Hubbry Logo
BerbersBerbersMain
Open search
Berbers
Community hub
Berbers
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
Berbers
Berbers
from Wikipedia

Key Information

Berbers, or the Berber peoples,[a] also known as Amazigh[b] or Imazighen,[c] are a diverse grouping of distinct ethnic groups indigenous to North Africa who predate the arrival of Arabs in the Maghreb.[38][39][40][41] Their main connections are identified by their usage of Berber languages, most of them mutually unintelligible,[40][42] which are part of the Afroasiatic language family.

They are indigenous to the Maghreb region of North Africa, where they live in scattered communities across parts of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and to a lesser extent Tunisia, Mauritania, northern Mali and northern Niger (Azawagh).[41][43][44] Smaller Berber communities are also found in Burkina Faso and Egypt's Siwa Oasis.[45][46][47]

Descended from Stone Age tribes of North Africa, accounts of the Imazighen were first mentioned in Ancient Egyptian writings.[48][49] From about 2000 BC, Berber languages spread westward from the Nile Valley across the northern Sahara into the Maghreb. A series of Berber peoples such as the Mauri, Masaesyli, Massyli, Musulamii, Gaetuli, and Garamantes gave rise to Berber kingdoms, such as Numidia and Mauretania. Other kingdoms appeared in late antiquity, such as Altava, Aurès, Ouarsenis, and Hodna.[50] Berber kingdoms were eventually suppressed by the Arab conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries AD. This started a process of cultural and linguistic assimilation known as Arabization, which influenced the Berber population. Arabization involved the spread of Arabic language and Arab culture among the Berbers, leading to the adoption of Arabic as the primary language and conversion to Islam. Notably, the Arab migrations to the Maghreb from the 7th century to the 17th century accelerated this process.[51] Berber tribes remained powerful political forces and founded new ruling dynasties in the 10th and 11th centuries, such as the Zirids, Hammadids, various Zenata principalities in the western Maghreb, and several Taifa kingdoms in al-Andalus, and empires of the Almoravids and Almohads. Their Berber successors – the Marinids, the Zayyanids, and the Hafsids – continued to rule until the 16th century. From the 16th century onward, the process continued in the absence of Berber dynasties; in Morocco, they were replaced by Arabs claiming descent from the Islamic prophet Muhammad.[50]

Berbers are divided into several diverse ethnic groups and Berber languages, such as Kabyles, Chaouis and Rifians. Historically, Berbers across the region did not see themselves as a single cultural or linguistic unit, nor was there a greater "Berber community", due to their differing cultures.[52] They also did not refer to themselves as Berbers/Amazigh but had their own terms to refer to their own groups and communities.[53] They started being referred to collectively as Berbers after the Arab conquests of the 7th century and this distinction was revived by French colonial administrators in the 19th century. Today, the term "Berber" is viewed as pejorative by many who prefer the term "Amazigh".[54] Since the late 20th century, a trans-national movement known as Berberism or the Berber Culture Movement has emerged among various parts of the Berber populations of North Africa to promote a collective Amazigh ethnic identity and to militate for greater linguistic rights and cultural recognition.[55]

Names and etymology

[edit]

The indigenous populations of the Maghreb region of North Africa are collectively known as Berbers or Amazigh in English.[41]

Tribal titles such as Barabara and Beraberata appear in Egyptian inscriptions of 1700 and 1300 BC, and the Berbers were probably intimately related with the Egyptians in very early times. Thus the true ethnic name may have become confused with Barbari, the designation used by classical conquerors.[56][better source needed]

The plural form Imazighen is sometimes also used in English.[43][57] While "Berber" is more widely known among English-speakers, its usage is a subject of debate, due to its historical background as an exonym and present equivalence with the Arabic word for "barbarian".[58][59][44][60] Historically, Berbers did not refer to themselves as Berbers/Amazigh but had their own terms to refer to themselves. For example, the Kabyle use the term "Leqbayel" to refer to their own people, while the Chaoui identified as "Ishawiyen", instead of Berber/Amazigh.[53]

Stéphane Gsell proposed the translation "noble/free" for the term Amazigh based on Leo Africanus's translation of "awal amazigh" as "noble language" referring to the Berber languages; this definition remains disputed and is largely seen as an undue extrapolation.[61][62][63] The term Amazigh also has a cognate in the Tuareg "Amajegh", meaning noble.[64][61] "Mazigh" was used as a tribal surname in Roman Mauretania Caesariensis.[62][65]

Abraham Isaac Laredo proposes that the term Amazigh could be derived from "Mezeg", which is the name of Dedan of Sheba in the Targum.[66][61]

The medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun says the Berbers were descendants of Barbar, the son of Tamalla, son of Mazigh, son of Canaan, son of Ham, son of Noah.[67][61]

The Numidian, Mauri and Libu populations of antiquity are typically understood by contemporary writers to have referred to approximately the same population as modern Berbers.[68][69]

History

[edit]

The areas of North Africa that have retained the Berber language and traditions best have been, in general, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Much of Berber culture is still celebrated among the cultural elite in Morocco and Algeria, especially in Kabylia, the Aurès and the Atlas Mountains. The Kabyles were one of the few peoples in North Africa who remained independent during successive rule by the Carthaginians, Romans, Byzantines, Vandals, and the Ottoman Turks.[70][71][72][73] Even after the Arab conquest of North Africa, the Kabyle people still maintained possession of their mountains.[74][75]

Prehistory

[edit]
Hoggar painting, Tassili n'Ajjer
An Egyptian statuette representing a Libyan Libu Berber from the reign of Rameses II (19th Dynasty) in 1279–1213 BC. (Louvre Museum, Paris)

The Maghreb region in northwestern Africa is believed to have been inhabited by Berbers from at least 10,000 BC.[76] Cave paintings, which have been dated to twelve millennia before present, have been found in the Tassili n'Ajjer region of southeastern Algeria. Other rock art has been discovered at Tadrart Acacus in the Libyan desert. A Neolithic society, marked by domestication and subsistence agriculture and richly depicted in the Tassili n'Ajjer paintings, developed and predominated in the Saharan and Mediterranean region (the Maghreb) of northern Africa between 6000 and 2000 BC (until the classical period).

Prehistoric Tifinagh inscriptions were found in the Oran region.[77] During the pre-Roman era, several successive independent states (Massylii) existed before King Masinissa unified the people of Numidia.[78][79][80][full citation needed]

Mythology

[edit]

According to the Roman historian Gaius Sallustius Crispus, the original people of North Africa are the Gaetulians and the Libyans, they were the prehistoric peoples that crossed to Africa from the Iberian Peninsula, then much later, Hercules and his army crossed from Iberia to North Africa where his army intermarried with the local populace and settled the region permanently, the Medes of his army that married the Libyans formed the Maur people, while the other part of his Army formed the Nomadas or as they are today known as the Numidians which later on united all of Berber tribes of North Africa under the rule of Massinissa.

Other sources

[edit]

According to the Al-Fiḥrist, the Barber (i.e. Berbers) comprised one of seven principal races in Africa.[81]

The medieval Tunisian scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), recounting the oral traditions prevalent in his day, sets down two popular opinions as to the origin of the Berbers: according to one opinion, they are descended from Canaan, son of Ham, and have for ancestors Berber, son of Temla, son of Mazîgh, son of Canaan, son of Ham, a son of Noah;[82] alternatively, Abou-Bekr Mohammed es-Souli (947 AD) held that they are descended from Berber, the son of Keloudjm (Casluhim), the son of Mesraim, the son of Ham.[82]

They belong to a powerful, formidable, brave and numerous people; a true people like so many others the world has seen – like the Arabs, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans. The men who belong to this family of peoples have inhabited the Maghreb since the beginning.

— Ibn Khaldun[83]

Ancestry and DNA

[edit]

As of about 5000 BC, the populations of North Africa were descended primarily from the Iberomaurusian and Capsian cultures, with a more recent intrusion being associated with the Neolithic Revolution.[84] The proto-Berber tribes evolved from these prehistoric communities during the late Bronze- and early Iron ages.[85]

Uniparental DNA analysis has established ties between Berbers and other Afroasiatic speakers in Africa. Most of these populations belong to the E1b1b paternal haplogroup, with Berber speakers having among the highest frequencies of this lineage.[86]

Additionally, genomic analysis found that Berber and other Maghreb communities have a high frequency of an ancestral component that originated in the Near East. This Maghrebi element peaks among Tunisian Berbers.[87] This ancestry is related to the Coptic/Ethio-Somali component, which diverged from these and other West Eurasian-affiliated components before the Holocene.[88]

In 2013, Iberomaurusian skeletons from the prehistoric sites of Taforalt and Afalou in the Maghreb were also analyzed for ancient DNA. All of the specimens belonged to maternal clades associated with either North Africa or the northern and southern Mediterranean littoral, indicating gene flow between these areas since the Epipaleolithic.[89] The ancient Taforalt individuals carried the mtDNA haplogroups U6, H, JT, and V, which points to population continuity in the region dating from the Iberomaurusian period.[90]

Ancient Libyan delegation at Persepolis.

Human fossils excavated at the Ifri n'Amr ou Moussa site in Morocco have been radiocarbon dated to the Early Neolithic period, c. 5000 BC. Ancient DNA analysis of these specimens indicates that they carried paternal haplotypes related to the E1b1b1b1a (E-M81) subclade and the maternal haplogroups U6a and M1, all of which are frequent among present-day communities in the Maghreb. These ancient individuals also bore an autochthonous Maghrebi genomic component that peaks among modern Berbers, indicating that they were ancestral to populations in the area. Additionally, fossils excavated at the Kelif el Boroud site near Rabat were found to carry the broadly distributed paternal haplogroup T-M184 as well as the maternal haplogroups K1, T2 and X2, the latter of which were common mtDNA lineages in Neolithic Europe and Anatolia. These ancient individuals likewise bore the Berber-associated Maghrebi genomic component. This altogether indicates that the late-Neolithic Kehf el Baroud inhabitants were ancestral to contemporary populations in the area, but also likely experienced gene flow from Europe.[91]

The late-Neolithic Kehf el Baroud inhabitants were modelled as being of about 50% local North African ancestry and 50% Early European Farmer (EEF) ancestry. It was suggested that EEF ancestry had entered North Africa through Cardial Ware colonists from Iberia sometime between 5000 and 3000 BC. They were found to be closely related to the Guanches of the Canary Islands. The authors of the study suggested that the Berbers of Morocco carried a substantial amount of EEF ancestry before the establishment of Roman colonies in Berber Africa.[91]

Antiquity

[edit]
Heracles wrestling with the Libyan giant Antaeus.

The great tribes of Berbers in classical antiquity (when they were often known as ancient Libyans)[92][d] were said to be three (roughly, from west to east): the Mauri, the Numidians near Carthage, and the Gaetulians. The Mauri inhabited the far west (ancient Mauretania, now Morocco and central Algeria). The Numidians occupied the regions between the Mauri and the city-state of Carthage. Both the Mauri and the Numidians had significant sedentary populations living in villages, and their peoples both tilled the land and tended herds. The Gaetulians lived to the near south, on the northern margins of the Sahara, and were less settled, with predominantly pastoral elements.[93][94][95]: 41f 

For their part, the Phoenicians (Semitic-speaking Canaanites) came from perhaps the most advanced multicultural sphere then existing, the western coast of the Fertile Crescent region of West Asia. Accordingly, the material culture of Phoenicia was likely more functional and efficient, and their knowledge more advanced, than that of the early Berbers. Hence, the interactions between Berbers and Phoenicians were often asymmetrical. The Phoenicians worked to keep their cultural cohesion and ethnic solidarity, and continuously refreshed their close connection with Tyre, the mother city.[92]: 37 

The earliest Phoenician coastal outposts were probably meant merely to resupply and service ships bound for the lucrative metals trade with the Iberians,[96] and perhaps at first regarded trade with the Berbers as unprofitable.[97] However, the Phoenicians eventually established strategic colonial cities in many Berber areas, including sites outside of present-day Tunisia, such as the settlements at Oea, Leptis Magna, Sabratha (in Libya), Volubilis, Chellah, and Mogador (now in Morocco). As in Tunisia, these centres were trading hubs, and later offered support for resource development, such as processing olive oil at Volubilis and Tyrian purple dye at Mogador. For their part, most Berbers maintained their independence as farmers or semi-pastorals, although, due to the example of Carthage, their organized politics increased in scope and sophistication.[95]

Berber kingdoms in Numidia, c. 220 BC (green: Masaesyli under Syphax; gold: Massyli under Gala, father of Masinissa; further east: city-state of Carthage).

In fact, for a time their numerical and military superiority (the best horse riders of that time) enabled some Berber kingdoms to impose a tribute on Carthage, a condition that continued into the 5th century BC.[96]: 64–65  Also, due to the Berbero-Libyan Meshwesh dynasty's rule of Egypt (945–715 BC),[98] the Berbers near Carthage commanded significant respect (yet probably appearing more rustic than the elegant Libyan pharaohs on the Nile). Correspondingly, in early Carthage, careful attention was given to securing the most favourable treaties with the Berber chieftains, "which included intermarriage between them and the Punic aristocracy".[99] In this regard, perhaps the legend about Dido, the foundress of Carthage, as related by Trogus is apposite. Her refusal to wed the Mauritani chieftain Hiarbus might be indicative of the complexity of the politics involved.[100]

Eventually, the Phoenician trading stations would evolve into permanent settlements, and later into small towns, which would presumably require a wide variety of goods as well as sources of food, which could be satisfied through trade with the Berbers. Yet, here too, the Phoenicians probably would be drawn into organizing and directing such local trade, and also into managing agricultural production. In the 5th century BC, Carthage expanded its territory, acquiring Cape Bon and the fertile Wadi Majardah,[101] later establishing control over productive farmlands for several hundred kilometres.[102] Appropriation of such wealth in land by the Phoenicians would surely provoke some resistance from the Berbers; although in warfare, too, the technical training, social organization, and weaponry of the Phoenicians would seem to work against the tribal Berbers. This social-cultural interaction in early Carthage has been summarily described:

Lack of contemporary written records makes the drawing of conclusions here uncertain, which can only be based on inference and reasonable conjecture about matters of social nuance. Yet it appears that the Phoenicians generally did not interact with the Berbers as economic equals, but employed their agricultural labour, and their household services, whether by hire or indenture; many became sharecroppers.[92]: 86 

For a period, the Berbers were in constant revolt, and in 396 there was a great uprising.

Thousands of rebels streamed down from the mountains and invaded Punic territory, carrying the serfs of the countryside along with them. The Carthaginians were obliged to withdraw within their walls and were besieged.

Yet the Berbers lacked cohesion; and although 200,000 strong at one point, they succumbed to hunger, their leaders were offered bribes, and "they gradually broke up and returned to their homes".[96]: 125, 172  Thereafter, "a series of revolts took place among the Libyans [Berbers] from the fourth century onwards".[92]: 81 

The Berbers had become involuntary 'hosts' to the settlers from the east, and were obliged to accept the dominance of Carthage for centuries. Nonetheless, therein they persisted largely unassimilated,[citation needed] as a separate, submerged entity, as a culture of mostly passive urban and rural poor within the civil structures created by Punic rule.[103] In addition, and most importantly, the Berber peoples also formed quasi-independent satellite societies along the steppes of the frontier and beyond, where a minority continued as free 'tribal republics'. While benefiting from Punic material culture and political-military institutions, these peripheral Berbers (also called Libyans)—while maintaining their own identity, culture, and traditions—continued to develop their own agricultural skills and village societies, while living with the newcomers from the east in an asymmetric symbiosis.[e][105]

As the centuries passed, a society of Punic people of Phoenician descent but born in Africa, called Libyphoenicians emerged there. This term later came to be applied also to Berbers acculturated to urban Phoenician culture.[92]: 65, 84–86  Yet the whole notion of a Berber apprenticeship to the Punic civilization has been called an exaggeration sustained by a point of view fundamentally foreign to the Berbers.[94]: 52, 58  A population of mixed ancestry, Berber and Punic, evolved there, and there would develop recognized niches in which Berbers had proven their utility. For example, the Punic state began to field Berber–Numidian cavalry under their commanders on a regular basis. The Berbers eventually were required to provide soldiers (at first "unlikely" paid "except in booty"), which by the fourth century BC became "the largest single element in the Carthaginian army".[92]: 86

Masinissa (c. 240 – c. 148), King of Numidia, Berber and Roman script

Yet in times of stress at Carthage, when a foreign force might be pushing against the city-state, some Berbers would see it as an opportunity to advance their interests, given their otherwise low status in Punic society.[citation needed] Thus, when the Greeks under Agathocles (361–289 BC) of Sicily landed at Cape Bon and threatened Carthage (in 310 BC), there were Berbers, under Ailymas, who went over to the invading Greeks.[96]: 172 [f] During the long Second Punic War (218–201 BC) with Rome (see below), the Berber King Masinissa (c. 240 – c. 148 BC) joined with the invading Roman general Scipio, resulting in the war-ending defeat of Carthage at Zama, despite the presence of their renowned general Hannibal; on the other hand, the Berber King Syphax (d. 202 BC) had supported Carthage. The Romans, too, read these cues, so that they cultivated their Berber alliances and, subsequently, favored the Berbers who advanced their interests following the Roman victory.[106]

Carthage was faulted by her ancient rivals for the "harsh treatment of her subjects" as well as for "greed and cruelty".[92]: 83 [g][107] Her Libyan Berber sharecroppers, for example, were required to pay half of their crops as tribute to the city-state during the emergency of the First Punic War. The normal exaction taken by Carthage was likely "an extremely burdensome" one-quarter.[92]: 80  Carthage once famously attempted to reduce the number of its Libyan and foreign soldiers, leading to the Mercenary War (240–237 BC).[96]: 203–209 [108][109] The city-state also seemed to reward those leaders known to deal ruthlessly with its subject peoples, hence the frequent Berber insurrections. Moderns fault Carthage for failure "to bind her subjects to herself, as Rome did [her Italians]", yet Rome and the Italians held far more in common perhaps than did Carthage and the Berbers. Nonetheless, a modern criticism is that the Carthaginians "did themselves a disservice" by failing to promote the common, shared quality of "life in a properly organized city" that inspires loyalty, particularly with regard to the Berbers.[92]: 86–87  Again, the tribute demanded by Carthage was onerous.[110]

[T]he most ruinous tribute was imposed and exacted with unsparing rigour from the subject native states, and no slight one either from the cognate Phoenician states. ... Hence arose that universal disaffection, or rather that deadly hatred, on the part of her foreign subjects, and even of the Phoenician dependencies, toward Carthage, on which every invader of Africa could safely count as his surest support. ... This was the fundamental, the ineradicable weakness of the Carthaginian Empire ...[110]

The Punic relationship with the majority of the Berbers continued throughout the life of Carthage. The unequal development of material culture and social organization perhaps fated the relationship to be an uneasy one. A long-term cause of Punic instability, there was no melding of the peoples. It remained a source of stress and a point of weakness for Carthage. Yet there were degrees of convergence on several particulars, discoveries of mutual advantage, occasions of friendship, and family.[111]

Saint Augustine was the bishop of Hippo Regius in Roman North Africa

The Berbers gain historicity gradually during the Roman era. Byzantine authors mention the Mazikes (Amazigh) as tribal people raiding the monasteries of Cyrenaica. Garamantia was a notable Berber kingdom that flourished in the Fezzan area of modern-day Libya in the Sahara desert between 400 BC and 600 AD.

Roman-era Cyrenaica became a center of early Christianity. Some pre-Islamic Berbers were Christians[112] (there is a strong correlation between adherence to the Donatist doctrine and being a Berber, ascribed to the doctrine matching their culture, as well as their being alienated from the dominant Roman culture of the Catholic church),[83] some perhaps Jewish, and some adhered to their traditional polytheist religion. The Roman-era authors Apuleius and St. Augustine were born in Numidia, as were three popes, one of whom, Pope Victor I, served during the reign of Roman emperor Septimius Severus, who was a North African of Roman/Punic ancestry (perhaps with some Berber blood).[113]

Numidia

[edit]
A map of Numidia

Numidia (202 – 46 BC) was an ancient Berber kingdom in modern Algeria and part of Tunisia. It later alternated between being a Roman province and being a Roman client state. The kingdom was located on the eastern border of modern Algeria, bordered by the Roman province of Mauretania (in modern Algeria and Morocco) to the west, the Roman province of Africa (modern Tunisia) to the east, the Mediterranean to the north, and the Sahara Desert to the south. Its people were the Numidians.

The name Numidia was first applied by Polybius and other historians during the third century BC to indicate the territory west of Carthage, including the entire north of Algeria as far as the river Mulucha (Muluya), about 160 kilometres (100 mi) west of Oran. The Numidians were conceived of as two great groups: the Massylii in eastern Numidia, and the Masaesyli in the west. During the first part of the Second Punic War, the eastern Massylii, under King Gala, were allied with Carthage, while the western Masaesyli, under King Syphax, were allied with Rome.

In 206 BC, the new king of the Massylii, Masinissa, allied himself with Rome, and Syphax, of the Masaesyli, switched his allegiance to the Carthaginian side. At the end of the war, the victorious Romans gave all of Numidia to Masinissa. At the time of his death in 148 BC, Masinissa's territory extended from Mauretania to the boundary of Carthaginian territory, and southeast as far as Cyrenaica, so that Numidia entirely surrounded Carthage except towards the sea.[114]

Masinissa was succeeded by his son Micipsa. When Micipsa died in 118 BC, he was succeeded jointly by his two sons Hiempsal I and Adherbal and Masinissa's illegitimate grandson, Jugurtha, of Berber origin, who was very popular among the Numidians. Hiempsal and Jugurtha quarreled immediately after the death of Micipsa. Jugurtha had Hiempsal killed, which led to open war with Adherbal.

After Jugurtha defeated him in open battle, Adherbal fled to Rome for help. The Roman officials, allegedly due to bribes but perhaps more likely out of a desire to quickly end conflict in a profitable client kingdom, sought to settle the quarrel by dividing Numidia into two parts. Jugurtha was assigned the western half. However, soon after, conflict broke out again, leading to the Jugurthine War between Rome and Numidia.

Mauretanian cavalry under Lusius Quietus fighting in the Dacian wars, from the Column of Trajan

Mauretania

[edit]

In antiquity, Mauretania (3rd century BC – 44 BC) was an ancient Mauri Berber kingdom in modern Morocco and part of Algeria. It became a client state of the Roman empire in 33 BC, after the death of king Bocchus II, then a full Roman province in AD 40, after the death of its last king, Ptolemy of Mauretania, a member of the Ptolemaic dynasty.

Middle Ages

[edit]
Fernández de Lugo presenting the captured Guanche kings of Tenerife to Ferdinand and Isabella, 1497

According to historians of the Middle Ages, the Berbers were divided into two branches, Butr and Baranis (known also as Botr and Barnès), descended from Mazigh ancestors, who were themselves divided into tribes and subtribes. Each region of the Maghreb contained several fully independent tribes (e.g., Sanhaja, Houaras, Zenata, Masmuda, Kutama, Awraba, Barghawata, etc.).[115][full citation needed][116]

The Mauro-Roman Kingdom was an independent Christian Berber kingdom centred in the capital city of Altava (present-day Algeria) which controlled much of the ancient Roman province of Mauretania Caesariensis. Berber Christian communities within the Maghreb all but disappeared under Islamic rule. The indigenous Christian population in some Nefzaoua villages persisted until the 14th century.[117]

Several Berber dynasties emerged during the Middle Ages in the Maghreb and al-Andalus. The most notable are the Zirids (Ifriqiya, 973–1148), the Hammadids (Western Ifriqiya, 1014–1152), the Almoravid dynasty (Morocco and al-Andalus, 1040–1147), the Almohads (Morocco and al-Andalus, 1147–1248), the Hafsids (Ifriqiya, 1229–1574), the Zianids (Tlemcen, 1235–1556), the Marinids (Morocco, 1248–1465) and the Wattasids (Morocco, 1471–1554).

Berber dynasties in the 15th century

Before the eleventh century, most of Northwest Africa had become a Berber-speaking Muslim area. Unlike the conquests of previous religions and cultures, the spread of Islam, which was spread by Arabs, was to have extensive and long-lasting effects on the Maghreb. The new faith, in its various forms, would penetrate nearly all segments of Berber society, bringing with it armies, learned men, and fervent mystics, and in large part replacing tribal practices and loyalties with new social norms and political idioms. A further Arabization of the region was in large part due to the arrival of the Banu Hilal, a tribe sent by the Fatimids of Egypt to punish the Berber Zirid dynasty for having abandoned Shiism. The Banu Hilal reduced the Zirids to a few coastal towns and took over much of the plains, resulting in the spread of nomadism to areas where agriculture had previously been dominant.

Besides the Arabian influence, North Africa also saw an influx, via the Barbary slave trade, of Europeans, with some estimates placing the number of European slaves brought to North Africa during the Ottoman period to be as high as 1.25 million.[118] Interactions with neighboring Sudanic empires, traders, and nomads from other parts of Africa also left impressions upon the Berber people.

Islamic conquest

[edit]
A statue of Dihya, a 7th-century female Berber religious and military leader

The first Arabian military expeditions into the Maghreb, between 642 and 669, resulted in the spread of Islam. These early forays from a base in Egypt occurred under local initiative rather than under orders from the central caliphate. But when the seat of the caliphate moved from Medina to Damascus, the Umayyads (a Muslim dynasty ruling from 661 to 750) recognized that the strategic necessity of dominating the Mediterranean dictated a concerted military effort on the North African front. In 670, therefore, an Arab army under Uqba ibn Nafi established the town of Qayrawan about 160 kilometres south of modern Tunis and used it as a base for further operations.

Abu al-Muhajir Dinar, Uqba's successor, pushed westward into Algeria and eventually worked out a modus vivendi with Kusaila, the ruler of an extensive confederation of Christian Berbers. Kusaila, who had been based in Tlemcen, became a Muslim and moved his headquarters to Takirwan, near Al Qayrawan. This harmony was short-lived; Arabian and Berber forces controlled the region in turn until 697. Umayyad forces conquered Carthage in 698, expelling the Byzantines, and in 703 decisively defeated Dihya's Berber coalition at the Battle of Tabarka. By 711, Umayyad forces helped by Berber converts to Islam had conquered all of North Africa. Governors appointed by the Umayyad caliphs ruled from Kairouan, capital of the new wilaya (province) of Ifriqiya, which covered Tripolitania (the western part of modern Libya), Tunisia, and eastern Algeria.

The spread of Islam among the Berbers did not guarantee their support for the Arab-dominated caliphate, due to the discriminatory attitude of the Arabs. The ruling Arabs alienated the Berbers by taxing them heavily, treating converts as second-class Muslims, and, worst of all, by enslaving them. As a result, widespread opposition took the form of open revolt in 739–740 under the banner of Ibadi Islam. The Ibadi had been fighting Umayyad rule in the East, and many Berbers were attracted by the sect's seemingly egalitarian precepts.

After the revolt, Ibadis established a number of theocratic tribal kingdoms, most of which had short and troubled histories. But others, such as Sijilmasa and Tlemcen, which straddled the principal trade routes, proved more viable and prospered. In 750, the Abbasids, who succeeded the Umayyads as Muslim rulers, moved the caliphate to Baghdad and reestablished caliphal authority in Ifriqiya, appointing Ibrahim ibn al Aghlab as governor in Kairouan. Though nominally serving at the caliph's pleasure, Al Aghlab and his successors, the Aghlabids, ruled independently until 909, presiding over a court that became a center of learning and culture.

Just to the west of Aghlabid lands, Abd ar Rahman ibn Rustam ruled most of the central Maghreb from Tahert, south-west of Algiers. The rulers of the Rustamid imamate (761–909), each an Ibadi imam, were elected by leading citizens. The imams gained a reputation for honesty, piety, and justice. The court at Tahert was noted for its support of scholarship in mathematics, astronomy, astrology, theology, and law. The Rustamid imams failed, by choice or by neglect, to organize a reliable standing army. This important factor, accompanied by the dynasty's eventual collapse into decadence, opened the way for Tahert's demise under the assault of the Fatimids.

Mahdia was founded by the Fatimids under the Caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi in 921, and made the capital city of Ifriqiya by caliph Abdallah El Fatimi.[119] It was chosen as the capital because of its proximity to the sea, and the promontory on which an important military settlement had been since the time of the Phoenicians.[120]

In al-Andalus under the Umayyad governors

[edit]
The Almohad Empire, a Berber empire that lasted from 1121 to 1269
Castillian ambassadors meeting Almohad caliph Abu Hafs Umar al-Murtada, contemporary depiction from the Cantigas de Santa Maria

The Muslims who invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 711 were mainly Berbers, and were led by a Berber, Tariq ibn Ziyad, under the suzerainty of the Arab Caliph of Damascus Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and his North African Viceroy, Musa ibn Nusayr.[121] Due to subsequent antagonism between Arabs and Berbers, and due to the fact that most of the histories of al-Andalus were written from an Arab perspective, the Berber role is understated in the available sources.[121] The biographical dictionary of Ibn Khallikan preserves the record of the Berber predominance in the invasion of 711, in the entry on Tariq ibn Ziyad.[121] A second mixed army of Arabs and Berbers came in 712 under Ibn Nusayr himself. They supposedly helped the Umayyad caliph Abd ar-Rahman I in al-Andalus, because his mother was a Berber.

English medievalist Roger Collins suggests that if the forces that invaded the Iberian peninsula were predominantly Berber, it is because there were insufficient Arab forces in Africa to maintain control of Africa and attack Iberia at the same time.[121]: 98  Thus, although north Africa had only been conquered about a dozen years previously, the Arabs already employed forces of the defeated Berbers to carry out their next invasion.[121]: 98  This would explain the predominance of Berbers over Arabs in the initial invasion. In addition, Collins argues that Berber social organization made it possible for the Arabs to recruit entire tribal units into their armies, making the defeated Berbers excellent military auxiliaries.[121]: 99  The Berber forces in the invasion of Iberia came from Ifriqiya or as far away as Tripolitania.[122]

Governor As-Samh distributed land to the conquering forces, apparently by tribe, though it is difficult to determine from the few historical sources available.[121]: 48–49  It was at this time that the positions of Arabs and Berbers were regularized across the Iberian peninsula. Berbers were positioned in many of the most mountainous regions of Spain, such as Granada, the Pyrenees, Cantabria, and Galicia. Collins suggests this may be because some Berbers were familiar with mountain terrain, whereas the Arabs were not.[121]: 49–50  By the late 710s, there was a Berber governor in Leon or Gijon.[121]: 149  When Pelagius revolted in Asturias, it was against a Berber governor. This revolt challenged As-Samh's plans to settle Berbers in the Galician and Cantabrian mountains, and by the middle of the eighth century it seems there was no more Berber presence in Galicia.[121]: 49–50  The expulsion of the Berber garrisons from central Asturias, following the battle of Covadonga, contributed to the eventual formation of the independent Asturian kingdom.[122]: 63 

Many Berbers were settled in what were then the frontier lands near Toledo, Talavera, and Mérida,[121]: 195  Mérida becoming a major Berber stronghold in the eighth century.[121]: 201  The Berber garrison in Talavera would later be commanded by Amrus ibn Yusuf and was involved in military operations against rebels in Toledo in the late 700s and early 800s.[121]: 210  Berbers were also initially settled in the eastern Pyrenees and Catalonia.[121]: 88–89, 195  They were not settled in the major cities of the south, and were generally kept in the frontier zones away from Cordoba.[121]: 207 

Roger Collins cites the work of Pierre Guichard to argue that Berber groups in Iberia retained their own distinctive social organization.[121]: 90 [123][124] According to this traditional view of Arab and Berber culture in the Iberian peninsula, Berber society was highly impermeable to outside influences, whereas Arabs became assimilated and Hispanized.[121]: 90  Some support for the view that Berbers assimilated less comes from an excavation of an Islamic cemetery in northern Spain, which reveals that the Berbers accompanying the initial invasion brought their families with them from north Africa.[122][125]

In 731, the eastern Pyrenees were under the control of Berber forces garrisoned in the major towns under the command of Munnuza. Munnuza attempted a Berber uprising against the Arabs in Spain, citing mistreatment of Berbers by Arabic judges in north Africa, and made an alliance with Duke Eudo of Aquitaine. However, governor Abd ar-Rahman attacked Munnuza before he was ready, and, besieging him, defeated him at Cerdanya. Because of the alliance with Munnuza, Abd ar-Rahman wanted to punish Eudo, and his punitive expedition ended in the Arab defeat at Poitiers.[121]: 88–90 

By the time of the governor Uqba, and possibly as early as 714, the city of Pamplona was occupied by a Berber garrison.[121]: 205–206  An eighth-century cemetery has been discovered with 190 burials all according to Islamic custom, testifying to the presence of this garrison.[121]: 205–206 [126] In 798, however, Pamplona is recorded as being under a Banu Qasi governor, Mutarrif ibn Musa. Ibn Musa lost control of Pamplona to a popular uprising. In 806 Pamplona gave its allegiance to the Franks, and in 824 became the independent Kingdom of Pamplona. These events put an end to the Berber garrison in Pamplona.[121]: 206–208 

Medieval Egyptian historian Al-Hakam wrote that there was a major Berber revolt in north Africa in 740–741, led by Masayra. The Chronicle of 754 calls these rebels Arures, which Collins translates as 'heretics', arguing it is a reference to the Berber rebels' Ibadi or Khariji sympathies.[121]: 107  After Charles Martel attacked Arab ally Maurontus at Marseille in 739, governor Uqba planned a punitive attack against the Franks, but news of a Berber revolt in north Africa made him turn back when he reached Zaragoza.[121]: 92  Instead, according to the Chronicle of 754, Uqba carried out an attack against Berber fortresses in Africa. Initially, these attacks were unsuccessful; but eventually Uqba destroyed the rebels, secured all the crossing points to Spain, and then returned to his governorship.[121]: 105–106 

Although Masayra was killed by his own followers, the revolt spread and the Berber rebels defeated three Arab armies.[121]: 106–108  After the defeat of the third army, which included elite units of Syrians commanded by Kulthum and Balj, the Berber revolt spread further. At this time, the Berber military colonies in Spain revolted.[121]: 108  At the same time, Uqba died and was replaced by Ibn Qatan. By this time, the Berbers controlled most of the north of the Iberian peninsula, except for the Ebro valley, and were menacing Toledo. Ibn Qatan invited Balj and his Syrian troops, who were at that time in Ceuta, to cross to the Iberian peninsula to fight against the Berbers.[121]: 109–110 

The Berbers marched south in three columns, simultaneously attacking Toledo, Cordoba, and the ports on the Gibraltar strait. However, Ibn Qatan's sons defeated the army attacking Toledo, the governor's forces defeated the attack on Cordoba, and Balj defeated the attack on the strait. After this, Balj seized power by marching on Cordoba and executing Ibn Qatan.[121]: 108  Collins points out that Balj's troops were away from Syria just when the Abbasid revolt against the Umayyads broke out, and this may have contributed to the fall of the Umayyad regime.[121]: 121 

In Africa, the Berbers were hampered by divided leadership. Their attack on Kairouan was defeated, and a new governor of Africa, Hanzala ibn Safwan, proceeded to defeat the rebels in Africa and then to impose peace between Balj's troops and the existing Andalusi Arabs.[121]: 110–111 

Roger Collins argues that the Great Berber revolt facilitated the establishment of the Kingdom of Asturias and altered the demographics of the Berber population in the Iberian peninsula, specifically contributing to the Berber departure from the northwest of the peninsula.[121]: 150–151  When the Arabs first invaded the peninsula, Berber groups were situated in the northwest. However, due to the Berber revolt, the Umayyad governors were forced to protect their southern flank and were unable to mount an offense against the Asturians. Some presence of Berbers in the northwest may have been maintained at first, but after the 740s there is no more mention of the northwestern Berbers in the sources.[121]: 150–151, 153–154 

In al-Andalus during the Umayyad emirate

[edit]

When the Umayyad Caliphate was overthrown in 750, a grandson of Caliph Hisham, Abd ar-Rahman, escaped to north Africa[121]: 115  and hid among the Berbers of north Africa for five years. A persistent tradition states that this is because his mother was Berber[121]: 117–118  and that he first took refuge with the Nafsa Berbers, his mother's people. As the governor Ibn Habib was seeking him, he then fled to the more powerful Zenata Berber confederacy, who were enemies of Ibn Habib. Since the Zenata had been part of the initial invasion force of al-Andalus, and were still present in the Iberian peninsula, this gave Abd ar-Rahman a base of support in al-Andalus,[121]: 119  although he seems to have drawn most of his support from portions of Balj's army that were still loyal to the Umayyads.[121]: 122–123 [122]: 8 

Abd ar-Rahman crossed to Spain in 756 and declared himself the legitimate Umayyad ruler of al-Andalus. The governor, Yusuf, refused to submit. After losing the initial battle near Cordoba,[121]: 124–125  Yusuf fled to Mérida, where he raised a large Berber army, with which he marched on Seville, but was defeated by forces loyal to Abd ar-Rahman. Yusuf fled to Toledo, and was killed either on the way or after reaching that place.[121]: 132  Yusuf's cousin Hisham ibn Urwa continued to resist Abd ar-Rahman from Toledo until 764,[121]: 133  and the sons of Yusuf revolted again in 785. These family members of Yusuf, members of the Fihri tribe, were effective in obtaining support from Berbers in their revolts against the Umayyad regime.[121]: 134 

As emir of al-Andalus, Abd ar-Rahman I faced persistent opposition from Berber groups, including the Zenata. Berbers provided much of Yusuf's support in fighting Abd ar-Rahman. In 774, Zenata Berbers were involved in a Yemeni revolt in the area of Seville.[121]: 168  Andalusi Berber Salih ibn Tarif declared himself a prophet and ruled the Bargawata Berber confederation in Morocco in the 770s.[121]: 169 

In 768, a Miknasa Berber named Shaqya ibn Abd al-Walid declared himself a Fatimid imam, claiming descent from Fatimah and Ali.[121]: 168  He is mainly known from the work of the Arab historian Ibn al-Athir,[121]: 170  who wrote that Shaqya's revolt originated in the area of modern Cuenca, an area of Spain that is mountainous and difficult to traverse. Shaqya first killed the Umayyad governor of the fortress of Santaver [ca] (near Roman Ercavica), and subsequently ravaged the district surrounding Coria. Abd ar-Rahman sent out armies to fight him in 769, 770, and 771; but Shaqya avoided them by moving into the mountains. In 772, Shaqya defeated an Umayyad force by a ruse and killed the governor of the fortress of Medellin. He was besieged by Umayyads in 774, but the revolt near Seville forced the besieging troops to withdraw. In 775, a Berber garrison in Coria declared allegiance to Shaqya, but Abd ar-Rahman retook the town and chased the Berbers into the mountains. In 776, Shaqya resisted sieges of his two main fortresses at Santaver and Shebat'ran (near Toledo); but in 777 he was betrayed and killed by his own followers, who sent his head to Abd ar-Rahman.[121]: 170–171 

Roger Collins notes that both modern historians and ancient Arab authors have had a tendency to portray Shaqya as a fanatic followed by credulous fanatics, and to argue that he was either self-deluded or fraudulent in his claim of Fatimid descent.[121]: 169  However, Collins considers him an example of the messianic leaders that were not uncommon among Berbers at that time and earlier. He compares Shaqya to Idris I, a descendant of Ali accepted by the Zenata Berbers, who founded the Idrisid dynasty in 788, and to Salih ibn Tarif, who ruled the Bargawata Berber in the 770s. He also compares these leaders to pre-Islamic leaders Dihya and Kusaila.[121]: 169–170 

In 788, Hisham I succeeded Abd ar-Rahman as emir; but his brother Sulayman revolted and fled to the Berber garrison of Valencia, where he held out for two years. Finally, Sulayman came to terms with Hisham and went into exile in 790, together with other brothers who had rebelled with him.[121]: 203, 208  In north Africa, Sulayman and his brothers forged alliances with local Berbers, especially the Kharijite ruler of Tahert. After the death of Hisham and the accession of Al-Hakam, Hisham's brothers challenged Al-Hakam for the succession. Abd Allah[who?] crossed over to Valencia first in 796, calling on the allegiance of the same Berber garrison that sheltered Sulayman years earlier.[122]: 30  Crossing to al-Andalus in 798, Sulayman based himself in Elvira (now Granada), Ecija, and Jaen, apparently drawing support from the Berbers in these mountainous southern regions. Sulayman was defeated in battle in 800 and fled to the Berber stronghold in Mérida, but was captured before reaching it and executed in Cordoba.[121]: 208 

In 797, the Berbers of Talavera played a major part in defeating a revolt against Al-Hakam in Toledo.[122]: 32  A certain Ubayd Allah ibn Hamir of Toledo rebelled against Al-Hakam, who ordered Amrus ibn Yusuf, the commander of the Berbers in Talavera, to suppress the rebellion. Amrus negotiated in secret with the Banu Mahsa faction in Toledo, promising them the governorship if they betrayed Ibn Hamir. The Banu Mahsa brought Ibn Hamir's head to Amrus in Talavera. However, there was a feud between the Banu Mahsa and the Berbers of Talavera, who killed all the Banu Mahsa. Amrus sent the heads of the Banu Mahsa along with that of Ibn Hamir to Al-Hakam in Cordoba. The Toledo rebellion was sufficiently weakened that Amrus was able to enter Toledo and convince its inhabitants to submit.[122]: 32–33 

Collins argues that unassimilated Berber garrisons in al-Andalus engaged in local vendettas and feuds, such as the conflict with the Banu Mahsa.[122]: 33  This was due to the limited power of the Umayyad emir's central authority. Collins states that "the Berbers, despite being fellow Muslims, were despised by those who claimed Arab descent".[122]: 33–34  As well as having feuds with Arab factions, the Berbers sometimes had major conflicts with the local communities where they were stationed. In 794, the Berber garrison of Tarragona massacred the inhabitants of the city. Tarragona was uninhabited for seven years until the Frankish conquest of Barcelona led to its reoccupation.[122]: 34 

Berber groups were involved in the rebellion of Umar ibn Hafsun from 880 to 915.[122]: 121–122  Ibn Hafsun rebelled in 880, was captured, then escaped in 883 to his base in Bobastro. There he formed an alliance with the Banu Rifa' tribe of Berbers, who had a stronghold in Alhama.[122]: 122  He then formed alliances with other local Berber clans, taking the towns of Osuna, Estepa, and Ecija in 889. He captured Jaen in 892.[122]: 122  He was only defeated in 915 by Abd ar-Rahman III.[122]: 125 

Throughout the ninth century, the Berber garrisons were one of the main military supports of the Umayyad regime.[122]: 37  Although they had caused numerous problems for Abd ar-Rahman I, Collins suggests that by the reign of Al-Hakam the Berber conflicts with Arabs and native Iberians meant that Berbers could only look to the Umayyad regime for support and patronage and developed solid ties of loyalty to the emirs. However, they were also difficult to control, and by the end of the ninth century the Berber frontier garrisons disappear from the sources. Collins says this might be because they migrated back to north Africa or gradually assimilated.[122]: 37 

In al-Andalus during the Umayyad caliphate

[edit]
Old fortress at Calatrava la Vieja. The site was used during the Muslim period from about 785 until the fall of the Caliphate of Cordova.

New waves of Berber settlers arrived in al-Andalus in the 10th century, brought as mercenaries by Abd ar-Rahman III, who proclaimed himself caliph in 929, to help him in his campaigns to restore Umayyad authority in areas that had overthrown it during the reigns of the previous emirs.[122]: 103, 131, 168  These new Berbers "lacked any familiarity with the pattern of relationships" that had existed in al-Andalus in the 700s and 800s;[122]: 103  thus they were not involved in the same web of traditional conflicts and loyalties as the previously already existing Berber garrisons.[122]: 168 

An old Amazigh room in Morocco.

New frontier settlements were built for the new Berber mercenaries. Written sources state that some of the mercenaries were placed in Calatrava, which was refortified.[122]: 168  Another Berber settlement called Vascos, west of Toledo, is not mentioned in the historical sources, but has been excavated archaeologically. It was a fortified town, had walls, and a separate fortress or alcazar. Two cemeteries have also been discovered. The town was established in the 900s as a frontier town for Berbers, probably of the Nafza tribe. It was abandoned soon after the Castilian occupation of Toledo in 1085. The Berber inhabitants took all their possessions with them.[122]: 169 [127]

In the 900s, the Umayyad caliphate faced a challenge from the Fatimids in North Africa. The Fatimid Caliphate of the 10th century was established by the Kutama Berbers.[128][129] After taking the city of Kairouan and overthrowing the Aghlabids in 909, the Mahdi Ubayd Allah was installed by the Kutama as Imam and Caliph,[130][131] which posed a direct challenge to the Umayyad's own claim.[122]: 169  The Fatimids gained overlordship over the Idrisids, then launched a conquest of the Maghreb. To counter the threat, the Umayyads crossed the strait to take Ceuta in 931,[122]: 171  and actively formed alliances with Berber confederacies, such as the Zenata and the Awraba. Rather than fighting each other directly, the Fatimids and Umayyads competed for Berber allegiances. In turn, this provided a motivation for the further conversion of Berbers to Islam, many of the Berbers, particularly farther south, away from the Mediterranean, being still Christian and pagan.[122]: 169–170  In turn, this would contribute to the establishment of the Almoravid dynasty and Almohad Caliphate, which would have a major impact on al-Andalus and contribute to the end of the Umayyad caliphate.[122]: 170 

Origin and conquests of the Fatimids

With the help of his new mercenary forces, Abd ar-Rahman launched a series of attacks on parts of the Iberian peninsula that had fallen away from Umayyad allegiance. In the 920s he campaigned against the areas that rebelled under Umar ibn Hafsun and refused to submit until the 920s. He conquered Mérida in 928–929, Ceuta in 931, and Toledo in 932.[122]: 171–172  In 934 he began a campaign in the north against Ramiro II of Leon and Muhammad ibn Hashim al-Tujibi, the governor of Zaragoza. According to Ibn Hayyan, after inconclusively confronting al-Tujibi on the Ebro, Abd ar-Rahman briefly forced the Kingdom of Pamplona into submission, ravaged Castile and Alava, and met Ramiro II in an inconclusive battle.[122]: 171–172  From 935 to 937, he confronted the Tujibids, defeating them in 937. In 939, Ramiro II defeated the combined Umayyad and Tujibid armies in the Battle of Simancas.[122]: 146–147 

Umayyad influence in western North Africa spread through diplomacy rather than conquest.[122]: 172  The Umayyads sought out alliances with various Berber confederacies. These would declare loyalty to the Umayyad caliphate in opposition to the Fatimids. The Umayyads would send gifts, including embroidered silk ceremonial cloaks. During this time, mints in cities on the Moroccan coast—Fes, Sijilmasa, Sfax, and al-Nakur—occasionally issued coins with the names of Umayyad caliphs, showing the extent of Umayyad diplomatic influence.[122]: 172  The text of a letter of friendship from a Berber leader to the Umayyad caliph has been preserved in the work of 'Isa al-Razi.[132]

During Abd ar-Rahman's reign, tensions increased between the three distinct components of the Muslim community in al-Andalus: Berbers, Saqaliba (European slaves), and those of Arab or mixed Arab and Gothic descent.[122]: 175  Following Abd ar-Rahman's proclamation of the new Umayyad caliphate in Cordoba, the Umayyads placed a great emphasis on the Umayyad membership of the Quraysh tribe.[122]: 180  This led to a fashion, in Cordoba, for claiming pure Arab ancestry as opposed to descent from freed slaves.[122]: 181  Claims of descent from Visigothic noble families also became common.[122]: 181–182  However, an "immediately detrimental consequence of this acute consciousness of ancestry was the revival of ethnic disparagement, directed in particular against the Berbers and the Saqaliba".[122]: 182 

When the Fatimids moved their capital to Egypt in 969, they left north Africa in charge of viceroys from the Zirid clan of Sanhaja Berbers, who were Fatimid loyalists and enemies of the Zenata.[122]: 170  The Zirids in turn divided their territories, assigning some to the Hammadid branch of the family to govern. The Hammadids became independent in 1014, with their capital at Qal'at Beni-Hammad. With the withdrawal of the Fatimids to Egypt, however, the rivalry with the Umayyads decreased.[122]: 170 

Al-Hakam II sent Muhammad Ibn Abī 'Āmir to north Africa in 973–974 to act as qadi al qudat (chief justice) to the Berber groups that had accepted Umayyad authority. Ibn Abī 'Āmir was treasurer of the household of the caliph's wife and children, director of the mint at Madinat al-Zahra, commander of the Cordoba police, and qadi of the frontier. During his time as qadi in north Africa, Ibn Abi Amir developed close ties with the North African Berbers.[122]: 186 

Considerable resentment arose in Cordoba against the increasing numbers of Berbers brought from north Africa by al-Mansur and his children Abd al-Malik and Sanchuelo.[122]: 198  It was said that Sanchuelo ordered anyone attending his court to wear Berber turbans, which Roger Collins suggests may not have been true, but shows that hostile anti-Berber propaganda was being used to discredit the sons of al-Mansur. In 1009, Sanchuelo had himself proclaimed Hisham II's successor, and then went on military campaign. However, while he was away a revolt took place. Sanchuelo's palace was sacked and his support fell away. As he marched back to Cordoba his own Berber mercenaries abandoned him.[122]: 197–198  Knowing the strength of ill feeling against them in Cordoba, they thought Sanchuelo would be unable to protect them, and so they went elsewhere in order to survive and secure their own interests.[122]: 198  Sanchuelo was left with only a few followers, and was captured and killed in 1009. Hisham II abdicated and was succeeded by Muhammad II al-Mahdi.

Having abandoned Sanchuelo, the Berbers who had formed his army turned to support another ambitious Umayyad, Sulayman. They obtained logistical support from Count Sancho Garcia of Castile. Marching on Cordoba, they defeated Saqaliba general Wadih and forced Muhammad II al-Mahdi to flee to Toledo. They then installed Sulayman as caliph, and based themselves in the Madinat al-Zahra to avoid friction with the local population.[122]: 198–199  Wadih and al-Mahdi formed an alliance with the Counts of Barcelona and Urgell and marched back on Cordoba. They defeated Sulayman and the Berber forces in a battle near Cordoba in 1010. To avoid being destroyed, the Berbers fled towards Algeciras.[122]: 199 

Al-Mahdi swore to exterminate the Berbers and pursued them. However, he was defeated in battle near Marbella. With Wadih, he fled back to Cordoba while his Catalan allies went home. The Berbers turned around and besieged Cordoba. Deciding that he was about to lose, Wadih overthrew al-Mahdi and sent his head to the Berbers, replacing him with Hisham II.[122]: 199  However, the Berbers did not end the siege. They methodically destroyed Cordoba's suburbs, pinning the inhabitants inside the old Roman walls and destroying the Madinat al-Zahra. Wadih's allies killed him, and the Cordoba garrison surrendered with the expectation of amnesty. However, "a massacre ensued in which the Berbers took revenge for many personal and collective injuries and permanently settled several feuds in the process".[122]: 200  The Berbers made Sulayman caliph once again. Ibn Idhari said that the installation of Sulayman in 1013 was the moment when "the rule of the Berbers began in Cordoba and that of the Umayyads ended, after it had existed for two hundred and sixty eight years and forty-three days".[122]: 200 [133]

In al-Andalus in the Taifa period

[edit]

During the Taifa era, the petty kings came from a variety of ethnic groups; some—for instance the Zirid kings of Granada—were of Berber origin. The Taifa period ended when a Berber dynasty—the Moroccan Almoravids—took over al-Andalus; they were succeeded by the Almohad dynasty of Morocco, during which time al-Andalus flourished.

After the fall of Cordoba in 1013, the Saqaliba fled from the city to secure their own fiefdoms. One group of Saqaliba seized Orihuela from its Berber garrison and took control of the entire region.[122]: 201 

Among the Berbers who were brought to al-Andalus by al-Mansur were the Zirid family of Sanhaja Berbers. After the fall of Cordoba, the Zirids took over Granada in 1013, forming the Zirid kingdom of Granada. The Saqaliba Khayran, with his own Umayyad figurehead Abd ar-Rahman IV al-Murtada, attempted to seize Granada from the Zirids in 1018, but failed. Khayran then executed Abd ar-Rahman IV. Khayran's son, Zuhayr, also made war on the Zirid kingdom of Granada, but was killed in 1038.[122]: 202 

In Cordoba, conflicts continued between the Berber rulers and those of the citizenry who saw themselves as Arab.[122]: 202  After being installed as caliph with Berber support, Sulayman was pressured into distributing southern provinces to his Berber allies. The Sanhaja departed from Cordoba at this time. The Zenata Berber Hammudids received the important districts of Ceuta and Algeciras. The Hammudids claimed a family relation to the Idrisids, and thus traced their ancestry to the caliph Ali. In 1016 they rebelled in Ceuta, claiming to be supporting the restoration of Hisham II. They took control of Málaga, then marched on Cordoba, taking it and executing Sulayman and his family. Ali ibn Hammud al-Nasir declared himself caliph, a position he held for two years.[122]: 203 

For some years, Hammudids and Umayyads fought one another and the caliphate passed between them several times. Hammudids also fought among themselves. The last Hammudid caliph reigned until 1027. The Hammudids were then expelled from Cordoba, where there was still a great deal of anti-Berber sentiment. The Hammudids remained in Málaga until expelled by the Zirids in 1056.[122]: 203  The Zirids of Granada controlled Málaga until 1073, after which separate Zirid kings retained control over the taifas of Granada and Malaga until the Almoravid conquest.[134]

During the taifa period, the Aftasid dynasty, based in Badajoz, controlled a large territory centered on the Guadiana River valley.[134] The area of Aftasid control was very large, stretching from the Sierra Morena and the taifas of Mértola and Silves in the south, to the Campo de Calatrava in the west, the Montes de Toledo in the northwest, and nearly as far as Oporto in the northeast.[134]

According to Bernard Reilly,[134]: 13  during the taifa period genealogy continued to be an obsession of the upper classes in al-Andalus. Most wanted to trace their lineage back to the Syrian and Yemeni Arabs who accompanied the invasion. In contrast, tracing descent from the Berbers who came with the same invasion "was to be stigmatized as of inferior birth".[134]: 13  Reilly notes, however, that in practice the two groups had by the 11th century become almost indistinguishable: "both groups gradually ceased to be distinguishable parts of the Muslim population, except when one of them actually ruled a taifa, in which case his low origins were well publicized by his rivals".[citation needed]

Nevertheless, distinctions between Arab, Berber, and slave were not the stuff of serious politics, either within or between the taifas. It was the individual family that was the unit of political activity."[134]: 13  The Berber that arrived towards the end of the caliphate as mercenary forces, says Reilly, amounted to only about 20 thousand people in a total al-Andalusi population of six million. Their high visibility was due to their foundation of taifa dynasties rather than large numbers.[134]: 13 

In the power hierarchy, Berbers were situated between the Arabic aristocracy and the Muladi populace. Ethnic rivalry was one of the most important factors driving Andalusi politics. Berbers made up as much as 20% of the population of the occupied territory.[135]

In al-Andalus under the Almoravids

[edit]
The Almoravid realm at its greatest extent, c. 1120

During the taifa period, the Almoravid empire developed in northwest Africa, whose core was formed by the Lamtuna branch of the Sanhaja Berber.[134]: 99  In the mid-11th century, they allied with the Guddala and Massufa Berber. At that time, the Almoravid leader Yahya ibn Ibrahim went on a hajj. On his way back he met Malikite preachers in Kairouan, and invited them to his land. Malikite disciple Abd Allah ibn Yasin accepted the invitation. Traveling to Morocco, he established a military monastery or ribat where he trained a highly motivated and disciplined fighting force. In 1054 and 1055, employing these specially trained forces, Almoravid leader Yahya ibn Umar defeated the Kingdom of Ghana and the Zenata Berber. After Yahya ibn Umar died, his brother Abu Bakr ibn Umar pursued an Almoravid expansion. Forced to resolve a Sanhaja civil war, he left control of the Moroccan conquests to his brother, Yusuf ibn Tashfin. Yusuf continued to conquer territory; and following Abu Bakr's death in 1087, he became the Almoravid leader.[134]: 100–101 

After their loss of Cordoba, the Hammudids had occupied Algeciras and Ceuta. In the mid-11th century, the Hammudids lost control of their Iberian possessions, but retained a small taifa kingdom based in Ceuta. In 1083, Yusuf ibn Tashufin conquered Ceuta. In the same year, al-Mutamid, king of the Taifa of Seville, traveled to Morocco to appeal to Yusuf for help against King Alfonso VI of Castile. Earlier, in 1079, the king of Badajoz, al-Mutawakkil, had appealed to Yusuf for help against Alfonso. After the fall of Toledo to Alfonso VI in 1085, al-Mutamid appealed again to Yusuf. This time, financed by the taifa kings of Iberia, Yusuf crossed to al-Andalus and took direct personal control of Algeciras in 1086.[134]: 102–103 

Modern history

[edit]
Berber village in the High Atlas mountains of Morocco

The Kabylians were independent of outside control during the period of Ottoman Empire rule in North Africa. They lived primarily in three states or confederations: the Kingdom of Ait Abbas, Kingdom of Kuku, and the principality of Aït Jubar.[136] The Kingdom of Ait Abbas was a Berber state of North Africa, controlling Lesser Kabylie and its surroundings from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century. It is referred to in the Spanish historiography as reino de Labes;[137] sometimes more commonly referred to by its ruling family, the Mokrani, in Berber At Muqran (Arabic: أولاد مقران Ouled Moqrane). Its capital was the Kalâa of Ait Abbas, an impregnable citadel in the Biban mountain range.

The most serious native revolt against colonial power in French Algeria since the time of Abd al-Qadir broke out in 1871 in the Kabylie and spread through much of Algeria. By April 1871, 250 tribes had risen, or nearly a third of Algeria's population.[138] In the aftermath of this revolt and until 1892, the Kabyle myth, which supposed a variety of stereotypes based on a binary between Arabs and Kabyle people, reached its climax.[139][140]

In 1902, the French penetrated the Hoggar Mountains and defeated Ahaggar Tuareg in the battle of Tit.

Abd el-Krim featured in the magazine Time in 1925

In 1912, Morocco was divided into French and Spanish zones.[141] The Rif Berbers rebelled, led by Abd el-Krim, a former officer of the Spanish administration. In July 1921, the Spanish army in northeastern Morocco, under Manuel Silvestre, were routed by the forces of Abd el-Krim, in what became known in Spain as the Disaster of Annual. The Spaniards may have lost up to 22,000 soldiers at Annual and in subsequent fighting.[142]

During the Algerian War (1954–1962), the FLN and ALN's reorganisation of the country created, for the first time, a unified Kabyle administrative territory, wilaya III, being as it was at the centre of the anti-colonial struggle.[143] From the moment of Algerian independence, tensions developed between Kabyle leaders and the central government.[144]

Soon after gaining independence in the middle of the twentieth century, the countries of North Africa established Arabic as their official language, replacing French, Spanish, and Italian; although the shift from European colonial languages to Arabic for official purposes continues even to this day. As a result, most Berbers had to study and know Arabic, and had no opportunities until the twenty-first century to use their mother tongue at school or university. This may have accelerated the existing process of Arabization of Berbers, especially in already bilingual areas, such as among the Chaouis of Algeria. Tamazight is now taught in Aurès since the march led by Salim Yezza [fr] in 2004.

While Berberism had its roots before the independence of these countries, it was limited to the Berber elite. It only began to succeed among the greater populace when North African states replaced their European colonial languages with Arabic and identified exclusively as Arabian nations, downplaying or ignoring the existence and the social specificity of Berbers. However, Berberism's distribution remains uneven. In response to its demands, Morocco and Algeria have both modified their policies, with Algeria redefining itself constitutionally as an "Arab, Berber, Muslim nation".

There is an identity-related debate about the persecution of Berbers by the Arab-dominated regimes of North Africa through both Pan-Arabism and Islamism,[145] their issue of identity is due to the pan-Arabist ideology of former Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Some activists have claimed that "[i]t is time—long past overdue—to confront the racist arabization of the Amazigh lands."[146]

Demonstration of Kabyles in Paris, April 2016

The Black Spring was a series of violent disturbances and political demonstrations by Kabyle activists in the Kabylie region of Algeria in 2001. In the 2011 Libyan civil war, Berbers in the Nafusa Mountains were quick to revolt against the Gaddafi regime. The mountains became a stronghold of the rebel movement, and were a focal point of the conflict, with much fighting occurring between rebels and loyalists for control of the region.[4] The Tuareg Rebellion of 2012 was waged against the Malian government by rebels with the goal of attaining independence for the northern region of Mali, known as Azawad.[147] Since late 2016, massive riots have spread across Moroccan Berber communities in the Rif region. Another escalation took place in May 2017.[148]

In Morocco, after the constitutional reforms of 2011, Berber has become an official language, and is now taught as a compulsory language in all schools regardless of the area or the ethnicity. In 2016, Algeria followed suit and changed the status of Berber from "national" to "official" language.

Although Berberists who openly show their political orientations rarely reach high positions, Berbers have reached high positions in the social and political hierarchies across the Maghreb. Examples are the former president of Algeria, Liamine Zeroual; the former prime minister of Morocco, Driss Jettou; and Khalida Toumi, a feminist and Berberist militant, who has been nominated as head of the Ministry of Communication in Algeria.

Arabization

[edit]

The Arabization of the indigenous Berber populations was a result of the centuries-long Arab migrations to the Maghreb which began since the 7th century, in addition to changing the population's demographics. The early wave of migration prior to the 11th century contributed to the Berber adoption of Arab culture. Furthermore, the Arabic language spread during this period and drove Latin into extinction in the cities. The Arabization took place around Arab centres through the influence of Arabs in the cities and rural areas surrounding them.[149]

The migration of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym in the 11th century had a much greater influence on the process of Arabization of the population. It played a major role in spreading Bedouin Arabic to rural areas such as the countryside and steppes, and as far as the southern areas near the Sahara.[149] It also heavily transformed the culture in the Maghreb into Arab culture, and spread nomadism in areas where agriculture was previously dominant.[150] These Bedouin tribes accelerated and deepened the Arabization process, since the Berber population was gradually assimilated by the newcomers and had to share with them pastures and seasonal migration paths. By around the 15th century, the region of modern-day Tunisia had already been almost completely Arabized.[51] As Arab nomads spread, the territories of the local Berber tribes were moved and shrank. The Zenata were pushed to the west and the Kabyles were pushed to the north. The Berbers took refuge in the mountains whereas the plains were Arabized.[151]

Currently, most Arabized Berbers identify as Berber, although the prominence of Arab influences has fully assimilated them into the Arab cultural sphere.[152]

Contemporary demographics

[edit]
Sanhaja Berber women in the 1970s

Ethnic groups

[edit]

Ethnically, Berbers comprise a minority population in the Maghreb. Berbers comprise 15%[153] to 25%[154] the population of Algeria, 10%[155] of Libya, 31%[156] to 35%[157] of Morocco, and 1%[158] of Tunisia. Berber language speakers in the Maghreb comprise 30%[4] to 40%[159][better source needed][16][better source needed] of the Moroccan population, and 15%[160] to 35%[16][better source needed] of the Algerian population, with smaller communities in Libya and very small groups in Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania.[161] Berber languages in total are spoken by around 14 million[162] to 16 million[163] people in Africa.

Berber village in the Atlas mountains

Prominent Berber ethnic groups include the Kabyles—from Kabylia, a historical autonomous region of northern Algeria—who number about six million and have kept, to a large degree, their original language and society; and the Shilha or Chleuh—in High and Anti-Atlas and Sous Valley of Morocco—who number about eight million.[citation needed] Other groups include the Riffians of northern Morocco, the Chaoui people of eastern Algeria, the Chenouas in western Algeria and the Nafusis of the Nafusa Mountains.

Outside the Maghreb, the Tuareg in Mali (early settlement near the old imperial capital of Timbuktu),[164] Niger, and Burkina Faso number some 850,000,[20] 1,620,000,[165] and 50,000, respectively. Tuaregs are a Berber ethnic group with a traditionally nomadic pastoralist lifestyle and are the principal inhabitants of the vast Sahara Desert.[166][167]

List of Berber ethnic groups
Ethnic group Country Regions Ethnic population Linguistic population
Chaouis ALG Aurès Mountains, eastern Algeria 2,870,000[168] Including 2,130,000 speakers of Shawiya language[169]
Chenouas ALG Mount Chenoua, western Algeria 106,000[170] Including 76,000 speakers of Shenwa language[171]
Chleuhs MAR High Atlas, Anti-Atlas and the Sous valley, southern Morocco 3,500,000[172]
Djerbas TUN Djerba, southern Tunisia 11,000[173]
Ghomaras MAR Western Rif, northern Morocco 12,000[174] Including 10,000 speakers of Ghomara language[citation needed]
Guezula MRT Southern Mauritania Unknown
Kabyles ALG Kabylia, northern Algeria 6,000,000[175] Including 3,000,000 speakers of Kabyle language[176]
Matmatas TUN Matmata, southern Tunisia 3,700
Mozabites ALG M'zab Valley, central Algeria 200,000[177] Including 150,000 speakers of Mozabite language[178]
Nafusis LBY Jabal Nafusa, western Libya 186,000[179] Including 140,000 speakers of Nafusi language[180]
Riffians MAR Rif, northern Morocco 1,500,000 Including 1,271,000 speakers of Tarifit language[181]
Siwi EGY Siwa Oasis, western Egypt 24,000[46] Including 20,000 speakers of Siwi language[182]
Tuareg ALG
MLI
NIG
Sahara, northern Mali and Niger, and southern Algeria 4,000,000
Central Atlas Amazigh MAR Middle Atlas, Morocco 2,867,000[183] Including 2,300,000 speakers of Central Atlas Tamazight[181]
Zuwaras LBY Zuwarah, northwestern Libya 280,000 247,000 speakers of Zuwara language[184]

Genetics

[edit]

Genetically, the Berbers form the principal indigenous ancestry in the region.[185][186] Haplogroup E1b1b is the most frequent among Maghrebi groups, especially the downstream lineage of E1b1b1b1a, which is typical of the indigenous Berbers of North-West Africa. On the other hand, Haplogroup J1 is the second most frequent among Maghrebi groups and is more indicative of Middle East origins, and has its highest distribution among populations in the southern Arabian Peninsula. E1b1b1b accounts for 45% of North Africans, while Haplogroup J1-M267 accounts for 30% of North Africans, and has spread from Arabia.[187]

The Semitic-speaking presence in the Maghreb is mainly due to the migratory movements of Phoenicians in the 3rd century BC and large scale migrations of Arab Bedouin tribes in the 11th century AD such as Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, as well as other waves that occurred during the Arab migrations to the Maghreb (c. 7th century – 17th century). The results of a study from 2017 suggest that these Arab migrations to the Maghreb were mainly a demographic process that heavily implied gene flow and remodeled the genetic structure of the Maghreb.[188]

DNA studies of Iberomaurusian peoples at Taforalt, Morocco dating to around 15,000 years ago have found them to have a distinctive Maghrebi ancestry formed from a mixture of Near Eastern and African ancestry, which is still found as a part of the genome of modern Northwest Africans.[189] A 2025 study sequenced individuals from Takarkori (7,000 YBP) and discovered that most of their ancestry was from an unknown Ancestral North African lineage, related to the African admixture component found in Iberomaurusians.[190] According to the study, the Takarkori people were distinct from both contemporary sub-Saharan Africans and non-Africans/Eurasians. They had "only a minor component of non-African ancestry" but did "not carry sub-Saharan African ancestry, suggesting that, contrary to previous interpretations, the Green Sahara was not a corridor connecting Northern and sub-Saharan Africa."[191]

Later during the Neolithic, from around 7,500 years ago onwards, there was a migration into Northwest Africa of European Neolithic Farmers from the Iberian Peninsula (who had originated in Anatolia several thousand years prior), as well as pastoralists from the Levant, both of whom also significantly contributed to the ancestry of modern Northwest Africans.[192] The proto-Berber tribes evolved from these prehistoric communities during the late Bronze- and early Iron ages.[193]

Diaspora

[edit]
French former footballer Zinedine Zidane, born to Berber Kabyle parents from Algeria

According to a 2004 estimate, there were about 2.2 million Berber immigrants in Europe, especially the Riffians in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France; and Algerians of Kabyles and Chaouis heritage in France.[194]

Politics

[edit]

Berberism

[edit]

Since the 1970s,[195]: 209  a political movement, initially led by the Kabyles of Algeria, has developed among various parts of the Berber populations of North Africa to promote a collective Amazigh ethnic identity.[55] It is variously referred to as Amazighism,[196] Berberism,[195] the Berber identity movement, or the Berber Culture Movement.[55] The movement does not have a specific organization and cuts across both modern national boundaries and traditional tribal divisions. It is generally consistent in its demands, which include greater linguistic rights for Berber languages and greater official and social recognition of Amazigh culture.[55] These Berberists also aimed to counter the image that Berbers were a mere collection of disparate tribes speaking mutually incomprehensible languages. They did this by introducing "Imazighen" as a collective term of self-referral and claimed that the various Berber languages once constituted a single language.[53]

The political outcomes have been different in each country of the Maghreb and are shaped by other factors such as geography and socioeconomic circumstances. In Algeria, the politics of the movement were focused in Kabylie, were more overtly political, and have sometimes been confrontational. In Morocco, where Amazigh populations are spread across a wider area, the movement has been less overtly political and confrontational.[55][195]: 213  In the 1990s, both states made concessions to this movement or attempted to ally itself with it, partly in response to the challenge of other political forces such as Islamism.[195]: 214 

Political tensions

[edit]

Over the past few decades, political tensions have arisen between some Berber groups (especially the Kabyles and Rifians) and North African governments, partly over linguistic and social issues. For example, in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, giving children Berber names was banned.[197][198][199] In Morocco, the Arabic language and Arab culture occupied a superior position in official and social domains. The Arabist ideology was popular among Moroccan society, as well as within bureaucratic cadres and the political parties.[200] The regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya also banned the teaching of Berber languages, and, in a 2008 leaked diplomatic cable, the Libyan leader warned Berber minorities: "You can call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes – Berbers, Children of Satan, whatever – but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes."[201] He denied the existence of Berbers as a separate ethnicity, and called them a "product of colonialism" created by the West to divide Libya.[202][203] As a result of the persecution suffered under Gaddafi's rule, many Berbers joined the Libyan opposition in the 2011 Libyan civil war.[204]

In contrast, many Berber students in Morocco supported Nasserism and Arabism, rather than Berberism. Many educated Berbers were attracted to the leftist National Union of Popular Forces rather than the Berber-based Popular Movement.[200]

Languages

[edit]
Areas in North Africa where Berber languages are spoken
Tifinagh in Tifinagh

The Berber languages form a branch of the Afroasiatic language family, a large family that also includes Semitic languages like Arabic and the Ancient Egyptian language.[205][206] Most Berbers speak Arabic and French.[207]

Tamazight is a generic name for all of the Berber languages, which consist of many closely related varieties and dialects. Among these Berber languages are Riffian, Zuwara, Kabyle, Shilha, Siwi, Zenaga, Sanhaja, Tazayit (Central Atlas Tamazight), Tumẓabt (Mozabite), Nafusi, and Tamasheq, as well as the ancient Guanche language.

Most Berber languages have a high percentage of borrowing and influence from the Arabic language, as well as from other languages.[208] For example, Arabic loanwords represent 35%[209] to 46%[210] of the total vocabulary of the Kabyle language and represent 51.7% of the total vocabulary of Tarifit.[211] The least influenced are the Tuareg languages.[208] Almost all Berber languages took from Arabic the pharyngeal fricatives /ʕ/ and /ħ/, the (nongeminated) uvular stop /q/, and the voiceless pharyngealized consonant /ṣ/.[212] In turn, Berber languages have influenced local dialects of Arabic. Although Maghrebi Arabic has a predominantly Semitic and Arabic vocabulary,[213] it contains a few Berber loanwords which represent 2–3% of the vocabulary of Libyan Arabic, 8–9% of Algerian Arabic and Tunisian Arabic, and 10–15% of Moroccan Arabic.[214]

Berber languages in total are spoken by around 14 million[162] to 16 million[163] people in Africa (see population estimation). These Berber speakers are mainly concentrated in Morocco and Algeria, followed by Mali, Niger, and Libya. Smaller Berber-speaking communities are also found as far east as Egypt, with a southwestern limit today at Burkina Faso.

Religion

[edit]
The mausoleum of Madghacen
Traditional Berber penannular brooch, a custom dating from the pre-Abrahamic era.

The Berber identity encompasses language, religion, and ethnicity, and is rooted in the entire history and geography of North Africa. Berbers are not an entirely homogeneous ethnicity, and they include a range of societies, ancestries, and lifestyles. The unifying forces for the Berber people may be their shared language or a collective identification with Berber heritage and history.

As a legacy of the spread of Islam, the Berbers are now mostly Sunni Muslim. However, the Mozabite Berbers of the M'zab Valley in the town of Ghardaïa in Algeria and some Libyan Berbers in the Nafusa Mountains and Zuwara are primarily adherents of Ibadi Islam.

In antiquity, before the arrival of Abrahamic faiths into North Africa, the Berber people adhered to the traditional Berber religion. This traditional religion emphasized ancestor veneration, polytheism, and animism. Many ancient Berber beliefs were developed locally. Whereas others were influenced over time through contact with other traditional African religions (such as the Ancient Egyptian religion), or borrowed during antiquity from the Punic religion, Judaism, Iberian mythology, and the Hellenistic religion. The most recent influence came from Islam and pre-Islamic Arab religion during the medieval period. Some of the ancient Berber beliefs still subtly exist today within the Berber popular culture and tradition.

Until the 1960s, there was also a significant Jewish Berber minority in Morocco,[215] but emigration (mostly to Israel and France) dramatically reduced their number to only a few hundred individuals.

Following Christian missions, the Kabyle community in Algeria has a recently constituted Christian minority, both Protestant and Roman Catholic; and a 2015 study estimates that 380,000 Muslim Algerians have converted to Christianity in Algeria.[30] There are Berbers among the 8,000[216]–40,000[217] Moroccans who have converted to Christianity in the last decades, some of whom explain their conversion as an attempt to go back to their "Christian sources".[218] The International Religious Freedom Report for 2007 estimates that thousands of Tunisian Berber Muslims have converted to Christianity.[219][220]

Architecture

[edit]

Antiquity

[edit]

Some of the earliest evidence of original Amazigh culture in North Africa has been found in the highlands of the Sahara and dates from the second millennium BC, when the region was much less arid than it is today and when the Amazigh population was most likely in the process of spreading across North Africa.[221]: 15–22  Numerous archaeological sites associated with the Garamantes have been found in the Fezzan (in present-day Libya), attesting to the existence of small villages, towns, and tombs. At least one settlement dates from as early as 1000 BC. The structures were initially built in dry stone, but around the middle of the millennium (c. 500 BC) they began to be built with mudbrick instead.[221]: 23  By the second century AD there is evidence of large villas and more sophisticated tombs associated with the aristocracy of this society, in particular at Germa.[221]: 24 

Further west, the kingdom of Numidia was contemporary with the Phoenician civilization of Carthage and the Roman Republic. Among other things, the Numidians have left thousands of pre-Christian tombs. The oldest of these is Medracen in present-day Algeria, believed to date from the time of Masinissa (202–148 BC). Possibly influenced by Greek architecture further east, or built with the help of Greek craftsmen, the tomb consists of a large tumulus constructed in well-cut ashlar masonry and featuring sixty Doric columns and an Egyptian-style cornice.[221]: 27–29  Another famous example is the Tomb of the Christian Woman in western Algeria. This structure consists of columns, a dome, and spiral pathways that lead to a single chamber.[222] A number of "tower tombs" from the Numidian period can also be found in sites from Algeria to Libya. Despite their wide geographic range, they often share a similar style: a three-story structure topped by a convex pyramid. They may have initially been inspired by Greek monuments but they constitute an original type of structure associated with Numidian culture. Examples of these are found at Siga, Soumaa d'el Khroub, Dougga, and Sabratha.[221]: 29–31 

Mediterranean empires of Carthage and Rome left their mark in the material culture of North Africa as well. Phoenician and Punic (Carthaginian) remains can be found at Carthage itself and at Lixus. Numerous remains of Roman architecture can be found across the region, such as the amphitheatre of El Jem and the archaeological sites of Sabratha, Timgad, and Volubilis, among others.[223]

After the Muslim conquest

[edit]

After the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Maghreb in the 7th and early 8th centuries, Islamic architecture developed in the region. Various dynasties, either based in North Africa or beyond it, contributed to the architecture of the region, including the Aghlabids, the Fatimids, and the Umayyads of Cordoba. In addition to the general "Moorish" style prevalent in North Africa during the Islamic period, some architectural styles and structures in North Africa are distinctively associated with areas that have maintained strong Berber populations and cultures, including but not limited to the Atlas Mountain regions of Morocco, the Aurès and M'zab regions of Algeria, and southern Tunisia.[224] They do not form one single architectural style but rather a diverse variety of local vernacular styles.[224] Berber ruling dynasties also contributed to the formation and patronage of western Islamic art and architecture through their political domination of the region between the 11th and 16th centuries (during the rule of the Almoravids, Almohads, Marinids and Hafsids, among others).[225][224][226]

In Morocco, the largely Berber-inhabited rural valleys and oases of the Atlas and the south are marked by numerous kasbahs (fortresses) and ksour (fortified villages), typically flat-roofed structures made of rammed earth and decorated with local geometric motifs, as with the famous example of Ait Benhaddou.[224][227][228] Likewise, southern Tunisia is dotted with hilltop ksour and multi-story fortified granaries (ghorfa), such as the examples in Medenine and Ksar Ouled Soltane, which are typically built with loose stone bound by a mortar of clay.[224] Fortified granaries also exist in the Aures region of Algeria,[229] or in the form of agadirs of which numerous examples can be found in Morocco.[224][230] The island of Jerba in Tunisia, traditionally dominated by Ibadi Berbers,[231] has a traditional style of mosque architecture that consists of low-lying structures built in stone and covered in whitewash. Their prayer halls are domed and they have short, often round minarets.[231][224] The mosques are often described as "fortified mosques" because the island's flat topography made it vulnerable to attacks and as a result the mosques were designed in part to act as watch posts along the coast or in the countryside.[232][233] The M'zab region of Algeria (e.g. Ghardaïa) also has distinctive mosques and houses that are completely whitewashed, but built in rammed earth. The structures here also make frequent use of domes and barrel vaults. Unlike in Jerba, the distinctive minarets in this region are tall and have a square base, tapering towards the end and crowned with "horn"-like corners.[231][224]

Culture and arts

[edit]

Social context

[edit]

The traditional social structure of the Berbers has been tribal. A leader is appointed to command the tribe. In the Middle Ages, many women had the power to govern, such as Dihya and Tazoughert Fatma in the Aurès Mountains, Tin Hinan in the Hoggar, and Chemci in Aït Iraten [ar]. Lalla Fatma N'Soumer was a Berber woman in Kabylie who fought against the French.

The majority of Berber tribes currently have men as heads of the tribe. In Algeria, the el Kseur platform in Kabylie gives tribes the right to fine criminal offenders. In areas of Chaoui, tribal leaders enact sanctions against criminals.[234] The Tuareg have a king who decides the fate of the tribe and is known as Amenokal; it is a very hierarchical society. The Mozabites are governed by the spiritual leaders of Ibadism and lead communal lives. During the crisis of Berriane between the Maliki and Ibadite movements, the heads of each tribe began talks to end the crisis and resolved the problem.[235][full citation needed]

Berber wedding in Morocco

In marriages, the man usually selects the woman, and depending on the tribe, the family often makes the decision. In contrast, in the Tuareg culture, the woman chooses her future husband. The rites of marriage are different for each tribe. Families are either patriarchal or matriarchal, according to the tribe.[236]

Traditionally, men take care of livestock. They migrate by following the natural cycle of grazing, and seeking water and shelter. They are thus assured of an abundance of wool, cotton, and plants used for dyeing. For their part, women look after the family and handicrafts – first for their personal use, and secondly for sale in the souqs in their locality.

Visual arts

[edit]

The Berber tribes traditionally weave kilims (tapestry-woven carpets), whose designs maintain the traditional appearance and distinctiveness of the region of origin of each tribe, which has in effect its own repertoire of drawings. The plain weave textile designs include a wide variety of stripes and, more rarely, geometrical patterns such as triangles and diamonds. Additional decorations such as sequins or fringes, are typical of Berber weave in Morocco. The nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle of the Berbers is suitable for weaving kilims.[237] In Algeria, the cloak-like kachabia is typical Berber masculine clothing.

Traditional Berber jewelry is a style of jewellery, originally worn by women and girls of different rural Berber groups of Morocco, Algeria and other North African countries. It is usually made of silver and includes elaborate triangular plates and pins, originally used as clasps for garments, necklaces, bracelets, earrings and similar items. In modern times, these types of jewellery are produced also in contemporary variations and sold as a commercial product of ethnic-style fashion.[238]

From December 2004 to August 2006, the Peabody Museum of Archeology and Ethnology at Harvard University presented the exhibition Imazighen! Beauty and Artisanship in Berber Life, curated by Susan Gilson Miller and Lisa Bernasek, with an accompanying catalogue on artifacts from the Berber regions Kabylia in northeastern Algeria, the Rif mountains of northeastern Morocco and the Tuareg regions of the Algerian Sahara.[239][240]

From June to September 2007, the Musée du quai Branly in Paris showed an exhibition on the history of traditional ceramics in Algeria, titled Ideqqi, art de femmes berbères (Art of Berber women), and published an accompanying catalogue. The exhibition highlighted the originality of these pieces compared to urban earthenware, underlining their African roots as well as close relationship with the ancient art of the Mediterranean.[241]

Cuisine

[edit]

Berber cuisine is a traditional cuisine that has evolved little over time. It differs from one area to another between and within Berber groups.

Principal Berber foods are:

  • Couscous, a semolina staple dish
  • Tajine, a stew made in various forms
  • Pastilla, a meat pie traditionally made with squab (fledgling pigeon); today often made using chicken
  • Bread made with traditional yeast
  • Bouchiar, fine yeastless wafers soaked in butter and natural honey
  • Bourjeje, pancake containing flour, eggs, yeast, and salt
  • Baghrir, light and spongy pancake made from flour, yeast, and salt; served hot and soaked in butter and tment ('honey').
  • Tahricht, sheep offal (brains, tripe, lungs, and heart) rolled up with the intestines on an oak stick and cooked on embers in specially designed ovens. The meat is coated with butter to make it even tastier. This dish is served mainly at festivities.

Although they are the original inhabitants of North Africa, and in spite of numerous incursions by Phoenicians, Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, and French, Berber groups lived in very contained communities. Having been subject to limited external influences, these populations lived free from acculturating factors.

Music

[edit]
Bendir

Berber music has a wide variety of regional styles. The best known are Moroccan music, the popular Gasba, Kabyle and Chawi music of Algeria, and the widespread Tuareg music of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. Instruments used include the bendir (large drums) and the guembri (a lute). There are three varieties of Berber folk music: village music, ritual music, and the music performed by professional musicians. Village music is performed collectively for dancing, including ahidus and ahouach dances, which each begin with a chanted prayer. Ritual music is performed at regular ceremonies to celebrate marriages and other important life events, and is also used as protection against evil spirits. Professional musicians (imdyazn) travel in groups of four, led by a poet (amydaz). The amydaz recites improvised poems, often accompanied by drums and a rabab (a one-stringed fiddle), along with a bou oughanim who plays a double clarinet and acts as a clown for the group. The Chleuh Berbers have professional musicians called rwais who play in ensembles consisting of lutes, rababs, and cymbals, with any number of vocalists. The leader, or rayes, leads the group in its music and choreography. These performances begin with an instrumental astara on rabab, which also gives the notes of the melody which follows. The next phase is the amarg, or sung poetry, and then ammussu, a danced overture, tammust, an energetic song, aberdag, a dance, and finally the rhythmically swift tabbayt. There is some variation in the order of the presentation, but the astara is always at the beginning, and the tabbayt always at the end.

The fantasia festival, 19th-century illustration

Traditional Berber festivals include Fantasia, Imilchil marriage festival and Udayn n Acur.

Role in tourism

[edit]

In recent decades, Berber communities and culture have become involved in the tourism industries of some North African countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia.[242][243] Images and descriptions of Berber culture play a central role in the tourism industry of Morocco, where they are prominently featured in the marketing of products and locations.[244][245]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Berbers, known endonymously as the Imazighen or Amazigh ("free people"), are the indigenous inhabitants of , with origins tracing back over 20,000 years based on genetic evidence indicating their arrival prior to Arab migrations in the CE. Primarily distributed across the —from and to and —and extending into Saharan regions of and , they number in the tens of millions, though precise figures are elusive due to assimilation and bilingualism with . Their languages form a distinct branch of the Afro-Asiatic family, spoken natively by millions despite historical suppression, reflecting a resilient shaped by nomadism, tribal confederations, and to diverse environments from Mediterranean coasts to desert oases. Historically, Berbers established influential kingdoms such as in the 3rd–2nd centuries BCE under leaders like Massinissa, who unified tribes and allied with against , fostering agricultural innovation and prowess that defined their military role in antiquity. In the medieval era, Berber dynasties like the Almoravids and Almohads propelled expansive Islamic empires across and the , enforcing doctrinal reforms, architectural advancements, and networks that integrated with the Mediterranean world. These movements, rooted in Berber tribal structures, challenged both Fatimid and Andalusian authorities, highlighting Berber agency in shaping Islamic governance and cultural synthesis rather than mere subordination. In modern times, Berbers have navigated , policies post-independence, and , sparking identity revival movements exemplified by Algeria's 1980 —a student-led uprising in protesting linguistic marginalization and demanding recognition of Tamazight as a . Such efforts underscore ongoing tensions over cultural preservation amid state-driven assimilation, with achievements including official status for in and since the , yet persistent challenges from , migration to , and Islamist opposition to non-Arab indigenous narratives. This history of adaptation and resistance defines Berbers not as passive recipients of external influences but as causal actors in North Africa's demographic and political evolution.

Nomenclature and etymology

Self-designations and regional variants

The Berbers collectively self-identify as Imazighen (singular Amazigh), an endonym rooted in their that translates to "free people," reflecting assertions of indigenous autonomy predating Arab conquests in the 7th–8th centuries CE. This designation gained prominence in 20th-century revivalist movements, such as the of Independence (1954–1962), where it symbolized resistance to both colonial and Arabizing policies, though some groups historically emphasized tribal over pan-ethnic labels. Regional self-designations vary by dialect clusters and tribal confederations, often incorporating kel ("people of") prefixes to denote subgroups, as seen in over 30 distinct spoken by an estimated 20–30 million across as of 2023. In the , Tuareg nomads—numbering around 2–3 million—refer to themselves as Kel Tamasheq ("speakers/ of Tamasheq"), with subgroups like the in Algeria's or Kel Adrar in maintaining patrilineal clan identities tied to pastoral mobility. In Algeria, comprising about 25% of the population (roughly 10 million as of 2020 estimates), Kabyles in the northern region self-identify as Leqbayel or Izwawen, speaking Taqbaylit, a dialect with over 5 million speakers that features unique oral traditions preserved amid French colonial suppression from 1830–1962. Eastern Chaouis use Tacawit and identify via Mountain confederacies, while Mzab Valley Mozabites employ Tumẓabt in Ibadi Muslim theocratic communities established around 1012 CE. Morocco hosts the largest Berber population, estimated at 40–50% of 37 million inhabitants in 2023, with southern Souss Valley groups self-designating as Išəlḥiyen (Shilha) and speaking Tashelhit, the most spoken Berber dialect with 7–8 million users; northern Rifians as Iriwayen, using Tarifit in rugged terrain that facilitated resistance during the Rif Republic (1921–1926); and central Middle Atlas tribes via Tamazight, often without distinct ethnic labels beyond clan ties. Smaller Libyan communities, such as Nafusi speakers in the Nafusa Mountains (around 150,000 as of 2010), and Tunisian Zuwara groups retain Imazighen identities amid marginalization, with dialects showing Punic substrate influences from pre-146 BCE Carthage. These variants underscore linguistic divergence, with mutual intelligibility limited outside subgroups, fostering localized rather than uniform self-conceptions until recent standardization efforts like Morocco's 2001 recognition of Tamazight.

External historical terms and misconceptions

In ancient sources, the indigenous peoples of west of were collectively termed Libyes (Λίβυες), a designation applied broadly to Berber-speaking groups inhabiting the region from to the Atlantic, without distinguishing ethnic subgroups. This term, appearing in Herodotus's Histories around 440 BCE, reflected Greek perceptions of these pastoralists and farmers as distinct from and Phoenicians, often portraying them as nomadic warriors allied with or against . Roman nomenclature further subdivided these populations, using Numidae for eastern groups in modern and , noted for their skilled horsemen and kingdoms under rulers like (r. 202–148 BCE); Mauri for western tribes in and western , from which the later European term "Moors" derives; and Gaetuli for southern nomadic peoples. These labels, documented in texts like Pliny the Elder's (77 CE) and Tacitus's (c. 116 CE), emphasized tribal affiliations and military roles rather than a unified ethnic identity, with Romans viewing them as semi-autonomous allies or rebels. The modern exonym "Berber" emerged post-Arab conquests, derived from barbār (sing. barbar), a term used by 8th-century Muslim chroniclers like Ibn Abd al-Hakam to denote unconverted or resistant North African tribes, echoing bárbaros for non-Greek speakers and the Latin barbarus for uncivilized outsiders. Initially neutral as a phonetic descriptor of ' "r"-heavy sounds to Arabic ears, it acquired connotations of savagery only later in European usage, such as in medieval Iberian texts referring to North African invaders. A persistent misconception holds that "Berber" inherently signifies barbarism as a deliberate ethnic slur unique to these peoples, but linguistic evidence shows it as a generic ancient label for any non-Indo-European or non-Semitic speakers, applied similarly to , , and ; Berber societies, including urbanized Numidian capitals like (founded c. BCE), demonstrated advanced , , and statecraft contradicting simplistic "" stereotypes. Another error conflates Berbers with due to shared Islamic history, ignoring archaeological continuity from Capsian culture (c. 10,000–6,000 BCE) and distinct Afro-Asiatic linguistics; post-7th century CE affected nomenclature but not indigenous genetic or cultural cores, as nomadic Berbers often adopted Arab tribal claims for prestige without full assimilation. Colonial-era French scholarship (19th–20th centuries) propagated myths of Berber "European" or "" affinities—e.g., linking them to or Iberomaurusians—to portray them as civilizable allies against Arab majorities, justifying policies like the 1930 Berber Dahir decree restricting Islamic law; this ignored Berber phenotypic diversity and pre-colonial with Punic and Roman elements.

Origins and genetic ancestry

Archaeological and prehistoric evidence

Archaeological evidence indicates that human occupation in the , the core region of modern Berber populations, extends to the , with the culture (ca. 21,000–11,000 BP) representing a key industry characterized by backed bladelets and found at coastal sites in , , and . remains from the cave in , associated with this culture, have been dated to approximately 15,000 years ago through ancient mitogenome analysis, providing direct skeletal evidence of these early inhabitants. The is marked by semi-sedentary settlements, exploitation, and possible early wild plant use, though debates persist on whether it directly contributed to later North African populations or represented a genetic discontinuity. Transitioning into the , the Capsian culture (ca. 10,000–6,000 ) emerged in the eastern , particularly in modern and , featuring microlithic tools, escargotières ( heaps of land snails), and evidence of hunting small game alongside gathering. Divided into Typical Capsian (older, more mobile) and Aterian-influenced variants, it reflects adaptation to post-glacial environments and is linked by some researchers to the of Berber-speaking groups due to regional continuity in . By the phase around 7,000 , Capsian sites show introductions of domesticated sheep, goats, and cereals, likely via diffusion from the or local innovation, with appearing in coastal areas by 6,000 . Prehistoric rock art in the central , including sites like in , provides visual evidence of cultural practices among these ancient North Africans, with engravings and paintings dating from 12,000 years ago depicting "Round Head" humanoid figures, wild animals, and later pastoral scenes with cattle and chariots by 5,000–3,000 . These artworks, spanning the (10,000–9,000 BC), Round Head (9,000–6,000 BC), and (7,000–2,500 BC) periods, illustrate a shift from to lifestyles amid the "Green " phase of increased humidity until ca. 5,000 , aligning with the environmental for Capsian-Neolithic transitions in Berber ancestral territories. Such motifs of cattle pastoralism recur in later Berber traditions, suggesting cultural persistence despite climatic .

Genetic studies and population continuity

Genetic studies of Berber populations, also known as Amazigh, reveal a predominant paternal lineage of E-M81 (specifically its E-M183), which reaches frequencies of 79.1% to 98.5% among Berber-speaking males in northwestern , underscoring a strong autochthonous North paternal continuity predating major historical invasions. This 's expansion is estimated to have occurred approximately 2,300 years ago, aligning with the in the region, though its deeper roots trace to earlier North African populations associated with the culture. In contrast, maternal lineages (mtDNA) exhibit greater diversity, with U6 comprising 5-30% in various Berber groups, reflecting a Paleolithic back-migration from to North around 20,000-30,000 years ago, while L haplogroups indicate variable sub-Saharan African admixture, particularly higher in southern Berber groups like the Tuareg. Autosomal DNA analyses confirm that modern Berbers derive substantial ancestry from ancient North African hunter-gatherers, akin to the individuals from sites like (dated ~15,000 years ago), who show genetic continuity with contemporary Maghrebi populations despite subsequent influxes from the and . This continuity is evidenced by principal component analyses where Berber samples cluster closely with other indigenous North Africans, distinct from Middle Eastern or sub-Saharan profiles, with admixture events—including minor Levantine (~10-20%) and recent Arab (~5-15% in eastern groups)—not substantially diluting the core prehistoric substrate. Regional variation exists; for instance, Algerian Chaoui Berbers display mitogenome profiles with elevated Eurasian-derived haplogroups (e.g., H, J), suggesting bidirectional across the Mediterranean, while Moroccan Berbers like those from Asni and retain higher proportions of North African-specific variants. Population continuity is further supported by low levels of replacement from historical conquerors: Arab expansions post-7th century CE introduced J1 haplogroups at low frequencies (<10%) in most Berber cohorts, indicating limited male-mediated and without wholesale genetic turnover, as Berber groups maintain higher E-M81 frequencies than Arabized North Africans. Ancient DNA from Iron Age sites corroborates this, showing Berber-like profiles with minimal external overlay until , challenging narratives of extensive demographic disruption. Heterogeneity among Berber subgroups—e.g., higher sub-Saharan components (up to 20-30% autosomal) in Saharan nomads versus coastal isolates—reflects geographic isolation and trans-Saharan exchanges rather than a uniform origin, yet the shared E-M81 dominance and affinity affirm overarching indigenous persistence across the .

Linguistic and cultural precursors

The constitute a branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family, indigenous to , with Proto-Berber reconstructible through showing low internal diversity indicative of a relatively recent common ancestor around 0-200 AD. This reconstruction includes phonological features such as a single mid vowel *e and short vowels */ă/ and */ə/, alongside evidence of early loanwords from Punic and Latin, suggesting interactions during the late prehistoric and early historic periods. Linguistic evidence points to an earlier divergence from other Afro-Asiatic branches, such as Semitic, estimated at approximately 6500 BP, without compelling support for external origins like the or despite historical theories. Culturally, precursors to Berber societies trace to prehistoric North African traditions, including the culture of the Late Paleolithic (circa 25,000-10,000 BP), characterized by lifeways and associated with the skeletal type, which exhibits genetic continuity with later North African populations. This transitioned into the Capsian culture (circa 10,000-6000 BP), a complex in the featuring microlithic tools, seasonal camps, and burials indicative of beliefs in an , often linked to ancestral Berber-speaking groups through archaeological and genetic correlations. from the Round Head period (9500-7500 BP) depicts early pastoral motifs, reflecting a shift toward mobile herding economies that prefigured Berber , with engravings and paintings in sites like evidencing environmental adaptations during the wet phase. These linguistic and cultural elements coalesced amid broader developments, including the introduction of around 5000-4000 , which facilitated Berber expansion across the and , though uncertainties persist regarding the elimination of potential earlier dialect diversity through sociolinguistic leveling. Megalithic structures and early agricultural practices in further underscore continuity from these precursors to the ethnolinguistic Berber identity emerging by the first millennium BCE.

Ancient history

Numidian and Mauretanian kingdoms

The emerged as a unified Berber state in the BCE, encompassing territories in modern-day eastern , western , and parts of , inhabited by tribes such as the and known for their horsemanship and cavalry forces. These pastoralist societies initially allied with during its conflicts with Greek colonies and later , providing elite that proved decisive in battles. (c. 238–148 BCE), initially a Massylii leader, shifted allegiance to during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), defeating rival king of the Masaesyli at the in 204 BCE and contributing cavalry at the in 202 BCE, which ended Carthaginian power in the region. Following the Roman victory, Masinissa consolidated power over a expanded Numidia, ruling for 54 years and introducing sedentary , urban development at sites like , and economic reforms that transformed nomadic tribes into settled farmers, laying foundations for later prosperity. Succession after Masinissa's death in 148 BCE led to internal strife under his son Micipsa (r. 148–118 BCE), whose nephew (c. 160–104 BCE) seized control around 118 BCE through assassinations and civil war, prompting Roman intervention in the (112–105 BCE). 's forces, leveraging Numidian mobility, prolonged the conflict against Roman legions until his betrayal by Mauretanian king in 105 BCE, resulting in 's capture and execution in . Numidia's military relied on javelin-armed horsemen without saddles or stirrups, enabling rapid maneuvers that influenced Roman tactics, while its economy shifted from herding to grain and olive production under royal initiative. The Mauretanian kingdom, west of in modern western and , was ruled by the Berber tribes, semi-nomadic pastoralists who traded , , and across Saharan routes and produced goods like dye. Emerging as a cohesive entity by the BCE, it featured clan-based governance under chieftains, with early rulers like Baga (c. 225 BCE) aiding unification efforts. (r. c. 110–91 BCE) expanded influence by allying with against but pragmatically betrayed him in 105 BCE, securing western as a reward and establishing as a Roman . This opportunistic diplomacy preserved autonomy temporarily, though internal tribal divisions and reliance on and mirrored structures, fostering a culture of adaptation to Mediterranean powers. By the late 1st century BCE, 's rulers, including Bogud II and , navigated civil wars in , aligning variably until full integration under client kings like from 25 BCE. Both kingdoms exemplified Berber resilience through fluid alliances and martial prowess, with 's unification under representing a peak of indigenous state-building before Roman dominance curtailed independence, while 's strategic betrayals extended its viability amid encroaching empires.

Relations with Carthage, Rome, and early empires

Berber tribes, particularly the inhabiting eastern and parts of , engaged in tributary and military relations with from its founding circa 814 BC, supplying grain, livestock, and cavalry forces essential to Carthaginian expansion. 's reliance on Berber manpower intensified during conflicts, with Numidian horsemen renowned for their mobility and skirmishing tactics serving as key auxiliaries. However, exploitation bred resentment; following 's defeat in the (264–241 BC), unpaid Berber mercenaries and Libyan subjects revolted in the (241–238 BC), seizing and nearly toppling the weakened state until Hamilcar Barca's campaigns restored control. During the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), Numidian factions divided loyalties: King of the supported , while Massinissa of the initially fought alongside before defecting to in 206 BC after Roman victories in . Massinissa's cavalry proved decisive, aiding in defeating Syphax at in 203 BC and contributing to Hannibal's loss at Zama in 202 BC. Post-war, rewarded Massinissa with expanded territories, enabling Numidian encroachments on Carthaginian holdings that precipitated the Third Punic War and Carthage's destruction in 146 BC. Under Roman hegemony, Berber kingdoms transitioned to client states, with Massinissa ruling until 148 BC and fostering a centralized monarchy blending indigenous and Hellenistic elements. Successors faced Roman scrutiny; , Massinissa's grandson, waged the (112–105 BC) against perceived Roman corruption and interference, employing guerrilla tactics before his capture and execution by Marius. , under kings like —who betrayed to Rome—and later (r. 25 BC–23 AD), remained allied, providing troops and stability until annexation in 40 AD. Berber revolts persisted, exemplified by ' insurgency (17–24 AD), a coalition of tribes resisting land seizures and tribute demands through hit-and-run warfare, ultimately quelled by Roman legions under Publius Cornelius Dolabella. Despite tensions, integration advanced: Numidian and Mauritanian supplemented Roman forces in campaigns across the empire, while Berber elites adopted , urbanized, and participated in provincial governance, contributing to North Africa's prosperity as a via olive and grain exports. Roman infrastructure, including roads and cities like , facilitated this synthesis, though tribal autonomy endured in interior regions beyond direct control.

Roman-Berber synthesis and late antiquity

The Roman conquest of following the Third Punic War in 146 BC incorporated Berber territories into provinces such as Africa Proconsularis, , and , where local elites often retained semi-autonomy as client kings before full annexation by the 1st century AD. Berber rulers like of allied with during the , providing cavalry forces renowned for their javelin skills and horsemanship, which later became a staple of Roman auxiliary units across the empire. This military integration facilitated economic prosperity, with Berber-inhabited regions contributing significantly to 's grain supply from fertile coastal plains and olive groves, while interior tribes maintained traditional . Cultural synthesis manifested in urban centers like and , where Berber elites adopted Latin nomenclature, intermarried with Roman settlers, and syncretized deities—equating local gods such as Gurzil with —evident in bilingual inscriptions and hybrid sanctuaries. was uneven, strongest among coastal and urban Berbers who served in the legions or bureaucracy, but weaker in mountainous interiors where Punic-Berber linguistic elements persisted alongside Latin. Rebellions, such as ' war from 17 to 24 AD, highlighted tensions, as former Numidian cavalrymen exploited Roman overextension to rally tribes against taxation and . In , permeated Berber society, with figures like (354–430 AD), born in to a Romanized father and Berber mother Monica, embodying the fusion of local heritage and imperial theology through his writings on grace and predestination. The Donatist schism, emerging after 311 AD over the validity of sacraments administered by traditores during Diocletian's persecution, gained traction among rural Berbers as a marker of indigenous purity against "imperial" clergy, blending Christian doctrine with resistance to centralized Roman ecclesiastical authority. By the , as Vandal invasions disrupted Roman control from 429 AD, Berber moors increasingly asserted autonomy in the hinterlands, preserving linguistic and customary continuity amid declining urban Roman-Berber elites.

Medieval history

Arab conquests and Berber resistance

The conquest of began after the completion of the Muslim conquest of in 642 CE, with initial raids into Berber territories west of , known as Bilād al-Maghrib. In 670 CE, led a major expedition from , establishing the garrison city of in modern as a base for further advances, and pushed westward through present-day , , and into , reaching the Atlantic Ocean without decisive opposition until encountering organized Berber forces. Uqba's campaign involved rapid cavalry maneuvers across hundreds of miles, imposing tribute on Berber tribes and destroying Byzantine remnants, but it provoked unified resistance from Berber confederations wary of demands for submission and resources. Berber opposition crystallized under Kusaila, a chieftain of the Awrāba based near in western , who allied with Byzantine forces and mobilized Romano-Berber warriors. In 682 or 683 CE, ambushed and killed Uqba near (ancient Vescera), effectively halting Arab momentum and allowing Berbers to recapture temporarily. Kusaila's forces, leveraging knowledge of the terrain and tribal networks, exploited Arab overextension, marking one of the most effective early resistances to the Umayyad expansion. Following Uqba's death, Arab reinforcements under Abu al-Muhajir Dinar briefly subdued , who converted to , but internal Umayyad politics delayed full reconquest until 693 CE. In 693 CE, Hassan ibn al-Nu'man arrived from Egypt with a reinforced army, recapturing Carthage from Byzantine-Berber holdouts and defeating Kusaila, who had rejoined resistance efforts, around 688-690 CE. Leadership then passed to Dihya, known as al-Kahina ("the soothsayer"), a Berber prophetess from the Jarawa or Zenata tribes in the Aurès Mountains region of eastern Algeria, who unified disparate Berber groups including Christians, pagans, and possibly Jewish elements. Al-Kahina inflicted severe defeats on Hassan's forces in 695 CE near modern Constantine, employing guerrilla tactics and a scorched-earth policy that devastated agricultural lands to deny Arabs sustenance, reportedly telling her people, "We must burn everything to leave nothing for the enemy." This strategy temporarily expelled Arabs from much of Ifriqiya, but it alienated some Berber allies dependent on the land, contributing to her downfall. Hassan regrouped with Umayyad support, importing Syrian troops and Berber converts to outmaneuver al-Kahina's coalitions. By 702-703 CE, he decisively defeated her at a battle in the region or near the Nemencha Mountains, where al-Kahina was killed, effectively ending large-scale organized Berber resistance to Arab political control. Despite military subjugation, Berber adoption of proceeded unevenly, with many tribes converting to evade taxes or but retaining and later rebelling against Arab fiscal impositions, as seen in the Great Berber Revolt of 740 CE; the conquest thus sowed seeds for ongoing cultural and political tensions rather than total assimilation.

Rise of Berber Islamic dynasties

The rise of Berber Islamic dynasties occurred in the centuries following the Arab conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries, as Berber tribes converted to and leveraged tribal confederations to establish autonomous states in the amid weakening Abbasid authority. These dynasties often drew on puritanical interpretations of to unify disparate groups, fostering military expansion and cultural patronage while resisting external Arab dominance. Early examples included heterodox Ibadi states, followed by Sunni and Masmuda-led empires that projected power across and into Iberia. One of the earliest was the (776–909), founded by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Rustam, a Persian-origin Ibadi scholar, in Ṭāhart (modern ), where it governed a tolerant emphasizing Kharijite and trade networks linking the Mediterranean to . Supported by local Berber tribes who had embraced Ibadi Islam during 8th-century revolts against Umayyad orthodoxy, the Rustamids maintained independence until their overthrow by the Fatimid invasion in 909, which scattered Ibadi communities southward into the . In the , Berbers established the (972–1148), initially as Fatimid governors in Ifriqiyya (eastern and ), with founding the capital at Achir before relocating to al-Qalʿa and later Mahdiyya. A branch, the Hammadids (1014–1152), split off under Hammad ibn Buluggin, ruling northeastern from Qalʿat Bani Hammad and promoting and scholarship until Almohad conquest. The Zirids' from the Fatimids in 1048 provoked the unleashing of Arab tribes, devastating agriculture and urban centers, which fragmented power. The Almoravids (c. 1040–1147), originating from nomads of the (Lamtuna and Gudala tribes), rose through the religious reform of Mālikī preacher ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yāsīn, who established a ribāṭ (fortified ) to enforce strict moral codes. Under leaders like Yahya ibn ʿUmar and , they conquered in 1054, founded as capital in 1070, subdued by 1072, and extended into by aiding Muslim taifas against Christian forces, culminating in the victory at Zallaqa in 1086. Their empire facilitated trans-Saharan gold trade and urban development but faced internal tribal divisions. Opposing Almoravid perceived laxity, the Almohads (1121–1269) emerged among Berbers of the , led by Muḥammad ibn Tūmart, who proclaimed himself and advocated unitarian tawḥīd (divine unity), rejecting and promoting rationalist theology. After ibn Tūmart's death in 1130, his successor ʿAbd al-Muʾmin unified tribes, captured in 1147, and built a spanning from to by 1160, with victories like Alarcos in 1195. Almohad rule emphasized doctrinal purity, infrastructure such as the minaret, and administrative centralization, though it enforced conversions and faced revolts. These dynasties marked Berber agency in Islamic , blending tribal military prowess with religious ideology to create transient but influential states that shaped identity before fragmentation under later Marinid and Hafsid successors.

Expansion to Iberia, , and

Berber tribes exerted significant control over medieval routes, leveraging camel caravans to transport gold from West African states like , salt from northern mines, and enslaved people northward to Mediterranean markets. This commerce, intensified after the with Islamic expansion, generated wealth that underpinned Berber military capabilities, as nomads secured oases such as and Audaghost to monopolize exchanges and mint dinars from imported gold. The Almoravids, emerging from these networks around 1040 under religious reformer Abdullah ibn Yasin, initially consolidated power by capturing trade hubs, which funded their unification of Moroccan territories by 1070 and the founding of Marrakech as capital. Almoravid expansion into Iberia began in 1086 when crossed the at the urging of Muslim rulers facing Christian advances, culminating in victory over Alfonso VI of Castile at the Battle of Zallaqa on October 23. This intervention preserved temporarily, with Almoravids annexing kingdoms by 1094 and imposing centralized Berber rule, though their rigid policies alienated local Arab elites. The dynasty's empire, spanning from the to central Iberia, relied on trans-Saharan revenues but declined amid internal revolts and Christian offensives, falling to the Almohads by 1147. The Almohads, a Berber movement founded by circa 1121, succeeded the Almoravids through doctrinal reform emphasizing and anti-Anthropomorphism, conquering under by 1160 and extending to Iberia via invasions starting in 1146. By 1172, they dominated , defeating taifa remnants and briefly checking momentum until defeats at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 eroded their holdings. Almohad governance fused Berber tribal structures with caliphal authority, sustaining but facing overextension. Berber elements contributed to the from 827 to 902, as Aghlabid forces incorporated Berber recruits and later Fatimid tribes supported expeditions, fostering Berber settlements amid Arab dominance. These communities influenced Sicilian agriculture and crafts until in 1072, though Berber-led expansions there remained limited compared to Iberian campaigns. Almohad fleets raided in 1159–1160 against but achieved no territorial gains.

Early modern and colonial periods

Fragmentation under Ottoman and local rule

During the 16th to 19th centuries, Berber societies in exhibited significant political fragmentation, with tribal structures dominating governance amid nominal Ottoman oversight in regions like , , and , and independent local dynasties in . Berber communities, primarily in mountainous and desert peripheries, operated through decentralized tribal confederations and village assemblies rather than unified polities, often resisting central taxation and military . This era saw no emergence of overarching Berber states, as inter-tribal rivalries and geographic isolation perpetuated localized rule by chiefs (caids or sheikhs) enforcing customary law known as azref. In Ottoman Algeria, the (established 1516) exerted control mainly over coastal and urban areas, leaving interior Berber groups like the Kabyles in largely autonomous. Kabyle tribes, organized into clans and federations such as the Aït Fraoussen or Aït Menghellat, governed via democratic assemblies (jemaa) that elected leaders and resolved disputes without submitting taxes to Ottoman deys. This independence stemmed from the rugged Tell Atlas terrain, which hindered Ottoman expeditions, allowing Kabyles to raid lowland territories while maintaining internal self-rule until French forces subdued the region in 1857. Similar patterns held in the , where Chaoui Berbers formed loose confederations resisting Ottoman incursions, with local emirs wielding authority over perhaps 50,000-100,000 adherents per major group by the late 18th century. Berber resistance to Ottoman dominance was recurrent, as tribes viewed Turkish governors as foreign imposers threatening traditional . In the , Kabyle and Berber coalitions launched raids on , prompting Ottoman retaliatory campaigns that failed to impose lasting control, reinforcing fragmentation into over 100 semi-independent villages in alone. Further east in under the Husaynid beys (from 1705), southern Berber tribes like the islanders or Matmata dwellers paid nominal tribute but retained through tribal councils, while in Ottoman Libya, Jabal Nafusa Berbers maintained fortified against Tripolitanian pashas. These dynamics preserved Berber linguistic and customary practices but hindered , as confederations prioritized local feuds over unified opposition. In Morocco, outside Ottoman reach, the Alaouite dynasty (ruling from ) faced analogous challenges from Berber tribes in the High and Middle Atlas, Rif, and Anti-Atlas ranges. Sultans like Moulay Ismail (r. 1672-1727) sought to centralize power via the makhzen system, allying with submissive Arab tribes to subdue dissident Berber groups classified as siba (unruly lands), yet authority remained nominal in remote areas encompassing roughly 40% of the territory. Tribes such as the Aït Atta or Chleuh confederations operated under elected assemblies and segmentary lineages, engaging in trade across the or raiding for tribute, with populations per major tribe numbering 10,000-50,000 by the . This tribal balkanization, exacerbated by the sultans' divide-and-rule tactics, prevented Berber unification, as seen in periodic revolts like those against Moulay Sulayman (r. 1792-1822), where Masmuda and Sanhaja subgroups clashed internally rather than coalescing. Overall, Ottoman and local rule fostered Berber fragmentation by exploiting tribal divisions, with governance relying on kinship-based alliances rather than bureaucracies, enabling cultural continuity but vulnerability to European encroachment by the early . Estimates suggest Berber populations comprised 30-50% of the Maghreb's total, yet their disunity—rooted in ecological adaptation to marginal lands and historical aversion to lowland hierarchies—ensured no revival of ancient kingdoms like .

European penetration and resistance movements

Spanish forces established coastal presidios in Berber-inhabited regions of North Africa during the early 16th century, including Oran in present-day Algeria in 1509 and Melilla in Morocco in 1497, aiming to counter Ottoman influence and secure Mediterranean trade routes. These enclaves faced persistent raids and guerrilla resistance from local Berber tribes, often allied with Ottoman corsairs, which limited deeper inland penetration until the 19th century. The French invasion of in marked the onset of systematic European penetration into Berber territories, prompting widespread resistance across Algeria's interior. In , a stronghold of Berber identity, mountain terrain and clan-based organization enabled prolonged ; the region was the last to be subdued between 1854 and 1857 despite fierce opposition from leaders such as , who mobilized thousands against French forces until her capture in 1849. French policies exploited perceived cultural differences between Berbers and to divide resistance, portraying Kabyles as more amenable to assimilation, though this "" did not prevent uprisings like the 1871 , which united Kabyle tribes under Sheikh Mokrani and briefly captured major towns before being crushed. In , European influence intensified after the 1904-1906 agreements granting and spheres of control, leading to the of 1921-1926. Berber Riffian tribes under Muhammad Abd el-Krim launched coordinated guerrilla attacks, annihilating a of over 20,000 at in July 1921 through ambushes and captured weaponry, establishing the short-lived as a theocratic state enforcing tribal unity against colonial rule. Spanish retaliation involved chemical weapons, while joined in 1925, deploying 500,000 troops to suppress the insurgency by 1926, forcing Abd el-Krim's surrender; this conflict highlighted Berber military innovation, including early use of learned from . Among Saharan Berbers, Tuareg confederations mounted significant rebellions against French expansion from the late 19th century, with the of 1916-1917 in Niger's uniting clans under Firhoun ag Almakt to challenge colonial garrisons through mobile raids, though ultimately defeated by superior firepower after initial successes. French conquest of Tuareg lands spanned decades of brutal campaigns, relying on divide-and-rule tactics amid the nomads' vast desert mobility, setting precedents for post-colonial insurgencies.

Colonial administration and identity formation

During the French conquest of Algeria beginning in 1830, colonial administrators implemented policies that differentiated Berber (Amazigh) communities from Arab populations, granting Berber regions such as Kabylia greater judicial and administrative autonomy to exploit perceived ethnic divisions for control. French officials propagated the "Kabyle myth," portraying Berbers as racially distinct from Arabs—often as descendants of ancient Indo-European Vandals or Numidians—and more predisposed to assimilation due to their supposed secularism, industriousness, and linguistic ties to non-Semitic roots, which justified preferential access to French education and military recruitment. This approach, rooted in divide-and-rule tactics, involved separate legal codes for Berbers under customary 'adat rather than Islamic sharia, fostering a sense of Berber exceptionalism while suppressing unified Muslim resistance. In the French protectorate of Morocco established in 1912, Resident-General Hubert Lyautey extended indirect rule to Berber tribes in the Atlas Mountains and Rif, administering them through traditional caids and jemaa councils while isolating them from Arab urban centers like Fez. The 1930 Berber Dahir, which formalized the application of non-Islamic customary law to Berbers and barred them from religious courts, exemplified this segregation by aiming to "civilize" Berbers outside Arab-Islamic influence, but it provoked widespread riots in 1930–1931, uniting nationalists against perceived cultural erasure. Despite backlash, the policy inadvertently galvanized proto-Berberist intellectuals, such as those in the L'Étoile Nord-Africaine, who began articulating Berber cultural distinctiveness in response to colonial categorization. Spanish administration in northern Morocco's Rif zone from 1912 emphasized military pacification over cultural policy, recruiting Berber regulares troops for suppression duties but facing fierce resistance in the Rif War (1921–1926), where tribes under Abd el-Krim rejected colonial mining concessions and governance. Italian rule in Libya's Cyrenaica (1911–1943) targeted Sanusi-led Berber-Arab confederations with brutal reconquests, including concentration camps holding up to 10,000 by 1930, prioritizing demographic Italianization over ethnic differentiation and eroding tribal structures without promoting distinct Berber identity. These colonial strategies, by imposing racial and legal binaries on fluid North African identities, contributed to the emergence of modern as an ethnonationalist response, though empirical evidence from linguistic and genetic continuity suggests pre-colonial Berber cohesion predated such impositions, with colonial emphasis amplifying rather than originating group consciousness.

Modern history and Arabization

Independence, pan-Arabism, and cultural suppression

Following the independence of North African states in the mid-20th century—Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, Algeria in 1962, and Libya under Muammar Gaddafi's 1969 coup—governing elites embraced pan-Arabist ideologies inspired by figures like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, prioritizing Arabic as the unifying language and Arab-Islamic identity as the foundation of nation-building. This approach, aimed at consolidating power against colonial legacies and internal divisions, systematically marginalized indigenous Berber (Amazigh) culture, viewing it as a relic incompatible with the envisioned homogeneous Arab state. Policies enforced Arabization in education, administration, and media, effectively suppressing Tamazight languages and traditions to foster assimilation, though Berber populations, estimated at 20-40% in Algeria and Morocco, resisted through informal cultural preservation. In Algeria, Arabization accelerated under President Ahmed Ben Bella's government, which in 1963 designated Arabic as the sole via Ordinance 63-144, replacing French in public spheres and initiating a shift in schooling where Berber dialects were excluded from curricula. This intensified under Houari Boumediene after 1965, with policies demonizing Berber identity as divisive and tied to colonial favoritism toward Kabyles, leading to the closure of Berber cultural associations and of non-Arabic media by the 1970s. Berbers, who had comprised a disproportionate share of FLN fighters during the independence war, faced job in state institutions favoring speakers, exacerbating resentment in where protests against cultural erasure occurred as early as 1968 but were quashed. Morocco's King Hassan II reinforced pan-Arabist narratives post-independence, framing the monarchy's legitimacy in Arab-Islamic terms while downplaying Berber linguistic and customary elements through and education reforms that mandated instruction from onward in the 1960s. Berber oral traditions and script were sidelined in favor of , with rural Berber communities pressured to adopt names and attire for urban integration; this cultural homogenization, justified as national unity, alienated Amazigh groups in the and Atlas regions, where informal resistance via music and poetry persisted despite surveillance. Libya under Gaddafi exemplified extreme suppression, with the 1973 banning Berber personal names, forcing thousands to Arabize them under threat of imprisonment, and prohibiting Tamazight in schools, publications, or broadcasts to enforce a pan-Arab vision of as an undivided Arab nation. Activists faced arbitrary arrests and , as Berbers in and were labeled threats to unity, resulting in the erasure of Amazigh history from textbooks and the destruction of cultural artifacts over four decades. In , where Berber populations are smaller and more assimilated, Habib Bourguiba's post-1956 regime pursued similar Arabization to forge a unified identity, suppressing residual Berber elements in favor of dominance in state functions. These policies, while building administrative cohesion, deepened ethnic fractures by denying Berber contributions to national history and prioritizing ideological purity over empirical diversity.

Berber Spring and revival movements

The , known in Tamazight as Tafsut Imazighen, erupted in Algeria's region in March 1980 following the government's cancellation of a lecture on ancient Berber poetry by scholar Mouloud Mammeri at University on March 10. This event, intended as part of a week of cultural activities, symbolized broader frustrations with post-independence policies that marginalized and identity in favor of Arabic as the sole national tongue. Protests quickly spread across , involving students, intellectuals, and local populations demanding official recognition of Tamazight (Berber language) in education and media, alongside cultural autonomy. The demonstrations escalated into widespread unrest from March to June 1980, marked by strikes, road blockades, and clashes with security forces in cities like and . Algerian authorities responded with military intervention, imposing curfews, arresting hundreds of activists, and reporting dozens of deaths—estimates range from 30 to over 100 fatalities, though official figures minimized the toll. The crackdown included banning Berber cultural associations and further enforcing Arabic monolingualism, yet the events galvanized a clandestine Berber cultural revival, fostering underground language classes and literary production. In the ensuing decades, the catalyzed organized revival movements across , particularly among Kabyles in and Imazighen in . In , Berber activists formed groups like the , which persisted despite repression, leading to renewed protests in the against laws designating as the exclusive national language; mass demonstrations in 1998 drew tens of thousands in . Morocco saw parallel efforts through cultural associations such as the in the and Atlas regions, advocating for Tamazight's integration into schools and public life amid state resistance tied to Arab-Islamic . These movements emphasized linguistic preservation, historical narratives predating Arab conquests, and resistance to assimilation, often framing demands in terms of rather than . The 2001 Black Spring in , triggered by the killing of a young protester by gendarmes on April 18, echoed the 1980 events with over 100 deaths and thousands arrested, underscoring ongoing grievances over cultural erasure and economic marginalization. Revival efforts extended to and , where smaller Berber communities mobilized for language rights during the 2011 uprisings, though less prominently than in and . Collectively, these initiatives shifted Berber identity from passive endurance to active assertion, challenging state narratives of homogeneous nationhood through empirical documentation of pre-Islamic heritage and demographic persistence.

Recent developments and state recognitions (post-2011)

In , the 2011 constitution marked a pivotal recognition of Tamazight as an official state language alongside , designating it as a common patrimony of all Moroccans under Article 5. This followed widespread protests during the Arab Spring-inspired February 20 Movement, which amplified Amazigh demands for cultural and . Implementation advanced with the 2019 Organic Law 02-17, which established the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe to standardize and promote Tamazight in , media, and administration, though critics note uneven enforcement and resource shortages hindering full integration. Algeria amended its in February 2016 to designate Tamazight as an in addition to , elevating its status from (recognized in 2002) to one usable in official contexts. This change, approved amid the "Hirak" protest movement's early stirrings, responded to decades of activism by groups like the World Amazigh Congress and addressed grievances over prior cultural marginalization. By 2023, Tamazight instruction expanded in schools, particularly in Kabylie regions, with government commitments to develop standardized curricula, though dominance persists in higher education and bureaucracy. In , post-Gaddafi transitional authorities faced persistent Amazigh advocacy for constitutional recognition of their language and identity, with the 2013 Amazigh explicitly demanding inclusion in the draft . Despite contributions to the 2011 revolution, formal recognitions remain limited amid civil instability; the 2012-2015 draft constitutions proposed multilingual provisions, but no permanent framework has enshrined Tamazight officially, leading to boycotts of electoral processes by Amazigh councils seeking cultural safeguards. Among Tuareg Berber subgroups in Mali and Niger, post-2011 developments centered on conflict rather than state recognitions, including the 2012 Mali rebellion seeking Azawad autonomy, which collapsed into jihadist control before the 2015 Algiers Accord granted limited decentralized governance without independence. Niger's government has pursued integration policies, such as Tuareg inclusion in military and administrative roles post-2011 coups, but without explicit linguistic or indigenous recognitions, prioritizing security over cultural concessions. Broader cultural revivals in the 2020s include Morocco's promotion of Amazigh heritage sites and festivals, alongside tentative steps toward recognizing (Amazigh New Year) as a national holiday, reflecting state efforts to balance Arab-Islamic identity with indigenous pluralism, though pan-Arabist resistances in academia and media occasionally frame these as divisive.

Demographics and subgroups

Population estimates and geographic distribution

Estimates of the Berber population range from 25 to 36 million globally, with the overwhelming majority concentrated in , though exact figures remain uncertain due to incomplete censuses, assimilation through , and reliance on linguistic or self-reported data rather than ethnic enumeration. are spoken by roughly 14 to 20 million people, serving as an imperfect proxy for ethnic identification, as many Berbers are bilingual or have shifted to . In , which hosts the largest Berber population, the 2024 census indicated that 24.8% of the 36.8 million inhabitants—approximately 9.1 million—speak Tamazight as a native , predominantly in rural regions of the Mountains, Middle and , and . However, associations estimate broader Berber ancestry among 40-60% of Moroccans, factoring in Arabized descendants. Algeria follows with an estimated 10 to 13 million Berbers, comprising 25-30% of the roughly 45 million total population, mainly in the Kabylie region, , and Saharan areas; Tamazight speakers number around 12 million, or one-third of the populace. Smaller communities exist in (about 1% or 100,000-200,000, scattered in southern and island areas), (5-10% or 300,000-600,000, including Warfalla and Zuwaya groups in the and ), and (under 5%, or ~200,000). In Sahelian states, the nomadic Tuareg subgroup totals 2 to 3 million, distributed across southern , , , and , primarily in desert oases and pastoral zones. Berbers are predominantly rural, inhabiting mountainous terrains, coastal strips, and arid interiors, with increasing urban migration to cities like , , and Tripoli altering traditional distributions. communities, numbering several million, are prominent in , , and due to 20th-century .

Major subgroups and their distinctions

The Berbers, or Amazigh, comprise diverse subgroups distinguished primarily by regional geography, linguistic variations within the , and adaptations to local environments such as mountains, deserts, or oases. These groups often maintain distinct dialects that exhibit limited , alongside differences in social structures, economic practices (e.g., sedentary agriculture versus nomadism), and historical interactions with , Ottoman, and colonial powers. While sharing a common indigenous heritage in , subgroup identities have been shaped by isolation in rugged terrains, which preserved cultural autonomy amid waves of . The Kabyles primarily inhabit the Kabylie Mountains in northern , east of , where they form one of the largest Berber subgroups. They speak Kabyle, a Zenati-branch dialect of Berber, and organize society around patrilineal kin groups and village councils known as jama'a, emphasizing communal decision-making and resistance to central authority. Historically, Kabyles have pursued independent village life, with many migrating to urban centers or due to limited arable land, while playing key roles in Algeria's independence struggle. In eastern Algeria's , the Chaouis (or Shawiya) reside in a region of relative isolation, speaking Chaouia, another Zenati dialect influenced by Arabic loanwords. They blend settled agriculture in northern slopes with semi-nomadic in the south, fostering self-sufficient economies less integrated with lowland Arab populations; their numbers are estimated at about half those of the Kabyles. The Chaouis' rugged terrain has historically served as a stronghold against invasions, contributing to their distinct martial traditions. Tuaregs, a nomadic subgroup, traverse the Desert across southern , , , and , speaking Tamasheq dialects and employing the ancient script. Distinguished by male veiling, elements of matrilineal descent among nobles, and a rigid class system (nobles, vassals, artisans, and former slaves), Tuaregs traditionally served as caravan guides and herders; modernization has forced partial sedentarization, reducing their populations in Algerian oases to 5,000–10,000 by the . Their conservative customs, including ancient rituals, set them apart from more settled northern Berbers. In Morocco's northern Rif Mountains, the Rifians speak (Riffi), a northern Berber , and are renowned for their toughness, hospitality, and of armed resistance against Spanish and French colonial forces in the early . Their coastal-mountainous supports and , fostering tight-knit tribal confederations distinct from central Moroccan groups. The Shilha (or Chleuh), concentrated in Morocco's Mountains and Souss Plain, speak Tashelhit, a central Atlas , and engage in intensive amid steep terrains. Known for fierce , thriftiness, strict Islamic observance, and strong bonds through tribal divisions like the Ammeln (noted for financial skills), Shilha society features inter-tribal rivalries alongside shared customs such as elaborate festivals. Mozabites dwell in Algeria's Mzab Valley oases, such as , speaking Tumzabit (Mozabite Berber) and adhering to Ibadi Islam, which promotes , literacy, and . Their urban, fortified settlements reflect a shift from to modern commerce, with a population of around 100,000 in the mid-1980s; this doctrinal minority status has reinforced and cultural insularity compared to Sunni-majority Berber groups.
SubgroupPrimary RegionDialect BranchKey Distinctions
KabyleKabylie, ZenatiVillage assemblies, urban migration
ChaouiAurès, ZenatiSemi-nomadic/agricultural mix, isolation
Tuareg (multi-country)TuaregNomadism, veiling,
RifianRif Mountains, NorthernResistance history, tribal toughness
ShilhaAtlas/Souss, CentralAgricultural intensity, community thrift
MozabiteMzab Valley, ZenatiIbadi Islam, oasis urbanism

Diaspora and migration patterns

Berber emigration to intensified after , facilitated by colonial labor ties and bilateral recruitment agreements for industrial work. Algerian Berbers, particularly Kabyles, began migrating to in significant numbers during the 1950s and 1960s, initially as soldiers in the and later as factory laborers amid post-independence economic pressures. Moroccan Berbers followed suit, with rural populations from Berber-speaking regions like the and Souss valleys responding to invitations from , , the , and for guest workers between 1963 and 1973. France hosts the largest Berber diaspora, with estimates ranging from 1 million to 2 million individuals of Amazigh descent, including substantial Kabyle and Chaoui communities from alongside Moroccan groups. In the and , Riffian Berbers predominate, comprising a majority of Moroccan-origin migrants due to targeted recruitment from northern Morocco's region, where about 85% of early emigrants hailed from Berber areas. policies in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with chain migration, expanded these communities, leading to second- and third-generation Berbers maintaining cultural associations and language schools in urban enclaves like , , and . Smaller diasporas exist in , , , and the , often driven by political exile following events like the 1958-1959 Rif uprising or the 1980 protests in , alongside economic and educational opportunities. In , Berber populations remain modest, with concentrations in cities like and New York, where activism for cultural recognition has fostered transnational networks linking diaspora groups to homeland revival movements. Internal migration patterns within have paralleled external flows, with rural Berbers relocating to coastal cities like and for employment, contributing to urban Berber enclaves before further emigration. Recent trends show slowed labor migration due to stricter European policies, shifting toward skilled migration and asylum claims amid ongoing regional instability.

Languages

Structure and classification of Berber languages

The , also termed Amazigh or Tamazight, form a distinct branch within the Afroasiatic language family, alongside branches such as Semitic, Egyptian, Chadic, Cushitic, and Omotic. This classification stems from shared morphological features like root-and-pattern derivation and consonantal roots, though Berber exhibits less Semitic-like vowel patterns and more prefixal verbal morphology compared to . Approximately 25 to 30 exist, spoken by 14 to 25 million people across North Africa, with limited between major varieties due to geographic fragmentation and substrate influences. Internal classification of Berber languages relies on comparative reconstruction of innovations in phonology (e.g., loss of certain Proto-Afroasiatic consonants), morphology (e.g., plural formation patterns), and lexicon, revealing a dialect continuum rather than discrete languages in some regions. Predominant subgroups include: Northern Berber, covering Atlas varieties like Central Atlas Tamazight (Morocco), Kabyle (Algeria), and Tashelhit (southern Morocco); Tuareg languages (Tamasheq/Tamahaq), spoken by nomadic groups in the Sahara from Mali to Algeria; Eastern Berber, comprising Siwi in Egypt's Siwa Oasis; and Western Berber, represented by the divergent Zenaga (Znaga) in Mauritania and Senegal. Guanche, once spoken in the Canary Islands, is considered an extinct isolate or loosely affiliated branch, with limited lexical attestations suggesting links to Northern Berber. Debates persist over whether subgroups like Zenati (a proposed Northern subset including Riffian and Mzab) reflect genetic unity or areal diffusion from Arabic contact. Structurally, Berber languages exhibit verb-subject-object (VSO) as the dominant , with subject clitics often prefixed to verbs and objects following. Phonologically, they feature a reduced system—typically /a, i, u/ plus the central schwa /ə/—and a rich inventory including pharyngeals (/ħ, ʕ/), uvulars (/χ, ɢ/), and emphatic (pharyngealized) series (/sˤ, dˤ, tˤ/), with Tashlhiyt Berber uniquely permitting vowelless words and nuclei. Morphologically, nouns inflect for two genders (masculine/feminine, unmarked for masculine) and number (singular/, with sound plurals via suffixes like -en and broken plurals via internal shifts or ), while verbs distinguish (imperfective/aspectually neutral) from (perfective) stems via prefix alternations (e.g., a-/i- for 1st/2nd person) and suffixes for or directionality. Syntax employs topic-comment structures, with preverbal particles marking focus, and heavy reliance on clitics for pronouns and prepositions, reflecting agglutinative tendencies adapted from Proto-Afroasiatic fusional roots.

Historical decline and Arabization factors

The process of linguistic Arabization in North Africa, which contributed to the historical decline of Berber languages, originated with the Arab Muslim conquests commencing in 647 CE under the Umayyad Caliphate, culminating in the subjugation of the Maghreb by 709 CE. This era introduced Arabic as the liturgical language of Islam, inextricably linking it to religious authority via the Quran, which incentivized Berber elites and converts to acquire proficiency in Arabic for scriptural access and scholarly participation, fostering initial bilingualism rather than outright replacement. Early assimilation was primarily cultural and religious, with limited demographic influx from the Arabian Peninsula, as Arabization proceeded through voluntary adoption among Islamized Berber communities rather than coercive mass settlement. A significant escalation in the 11th century arose from the migration of large Bedouin confederations, including the and —estimated at 200,000 to 1 million individuals—encouraged by the in 1052 CE to destabilize the in (modern and eastern ). These nomadic incursions devastated agricultural Berber polities, such as the Zirid state, by introducing tribal economies that displaced sedentary populations, promoted intermarriage, and imposed dialects in , mercantile, and conflictual interactions across the central and eastern plains. The resulting demographic dilution and social upheaval accelerated , particularly in lowland and urban settings, where Berber varieties faced competition from the prestige and utility of in and commerce under subsequent dynasties. Linguistic mechanisms further entrenched this decline through pervasive borrowing, with incorporating up to 37% lexicon in varieties like Ghomara Berber, encompassing domains such as , , and Islamic terminology (e.g., taẓallit for , adapted from ṣalāh). Phonological adaptations (e.g., Arabic /q/ shifting to Berber /ɣ/ or /ʔ/) and morphological integrations (e.g., Arabic verb patterns in Kabyle) reflected sustained contact, but over time, these hybridizations yielded to full shift in non-isolated areas, as dominated administration, urban literacy, and trade networks by the . thereby contracted to oral use in mountainous refugia (e.g., , ) and oases, preserving diversity in peripheral zones while urban centers achieved near-total , a pattern reinforced by endogamous tribal structures limiting but not halting assimilation.

Revitalization efforts and official status

In , Tamazight was constitutionally recognized as an alongside in 2011, marking a shift from prior policies that marginalized post-independence. This recognition followed the establishment of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture () in , tasked with standardizing Tamazight, developing the script, and promoting its use in education and media. Educational reforms since 2003 have introduced Tamazight as a subject in primary schools for approximately 20% of students in Berber-speaking regions, though implementation remains uneven due to teacher shortages and limited curriculum extension beyond early grades. In , Tamazight gained national language status in 2002 via , with full official recognition achieved in the 2016 constitution alongside and likely French in practice. The High Commission for the Development of Tamazight (HCDA), created in 2001, has driven efforts including script standardization, university programs, and media broadcasting in Tamazight on state television since 2009. By 2023, Tamazight was taught in over 1,000 primary schools, primarily in Kabylie and regions, but progress has stalled amid debates over its parity with and insufficient funding for teacher training. Broader revitalization initiatives across include cultural emphasizing as core to Amazigh identity, with movements producing , music, and digital content in Berber dialects to counter historical stigma and . Despite these advances, empirical assessments indicate limited intergenerational transmission, as urban migration and dominance in public spheres hinder widespread proficiency; for instance, only about 10-15% of Moroccan youth report fluent Tamazight use outside rural areas. In and , Tamazight enjoys no formal official status, relying on ad hoc community programs amid political instability.

Religion

Pre-Islamic beliefs and practices

Pre-Islamic Berber religion encompassed a polytheistic and animistic system centered on the veneration of natural forces, ancestral spirits, and localized deities, with practices evidenced in classical accounts and archaeological remains dating from the Neolithic period onward. Natural phenomena such as the sun, moon, rocks, mountains, caves, and springs were regarded as sacred, forming the core of worship that persisted regionally despite external influences. Herodotus, in the 5th century BCE, described Berber tribes in Libya sacrificing to the sun and moon by first cutting the victim's ear, indicating ritual animal offerings tied to celestial bodies. Prominent deities included Ammon (Amun), a ram-horned god associated with weather, fertility, wind, and life, whose cult extended from Siwa Oasis in Egypt to Libyan Berber groups and showed syncretism with Egyptian Amen-Ra and Greek Zeus-Ammon; depictions of horned figures in rock art date to 9600–7500 BCE. Gurzil, son of Ammon, served as a war god among tribes like the Laguatan, personified as a bull-headed figure carried into battle as a talisman, as recorded by the 6th-century CE poet Corippus. Other figures encompassed Antaeus, a giant protector of Libyan lands mythologized as son of Gaia and Poseidon, linked to megalithic sites like the Mzora stone circle of 168 stones (tallest 5 meters high) in Morocco. Phoenician influences introduced Baal-Hammon (syncretized with Roman Saturn) and Tanit, while Egyptian elements included Osiris and Isis, with taboos against consuming swine or cow flesh attributed to these cults among some groups. Local spirits, termed dii Mauri, appeared in Roman-era inscriptions, such as Varsissima ("the nameless one") and Macurgum ("the great one") among 52 deities listed at Vaga in Tunisia. Rituals emphasized ancestor veneration, with consultations of spirits through divination in tombs or dreams, as practiced by tribes like the Awjila in Libya's oases. Animal veneration featured in Neolithic rock art depicting rams and bulls, potentially indicating fetishistic elements, while sacrifices and communal feasts occurred at sanctuaries in caves or near water sources. Charismatic Numidian rulers, such as those in the 3rd–2nd centuries BCE, were deified posthumously, paralleling later saint cults. Megalithic structures supported funerary practices: simple ground burials evolved into tumuli, rock-cut tombs with altars for offerings, and pyramidal mausolea like the Medracen (19 meters high, circa 3rd century BCE) in Algeria and the Mausoleum of Mauretania (30 meters, 1st century CE). These beliefs, documented via Herodotus, Roman inscriptions, and early Christian writers like Augustine—who noted persistent rock worship—reflected a resilient indigenous framework adapted through contacts with Phoenician, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman cultures from the 1st millennium BCE. ![Hoggar rock painting depicting ancient scenes][float-right]

Conversion to Islam and doctrinal adaptations

The Arab conquest of Berber territories in North Africa commenced in 647 CE with initial raids into Ifriqiya, escalating under Uqbah ibn Nāfiʿ, who established the garrison city of in 670 CE as a base for further expansion. Berber tribes mounted fierce resistance, exemplified by the defeat and death of Uqbah in 683 CE at the hands of the Awraba leader Kusayla, who briefly allied with Byzantine remnants before turning against the invaders. Subsequent campaigns under Ḥassān ibn al-Nuʿmān culminated in the decisive defeat of the Berber prophetess and military leader al-Kāhinah (Dihya) around 698–701 CE in the Awrās Mountains, marking the collapse of organized opposition and facilitating the consolidation of Muslim control by 711 CE. Conversion to Islam proceeded gradually rather than through wholesale coercion, driven by pragmatic incentives such as exemption from the jizya poll tax imposed on non-Muslims and opportunities for social integration and military participation. Umayyad governors like Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr (r. c. 705–715 CE) employed assimilation strategies, including missionary efforts and equitable treatment that encouraged tribes such as the Kutāma and Zanāta to convert en masse and join Arab-led armies for further conquests into al-Andalus. However, discriminatory policies under the Umayyads—treating Berber converts (mawālī) as inferior, subjecting them to heavy taxation, and reserving leadership roles for Arabs—fueled resentment, culminating in the Great Berber Revolt of 740–743 CE, which exploited the Abbasid Revolution to challenge Umayyad authority across the Maghreb. Doctrinal adaptations emerged prominently through Berber affinity for Kharijism, a sect originating in the eastern Islamic world but disseminated via missionaries from Baṣra starting in the 720s CE, which resonated with tribal egalitarianism and rejection of Arab ethnic privilege in governance. Kharijite tenets emphasizing piety, merit-based leadership, and opposition to unjust rulers appealed to Berbers chafing under caliphal centralism, leading to the establishment of autonomous polities such as the Ibāḍī imamate in Tripolitania under Abū al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 761 CE) and the Rustamid dynasty at Tāhart, founded by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Rustam in 761 CE (elected imām 776 CE), which endured until Fatimid conquest in 909 CE. Ibāḍism, a moderate Kharijite variant, predominated among Berbers by the , promoting walāya (association with fellow believers) and barāʾa (dissociation from unbelievers) while permitting pragmatic coexistence with non-Ibāḍīs, as seen in Rustamid commercial ties and doctrinal refinement through Basran . This adaptation aligned with Berber tribal autonomy, enabling states like the Midrarid emirate at Sijilmāsa (est. 771 CE) to thrive amid Abbasid pressures, though Kharijism waned in favor of Ibāḍism's less militant stance. Over subsequent centuries, many Berbers transitioned to Sunni Maliki orthodoxy under dynasties like the Aghlabids, yet Ibāḍī communities persisted in enclaves such as the Mzāb Valley and Jabal Nafūsa, retaining doctrinal emphases on elective leadership and as vestiges of early adaptations.

Modern religious diversity and syncretism

Among contemporary Berbers, predominates, yet practices frequently exhibit with pre-Islamic indigenous elements, such as the veneration of marabouts (holy men or saints) and integration of animist rituals into daily life and festivals. These blended customs, evident in rural Moroccan and Algerian communities, include protective amulets derived from ancient beliefs and communal ceremonies honoring natural spirits alongside Islamic prayers. A distinct minority adheres to Ibadi Islam, primarily the Mozabite Berbers in Algeria's Mzab Valley around , where this puritanical sect—originating from early Kharijite schisms—emphasizes egalitarian social structures, literacy, and asceticism, setting it apart from surrounding Sunni majorities and occasionally leading to intercommunal tensions. In Algeria's Kabyle region, Protestant has expanded significantly since the 1990s, with estimates indicating over 5% of the local Berber population professing Christian faith and annual growth rates approximating 8%, outpacing global evangelical averages; this surge correlates with Berber cultural revivalism and perceptions of Islam as tied to policies. Tuareg Berbers, nomadic across the , largely follow with syncretic infusions from pastoral traditions, including reverence for ancestral sites and protective rituals, though stricter Salafi influences have emerged in some and groups post-2010s conflicts. Revival of pre-Islamic cultural markers, like the celebration—tied to agricultural cycles and now officially recognized in since 2011—highlights ongoing , as some communities fuse these with Islamic observances despite orthodox objections.

Culture and society

Kinship, gender roles, and social structures

Berber kinship systems exhibit regional variation, with most northern groups employing patrilineal descent and , tracing lineage primarily through male lines and emphasizing agnatic ties. In contrast, southern Berber societies, including certain Tuareg confederations, adopt bilineal or matrilineal patterns with terminology, where inheritance and membership often follow the mother's line, reflecting adaptations to nomadic lifestyles and historical influences. The serves as the foundational unit in many communities, expanding into extended patrilineal households that prioritize tribal solidarity and reciprocity over rigid hierarchy. Among the Tuareg, a prominent Berber subgroup spanning the , matrilineal clans hold corporate significance, with property and social identity inherited through women, though men typically assume formal leadership roles such as chiefs. This structure coexists with Islamic patrilineal norms imposed historically, resulting in hybrid practices where women retain influence over household decisions and marriages, often initiating or dissolving unions without male veto. Tuareg women notably forgo veiling, a reversal of common Muslim gender markers, underscoring their relative autonomy in public and private spheres compared to patrilineal Berber groups. However, matriliny does not equate to ; patriarchal elements persist, with male dominance in political and military affairs. Gender roles across Berber societies traditionally assign women primary responsibilities for domestic production, child-rearing, and cultural transmission, positioning them as custodians of language, oral histories, and identity amid Arabization pressures. In sedentary villages of the Atlas Mountains or Kabylia, women contribute substantially to agriculture and crafts, yet spatial norms confine them to indoor or familial domains, while men engage in public assemblies and herding. Economic participation varies; in High Atlas communities, women access wage labor in tourism or cooperatives, challenging strict segregation but reinforcing their role in family sustenance without upending male authority. Berber societies remain patriarchal overall, with no evidence of historical matriarchy, though women's agency in resilience and adaptation—such as navigating vulnerabilities through communal networks—demonstrates pragmatic influence beyond formal power. Social structures revolve around tribal confederations, clans, and autonomous villages governed by councils (jemaa) comprising elders and notables, emphasizing consensus, economic mutualism, and aversion to centralized . Major groups like the , , and historically federated into larger units for defense and migration, with clans (often rivalrous) handling internal disputes via (azref). Villages function as self-regulating entities, integrating castes such as artisans (inadan) who provide specialized services in exchange for protection, fostering interdependence over strict class divisions. This decentralized model persists in rural areas, balancing obligations with adaptive amid modern state encroachments.

Oral traditions, music, and performing arts

Berber oral traditions form a cornerstone of cultural transmission, relying on memorization and recitation due to the historical absence of widespread written records among many communities. Epic poetry appears in forms such as tayffart or tamdyazt, consisting of extended poetic sequences that recount historical events, heroic deeds, and moral lessons, preserved through generations of performers. Poetic jousts conducted by inḍḍāmn—oral poets and composers—maintain interactive traditions of improvisation and competition, sustaining communal identity and knowledge. These traditions include diverse genres like riddles, folktales, proverbs, lullabies, and enigmas, often embedded in daily life and rituals to encode social norms and historical memory. Berber music draws from regional variations, featuring acoustic instruments adapted to nomadic and sedentary lifestyles. Common instruments include the guembri (a three-stringed used in rhythmic strumming), the lotar (a plucked with three or four strings prevalent in the Middle Atlas), and the imzad (a one-stringed violin-like instrument played exclusively by Tuareg women for melodic expression). Percussive elements dominate with hand drums, bendirs (frame drums), and tambourines, often layered in polyrhythms during ensemble performances, while wind instruments like the ghaita (a double-reed resembling a bagpipe) and rabab (a one-stringed spike ) add piercing tones. Music serves narrative functions, accompanying and stories that address themes of resistance, , and heritage, with ululations enhancing communal energy in tribal settings. Performing arts among Berbers emphasize collective dances tied to , weddings, and festivals, symbolizing social cohesion and rites of passage. The Ahwash (or Ahwach), a prominent Amazigh dance from the Souss Valley and , involves lines of men and women facing each other, synchronized steps with drums and poetic singing that narrate village life and history. The Ahidous, originating in eastern Morocco's and Atlas regions, features processional movements with hand-clapping and choral refrains, rooted in pre-Islamic communal rituals. Other forms include the Taskiwin, a martial dance from the Western employing a horn (tiskt) for signals amid energetic footwork evoking warfare or , and Kabyle dances laden with symbolism for and marriage rites. These performances, often improvised within fixed structures, preserve ethnic diversity across Tuareg, Kabyle, and Shilha subgroups, resisting .

Material culture, cuisine, and crafts

Berber material culture reflects adaptation to diverse North African environments, with housing constructed from locally available resources. In mountainous regions such as the , structures utilize stone and wood for durability against harsh weather, while desert-dwelling groups like the Tuareg employ clay and straw for mud-brick homes that provide insulation from extreme temperatures. Traditional attire includes the , a long, loose-fitting robe made from lightweight or fabrics, designed to shield against sun, sand, and cold nights; regional variations feature vibrant geometric patterns and bold colors derived from natural dyes like and . Berber cuisine emphasizes simple, communal meals prepared with staple grains, meats, and vegetables, originating from ancient pastoral and agricultural practices. , a semolina-based dish steamed in a , forms the core of many meals and is typically served with stews featuring lamb, chicken, or vegetables seasoned with , , , and . Tagines, slow-cooked in earthenware pots of the same name, incorporate ingredients like onions, carrots, potatoes, , and olives, allowing flavors to meld over low heat for hours. Herbs such as mint, , and are ubiquitous, often used fresh in salads or teas, reflecting Mediterranean influences blended with indigenous . Berber crafts, primarily practiced by women in rural communities, preserve symbolic motifs tied to , fertility, and protection. Silver jewelry, including elaborate necklaces, bracelets, and pins with triangular plates, serves both ornamental and functional roles, such as fastening garments, and incorporates motifs like eyes or hands to ward off evil. produces woolen carpets and rugs using sheep or dyed with plant-based colors, featuring geometric patterns that encode tribal identities and stories passed down generations. is hand-formed without wheels, fired in open pits using branches and dung for fuel, yielding unglazed vessels for cooking and storage adorned with incised designs. These artisanal traditions, dating back millennia, continue in areas like the , where they support local economies amid modernization pressures.

Politics and identity

Berberism as ideology and nationalism

Berberism, also termed Amazighism, constitutes a political and ethnonationalist movement centered on affirming the distinct cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of Berber (Amazigh) peoples across , in opposition to post-colonial policies that marginalized indigenous languages and heritage. Emerging during the French colonial era, particularly in Algeria's region and , it initially manifested as cultural associations resisting assimilation into Arab-nationalist frameworks during struggles. By the mid-20th century, Berberist thought emphasized the autochthonous roots of North Africans predating Arab conquests, advocating for the revival of Tamazight languages, script, and pre-Islamic historical narratives to counter state-imposed dominance in , administration, and media. The 1949 Berberist Crisis in exemplified early ideological tensions, where French colonial policies exploiting Berber-Arab divides provoked backlash from Arab nationalists, yet underscored Berber demands for separate cultural recognition, marking a pivotal shift in toward suppressing regional identities. This evolved into more organized activism, with the 1980 —triggered by the Algerian regime's cancellation of Mouloud Mammeri's lecture on ancient Kabyle at University—igniting mass protests in that demanded Tamazight's official status and cultural autonomy. Though met with violent repression resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of arrests, the uprising galvanized Berber consciousness, fostering organizations like the Berber Cultural Movement and laying groundwork for linguistic reforms. In , parallel developments saw the formation of cultural groups in the , evolving into the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCA) by the 2000s, which pressured the monarchy for rights amid edicts post-1962 independence. Achievements include Tamazight's designation as a in Algeria's 2002 constitution and official language in 2016, alongside 's 2011 constitutional recognition, though implementation lags due to resource constraints and resistance from elites. has seen sporadic activism, with partial media allowances but no full official status as of 2023. Berber nationalism varies regionally: autonomist in via groups like the Movement for Kabyle Autonomy (MAK), which seeks citing systematic discrimination, while broader ideology prioritizes or over outright . Symbols such as the Amazigh —blue for Mediterranean ties, for nature, for —and the Y letter evoking free man ("Aḥrar") encapsulate unity under the pan-Berber concept of .

Conflicts with Arab-centric states

In post-independence , Berber populations faced systemic marginalization under Arab-centric policies that prioritized , culture, and identity, often framing Berber as a to national unity influenced by pan-Arab ideologies. These policies, implemented in and , included mandatory of education and administration from the onward, suppressing Tamazight (Berber ) usage and leading to cultural erasure efforts. Conflicts erupted as Berbers demanded , , and recognition, resulting in violent clashes with state . In Algeria, the Berber Spring of 1980 began on April 10 when authorities canceled a lecture on ancient Berber poetry in , sparking riots across that spread to and lasted until June, with estimates of dozens killed by security forces. Protesters, primarily Kabyles, demanded official recognition of Tamazight and an end to , viewing the government's response—including arrests of intellectuals and a media blackout—as an assault on indigenous identity. The uprising highlighted underlying grievances over economic neglect and cultural suppression in Berber regions, though the regime crushed it without concessions, reinforcing perceptions of state favoritism toward Arab elements. The Black Spring of 2001 in escalated these tensions after the April 18 death of 19-year-old student Massinissa Guermah in police custody in Beni , ruled a but widely attributed to , igniting months of protests that killed at least 126 civilians and injured hundreds more in clashes with gendarmes. Demonstrators from the Coordination des Aârush (citizens' movement) called for , justice reforms, and Tamazight's elevation, boycotting elections and erecting barricades; the violence exposed failures in integrating Berber demands into the Arab-dominated republic. This led to partial reforms, including Tamazight's 2002 designation as a , though implementation remained uneven amid ongoing distrust. In , Berber activism against intensified in the 1970s–1990s through groups like the Amazigh Cultural Movement, facing arrests and charges of for rallies demanding Tamazight and land rights in and Atlas regions. The 1991 arrest of activist Mohamed Bouziane for distributing Berber materials exemplified state repression, while 2001 protests in southern oases over cultural suppression drew similar crackdowns. Sustained nonviolent campaigns pressured King Mohammed VI to establish the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in 2001 and enshrine Tamazight as an in the 2011 , yet activists report persistent underfunding and Arab-centric biases in media and policy. Among Tuareg Berbers in Sahelian states like , rebellions from 1963–1964, 1990–1995, and 2012 sought autonomy against central governments accused of neglecting nomadic pastoralists in favor of sedentary, often Arab-influenced southern majorities, with the 2012 briefly declaring independence before French intervention. These cycles stemmed from broken peace accords and resource disputes, underscoring Berber-wide patterns of resistance to homogenizing state structures.

Autonomy demands, rebellions, and international advocacy

Berber groups have pursued autonomy through armed rebellions against colonial and post-colonial authorities. The Rif War from 1921 to 1926 in northern Morocco pitted Riffian Berber tribes, unified under Muhammad Abd el-Krim, against Spanish forces, employing guerrilla tactics that inflicted significant defeats, including at the Battle of Annual on July 22, 1921, where over 10,000 Spanish troops perished. Abd el-Krim proclaimed the Republic of the Rif in 1921, aiming for independence, but the combined Spanish-French offensive with 400,000 troops ended the rebellion by 1926, leading to his exile. Post-independence, Tuareg Berbers in launched the first from to against the central government in , protesting marginalization after Mali's 1960 ; insurgents conducted hit-and-run raids in the north, but were suppressed by due to superior Malian forces. Subsequent Tuareg uprisings occurred in 1990–1996 and 2007–2009, driven by demands for and resource control in the region, often involving alliances with Islamist groups amid state neglect. In , Kabyle Berbers have demanded regional amid policies post-1962 independence, culminating in the Black Spring protests of 2001 after gendarmes killed a Kabyle on April 18, 2001, sparking riots that resulted in 126 deaths and over 600 structures burned, with protesters seeking Tamazight's official status and self-rule for . The Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK), founded in 2010, advocates or confederation, citing cultural suppression, though labeled separatist by ; by 2023, saw repeated clashes over these claims. Moroccan Amazigh movements focus less on territorial and more on cultural revival, with over 800 associations by the 2010s pushing -based recognition; the 2011 constitutional amendment made Tamazight an following Arab Spring pressures, yet activists report ongoing land disputes and arrests for demonstrations. Internationally, Berber advocacy leverages diaspora networks and frameworks; Kabyle exiles in organized protests, such as those in during the 2001 Black Spring solidarity, while groups like the Amazigh lobby for UN , highlighting state repression in reports to bodies like the . Algerian authorities have accused international NGOs of fueling , as in 2021 terrorism charges against MAK leaders for alleged foreign ties.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.