Hubbry Logo
Bui DamBui DamMain
Open search
Bui Dam
Community hub
Bui Dam
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Bui Dam
Bui Dam
Bui Dam
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Bui Dam is a 400-megawatt (540,000 hp) hydroelectric project in Ghana. It is built on the Black Volta river at the Bui Gorge, at the southern end of Bui National Park. The project was a collaboration between the government of Ghana and Sino Hydro, a Chinese state-owned construction company. Construction on the main dam began in December 2009. Its first generator was commissioned on 3 May 2013,[4] and the dam was inaugurated in December of the same year.[5]

Key Information

Bui is the second largest hydroelectric generating plant in the country after the Akosombo Dam. The reservoir flooded about 20% of the Bui National Park and impacted the habitats for the rare black hippopotamus as well as a large number of wildlife species. It required the resettlement of 1,216 people,[6] and affected the lives and livelihoods of many more.

History

[edit]

The Bui hydro-electric dam had first been envisaged in 1925 by the British-Australian geologist and naturalist Albert Ernest Kitson when he visited the Bui Gorge. The dam had been on the drawing board since the 1960s, when Ghana's largest dam, the Akosombo Dam, was built further downstream on the Volta River. By 1978 planning for the Bui Dam was advanced with support from Australia and the World Bank. However, four military coups stalled the plans. At the time Ghana began to be plagued by energy rationing, which has persisted since then. In 1992, the project was revived and a first feasibility study conducted by the French firm Coyne et Bellier.[7]

Construction of the dam

In 1997 a team of students from Aberdeen University carried out ecological investigations in the area to be flooded by the reservoir.[8] The Ghanaian environmental journalist Mike Anane,[9] who was included in UNEP’s Global 500 Roll of Honour for 1998, called the dam an "environmental disaster" and a "textbook example of wasted taxpayer money".[10] In his article he quoted the investigation team, but apparently somewhat exaggerated the environmental impact of the dam. The leader of the investigation team, the zoologist Daniel Bennett, clarified that "the opinions (Anane) attributes to our team are unfair and misleading". He added that "Contrary to Mr Anane's claims, we are unaware of any globally endangered species in Bui National Park, nor did we claim that the dam would destroy the spawning runs of fish."[11] Although Bennett always maintained a neutral stance towards the construction of the dam, in April 2001 the government of Ghana banned him from doing further research on the ecology of the Bui National Park. The government stated that the issue was "very sensitive" and Bennett's "presence in the National Park was no longer in the national interest". One of the journalist who criticized the government for banning Bennett was Mike Anane.[12]

In 1999 the Volta River Authority, the country's power utility, signed an agreement with the US firms Halliburton and Brown and Root to build the dam without issuing a competitive bid.[7] In December 2000 President Jerry Rawlings, who had ruled the country for the two previous decades, did not contest in elections (as per the constitution) and his party lost to the opposition led by John Kufuor. In October 2001 the new government shelved the dam project. According to Charles Wereko-Brobby, then President of the Volta River Authority, Bui Dam was not considered the least–cost option and could not meet "immediate" energy needs. Instead gas-powered thermal power plants were to be built, producing electricity at what was said to be half the cost of Bui. Furthermore, a severe drought in 1998 exacerbated the energy crisis due to low water levels in Akosombo Dam. As a consequence, the government wanted to reduce its dependence on hydropower at the time.[13]

However, in 2002 the project was revived. An international call for tender was issued, but only a single company submitted a bid and the tender was cancelled. In 2005 the Chinese company Sinohydro submitted an unsolicited bid for the dam together with funding from the Chinese Exim Bank. The government accepted the bid and the Ministry of Energy signed contracts for an environmental impact assessment in December 2005, as well as for an updated feasibility study in October 2007. The government created the Bui Power Authority in August 2007 to oversee the construction and operation of the project and the associated resettlement. Responsibility for the dam was thus transferred from the Volta River Authority, which until then had been responsible for the development and operation of all power projects in Ghana.[7] Coyne et Bellier is the consulting engineer for the dam.[14]

Field investigations for the dam began in October 2007. In January 2008 preparatory construction began and in May 2008 the first people were resettled. In December 2008 the river was diverted and a year later construction on the main part of the dam began. The filling of the reservoir began in June 2011.[15] Unit 3 was connected to the grid on 3 May 2013; Units 2 and 1 were commissioned by the end of November 2013.[16] The dam and power station were inaugurated in December 2013 by President John Mahama.[5]

To boost the Bui dam's overall electricity generation without affecting the water reservoir, a 50-megawatt (MW) solar power plant was built on land 3km from the dam. The solar plant was commissioned in November 2020.[17]

Design

[edit]

The Bui Dam is a gravity roller-compacted concrete-type with a height of 108 metres (354 ft) above foundation and 90 metres (300 ft) above the riverbed. The crest of the dam is 492 metres (1,614 ft) meters long and sits at an elevation of 185 metres (607 ft) above sea level (ASL). The main dam's structural volume is 1 million cubic metres (35×10^6 cu ft). Southwest of the dam two saddle (or auxiliary) dams maintain pool levels and prevent spillage into other areas of the basin. The first and closest to the main dam is Saddle Dam 1. It is 500 metres (1,600 ft) southwest of the main dam and is a rock-fill embankment dam. The dam rises 37 metres (121 ft) above ground level and has a crest length of 300 m (984 ft). 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) southwest of the main dam is Saddle Dam 2. This dam is a zoned earth-fill type with a height of 7 metres (23 ft) ASL and a crest length of 580 m (1,903 ft). Both saddle dams have a crest elevation of 187 metres (614 ft) ASL.[3]

Bui Dam, Ghana in November 2013 shortly before official opening. Looking upstream, approximately north-east. Powerhouse at right, with three orange penstocks visible above the roof (one for each generator). Spillway has five bays. The penstock for the future house unit is visible at the left. The dam crest is about 75 metres above the powerhouse main floor. Powerhouse paved road under construction visible in foreground. Telpher construction crane supported by cables has not yet been removed.

The dam's spillway near the right bank consists of five radial gates, each 15 metres (49 ft) wide. The spillway sits at an elevation of 169 metres (554 ft) and has a maximum discharge of 10,450 cubic metres per second (369,000 cu ft/s) which correlates to a 1-in-10,000 year flood. The dam's outlet works consist of a single outlet on the right bank converted from one of the diversion tunnels.[3]

Reservoir

[edit]

The reservoir that the main and saddle dams create will have a maximum capacity of 12,570 million cubic metres (10,190,000 acre⋅ft) of which 7,720 million cubic metres (6,260,000 acre⋅ft) is useful for power generation and irrigation. The reservoir's maximum operating level will be 185 metres (607 ft) ASL and the minimum 167 metres (548 ft) ASL. At the maximum level, the reservoir will have a surface area of 440 square kilometres (170 sq mi) while at the minimum it will be 288 square kilometres (111 sq mi). The reservoir's volume at minimum level is 6,600 million cubic metres (5,400,000 acre⋅ft). The average length of the reservoir will be 40 kilometres (25 mi) with an average depth of 29 metres (95 ft) and a maximum 88 metres (289 ft).[3]

Bui Hydropower Plant

[edit]

Just downstream of the dam on the left bank is the dam's powerhouse. The intake at the reservoir feeds water through three penstocks to the three separate 133 MW Francis turbine-generators. Each turbine-generator has a step-up transformer to increase the voltage to transmission level. A fourth unit, with a penstock on the spillway, will provide four megawatts for station service and black start power, and will provide minimum flow to maintain river levels if the main units should be shut down. The power station will have an installed capacity of 400 megawatts and an estimated average annual generation of 980 gigawatt-hours (3,500 TJ). The power station's switchyard is located 300 metres (980 ft) downstream. Four 161 kV transmission lines connect the substation to the Ghana grid.[2][3]

Benefits

[edit]

The Bui hydropower plant will increase the installed electricity generation capacity in Ghana by 22%, up from 1920 MW in 2008 to 2360 MW.[18] Together with three thermal power plants that are being developed at the same time, it will contribute to alleviate power shortages that are common in Ghana. Like any hydropower plants, the project avoids greenhouse gas emissions that would have occurred if thermal power plants had been built instead. An additional expected benefit is the irrigation of high-yield crops on 30,000 hectares of fertile land in an "Economic Free Zone".[19] The current status of the irrigation project is unclear.

Cost and financing

[edit]

The total project costs are estimated to be US$622 million. It is being financed by the government of Ghana's own resources (US$60m) and two credits by the China Exim Bank: a concessional loan of US$270 million at 2% interest and a commercial loan of US$292 million. Both loans have a grace period of five years and an amortization period of 20 years. The proceeds of 30,000 tons per year of Ghanaian cocoa exports to China, which are placed in an escrow account at the Exim Bank, serve as collateral for the loan. Once the dam becomes operational, 85% of the proceeds of electricity sales from the hydropower plant will go to the escrow account. If not all the proceeds are needed to service the loan, the remainder reverts to the government of Ghana.[18]

Environmental and social impact

[edit]
The reservoir behind the Bui Dam started to fill up in 2011

An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for the dam was completed in January 2007 by the US consulting firm Environmental Resources Management (ERM).[3] During its preparation hearings were held in Accra and in five localities near the project area, such as Bamboi. However, no hearings were conducted in the project area itself. Once completed, an independent panel appointed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of Ghana reviewed the ESIA. The latter was revised in the important aspects, including the following: "compensation" had to be provided for the inundated area of Bui National Park, a "rescue plan" for the hippos was required and it had to be specified how resettlement would be carried out. When the EPA issued the environmental permit for the dam, it required the Bui Power Authority to present within 18 months an Environmental Management Plan based on the revised ESIA. Construction and resettlement began in 2008, but no environmental management plan had been submitted as of July 2010.[20]

Environmental impact

[edit]

The Bui National Park will be significantly affected by the Bui Dam. 21% of the park will be submerged. This will affect the only two populations of black hippopotamus in Ghana, whose population is estimated at between 250 and 350 in the park.[8] It is unclear if hippos can be relocated and if there is any suitable habitat near the area to be inundated. Even if there were such a "safe haven", it is not clear if the country's game and wildlife department has the means to rescue the animals.[21] The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment states that hippos will be vulnerable to hunting during the filling period of the reservoir. It also claims that they would ultimately "benefit from the increased area of littoral habitat provided by the reservoir".[3]

The dam could also have other serious environmental impacts, such as changing the flow regime of the river which could harm downstream habitats. A survey by the University of Aberdeen has revealed that the Black Volta River abounds with 46 species of fish from 17 families.[8] None of these species is endangered. Nevertheless, these fish communities could be severely impacted by changes to water temperature, turbidity and the blocking of their migration. Waterborne disease could also occur. Schistosomiasis in particular could become established in the reservoir, with severe health risks for local people.[3][21]

Social impact

[edit]

The Bui dam project requires the forced relocation of 1,216 people, of which 217 have been resettled as of June 2010.[22] In order not to slow down the construction of the dam, the Bui Power Authority has opted for a quick resettlement process. It neglected the recommendations of a study, the "Resettlement Planning Framework", that it had contracted itself. In theory, all affected people are expected to be moved to a new locality called Bui City. However, as of 2010 the city does not exist and there is not even a schedule for its construction. Instead, the first 217 relocated people have been moved to a temporary settlement called Gyama Resettlement Township, which has dilapidated infrastructure. Fishers were resettled on dry land and lost their livelihoods. Although the study had recommended to establish an independent body to monitor the resettlement, no such body has been set up.[23]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Bui Dam

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

The Bui Dam is a gravity hydroelectric dam situated on the River in Ghana's , featuring an installed capacity of 404 megawatts from four turbine units. Constructed by China's Corporation under an engineering-procurement-construction contract, the project commenced in late 2008 and achieved full operation by December 2013, following decades of planning that originated in the early . With a maximum structural height of 108 meters and a crest length of 492.5 meters, the dam creates a reservoir supporting annual of approximately 1 billion kilowatt-hours while enabling for up to 30,000 hectares of land. As Ghana's second-largest hydropower facility after the , it addresses chronic power shortages but has drawn scrutiny for ecological disruptions in the adjacent Bui National Park, including for like hippopotamuses and the resettlement of over 1,000 local residents. The initiative, financed largely through Chinese loans totaling around $622 million, exemplifies Beijing's resource-for-infrastructure diplomacy in Africa, influencing subsequent Sino-Ghanaian economic ties.

Historical Development

Planning and Feasibility Studies

The planning phase for the Bui Dam involved multiple feasibility studies assessing technical, economic, and hydrological viability for a hydroelectric project on the River in . Initial reconnaissance surveys occurred in the , followed by a comprehensive in December 1976 conducted by the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) of , which identified the Bui Gorge site as suitable for power generation with an estimated capacity of around 400 megawatts. The project gained renewed momentum in 1992 when the French engineering firm Coyne et Bellier (now part of Tractebel Engineering) performed an updated , confirming the site's geological stability and potential for formation despite seasonal flow variations in the Black Volta. This was supplemented by another Coyne et Bellier study in 1995, which incorporated economic analyses projecting benefits for Ghana's national grid amid growing demand. By October 2006, the 1995 study was revised by Coyne et Bellier to address updated hydrological data and project economics, enabling progression to financing and construction preparations; this revision estimated construction costs at approximately $622 million and emphasized integration with existing hydropower infrastructure like the . Parallel to technical assessments, the Ghanaian government commissioned an (ESIA) in the mid-2000s, allocating about $2 million for evaluations of biodiversity effects in the adjacent Bui National Park and resettlement needs for roughly 1,216 affected individuals, with findings submitted to the Agency for review. These studies collectively validated the project's feasibility but highlighted risks such as downstream flow alterations and habitat inundation spanning 21% of the national park.

Approval and Initial Opposition

The Bui Dam project, first conceptualized in the 1920s as part of broader development plans, saw renewed governmental interest in the late under the National Democratic Congress administration, with the announcing intentions to construct it in mid-1999. However, following a change in government in 2001, the project was initially shelved, as confirmed by Volta River Authority president Charles Wereko-Brobby, amid competing priorities and fiscal constraints. Initial opposition emerged primarily from environmental advocates and international NGOs, who highlighted risks to the Bui National Park, including habitat disruption for endangered species such as hippopotamuses and potential increases in greenhouse gas emissions from reservoir-induced decomposition. A 2000 report by a government-commissioned panel, influenced by the World Commission on Dams' global critique of large hydropower, portrayed the project negatively, amplifying calls for alternatives like thermal power or smaller-scale renewables. Local and international researchers faced restrictions, exemplified by the 2001 expulsion of a British academic studying ecological impacts, signaling governmental sensitivity to critiques that challenged the dam's viability. Resettlement needs, though limited to 1,216 people compared to over 80,000 for prior Ghanaian dams, still raised social equity concerns among affected communities. Opposition waned after 2006 when a from the Chinese government provided critical financing, bypassing earlier funding hurdles and enabling parliamentary approval of the Bui Power Authority's creation in 2007, separating it from the Authority to oversee the project. The contract was signed on April 19, 2007, between the Ghanaian and Corporation, followed by a on August 24, 2007, led by President John Agyekum Kufuor. This marked formal approval, with the Chinese Exim Bank's $293.5 million buyer's credit facilitating progress despite lingering environmental debates.

Construction Timeline

The construction of the Bui Dam commenced with a ceremonial groundbreaking on 24 August 2007, officiated by Ghanaian President John Agyekum Kufuor at the site on the River. Preparatory activities, including field investigations, began in October 2007, with initial construction works starting in January 2008. The project was managed by the Bui Power Authority, with Corporation Limited of China serving as the primary contractor responsible for . Main dam construction, involving for the 108-meter-high structure, initiated in December 2009 following site clearance and resettlement efforts. The overall timeline targeted completion by early 2012 to address Ghana's growing energy demands, but delays pushed this milestone. By January 2013, the project reached 97% completion, encompassing the dam, powerhouse, and associated infrastructure such as spillways and saddle dams. The first of three 133 MW turbine units was commissioned in May 2013, delivering initial power to the national grid and providing approximately one-third of the facility's 400 MW capacity. The full hydropower plant became operational with the inauguration of the dam on 19 December 2013 by President John Dramani Mahama. Although commercially operational from 2013, formal handover from to the Bui Power Authority occurred on 28 November 2016 after final testing and defect rectification.

Technical Specifications

Dam Design and Engineering

The Bui Dam features a (RCC) gravity structure as its primary component, designed to withstand the hydraulic pressures of the River while optimizing material efficiency. The main dam reaches a maximum height of 108 above the foundation (90 above the riverbed) and has a crest length of 492 , with a total volume of one million cubic meters. Auxiliary saddle dams on the right bank supplement the main structure: one constructed with rock-fill and the other with earth-fill, both elevated to a crest height of 187 meters above to fully impound the . These elements ensure comprehensive containment of the 12.57 billion cubic meter at full supply level. The is integrated into the main body with five bays, each equipped with a 15-meter-wide radial , positioned at 169 meters and engineered for a maximum discharge capacity of 10,450 cubic meters per second during extreme events. Three structures are also embedded in the crest to channel to the downstream powerhouse, incorporating features for sediment control and operational flexibility. The RCC construction technique, executed by Corporation Limited as the contractor, facilitated layered placement and compaction of , enhancing construction speed and seismic resilience in the region's geological context. This design prioritizes gravitational stability over arch effects, relying on the dam's mass to resist water thrust.

Reservoir Formation and Hydrology

The Bui Reservoir was formed by impounding the River following the closure of the dam's main structure, with the filling process commencing on June 8, 2011. This marked a key milestone in the project, with water levels rising progressively over the subsequent years; by March 2013, the reservoir had accumulated sufficient volume to support initial operations, coinciding with the dam's commissioning in December of that year. The impoundment submerged approximately 444 km² of land at full supply level (FSL), extending the reservoir's average length to about 40 km upstream. At FSL of 183 meters above , the attains a surface area of 444 km² and a total storage capacity of 12,600 million cubic meters, enabling regulation of seasonal flows from the basin. The minimum operating level is maintained to preserve ecological and operational functions, though specific thresholds vary with hydrological conditions and protocols. from upstream inflows has begun accumulating in the , potentially affecting long-term storage efficiency, as observed in comparable impoundments on sediment-laden rivers. Hydrologically, the reservoir intercepts annual inflows from the catchment, which exhibit variability influenced by upstream changes and patterns, with modeled water yields increasing from 3.25 million cubic meters in 2000 to 4.75 million cubic meters in 2020. Outflows are regulated primarily for generation, resulting in attenuated peak discharges during wet seasons and augmented base flows in dry periods, which alters downstream flow regimes and reduces the frequency of extreme events. This management has implications for water availability, with analyses confirming shifts in reversal frequencies, flow change rates, and minimum discharges post-impoundment.

Hydropower Infrastructure

The Bui Hydropower Station features an installed capacity of 404 MW, comprising three main Francis turbines each rated at 133.33 MW and one auxiliary 4 MW turbinette. The Francis turbines, housed in the main powerhouse, are designed for high-head operation and fed by water from the reservoir via three structures and associated penstocks, enabling efficient conversion of hydraulic energy to . The turbinette, located in a separate mini powerhouse, utilizes minimum environmental flow releases to generate supplemental power, ensuring compliance with ecological requirements while contributing to overall output. The powerhouse infrastructure supports peaking operations, with the station capable of rapid startup and load adjustments to stabilize Ghana's grid. Electric generators synchronized with the turbines, supplied by , deliver power at 161 kV through a 500 MVA switchyard equipped with five bays for interconnection. A 241 km evacuates generated to key substations at Sawla, Kintampo, , and , facilitating integration into the national grid. Annual energy production averages 969 GWh, with peaks reaching 1,547 GWh in high-inflow years like 2022, reflecting variability tied to seasonal River flows. The system's design emphasizes reliability, providing ancillary services such as frequency regulation amid Ghana's reliance on for baseload and .

Financing and International Partnerships

Project Costs and Sources

The total cost of the Bui Dam project was initially estimated at US$622 million in the mid-2000s. A cost review conducted in 2012 increased this figure by US$168 million, bringing the final project cost to US$790 million. Funding was primarily secured through loans from the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), with the Government of Ghana providing a smaller equity contribution. The financing structure included a concessional loan of approximately US$263.5 million at a low interest rate of 2% and a 20-year repayment term including a five-year grace period, alongside a buyer's credit facility of US$298.5 million tied to procurement from Chinese contractors. The concessional loan was approved and disbursed starting in 2007, while the buyer's credit was formalized in September 2007 to support engineering, procurement, and construction by Sinohydro Corporation Limited. Ghana's contribution amounted to US$60 million in public funds, covering about 10% of the initial estimated costs and allocated toward local components and contingencies.
Funding SourceAmount (US$)TypeKey Terms
China Exim Bank (Concessional Loan)263.5 millionLoan2% interest, 20-year term, 5-year grace period
China Exim Bank (Buyer's Credit)298.5 millionLoanTied to Chinese procurement; disbursed 2007–2013
Government of Ghana60 millionEquityPublic spending for project equity and overruns
The loans from China Exim Bank, totaling around US$562 million by 2008 approvals, were structured as an export credit mechanism to facilitate Chinese firm involvement, with no reported additional international donors or multilateral financing. Cost overruns beyond the initial budget were absorbed through adjustments in loan disbursements and Ghanaian fiscal allocations, though specific breakdowns for the US$168 million increase remain tied to construction delays and scope changes rather than new funding rounds.

Role of Chinese Entities

The Bui Dam project received substantial financing from the Export-Import Bank of (China Exim Bank), which extended a buyer's of $293.5 million to the Ghanaian government on September 25, 2007, to cover a significant portion of the costs. This funding was part of a broader resource-backed arrangement, where committed to exporting cocoa to to service part of the debt, reflecting 's strategy of tying infrastructure finance to commodity exports from recipient countries. The total project cost reached approximately $790 million, positioning Bui as the largest Chinese-funded infrastructure initiative in and underscoring Exim Bank's role as a key financier of African projects during this period. Construction responsibilities were assigned to Corporation Limited, a state-owned Chinese enterprise and subsidiary of the Power Construction Corporation of , under an (EPC) contract awarded following a 2005 memorandum of understanding between Sinohydro and the Ghanaian . managed the core implementation from site preparation through to commissioning in December 2013, supplying expertise, , and a substantial portion of the labor force, which included Chinese expatriates and local hires. While focused on execution rather than initial planning—such as environmental impact assessments or dam design, which involved input from Ghanaian agencies and European consultants—the company's involvement exemplified 's model of integrated overseas infrastructure delivery, prioritizing rapid deployment over extensive host-country in pre-construction phases. Chinese entities' participation extended beyond direct finance and construction to influence project oversight, with coordinating with the Bui Power Authority for implementation monitoring, though retained ultimate regulatory control. This arrangement facilitated the dam's completion despite delays from funding disbursements and environmental disputes, but it also highlighted dependencies on Chinese technical know-how, as brought experience from over 300 global projects. Overall, the involvement of Exim Bank and advanced 's geopolitical and economic objectives in , including resource access and market expansion for its firms, while providing with infrastructure it might otherwise have struggled to fund through Western lenders due to environmental safeguards.

Operational Performance

Capacity and Energy Output

The Bui Generating Station has an installed capacity of 404 megawatts (MW), comprising three main Francis turbines each rated at 133.33 MW and one auxiliary turbinette unit of 4 MW. This capacity was fully commissioned by December 2013, contributing to Ghana's national infrastructure alongside larger facilities like and Kpong. The plant's long-term average annual energy output is designed at 969 gigawatt-hours (GWh), corresponding to a of 27% under typical hydrological conditions in the Black Volta River basin. Actual generation has frequently exceeded this benchmark due to favorable inflow variability, with operational data indicating peaks above 1,500 GWh in high-rainfall years; for instance, net evacuation to the national grid reached 1,547 GWh in 2022, reflecting a 50% increase from 1,028 GWh in 2021. In 2024, output totaled 1,348 GWh, surpassing the annual target of 1,333 GWh, with the hydro plant accounting for 94.4% of Bui Power Authority's generation. Performance metrics demonstrate high reliability, including a 92.24% rate for main generating units in 2022 and downtime limited to 1.85%, well below the 2% target. Output fluctuations are primarily driven by seasonal river flows and upstream water management, underscoring the plant's sensitivity to regional climate patterns despite its baseload potential.

Integration into Ghana's Power Grid

The Bui Generating Station's hydropower output is evacuated from its onsite switchyard via four 161 kV transmission lines to the Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo) substations at Sawla, , Kintampo, and , facilitating injection into the national transmission network. These lines, constructed as part of the project infrastructure, span approximately 200-300 km in total to connect the remote Bui site in the to the southern and northern load centers, enabling bidirectional power flow for grid stability. Synchronization with began on May 3, 2013, with the first unit, followed by full operational commissioning of all three units totaling 404 MW by December 19, 2013, allowing consistent baseload contribution to Ghana's interconnected system managed by GRIDCo. This setup integrates Bui as a key northern anchor in the 161 kV and higher voltage backbone, which spans over 4,000 km nationwide, supporting peak demand evacuation and reducing reliance on thermal imports during high-water periods. Subsequent enhancements, including the 2019-2021 hydro-solar hybrid additions of up to 22.25 MW floating and ground-mounted PV capacity, utilize the existing Bui Switchyard for seamless grid tie-in, optimizing dispatch by complementing hydro variability with diurnal solar output directly into the same 161 kV lines. Grid constraints, such as occasional line faults or loading limits on downstream 161 kV segments, have periodically limited full offtake, prompting GRIDCo upgrades like the Anwomaso-Kintampo 330 kV reinforcements to bolster evacuation reliability.

Economic Contributions

National Energy Security and Growth

The Bui Dam bolsters Ghana's by adding 404 MW of installed capacity to the national grid, operational since its commissioning on December 6, 2013, which helps mitigate supply deficits amid rising demand driven by and . As a peaking facility on the River, it delivers ancillary services including reactive power compensation, frequency regulation, and spinning reserves, enhancing grid resilience and power quality, particularly in northern regions previously underserved by major transmission infrastructure. The dam's average annual energy production of 969 GWh has been consistently surpassed, reaching a record 1,547 GWh in , thereby reducing vulnerability to fluctuations in , which relies on imported and has historically contributed to load-shedding episodes known as "." This capacity expansion has played a key role in diversifying Ghana's mix, where constituted 29.1% of generation in 2021, supporting total output of 20,170 GWh in 2020 and contributing to a more than doubling of national installed capacity over the preceding decade alongside thermal additions. By providing a renewable, domestic source of baseload and flexible power, the project lessens reliance on imports, which accounted for significant portions of costs prior to 2013, and aligns with efforts to stabilize supply amid projected peak loads exceeding 4,000 MW by the mid-2020s. Economically, the dam's reliable output has facilitated industrial expansion and manufacturing growth by enabling consistent power for factories and urban centers, with macroeconomic modeling indicating positive ripple effects across sectors such as and services through improved infrastructure performance. Financing arrangements, including cocoa export collateral to , have amplified these benefits, nearly doubling the project's net positive impact on GDP by optimizing in a capital-constrained . Enhanced access has also driven household-level gains, including higher ownership of appliances in urban areas near the project, correlating with broader via productive uses of .

Local Employment and Infrastructure

The phase of the Bui Dam generated significant local employment opportunities, with the majority of workers being Ghanaian nationals. Studies indicate that most laborers hired during building were locals paid wages substantially exceeding Ghana's at the time, contributing to short-term income gains in the surrounding communities. Project announcements projected around 3,000 jobs, encompassing roles in , support services, and ancillary activities, which temporarily boosted incomes in the . Post-commissioning in 2013, the dam's operations sustained a smaller but ongoing demand for local in , , and , with some communities reporting over 30% of residents shifting to new income sources linked to the facility. However, challenges persisted, including limited skill transfer to locals due to reliance on Chinese contractors for technical roles, which constrained long-term job quality improvements. Infrastructure development accompanied employment efforts, including the construction of roads, schools, health centers, markets, and community facilities as part of resettlement and project mitigation. These enhancements improved connectivity and access to services in previously remote areas near the Black Volta River. Additionally, the dam's integration increased local electricity access by approximately 4% overall, with urban households experiencing a 14.5% rise, facilitating greater use of electrified infrastructure and appliances. Such developments supported ancillary economic activities, though evaluations note uneven distribution favoring resettled groups over unaffected peripherals.

Environmental Assessments

Impacts on Flora, Fauna, and Water Quality

The construction of the Bui Dam resulted in the inundation of approximately 444 square kilometers of land, primarily within the Bui National Park, leading to the direct submergence and loss of terrestrial flora, including savanna woodlands and riverine vegetation that supported diverse plant species. This habitat destruction eliminated vegetation cover in the reservoir area, contributing to deforestation and altered land use patterns, with forest cover decreasing notably post-impoundment as detected through remote sensing analyses. Aquatic weed proliferation emerged following reservoir formation, as stagnant conditions in the Black Volta River promoted the growth of invasive macrophytes, potentially exacerbating eutrophication risks. Faunal impacts included the displacement and of terrestrial and aquatic species, with the flooding affecting an estimated 25% of Bui National Park's biodiversity hotspots, home to endangered mammals such as the West African hippo (Hippopotamus amphibius). Pre- and post-impoundment surveys documented declines in fish populations due to disrupted migratory patterns and altered hydrological regimes, including reduced sediment transport and flow variability that impacted species from families like , Anabantidae, and . Overall alterations, such as temperature fluctuations and prolonged dry-season flows, further threatened downstream by modifying spawning grounds and food webs, though some adaptive relocation of hippos upstream was observed. Water quality in the Black Volta River exhibited measurable changes post-2013 impoundment, with physico-chemical parameters including electrical conductivity (EC) decreasing, as monitored in nutrient studies, potentially stressing osmoregulatory capabilities of resident fish species. Impoundment fostered biological shifts, such as increased accumulation and weed growth, leading to perceptions among local communities of diminished potability due to and potential contaminants. While initial assessments noted pollution risks from reduced flow velocities and trapping, long-term data indicate variable impacts, including influences from reservoir seepage, though broader threats from upstream activities like have compounded dam-related quality declines.

Mitigation Measures and Long-Term Monitoring

Mitigation efforts for the Bui Dam's environmental impacts focused on habitat compensation, wildlife relocation, and vegetation management. The Bui Power Authority (BPA) implemented a habitat offset program by earmarking new areas north, south, and east of the existing for gazetting via legislative instrument, aiming to compensate for the inundation of approximately 21% of the park's area. protection included collaboration with the Division to relocate upstream from the reservoir and conduct rescue operations, alongside for park wardens to reduce through enhanced patrolling and infrastructure improvements. For flora, selective salvaging of tall trees occurred across the 444 km² inundation zone prior to impoundment in 2013, with additional targeted vegetation clearance proposed to minimize from submerged . Water quality mitigation involved routine physicochemical parameter testing, conducted monthly to monitor compliance with standards, though sedimentation effects on downstream habitats were anticipated as minor without specific structural interventions like fish ladders, as no migratory of conservation concern were identified in pre-construction assessments. Non-governmental organizations, including International Rivers, have critiqued these measures as insufficient, arguing that they fail to address broader ecological disruptions such as altered river flows and potential long-term in the Black Volta basin. Long-term monitoring provisions under the project's Environmental Management Plan emphasize adaptive adjustments to based on ongoing observations, with BPA responsible for tracking and park . Post-impoundment studies have documented persistent changes, including reduced downstream water availability and shifts in nutrient dynamics, prompting calls for expanded hydrological and ecological surveillance using and GIS to quantify cumulative impacts. However, comprehensive, independent long-term programs remain limited, with reliance on periodic BPA reports and academic assessments rather than systematic, multi-decadal frameworks to evaluate effectiveness against baseline conditions established in the 2000s .

Social and Resettlement Outcomes

Affected Communities and Displacement

The Bui Hydroelectric Project, operational since December 2013, necessitated the involuntary displacement of 1,216 residents from eight communities situated within the reservoir inundation zone along the River in Ghana's . These communities, primarily comprising small-scale farmers, fishermen, and Gonja ethnic group members reliant on riverine livelihoods, included Bui Village, Bator, and six others such as Dampong and Brewohodi, which faced submersion due to the 444-square-kilometer reservoir created by the 60-meter-high dam wall. Resettlement efforts, managed by the Bui Power Authority under Ghana's 1992 Resettlement Act and World Commission on Dams guidelines, relocated the affected populations to two planned townships: (accommodating 217 individuals from four source communities) and Bongasi. Compensation packages included payments, replacement , agricultural land allocations (approximately 2.5 hectares per ), and infrastructure like schools and boreholes, though independent assessments noted deficiencies in land fertility and water access at new sites compared to original locations. Downstream communities, such as those in the Black Volta basin below the dam, experienced indirect effects including altered river flows and reduced , impacting an estimated additional 1,000-2,000 seasonal fishermen without formal displacement but with livelihood disruptions from irregular water releases. Cultural sites, including sacred groves and ancestral burial grounds in the affected villages, were inundated or relocated, leading to reported losses of heritage artifacts with religious significance for local indigenous groups. Governance of the process involved consultations via local chiefs and district assemblies, but studies highlight limited participation by displacees in decision-making, with property rights over resettled lands remaining insecure due to communal tenure systems. The Bui Power Authority's monitoring extended post-relocation, yet empirical reviews indicate persistent vulnerabilities, such as inadequate integration of host community dynamics, exacerbating tensions over shared resources.

Livelihood Adaptations and Socioeconomic Studies

The of the Bui Dam led to the displacement of 219 households comprising 1,219 individuals, primarily affecting livelihoods dependent on , , and resources in the Black basin. Resettled communities, including those in Lucene and Agbegikuro, experienced reduced access to and traditional grounds due to inundation covering approximately 444 km², prompting shifts toward diversification such as petty trading, labor, and non-farm activities. Empirical socioeconomic studies indicate that assets, including improved road access and housing provided during resettlement, positively influenced adaptive strategies by enabling diversification away from primary agriculture and fishing, though losses—such as diminished and riverine resources—constrained overall recovery. One analysis found that resettled households increased reliance on off-farm income sources, with physical assets correlating to higher diversification indices, but human and deficits, including skill gaps and fragmented social networks, limited long-term gains. Positive infrastructural changes, like electrified homes and better in some sites, were offset by persistent challenges including food insecurity and elevated rates compared to pre-dam baselines. Post-construction evaluations highlight mixed outcomes in livelihood revitalization efforts, with Chinese-led dam builders and Ghanaian authorities implementing compensation packages that included farmland allocation and vocational , yet implementation shortfalls resulted in net socioeconomic costs for many displacees. A 2023 study on host communities near Bui documented adaptive coping mechanisms, such as communal resource sharing and migration for seasonal labor, but emphasized that without sustained monitoring, these remained vulnerable to from altered . Overall, underscores that while some households achieved partial adaptation through asset leveraging, the majority faced enduring vulnerabilities, with diversification serving more as survival than prosperity enhancement.

Controversies and Evaluations

Debates on Development vs. Costs

Proponents of the Bui Dam's construction emphasized its role in enhancing Ghana's energy security and fostering economic diversification, arguing that the 400 MW hydroelectric capacity would address chronic power shortages and support industrial growth in the northern regions. The project was projected to generate electricity at a lower cost than thermal alternatives reliant on imported oil, while also enabling irrigation for approximately 30,000 hectares of land to boost agricultural output. During the construction phase from 2009 to 2013, it created temporary employment opportunities and stimulated local infrastructure development, with macroeconomic models indicating positive GDP contributions through increased energy supply and reduced import dependence. Ghanaian government officials and supporters highlighted these benefits as essential for bridging developmental disparities between the resource-rich south and the underserved north, positioning the dam as a catalyst for national progress. Critics, including environmental advocacy groups like International Rivers, contended that the developmental gains were overstated relative to the substantial environmental and social costs, particularly given the dam's location within Bui National Park, where reservoir flooding would submerge 21% of the area and threaten such as the remaining viable populations in . The total construction cost of $622 million, largely financed through loans from China's Exim Bank after Western institutions declined funding due to environmental safeguard concerns, imposed a long-term debt burden on without commensurate equitable benefits for affected communities. Resettlement of over 2,500 people disrupted traditional livelihoods in and farming, leading to reported increases in , issues, and loss of cultural artifacts, with empirical studies on resettled households revealing persistent shortfalls in compensation and adaptation despite some improvements like roads and water access. These debates intensified prior to construction approval in 2006, with opponents citing global precedents of dams causing net socioeconomic harm through ecosystem degradation and greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs, while proponents dismissed such concerns as impediments to Africa's energy needs, ultimately prevailing through alternative Chinese financing that bypassed stringent World Bank-style environmental protocols. Post-completion assessments have shown mixed outcomes: aggregate electricity access rose by about 4% nationally (14.5% in urban areas), supporting broader economic activity, yet micro-level analyses of displaced groups indicate livelihood challenges outweighed localized gains, underscoring causal disconnects between macro benefits and direct costs borne by vulnerable populations. Ongoing evaluations question the project's amid variability, which could reduce output reliability and exacerbate financial strains without robust .

Empirical Reviews of Benefits and Drawbacks

The Bui Dam, with an installed capacity of 400 MW, has empirically contributed to Ghana's national electricity supply, generating an average of 969 GWh annually and operating primarily as a peaking plant to supplement baseload power from other sources like the and Kpong dams. An economy-wide model evaluation across construction, financing, and operational phases estimated positive macroeconomic effects, including GDP growth from direct construction activities (peaking at 0.15% in 2011) and indirect multipliers in sectors like and services during operation, though these gains were modest relative to overall economy size. Household-level surveys near the dam site found statistically significant improvements in urban access (from 78% to 92% post-commissioning) and ownership of appliances such as refrigerators and fans, attributing these to grid extensions enabled by the project. Empirical social impact assessments, however, reveal substantial drawbacks in resettlement outcomes for the 1,216 individuals displaced from six communities, with post-relocation studies documenting persistent declines: resettled farmers experienced a 30-50% drop in crop yields due to inferior soils and reduced access to former grounds, compounded by inadequate compensation and limited skill programs. Qualitative and quantitative data from affected households indicate heightened vulnerability to food insecurity, with 40% reporting worsened metrics five years post-resettlement, as alternative income sources like wage labor failed to offset losses in and riverine resources. Environmental monitoring and ecological surveys post-2013 commissioning have quantified drawbacks including altered downstream —reducing seasonal flow variability by up to 25%—which disrupted patterns for like Labeo senegalensis, leading to a 20-30% decline in commercial catches reported by local fishers. assessments detected elevated and nutrient levels in the , correlating with algal blooms and potential risks, while terrestrial surveys noted affecting hotspots, including the displacement of the last viable population of West African manatees and hippopotamuses from the Bui area. A sustainability framework analysis rated the project's overall environmental score low due to unmitigated cumulative effects on services, estimating long-term buildup could reduce storage by 1-2% annually without sustained . Cost-benefit evaluations highlight uneven trade-offs: while operational phase projections from feasibility studies promised a benefit-cost of 1.2-1.5 based on power sales, ex-post analyses incorporating social and environmental externalities adjust this downward to near parity or negative when factoring in resettlement failures and losses valued at $10-20 million in foregone services. Independent reviews critique the original for underestimating downstream effects and climate variability, noting that actual generation has averaged below 80% of designed output in dry years due to variable inflows, amplifying economic risks amid Ghana's dependency. These findings underscore a pattern in large dam projects where short-term energy gains often mask enduring socio-ecological costs, as evidenced by longitudinal data from similar Volta Basin developments.

References

  1. https://buipower.com/bui-hydro-project/
  2. https://en.powerchina.cn/2023-10/20/c_828539.htm
  3. https://www.power-technology.com/projects/bui-dam-hydro-power-ghana/
  4. https://buipower.com/project-background/
  5. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988322002316
  6. http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FS-25.pdf
  7. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bui-Will-Add-17-to-Ghana-s-Hydropower-74476
  8. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/news/newsbui-dam-project-ghana-4277839/
  9. https://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin-articles/ghana-a-dam-at-the-cost-of-forests
  10. https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/bui_case_final_formatted_feb2019.pdf
  11. https://riverresourcehub.org/resources/british-researcher-thrown-out-of-ghana-controversy-over-proposed-construction-of-bui/
  12. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/ghanas-bui-dam-and-the-contestation-over-hydro-power-in-africa/5145562557BEE1CB7EFE58E53E1D854D
  13. https://theconversation.com/ghanas-bui-dam-raises-concerns-again-about-hydro-power-projects-155788
  14. https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/lad/publication/weighing-environment-ghanas-bui-dam
  15. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452292924000870
  16. https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/energy-business/new-project-development/ghanas-cocoa-to-help-pay-china-for-building-400-mw-bui/
  17. https://china.aiddata.org/projects/183/
  18. https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/energy-business/new-project-development/ghana-launches-construction-of-400-mw-bui/
  19. https://www.modernghana.com/news/393785/mills-completes-bui-dam-1st-power-supply-expected-in-decem.html
  20. https://ejatlas.org/print/bui-dam-ghana
  21. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Construction-of-Bui-Dam-begins-129506
  22. https://www.myjoyonline.com/bui-dam-97-per-cent-complete/
  23. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Prez-Mahama-commissions-Bui-dam-295666
  24. https://www.modernghana.com/news/333649/filling-of-bui-dam-reservoir-begins.html
  25. https://www.myjoyonline.com/bui-power-authority-reduces-power-production/
  26. http://www.scielo.sa.cr/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-77442015000100003
  27. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2588912518300109
  28. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/395867636_Hydro-power_dam_construction_and_water_availability_in_the_Bui_Basin_of_Ghana
  29. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214581825006421
  30. https://buipower.com/404mw-bui-generating-station/
  31. https://www.power-technology.com/marketdata/power-plant-profile-bui-ghana/
  32. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Financing-structure-of-the-Bui-Power-Project-Bui-Power-Authority-Ghana_fig6_339917748
  33. https://www.modernghana.com/news/143950/ghana-and-china-sign-loan-agreement-on-bui-dam-project.html
  34. https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/energy-business/new-project-development/report-china-releases-us562-million-for-ghanas-400-mw-bui/
  35. https://africa.isp.msu.edu/index.php/download_file/view/1653/417/
  36. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2021.1963575
  37. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629818305419
  38. https://theconversation.com/how-the-bui-dam-set-up-chinas-future-engagement-strategy-with-ghana-164970
  39. https://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/interaction-of-chinese-institutions-with-host-governments-in-dam-construction-the-bui-dam-in-ghana/
  40. https://www.idos-research.de/uploads/media/DP_3.2001.pdf
  41. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.103
  42. https://buipower.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2022-annual-report.pdf
  43. https://www.facebook.com/buipowerauthoity/posts/bpa-reports-strong-performance-at-2024-agmaccra-august-29-2025-the-bui-power-aut/1212921767543147/
  44. https://www.modernghana.com/news/509684/bui-dam-comes-alive-8230-ghana-energy-problems-now-over.html
  45. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bui-Project-will-generate-electricity-from-April-266154
  46. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bui-Dam-Nearing-Completion-245965
  47. https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/reports/ghana/2018-report/economy/building-reliability-key-initiatives-boost-the-provision-of-energy-water-and-sanitation
  48. https://sykesandpartners.com/bui-adds-22-25mw-solar-power-to-augment-national-grid/
  49. https://buipower.com/hyrdo-solar-hybrid/
  50. https://gridcogh.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2020-Electricity-Supply-Plan.pdf
  51. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Bui-Power-CEO-is-wrong-Energy-Minister-not-misled-by-GRIDCo-1234462
  52. https://gheatoolkit.energycom.gov.gh/Analysis/Electricity
  53. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360547795_Financing_national_scale_energy_projects_in_developing_countries_-_An_economy-wide_evaluation_of_Ghana%27s_Bui_Dam
  54. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421519306494
  55. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b330bd88-ad5b-461c-859f-5f19dfd04236/files/ma41721353f6f242e639c501af77dcb56
  56. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293800473_Safeguards_Financing_and_Employment_in_Chinese_Infrastructure_Projects_in_Africa_The_Case_of_Ghana%27s_Bui_Dam
  57. https://www.myjoyonline.com/bui-dam-project-to-offer-job-opportunities/
  58. https://udsijd.org/index.php/udsijd/article/view/41
  59. https://practicalactionpublishing.com/article/2775/safeguards-financing-and-employment-in-chinese-infrastructure-projects-in-africa-the-case-of-ghanas-bui-dam
  60. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108940/1/MPRA_paper_108940.pdf
  61. https://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/server/api/core/bitstreams/4d27360b-fec6-40cf-a82b-f112c4f1fbb7/content
  62. https://www.scielo.br/j/mercator/a/PLxRFrG4YHhJpKNS7t7KZKF/
  63. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1155/2018/6471525
  64. https://sais.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/China%27s-Environmental-Footprint-in-Africa.pdf
  65. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2215153224000485
  66. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6188593/
  67. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280012245_PHYSICO-CHEMICAL_CHARACTERISTICS_OF_THE_BUI_DAM_AREA_OF_THE_BLACK_VOLTA_RIVER_GHANA
  68. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1464343X23001450
  69. https://thefourthestategh.com/2024/12/galamsey-on-black-volta-threatens-livelihoods-bui-dam/
  70. https://buipower.com/environmental-social-issues-mitigation-measures/
  71. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/299251468191674737/pdf/RP11390V10P09400Box358357B00PUBLIC0.pdf
  72. https://oro.open.ac.uk/83864/1/Final%2520Version%2520of%2520Thesis%2520-%2520Socio-ecological%2520Impacts%2520and%2520Adaptations%2520%2520Arising%2520from%2520Chinese-led%2520Infrastructure%2520Developments%2520in%2520Africa%2520-%2520A%2520Case%2520Study%2520%2520of%2520the%2520Bui%2520Hydropower%2520Dam%2520in%2520Ghana%2520-%252028-03-22%2520%281%29.pdf
  73. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380277607_Nutrients_monitoring_on_the_Bui_multipurpose_dam_project_in_the_Savannah_region_of_Ghana
  74. https://buipower.com/bpa-resettlement-programme-2/
  75. https://buipower.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Resettlement_Plan.pdf
  76. https://www.riverresourcehub.org/wp-content/uploads/files/attached-files/bui_field_report.pdf
  77. https://ejatlas.org/conflict/bui-dam-ghana/
  78. https://www.informingscience.org/Articles/v2p145-158Abdulai4826.pdf
  79. https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/6/4/80
  80. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12259
  81. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14615517.2024.2400457
  82. https://www.informingscience.org/Publications/4101
  83. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315881249_The_Livelihood_Challenges_of_Resettled_Communities_of_the_Bui_Dam_Project_in_Ghana_and_the_Role_of_Chinese_Dam-builders
  84. https://www.academia.edu/70737005/Effect_of_Bui_Hydroelectric_Dam_on_Household_Livelihood_Diversification
  85. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281116242_THE_SOCIO_-ECONOMIC_IMPACT_OF_BUI_DAM_ON_RESETTLED_COMMUNITIES_A_CASE_STUDY_OF_LUCENE_AND_AGBEGIKURO_COMMUNITIES_IN_THE_NORTHERN_REGION_OF_GHANA
  86. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11305308/
  87. https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/7726/Arthur_Jones_PhD_2016.pdf
  88. https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/206027/1/Post_dam_construction_and_Livelihood_revitilisation_of_affected_communities_at_Ghana_s_Bui_Dam_Manuscript.pdf
  89. https://www.history.ucsb.edu/wp-content/uploads/1-Miescher_Tsikata.pdf
  90. https://journaljgeesi.com/index.php/JGEESI/article/view/484
  91. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273773543_The_impacts_of_dams_on_local_livelihoods_a_study_of_the_Bui_Hydroelectric_Project_in_Ghana
  92. https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3298/4/2/25
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.