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Achillas (Greek: Ἀχιλλᾶς; died 47 BC) was one of the guardians of the Egyptian king Ptolemy XIII Theos Philopator, and commander of the king's troops, when Pompey fled to Egypt in September 48 BC. He was called by Julius Caesar a man of extraordinary daring, and it was he and Lucius Septimius who killed Pompey at the suggestion of the eunuch Pothinus and Theodotus of Chios.[1][2][3]

Achillas subsequently joined Pothinus in resisting Caesar, and having had the command of the whole army entrusted to him by Pothinus, he marched against Alexandria with 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.[4] Caesar, who was at Alexandria, did not have sufficient forces to oppose him, and sent ambassadors to negotiate with him. However, Achillas murdered the ambassadors to remove all hopes of reconciliation. He then marched into Alexandria and some of the city. Meanwhile, Arsinoe, the younger sister of Ptolemy, escaped from Caesar and joined Achillas. However, in 47 BC, dissension broke out between them, so Arsinoe had Achillas put to death by Ganymedes, a eunuch to whom she then entrusted the command of the forces.[5][6][7][8]

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Achillas

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Achillas (Greek: Ἀχιλλᾶς; died 47 BC) was a Ptolemaic military commander of likely mixed Greek and native Egyptian descent who served as one of the guardians (epitropos) of the young king Ptolemy XIII Theos Philopator and as commander-in-chief of the royal army during the Alexandrian War against Julius Caesar in 48–47 BC. Under the direction of the regency cabal including the eunuch Pothinus and rhetorician Theodotus, Achillas oversaw the assassination of the defeated Roman general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey) in September 48 BC, shortly after Pompey's flight to Egypt following the Battle of Pharsalus, an act intended to curry favor with Caesar but which instead escalated conflict. He then mobilized a force of approximately 20,000 troops, including veteran soldiers and Gabiniani mercenaries, to besiege Caesar's position in Alexandria, briefly gaining the upper hand through control of key fortifications and the harbor before internal divisions undermined the Ptolemaic effort. Achillas's command ended in his execution by order of Ptolemy XIII's sister Arsinoe IV, amid a power struggle with her advisor Ganymedes, highlighting the factional instability that contributed to Ptolemaic defeat.

Background and Origins

Appointment under Ptolemy XII

Achillas, bearing a distinctly derived from the Homeric Achilles, likely originated from the Hellenic elite within Ptolemaic , though no primary evidence confirms ties to native Egyptian nobility or detailed familial background. His emergence in military administration occurred during the turbulent final years of ' reign (80–51 BC). In 55 BC, following Ptolemy XII's restoration to the throne via Roman military intervention led by proconsul , Achillas received appointment as strategos, the chief general overseeing the royal army. This Roman expedition, comprising around 10,000 legionaries, defeated Ptolemy's opponents at and marched on , enabling the king's return after his three-year exile. Gabinius subsequently left a of approximately 2,000 Roman soldiers, known as the (four cohorts), to secure Ptolemy's rule, marking a pivotal of Roman-trained personnel into Egyptian forces. Under Achillas' command, these mercenaries, including later deserters from Gabinius' legions, were integrated into the Ptolemaic , fostering a hybrid force blending Greek tactics with Roman discipline and equipment. This reorganization addressed XII's vulnerabilities exposed by internal revolts and financial dependence on , where the king had incurred debts exceeding 10,000 talents to secure Gabinius' aid. Achillas' role emphasized the Ptolemaic court's reliance on professional commanders to manage a diverse amid intensifying Roman influence in Egyptian affairs.

Rise as Military Commander

Achillas assumed command of the Ptolemaic forces stationed outside , comprising an estimated 20,000 and 2,000 drawn from Egyptian levies, Greek mercenaries, and Roman deserters or freedmen, as detailed in contemporary accounts of the era's mobilizations. This heterogeneous composition reflected the Ptolemaic reliance on diverse to bolster defenses amid regional threats, with Achillas tasked by regents like to preserve operational readiness in and beyond. His loyalty to the proved instrumental in navigating court intrigues following Ptolemy XII's restoration in 55 BC, where factional rivalries threatened regime stability; as an officer of likely Greek-Egyptian background, Achillas prioritized dynastic continuity over personal ambition, emerging as a key enforcer against internal dissent. Amid Ptolemy XII's substantial debts to Roman creditors—incurred to secure his throne through bribes exceeding 10,000 talents—Achillas maintained army cohesion by ensuring mercenary payments from strained treasuries, a pragmatic measure rooted in the contractual nature of Hellenistic forces where fiscal reliability deterred or . This role underscored the causal link between timely remuneration and troop fidelity in a debt-burdened state, positioning Achillas as a bulwark against collapse prior to external Roman pressures.

Service under Ptolemy XIII

Role as Guardian

Achillas was appointed as one of the guardians (epitropoi) to the underage following the death of in early 51 BC, forming part of a regency council that included the as chief minister and Theodotus of as tutor. This arrangement exemplified the Ptolemaic dynasty's practice of entrusting governance to non-royal advisors during royal minorities, as the young king, born around 62–61 BC, lacked the capacity for independent rule. Achillas' position as a senior military figure complemented ' administrative dominance and Theodotus' rhetorical influence, creating a balanced triad to safeguard the throne amid internal court dynamics. In this advisory capacity, Achillas contributed to steering Ptolemy XIII's early decisions during the succession crisis, where joint rule with VII—stipulated in Ptolemy XII's will—quickly eroded into factional strife by . The regents, prioritizing the preservation of male-line dynastic authority, aligned against Cleopatra's assertive leadership, which threatened to marginalize the boy king; this stance reflected pragmatic power equilibria in Hellenistic courts, where female rulers often faced resistance from entrenched male elites unless backed by overwhelming force or foreign alliances. Empirical accounts from Julius Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Civili depict the guardians' collective maneuvering to exclude Cleopatra, expelling her from and consolidating control under Ptolemy XIII to avert fragmentation of the realm. Their actions underscored a commitment to institutional continuity over individual ambition, as evidenced by the regency's unified front against external Roman pressures while internal rivalries remained subdued. Achillas' protective functions extended to vetting court influences and mediating among Ptolemaic factions, ensuring the king's symbolic role as was upheld amid whispers of Cleopatra's independent maneuvers in . This role demanded vigilance against dynastic challengers, with the guardians' decisions grounded in the causal imperatives of maintaining Egypt's autonomy vis-à-vis , as Ptolemy XII's debts and restorations had heightened vulnerabilities. Primary narratives, such as those in Cassius Dio's Roman History, corroborate the regents' emphasis on Ptolemy XIII's primacy, portraying Achillas as a stabilizing force in advisory councils prior to escalating conflicts. While Caesar's account, written from a Roman perspective, highlights ' prominence, the broader evidentiary consensus affirms Achillas' integral advisory input in fostering regency cohesion.

Assassination of Pompey

Following his defeat at the Battle of Pharsalus in August 48 BC, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus sought refuge in Egypt, arriving off the coast of Pelusium on September 28, 48 BC, with hopes of support from the young Ptolemy XIII, whose father Ptolemy XII had previously benefited from Pompey's influence in Roman affairs. The Ptolemaic court, however, viewed Pompey's presence as a liability amid the Roman civil war; regent Pothinus, advised by Theodotus, argued that neutrality was untenable and that presenting Pompey's head to the victor—anticipated to be Julius Caesar—would secure Egypt's position. This calculation was compounded by longstanding Ptolemaic debts to Roman creditors, stemming from Ptolemy XII's 59 BC bribes for Roman recognition, totaling around 10,000 talents, which left the regime vulnerable to reprisals from whichever Roman faction prevailed. Pothinus issued secret orders to Achillas, the prefect commanding Egyptian forces at , directing him to eliminate upon arrival; Achillas collaborated with , a former Pompeian lured by promises of reward, and Salvius, a . Pretending , Achillas dispatched a to ferry ashore; as , accompanied only by his son Sextus and a few attendants, boarded and turned to bid farewell to his wife Cornelia's ship, Septimius struck the first blow with his sword, followed by Achillas' men who swiftly dispatched him to prevent resistance. 's body was abandoned on the beach, later cremated by his Philippus using oars and ship timbers, while his head was severed and dispatched to as proof of the deed. Three days later, Caesar arrived in and was presented with Pompey's embalmed head by , expecting gratitude; instead, Caesar recoiled in horror, weeping and turning away, offended by the barbarity despite his rivalry with . This misjudgment—prioritizing a perceived diplomatic coup over understanding Roman elite norms against such desecration—failed to avert conflict and instead alienated Caesar, who demanded repayment of the Ptolemaic debts and mediation in the royal succession dispute.

Military Campaigns

Mobilization against Caesar

Following the assassination of on September 28, 48 BC, , acting as regent for the young Ptolemy XIII, dispatched secret instructions to Achillas at , directing him to lead the —estimated at 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry—toward to challenge Caesar's presence. This force, primarily composed of Egyptian and Libyan troops supplemented by mercenaries, drew on units previously organized under Roman general in 55 BC, when Achillas had served as a key commander, imparting familiarity with Roman military practices. The march spanned approximately 150 miles across the , a logistical feat accomplished in late 48 BC despite the terrain's challenges, including canals and marshy regions that complicated supply lines for such a large contingent. Coordination was further disrupted when Caesar, discovering Pothinus's intrigue through intercepted messages and the murder of his envoys to Achillas, ordered the regent's execution around mid-October 48 BC; nonetheless, Achillas maintained operational momentum, advancing without faltering leadership transition. Upon arrival outside Alexandria, Achillas positioned his troops to encircle key approaches to the city, fortifying camps and securing water sources to sustain a prolonged standoff against Caesar's smaller garrison of roughly 4,000 men entrenched within the urban core. This buildup emphasized Achillas's role in rapid deployment and defensive consolidation, leveraging the army's numerical superiority and prior exposure to Roman-style discipline for anticipated close-quarters confrontations.

Conduct of the Alexandrian Siege

Achillas arrived in Alexandria with an army estimated at 20,000 infantry, including veteran cohorts trained under Roman general , and 2,000 cavalry, vastly outnumbering Julius Caesar's approximately 4,000 troops—comprising elements of the 6th and 37th Legions plus —confined to the fortified Bruchion quarter near the royal palace. In late 48 BC, he exploited this superiority by encircling Caesar's position with a perimeter, incorporating armed civilians and slaves to man defenses, while directing assaults to isolate the Romans from external aid. His forces fortified held districts with triple walls up to 40 feet high, supported by ten-story towers and mobile siege engines, aiming to starve out or overwhelm the defenders through sustained pressure. Key tactical decisions focused on dual land and naval pressure. Achillas launched coordinated assaults, dividing his troops to strike Caesar's palace residence while a larger contingent targeted the harbor to secure Ptolemaic naval assets and prevent Roman resupply by . To block reinforcements, he stationed guardships at the Nile's mouths and approaches, while repairing derelict vessels to contest harbor control. Supply lines for his leveraged Alexandria's network and urban hinterlands, allowing initial influxes of provisions from Egyptian-controlled territories, though these routes exposed vulnerabilities to Roman counter-raids. A critical setback occurred when Achillas failed to safeguard the Ptolemaic fleet of over 70 warships anchored in the Great Harbor; in response to mounting attacks, Caesar ordered their , denying Achillas naval superiority and temporarily easing Roman pressure despite the fire's spread to parts of the city. This loss, coupled with logistical strains—such as oar shortages prompting the dismantling of public buildings for timber—eroded Egyptian momentum, as Achillas' forces struggled to rebuild vessels amid ongoing engagements and the siege's attritional demands. Despite early advantages from citywide control, these empirical failures highlighted the limitations of Achillas' strategy in sustaining a prolonged against Caesar's defensive resilience.

Internal Conflicts and Downfall

Rivalry with Ganymedes

In early 47 BC, during the ongoing siege of , internal divisions intensified within the Ptolemaic forces as Ganymedes, the eunuch tutor and advisor to , positioned himself as a direct challenger to Achillas' command of the veteran army. Ganymedes, leveraging his close ties to Arsinoe—who had fled to the countryside and rallied supporters—advocated for a shift in strategy and authority, reflecting the factional court politics typical of Ptolemaic Egypt where personal allegiances to royal figures often superseded military unity. This rivalry manifested in disputes over tactical decisions, with Ganymedes pushing for more aggressive measures against Caesar's entrenched positions, while Achillas prioritized maintaining the blockade with his experienced troops. Accusations of incompetence and potential circulated between the factions, exacerbating command fragmentation; Achillas was rumored to be plotting against Arsinoe, prompting her supporters to question his amid fears of secret negotiations with Caesar. Such charges underscored the Hellenistic penchant for intrigue, where eunuchs like Ganymedes wielded influence through royal proximity rather than merit, eroding trust among the ranks. Despite these tensions, Achillas retained operational control over field forces in the short term, but the sowed divided , as soldiers aligned with either Achillas' military or Ganymedes' royalist zeal, weakening overall cohesion against the Roman counteroffensives. This infighting diverted resources from the war effort, allowing Caesar to exploit the disarray through targeted reinforcements and supply maneuvers.

Execution on Orders of Arsinoe IV

In early 47 BC, amid escalating internal divisions within the Ptolemaic faction opposing , ordered the execution of Achillas, the commander of the Egyptian forces, at the instigation of her tutor Ganymedes. Ganymedes, suspecting Achillas of potential betrayal to the enemy, convinced Arsinoe to act preemptively against him, resulting in Achillas' immediate killing. This act stemmed from mutual suspicions between Achillas and Arsinoe, each vying for dominance over the war effort. Following Achillas' death, Ganymedes assumed command of the Egyptian army, consolidating power under Arsinoe's nominal authority but introducing further volatility in leadership. The abrupt removal of Achillas, who had previously mobilized and led the bulk of Ptolemy XIII's troops against Caesar's forces, exacerbated disorganization among the defenders during the ongoing of . This command transition weakened strategic cohesion, as Ganymedes shifted tactics toward desperate measures like contaminating the city's water supply, hastening the erosion of Ptolemaic resistance. Without Achillas' experienced oversight, the Egyptian military suffered from fragmented decision-making, contributing directly to their vulnerabilities in the subsequent confrontations.

Historical Assessment

Accounts in Primary Sources

The Bellum Alexandrinum, attributed to Caesar or his associates in chapters 1–33, offers the most extensive primary depiction of Achillas as commander of XIII's forces. It recounts his execution of Magnus on September 29, 48 BC, near , where Achillas received the fugitive Roman general but ordered his immediate killing to align with the Egyptian court's perceived interests following Pharsalus. Achillas subsequently assembled about 20,000 troops—comprising regular soldiers, mercenaries, and armed civilians—and led them into , initiating a against Caesar's outnumbered contingent of roughly 3,200 legionaries plus auxiliaries. The account credits Achillas with tactical acumen, such as fortifying the harbor island of Pharos, severing supply lines via bridge demolitions, and launching coordinated assaults that exploited numerical superiority to pressure Roman positions over several weeks. However, it attributes his downfall to Egyptian internal betrayals, noting his poisoning on Arsinoe IV's orders and the command's transfer to Ganymedes, framing Achillas as a capable but ultimately ineffective leader undermined by factionalism rather than outright incompetence. This portrayal reflects a Roman bias, emphasizing perfidious oriental intrigue and resourcefulness amid adversity, while downplaying Egyptian strategic agency. Dio Cassius corroborates these events in Roman History Book 42, chapters 43–44, identifying Achillas as supreme commander who, with , deceived onto a for his stabbing death, preserving the head as a trophy for Caesar's anticipated arrival. Dio echoes Achillas' march on Alexandria and efforts but stresses court machinations, including his rivalry-fueled execution by Ganymedes, portraying him within a narrative of Ptolemaic dysfunction that facilitated Caesar's eventual triumph. Appian, in Civil Wars Book 2, chapters 84–90, aligns Achillas with Ptolemy XIII's guardians and Theodotus, depicting him as army chief who dispatched the fatal skiff and preserved Pompey's remains to curry Roman favor, only to face execution by Caesar upon the latter's reinforcement. This variant on his death highlights inconsistencies across sources, with compressing the nine-month into a broader framework, less focused on Achillas' battlefield prowess than on the regents' opportunistic . Collectively, these Roman-centric texts privilege Caesar's perspective, acknowledging Achillas' military threat while subordinating it to themes of barbaric betrayal; no extant Ptolemaic or Cleopatran records counter this, suggesting gaps in non-Roman regarding his pre-48 BC career.

Evaluations of Competence and Motives

Achillas demonstrated organizational competence in rapidly mobilizing a substantial Ptolemaic force from to in October 48 BC, assembling approximately 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, including disciplined mercenaries and Roman deserters, which enabled an initial exerting pressure on Julius Caesar's limited contingent of about 4,000 men. This recruitment and deployment highlighted his ability to integrate diverse elements, countering perceptions of inherent disorganization in Egyptian armies by effectively incorporating former Roman legionaries who provided tactical expertise. Criticisms of Achillas' strategic acumen center on coordination breakdowns with the Ptolemaic court following ' execution by Caesar in late 48 BC, as Achillas persisted with the siege independently but failed to adapt to shifting palace dynamics, contributing to operational stagnation. Subsequent internal purges, including his replacement and execution by Ganymedes amid rivalries favoring , reflect broader Ptolemaic systemic frailties—such as factional influence and regency instability—rather than isolated personal errors, as the army's initial cohesion eroded due to court-level disunity rather than battlefield deficiencies. Achillas' motives appear rooted in fidelity to Ptolemy XIII as one of the king's guardians, executing Pompey's murder on regent ' counsel to ostensibly secure Roman favor while prioritizing the young ruler's throne against 's claim, with no primary evidence indicating pro-Roman sympathies or independent ambition. This loyalty-driven opposition to Caesar, once he aligned with , underscores a pragmatic defense of the Ptolemaic status quo over ideological or personal gain.

Cultural Depictions

In Ancient Literature

Achillas receives only cursory treatment in surviving ancient literary works outside historiography, appearing primarily in Marcus Annaeus Lucan's epic poem Pharsalia (also known as Bellum Civile), composed around 60–65 AD. In Book 8, Lucan describes Achillas as the recipient of Pompey the Great's severed head, delivered by the assassin Septimius after the murder on September 28, 48 BC; the poet notes Achillas "appropriated it, fondling it" in a scene emphasizing the barbarity of Egyptian involvement in Roman affairs, yet without embellishing Achillas's personal motives or psychology beyond his role as Ptolemy XIII's military agent. Lucan's portrayal in Book 10 extends to Achillas's command of Egyptian forces during the Alexandrian conflict, depicting him as an extension of Ptolemaic intrigue under the young king's influence, where he learns of assassination plots against but meets his end amid internal rivalries. This representation casts Achillas as a functional of Hellenistic generalship—loyal to factional interests in a Roman-Egyptian clash—prioritizing narrative utility in illustrating civil war's spillover into foreign courts over individualized heroism or villainy. Unlike mythic figures, Achillas lacks amplification into legend, reflecting the 's stoic emphasis on historical contingency rather than moral archetype-building. No substantial references appear in other poetic or rhetorical corpora, such as those of , where critiques of Egyptian leadership remain generalized without naming Achillas.

In Modern Drama and Fiction

In George Bernard Shaw's 1898 play Caesar and Cleopatra, Achillas appears as a subordinate general to , depicted as a tall, handsome man of about thirty-five with a finely curled black beard, distinguished yet lacking in evident cleverness, serving to underscore the comedic ineptitude and internal rivalries within XIII's court. Shaw's characterization emphasizes Achillas's imposing physical presence over intellectual depth, portraying him as part of a faction that initially boasts military superiority against forces but quickly yields amid the play's satirical exploration of Egyptian dysfunction. This representation deviates from historical accounts of Achillas's rapid mobilization of 20,000 troops in 48 BCE, prioritizing dramatic humor over evidence of logistical competence drawn from primary sources like Commentarii de Bello Alexandrino. Achillas features as an antagonistic figure in the 1963 film Cleopatra, directed by , where actor embodies the general as a loyal Ptolemaic entangled in the siege of , amplifying tropes of Egyptian treachery influenced by partisan narrative. In this adaptation, his role supports the film's focus on 's intrigue and heroism, portraying Achillas as a straightforward military foil whose downfall aligns with romanticized views of Roman invincibility, rather than reflecting the internal Ptolemaic power struggles documented in Appian's . Modern video games, such as Assassin's Creed Origins (2017) by Ubisoft, include Achillas as a historical antagonist serving Ptolemy XIII, depicted as a high-ranking general in the pharaoh's inner circle during the Alexandrian conflict, often engaged in combat sequences that heighten his villainy for gameplay purposes. These portrayals typically exaggerate Achillas's role in anti-Caesar plots, drawing from Caesar's biased emphasis on betrayal while omitting nuances like his brief command effectiveness before rivalries with figures such as Ganymedes undermined Ptolemaic unity, as noted in ancient historians. Such fictional amplifications prioritize narrative tension and player immersion over empirical reconstruction, contributing to anachronistic views of Ptolemaic leadership as uniformly scheming rather than strategically adaptive amid civil strife.

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