response of the State Department, and the Defense Department, leading up to and during the attacks in Benghazi.[252] No further public investigations have been conducted since.

The findings of the two-year investigation by the Republican-controlled House Intelligence Committee, the fifth of six Republican investigations, was summarized by the Associated Press on November 21, 2014:[5]

A two-year investigation by the Republican-controlled House Intelligence Committee has found that the CIA and the military acted properly in responding to the 2012 attack on a U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, and asserted no wrongdoing by Obama administration appointees.

Debunking a series of persistent allegations hinting at dark conspiracies, the investigation of the politically charged incident determined that there was no intelligence failure, no delay in sending a CIA rescue team, no missed opportunity for a military rescue, and no evidence the CIA was covertly shipping arms from Libya to Syria.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, intelligence about who carried it out and why was contradictory, the report found. That led Susan Rice, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, to inaccurately assert that the attack had evolved from a protest, when in fact there had been no protest. But it was intelligence analysts, not political appointees, who made the wrong call, the committee found. The report did not conclude that Rice or any other government official acted in bad faith or intentionally misled the American people.

...

In the aftermath of the attacks, Republicans criticized the Obama administration and its then-secretary of state, Hillary Rodham Clinton, who ran for president in 2016. People in and out of government have alleged that a CIA response team was ordered to "stand down" after the State Department compound came under attack, that a military rescue was nixed, that officials intentionally downplayed the role of al-Qaida figures in the attack, and that Stevens and the CIA were involved in a secret operation to spirit weapons out of Libya and into the hands of Syrian rebels. None of that is true, according to the House Intelligence Committee report.

The report did find, however, that the State Department facility where Stevens and Smith were killed was not well-protected, and that State Department security agents knew they could not defend it from a well-armed attack. Previous reports have found that requests for security improvements were not acted upon in Washington.

FOIA requests

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Freedom of Information Act requests have been made since the attack. The conservative foundation Judicial Watch filed a FOIA request to the Department of State on December 19, 2012. An acknowledgement of the request was received by Judicial Watch on January 4, 2013. When the State Department failed to respond to the request by February 4, 2013, Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit, which resulted in seven photographs being delivered on June 6, 2013.[253] Three of the photographs show Arabic-language spray paint graffiti.

On May 30, 2013, it was reported that the Republican National Committee filed a FOIA for "any and all emails or other documents containing the terms 'Libya' and/or 'Benghazi' dated between September 11, 2012 and November 7, 2012 directed from or to U.S. Department of State employees originating from, or addressed to, persons whose email addresses end in either 'barackobama.com' or 'dnc.org'".[254]

On April 18, 2014, the conservative group Judicial Watch released more than 100 pages of documents obtained through a FOIA lawsuit.[255] One email, dated September 14, 2012, with a subject line "RE PREP CALL with Susan: Saturday at 4:00 pm ET", was from deputy national security advisor for strategic communications Rhodes stated:[256] "Goals: ... To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy..."[257] According to another e-mail obtained by Judicial Watch, when asked about whether the attack was linked to the Mohammad video, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said she "could not confirm a connect as we simply don't know—and we won't know until there is an investigation".[258]

According to The Wall Street Journal, the e-mail was written to prepare U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice for her appearances on Sunday news shows two days later, and it "sets out the Administration's view of the cause of the Benghazi attacks".[259] John Dickerson of Slate says the e-mail refers to the worldwide protests against Innocence of Muslims and not the Benghazi attack.[260][verification needed]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The 2012 Benghazi attack was a coordinated terrorist attack by Ansar al-Sharia militants against two United States compounds in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11–12, 2012. The attackers, affiliated with the al-Qaeda-linked group Ansar al-Sharia, overwhelmed local security forces and used small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars, killing four Americans—including U.S. Ambassador , Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and CIA contractors Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty—while injuring at least ten others. The incident exposed profound security shortcomings at the State Department, where prior warnings of threats in —including over a dozen attacks on Western targets—were not adequately addressed despite requests for enhanced protection from personnel on the ground. The Accountability Review Board (ARB), an independent panel convened by the State Department, identified "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies" at senior levels that contributed to the vulnerability of the facilities, which operated as a lightly secured temporary mission rather than a full . Subsequent investigations, including by House committees, revealed delays in the U.S. military response due to asset positioning and command decisions, though no evidence emerged of a deliberate stand-down order. The Obama administration's initial public attribution of the attack to a spontaneous protest over an anti-Islam video—echoed by U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice—contrasted with intelligence assessments indicating a premeditated terrorist operation, fueling accusations of political manipulation to minimize perceptions of al-Qaeda resurgence ahead of the 2012 election. These discrepancies, compounded by the alteration of congressional talking points to de-emphasize terrorism, led to multiple congressional probes and enduring debates over accountability, with no senior officials facing criminal charges despite findings of negligence.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

Fall of Gaddafi and Instability in Libya

The 2011 Libyan Civil War erupted on February 15 when protests against Muammar Gaddafi's regime began in , triggered by the arrest of a lawyer and escalating into widespread clashes with security forces. Gaddafi's brutal crackdown prompted international intervention, with the authorizing a and measures to protect civilians via Resolution 1973 on March 17. assumed command of enforcement operations on March 19, conducting airstrikes against Gaddafi loyalist targets, which tilted the balance toward rebel forces backed by the (NTC). Tripoli fell to rebels on August 28, and Gaddafi was captured and killed by NTC fighters during the Battle of Sirte on October 20, ending his 42-year rule. In the immediate aftermath, the NTC declared Libya liberated on , 2011, but struggled to consolidate authority amid a exacerbated by the proliferation of from Gaddafi's vast stockpiles and the fragmentation of revolutionary militias along regional, tribal, and ideological lines. By mid-2012, Libya had devolved into de facto militia-controlled zones, with groups from , , and operating independently of the weak central government in Tripoli, undermining efforts to disarm fighters or build national institutions. Insecurity persisted, as militias engaged in turf wars, arbitrary detentions, and extortion, deterring foreign investment and stalling oil production recovery despite initial post-war gains. This instability particularly afflicted eastern Libya, including , the civil war's cradle, where jihadist networks exploited ungoverned spaces to expand. Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militia formed after the revolution, established a presence in by 2012, advocating strict implementation and opposing Western influence, while drawing on al-Qaeda-linked ideologues and looted weaponry. The government's inability to integrate or neutralize such groups—coupled with tribal rivalries and economic grievances—fostered a permissive environment for , as evidenced by attacks on Western targets and Sufi sites, setting the stage for heightened threats to diplomatic facilities.

U.S. Diplomatic and Intelligence Presence in Benghazi

The United States established the Special Mission Compound (SMC) in Benghazi in November 2011 as a temporary diplomatic outpost in the wake of Muammar Gaddafi's overthrow. This facility, comprising rented villas on approximately eight acres, aimed to engage local authorities in eastern Libya—the origin of the 2011 revolt—and assist the nation's transition to democracy. Unlike a permanent consulate, the SMC operated without formal designation or notification to the Libyan government, relying on short-term temporary duty (TDY) personnel for operations. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens arrived at the SMC on September 10, 2012, from Tripoli for a planned multi-day visit to confer with Libyan officials, evaluate regional stability, and promote U.S. interests amid post-revolutionary flux. The outpost housed seven U.S. personnel at the time: Stevens, Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and five special agents, with no locally employed staff and staffing rotations limited to periods of 10 days to over two months. Local security was provided by Libyan contractors, including four armed members of the and five unarmed guards from Blue Mountain Libya per shift. Concurrently, the maintained a separate facility roughly 1.2 miles from the SMC, housing officers focused on and the recovery of proliferated Gaddafi-era weapons, such as man-portable air-defense systems. This covert site supported broader U.S. efforts to monitor militant activities in unstable eastern , with CIA security teams equipped to defend the installation independently. The 's personnel, including contractors, later mounted a defensive response to the attack on the diplomatic compound, highlighting operational coordination between agencies despite distinct mandates.

Pre-Attack Security Environment

Intelligence Warnings and Threat Assessments

U.S. intelligence agencies provided extensive reporting on the growing terrorist threats in prior to the September 11, 2012 attack, including assessments of militant groups like Ansar al-Sharia and their capabilities. A bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee report documented ample warnings about specific risks to U.S. personnel, noting over a dozen attacks on Western diplomatic facilities and convoys in in the preceding months, such as the June 6, 2012 (IED) incident at the U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) and a May 2012 assault on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In June 2012, the issued a report identifying threats from extremists in eastern targeting U.S. interests, including potential attacks on diplomatic facilities amid post-Gaddafi instability and the proliferation of weapons from unsecured stockpiles. The similarly assessed risks, issuing a June 26, 2012 Worldwide Intelligence Review (WIRe) on security challenges facing 's successor government and highlighting vulnerabilities after an attack on a British diplomatic convoy. These assessments underscored patterns of violence by al-Qaeda-affiliated networks, including Ansar al-Sharia's operations in , but lacked a specific tactical warning of an imminent assault on the SMC on September 11. Diplomatic cables from Ambassador Christopher Stevens further reflected threat assessments, with his final cable from emphasizing escalating dangers from armed militias and the inability of local forces to secure the area. Despite these indicators—drawn from , , and open-source monitoring—U.S. agencies did not predict the coordinated mortar and small-arms assault that unfolded, though the Senate report attributed preventability to the overall intelligence picture of heightened risk rather than isolated predictive failures.

Security Requests, Denials, and Systemic Shortcomings

Prior to the September 11, 2012, attack, personnel at the U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) in and the Embassy in Tripoli submitted multiple formal requests for enhanced resources, including additional Diplomatic Security (DS) agents and fixed security upgrades to meet Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards. These requests were repeatedly denied or deferred by senior State Department officials in Washington, citing resource constraints and a policy emphasis on relying on host-nation forces to demonstrate normalization of operations in post-Gaddafi . Eric Nordstrom, who served as (RSO) in Tripoli from September 2011 to July 2012, testified that a November 2011 request for funding and resources to bolster Libya-wide was routed to the Under Secretary for Management but received no action, while a July 9, 2012, staffing request was "lost in the shuffle." Nordstrom further detailed denials of specific personnel augmentations, including a request for up to 12 additional security agents during a with a regional director, where internal resistance was described as "for me, the is on the inside of the building," indicating bureaucratic opposition within the State Department rather than solely external threats. In early February 2012, approval was granted to occupy Tripoli facilities "as is" without completed security upgrades, bypassing standard protocols, with an email noting the Under Secretary for Management's agreement to this suboptimal condition. The Accountability Review Board (ARB), an independent panel commissioned by , confirmed that repeated requests from for a steady complement of 4-5 DS agents were refused by DS leadership in Washington, resulting in only a full staffing level for 23 days between January and September 2012, forcing reliance on short-term, transient personnel with limited institutional knowledge. Systemic shortcomings exacerbated these denials, including chronic understaffing in the (DS) relative to global mission demands, deficiencies in both DS and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), and a fragmented that treated as a low priority for high-risk, temporary facilities like the Benghazi SMC. The ARB identified "systemic failures and and management deficiencies at senior levels" within these bureaus, noting inadequate responses to a deteriorating threat environment marked by prior attacks on Western targets in , such as the June 6, 2012, IED incident at the SMC gate. Overdependence on unreliable local Libyan — including the militia and undertrained Blue Mountain Libya guards—stemmed from Washington's refusal to authorize sufficient U.S. personnel or infrastructure investments, despite assessments that the compound could not withstand a coordinated assault. Congressional investigations, including House Oversight Committee hearings, criticized the ARB for downplaying senior-level while highlighting that these decisions reflected broader policy choices prioritizing diplomatic normalization over fortified protection in unstable regions.

Chronology of the Attack

Initial Assault on the Special Mission Compound

The initial assault on the U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) in commenced at approximately 9:42 p.m. local time on September 11, 2012, when a TDY (RSO) observed on security cameras dozens of armed individuals entering through the unsecured C1 pedestrian gate following reports of gunfire and an explosion. Local Libyan guards provided by the Blue Mountain Group (BMG) and the militia offered no effective resistance and fled the perimeter, leaving the compound defended primarily by five (DSS) agents. The attackers, numbering in the dozens, were equipped with small arms such as rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and possibly mortars, enabling them to rapidly overwhelm the outer defenses. Upon breaching the perimeter, the militants targeted structures near the C1 gate, using fuel cans to ignite fires in the February 17th militia's living quarters and destroying vehicles, before advancing toward Villa C, the residence where Ambassador and Information Management Officer Sean Smith were located. DSS Agent ARSO 1, who had been with Stevens, directed him and Smith to a safe haven within the villa as the duck-and-cover alarm was triggered; the remaining agents retrieved weapons and emergency kits from the (TOC) but faced blocking fire from intruders. Intruders forced entry into Villa C, ransacked the interior, and set additional fires, rapidly filling the building with thick smoke that compromised the safe haven's integrity. As visibility deteriorated due to smoke and heat, ARSO 1 attempted to evacuate Stevens and Smith through an egress window, successfully escaping himself but becoming separated from them amid the chaos; multiple re-entries to search proved futile. Sustained gunfire and RPG impacts on the TOC forced the surviving DSS agents to engage the attackers defensively while coordinating with a CIA-led security team from the nearby , which departed to reinforce around 10:05 p.m. . The initial phase of the assault subsided after roughly 90 minutes, allowing the agents to link up with arriving reinforcements, though Stevens remained missing; he was later discovered unresponsive by Libyan civilians outside the compound and pronounced dead at 1:15 a.m. on September 12 from apparent . Smith succumbed during the attack, his body recovered from the villa amid the destruction.

Escalation to the CIA Annex

Following the initial assault on the U.S. Special Mission that began at approximately 9:40 p.m. local time on , , a Global Response Staff team consisting of six CIA contractors stationed at the nearby CIA mobilized to provide aid. The , situated about 1.2 miles northwest of the , served as a base for intelligence collection on Libyan militias and arms proliferation. Departing the around 10:05 p.m. Benghazi time after receiving authorization from the base chief, the team navigated to the amid ongoing gunfire, arriving roughly 45 minutes later. Upon reaching the breached facility, the contractors engaged attacking militants with small-arms fire and suppressed an estimated 50-100 assailants, facilitating the evacuation of approximately 30 personnel, including diplomatic staff and security details. Ambassador , however, could not be located amid the chaos and smoke from fires set by the attackers; he had succumbed to earlier. By around midnight, the group loaded into armored vehicles and convoyed back to , arriving shortly after 12:00 a.m. on , with militants pursuing and firing upon them en route. This relocation effectively shifted the focal point of the violence to , escalating the confrontation as the safe haven became a secondary target. The Annex immediately came under sporadic small-arms and fire upon the evacuees' arrival, with defenders returning fire from rooftops and perimeter positions throughout the early morning hours. Attackers, including elements linked to Ansar al-Sharia, maintained pressure with intermittent barrages, though the intensity varied. The situation culminated in a precise mortar assault beginning around 4:00-5:00 a.m., targeting the Annex's main building and outbuildings where spotters had likely observed defender movements. This barrage, lasting about 10-20 minutes, inflicted fatal wounds on CIA contractors Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty, who were directing mortar counterfire from an exposed rooftop position, and injured at least 10 others. The employment of mortars indicated tactical coordination beyond spontaneous rioting, aligning with patterns of premeditated militant operations. Local Libyan militia forces, including elements of the , began arriving at the Annex around 5:30-6:00 a.m., providing limited support that helped deter further assaults until U.S. quick reaction forces from Tripoli and eventual evacuation aircraft could extract the remaining personnel later that morning. The escalation underscored vulnerabilities in inter-facility coordination and response times, as no immediate U.S. military assets were positioned for rapid intervention despite prior threat indicators.

Rescue Operations and Evacuation

A six-member CIA security team from , consisting of armed officers and an interpreter, departed for the Special Mission Compound (SMC) at 10:03 p.m. local time on , 2012, arriving under heavy fire by 10:10 p.m. They linked with local Libyan security from the 17 February Martyrs Brigade and State Department personnel to evacuate survivors amid gunfire and explosions, recovering the body of Information Officer Sean Smith by 11:10 p.m. but unable to locate Stevens during repeated searches. The team withdrew to by 11:30 p.m., transporting approximately 30 personnel, including Libyan guards, in armored vehicles while fending off pursuers. The Annex came under sporadic small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortar attacks starting around 11:56 p.m., with defenders—including CIA Global Response Staff (GRS) contractors Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty—repelling assailants using available small arms and requesting external support such as air assets and additional forces. An unarmed U.S. Predator drone arrived overhead at 11:10 p.m. for surveillance but provided no offensive capability, while U.S. military commands in and began mobilizing teams and a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) between midnight and 2:00 a.m. ; however, these units could not reach until after the attacks subsided due to distance and logistical constraints. No U.S. or intervened during the overnight defense, despite calls for rapid reaction forces. A seven-member reinforcement team, dubbed "Team Tripoli" and comprising four CIA officers, two Department of Defense personnel, and a linguist, departed Tripoli airport around 1:11 a.m. on September 12 and landed at airport by 1:15 a.m., but faced delays negotiating transport with local militias, departing for the Annex at 4:30 a.m. and arriving at 5:04 a.m. Their arrival preceded a precise mortar barrage at 5:15 a.m. that struck the Annex roof, killing Woods and Doherty—both former SEALs who had manned a position—and wounding others; the attack ended by 5:26 a.m. with no further assaults. Libyan militias provided intermittent assistance but proved unreliable, with some reports indicating they abandoned posts earlier. Evacuation commenced around 6:00 a.m. with Libyan support to secure routes to airport, where U.S. personnel departed at 6:33 a.m. Two chartered —one at 7:30 a.m. carrying survivors and a second at 10:00 a.m. with the remains of the four deceased —ferried approximately 30 U.S. personnel to Tripoli without incident. From Tripoli, evacuees were transported to safer locations, including U.S. naval assets in the Mediterranean, marking the conclusion of immediate on-site operations; all surviving were accounted for, though the response highlighted limitations in rapid deployment capabilities absent pre-positioned forces.

Casualties and Immediate Outcomes

Fatalities and Injuries

The 2012 Benghazi attack resulted in the deaths of four Americans: U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and CIA contractors Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty. Stevens and Smith were killed during the initial assault on the U.S. Special Mission compound on the night of September 11-12, 2012, with Stevens dying from severe smoke inhalation after militants set fire to the main building where he sought refuge. Woods and Doherty, both former Navy SEALs serving as contract security officers, were fatally wounded by mortar fire during the early morning attack on the nearby CIA annex on September 12. In addition to the fatalities, at least six other U.S. personnel sustained injuries, including gunshot wounds, shrapnel from rocket-propelled grenades, and burns from the fires. These included members of the diplomatic security team and CIA Global Response Staff contractors who engaged the attackers. Libyan casualties were also reported, though exact figures remain inconsistent across accounts; local and militia members assisting in the defense suffered deaths and injuries from the heavy small-arms fire, RPGs, and mortar barrages employed by the militants. The U.S. highlighted vulnerabilities in the lightly defended facilities, with no U.S. fatalities resulting from the initial breach but rather from sustained combat and .

Recovery Efforts for Ambassador Stevens

During the initial assault on the U.S. Special Mission Compound in on September 11, 2012, Ambassador separated from other personnel and entered a in the main villa building as militants set fires, filling the area with smoke. After the attackers temporarily withdrew around 10:00 p.m. local time, local Libyan individuals, including freelance videographer Fahd al-Bakoush and photographer Abdel-Qader Fadl, re-entered the compound and located Stevens in the smoke-filled . He was alive but unconscious, breathing shallowly with flickering eyelids, suffering from severe due to , and showed no other visible injuries. These locals carried Stevens from the building to a private vehicle, as no ambulances were immediately available, and transported him to Medical Center. There, attending physician Ziad Abu Zeid and staff attempted resuscitation efforts, including manual chest compressions, for approximately 90 minutes, but failed to revive him. Stevens was pronounced dead from severe , with autopsy indications of in the stomach from the smoke exposure. No U.S. personnel were present during the discovery, transport, or initial medical treatment, as American security elements were either engaged elsewhere in or at the nearby CIA annex. U.S. officials, learning of Stevens' condition through local contacts amid ongoing threats and suspicions of militia traps, instructed staff to list his as "" to minimize attention to his identity and facilitate discreet recovery. A local U.S. associate known as "Babakar" coordinated the body's retrieval from the , transferring it to Benghazi's airport later that night. The remains were then flown to Tripoli on September 12, 2012, joining other evacuated U.S. personnel, before being transported to the , arriving at on September 14 alongside the caskets of the other three American fatalities.

Attribution and Perpetrators

Identification of Ansar al-Sharia and Other Militants

Ansar al-Sharia in , an Islamist militant group formed after the 2011 Libyan revolution with ties to , was identified as the primary perpetrator of the September 11-12, 2012, attacks on the U.S. Special Mission and CIA Annex in . The group claimed responsibility via posts on platforms like shortly after the assault, with fighters documented in videos chanting Ansar al-Sharia slogans and displaying the group's black flag during the assault on the mission compound. U.S. intelligence assessments, including those from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, linked the attackers to Ansar al-Sharia's network, which sought to impose sharia law and expel Western influence from . Key individuals associated with Ansar al-Sharia were pinpointed through eyewitness accounts, surveillance footage, and post-attack investigations. , a Libyan militia leader who commanded the Umar al-Farouq Brigade and collaborated with Ansar al-Sharia, was identified as a ringleader who helped plan and execute the attacks; he was captured by U.S. forces in 2014 and convicted in 2017 on terrorism-related charges, including providing material support for the assault that killed Ambassador and three other Americans. Abu Khattala admitted to being present at the scene and coordinating with other militants but denied leading the operation during his trial and a prior New York Times interview. Another figure, Mustafa al-Imam, was convicted in 2019 on charges related to his role in the attacks, further corroborating the involvement of local Ansar al-Sharia operatives. Zubayr al-Bakoush, a Libyan national and alleged Ansar al-Sharia member, was arrested in early 2026 and extradited to the United States, where he faces an eight-count indictment including murder of Ambassador Stevens and State Department employee Sean Smith, attempted murder, providing material support to terrorists resulting in death, conspiracy, and arson related to the attack. The charges allege his direct involvement, including conducting surveillance and attempting to access U.S. mission vehicles during the assault; he was first charged in a sealed 2015 complaint. Other militants included members of affiliated local militias with connections, as detailed in U.S. House Intelligence Committee reports, which described as carried out by armed groups tied to terrorist organizations rather than unaffiliated protesters. Libyan authorities initially corroborated the identification, with officials attributing the attack to Ansar al-Sharia extremists, though some local militias like the , tasked with security, were accused of failing to intervene or indirectly aiding by warning others against interference. The FBI's investigation, launched immediately after the attack, relied on forensic evidence, intercepted communications, and detainee interrogations to confirm these attributions, leading to designations of Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi as a terrorist entity by the UN Security Council for its role in the violence. No evidence emerged of direct involvement by other international terrorist organizations like the , which was not yet prominent in at the time.

Evidence of Pre-Planning and Terrorist Motivations

The assault on the U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) in on September 11, , involved the use of military-grade weaponry, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mortars, machine guns, , and hand grenades, which required acquisition, transport, and deployment beyond the capabilities of a spontaneous mob. Attackers penetrated the compound perimeter in coordinated waves, with an initial breach followed by a second phase employing RPGs and further , demonstrating tactical sequencing rather than violence. Libyan President Mohamed Yusuf al-Magariaf stated shortly after the incident that the attack was "pre-planned, premeditated," pointing to organized preparation by Islamist extremists. Evidence of reconnaissance preceded the assault; at approximately 06:45 local time on , an individual dressed in a Supreme Security Committee (SSC) uniform photographed the SMC perimeter, suggesting prior to assess vulnerabilities. The subsequent attack on the nearby CIA Annex involved militants approaching from multiple directions in a synchronized manner, including mortar fire that struck with precision, further indicating rehearsed coordination among groups equipped for tactics. No preceding materialized, and the sudden influx of dozens of heavily armed individuals overwhelmed static defenses, consistent with a deliberate operation rather than an escalation from unrest. Terrorist motivations were evident in the perpetrators' affiliations with jihadist networks, including Ansar al-Sharia in , a militia linked to that had conducted prior assassinations and attacks on Western targets in eastern . Key figure Ahmed Abu Khatallah, a leader in the assault, was convicted on terrorism charges for orchestrating the violence as part of a planned strike against U.S. facilities, motivated by ideological opposition to American presence. The timing on the 11th anniversary of the , 2001, attacks aligned with al-Qaeda's symbolic calendar for striking U.S. interests, reinforcing ideological drivers over localized grievances. Al-Magariaf attributed the plot to al-Qaeda elements, citing their established operational patterns in the region.

U.S. Government Initial Response

Military and Operational Reactions

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was notified of the initial assault on the Special Mission Compound in approximately 30 minutes to one hour after it began at around 9:40 p.m. local time (3:40 p.m. EDT) on September 11, 2012. Within 17 to 20 minutes of the first reports, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) redirected an unarmed (UAV) already operating in the region to provide surveillance over , which arrived overhead and streamed video feeds to Washington command centers. By 5:00 p.m. EDT, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs Chairman General briefed President Obama on the unfolding events, after which DoD initiated a cross-functional team to coordinate potential rescue and evacuation options. DoD ordered the mobilization of several units in response, though none reached Benghazi in time to influence the attacks, which concluded within 8 to 12 hours. These included two Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoons from , —one deployed to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli for enhanced security, the other initially tasked for Benghazi but redirected after evacuation; the deployment faced a roughly 30-minute delay due to a Libyan request for the Marines to change into non-combat uniforms. A Commander's In-Extremis Force (CIF) of approximately 30 personnel, sourced from U.S. European Command (EUCOM) assets in due to AFRICOM's limited organic crisis response capabilities, was ordered to Sigonella Air Base in and then to , Greece, for staging but arrived too late for direct intervention. Additional elements, such as a from the U.S. East Coast and a Stryker armored battalion from Europe, were alerted and began movement, while naval assets including the and USS New York were repositioned from the to the . Fighter aircraft like F-16s at , , and AC-130 gunships were considered but not deployed, as transit times exceeded 9 to 20 hours and lacked forward air controllers or real-time targeting data on the ground. The operational focus shifted to evacuation after the compound assault subsided around midnight local time, with CIA personnel from Tripoli already en route to under their own authority. By approximately 3:42 a.m. EDT on September 12 (about 12 hours after the attack's start), all U.S. personnel from had been evacuated to Tripoli via Libyan-provided vehicles and aircraft, facilitated by on-scene CIA teams rather than U.S. military airlifts during the height of hostilities; surviving personnel were then transported to , . No U.S. military strikes or occurred, and subsequent investigations, including the State Department's Accountability Review Board, found no evidence of denied requests for available support or stand-down orders to responding forces, attributing the lack of intervention to the absence of pre-positioned assets rather than deliberate inaction. Limitations in the response stemmed primarily from geographic and postural factors: AFRICOM operated without a dedicated, fully operational at the time, relying on borrowed EUCOM units; the nearest substantial U.S. bases were in , , and , imposing minimum response times of 13 to 15 hours to ; and the attacks' brevity outpaced deployment amid incomplete real-time . Panetta later testified that the military executed "what we could" given these constraints, with no prior specific warnings of an imminent coordinated assault enabling preemptive positioning. In the aftermath, DoD enhanced AFRICOM's rapid reaction capabilities by establishing a permanent and increasing SOF presence in the region to address such vulnerabilities.

Public Communications and the "Innocence of Muslims" Narrative

In the hours following the September 11, 2012, assault on the U.S. diplomatic compound in , senior Obama administration officials issued public statements that emphasized a connection to the "" video—a poorly produced trailer depicting the Prophet Muhammad in derogatory terms—while downplaying evidence of premeditated terrorism. On September 12, President addressed the nation from the , condemning the killings of Ambassador and three other Americans as "acts of terror" in a broad sense but avoiding a specific designation of the Benghazi event as a terrorist attack, instead framing it amid regional unrest. Secretary of State , in concurrent remarks, referenced the video explicitly in relation to simultaneous protests at the U.S. Embassy in , stating that some sought to justify the Benghazi violence through similar "inflammatory material both online and in media," though she asserted no such justification existed. By September 14, White House Press Secretary reinforced the narrative during a briefing, asserting that the attack occurred "almost simultaneously" with demonstrations triggered by the offensive video and explicitly denying any evidence of pre-planning or execution as a terrorist act. This stance contrasted with early Libyan accounts, such as President Mohamed Yusuf al-Magarief's assertion of a long-premeditated operation. Two days later, on September 16, U.S. Ambassador to the appeared on five major Sunday morning television programs, including CBS's , where she described the violence as beginning "spontaneously" from a reaction to the video—mirroring events in Tripoli—and escalating when "extremist elements" with heavy weapons joined in, while insisting no intelligence indicated premeditation. Rice's talking points, derived from interagency assessments, prioritized the video's role over al-Qaeda links or planning, despite her acknowledgment of an ongoing FBI investigation. The administration maintained this framing into late September, with Obama delivering a major address to the on September 25, portraying the Benghazi attack as part of outrage "sparked" by the "crude and disgusting video" across the Muslim world, though he qualified that "no video...justifies an attack on an embassy." This speech, Obama's first major foreign policy platform post-attack, devoted significant attention to condemning the video's slander while urging condemnation of violence, amid broader appeals for tolerance between civilizations. Subsequent U.S. intelligence revisions, informed by on-site video analysis and perpetrator identifications, led to acknowledgments by late September and October that the assault was a deliberate terrorist operation by Ansar al-Sharia militants, unlinked to any preceding Benghazi protest and motivated by anti-U.S. rather than the film's release. Investigations, including congressional probes, later critiqued the initial public narrative as inconsistent with real-time evidence of planning, such as the attackers' use of coordinated weaponry and announcements of affiliation with known terrorist groups during the assault.

Libyan Government and Local Reactions

Official Libyan Statements and Actions

The Libyan government condemned the -12, 2012, attack on the U.S. Special Mission in in the strongest terms, with President Mohammed Yusuf al-Magariaf coordinating directly with U.S. officials to express condolences and pledge cooperation. On the evening of , U.S. spoke with Magariaf, who committed Libyan support for securing U.S. personnel and facilities amid the ongoing violence. The following day, September 13, President discussed the incident with Magariaf, who reiterated the Libyan government's resolve to hold the attackers accountable and emphasized joint efforts to prevent future threats. Magariaf publicly characterized the assault as a deliberate terrorist operation orchestrated by a small, organized group of approximately 50 armed militants who infiltrated what may have appeared as a larger , rejecting narratives of spontaneity. He cited intercepted communications as evidence implicating Ansar al-Sharia in the planning and execution, information shared with U.S. authorities, and indicated Libya's readiness for potential military measures against the perpetrators to restore order. Mustafa Abu Shagur echoed these sentiments, stating that an investigation was underway to identify the responsible factions, though initial assessments lacked definitive attribution to specific groups. In immediate actions, Libyan security forces responded to the attack alongside U.S. personnel, though they were outnumbered and unable to prevent the fatalities. By , authorities announced arrests of individuals suspected in the assault, as part of broader efforts to apprehend perpetrators and bolster security around foreign missions. The government vowed comprehensive probes and justice for the victims, including Ambassador , marking the incident as a pivotal challenge to Libya's post-Gaddafi stability.

Anti-Militia Protests and Militia Purges

Following the September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in , thousands of Libyan demonstrators marched through the city on September 21, 2012, chanting against armed militias and demanding their dismantlement amid widespread public outrage over the killings of Ambassador and three other Americans. The protests, which continued into early September 22, targeted Islamist groups suspected of involvement, including Ansar al-Sharia, reflecting a backlash against the unchecked power of post-Gaddafi militias that had proliferated since 2011. By September 22, 2012, demonstrators escalated actions by storming militia compounds in , overrunning bases of groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and the Rafallah al-Sahati brigade; protesters seized weapons, torched vehicles, and forced militia members to flee without significant gunfire in initial takeovers. Clashes erupted as some militiamen defended their positions, resulting in at least 11 deaths and over 60 injuries from gunfire and other violence during the assaults on multiple sites. These events marked a rare instance of civilian-led opposition overpowering armed factions, with demonstrators symbolically rejecting by occupying and dismantling militia infrastructure linked to the attack. In response, the Libyan government on September 23, , announced the dissolution of all independent militias, ordering non-state-aligned armed groups to disband or integrate under official control, a directive prompted directly by the protests. Political and military leaders negotiated agreements to bring -based militias under central authority, leading several Islamist units, including those evicted from compounds, to formally close their bases. While the purges temporarily weakened rogue elements, enforcement proved uneven, as many militias reemerged or operated covertly amid Libya's fragmented security landscape.

Major Controversies

Security Failures and Accountability for Denied Resources

The U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) in operated with grossly inadequate security measures despite repeated warnings of escalating threats in eastern , including prior attacks on Western targets such as the June 6, 2012, incident at the British diplomat compound and assaults on the International Committee of the Red Cross office. The facility lacked compliance with Overseas Security Policy Board standards, featuring insufficient perimeter walls, limited surveillance cameras, and no hardened safe haven, while relying on understaffed (DSS) personnel—only five agents were present on , 2012—and unvetted local guards from Blue Mountain Libya and the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, who proved unreliable or absent during the assault. These deficiencies stemmed from a broader State Department policy prioritizing the appearance of normalized operations in post-Gaddafi over fortified protection, resulting in a security posture incapable of withstanding coordinated militant attacks. Diplomatic personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli repeatedly requested additional resources, including more DSS agents and extensions of the Security Support Team (SST), a U.S. military unit that had been withdrawn in summer 2012 despite Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens' explicit appeals for its retention due to the compound's vulnerability to coordinated assaults. For instance, between January and September 2012, staffing for security rotations averaged just 23 days, far below requirements, as Washington officials denied upgrades citing the mission's temporary designation and resource constraints, even as intelligence indicated rising al-Qaeda-affiliated activity in the region. These denials reflected a systemic underestimation of risks, with State Department bureaus failing to allocate personnel or funding adequately, despite Stevens' August 2, 2012, cable reiterating the need for enhanced protection amid fluid security conditions. The Accountability Review Board (ARB), established by and chaired by Thomas Pickering, concluded in its December 2012 report that "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies" at senior levels in the and Near Eastern Affairs produced this inadequate posture, attributing it to poor coordination, risk misassessment, and insufficient prioritization of over other posts. The ARB highlighted that requests for additional agents were not escalated effectively due to bureaucratic silos and a culture of complacency, though it stopped short of finding that would mandate dismissals under existing statutes. Despite these findings, accountability remained limited, with the State Department disciplining only mid-level officials—such as placing four and Near Eastern Affairs personnel on in 2012—while senior leaders, including those directly overseeing security decisions, faced no formal repercussions or resignations tied to the lapses. Congressional investigations, including House Oversight Committee probes, criticized the ARB for incomplete scope and the administration for shielding executives, noting that by 2013, affected officials had been reinstated without demotion, perpetuating perceptions of insufficient consequences for decisions that contributed to the deaths of Stevens, information officer Sean Smith, and security contractors Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. The ARB recommended statutory changes to enable discipline of high-level performers in future incidents but urged no immediate actions beyond hiring more DSS staff, which Congress partially addressed through increased funding, though critics argued this evaded personal responsibility for pre-attack resource denials.

Allegations of Stand-Down Orders and Delayed Response

Allegations of stand-down orders emerged primarily from accounts by U.S. personnel on the ground during the attacks, including CIA Global Response Staff (GRS) contractors who defended the CIA annex. These individuals, including survivors who later contributed to the book and film 13 Hours: The Inside Account of What Really Happened in , claimed that a rapid response team in Tripoli was initially ordered to "stand down" or wait approximately 20-30 minutes before deploying to , despite requests for immediate assistance after the initial assault on the diplomatic compound began around 9:40 p.m. local time on , 2012. Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty, former Navy SEALs attached to the GRS, reportedly defied these instructions to provide aid, evacuating survivors from the compound before succumbing to a mortar attack on around 4:00 a.m. on September 12. The stand-down claims were amplified in congressional and media reports, with some attributing the order to CIA Chief of Base in or higher command, allegedly prioritizing caution over amid uncertain threats. Proponents argued this reflected broader hesitation from Washington to avoid escalating the situation politically during an election year, though no direct evidence linked the decision to President Obama or Clinton. Critics of the allegations, including military officers involved, testified that instructions to the Tripoli team—such as to "remain in place"—were precautionary measures due to lack of real-time intelligence, not prohibitive orders, and that the team ultimately deployed via aircraft within hours. Multiple investigations, including the bipartisan House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report released in November 2014, concluded there was no evidence of a deliberate stand-down order or denial of requested support, attributing initial delays to tactical assessments rather than political directives. The 2016 House Select Committee on similarly found no such order but criticized the U.S. military's overall response as insufficiently aggressive, noting that assets like F-16 fighters from in (over 600 miles away) or a Marine FAST team from Rota, , faced logistical hurdles including refueling, arming, and absence of approved overflight requests for , , and (ISR) assets. Response timelines showed a C-130 providing air cover by midnight but no fast-movers scrambling until after the annex assault peaked, with full military reinforcements arriving post-attack. These reports highlighted systemic issues like asset positioning in a post-Arab Spring environment but rejected claims of intentional withholding. Persistent discrepancies between eyewitness accounts and official narratives have fueled , with ground operators maintaining their experiences indicated avoidable delays, while higher-level reviews emphasized the chaos of a fluid, multi-site attack without pre-positioned forces capable of sub-hour intervention. No prosecutions or admissions of a stand-down have materialized, though the allegations underscore debates over command in high-risk diplomatic outposts.

Claims of Deliberate Misinformation and Cover-Up

Critics alleged that senior Obama administration officials, including UN Ambassador Susan Rice, deliberately promoted a narrative attributing the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack to spontaneous protests over an anti-Islam YouTube video titled "Innocence of Muslims," despite internal intelligence indicating a premeditated terrorist assault by Ansar al-Sharia-linked militants. Rice appeared on five Sunday talk shows on September 16, 2012, stating the attack appeared to stem from a protest that evolved into violence, with no mention of terrorism, even as CIA assessments from September 12 onward described the assault as carried out by "armed militants" with possible al-Qaeda ties and no evidence of widespread protests. This public messaging contrasted with classified briefings, such as a September 12 CIA memo noting the facility was "attacked by roughly 20 armed people" using RPGs and no initial protest indicators, fueling claims of intentional deception to align with President Obama's campaign assertions of al-Qaeda's defeat ahead of the November 2012 election. Draft CIA talking points prepared on September 14, 2012, for congressional use initially referenced "indications of Al Qa'ida involvement" and "extremist elements that may be affiliated with Al Qa'ida," attributing the attack to terrorists rather than a video-sparked riot. Over 12 revisions in 24 hours, involving input from State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland—who objected to references blaming media or prior warnings—and White House officials like Ben Rhodes, the document was altered to emphasize a "spontaneous" protest, excise al-Qaeda mentions, and highlight the video's role, resulting in the final version Rice used. The White House maintained these changes reflected interagency concerns over classified information and unconfirmed reporting, not political motives, though declassified emails revealed Rhodes instructing emphasis on the video's "initial" role in Cairo protests to shape public perception. Congressional investigations, particularly Republican-led probes, cited these edits as evidence of a coordinated effort to obscure the terrorist nature of the attack, potentially prioritizing electoral optics over transparency, with internal State Department cables from September 11 confirming armed assaults without protest context. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton contributed to the narrative privately and publicly; on September 12, she emailed her daughter describing the events as a terrorist attack, yet in a call with Egyptian Prime Minister Hesham Kandil the same day, she blamed the video, and President Obama referenced it in his September 25 UN General Assembly speech without naming terrorism explicitly. During her January 23, 2013, Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, Clinton deflected questions on the video-versus-terrorism discrepancy by stating, "With all due respect, the fact is we had four dead Americans. Was it because of a protest or was it because of guys out for a walk one night who decided to go kill some Americans? What difference, at this point, does it make?" Critics interpreted this as minimizing accountability for the initial misinformation, arguing it evaded scrutiny over why the administration clung to the protest story for weeks despite FBI and CIA conclusions by September 13-14 identifying Ansar al-Sharia's role and pre-attack planning indicators like surveillance of the compound. Subsequent probes yielded mixed conclusions on intent. The GOP-led House Select Committee on Benghazi's 2016 final report, after interviewing over 100 witnesses and reviewing 75,000 pages of documents, faulted the administration for a "basic level of disorder and dysfunction" in public communications but found no evidence of deliberate wrongdoing by or stand-down orders, attributing the video emphasis to "evolving intelligence" and bureaucratic caution. However, the report highlighted persistent gaps, such as delayed acknowledgment of in official statements until September 20, and criticized the for not correcting Rice's appearances promptly, suggesting systemic incentives to downplay threats amid Libya's post-Gaddafi instability narrative. Earlier Senate Intelligence Committee findings in noted that while no protest occurred, initial assessments included protest possibilities due to concurrent unrest, but affirmed the attack's terrorist character was clear by September 12, rejecting claims of a premeditated while underscoring failures in interagency coordination. Detractors, including former CIA Deputy Director —who later admitted the talking points should have called it —argued political pressures influenced dilutions, pointing to the administration's reluctance to admit vulnerabilities in a "success story" like intervention. These discrepancies persist, with empirical evidence of narrative shaping via edits and statements supporting claims of at least negligent , if not deliberate obfuscation to mitigate domestic political fallout.

Accountability Review Board and Early Inquiries

The Accountability Review Board (ARB) was convened by Secretary of State on October 4, 2012, pursuant to the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, to assess the facts and circumstances of the September 11–12 attacks on U.S. facilities in , including the deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other personnel. Chaired by former Ambassador , with retired Admiral Michael G. Mullen as vice chairman, the independent panel comprised four members with expertise in diplomacy, security, and military operations; it conducted over 100 interviews and reviewed thousands of documents over two months. The ARB's unclassified report, released on December 18, 2012, determined that the attacks stemmed from a combination of systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within the State Department's (DS) and Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), resulting in a "grossly inadequate" security posture for the high-threat environment in . It emphasized that U.S. personnel in had repeatedly sought enhanced security measures—such as additional Diplomatic Security personnel, armored vehicles, and static cameras—between June and September 2012, but these requests were denied or deferred by Washington officials citing fiscal constraints, risk assessments, and competing global priorities, despite the temporary mission's expansion to over 30 staff. The board found no evidence of "reason to systematically question the judgments" of specific decision-makers but recommended that the State Department conduct disciplinary reviews for four senior officials, including the Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya and regional security officers, for unsatisfactory leadership performance. The ARB issued 24 recommendations, later expanded to 29 in a classified annex, focusing on bolstering diplomatic worldwide, including mandatory risk assessments for high-threat posts, increased funding for protective equipment, and streamlined approval processes for security upgrades; by 2014, the State Department reported full or substantial implementation of most. It explicitly stated that the board did not assess post-attack tactical response decisions, attributing those to separate interagency reviews, and found no deliberate wrongdoing or negligence by senior leadership in real-time . Early congressional scrutiny of the ARB, including a September 2013 interim report by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, faulted the process for incompleteness, noting it failed to interview Secretary Clinton (despite her offer for a private session, which Pickering declined) and key subordinates, omitted analysis of the compound's permanent status despite its "temporary" designation, and downplayed DS and NEA roles in resource denials. The report accused the State Department of obstructing ARB access to certain witnesses and documents during the initial phase, contributing to perceptions of limited accountability; Pickering and Mullen defended the inquiry's scope in subsequent testimony, asserting it prioritized pre-attack systemic issues over exhaustive personnel reviews. Parallel early efforts included the FBI's , launched September 12, 2012, which secured the crime scenes by September 13 but faced delays in full access due to Libyan cooperation issues, focusing on forensic and suspect identification rather than failures.

Congressional Probes and Key Testimonies

Following the September 11, 2012, attack, multiple congressional committees initiated probes into the security lapses, response efforts, and initial public messaging. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held hearings as early as October 10, 2012, examining security failures at the facilities. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released interim and final reports, concluding in December 2012 that the assault was a deliberate terrorist act, not a spontaneous . These early inquiries identified deficiencies in diplomatic security protocols but faced limitations in access to classified materials and inter-agency coordination. In May 2014, the established the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in , chaired by Rep. (R-SC), to conduct a comprehensive investigation encompassing prior efforts. The committee conducted over 100 interviews, reviewed millions of documents, and held public hearings, culminating in an 800-page final report released on June 28, 2016. The report detailed chronological timelines of the attack and response, criticizing the lack of a unified command structure and delays in deploying military assets, though it found no evidence of a deliberate stand-down order. Key testimonies highlighted operational and leadership gaps. On January 23, 2013, then-Secretary of State testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Select Committee on , defending the State Department's security decisions while acknowledging broader responsibility, and famously stating, "What difference, at this point, does it make?" regarding inconsistencies in the attack's causation narrative. In a marathon 11-hour session on October 22, 2015, before the House Select Committee, Clinton reiterated that she took responsibility for systemic issues but not specific security requests denied by lower-level officials, and emphasized her focus on multiple global crises simultaneously. Other pivotal accounts came from State Department and military witnesses. Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks testified in May 2013 about post-attack communications delays and pressure to align statements with the video protest explanation. CIA and Defense Department officials, including those from the House Intelligence Committee's parallel probe, detailed challenges, with the November 2014 report affirming adequate CIA annex security but noting broader inter-agency response shortcomings. These testimonies underscored empirical failures in threat assessment and rapid reaction capabilities, informing recommendations for enhanced diplomatic protections.

Prosecutions, Convictions, and Recent Developments

The United States Department of Justice indicted multiple individuals for their roles in the September 11-12, 2012, attacks on the U.S. Special Mission and CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya, with two Libyans facing trial in federal court in Washington, D.C. Ahmed Abu Khatallah, a leader of the Abu Obaida bin Jarrah militia and accused ringleader, was captured by U.S. Delta Force in Benghazi on June 15, 2014, and extradited to the U.S. On November 28, 2017, a jury convicted him of four counts, including providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists knowing and intending it would be used in connection with a violent act, but acquitted him of 14 other charges, including murder of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison on June 27, 2018. Mustafa al-Imam, another Libyan participant who transported fighters and weapons to the attack sites, was seized by U.S. forces near on October 29, 2017. On June 13, 2019, he was convicted by a federal jury on two terrorism-related counts: conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists resulting in death and providing such support. Al-Imam was acquitted of additional charges, including , and sentenced on , 2020, to 236 months (19 years and 6 months) in prison. Libyan authorities arrested several suspects in the immediate aftermath, including members of Ansar al-Sharia, but ongoing civil unrest and militia influence limited prosecutions, with no major convictions reported in Libyan courts for direct involvement in the attacks. The Libyan government condemned the assault and pursued some detentions, yet systemic instability prevented comprehensive judicial accountability. In July 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated Abu Khatallah's 22-year sentence as "substantively unreasonably low" given the attacks' gravity, remanding the case for resentencing while upholding the convictions. No further captures, trials, or significant updates on Benghazi-related prosecutions have occurred as of October 2025.

Long-Term Implications

Political and Electoral Impact

The 2012 Benghazi attack occurred less than two months before the U.S. presidential election on November 6, 2012, providing Republican nominee Mitt Romney an opportunity to challenge President Barack Obama's foreign policy record, particularly the administration's initial attribution of the assault to spontaneous protests over an anti-Islam video rather than premeditated terrorism. During the second presidential debate on October 16, 2012, Romney criticized Obama for inadequate consular security and politicized messaging, contrasting it with the killing of Osama bin Laden as evidence of al-Qaeda's persistence. However, contemporaneous polling indicated foreign policy, including Benghazi, ranked low among voter priorities compared to the economy and healthcare, with only a minority viewing international affairs as decisive. Obama secured re-election with 51.1% of the popular vote and 332 electoral votes, suggesting the attack's immediate electoral salience was limited despite Republican emphasis. Post-election, the incident amplified partisan divisions, with Republicans launching multiple investigations into security lapses and response delays, portraying it as emblematic of Obama-era weaknesses in counterterrorism and policy following the 2011 intervention. These probes, including the House Select Committee on established in May 2014, scrutinized then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's oversight, culminating in an 11-hour hearing on 22, 2015, where she defended departmental decisions amid allegations of withheld resources and misleading public statements. A June 2016 committee report faulted military response timelines and intelligence-sharing but found no evidence of deliberate stand-down orders or criminal misconduct by senior officials, including Clinton. Polls during the 2016 campaign reflected polarized views: a 2015 /Wall Street Journal survey showed 44% of Americans dissatisfied with Clinton's handling, though post-hearing data indicated she alleviated concerns for many, with 49% trusting her over congressional Republicans on the matter. In the 2016 presidential race, factored into Republican attacks on Clinton's candidacy, reinforcing narratives of evasion and institutional bias in Democratic , yet empirical voter data suggested it was not a pivotal swing factor amid dominant issues like s and the . Clinton won the Democratic and the popular vote by 2.9 million but lost the 227-304 to , with analyses attributing her defeat more to turnout and email scandals than Benghazi alone. The episode entrenched Benghazi as a symbol in conservative critiques of elite accountability, influencing subsequent discourse on diplomatic vulnerabilities without yielding electoral penalties commensurate to the scrutiny invested, as subsequent convictions targeted low-level perpetrators rather than policymakers.

Reforms in Diplomatic Security and Intelligence Sharing

Following the release of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) report on December 19, 2012, the U.S. Department of State accepted all 29 recommendations aimed at bolstering diplomatic security, with 25 fully implemented by December 10, 2014. Key enhancements included the establishment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Programs in 2014 to oversee operations at designated high-risk posts, alongside the creation of a Framework to standardize risk assessments and accountability measures across facilities. Personnel expansions featured the hiring of 113 new agents and support staff in 2013, followed by 38 additional hires in 2014, while detachments were augmented at 35 posts, with staffing increased to a minimum of 13 at 16 high-threat locations. Funding surges supported these efforts, including $2.4 billion allocated via the 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act for embassy security upgrades and $5.4 billion overall for diplomatic security-related accounts that year. The Department's Best Practices Panel (BPP), convened in response to the ARB and issuing its report on August 29, 2013, drove further policy shifts, with 30 of 38 accepted recommendations completed by August 1, . Notable implementations encompassed the Vital Presence Validation Process, codified in the Manual for risk-based decisions on maintaining operations at high-threat sites, and the construction of the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) at Fort Pickett, , announced on April 17, , to provide advanced tactical training. By September , 30 posts were formally designated as high-threat, mandating enhanced protocols such as one-year minimum tours for key personnel, upgraded cameras (90% of high-threat posts equipped by early , with full upgrades targeted by December ), and revised interagency response mechanisms like the ALERT application for alerts. , including through H.R. 2848 passed on September 29, 2013, reinforced these by authorizing additional resources for physical and personnel security. Reforms in intelligence sharing focused on streamlining threat information flow within the State Department and with interagency partners. The Diplomatic Security Service's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis was restructured to report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, improving the timeliness and distribution of threat assessments to embassy leadership. Routine embedding of Department of Defense and Intelligence Community personnel in the Diplomatic Security and Threat Analysis Office facilitated ongoing exchanges, addressing prior gaps in real-time coordination highlighted by the events. These measures built on BPP guidance for institutionalized interagency security assessments at high-threat posts, though broader intelligence community-wide overhauls were not directly mandated by Benghazi-specific reviews.

References

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