Hubbry Logo
C5+1C5+1Main
Open search
C5+1
Community hub
C5+1
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
C5+1
C5+1
C5+1
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
John Kerry (far left) with the Central Asian foreign ministers during the 70th Regular Session of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 26, 2015.

Key Information

The C5+1 is a diplomatic summit that has been held every year since 2015 between the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, with the United States Secretary of State to discuss and work on common issues of concern to improve and strengthen the U.S. relationship with the five Central Asian states, but to also enhance the relations between the individual nations in Central Asia. The format is used to discuss regional issues such as the war in Afghanistan, the Syrian civil war, the War on terror, combating drug and human trafficking, economic issues regarding trade relations, job growth in the region, and combating environmental issues.

The C5+1 is viewed[1] as an attempt by the United States to gain influence in the Central Asian states countering Russia where U.S.–Russian relations have worsened since 2014, and what the U.S. has perceived as being Russia's ambitions to restore the Soviet Union.[2]

History

[edit]

The first meeting between the six states took place on September 26, 2015, during the seventieth session of the United Nations General Assembly where then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with his foreign minister counterparts from the five states to establish a new multilateral dialogue platform.[3] Following the meeting at the U.N., from October to November, Kerry embarked on visiting each of the five countries marking the first time a Secretary of State visited these countries since James Baker in 1992 following their independence from the Soviet Union.[4][5]

2015

[edit]

The C5+1's first summit took place on November 1 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The summit resulted in the six countries issuing a declaration on increasing cooperation in trade, transport, and energy. The parties also issued a Joint Declaration of Partnership and Cooperation where the countries will improve cooperation in regional trade, transport and communication, energy linkages, and transit opportunities, including upgrading existing facilities and promoting common rules and regulations. Kerry announced at the summit that the U.S. would launch a program called Smart Waters, which would focus on training future expert water managers and river basin planning for sustainable water management in the region.[6][7]

2016

[edit]

The second summit was held in Washington, D.C., on August 3. The meeting itself marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between each of the six states.[8]

The summit resulted in the U.S. and the five Central Asian states launching five corresponding projects with the U.S. providing financial support up to fifteen million dollars. The projects include the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Regional Dialogue, which aims to counter foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization to violence in the region. The dialogue will work to implement The Hague–Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon. The Central Asia Business Competitiveness (CABC) aims to make it easier for businesses in Central Asia to increase exports and enter new markets working with governments and trade authorities making it easier for businesses to export goods and to attract capital and technology to improve food production, processing, and packaging. The Transport Corridor Development (TCD) is to reduce the cost and time associated with moving goods across the borders in Central Asia and improve the quality of transport and logistics services across the region. Power the Future is to provide renewable energy across the region with the U.S. providing training and technical assistance on strategic energy planning, competitive procurement, grid integration, smart incentives, renewable energy zones, and innovative finance. Supporting National and Regional Adaptation Planning is to increase the region's capacity to adapt against the impact of climate change by helping the five nations adaptation process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.[9]

2017

[edit]

Two summits were held in 2017. The first was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on July 26. This summit marked the first meeting without the Secretary of State and the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian nations. The meeting was held at the National Library with the United States being represented by R. Carl Paschall, the Deputy Coordinator for Operations Policy and Military Coordination of the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, with the then-U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan, Elisabeth I. Millard. The meeting focused primarily on security concerns involving regional cooperation in counterterrorism and addressing the threat of foreign fighters in the region.[10]

The second meeting was held on September 22 in New York with the ministers meeting with Rex Tillerson during the Seventy-second session of the United Nations General Assembly.[11]

2018

[edit]

The fifth summit was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on July 23. This was the second time the U.S. Secretary of State did not attend the summit, but the Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov opened the meeting. The U.S. was represented by Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, Henry Ensher with the then-U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Pamela Spratlen. The six nations reaffirmed their commitment to addressing the issues and cooperation as agreed upon back during the 2016 summit. The meeting also launched two security working groups with the United States Institute of Peace focusing on community engagement in preventing radicalization.[12]

2019

[edit]

Two summits of the C5+1 were held in 2019. The first was on August 21 in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, on the occasion of the C5+1 High-Level Security Discussion where the nations reaffirmed their support for the C5+1 platform and initiatives. This summit was the third time that the Secretary of State did not attend. Instead, David Hale, the then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs represented the United States.[13]

The second summit was held on September 22 in New York City during the Seventy-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The summit marked the return of the Secretary of State with Mike Pompeo leading the U.S. delegation and meeting with his foreign minister counterparts. Aside from the usual agreement to cooperate on the issues the summit has been engaged in since 2015, Pompeo, while discussing counterterrorism referred to China's treatment of the Uighurs stating, "And further on the subject of terrorism, I want to make clear that China’s repressive campaign in Xinjiang is not about terrorism. It’s about China’s attempt – about China’s attempt to erase its own citizens’ Muslim faith and culture. We call on all countries to resist China's demands to repatriate Uighurs."[14]

2020

[edit]
Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Hale (left) during the virtual C5+1 High Level Dialogue on June 30, 2020.

Two summits were once again held in 2020. The first was on February 3 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, where Pompeo and the foreign ministers of Central Asia discussed the Afghan peace process, joint border security, and regional efforts to improve economic and energy connectivity. Pompeo had met with each of the foreign ministers individually as well as the Presidents of both Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on February 2 in Nur-Sultan, and Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev on February 3. During the meeting, Pompeo warned the five countries to not become overly dependent on China criticizing their business and lending practices, and mentioning China's persecution of Uyghur and Kazakh minorities.[15]

The second summit was held on June 30 over video conference due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The meeting primarily revolved around the economic impact of the pandemic.[16]

2021

[edit]

On January 7, the governments of the United States, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, announced the creation of the Central Asia Investment Partnership to be implemented through the C5+1. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Astana International Financial Centre, and the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade of Uzbekistan, plan to raise one billion dollars over the next five years to support the advancement of private-sector-led growth and increase economic connectivity within Central Asia and the broader region to help the countries recover from the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.[17]

The first summit took place on April 23, 2021, during a virtual meeting with the foreign ministers and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The participants welcomed the U.S. proposal for a future meeting of the group with U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. While noting the importance of the C5+1 working groups on economic issues, environment and energy, and security, and agreed the C5+1 working groups will continue to meet regularly, including later in 2021, at the expert level to prepare decisions for future high-level dialogue meetings. The next meeting with Uzbekistan hosting in July will review the program of work adopted in 2020 and adjust it as necessary. And lastly, the ministers and the secretary agreed to meet again by the end of the year.[18]

The next summit took place from July 15 to 16 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the first in-person summit since 2019. The United States was represented by Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, where she and the foreign ministers discussed among the usual issues of concern, including the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan expected by August 31.[19]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

C5+1

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The C5+1 is a multilateral diplomatic framework initiated by the in to foster cooperation with the five Central Asian republics—, , , , and —addressing shared regional challenges including security, economic connectivity, and environmental sustainability. This platform emphasizes joint engagement to promote sovereignty, , and regional solutions without external coercion, countering influences from larger powers like and through enhanced U.S. partnerships. Key activities under C5+1 include annual foreign ministers' meetings, starting with the inaugural session in New York in 2015 hosted by then-Secretary of State , which laid the groundwork for collaborative projects on , border management, and critical minerals development. The format expanded to a leaders' summit in September 2023, where U.S. President met with Central Asian heads of state, issuing a joint statement committing to diversified energy routes, digital connectivity, and initiatives. Notable achievements encompass over 50 joint projects by 2016, focusing on practical outcomes like regional electricity transmission and water resource management, demonstrating empirical progress in areas vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions. While praised for bolstering Central Asian agency amid great-power competition, C5+1 has faced scrutiny for its alignment with U.S. strategic interests, potentially straining relations with , whose influence in the has waned post-2022 invasion, prompting some analysts to view it as a pragmatic response to causal shifts in Eurasian power dynamics rather than ideological imposition. Official U.S. sources highlight sustained commitments, with virtual and in-person dialogues continuing into 2025, underscoring the framework's adaptability to evolving threats like and vulnerabilities.

Overview

Definition and Participants

The is a multilateral diplomatic platform established to facilitate cooperation between the and the five independent Central Asian republics. It represents a by the U.S. to engage jointly with these nations on regional priorities, including , economic connectivity, and . The format emphasizes collective dialogue among the participants rather than bilateral dealings, promoting Central Asia's and integration into broader international frameworks. The participants in the C5+1 comprise the Government of the and the governments of the Republic of , the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of , , and the Republic of Uzbekistan. These five , often referred to as the C5, share geographic proximity, historical ties, and common challenges such as and border security, which the framework addresses through coordinated U.S. engagement. High-level meetings typically involve foreign ministers, though summits have occasionally included heads of state or government.

Objectives and Strategic Rationale

The C5+1 framework aims to foster an independent, prosperous, and secure through enhanced coordination between the and the five Central Asian states—, , , , and . Official objectives include advancing regional security by countering transnational threats such as , narcotics trafficking, and via joint training programs and capacity-building initiatives. Economic resilience is prioritized through initiatives promoting trade diversification, critical minerals development, and connectivity, exemplified by the inaugural C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue launched on February 9, 2024, to leverage shared resources for mutual benefit. Sustainable development goals encompass environmental cooperation, including water and , as affirmed in the September 21, 2023, C5+1 Leaders' Joint Statement. Strategically, the United States employs the C5+1 as a multilateral diplomatic platform to support the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Central Asian nations, particularly amid regional geopolitical pressures. This whole-of-government approach, institutionalized since 2015, enables coordinated U.S. engagement across agencies to build resilient partnerships that align with Central Asian multivector foreign policies, avoiding over-reliance on any single external power. By facilitating high-level dialogues and joint statements, such as those marking the framework's tenth anniversary in 2025, the initiative counters instability risks from extremism and resource competition while opening markets for U.S. investment in energy and transport sectors. Empirical outcomes include expanded U.S. assistance programs totaling over $1 billion since inception, focused on border security and economic reforms to promote self-reliance. The rationale underscores causal linkages between regional autonomy and broader U.S. interests in Eurasian stability, where unchecked external dominance could exacerbate vulnerabilities like disruptions or migration pressures. Unlike bilateral aid, the C5+1 format amplifies collective Central Asian agency, as evidenced by joint commitments to combat illicit finance and enhance digital connectivity, reducing asymmetries in power dynamics. This pragmatic engagement prioritizes verifiable progress in governance and trade over ideological impositions, aligning with post-2022 adaptations to heightened great-power competition.

Historical Development

Inception (2015–2016)

The C5+1 diplomatic format emerged in 2015 as a multilateral platform for dialogue between the and the five Central Asian republics—, , , , and —to address shared challenges in security, economic connectivity, and governance. The initiative built on bilateral U.S. engagements but introduced a regional approach to promote sovereignty, economic diversification, and cooperation without dominance by external powers like or . U.S. advanced the framework during the in September 2015, where initial discussions with Central Asian foreign ministers laid groundwork for structured meetings. This was followed by Kerry's first visit to all five countries from October 28 to November 3, 2015, culminating in the inaugural C5+1 ministerial in , , on November 1. At the Samarkand meeting, Kerry and the five foreign ministers issued the Joint Declaration of Partnership and Cooperation, committing to regular C5+1 engagements and prioritizing regional projects in , border management, and economic linkages such as transport corridors. The declaration emphasized mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference, aiming to enhance Central Asia's role in Afghan stability and global energy markets while fostering people-to-people ties. This gathering marked a shift from fragmented bilateral , enabling collective U.S. support for Central Asian integration amid post-Soviet dependencies. In 2016, the framework gained momentum with the launch of specialized working groups. The first C5+1 Economic and Regional Connectivity Working Group convened in , , on April 4, focusing on trade facilitation and infrastructure to boost intraregional commerce, which stood at under 10% of total Central Asian trade at the time. A second ministerial hosted by Kerry in Washington, D.C., on August 3, endorsed five pilot projects, including in the Aral Sea basin and capacity-building for nuclear nonproliferation, signaling practical implementation. These steps institutionalized the format, with U.S. funding allocated for technical assistance to align with Central Asian priorities like water resource management and countering .

Consolidation and Key Summits (2017–2021)

Following the inception of the C5+1 framework, the period from 2017 to 2021 focused on consolidating the dialogue through operationalizing working groups and launching targeted projects across security, economic, and environmental domains. The United States allocated $15 million in congressional funding to initiate five collaborative initiatives, including counter-terrorism efforts led by the U.S. Institute of Peace, USAID-supported programs for business competitiveness in horticulture, transport corridor development, low-emission energy via "Power the Future," and national adaptation planning for environmental risks. These efforts complemented bilateral relations by fostering regional interconnectivity among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2017, consolidation advanced with the third C5+1 ministerial meeting held in New York during the United Nations General Assembly, where foreign ministers reaffirmed commitments to regional cooperation. A security working group convened in , , on July 26, emphasizing counter-terrorism and preventing . The following year, U.S. officials engaged senior Central Asian delegations in , , and , , from July 20-23 for working group meetings on , , and , marking progress in implementing project-specific outcomes. The fourth ministerial convened in New York on September 24, 2019, building momentum ahead of the fifth in , , in early 2020. At the -hosted meeting, participants endorsed expanded cooperation in trade, investment, , adaptation, , and counter-terrorism, while supporting the peace process and affirming Central Asian sovereignty. The prompted a shift to virtual formats, with a high-level dialogue on June 30, 2020, involving U.S. Secretary of State and Central Asian foreign ministers; discussions covered economic resilience, stability, and regional connectivity, establishing a program of work including a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, expert meetings, and enhancements. Into 2021, virtual engagements persisted, highlighted by U.S. Antony Blinken's participation in an April 23 meeting underscoring U.S. commitment amid global challenges. Additional joint statements addressed the climate crisis on September 21 and an international conference on July 16, reinforcing cooperation in and security. This phase solidified C5+1 as a resilient platform for addressing shared priorities despite geopolitical and health disruptions.

Adaptation to Geopolitical Shifts (2022–2025)

The in February 2022 prompted Central Asian states to pursue greater economic diversification and regional connectivity, creating opportunities for intensified U.S. engagement through the C5+1 framework to mitigate reliance on . These countries abstained from resolutions condemning the invasion, reflecting deep economic interdependence with —such as remittances, labor migration, and transit—while signaling a multivector that balanced neutrality with Western outreach. The U.S. adapted by emphasizing alternative trade routes, like the Middle Corridor via the , to bypass Russian territory and enhance Central Asia's amid disrupted Eurasian . In September 2022, U.S. convened the C5+1 foreign ministers on the margins of the UN in New York, issuing a joint statement underscoring commitments to regional stability, , and economic resilience in response to global disruptions from the conflict. This was followed by a March 2023 ministerial meeting in , , where participants advanced discussions on connectivity projects and sanctions compliance to address evasion risks linked to Russia's . The framework elevated to leaders' level in September 2023, with President hosting the first C5+1 summit alongside the UN , focusing on , , and countering illicit finance, which marked a strategic pivot toward high-level diplomacy to compete with Russian and Chinese influence. By 2024, adaptations included virtual and in-person dialogues addressing security vacuums from Russia's preoccupation in , with U.S. support for border management and critical minerals development to bolster Central Asian independence. Secretary Blinken met C5+1 counterparts again during the September 2024 UN , highlighting the upcoming 2025 decennial anniversary and pledging sustained collaboration on and digital connectivity. In early 2025, the C5+1 secretariat convened in , , on September 4 to coordinate on and geopolitical navigation, reflecting Central Asia's exploitation of power shifts for intra-regional cooperation. As of October 2025, U.S. congressional figures urged incoming President to host a leaders' , positioning the format as a tool for multivector alignment amid Russia's weakened regional leverage and China's expanding footprint. This evolution has fostered Central Asian multilateralism, with the C5+1 serving as a platform for pragmatic U.S. policy that prioritizes and trade over confrontation, though challenges persist in translating dialogues into binding commitments.

Areas of Cooperation

Security and Regional Stability

The C5+1 framework prioritizes security cooperation to counter transnational threats and promote regional stability in , with initial efforts launched in 2015 focusing on and border management. This includes joint initiatives to address , illicit trafficking, and instability stemming from neighboring . Counterterrorism efforts under C5+1 emphasize preventing , interdicting foreign terrorist fighters, and enhancing capacities through bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The supports rehabilitation programs for returning fighters and shares best practices on countering , as affirmed in the 2023 C5+1 Leaders' Joint Statement. Specific mechanisms include the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Regional Dialogue, aimed at tackling foreign terrorist fighter challenges. Recent priorities target groups like the Islamic State's regional branch, reflecting ongoing threats post-Afghanistan withdrawal. Border security receives substantial U.S. investment, with over $90 million allocated to train more than 2,600 border officers and establish 13 operational posts, alongside over 200 training activities. C5+1 Border Security Dialogues facilitate Foreign Military Financing grants and information sharing to detect illicit flows and support safe migration. These measures bolster sovereignty and interoperability, including through exercises like Steppe Eagle and the State Partnership Program. Regional stability is advanced via the C5+1 platform's $34 million in and economic projects, fostering defense dialogues and on to prevent spillover. Ministerial-level discussions deepen ties on and repatriation of nationals from conflict zones like northeast . U.S. assistance prioritizes tools to enhance resilience against shared threats, contributing to a terrorism-free environment in .

Economic and Trade Initiatives

The C5+1 framework emphasizes economic cooperation to enhance regional connectivity, diversify partnerships, and attract sustainable investment, aiming to integrate into global markets while reducing reliance on and . This includes promoting transparent business environments, resolving trade barriers, and leveraging U.S. financial tools such as the Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank, and USAID for in transport, digital connectivity, and related sectors. A core initiative is the advancement of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, or Middle Corridor, to improve overland trade links from through the to , alongside commitments to develop and networks for economic resilience and market access. In 2023, C5+1 leaders endorsed a private-sector business platform, coordinated by the U.S. Department of State and the Center for International Private Enterprise, to facilitate U.S. investment and . The framework also supports WTO accession processes for and to ease global trade integration, while pursuing repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for , , and to normalize bilateral trade status. USAID-led programs under C5+1 include the Business Competitiveness projects, which target growth in areas like to secure export contracts and reduce post-harvest losses, and Development Projects to bolster logistics efficiency. In 2016, U.S. provided $15 million to fund these economic initiatives alongside environmental and security efforts. A new Critical Minerals Dialogue, announced in 2023, seeks to harness 's mineral resources for diversified supply chains and U.S. strategic interests. In 2023 alone, the U.S. allocated over $100 million across more than 40 C5+1 programs, with significant portions directed toward economic diversification and . The C5+1 Secretariat, launched in , coordinates these efforts to prioritize intra-regional trade flows and investment attraction.

Energy, Infrastructure, and Connectivity

The C5+1 framework promotes regional energy integration through the USAID Power Central Asia initiative, launched in 2020 to enhance cooperation among , , , , and on power sector reforms, management, and clean energy development. This program provides technical assistance for balancing generation with water needs, advancing energy efficiency, and exploring renewables like , including 's first green hydrogen hub established in 2024 to build workforce expertise in . Additionally, the initiative supports up to $15 million in funding for scaling, including training on grid integration, competitive procurement, and innovative financing. A C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, initiated in 2023, aims to develop 's deposits of , , , and other resources to secure supply chains and foster industrial cooperation, reducing reliance on dominant suppliers. Infrastructure efforts under C5+1 emphasize modernizing transport and energy networks to facilitate trade and diversification. Leaders committed in 2023 to investing in the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, known as the Middle Corridor, to connect to and via enhanced transportation links. The U.S. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment evaluates scaling private-sector funding for transport, clean energy, and related projects, building on earlier Development assistance that trains stakeholders to reduce non-tariff barriers and improve logistics efficiency. These initiatives align with broader goals of diversifying export routes and integrating regional energy systems, including potential supplies and mitigation. Connectivity cooperation focuses on digital, customs, and cross-border facilitation, as highlighted in the inaugural C5+1 Regional Connectivity Ministerial held in , , on October 24, 2023. Participants pledged collaboration on sustainable green energy, transport sector decarbonization, digital infrastructure, and the water-energy nexus to support . Efforts include modernization and private-sector engagement to streamline , complementing programs like Central Asia Business Competitiveness, which aids export enhancement in sectors such as through policy support and value-chain integration. In 2023, the U.S. allocated over $100 million across more than 40 C5+1 programs, many targeting these areas to advance regional solutions.

Cultural and Educational Exchanges

The C5+1 framework facilitates cultural and educational exchanges to build people-to-people ties between the and Central Asian states, with the U.S. investing over $100 million in 2023 across more than 40 regional programs, including those focused on academic collaboration and youth engagement. These initiatives emphasize proficiency, leadership development, and professional training to enhance regional connectivity and counterbalance external influences through . A flagship program is C5+O.N.E. (Opening Networks through English), funded by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, which delivers region-wide curricula in spoken English and entrepreneurship-focused English for Specific Purposes to professionals from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The initiative promotes cross-border dialogue and economic cooperation, with cohorts such as the May 2025 "English for Economic Development" group targeting skills for regional prosperity. Complementing this, the C5+O.N.E. Ed variant provides professional development for early-career English teachers across Central Asia, fostering instructional capacity in host countries. The C5+1 Youth Council program targets English-speaking university students from the five Central Asian states—and occasionally Afghanistan—to cultivate leadership skills and regional networks aligned with C5+1 priorities like stability and connectivity. The 2023 edition, implemented via grants to local and U.S. organizations, featured applications closing on June 16, 2023, with activities centered on civic engagement and cross-cultural understanding. Additional academic exchanges include the Central Asia University Partnership Program (UniCEN), which supports institutional collaborations, and the Central Asia Media Exchange Program (CAMEX), promoting journalistic training and media ties. Professional fellowships under C5+1, such as the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship, offer Central Asian participants advanced in the U.S., with expansions announced in 2015 to increase internship slots for regional professionals. Cultural preservation efforts, including U.S.-funded projects for heritage sites, further these exchanges by safeguarding shared historical narratives. At the September 2023 C5+1 summit, leaders reaffirmed commitments to vocational , programs, and higher education institutions serving regional students to deepen cross-cultural ties and scientific cooperation.

Geopolitical Context

Competition with Russia and China

The C5+1 framework emerged as a U.S. initiative to foster multilateral engagement with , , , , and , partly in response to 's security-oriented influence through the and , and 's economic expansion via the . In 2019, the U.S. approved a Strategy for spanning 2019–2025, emphasizing the advancement of regional sovereignty and economic prosperity to provide alternatives to dependencies on and . This approach aligns with the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, which identifies as an acute threat and as the primary pacing challenge, positioning as a theater for great-power competition. U.S. efforts under C5+1 focus on economic diversification and to counterbalance Chinese dominance in and investment; for instance, the inaugural C5+1 Critical Minerals in 2024 aimed to collaborate on resource development, reducing reliance on Beijing's supply chains. Russia-Central Asia reached €26.8 billion in , over ten times U.S. levels, underscoring Moscow's entrenched position, yet post-2022 sanctions and the conflict have prompted Central Asian states to seek U.S. partnerships for . Despite Sino-Russian cooperation in the region—rather than direct rivalry—U.S. leverages Central Asian multivector policies, pioneered by in the 2000s, to balance ties without full alignment. In late 2025, President Trump scheduled a C5+1 for November 6 in Washington to host Central Asian leaders, explicitly framed as a pushback against Russian and Chinese influence amid regional desires to mitigate over-dependence. This builds on prior mechanisms like the 2023 C5+1 high-level dialogue, which promoted security and economic cooperation as regional solutions to shared challenges, implicitly challenging hegemonic strategies from competitors. Geographically disadvantaged compared to proximate powers, U.S. influence remains constrained, with Central Asian states prioritizing pragmatic multivectorism over exclusive Western orientation.

Alignment with Broader US Foreign Policy

The C5+1 diplomatic format supports key tenets of by advancing a sovereign, economically resilient amid great power competition with and . As outlined in the U.S. Strategy on Interests in released in September 2025, strengthening the C5+1 platform furthers objectives in economic diversification, , and regional stability to reduce dependencies on adversarial powers. This aligns with the 2022 Strategy's framework of integrated deterrence, which prioritizes partnerships to counter authoritarian influence in without establishing permanent military bases. Security cooperation under C5+1, including joint efforts on , management, and information sharing, complements U.S. global priorities such as disrupting transnational threats like ISIS-K and narcotics trafficking from . These activities have expanded since 2015 to include training programs and equipment donations totaling over $100 million in regional assistance by 2023, enhancing U.S. leverage in post- stabilization without direct commitments. By promoting multilateral dialogues, mitigates risks of spilling into U.S. interests, such as allied routes through the or . Economically, C5+1 initiatives like the Critical and Emerging Technology Dialogue and trade capacity-building align with U.S. efforts to secure alternative supply chains for rare earths and , critical for domestic and nuclear sectors. Following Russia's 2022 invasion of , which disrupted global energy flows, the U.S. has leveraged C5+1 to encourage Central Asian exports via the Middle Corridor, bypassing Russian pipelines and supporting LNG diversification goals articulated in the 2023 Joint Statement. This pragmatic focus on connectivity—evidenced by $500 million in pledged U.S. investments for by 2025—reflects a transactional approach consistent across administrations, prioritizing over ideological impositions. In the context of 2025 geopolitical shifts, President Trump's planned C5+1 summit on November 6 in Washington signals intent to recalibrate the format toward bilateral economic deals, echoing his first-term emphasis on exports and reduced dependency. This continuity underscores C5+1's role in broader and Eurasian strategies, where serves as a buffer against dominance, though empirical outcomes remain constrained by the region's entrenched ties to and .

Central Asian Perspectives and Autonomy

Central Asian governments perceive the C5+1 framework as a valuable complement to their multi-vector foreign policies, which emphasize balanced relations with multiple global powers to preserve national sovereignty and avoid over-reliance on any single partner, particularly and . This approach aligns with empirical trends since the early 2010s, where leaders in , , and others have pursued diversified trade and security ties, evidenced by increased intra-regional consultations and external engagements that numbered nine active C5+1 formats by 2025, including with the , , and others. Participation in C5+1 summits, such as the 2023 New York gathering, has been framed by regional officials as advancing shared interests in connectivity and stability without implying exclusive alignment. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region's economic anchors, have articulated strongest support for C5+1 as a tool for , with Kazakh President and Uzbek President highlighting its role in fostering Western and transfers amid post-2022 disruptions to Russian-dominated routes. In joint statements from the 2023 ministerial, representatives from all five states underscored the need for deepened trade ties to implement policies enhancing regional , including projects bypassing traditional dependencies. This reflects causal dynamics where reduced Moscow-Beijing leverage—exacerbated by Russia's Ukraine involvement and China's debt concerns—has prompted proactive diversification, with Central Asian exports to non-Russian/Chinese markets rising 15-20% annually since 2022 per trade data. Smaller states like , , and exhibit more cautious endorsement, prioritizing non-interference clauses in engagements to safeguard internal stability, yet they consistently join C5+1 dialogues for power against external pressures. Turkmenistan's neutral stance, for instance, limits depth but affirms the format's utility in multilateral forums, as seen in virtual high-level talks through 2025. Overall, regional is pursued through C5+1 by leveraging partnerships for empirical gains in security capacity-building and economic resilience, countering dominance without confrontation, as articulated in 2025 analyses of middle-power strategies. Planned -hosted C5+1 meetings in early 2025 further signal sustained interest in this balanced dynamic.

Criticisms and Controversies

Accusations of External Interference

Russian officials and analysts have accused the United States of using the C5+1 format to meddle in Central Asian affairs by seeking to diminish Moscow's traditional influence in the region. Upon the initiative's launch in 2015, Russian commentators described it as a deliberate American strategy to redirect Central Asian states southward, away from Russia's sphere of influence, framing the multilateral dialogue as a geopolitical maneuver rather than genuine cooperation. This perspective aligns with broader Russian concerns over Western engagement formats, such as those involving the EU or Germany, which Moscow has criticized as encroachments on its post-Soviet backyard. In January 2018, Russian diplomatic warnings highlighted the potential for Washington to exploit C5+1 relations negatively, implying risks of interference in regional security dynamics involving , , , , and . has responded by promoting its own C5+1 variant, explicitly positioned as a counterbalance to the U.S. model, to reinforce Russian-led institutions like the and the . These accusations reflect Russia's strategic interest in maintaining dominance, particularly amid declining leverage following events like the 2022 invasion, but lack evidence of direct U.S. actions such as funding insurgencies or subverting governments through the platform. Chinese perspectives on C5+1 have been more subdued, with emphasizing its non-interference while advancing parallel engagements, such as the 2023 Xi-led C5+1 summit, to consolidate economic ties without explicit charges of U.S. meddling. Nonetheless, official Chinese analyses have warned against external powers disrupting Central Asian development paths, implicitly critiquing U.S. initiatives amid competition for and projects. Central Asian governments have not leveled formal accusations of interference against the U.S. via C5+1; instead, they have leveraged the format to pursue multivector foreign policies aimed at reducing overreliance on any single power, including and . This autonomy underscores that while rival powers voice concerns, the initiative operates on consensual diplomatic grounds without verifiable instances of coercive external interference.

Debates on Effectiveness and Dependency

Proponents of the C5+1 framework argue that it has enhanced multilateral , enabling Central Asian states to pursue regional solutions in , economic resilience, and , as evidenced by the 2023 summit commitments to collaborative activities. However, empirical outcomes remain modest, with achievements in areas like cybersecurity training and economic forums tempered by persistent regional threats, geopolitical rivalries, and domestic issues that limit deeper integration. Critics, including Russian analysts, contend that the initiative primarily serves U.S. strategic interests by countering Moscow's influence, but its effectiveness is constrained by inconsistent U.S. and Central Asia's prioritization of stability over alignment with Washington. For instance, the imposition of 25% tariffs on Kazakh goods effective August 1, 2025, under the Trump administration, has raised concerns about eroding trust and hindering trade expansion, potentially exacerbating volatility in bilateral ties. These factors underscore debates over whether the format delivers verifiable progress or merely provides a diplomatic veneer amid broader power competition. On dependency, advocates emphasize the C5+1's role in diversifying Central Asian partnerships, such as through joint projects that diminish reliance on Russian energy supplies and foster self-sufficiency in critical sectors like renewables. Yet, skeptics highlight risks of substituting one form of external dependence for another, particularly in critical minerals where U.S.-led dialogues could tie regional exports to American markets vulnerable to shifts, while infrastructural bottlenecks and gaps perpetuate broader economic vulnerabilities. Central Asian leaders, pursuing multi-vector , view the framework as a tool for balanced rather than wholesale alignment, though hinges on addressing these trade-offs.

Alternative Regional Frameworks

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai by , , , , , and , serves as a prominent Eurasian security and economic framework that includes four Central Asian states as founding members. The organization expanded to incorporate and in 2017 and in 2023, emphasizing counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and regional stability, though its activities have increasingly aligned with Chinese economic initiatives like the Belt and Road and Russian security priorities. participates as a dialogue partner rather than a full member, reflecting its policy of permanent neutrality, while Central Asian participants leverage the SCO for economic connectivity but face constraints from the dominant roles of and , which account for the majority of its budget and decision-making influence. The (CSTO), established on May 15, 1992, as the successor to earlier Soviet-era pacts and formalized in 2002, functions as a Russia-led providing collective defense commitments under Article 5-like provisions for members including , , , , , and . withdrew in 2012 citing concerns over Russian overreach and has since pursued non-alignment, while remains outside entirely; the CSTO has conducted joint exercises and rapid reaction forces deployments, such as in Kyrgyzstan's 2010 unrest, but its effectiveness is debated due to reliance on Russian forces and equipment, fostering dependency rather than equitable security sharing. Central Asian members participate to deter internal threats and border instability but increasingly hedge through bilateral ties, as evidenced by 's invocation of CSTO assistance in January 2022 riots followed by diversification efforts. The (EAEU), launched on January 1, 2015, integrates , , , , and into a aimed at free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, with a combined GDP of approximately $2.4 trillion as of 2023. applied for membership in 2023 but has not joined, preferring to avoid deeper Russian economic leverage, while and remain external; the EAEU facilitates intra-bloc trade, which reached 16% of members' total by 2022, yet critics note its asymmetry, with comprising over 85% of the union's GDP and using it to maintain influence over energy and migration flows from . Parallel to the U.S. C5+1, both and operate their own C5+1 dialogues with Central Asian leaders, alongside similar formats from the , , , , , and , enabling the five states to pursue multi-vector foreign policies and balance great-power influences since the mid-2010s. These alternatives contrast with C5+1 by embedding within broader Sino-Russian spheres, where participation yields investments and guarantees but risks erosion, as seen in SCO's expansion correlating with increased Chinese lending—totaling over $40 billion in Central Asia by 2023—often tied to opaque terms. Intra-regional efforts, such as the C5 consultative summits initiated in , represent nascent autonomous frameworks focused on sharing and transport corridors, though they lack institutional depth compared to external-led models.

Impact and Future Outlook

Measurable Achievements and Empirical Outcomes

The C5+1 framework has facilitated over 40 regional programs in 2023, with the allocating more than $100 million in assistance to support initiatives in economic connectivity, , and . These efforts include the USAID Trade Central Asia program, which aimed to enhance intraregional trade and but faced termination of a $34 million component in 2025 amid broader USAID cuts. In energy cooperation, the USAID Power Central Asia initiative has promoted regional electricity trade and renewable integration, building on commitments from the 2023 C5+1 Leaders' Summit to unlock economic benefits from cross-border power exchanges. Security outcomes include the establishment of the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Central Asia Regional Dialogue in 2016, which has implemented measures from The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum to address foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization through joint training and information sharing. The framework has also supported the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to expand U.S.-Central Asian partnerships in resource extraction and supply chains, contributing to diversified economic ties amid global demand for rare earths. Early joint projects, such as the Transport Corridor Development initiative funded with up to $15 million in U.S. support by 2016, targeted reductions in border crossing times and logistics costs, though specific post-implementation metrics remain limited in public reporting. Overall U.S. assistance to has totaled approximately $9 billion over the three decades preceding 2022, with C5+1 accelerating targeted regional projects since , including technical assistance for scaling via the Power the Future program and climate adaptation planning. Empirical impacts are modest; U.S. goods with the five C5 nations grew from $2.8 billion in to about $4.1 billion in 2022, driven partly by energy exports but constrained by logistical barriers and from other powers. These outcomes reflect incremental progress in sovereignty-enhancing cooperation, though causal attribution to C5+1 alone is complicated by parallel bilateral deals and external factors like commodity prices.

Challenges and Unresolved Issues

One persistent challenge for the C5+1 framework is the entrenched economic and security dependencies of Central Asian states on and , which undermine efforts to diversify partnerships with the . Despite C5+1 initiatives aimed at enhancing regional connectivity and countering external dominance, Central Asian countries continue to navigate multi-vector foreign policies that prioritize stability with and , particularly amid 's 2022 invasion of , which strained but did not sever regional ties. For instance, Kazakhstan's exports to increased by 25% in 2023, illustrating the causal pull of geographic proximity and established over nascent U.S. engagements. U.S. domestic policy fluctuations exacerbate these issues, as shifts in presidential priorities disrupt continuity; the imposition of a 25% on Kazakh goods effective August 1, 2025, under the Trump administration's escalation, directly contravenes C5+1 goals of economic resilience and has prompted calls from for exemptions to prevent deepened reliance on Eurasian alternatives. This volatility raises questions about the framework's durability, with analysts noting that without sustained investment—totaling only about $34 million in C5+1 projects since 2015—the struggles to compete with China's , which has financed over $40 billion in regional infrastructure since 2013. Tensions over and further complicate cooperation, as U.S. advocacy for democratic reforms, media freedom, and —embedded in C5+1 dialogues—clashes with the authoritarian structures prevalent in the five states, leading to perceptions of conditional that prioritizes Western values over pragmatic security needs. Central Asian leaders have voiced complaints that such emphases, including critiques of child labor and , divert from core issues like and border stability, with little empirical progress on rights metrics; for example, scores for the region averaged 7-20 out of 100 in 2024, showing minimal improvement post-C5+1 inception. Intra-regional divergences among the C5 states remain unresolved, hindering unified implementation; Turkmenistan's strict neutrality and Uzbekistan's assertive leadership contrast with Kyrgyzstan's volatility, stalling joint projects on transboundary threats like , where agreements exist but enforcement lags amid disputes over shared rivers supplying 80% of the Aral Sea basin. Overall, the framework's decade-long track record reveals limited tangible outcomes in fostering , as evidenced by persistent Chinese dominance in critical minerals supply chains despite dedicated C5+1 dialogues launched in 2024.

Prospects Under Current US Leadership

Under President Donald Trump's second term, which began on January 20, , the C5+1 framework has gained renewed momentum through planned high-level engagements aimed at countering Russian and Chinese influence in . Trump is scheduled to host leaders from , , , , and for a C5+1 summit in Washington in early , marking a strategic push to strengthen bilateral ties and promote economic diversification away from and . This initiative responds to Central Asian states' interest in reducing dependency on , particularly amid sanctions and the conflict, while leveraging U.S. incentives for energy exports and critical minerals. The administration's approach emphasizes transactional diplomacy, prioritizing trade, investment, and security cooperation over expansive aid programs, aligning with Trump's "" doctrine. Recent U.S. envoy visits to , for instance, focused on boosting trade and investment opportunities ahead of the summit, signaling potential deals in hydrocarbons and infrastructure to integrate into Western supply chains. Congressional advocates have urged the summit to advance U.S. priorities, including enhanced security partnerships and initiatives, viewing it as a counterweight to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization dominated by and . Prospects for deepened collaboration hinge on mutual economic incentives, with Central Asian governments perceiving the Trump administration as more pragmatic and less ideologically prescriptive than predecessors, facilitating direct leader-to-leader negotiations. However, challenges persist, including Turkmenistan's neutral stance and varying levels of Russian leverage, which could limit unified C5 commitments; success will depend on tangible outcomes like increased U.S. purchases of Kazakh uranium or Uzbek cotton, rather than vague assurances. Analysts note that by capitalizing on regional desires for , the U.S. could secure strategic resources vital for countering Chinese dominance in rare earths and battery metals, though sustained engagement requires navigating Trump's aversion to multilateral entanglements.

References

  1. https://www.state.gov/c51
  2. https://www.state.gov/c51-joint-statements-and-releases
  3. https://kz.usembassy.gov/c51/
  4. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/21/c51-leaders-joint-statement/
  5. https://tj.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/143/2016/08/c5-1-fact-sheet_english.pdf
  6. https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/the-future-of-the-c51-under-trump-2-0/
  7. https://2021-2025.state.gov/c51-diplomatic-platform/
  8. https://tj.usembassy.gov/c51-programming/
  9. https://2021-2025.state.gov/inaugural-c51-critical-minerals-dialogue-among-the-united-states-and-kazakhstan-the-kyrgyz-republic-tajikistan-turkmenistan-and-uzbekistan/
  10. https://tj.usembassy.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-the-c51-during-unga-79/
  11. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/249050.htm
  12. https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/new-format-of-dialogue-between-the-u-s-and-central-asian-states-c51-initiative/
  13. http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13300-pluses-
  14. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249046.htm
  15. https://uz.usembassy.gov/secretary-kerry-travels-vienna-bishkek-samarkand-astana-dushanbe-ashgabat/
  16. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/08/260726.htm
  17. https://2017-2021.state.gov/c51-fact-sheet/
  18. https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/us-congressional-representatives-urge-trump-to-host-a-c51-leaders-summit-soon/
  19. https://2017-2021.state.gov/c51-working-group-meetings-a-success-in-almaty-tashkent/
  20. https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-ministerial-meeting-in-the-c51-format/
  21. https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-for-the-press-on-c51-high-level-dialogue/
  22. https://cabar.asia/en/dynamics-of-regional-development-in-central-asia-and-the-new-format-of-multilateral-cooperation-5-1
  23. https://2021-2025.state.gov/c51-joint-statements-and-releases/
  24. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47591
  25. https://timesca.com/how-central-asia-has-strengthened-ties-with-the-west-since-2022/
  26. https://therussiaprogram.org/central_asia
  27. https://tj.usembassy.gov/c51-leaders-joint-statement/
  28. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/partner-with-central-asian-states-to-avoid-russia-china-dominance/
  29. https://www.mfa.tj/en/newyork/view/17488/meeting-of-the-secretariat-central-asia-united-states-in-c51-format
  30. https://astanatimes.com/2025/08/decade-of-c51-experts-observe-advanced-regional-cooperation-in-central-asia/
  31. https://sciendo.com/pdf/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0012
  32. https://www.trend.az/business/4109264.html
  33. https://tj.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/143/United-States-Strategy-for-Central-Asia-2019-2025-1.pdf
  34. https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-trump-to-host-u-s-central-asia-summit-on-november-6/
  35. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Strategy-on-United-States-Interests-in-Central-Asia-Accessible-9.26.2025.pdf
  36. https://uz.usembassy.gov/c51-fact-sheet-central-asian-u-s-forum-to-enhance-regional-economic-environmental-and-security-cooperation/
  37. https://kg.usembassy.gov/c51/
  38. https://kz.usembassy.gov/usaid-launches-power-central-asia-to-strengthen-regional-energy-sector-cooperation/
  39. https://uz.usembassy.gov/usaid-energizes-uzbekistans-first-green-hydrogen-hub/
  40. https://uz.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-c51-regional-connectivity-ministerial-in-samarkand/
  41. https://www.americancouncils.org/programs/c5one-opening-networks-through-english
  42. https://www.americancouncils.org/news/announcements/c5one-launches-english-economic-development-cohort
  43. https://www.worldlearning.org/program/c5o-n-e-ed/
  44. https://kg.usembassy.gov/2023-c51-youth-council-program/
  45. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/249051.htm
  46. https://2017-2021.state.gov/united-states-strategy-for-central-asia-advancing-sovereignty-and-economic-prosperity/
  47. https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/sino-russian-interactions-regarding-central-asia-preliminary-summary-richard-weitz
  48. https://cdn.website-editor.net/s/9cbc1728769a439897acc7f1557971d9/files/uploaded/2025-AEC-C5-1-US-in-Central-Asia.pdf?Expires=1755234675&Signature=KeLre7lQIIMD6ElaAGi72MIHI6Bg64wFPNdYqPzHA7MHOIoZKtTA5b7iWDvInFYobtjDzSkc63UFrsh-hfsiIHmTDf1KswuvcLe3rtq-6O49vYadiyM-5PGywc3bJkoCzzWNF461HWWS1-6i0wl8JdbdVeuknDpR580yCOFaBR-7Me1CaNBgJ~7cno4S4sD18JKPL~x69MT3MhEQ-XnJ45pDsnEVdAGyuJGvHkppSM3lI45ibUXjdmDmc2ruICNxBvQyquJppeHXHWa9JjcQL3-AuWyIgA2TZqabxO3u3hLky0WzFUUMeNjNv8S3r1zAuoxDJmxzrXO8XKsXMb9Fyw__&Key-Pair-Id=K2NXBXLF010TJW
  49. https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-summer-2024--issue-no-27/the-%25E2%2580%259Cc51%25E2%2580%259D-on-the-central-asian-geopolitical-chessboard
  50. https://www.ipis.ir/en/newsview/610072/russia-and-china-prime-targets-in-new-us-strategy-on-central-asia
  51. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3dmVpOw5iQ
  52. https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/rethinking-great-power-competition-the-rise-of-central-asia-as-middle-powers/
  53. https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/trump-administration/trump-plans-to-host-central-asian-leaders-in-pushback-against-russia-china
  54. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Journal-Of-Central-Asian-Studies/publication/379657862_US_Cooperation_with_Central_Asian_Countries_within_the_C51_Initiative_Trends_and_Prospects/links/6613e8d33d96c22bc77aea63/US-Cooperation-with-Central-Asian-Countries-within-the-C5-1-Initiative-Trends-and-Prospects.pdf
  55. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
  56. https://cdn.website-editor.net/s/9cbc1728769a439897acc7f1557971d9/files/uploaded/2025-AEC-C5-1-US-in-Central-Asia.pdf
  57. https://centralasiaprogram.org/publications-all/research-updates/united-we-stand-central-asian-unity-the-way-forward/
  58. https://timesca.com/how-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan-anchor-a-strategic-middle-power-hub-in-central-asia/
  59. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/middle-powers-along-the-middle-corridor
  60. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13300-pluses-and-minuses-of-the-c5%25201-format.html
  61. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/03/russia-fumes-as-the-west-courts-its-neighbors-in-central-asia.html
  62. https://qazaqtimes.com/en/article/31601
  63. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/how-china-leveraging-security-cooperation-central-asia
  64. https://en.icc.org.cn/thinktank_theories/intl_observation/399.html
  65. https://www.e-ir.info/2024/08/01/russias-reaction-to-us-china-competition-in-central-asia/
  66. https://jcas-journal.com/index.php/jcas/article/download/13/13
  67. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6019&context=etd
  68. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=134752
  69. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/central-asia-crm-offers?lang=en
  70. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/central-asias-geography-inhibits-a-us-critical-minerals-partnership/
  71. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/395798106_C51_as_a_Dovetailing_Mechanism_for_Central_Asia%27s_Regional_Integration_Insights_from_Uzbekistan
  72. https://www.natofoundation.org/central-asia/central-asian-countries-and-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/
  73. https://timesca.com/sco-summit-a-battle-for-influence-in-central-asia/
  74. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2017.1271642
  75. https://ojs.jdss.org.pk/journal/article/download/148/157/284
  76. https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/central-asian-regional-security-complex-kazakhstans-role-in-maintaining-regional-cooperation/
  77. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/central-asias-shifting-regional-dynamics
  78. https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/economy/the-time-has-come-for-an-association-of-central-asian-states
  79. https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/usaid-cuts-devastating-to-central-asia-programs/
  80. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9788862/
  81. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_central_asia_brief_overview_trade.pdf
  82. https://kz.usembassy.gov/u-s-strategy-for-central-asia-2019-2025-advancing-sovereignty-and-economic-prosperity/
  83. https://silkroadstudies.org/resources/230504-SRP-Fred-full.pdf
  84. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/analysing-the-limitations-of-the-us-central-asia-partnership
  85. https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/a-new-central-asia-emerging-opportunities-and-challenges
  86. https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/the-c51-critical-mineral-dialogue-what-it-means-and-how-we-got-here/
  87. https://daryo.uz/en/2025/10/27/washington-to-host-c51-summit-with-us-and-central-asian-leaders/
  88. https://uz.kursiv.media/en/2025-10-27/us-envoys-visit-tashkent-as-mirziyoyev-prepares-for-washington-c5-1-summit/
  89. https://timesca.com/congressional-panel-urges-trump-to-host-c51-summit-this-year/
  90. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/10/central-asia-trump-approach?lang=en
  91. https://caspianpolicy.org/research/security/c5trump-getting-the-us-down-to-business-in-central-asia
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.