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Arab Orthodox Movement
The Second Arab Orthodox Conference held in Jaffa, Mandatory Palestine on 28 October 1931, with delegates from various Palestinian and Transjordanian cities.
Native name الحركة العربية الأرثوذكسية
Date1860–present
LocationLevant, (specifically: Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and Syria)
Also known asOrthodox Cause
القضية الأرثوذكسية
CauseEnding the Greek domination of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and Antiochian Orthodox Church
MotiveArab nationalism
OutcomeEstablishment of separate Arab Orthodox institutions
Failure to end the Greek clerical hegemony in Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem

The Arab Orthodox Movement (Arabic: الحركة العربية الأرثوذكسية, romanized: Al-Haraka Al-ʿArabiyya Al-ʾUrthūdhuksiyya) is a political and social movement aiming for the Arabization of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Antiochian Orthodox Church , which has jurisdiction over the Orthodox communities of Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, to which most Christians in the region belong.[1]

Within the context of rising Arab nationalism in the 19th century, the movement was inspired by the successful precedent of the Arabization of Syria and Lebanon's Antioch Patriarchate in 1899. The movement seeks the appointment of an Arab patriarch, Arab laity control over Jerusalem patriarchate's properties for social and educational purposes, and the use of Arabic as a liturgical language.[2] Initially a church movement among Palestine and Transjordan's Orthodox Arab Christians in the late 19th century, it was later supported as a Palestinian and Arab nationalist cause and championed by some Arab Muslims, owing to the Greek-dominated patriarchate's early support to Zionism.

The Orthodox laity, which is mostly Arab, maintains that the patriarchate was forcibly Hellenized in 1543, while the Greek clergy says that the patriarchate was historically Greek.[2] Opposition to the Greek clergy turned violent in the late 19th century, when they came under physical attack by the Arab laity in the streets. The movement held Arab Orthodox conferences, the first of which was in Jaffa in 1923, and most recently in Amman in 2014. One outcome of the 1923 conference was the laity's establishment of tens of Orthodox churches, clubs and schools in Palestine and Jordan.[3] There were historically also several interventions to solve the conflict by the Ottoman, British (1920–1948), and Jordanian (1948–1967) authorities, owing to the patriarchate's headquarters being located in East Jerusalem. Despite the city coming under Israeli occupation since 1967, the patriarchate has continued to function according to a 1958 Jordanian law, which mandates the clergy hold Jordanian citizenship and speak Arabic.[4]

To this day, the patriarchate continues to be dominated by Greek clergy and owns vast properties that make it the second largest landowner in Israel.[1] In recent decades, lawsuits have ensued in Israeli courts between the Arab laity and the patriarchate over ownership of properties. Land sales by the patriarchate to Israeli investors has led to several controversies, the most recent of which led to the dismissal of patriarch Irenaios in 2005.[5] The patriarch's total control over the patriarchate and its vast properties has led to it being described as resembling a "small absolute kingdom".[1]

Background

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See also: Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem
View of the Holy Sepulchre, East Jerusalem, where the patriarchate's headquarters are located

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem is regarded as Jerusalem's most prominent patriarchate, and Palestine's largest and oldest church.[1] It was established by a decree issued from the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD, which elevated the Bishop of Jerusalem to the rank of Patriarch, ranking fifth after the sees of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch (known as the Pentarchy).[6] The patriarchate's jurisdiction extends to the regions of Palestine, Transjordan and the Sinai Peninsula.[1]

Succession to the position of patriarch has been dominated by Greeks since the resignation in 1543 of the last Arab Palestinian Patriarch, Dorotheus II, who was known as Atallah in Arabic.[7] He was replaced by Germanus, a Greek from Morea who pretended to be an Arab through his thorough knowledge of Arabic. Germanus initiated a process of Hellenization, for example by removing the names of Arab patriarchs who had served prior, appointing Greeks to the higher ranks of church, and using Greek as a liturgical language.[2][1] He also took steps to ensure that his successors would be Greeks by establishing the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, whose membership was exclusively Greek.[8] Germanus and the Greek patriarchs who succeeded him handled the patriarchate from their residence in Constantinople until 1834.[8] Election of successive Jerusalem patriarchs was approved by the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, who benefitted from his proximity to and influence on the Ottoman government.[1]

Arab Christians in the Palestine region amounted to around 10% of the population prior to World War I in 1914, the majority, around half, belonging to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.[9] The patriarchate, dominated by Greek clergy, saw itself as the guardian of the holy places, and not the spiritual guide of its mostly Arab laity, who were barred from becoming monks and had no role in administrative or financial workings of the church.[2]

Movement

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Within the context of rising Arab nationalism, Arab revolts against the Greek clergy in the Orthodox patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem — covering modern-day regions of Syria and Lebanon, and Palestine and Transjordan respectively — intensified in the late 19th century.[10] These movements in Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire gained inspiration from nationalists in fellow Balkan provinces (Serbian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Greek Orthodox), who merged demands for religious reforms and national emancipation within the Ottoman Empire earlier that century.[10] Movements demanding the Arabization of the Orthodox patriarchates started in Syria and Lebanon in 1872,[1] and was successful when Meletius II, Michael Doumani in Arabic, was appointed patriarch of Antioch in 1899, becoming its first Arab patriarch since 1720.[10] Sati' al-Husri termed this as "the first real victory of Arab nationalism".[10] However, Arabization of the Jerusalem Orthodox patriarchate failed in Palestine and Transjordan.[10] Other patriarchates in the Holy Land underwent successful Arabization, including Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran churches.[1]

The appointment of Meletius II as patriarch of Antioch in 1899 was considered a successful Arabization that inspired the movement among laity of the Jerusalem Patriarchate

In the late 19th century, the Arab laity protested against the Jerusalem Patriarchate. The Ottomans responded to these protests by promulgating a Fundamental Law in 1875, that gave minor rights to the Arab laity but ensured Greek hegemony, partly influenced by Russian support to laity's demands.[11] Following the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution by the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, a committee of 40 Orthodox Arabs met in Jerusalem and made a set of 18 demands; it was the first time that the right to participate in management of patriarchate's properties was raised.[1] The demands were rejected by the patriarch Damianos, which was followed by violent riots by the Arab laity. Damianos was then deposed by the Greek-dominated brotherhood for appearing too accommodative towards Arab laity demands, but was later reinstated.[11] In 1910, in an attempt to settle the problem, the Ottoman government set up a mixed council, consisting of six Arab and six Greek representatives; the patriarchate would also have to provide a third of its revenues towards financing schools, hospitals and charities. However, the Ottomans stopped short of allowing the Arab laity greater say in the election of their patriarch.[11] These minor concessions were never implemented, and the Mixed Council, which the patriarch deemed having an advisory role, was soon after dissolved in 1913.[11]

The 1914 World War I wreaked havoc on the patriarchate's finances. By the end of 1918, it was estimated that the patriarchate was 600,000 pounds in debt.[12] The Ottomans were driven out of Palestine by British forces commanded by General Edmund Allenby, who drew a temporary reconciliation between the Arab laity and the patriarchate. Tensions arose again when the brotherhood attempted to solve the church's financial problems by taking a loan from Greece, subjecting the church to Greek government influence, and affirming the Hellenic identity of the church. These demands were opposed by Damianos and the British authorities.[12] The Haycraft Commission established by the British in 1921, included recommendations to put control of the church's finances under a British-appointed committee, and greater British involvement in the patriarch's appointment; two policies that were consistent with "maintenance of religious institutions in colonial contexts".[12] The commission also stressed that the laity's problem was bound to reappear and expressed sympathy for Arab demands of greater participation in the church.[12]

In the early 1920s, tensions between the Arab laity and the Greek church worsened significantly after it had issued statements supporting Zionism, and after the British-Greek commission handling the church's finances sold large tracts of land in Jerusalem and its surroundings in 1923, to the Palestine Land Development Company owned by Zionists, aiming to increase Jewish colonization.[12] The Arab Orthodox laity began afterwards of portraying their Greek church a foreign oppressor, akin to the imperial British authorities, and the Zionist immigrants. The Arab Orthodox movement then started using nationalist and anti-imperialist language in its struggle against the patriarchate.[12]

First Arab Orthodox Conference

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Sixth meeting of the Palestine Arab Congress passed a resolution supporting the Arab Orthodox Movement and recognized it in broader nationalist terms, Jaffa, Mandatory Palestine, 16 June 1923

During the sixth conference of the Palestine Arab Congress that was held in Jaffa, Mandatory Palestine, in June 1923, Arab Orthodox leaders, including activists Yacoub Bordqosh and Ibrahim Shammas, and editors Issa El-Issa of the Falastin newspaper, and Issa Bandak of the Sawt Sha'ab magazine, petitioned the Congress to support the Arab Orthodox movement and recognize it as part of a broader nationalist struggle.[13] Encouraged by the Congress' support, they went on to establish an Arab Orthodox Conference in Haifa on 15 July 1923.[13]

The first Arab Orthodox Conference was led by Iskandar Kassab as president, Yaqoub Farraj as deputy president (who would in the following decade become the movement's most committed leader), Michael Khoury as secretary. It was attended by 54 delegates representing all the dioceses in Palestine and Transjordan, demanded Arabization and denounced the Greek hegemony, who were "foreign of language and country... and have four centuries ago usurped the spiritual authority from the Arab Orthodox." The conference demanded renaming the church to the Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarchate; allowing Arab members into brotherhood and hierarchy; enabling Arab administrative participation in financial affairs; Arab control of church institutions; formation of a Mixed Council of an Arab majority with widespread authorities; and insistence on Arabic as liturgical language.[13] The conference also castigated the patriarchate for its land sales to Zionists individuals and companies.[14]

Patriarch Damianos responded to the first Arab Orthodox Conference by organizing his own opposing party, which met several time in October 1923, and proposed less radical reforms to the British. Despite recognizing that the first Arab Orthodox Congress was representative of the community, the British did not respond to its demands.[15] In 1929, a series of letters from Orthodox clubs and association across Mandatory Palestine wrote to the British authorities, denouncing the Greek clergy and accusing them of continued Hellenization, greed and theft.[15]

In 1926, a British commission to "report on certain controversies", also known as the Bertram-Young commission, expressed sympathy with Arab Orthodox demands. It noted that a large part of the Arab Orthodox hostility was due to scandals by the Greek monks involving money and women.[16] However, despite supporting greater Arab participation in the patriarchate's affairs, it stopped short of demanding its Arabization. Significantly, the report's proposed reforms were delayed until a new patriarch was to be elected, which hindered the movement.[16] The British were keen on avoiding the empowerment of Palestinian Orthodox Christians, as they were, along with their Palestinian Muslim counterparts, hostile to Zionism and the British mandate. The report stated: "It is impossible not to view with feelings of sympathy the position in which these members of the Church find themselves." The British report continued:[16]

Like all young men of their time, they are full of the idea of nationalism, and cherish the language which united them with their fellow countrymen. They do not wish to abandon their Church; on the contrary, they are attached to its traditions and its rites. But they find themselves, owing to a peculiar historical development, subject to a monastery whose greatest pride is that it is composed of members of a race alien (or which they themselves consider alien) to their own.

Second Arab Orthodox Conference

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Falastin newspaper front-page headline reporting on Patriarch Damianos' death, 18 August 1931

In 1931, Patriarch Damianos died, and the laity quickly moved to renew their claims, by highlighting how the 1926 British commission sympathized with their stance; how Antioch Patriarchate had been inclusive of its Arab clergy and laity; and how the Jerusalem Patriarchate should be Palestinian and not Greek.[17] They regarded the Greek claim of ownership of holy sites as "groundless and arrogant". They added: "The Patriarchate is an Orthodox institution in Palestine. The Patriarch and the Fraternity are Palestinians. The Community is Palestinian and the Shrines are in Palestine".[17] A meeting was held in Jerusalem attended by 400 notables, Arab priests and the Orthodox community, that refused to recognize any patriarch elected without community's consent.[17]

On 28 November 1931, the second Arab Orthodox Conference was held in Jaffa, led by Issa El-Issa.[17] The concurrent World Islamic Congress held in Jerusalem passed a resolution supporting the Arab Orthodox Movement and recognized it as part of a wider Arab nationalist struggle.[17] The Patriarchate brotherhood moved quickly to preempt these moves, and nominated three candidates for the patriarch's position. The election was allowed to proceed by British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Wauchope, despite Arab laity protests, who demanded their right to elect the patriarch according to constitutional terms and in accordance with the situation in the Antioch patriarchate.[18]

The Arab community sought the opinion of the Palestine Mandate's High Court, and succeeded in getting a supportive ruling, which criticized the mandate authorities for its treatment of the laity, the ignoring of the 1926 British commission's recommendations, and accused the high commissioner of misconceiving his powers by allowing the patriarch's election to proceed.[19] The Falastin newspaper celebrated the ruling, and the Executive Orthodox Committee met with the high commissioner to present its stances. Wachoupe was irritated by the court's ruling, but in 1934, issued as statement saying that no patriarch election would be confirmed without heeding to the demands of the laity, and approved a draft bill of a new law to replace the 1875 Ottoman Fundamental Law concerning Patriarchate.[19] The bill was criticized by the laity. Palestinian journalist Yousef El-Issa and Transjordanian civil servant Auda Qusus wrote in the Executive Committee's memo:[19]

We must in conclusion admit that the problem shall surely be trusted to the Government and that the Patriarchate and the Community shall have to enjoy what the two cats enjoyed of the piece of cheese on which they disputed one another.

The conference sent a letter to Emir Abdullah of Transjordan asking for his support, to which he responded positively, especially with regards to the election of an Arab patriarch.[4] At George Antonius' suggestion, Wachoupe met with the patriarch-elect Timotheus and his chief secretary, and found both of them to be fully opposed to any laity rights. Commissioner Wachoupe wrote:[20]

At the end of 2 hours, I rose in my chair and in my wrath said I was profoundly disappointed and dismayed at the regrettable lack he had shown of any approach to a spirit of good will or conciliation. I said I should not forget his statement that the Convent had the power and would part with none of it to the laity.

British troops talk to Orthodox Greek priests outside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, 11 August 1942.

Despite Commissioner Wachoupe's attempts, no further action was taken by the Mandate authorities to prevent Timotheus' election. A further lawsuit by the Arab Orthodox community failed to stop his election. A year after the Arab revolt in Palestine against British mandate authorities in 1937, Yacoub Farraj wrote to the British Peel Commission presenting the Arab Orthodox community's position.[21]

The Arab Orthodox Movement however faced internal criticism from George Antonius and Khalil Sakakini, with the former viewing incorporation of Palestinian Arab nationalism into the movement was counterproductive, while the latter emphasized that communal political identifications were counterproductive to the integration of Christians into Palestinian political life.[22] While the Arab Orthodox Movement leaders, Yacoub Farraj, Issa El-Issa and Issa Bandak, continued to view the communal and national identities as intertwined.[23]

The movement was frustrated and lost momentum when the Patriarch's election, Timotheus, was confirmed in 1939; and it was overshadowed by growing Arab-Jewish hostilities.[24] The Arab Orthodox community was suffering from difficulties as many of the laity began to leave the church[24]

Third Arab Orthodox Conference

[edit]

On 23 and 24 September 1944, the third Arab Orthodox Conference was held, attended by Palestinian and Transjordanian Orthodox members. Issa Bandak headed the executive committee, who wrote to the British regarding their demands. Becoming disillusioned with the Mandate authorities, the Arab Orthodox community turned their attention to the newly formed Arab League in 1946, and presented their cause in Arab nationalist terms:[25]

We as Arabs and our case being both nationally and politically an Arab affair present this humble petition requesting from your honourable League and from the Arab States participating in the League sympathy for our case by embracing it as an indivisible part of the general Palestinian case.

1958 Jordanian law

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Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, known to Palestinians as the Nakba (catastrophe), the Arab Orthodox community focused its efforts on refugee relief.[1] The patriarchate lent lands for the construction of churches, in an effort to ease tensions with the congregation. However, it was reported that tenants faced harassment and high rents by rent collectors affiliated with the patriarchate.[1] The patriarchate had become in the wake of the war in East Jerusalem, under the control of Jordan, along with the West Bank. When Patriarch Timotheus died in 1955, the congregation renewed its demands, which led to the intervention of the Jordanian government. The Arab nationalist government of Suleiman Nabulsi was supportive of the patriarchate's Arabization,[4] and drafted a new law that met most of the congregation's demands in 1956. However, after his government's forced resignation in April 1957, and due to objections by Patriarch Benedictus, a compromise was reached in 1958 that responded to the Arab Orthodox laity's demands, without giving the right to manage the patriarchate's properties.[1] It demanded the adoption of Jordanian citizenship by all members of the brotherhood and the use of Arabic language among the Greek clergy.[4] This law is in force today, regulating the patriarchate's functions.[4]

1980s and 1990s activism

[edit]

In the wake of the 1967 Six Day War, the West Bank was occupied by Israel. A series of demonstrations erupted by the Arab Orthodox laity against the patriarchate in Bethlehem, Jaffa and Nazareth in the 1990s, demanding control over the patriarchate's properties.[1] Four conferences were held in Jerusalem in 1992, Amman in 1994, Nazareth in 1999, and Amman in 2002.[1]

In the 1980s and 1990s, the struggle between the Arab Orthodox laity and their patriarchate focused on lawsuits in Israeli courts, where both sides engaged in attempts to change ownership of some properties in their favor.[1] Israel has maintained good relations with the patriarchate, in an effort to solidify its hold on occupied East Jerusalem, and in exchange for unfreezing some of the patriarchate's properties.[1]

2005 Irenaios dismissal

[edit]

In early 2005, almost four years into his term as patriarch, Irenaios was dismissed from his position after being accused of selling three properties of the Greek Church in the Old City of Jerusalem to Ateret Cohanim, a Jewish organization whose declared aim is that of establishing a Jewish majority in Jerusalem's Old City and in East Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods.[5]

Arab Orthodox Conferences

[edit]
  • The First Arab Orthodox conference in Haifa on July 15, 1923
  • The Second Arab Orthodox conference in Jaffa on October 28, 1931
  • The Third Arab Orthodox conference in Jerusalem on September 23 and 24,1944
  • The Fourth Arab Orthodox conference in Jerusalem on March 23, 1956
  • The Fifth Arab Orthodox conference in Amman on December 8, 1992
  • The Sixth Arab Orthodox Conference in Amman in 1994
  • The Seventh Arab Orthodox Conference in Nazareth in 1999
  • The Eighth Arab Orthodox Conference in Amman in 2002
  • The Ninth Arab Orthodox Conference in Amman on 14 October 2014

Journalistic activism

[edit]
See also: History of Palestinian journalism

If Palestine has a right to say that it has fallen under two mandatories, a British one and a Zionist one, the Orthodox community has the right to say that it has fallen under three mandatories, a British one, a Zionist one, and yet a third Greek one. These three mandatories have combined to aid one another in depriving Palestinian Arabs of their rights.

— Issa El-Issa, founder and editor of the Falastin newspaper in October 1931.[26]

The Young Turk Revolution that restored the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, led to the abolishment of press censorship. Several newspapers, magazines and periodical appeared across Ottoman Palestine.[27] Out of the twenty-five Palestinian newspapers that were launched in 1908, nineteen were Christian-owned.[27] Palestinian Christian journalists dedicated a significant amount of space for the Orthodox cause. For example, Najib Nassar's Al-Karmil newspaper in 1908, Khalil Sakakini's Al-Dustour in 1910, and Bulus Shihadeh's Mir'at al-Sharq in 1919. The lead organ of the Orthodox movement, however, was the Falastin newspaper that was established by Issa El-Issa and Yousef El-Issa in 1911.[27]

The central motive behind the founding of the Falastin newspaper was to serve as an outlet for the Arab Orthodox community in their struggle against the Greek clerical hegemony of the Patriarchate, but soon after picked up the Arab fight against the Zionist colonization of Palestine.[27] When it first appeared in 1911, Falastin featured a column dedicated to Orthodox affairs. And after being republished in 1921, Falastin's editorials featured three main messages: Arab Orthodox dedication to their church; Greek clerical greed, immorality and foreignness; and inadequate British response to the issue.[27] By the 1920s, the newspaper's editor Issa El-Issa began to view the Arab Orthodox movement, the Arab opposition to Zionist colonization of Palestine, and Arab opposition to the British Mandate authorities, as intertwined struggles in the national liberation movement against European imperial domination of Palestine.[28]

National Orthodox institutions

[edit]

During the first Arab Orthodox Conference in July 1923, the attendees demanded "the establishment of new societies and clubs throughout Palestine and Transjordan" to solidify Arab leadership in the Orthodox community.[1] In 1924, the first Orthodox Club was founded in Jaffa, followed by clubs in Jerusalem (1926), Acre (1929), Beit Sahour (1930), Lydda (1932) and Haifa (1937).[3]

The National Orthodox School established in Amman in 1965, one of the largest national Orthodox institutions hosting thousands of students

Transjordanian notables established the Arab Orthodox Renaissance Association on 14 November 1928, presided by Auda Qusus and his deputy Amin Kawar. Qusus' first preoccupations was the establishment of an Orthodox school in Amman, which was constructed in 1930s hosting 50 students.[4] In 1932, the Association decided to build a church in Amman, funded by philanthropists from the laity across Transjordan and Palestine. The construction work only started in 1947, mainly thanks to a donation from Jerusalem's Orthodox Monastery.[4] The association also acquired two more lands, for cultural and social activities. It helped shape intellectual life in Transjordan and organized Arab nationalist debates against Zionism and later communism.[4]

After unsuccessful attempts to register Orthodox schools in the 1950s, the Orthodox Educational Society was established in 1958, presided by Fu'ad Yaghnam, and later businessman and politician Fouad Farraj. The Society then quickly established its first school that year in Amman's Jabal Ashrafiah, the National Orthodox School, which later opened a second branch in Shmesani in 1965, hosting thousands of students.[4]

Land sale controversies

[edit]

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem represents one of the largest landowners in the region known as the Holy Land. It is the second largest landowner in Israel after the Israel Land Department.[1] Starting from the 19th century onwards, the patriarchate engaged in extensive land purchases, planned for church buildings, institutions, and businesses. It bought lands in what is today the Palestinian territories, Israel, Jordan and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, places within its jurisdiction, and some even outside of it, including in Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, the United States, and Eastern Europe.[1] These properties included hundreds of buildings, churches, and educational and welfare organizations. They are exclusively controlled by the Greek patriarch, including those registered in his name, in the patriarchate's name, and in the congregation's name. Thus, the patriarchate has come to be described as resembling a "small absolute kingdom".[1]

Historiography

[edit]

Palestinian sociologist Salim Tamari wrote about the Arab Orthodox Movement:[10]

The Orthodox Renaissance movement, it should be remembered, became a cause célèbre within wide circles of the Muslim intelligentsia in Syria and Palestine. Many believed that it was an essential component for the development of Arab nationalist currents in the late nineteenth century. Sati' al-Husri, the early ideologue of Arab nationalism, believed that the Arabization of the Orthodox Church of Antioch was a critical landmark and historical turning point for the triumph of Arabism in Syria. Within the various currents of Arab cultural movements in Greater Syria, Orthodox Christian intellectuals often maintained stronger affinities with their Muslim compatriots than did their Catholic and Protestant compatriots.

See also

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References

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Bibliography

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Arab Orthodox Movement

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from Grokipedia
The Arab Orthodox Movement was a lay-led effort among Palestinian members of the Greek Orthodox Church during the British Mandate period (1920–1948), seeking to challenge the entrenched all-Greek clerical hierarchy and achieve greater Arab control over church administration, liturgy, and property management. As the largest Christian denomination in —comprising nearly half of the territory's 9.6% Christian population in —the movement drew on roots of tension tracing to the , when Greek dominance in the Patriarchate of Jerusalem intensified, but gained momentum in the late Ottoman era and peaked under Mandate rule. Its core demands included the establishment of mixed councils for communal affairs, election of Arab bishops (such as an Arabic-speaking one for ), and constitutional reforms to electoral processes for patriarchs. The movement organized key gatherings like the First Arab Orthodox Congress in 1923 and the Second in Jaffa in 1931, where delegates from Palestinian and Transjordanian cities advocated for these changes amid disputes over patriarchal elections and church finances. Led by educated middle-class professionals in fields such as journalism, medicine, and education—who were already prominent in the Palestinian national movement—it fused religious reform with anti-colonial nationalism, framing Greek ecclesiastical authority as analogous to British and Zionist influences. This alignment secured widespread community support and elevated Orthodox Arabs' role in post-Ottoman Palestinian politics, though internal dissent from some clergy and laity persisted. Despite achieving rhetorical and organizational gains, such as heightened awareness of Arab rights within the church, the movement failed to secure lasting structural reforms, with Greek control over the enduring. By the mid-1940s, escalating Mandate-era conflicts overshadowed its efforts, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War effectively dismantled its momentum, scattering communities and leaving a legacy of unresolved communal tensions rather than tangible institutional achievements.

Origins

Late Ottoman Roots

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, established as an autocephalous church since the 5th century, came under predominant ethnic Greek clerical control following the Ottoman conquest of 1517, with the maintaining exclusive authority over appointments and administration. This structure marginalized the Arab Orthodox laity and lower clergy, who formed the majority of the congregation in and , leading to growing discontent by the mid-19th century amid the Ottoman reforms that encouraged communal participation in governance. In the second half of the , Arab Orthodox communities intensified protests against the Greek hierarchy, demanding the use of in and administration, the appointment of Arab bishops, and the inclusion of lay representatives in church councils to address economic grievances over the management of vast patriarchal properties. These demands were articulated through petitions submitted to Ottoman authorities, including the , highlighting the linguistic barrier of Greek exclusivity and the perceived exploitation of Arab donations for Greek interests. The Ottoman response occasionally involved interventions, such as deposing patriarchs in response to complaints, though reforms remained limited and often favored the established Greek clergy to maintain stability within the millet system. The movement drew inspiration from successful Balkan Orthodox struggles for against Phanariot Greek dominance, fostering an emerging Arab Orthodox identity tied to the broader (Arab ) and nascent in Ottoman Arab provinces. By the early , figures like journalist Isa al-Isa began advocating for through Ottoman loyalist frameworks, blending religious reform with calls for communal while navigating the empire's multi-ethnic politics. Despite these efforts, the Greek hierarchy retained control, setting the stage for escalated conflicts under the British Mandate.

Transition to British Mandate

The collapse of Ottoman control in Palestine following the British capture of Jerusalem on December 9, 1917, provided the Arab Orthodox laity with new avenues to challenge the entrenched Greek hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Under Ottoman rule, demands for Arab representation in church governance—such as electing Arab bishops and establishing mixed lay-clerical councils—had been met with suppression, including the temporary deposition of Patriarch Damianos in 1908 and limited concessions via the 1910 Turkish Order allocating one-third of revenues to lay use. With General Allenby's administration pledging non-interference in religious affairs upon entering the city, Arab Orthodox leaders, including figures like educator Khalil Sakakini, resumed petitions to British authorities, framing Greek dominance as incompatible with local Arab interests and seeking oversight of patriarchal finances and elections. During the transitional military administration (1917–1920) and subsequent civil administration under Herbert Samuel, the movement adapted by forming informal committees and leveraging British bureaucratic channels previously unavailable under Ottoman censorship. British officials, prioritizing stability amid rising Arab-Jewish tensions, initially bolstered Damianos's position upon his full reinstatement in 1920, viewing the clergy as a counterweight to . However, persistent Arab complaints over the ate's mismanagement of communal properties—exacerbated by controversial land sales to Jewish buyers—prompted intervention; in April 1921, the Mandate government established a commission under H.C. Haycraft to investigate church finances, revealing exploitation of Arab-majority congregations and recommending reforms like audited accounts. This British scrutiny marked a pivotal shift, as Arab Orthodox activists portrayed the Mandate regime as a potential arbiter against Phanariot (Greek) control, distinct from Ottoman favoritism toward the . While the commission's findings did not immediately Arabize the hierarchy, they eroded Greek autonomy and emboldened lay organizing, culminating in the inaugural Arab Orthodox in on June 23, 1923, which demanded full lay veto in elections and as the liturgical . The period underscored the movement's strategic pivot to colonial leverage, though British reforms remained incremental to avoid alienating the Orthodox world's geopolitical interests.

Early Organizational Efforts

First Arab Orthodox Conference (1923)

The First Arab Orthodox Conference assembled in Haifa on 15 July 1923, representing a pivotal gathering of Arab Orthodox clergy and laity from Palestine and Transjordan to address longstanding grievances against the Hellenic-dominated administration of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Convened amid British Mandate rule, the conference responded to specific provocations, including Patriarch Damianos I's sale of church lands to Zionist buyers for 200,000 Egyptian pounds and the appointment of a non-Arabic-speaking Greek metropolitan in Nazareth, which exacerbated Arab demands for greater communal control over ecclesiastical affairs. The event built on prior agitation, including discussions at the Sixth Palestinian Arab Congress in June 1923, and involved representatives from Orthodox communities seeking to assert Arab linguistic and administrative rights within the church. Key resolutions emphasized structural reforms to diminish Greek clerical hegemony, including the immediate separation of the Patriarch's spiritual duties from administrative responsibilities, the election of local communal councils (majlis milli) in all Palestinian and Jordanian cities and villages, and the establishment of a mixed administrative council incorporating Arab lay and clerical members. Participants also called for expanding Arabic-language education through new church schools across the region and the Arabization of key positions, reflecting a broader push for ethnic and linguistic parity in church governance. While the conference briefly galvanized Arab Orthodox sentiment and laid groundwork for subsequent meetings, its demands met resistance from the and British authorities, yielding limited immediate reforms but sustaining momentum for the Arab Orthodox Movement's campaign against foreign ecclesiastical control.

Second Arab Orthodox Conference (1925)

The Second Arab Orthodox Conference, convened amid escalating tensions over Greek dominance in the Orthodox Patriarchate of , took place on 28 November 1931 in , , rather than in 1925 as sometimes misdated in secondary references. Led by the journalist and activist ʿIsa al-ʿIsa, the gathering included delegates from Palestinian dioceses and Transjordan, building on the unresolved demands of the 1923 congress for Arab clerical appointments, financial transparency, and lay involvement in church governance. The event coincided with the World Islamic Congress in , highlighting broader Arab communal solidarity against perceived foreign influences in religious institutions. Key resolutions reaffirmed the movement's rejection of any patriarchal election excluding Arab laity and , echoing the Bertram-Young Commission's 1926 recommendations for —which British authorities had failed to enforce despite inquiries into Damianos's administration (who died in 1931, precipitating the crisis). The conference's executive committee issued a to the , insisting on communal power over elections and audits of church properties, amid accusations of Hellenic mismanagement and land dealings favoring non-Arab interests. This positioned the Orthodox laity in opposition to the patriarchal , which comprised mostly Greek metropolitans, and pressured Mandate officials to intervene under the 1922 terms preserving the . The conference strengthened organizational infrastructure by endorsing the Arab Orthodox Executive Committee as a permanent body for negotiations and litigation, including lawsuits against the for electoral rights. It also coordinated with emerging Orthodox clubs (e.g., Jaffa's 1924 founding) to mobilize youth and professionals, framing the struggle as anti-colonial resistance intertwined with , though prioritizing autonomy over pan-Arab politics. British records noted the event's representativeness but deferred action, perpetuating deadlock until the 1930s protests and the 1941 imposed . Outcomes included heightened media campaigns via outlets like Filastin and temporary alliances with Muslim leaders, yet entrenched delayed reforms until post-Mandate shifts.

Third Arab Orthodox Conference (1935)

The Conference for Arab Christian Orthodox Youth, convened on November 17, 1935, in Ramleh, represented a targeted effort by younger members of the Arab Orthodox community to intensify opposition to the Greek-dominated hierarchy of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Held amid ongoing disputes following the death of Damianos in 1931, the gathering protested the delay in electing a new and the appointment of Greek clergy to key positions, including the locum tenens role filled by Metropolitan Kallistos. Participants, primarily youth from Palestinian Orthodox parishes, publicly recited a charter that articulated the historical grievances of the Arab against Hellenized clerical control, framing the conflict as a defense of indigenous ecclesiastical rights. Central to the conference's outcomes was a collective pledge by attendees to withhold recognition of any patriarch—Greek or otherwise—until the movement's core demands for Arab representation in the Holy Synod, administrative reforms, and cessation of land sales without communal consent were fulfilled. This commitment echoed resolutions from prior Arab Orthodox gatherings but emphasized youth-led , including boycotts of patriarchal services and calls for parallel lay institutions to manage church schools and charities. The event underscored the generational shift within the movement, as younger Arabs, influenced by rising , sought to sustain pressure on both the Greek brotherhood and British Mandate authorities, who had mediated but largely deferred to Orthodox traditions favoring clerical . The conference's charter, published contemporaneously in the Arabic press such as Mir'at al-Sharq, highlighted the laity's claim to co-governance rooted in Ottoman-era precedents, rejecting the Greek narrative of exclusive episcopal authority as incompatible with communal identity. While not resulting in immediate structural changes, it galvanized youth networks that contributed to escalated protests in subsequent years, including the repudiation of interim patriarchal ordinances during . British records noted the event's role in broadening the movement's base beyond urban elites, though Mandate officials viewed it warily as potentially exacerbating inter-communal tensions amid Zionist land acquisitions.

1958 Jordanian Patriarchal Election Law

The 1958 Jordanian Patriarchal Election Law, officially Law No. 27 of 1958 governing the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, was promulgated on March 26, 1958, by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under King Hussein I, during its administration of and the following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This legislation superseded prior Ottoman-era regulations from 1875 and 1292, establishing a formalized framework for the Patriarchate's internal organization, property management, and leadership selection amid escalating tensions between the Arab Orthodox laity and the predominantly Hellenic clergy. Drafted with input from Patriarch Benedictos I, the law partially addressed grievances articulated by the Arab Orthodox Movement, which had campaigned since the British Mandate period for reduced Greek dominance, increased Arab clerical appointments, and lay involvement in ecclesiastical decisions; Jordanian authorities intervened in 1957 to propose reforms responding to these congregational demands, particularly over financial opacity and land dealings. Central to the law were provisions standardizing patriarchal elections to favor local integration. Candidates for the patriarchal throne were required to be Jordanian nationals, at least 40 years old, Orthodox monks (holding ranks such as , , or ), and proficient in , ensuring linguistic and civic alignment with the Arab-majority flock. The election process involved a Nominating Council comprising the , all diocesan and titular , and up to 12 married priests selected by local parochial councils; this body nominated eligible candidates, after which a General Council—drawn from electors including members and additional clergy—narrowed the field to three, with the then selecting the Patriarch by majority vote. The process demanded a two-thirds for decisions and required ratification by Jordan's and the royal court, embedding state oversight to prevent irregularities. Similar criteria applied to elections, mandating Jordanian , monastic status, literacy, and expertise in ecclesiastical law for nominees. The , limited to 18 members including the as president, diocesan bishops, titular bishops, and archimandrites, handled administrative and electoral duties, with the empowered to adjust membership for institutional needs. Provisions encouraged inclusion by obliging the to admit qualified Orthodox monks into the and incorporating Jordanian lay members into local sectarian councils for oversight. The law also prohibited unauthorized sales of Patriarchal properties, a safeguard against prior controversies over land transactions that had fueled Orthodox protests. Despite these reforms, the law preserved the Patriarchate's Hellenic monastic core, as Greek clergy secured Jordanian citizenship to meet nationality rules, perpetuating non-Arab dominance in the Synod and elections—a circumvention that limited the Arab Orthodox Movement's goals of proportional representation and clerical Arabization. Post-1967, after Israel's control of , the law retained normative force for Jordanian-recognized elections but lacked enforcement in Israeli-held areas, where the state acknowledged elected Patriarchs without binding adherence. This framework influenced subsequent patriarchal successions, including those of Theophilos III in 2005, underscoring its enduring role in balancing confessional tradition against local nationalist pressures.

Post-1967 Shifts in Authority

Following Israel's capture of and the in the June 1967 , the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, headquartered in the Old City, came under , marking a pivotal change from Jordanian oversight. The Israeli government promptly affirmed the Patriarchate's tax-exempt status, property rights, and custodial role over Holy Sites, issuing protective orders on June 27, 1967, that shielded ecclesiastical lands from requisition without consent. This policy continuity with pre-1967 arrangements empowered the all-Greek , as Israel prioritized stability and direct negotiations with the Greek over enforcing prior Arab-favoring reforms like the 1957 Jordanian regulations on communal representation. Israeli authorities aligned pragmatically with the Greek leadership to maintain the religious —a Ottoman-era framework barring unilateral changes to holy places—while sidelining Arab Orthodox calls for laity involvement in governance and finances. Unlike Jordan's occasional pressure for mixed councils under the 1958 Patriarchal Election Law, Israel viewed the Greek Synod as a reliable interlocutor, facilitating administrative cooperation amid Arab dissent. On November 20, 1967, Patriarch Benedictos II formally outlined the Patriarchate's claims to Israeli officials, securing recognition that bolstered Greek autonomy but alienated the Arab flock, who numbered around 70,000 in the Patriarchate's jurisdiction at the time. This dynamic exacerbated tensions, as Arab leaders decried the lack of enforcement for electoral reforms mandating Arab episcopal candidates. Real estate disputes intensified these shifts, with the Greek-led initiating land leases and sales to Israeli entities post-1967, exploiting regulatory fears to retain control. Notable transactions included leases to the starting in the late 1960s, which yielded revenues but fueled Arab protests over perceived mismanagement of communal assets for non-Orthodox benefit. By the 1970s, such deals—totaling thousands of dunams in and environs—prompted Arab Orthodox factions to demand dissolution and Arab-majority administration, yet Israeli backing of Benedictos (r. 1959–1980) prevented concessions, framing Arab agitation as destabilizing. The , exclusively Greek, retained veto power over elections, effectively nullifying Arab electoral gains from the Mandate era. These developments reflected a causal alignment: Israel's strategic interest in a fragmented Christian reduced leverage for unified Arab advocacy, while Greek hierarchs traded communal goodwill for state protections amid demographic decline—the Arab Orthodox population shrank from approximately 40,000 in East pre- to under 5,000 by the 1990s, partly due to and reduced Patriarchal schools from six in to three by the . Arab efforts persisted through petitions and boycotts, but without sovereign enforcement, authority consolidated under Greek structures, deferring substantive until later decades.

Activism and Strategies

Journalistic and Media Campaigns

![Filastin newspaper edition reporting on Patriarch Damianos' death][float-right] The Arab Orthodox Movement utilized Arabic-language newspapers as a primary for publicizing grievances against Greek dominance in the Orthodox Patriarchate, framing the issue as one of national and confessional . These publications, often owned and edited by Orthodox Christians, systematically critiqued the Hellenic clergy's control over church administration, finances, and appointments, while advocating for Arab lay governance and episcopal representation. Filastin, established on 15 January 1911 in by cousins Issa and al-'Isa as a twice-weekly paper that later became daily, served as the movement's foremost organ. Its founding was explicitly motivated by the "Orthodox Renaissance" (al-Nahda al-urthudhuksiyya), aimed at Arabizing the and terminating Greek hegemony, with early issues devoting substantial coverage to church reform demands, exposés of patriarchal mismanagement, and calls for communal mobilization. The paper's editorials equated Greek clerical authority with foreign oppression, paralleling it to Ottoman or British rule, and reported extensively on lay protests and petitions to galvanize Orthodox support. Complementing Filastin, Mir'at al-Sharq (Mirror of the East), launched in on 16 November 1919 by Bulus Shihadeh, provided a local platform for Orthodox advocacy, publishing articles on church scandals, the need for Arabic in and administration, and solidarity with broader Arab nationalist sentiments. Earlier precursors included Najib Nassar's Al-Karmil (1908, ), which initiated critiques of Greek patriarchs, and Khalil al-Sakakini's short-lived Al-Dustour (1910), both amplifying demands for reform amid late Ottoman restrictions on press freedom. These outlets faced periodic suspensions—Filastin was banned multiple times under British Mandate censorship, particularly for anti-Zionist content that intersected with Orthodox land sale controversies—but persisted in shaping public discourse. By the 1920s and 1930s, these journalistic efforts evolved to cover the movement's conferences, such as the 1923 gathering, and to link ecclesiastical reform to Palestinian , portraying Greek dominance as an impediment to national unity. Christian journalists allocated significant column space to reinvent the Orthodox community as a politicized entity, countering perceptions of passivity under Hellenic oversight. Despite reliance on local printing presses and limited circulation, the press fostered a sustained media campaign that pressured both the and Mandate authorities, influencing subsequent legal challenges and institutional pushes.

Development of Parallel Institutions

The Arab Orthodox movement, seeking to circumvent the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem's administrative monopoly, began developing parallel institutions in the through the establishment of lay-led clubs and societies that focused on , youth organization, and community advocacy. These entities provided spaces for Arab Orthodox laity to exercise in social and cultural affairs, often petitioning British Mandate authorities directly on issues like church governance and . The inaugural Orthodox Club was founded in in 1924, functioning as a hub for athletic activities such as and , alongside political discussions aligned with the movement's demands for representation. This was followed by clubs in in 1926 and in 1937, which expanded the network to include Acre (1929), (1930), and Lydda (1932), fostering local leadership and countering perceptions of ecclesiastical neglect by the Hellenic hierarchy. These clubs not only promoted but also served as venues for mobilizing support against land sales and for communal welfare, reflecting a strategic shift toward institution-building amid stalled reforms. Complementing the clubs, executive committees elected at Arab Orthodox congresses operated as de facto parallel governing bodies, representing lay interests and issuing memoranda to colonial officials—for instance, the Orthodox Arab executive committee's 1931 petition to the Palestine government demanding implementation of communal electoral rights. These committees, often comprising prominent Arab Orthodox figures, managed fundraising for schools and charities independently of patriarchal oversight, embodying the movement's emphasis on laity-driven administration to preserve Arab Orthodox identity under Mandate-era constraints. By the 1930s, such structures had solidified into a web of societies across Palestine and Transjordan, enabling sustained advocacy despite resistance from the , which viewed them as encroachments on canonical authority.

Protests and Electoral Challenges

Following the death of Patriarch Damianos on November 18, 1931, the Arab Orthodox Movement intensified its electoral challenges by demanding comprehensive reforms to the patriarchal election process before any new selection could occur. Arab leaders sought a that would ensure greater lay participation and Arab representation in the , arguing that the existing Greek-dominated structure systematically excluded the majority Arab from . These demands delayed the election for over three years, as the movement leveraged petitions, conferences, and pressure on British Mandate authorities to withhold approval until reforms were enacted. Despite these efforts, the proceeded with the election of Timotheos Hanna, a Greek cleric, in July 1935, bypassing calls for prior legislative changes. In response, Orthodox communities refused to recognize Timotheos' authority, viewing the process as illegitimate and a continuation of Hellenic control. This non-recognition lasted until , during which prominent figures like Niqula Khoury resigned posts, ceased liturgical commemorations of the , and mobilized opposition through parallel committees and public campaigns. Legal challenges, including lawsuits against the election, further underscored the movement's strategy to contest outcomes through judicial and communal means, though British officials ultimately confirmed Timotheos without mandating reforms. Protests formed a parallel tactic, with demonstrations by laity and lower clergy in cities like , , and protesting the un reformed election and Timotheos' installation. These actions, often intertwined with broader Palestinian nationalist sentiments, highlighted grievances over church properties and administrative exclusion but waned in vigor by the late as internal divisions and the shifted priorities toward legal and diplomatic avenues. The movement's electoral obstructions and public outcries, while unsuccessful in altering the 1935 outcome immediately, sustained pressure that influenced subsequent governance debates and foreshadowed later reform laws.

Core Controversies

Land Sales to Israeli Entities

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of , which controls extensive real estate holdings estimated at over 700 dunams (approximately 172 acres) in strategic locations including and , has engaged in multiple land transactions with Israeli entities since Israel's founding in , often citing financial necessities such as breaches and court-ordered requiring multimillion-dollar payments. These deals, including long-term leases and outright sales to Jewish investors and Israeli companies, have provoked sharp opposition from Arab Orthodox communities, who view them as undermining Palestinian territorial claims and enabling Israeli expansion, particularly in disputed areas like . A pivotal controversy erupted in 2005 when Patriarch Irenaios I faced accusations of authorizing a 98-year lease of prime church-owned property in Jerusalem's Old City to a Jewish investor backed by Israeli interests, a transaction reportedly facilitated through a granted to a Greek associate. Although Irenaios denied direct involvement, the exacerbated tensions between the Greek-led and Arab , contributing to his deposition by a of Orthodox churches that May, amid broader Arab Orthodox grievances over perceived prioritization of financial gain over communal solidarity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Subsequent sales under Patriarch Theophilos III intensified Arab Orthodox activism; in 2017, the Patriarchate disclosed transactions involving over 100 acres in West Jerusalem sold secretly to Israeli institutions for about $10 million, alongside properties near Jaffa's clock tower transferred to private Israeli investors. These prompted protests by Greek Orthodox Arabs in Israel and the West Bank, including demands for Theophilos's resignation and physical confrontations during his January 2018 visit to Bethlehem, where demonstrators hurled stones at his convoy, decrying the deals as "treason" against Palestinian Christians. The Orthodox Central Council in Jordan and Palestine rejected patriarchal justifications, arguing the sales disregarded Arab parishioners' stakes in lands historically tied to their communities. Within the Arab Orthodox Movement, these transactions underscore demands for Arab-majority representation in church governance to prevent future sales that could alter demographic balances or facilitate settlements, as seen in 1990s deals enabling the settlement near East ; movement leaders frame such opposition as safeguarding ecclesiastical patrimony from external political pressures, though critics note the Patriarchate's legal in asset management.

Hellenic Dominance and Arab Representation Demands

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem has historically been characterized by Hellenic dominance in its upper echelons, with the Patriarch and the Holy Synod exclusively comprising Greek bishops selected from the all-Greek Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre. This arrangement, entrenched since the Ottoman period, reserved leadership roles for Greek monks, limiting Arabic-speaking Arabs—who constitute the majority of the Patriarchate's clergy and laity—to subordinate positions despite their numerical predominance in the flock. Greeks defended this structure as essential to preserving the Patriarchate's Orthodox canonical traditions and independence from nationalistic pressures, viewing Arab inclusion as a threat to ecclesiastical unity. Arab Orthodox Christians contested this exclusivity as a form of foreign , arguing that it alienated the local community from decision-making over spiritual, administrative, and financial matters. Primary demands included the admission of qualified Arabs into the monastic Brotherhood, the and of Arab bishops to achieve parity or majority in the , and the creation of mixed councils integrating Arab into governance to oversee church properties, budgets, and appointments. Additional calls encompassed the prioritization of Arabic in , education, and official proceedings, alongside demands for transparency in land administration and revenue distribution to benefit the Arab parishes. These representation demands emerged in late Ottoman petitions but intensified under the British Mandate, where Arab committees leveraged secular authorities to pressure for reforms, such as a 1920 proposal for a mixed advisory council that the Greek hierarchy rejected to maintain control. Conferences, including the 1931 Second Orthodox Congress in Jaffa attended by delegates from Palestine and Transjordan, formalized resolutions denouncing Greek hegemony and explicitly advocating for Arabization of the hierarchy while renaming the institution the "Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarchate" to emphasize its indigenous character. British interventions occasionally favored Arab claims for electoral participation, yet Greek resistance—bolstered by alliances with Orthodox states like Greece—prevented substantive changes, perpetuating the controversy into subsequent decades.

Ties to Broader Arab Nationalism

The Arab Orthodox Movement aligned with emerging Arab nationalist currents in the late Ottoman Empire and British Mandate period by framing the Greek-dominated hierarchy of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem as an extension of foreign ecclesiastical imperialism, paralleling broader Arab resistance to Ottoman Turkification and European colonial influences. This rhetoric positioned the demand for Arab clerical appointments and lay representation as part of the Arab awakening (nahda), emphasizing cultural and administrative Arabization over Hellenic control. In the 1920s, movement leaders adopted organizational tactics from the Arab nationalist milieu, including petitions and public campaigns that invoked shared to rally support from Muslim counterparts excluded from Greek-led church structures. The 1926 Bertram-Young Commission, appointed by British authorities, examined these intra-Orthodox disputes and highlighted Arab grievances against perceived Greek exclusivity, inadvertently amplifying nationalist critiques of confessional hierarchies as barriers to indigenous self-rule. Cooperation extended to joint opposition against British Mandate policies and Zionist land acquisitions, where Orthodox Arabs participated in multi-confessional bodies like the Arab Executive, subordinating sectarian interests to collective Arab political mobilization. By the mid-1940s, as articulated in the 1946 platform of the Executive Orthodox Committee of and Transjordan, the movement explicitly sought "independence of the community… with a definite and clear influence" to fulfill a "national message," reflecting integration into Palestinian nationalism while echoing pan- ideals of unity against external domination. This alignment, however, remained pragmatic and localized, prioritizing Orthodox communal autonomy over full subsumption into secular pan-ism, as evidenced by persistent intra- confessional tensions amid the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Academic analyses note that while the movement borrowed nationalist anti-imperialist framing to legitimize reforms, its sectarian focus distinguished it from purely ideological pan- ventures, such as those later promoted under .

Modern Developments

1980s-1990s Resurgence

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Arab Orthodox Movement revived through intensified legal challenges in Israeli courts, where lay representatives contested the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem's administrative practices, particularly regarding property management and clerical appointments. These lawsuits represented a strategic pivot from earlier protests, leveraging Israel's judicial system to demand transparency and Arab involvement in decision-making, amid ongoing grievances over the Patriarchate's predominantly Hellenic . A pivotal catalyst was controversy surrounding undisclosed land sales by the , which prompted the formation of the Arab Orthodox Initiative Committee in 1992. This body, comprising lay activists and clergy, asserted that church properties constituted communal endowments under Arab stewardship, not unilateral patriarchal assets, and called for oversight mechanisms to prevent sales without congregational consent. Tensions peaked in May 1992, when the committee publicly confronted Diodoros I, escalating demands for reforms that echoed interwar Arab Orthodox congresses but adapted to post-1967 realities of Israeli over holy sites. At a meeting that year, the Initiative Committee formalized resolutions for greater lay control over transactions, framing such sales—often to Israeli entities—as betrayals of communal heritage and potential national rights. This intertwined with broader Palestinian Christian assertions of identity, though constrained by the Patriarchate's canonical autonomy and Greek diplomatic ties, yielding limited immediate concessions but sustaining pressure into the .

2005 Patriarch Irenaios Dismissal and Aftermath

In early 2005, revelations emerged that Patriarch Irenaios had authorized 99-year leases for multiple properties in East Jerusalem's Old City, including the New Imperial Hotel and the Petra Hostel, to Israeli entities linked to Jewish settler organizations such as . These deals, valued at around $1.1 million but covering prime real estate in disputed Palestinian-claimed territory, ignited outrage among Arab Orthodox Christians, who interpreted them as complicity in expansion and a threat to communal lands. The Arab Orthodox Movement, long advocating against Hellenic clerical dominance, seized the scandal to amplify demands for Irenaios's ouster, framing it as emblematic of broader mismanagement and disregard for Arab laity interests. Prominent figures like Archimandrite Attallah Hanna, a vocal movement leader and the patriarchate's sole Palestinian archbishop at the time, publicly accused Irenaios of betrayal and confirmed the validity of his eventual dismissal in media statements. Protests escalated: on April 25, 2005, Arab demonstrators heckled Irenaios during an Old City procession, chanting against the land transfers; five days later, roughly 500 Palestinian Orthodox marched to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, waving flags and clashing with Israeli police, resulting in injuries. Palestinian legislators, including Orthodox representatives, passed a resolution urging secession from the Greek-led patriarchate, underscoring the movement's push for autonomous Arab ecclesiastical control. Under mounting pressure from these mobilizations and internal synodal dissent, 13 of the Jerusalem Holy Synod's bishops declared on May 5, 2005, that they had severed ties with Irenaios, effectively dismissing him over the ; formal ratification followed on May 8, with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in endorsing the action by late May. Irenaios, denying direct involvement and claiming forgery, resisted eviction, appearing at the under Israeli , but was ultimately confined to a until his death in 2023. The election of Theophilos III as patriarch on August 22, 2005—securing 23 of 41 votes in a synodal ballot—temporarily quelled the immediate crisis but failed to assuage Arab Orthodox grievances. Movement activists, including Hanna, critiqued the process for perpetuating Greek exclusivity, with no Arab candidates elevated to high office and persistent Hellenic oversight of finances and appointments. Demands intensified for an Arab patriarch, laity oversight of properties, and increased Arab episcopal representation, leading to boycotts of Theophilos and renewed protests by 2015, as the new leadership continued selective land policies amid unresolved legal challenges. Israeli courts, for instance, upheld aspects of the disputed leases in 2019 rulings, rejecting patriarchate appeals and fueling accusations of external influence. This episode marked a tactical resurgence for the movement, leveraging public scandal to expose vulnerabilities in the status quo, though structural reforms remained elusive, sustaining low-level agitation into the 2010s. In the aftermath of Patriarch Irenaios's 2005 dismissal, which was precipitated by revelations of unauthorized land sales to Israeli entities, Orthodox activists intensified legal challenges against the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of , contesting subsequent transactions as lacking communal consent and prioritizing foreign interests over those of the predominantly laity. These efforts focused on Israeli and Palestinian courts, where plaintiffs argued that the Hellenic-led hierarchy's decisions undermined the church's role as a steward of Christian heritage in contested territories. A prominent case emerged in August 2017, when approximately 300 , aligned with Arab Orthodox grievances, filed a criminal complaint in a Palestinian Authority court in against the Patriarchate and its leadership, including Patriarch Theophilos III. The suit accused the church of committing the capital offense of "selling land to the enemy" through deals involving properties in Jerusalem's Old City and other areas, demanding accountability and potential annulment of the sales. This action reflected broader movement demands for veto power over dispositions of communal assets, though the case highlighted jurisdictional tensions, as PA courts lack enforcement over church governance. Israeli courts, exercising jurisdiction over many disputed properties, have largely rejected challenges to the Patriarchate's sales authority, reinforcing the legal autonomy of the ecclesiastical body. In June 2022, the upheld a lower court's ruling permitting the transfer of rights to three historic buildings in Jerusalem's —previously sold by the Patriarchate to the settlement organization—dismissing appeals that questioned the transactions' validity amid Orthodox protests. Similarly, in July 2025, the resolved a protracted 25-year dispute originating in the early over church-owned land in , siding with the Patriarchate against competing claims and affirming its property rights despite objections from local stakeholders, including Christian groups concerned about demographic shifts. These judicial outcomes have sustained Arab Orthodox advocacy for statutory reforms, such as mandatory lay councils in property decisions, but have also exposed divisions: while some view sales as pragmatic financial measures amid declining donations, movement hardliners frame them as capitulation, prompting sporadic filings in synods and civil venues. Ongoing encroachments, including 2025 seizures of church lands near , have indirectly bolstered these suits by underscoring vulnerabilities exacerbated by perceived leadership detachment from realities. Despite limited successes, the litigation underscores persistent tensions over representation, with no comprehensive resolution achieved by late 2025.

Historiography and Critiques

Scholarly Analyses of Origins and Impact

Scholars locate the origins of the Orthodox Movement in the late Ottoman period, amid escalating conflicts between the laity and the Greek-dominated of the Patriarchate, where constituted over 90% of the flock by the yet were systematically excluded from bishoprics and senior clerical roles. Grievances centered on the policies that prioritized in —despite historical bilingual practices—and diverted church revenues from communities, prompting early petitions and unrest as far back as the , though organized mobilization intensified around the 1908-1914 involving Damianos' tenure. The movement's development accelerated under the British Mandate after 1917, as Arab Orthodox elites reframed ecclesiastical reform as a nationalist imperative, convening the First Arab Orthodox Congress in on July 12-15, 1923, to demand Arab majorities in the and lay councils. Analyses by historians like Nikolas Papastathis highlight how British administrators, seeking to dismantle Ottoman capitulatory privileges via the 1920 and balance Greek ties to against Arab pressures, temporarily bolstered figures like Damianos through his 1919 reinstatement, yet ultimately upheld the Status Quo to avoid broader communal instability. Laura Robson argues that this era marked a causal shift, with Mandate-era publications such as Filastin—edited by Orthodox Christians—fusing with Palestinian anti-colonialism, thereby positioning the movement as a vehicle for communal autonomy amid Muslim-led institutions like the , which marginalized Christian voices post-1922. This integration elevated Orthodox structures into political arenas, as evidenced by the 1946 formation of the Executive Orthodox Committee of and Transjordan, which sought ecclesiastical independence aligned with Arab . Evaluations of impact emphasize structural persistence over transformation: despite mobilizing thousands in protests and influencing lay elections, the movement secured no Arab bishops, with Greek control reaffirmed by Timotheos' 1939 election amid British mediation. Its legacy lies in forging an enduring Arab Orthodox consciousness that intertwined with , boosting Christian participation in the 1936-1939 revolt while exposing intra-communal fractures—such as linguistic demands for services—that scholars like Ines Jaurena attribute to deeper ethnic hierarchies rooted in Byzantine precedents rather than mere colonial manipulation. Long-term, it precipitated recurrent crises, including property disputes and the 2005 dismissal of Patriarch Irenaios, underscoring the movement's role in perpetuating tensions without resolving the demographic-church governance mismatch.

Internal Divisions and External Criticisms

The Arab Orthodox Movement encountered internal divisions primarily over the prioritization of religious versus political objectives, with some adherents advocating strict reforms like the of and clergy appointments, while others subsumed these demands within broader Palestinian nationalist agendas. This tension manifested in debates during the British Mandate era, where lay leaders restructured to emphasize Arab centrality in national politics, potentially diluting purely theological concerns. For example, British administrative encouragement transformed reform efforts into formalized political activism, fostering rifts between those seeking compromise with the Greek and radicals demanding outright control of church institutions. Prominent Arab intellectuals also voiced internal critiques, accusing the movement of exacerbating sectarian divides at the expense of unified Arab resistance against colonial and Zionist forces. Khalil Sakakini, a Palestinian Orthodox educator, faulted the focus on intra-church struggles for weakening collective national efforts, while argued that integrating Orthodox-specific grievances into pan-Arab nationalism risked fragmenting solidarity among diverse Arab communities. These divisions were evident in the 1920s and 1930s, when factional disputes over strategies—such as boycotts of church services versus legal petitions—hindered cohesive action, contributing to electoral failures like the contested 1925 patriarchal elections. Externally, the Greek Orthodox establishment lambasted the movement as an ethnically driven assault on traditions, prioritizing modern over the historic role of Hellenic in safeguarding Jerusalem's holy sites. Greek spokesmen contended that Arab demands for linguistic shifts from Greek to in undermined the sacred status of language and risked mismanagement of vast church properties, as seen in competing visions for real-estate administration post-1918. This perspective framed the reforms as schismatic, potentially inviting state interference in religious affairs, a concern heightened during Mandate-period interventions. Israeli authorities and pro-Zionist observers later criticized the movement's legacy for perpetuating disputes over church lands, portraying resistance to sales—such as those in the 1980s and 2000s—as ideologically motivated obstructionism that prioritized ethno-national claims over pragmatic economic . These critiques highlighted how the movement's emphasis on communal control allegedly prolonged legal battles, complicating the Patriarchate's financial operations amid post-1948 demographic shifts. Scholars like those analyzing Mandate-era dynamics have noted that such politicization invited external powers to exploit divisions, ultimately limiting the movement's long-term institutional gains.

Evaluations of Effectiveness and Legacy

The Arab Orthodox Movement achieved limited success in reforming the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, primarily failing to secure the full of the higher clergy despite decades of agitation. Early congresses in the , such as the 1923 gathering in , demanded the replacement of Greek bishops with and greater lay control over church affairs, but British Mandate authorities prioritized maintaining the status quo to preserve equilibrium among religious communities, often siding with the Hellenic Brotherhood against Arab laity demands. By the eve of , while the movement had broadened its appeal by aligning with , core grievances like Greek dominance in the patriarchate's and financial opacity remained unresolved, as evidenced by persistent lay protests and the lack of structural reforms in the . In the post-1948 era, the movement's influence waned amid Israeli state oversight of church properties and of Arab clergy, yet it laid groundwork for later resurgences by embedding demands for representation within broader Arab Christian identity formation. Scholarly analyses note that the movement's fusion of sectarian reform with anti-Zionist amplified its cultural resonance but diluted its focus, contributing to internal divisions rather than decisive victories. The 1980s-1990s revival, including protests against sales, pressured the but yielded no patriarchate-wide , with Greek prelates retaining control over key decisions. The legacy endures in ongoing tensions, as seen in the 2005 dismissal of Patriarch Irenaios amid scandals involving land deals to Israeli entities, which Arab Orthodox groups leveraged to demand accountability, though successor Theophilos III—a Greek—has appointed a few Arab hierarchs, such as Archbishop Theodosios Atallah Hanna of Sebastia in 2005, signaling partial concessions without altering the Hellenic core of the brotherhood. This incrementalism reflects the movement's causal impact: heightened scrutiny of church governance and ties to Palestinian advocacy, yet perpetuating communal fragmentation and legal disputes over properties into the present, where Arab continue to critique the patriarchate's opacity and foreign dominance. Overall, the movement's effectiveness is evaluated as modest in fostering awareness and minor appointments but ineffective in systemic overhaul, leaving a legacy of unresolved ethnoreligious conflict that hampers unified Arab Orthodox institutional power.

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