Hubbry Logo
Colgan AirColgan AirMain
Open search
Colgan Air
Community hub
Colgan Air
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Colgan Air
Colgan Air
Colgan Air
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Colgan Air was a regional airline in the United States that operated from 1965 until 2012, when it became a subsidiary of Pinnacle Airlines Corp. The initial headquarters of Colgan Air was in Manassas, Virginia until 2010, and then Memphis, Tennessee until closure in 2012.

Key Information

Colgan Air operated for Continental Express/United Express, and US Airways Express. Pinnacle Airlines Corporation phased out the Colgan Air name on September 5, 2012, and transferred personnel and logistics to Pinnacle Airlines.

History

[edit]
The Colgan Air building in Manassas, Virginia
Colgan Air Beechcraft 1900C
Saab 340 in Colgan Air's livery at Washington-Dulles International Airport in Northern Virginia

Charles J. Colgan founded[1] fixed-base operator Colgan Airways Corporation at Manassas Airport in Manassas, Virginia in 1965. It began scheduled service under contract with IBM in 1970 between Manassas and Dutchess County Airport near Poughkeepsie, New York. In 1986 Colgan Air received its first airline contract with New York Air operating as New York Air Connection with Beechcraft Model 99s, Beechcraft 1900Cs, and Short 330s.

New York Air was merged into Continental Airlines on February 1, 1987, at which time Colgan became a Continental Express feeder carrier. Jetstream 31 aircraft were then acquired. In 1986 and 1987 Colgan also code-shared with Pan Am as a Pan Am Partner on the Washington-Dulles to Norfolk, Virginia route. Colgan later sold out to Presidential Airways which was also a Continental Express operator. In mid 1988 Colgan and Presidential switched from a Continental Express feeder to become a United Express feeder carrier. This operation under the United Airlines banner also only lasted about one year before Presidential shut down in 1989.

After Presidential went defunct, Colgan and his son, Michael J. Colgan, restarted service under the name National Capital on a Washington Dulles International Airport to Binghamton, New York, route on December 1, 1991. Service was provided with Beechcraft 1900C equipment. This route was later dropped and the name Colgan Air adopted. On July 1, 1997 Colgan became a feeder for Continental Airlines once again, this time operating under the name Continental Connection.

On December 11, 1999, Colgan left the Continental system and became exclusively a US Airways Express carrier, focusing its routes around major US Airways stations such as LaGuardia Airport in New York City, Pittsburgh International Airport, and Logan International Airport in Boston. However, in 2005 Colgan acquired additional Saab 340 aircraft and resumed service as Continental Connection out of George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston (IAH).

Early on the morning of September 11, 2001, the day of the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda hijackers Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari flew on Colgan Air Flight 5930 from Portland International Jetport in Portland, Maine to Logan Airport in Boston, where they boarded American Airlines Flight 11.

On October 4, 2005, Colgan Air started providing flights for United Express flights out of Washington's Dulles Airport. Initially serving Charleston, West Virginia, and Westchester County Airport in White Plains, New York, Colgan expanded its United Express service to include State College, Pennsylvania; Charlottesville, Virginia; Allentown, Pennsylvania; and Binghamton, New York.

Colgan Air was acquired by Pinnacle Airlines Corporation on January 18, 2007, for US$20 million. Under the terms of the purchase, Colgan's regional aircraft fleet continued to operate independently of Pinnacle Airlines Corporation's major subsidiary, Pinnacle Airlines, whose all regional jet fleet continued to fly and operate in the livery of Northwest Airlink. It was a strategic move by Pinnacle to get access to Colgan’s partners, Continental Airlines, United Airlines and US Airways.[2]

Colgan Air began providing service out of Newark Liberty International Airport in Newark, New Jersey, as Continental Connection, starting in early 2008.

Colgan's headquarters moved from Manassas to Pinnacle's headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee, in December 2009.

In July 2010, Pinnacle Airlines Corporation announced that the Colgan Air name would be phased out and all Pinnacle Airlines Corporation propeller flights would be operated by Mesaba Airlines. Colgan operated for two more years before winding down operations in 2012.

On May 15, 2012, Colgan Air ceased flying for US Airways Express. On June 5, 2012, flying in and out of IAH for United Express ceased. Colgan had previously operated as Continental Connection from IAH with Saab 340 aircraft prior to the Continental-United merger. On July 31, Colgan Air phased out operations with their Saab 340 fleet.

The last revenue flight, Colgan Air doing business as United Express Flight 3923 from Washington-Dulles to Albany, NY, was on September 5, 2012.

The remaining Bombardier Q400s on order were delivered to Republic Airways. Republic then phased out the Q400s between September 2014 and September 2016.

On January 3, 2017, the airline’s founder, Charles J. Colgan, died at the age of 90.

Destinations

[edit]

As United Express

[edit]
Saab 340 in an unmarked livery operated by Colgan Air at Logan International Airport in Boston.
Bombardier Q400 in Continental Connection livery at Baltimore/Washington International Airport in Maryland.

Domestic

Canada

Fleet

[edit]
Colgan Air fleet[3]
Aircraft Total Passengers Notes
F Y+ E Total
Bombardier Q400 14 7 10 54 71 All operated as Continental Connection from 2008 until 2012, then as United Express.

All transferred to Republic Airways at the time of airline's dissolution

0 0 74 74
Saab 340 5 0 0 35 35 All aircraft retired during airline's dissolution
Total 19

All aircraft were operated under Colgan Air's operating certificate.

Q400 aircraft were scheduled for interior configuration changes to install first class. Saab 340 aircraft are also operated.

Headquarters

[edit]

The headquarters of Colgan Air were, at the end of the airline's life, located in Memphis.[4] The headquarters were formerly on the grounds of the Manassas Regional Airport]].[5][6][7] On Tuesday June 28, 2005, the Prince William County, Virginia, Board of County Supervisors voted to sell 10 acres (4.0 ha) of land in the Innovation@Prince William business park in Prince William County to Colgan. Colgan Air planned to build a 40,000 square feet (3,700 m2) corporate headquarters and training facility in the business park for $1.7 million (including equipment costs) and move its headquarters from its airport site. Colgan planned to move its administrative and training employees from the headquarters site and other sites in Manassas and Prince William County to the new complex. The company also planned to hire around 90 additional employees as part of the process.[7]

After Pinnacle Airlines Corp. bought Colgan Air in 2007 and made Colgan Air its subsidiary, Pinnacle agreed to keep Colgan's headquarters in Manassas as long as, in the company's words, "it continues to make operational and financial sense for the organization."[6] In 2009, Colgan Air announced that it was moving its headquarters to Memphis to be in proximity to the offices of Pinnacle Airlines, Colgan Air's parent company. Fifty employees were scheduled to transfer to Memphis to work in crew scheduling, dispatch, training, flight operations, and other administrative tasks. While 45 other employees were asked to move to Memphis, they declined so they could stay in the Manassas area.[8] In September 2009, the human resources department was scheduled to stay in Manassas.[6]

In October 2009, Pinnacle tried to get additional incentives from the State of Tennessee as the Colgan headquarters were about to move.[9] During that month, Colgan announced that 20 employees would remain in Manassas to man the two hangars at Manassas Regional Airport. One hundred jobs in Manassas were lost as part of the headquarters move.[8] Helaine Becker, a transportation analyst employed by Jesup & Lamont Securities Corp, believed that the moving of Colgan would help reduce costs; she said that the company did not need two corporate headquarters and that "I think it has more to do with that than anything else."[6]

In 2010, Pinnacle Airlines Corp. considered moving its headquarters to Downtown Memphis and to Olive Branch, Mississippi, and the airline also considered keeping the headquarters in its current location. Pinnacle selected Downtown Memphis, and on October 8, 2010, the airline held a celebration for its decision to move into One Commerce Square in Downtown Memphis. The Center City Commission, the City of Memphis, and Shelby County gave out $10 million in incentives, including free parking, to convince Pinnacle to move to Downtown Memphis.[10]

Accidents and incidents

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Colgan Air

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Colgan Air, Inc. was a regional airline headquartered in , that conducted scheduled commuter passenger operations primarily serving the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions from its establishment in 1989 until cessation in 2012. The carrier functioned under codeshare agreements with major airlines, including as starting in 1997, as US Airways Express in 1999, and as from 2005, utilizing fleets such as , Saab 340, and Bombardier Q400 aircraft. Acquired by Pinnacle Airlines Corporation in 2007 for $20 million to expand its Q400 operations, Colgan's brand was phased out in September 2012 following Pinnacle's Chapter 11 filing and decision to divest services. The airline's defining controversy arose from the crash of , a service, on February 12, 2009, near , where the aircraft stalled during approach, killing all 49 aboard and one on the ground; investigations attributed the accident to pilot errors in stall recovery, exacerbated by fatigue and training deficiencies, prompting the 2010 Airline Safety and Extension Act that mandated enhanced pilot qualifications, rest rules, and remedial training protocols.

Founding and Early History

Establishment and Initial Operations

Colgan Airways Corporation was founded in 1965 by Charles J. Colgan, a veteran and pilot, at (HEF) in . Initially established as a (FBO), the company provided , , and services rather than scheduled passenger flights. Scheduled commuter airline operations commenced in 1970, marking the transition to services under contract with larger carriers. Early routes focused on short-haul regional flights in the Mid-Atlantic area, utilizing small aircraft to serve underserved markets. The airline's initial fleet consisted of propeller-driven planes suited for low-volume routes, emphasizing reliability in infrastructure. By the late 1980s, Colgan Air had expanded to serve approximately 12 cities, building on its foundational role as a regional feeder. In 1991, Charles J. Colgan Sr. and his son Michael reorganized the entity into a dedicated regional airline, Colgan Air, Inc., to pursue codeshare partnerships while maintaining operations from its Manassas base. This restructuring supported growth through contractual flying for majors, though core initial activities remained rooted in commuter and charter services.

Growth Through Partnerships

Colgan Air initiated its expansion through codeshare agreements with major airlines in the late , beginning with a partnership with in 1997 that enabled operations under the brand. This agreement allowed Colgan to feed passengers into Continental's hub network, particularly from smaller markets to key airports, marking a shift from independent scheduled services to integrated regional operations. By December 1999, Colgan transitioned to an exclusive codeshare with , operating as US Airways Express and further broadening its route network across the . This partnership facilitated rapid growth, with Colgan expanding its services to multiple destinations under the US Airways banner, leveraging the major carrier's marketing and booking systems to increase passenger volume and operational scale. In the mid-2000s, Colgan diversified its partnerships to include alongside renewed and expanded contracts with and continued Express operations, enabling simultaneous service for three major airlines. By October 2005, the Continental agreement had grown to encompass additional routes from Washington Dulles to destinations such as , and , supporting fleet upgrades to larger aircraft like the Saab 340 and eventually the Bombardier Q400. These multi-partner codeshares drove Colgan's rapid expansion, increasing its served destinations to 58 by the late and solidifying its role as a key regional feeder.

Operational Scope

Destinations and Route Network

Colgan Air maintained a regional route network centered on feeder services for major carriers, primarily linking urban hubs to smaller airports in the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic United States. As a codeshare partner, its operations supported Continental Connection, United Express, and US Airways Express, with flights typically under 500 miles using turboprop aircraft. The network emphasized high-frequency short-haul routes to underserved communities, avoiding direct long-distance competition. Primary hubs included New York LaGuardia Airport (LGA), Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), , and , with additional operations from . From these bases, Colgan Air served destinations such as Albany, New York (ALB); Allentown, Pennsylvania (ABE); Binghamton, New York (BGM); Buffalo, New York (BUF); Charleston, West Virginia (CRW); Poughkeepsie, New York (POU); ; and . Under and agreements, representative routes encompassed IAD to , IAD to BGM, IAD to ABE, EWR to BUF, and IAD to CRW, facilitating connections to Continental and United's broader networks. For Express, operations from , LGA, and PIT extended to regional points including HPN and POU, often with multiple daily frequencies to support commuter traffic. Early network development traced to 1970s routes like Poughkeepsie (POU) to (HEF, formerly MNZ), evolving into a denser web by the through Pinnacle Airlines ownership.
Key Route ExamplesOrigin HubDestinationPartnership
EWR–BUFNewark (EWR)Buffalo (BUF)Continental Connection
IAD–ALBDulles (IAD)Albany (ALB)United Express
IAD–BGMDulles (IAD)Binghamton (BGM)United Express
BOS–HPNBoston (BOS)Westchester (HPN)US Airways Express
PIT–ABEPittsburgh (PIT)Allentown (ABE)US Airways Express

Codeshare Agreements and Branding

Colgan Air entered into codeshare agreements primarily with and , enabling it to operate regional flights marketed and sold under these carriers' brands. These partnerships allowed Colgan to serve as a feeder airline, connecting smaller airports to major hubs while leveraging the majors' reservation systems and flight designators. In December 1999, Colgan signed a codeshare and service agreement with , becoming an exclusive US Airways Express operator and utilizing US Airways' flight codes for its services. By March 2005, Colgan expanded its operations to resume service under ' brand, alongside its ongoing Express flights, reflecting a dual-partner model that increased its route network. This arrangement involved separate operational oversight, as each codeshare partner maintained distinct safety and service standards, though Colgan handled aircraft staffing and maintenance. Codesharing extended to following the 2010 Continental-United merger, with Colgan aircraft operating as on select routes until its cessation in 2012. Branding under these agreements emphasized the partner airlines' identities to passengers, with Colgan flights appearing in schedules and tickets under codes like (CO*) or (US*). Aircraft liveries were customized to match the partners', such as US Airways' blue-and-white scheme on Saab 340s and Bombardier Q400s, often with small Colgan operator markings in to comply with disclosure requirements. This branding strategy masked regional operators' involvement, presenting seamless integration into the majors' networks, though it drew scrutiny post-2009 for potentially obscuring varying protocols between carriers. Colgan maintained its own IATA code (9L) for non-codeshare operations but prioritized partner branding to align with revenue-sharing terms in the agreements.

Fleet and Technical Operations

Aircraft Types and Configurations


Colgan Air operated a fleet of regional aircraft optimized for short-haul flights under codeshare agreements with major carriers. The primary types included the Saab 340B, Bombardier DHC-8-400 (Q400), and 1900D, with the Saab 340 forming the backbone of operations for much of the 's history. Early in its operations, Colgan utilized smaller aircraft such as the Beechcraft 99, Beechcraft 1900C, and for US Airways Express services, typically configured for 19 to 30 passengers in all-economy layouts. By the mid-2000s, the fleet shifted to larger Saab 340B models, with approximately 38 aircraft in service, each accommodating 34 passengers in a single-class configuration featuring 1-2 abreast seating. In January 2008, Colgan introduced the Bombardier Q400 to support routes, operating up to 15 of these aircraft with a 74-seat all-economy interior arranged in a 2-2 configuration across 18 rows. The Q400 offered higher capacity and speed compared to the Saab, enabling service on slightly longer regional segments. A smaller contingent of three 1900D aircraft, each with 19 seats in economy, was retained for niche routes until retirement in 2009.
Aircraft TypeApproximate NumberPassenger CapacityConfiguration Notes
Saab 340B3834All economy, 1-2 seating
Bombardier Q4001574All economy, 2-2 seating
319All economy

Maintenance and Safety Protocols

Colgan Air maintained its fleet in accordance with (FAA) regulations, with oversight provided by the Washington Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), including a Principal Operations and Assistant Principal Inspectors. The airline's Safety Program Manual, last revised in June 2007, outlined comprehensive safety policies, procedures, and voluntary reporting programs, emphasizing safety as the primary operational goal. This included the Action Program (ASAP), implemented in 2005, which averaged approximately 25 reports per month from employees identifying potential hazards, though no pre-2009 reports addressed stall warnings or severe icing conditions. In 2008, Colgan initiated a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) using nonpunitive observations by check airmen and trained line pilots to detect procedural deviations, with plans for 50 to 100 observations annually. The Flight Operational (FOQA) program was also underway but not fully operational by February 2009, with quick access recorders installed post-accident for data-driven analysis. (CRM) training incorporated leadership and monitoring elements, supplemented by a 24-hour hotline for anonymous reporting. Despite these protocols, maintenance practices revealed vulnerabilities through prior incidents. On January 8, 2003, a Colgan Beechcraft 1900D experienced loss of pitch control after takeoff from Charlotte, North Carolina, due to incorrect elevator rigging during maintenance, compounded by an aft center of gravity; the aircraft was destroyed, but the crew survived. Similarly, on August 26, 2003, Colgan Air Flight 9446, a Beechcraft 1900D on a repositioning flight, crashed into water near Hyannis, Massachusetts, following improper replacement of the forward elevator trim cable and an inadequate functional check, reversing the trim system and causing uncontrollable nose-up pitch; both pilots survived with injuries. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) attributed the Flight 9446 accident to these maintenance errors, highlighting insufficient guidance in the aircraft maintenance manual and inadequate post-maintenance verification. These events prompted FAA and industry reviews of maintenance procedures for Beech 1900 series aircraft, including enhanced rigging checks and manual revisions. For the Bombardier DHC-8-400 involved in the 2009 Flight 3407 accident, maintenance records showed compliance, with no pre-impact failures or chronic flight control issues identified; routine checks, including tests, were performed without discrepancies. The NTSB concluded that did not contribute to the crash, though broader gaps—such as incomplete of data-monitoring tools and inadequate response to FAA Safety Alerts for Operators—persisted across operations. Post-2009, Colgan enhanced protocols with zero-tolerance policies for errors, increased surveillance, and a Verbalize, Verify, Monitor (VVM) program for threat .

Corporate Structure

Headquarters and Leadership

![Colgan Air operations at Manassas Regional Airport][float-right] Colgan Air maintained its headquarters in Manassas, Virginia, at 10677 Aviation Lane, near Manassas Regional Airport (HEF), from its founding in 1965 until December 1, 2009. The airline relocated its corporate offices to Memphis, Tennessee, following deeper integration with its parent company, Pinnacle Airlines Corporation, which was also headquartered there. This move occurred after Pinnacle's 2007 acquisition of Colgan Air, aligning administrative functions amid operational expansions. The company was founded by Charles "Chuck" Colgan, a veteran and pilot, who established Colgan Airways Corp. as a flight school and service provider at Manassas . Leadership transitioned within the Colgan family, with Michael Colgan serving as President and CEO prior to the 2007 acquisition by Pinnacle Airlines. Following the acquisition, George A. "Buddy" Casey was appointed President and General Manager of Colgan Air, overseeing operations during the period encompassing the 2009 Flight 3407 crash; some sources referred to him interchangeably as CEO. Under Pinnacle's oversight, ultimate strategic direction came from executives like CEO Sean Menke, but Colgan's day-to-day leadership remained focused on regional feeder services.

Ownership Transitions

Colgan Air was founded in 1991 by Charles J. Colgan and his son Michael Colgan as a family-owned regional carrier, succeeding earlier operations under the Colgan Airways name that had been partially divested in 1986 to Presidential Airways following expansion into scheduled services. The airline remained under sole ownership of the Colgan family through its growth phase, including codeshare partnerships with major carriers like starting in 1997. In December 2006, Pinnacle Airlines Corporation acquired all outstanding capital stock of Colgan Air for $20 million, with the transaction announced publicly in January 2007; the deal included $10 million in and a $10 million . Post-acquisition, Colgan Air functioned as a wholly owned subsidiary of , preserving operational independence, separate branding under affiliations like and , and its own management structure. Pinnacle Airlines Corp. encountered financial difficulties, filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 2012 amid declining regional jet contracts and high operating costs. As part of the restructuring, the Colgan Air brand was discontinued on September 5, 2012, with aircraft, routes, personnel, and logistics fully integrated into Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., effectively ending Colgan's distinct corporate identity. This merger aligned with broader industry consolidation, though Pinnacle itself later rebranded and faced further challenges before Delta Air Lines assumed control of its certificate in 2016.

Pre-Crash Incidents

Notable Early Events

On August 26, 2003, , a 1900D operating as a Express repositioning flight with no passengers aboard, crashed into the waters off , shortly after takeoff from Barnstable Municipal Airport (HYA) en route to (ALB). The aircraft, registration N240CJ, had undergone maintenance earlier that week, during which the trim system was improperly rigged, resulting in an uncommanded nose-up pitch that overwhelmed the pilots' corrective inputs despite their attempts to apply full nose-down and reduce power. Both pilots—captain Scott Knabe, aged 38, and first officer John McGowan, aged 27—were killed on impact approximately 300 feet offshore; the (NTSB) determined the probable cause as maintenance personnel's failure to properly position and secure the assembly during rigging, compounded by inadequate post-maintenance functional checks and unclear manufacturer documentation. This incident marked Colgan Air's first fatal accident and prompted procedural changes in the airline's maintenance practices, including revised checklists and enhanced training for system inspections. Earlier operational milestones included the airline's founding in 1965 as Colgan Airways Corp. by Charles "Chuck" Colgan at Manassas Regional Airport, Virginia, initially as a fixed-base operator offering charter services before expanding into scheduled regional flights in the 1970s under federal subsidies like the Essential Air Service program. By January 28, 1998, Colgan Air corresponded with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledging deficiencies in pilot training, maintenance oversight, and safety management systems, committing to upgrades amid growing operations. In June 2005, an FAA principal operations inspector cited inadequate enforcement of safety standards during an audit, highlighting issues with Colgan's compliance monitoring and voluntary disclosure reporting. A December 2005 U.S. Department of Defense audit further identified systemic problems, including a deficient quality assurance program and inconsistent adherence to maintenance protocols across Colgan's fleet. These pre-2009 events underscored recurring themes of procedural lapses that the NTSB later referenced in broader safety analyses of regional carriers.

Patterns in Safety Occurrences

Prior to the February 12, 2009, crash of Flight 3407, Colgan Air had operated without any fatal accidents involving passengers since its founding in 1991, maintaining a record free of hull losses or passenger fatalities in revenue service. However, investigations revealed recurring patterns in pilot performance deficiencies, as evidenced by frequent failures or marginal passes on proficiency checks and certificate examinations among crew members. For instance, the captain assigned to Flight 3407 had encountered multiple disapprovals, including for initial instrument ratings in October 1991, commercial single-engine certification in May 2002, and commercial multi-engine certification in March 2004, alongside unsatisfactory simulator evaluations at Gulfstream Training Academy from August 2004 to April 2005 requiring remedial sessions. Similar issues persisted in Colgan-specific training, with the same captain graded "train to proficiency" during Saab 340 initial checks in October 2005, receiving unsatisfactory marks on recurrent evaluations in October 2006, and failing an upgrade checkride in October 2007 due to airspeed mismanagement on a missed approach. These individual performance lapses reflected broader systemic shortcomings in protocols, where Colgan lacked a formalized program to identify and remediate weak performers prior to , relying instead on retraining without structured monitoring. (CRM) curricula inadequately emphasized monitoring responsibilities and captain leadership, contributing to patterns of non-standard responses in simulated scenarios. recovery for the Q400 fleet omitted demonstrations of stick pusher override, a critical element in icing conditions, while pilots received only general exposure via outdated resources like NASA's 1999 icing video without tailored instruction. Icing procedures further highlighted gaps, as management guidelines failed to specify targets beyond reference speeds or ensure buffers against low-speed cues, fostering confusion during approaches in contaminated conditions. Operational practices amplified these risks through unmitigated hazards, with approximately 68% of Colgan's Newark-based pilots from distant locations, often via overnight flights or extended drives that eroded opportunities. From 2008 to early 2009, only about a dozen pilots invoked Colgan's fatigue call-in policy despite the prevalence of commuter schedules, indicating underreporting and inadequate at a hub like Newark where such operations predominated. This pattern of deferred fatigue countermeasures, combined with pilots' reluctance to declare unfit—exemplified by instances of proceeding despite evident exhaustion—underscored a cultural tolerance for marginal that prioritized schedule adherence over proactive safety measures. Collectively, these pre-2009 occurrences pointed to latent vulnerabilities in human factors and procedural rigor, though they did not result in accidents until the confluence of events in Flight 3407.

The 2009 Crash

Flight 3407 Sequence of Events

Colgan Air Flight 3407, a Bombardier DHC-8-400 operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, departed Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) at 21:18 Eastern Standard Time on February 12, 2009, en route to Buffalo Niagara International Airport (BUF). The aircraft climbed to a cruising altitude of 16,000 feet, where the flight crew activated the de-icing equipment in response to forecast icing conditions. Descent commenced around 21:57, with the crew entering data for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 23, including reference speeds of 118 knots for Vref and 114 knots for Vga without adjustments for icing. Air traffic control cleared the flight for the ILS approach at 22:15:14, and the aircraft descended through icing layers, accumulating light to moderate on the and leading edges by 22:10. Approaching Buffalo at approximately 2,300 feet mean around 22:14, the aircraft was high and fast at 180 knots with flaps at 5 degrees; the crew responded by extending the , deploying speed brakes, and reducing to decelerate. Flaps were then extended to 15 degrees as the decreased to 150 knots at about 1,800 feet. At 22:16:27, with airspeed at 131 knots, the activated, signaling an impending aerodynamic stall due to ice-contaminated stall characteristics from supercooled large droplets. The disconnected automatically, and the captain, startled, applied nearly full aft column input, increasing pitch attitude to 18 degrees and producing 1.4 Gs, which overrode the activation. The first officer erroneously commanded flaps up to 0 degrees and failed to advance the power levers or call out the stall condition. The aircraft entered a full stall at 100 knots and 18 degrees , with the activating three times; it subsequently rolled right to 105 degrees bank, nose dropped 50 degrees, and impacted a residence at 6038 Long Street in , at 22:16:54, approximately five miles from the runway threshold. The entire upset-to-impact sequence lasted 27 seconds.

Immediate Aftermath and Response

The crash of on February 12, 2009, resulted in the immediate deaths of all 49 people aboard—comprising 45 passengers and four crew members—and one resident of the impacted house in , totaling 50 fatalities. The aircraft struck the residence at approximately 10:17 p.m. EST, igniting a post-impact fueled by the plane's fuel load and structural debris, which rapidly engulfed the site and prevented any survivor recovery. Emergency responders, led by the Clarence Center Volunteer Fire Department located just 720 feet from the scene, arrived within minutes and initiated containment efforts amid intense flames and structural collapse. Mutual aid was requested from neighboring departments, including those from the Town of Clarence and Erie County, focusing on fire suppression and securing the perimeter as no survivors were found due to the severity of the impact and fire. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) promptly dispatched its "go-team" investigators to recover the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, which were retrieved intact from the wreckage to aid the preliminary inquiry. Colgan Air activated its Critical Incident Response Program, deploying support teams to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport and employee bases to assist affected families and staff with counseling and logistics. Company executives, including Colgan Air's leadership, issued initial statements expressing condolences and committing to full cooperation with investigators, while —under whose branding the flight operated—similarly conveyed grief to victims' relatives gathered at the airport. The (FAA) confirmed no immediate operational disruptions to Colgan's fleet but initiated enhanced oversight of regional carriers amid early media scrutiny on icing conditions and pilot actions reported in communications. Local authorities in Clarence Center established a unified command post to manage victim identification and site stabilization, with the crash site cleared sufficiently for detailed forensic work within days.

Investigations and Causal Analysis

NTSB Findings on Pilot Actions

The (NTSB) identified the captain's mishandling of the stick shaker activation as the primary precipitating the . At approximately 21:16:59 Eastern Standard Time on February 12, 2009, as Flight 3407 descended toward with decaying below 130 knots, the activated to warn of an impending aerodynamic due to a high . Instead of applying nose-down inputs to reduce the angle of attack per established stall recovery protocols—which emphasize lowering the nose while maintaining —the commanded a nose-up deflection of up to 8.5 degrees, further increasing the angle of attack to over 30 degrees and deepening the . This response deviated from both Colgan Air's procedures and training standards, which the NTSB noted the captain had demonstrated awareness of in prior simulator sessions. Compounding the captain's actions, the first officer did not monitor critical flight parameters effectively and failed to assert corrective authority during the sequence. Cockpit voice recorder evidence showed the first officer's attention diverted to non-essential tasks, such as discussing personal fatigue and commuting practices, rather than cross-checking airspeed or altitude trends in the minutes leading to the upset; she later called out "we're stalled" only after the nose-up pitch had already occurred but did not initiate recovery steps. The captain simultaneously retracted the flaps from 15 degrees to 0 degrees and the slats, reducing lift-generating surfaces at a moment when maximum lift configuration was required, which the NTSB deemed an erroneous input inconsistent with icing or stall recovery guidance. Earlier in the approach, both pilots overlooked opportunities to the energy decay. The remained engaged until 21:16:00 despite warnings from the flight director and increasing ice accumulation on the , delaying manual control handover; upon disengagement, the crew applied full power but prioritized pitch-up over speed recovery, ignoring the integrated stall protection system's cues. The NTSB highlighted these actions as reflective of inadequate , where the captain's dominance suppressed the first officer's input, and both exhibited a pattern of non-adherence to sterile discipline by engaging in unrelated conversation below 10,000 feet.

Fatigue, Training, and Systemic Factors

The (NTSB) investigation determined that both the captain and first officer of exhibited signs of at the time of the on , 2009. The captain, Marvin Renslow, had commuted from to , arriving around 9:00 a.m. after a flight from Tampa; he then rested in the airport's crew room, which the NTSB deemed inadequate for restorative due to and discomfort. By the time of the 9:18 p.m. departure, he had been awake for approximately 15 hours, exceeding his typical bedtime of 10:00 p.m., with limited prior opportunities over the preceding days. The first officer, Rebecca Shaw, had also commuted extensively, traveling from via Memphis to Newark, arriving at 6:23 a.m.; she obtained about 6 hours of fragmented during travel and a subsequent nap in the crew room, but reported feeling unwell with cold-like symptoms, including congestion audible on the cockpit voice recorder. Although was not formally cited as a contributing factor, the NTSB noted it likely impaired the crew's alertness and decision-making, consistent with broader evidence of performance degradation in fatigued pilots. Colgan Air's training programs revealed significant deficiencies in stall recognition and recovery, particularly in icing conditions. The airline's simulator training emphasized approach-to-stall maneuvers in clean, takeoff, or landing configurations but lacked comprehensive full-stall recovery drills or specific emphasis on overriding the stick pusher during high-speed aerodynamic stalls; post-accident, Colgan implemented dedicated stall and stick pusher modules. Captain Renslow's response—pulling the yoke against the stick shaker—contradicted trained procedures, which stressed maintaining thrust and lowering the nose. Icing-specific training included general de-icing system use and a NASA video on tailplane stalls, but omitted Q400-tailored procedures or mandatory airspeed adjustments for contamination; the crew selected an incorrect reference speed of 118 knots instead of 138 knots, failing to monitor or call out low airspeeds as required in post-accident bulletins. Renslow had a history of training failures, including two prior FAA checkride disapprovals omitted from his Colgan application and unsatisfactory performances in instrument and upgrade training, addressed only through ad hoc remedial sessions without a formal weak-pilot monitoring program until after the crash. First Officer Shaw, with limited turbine and icing experience, noted on the recorder that her initial operating experience provided more relevant exposure than prior training. Systemic factors at Colgan Air and in the sector amplified these risks. Approximately 70% of Colgan's Newark-based pilots commuted, often from over 1,000 miles away, driven by low starting salaries around $20,000 annually that discouraged local residency; the company provided no crash pads or formal system, relying on a non-punitive reporting policy that saw only about 12 calls in the months before the , with sleeping in crew areas informally tolerated despite prohibitions. Professionalism lapses included sterile violations, with non-essential discussions below 10,000 feet, and inadequate lacking captain leadership modules or monitoring protocols. Broader industry practices permitted airline transport pilot certificates with as few as 250 flight hours under reduced minimums for regionals, enabling rapid advancement without rigorous experience; Colgan's procedures for icing approaches were vague, lacking explicit minima or cross-checks. The NTSB highlighted these as enabling environments for error chains, recommending enhanced mitigation, remedial oversight, and qualification standards, though 's role remained analytically secondary to procedural and response failures in the determination.

Debates on Primary Causation

The (NTSB) determined in its February 2010 accident report that the primary cause of the February 12, 2009, crash of was the captain's erroneous response to the activation, which indicated an aerodynamic ; instead of lowering the nose to recover, Captain Marvin Renslow raised it, exacerbating the and leading to the aircraft's uncontrolled descent into a residence in . Contributing factors included the first officer's failure to monitor and call out the recovery procedure, the captain's from commuting and inadequate rest (having slept in Newark airport the previous night), and Colgan Air's insufficient programs on recognition and recovery, particularly in icing conditions. The NTSB emphasized that while airframe icing was present, it did not precipitate a as the pilots appeared to believe—based on their post- inputs—but rather contributed to the wing aerodynamic through degraded performance. Debates over primary causation have centered on whether the crash stemmed fundamentally from individual pilot errors or from entrenched systemic deficiencies in regional airline operations that predisposed crews to such failures. Critics of the NTSB's pilot-centric framing, including aviation safety advocates and congressional investigators, argued that Colgan's hiring practices enabled the deployment of underqualified pilots: Renslow had failed multiple checkrides earlier in his career (disclosing only one during his 2004 Colgan application) and logged just over 3,200 total flight hours, while First Officer Rebecca Shaw held under 2,300 hours and commuted long distances due to low regional pay scales, exacerbating fatigue. Internal Colgan emails, revealed during NTSB hearings, questioned Renslow's aptitude, with one instructor noting his "unusual reaction" to simulated emergencies, yet the airline certified him without remediation, raising concerns about diluted oversight and a culture prioritizing cost over rigorous vetting. Proponents of systemic primacy, such as those testifying in 2010 Senate hearings, contended that lax Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations on pilot rest, commuting, and training—rather than isolated airmanship lapses—were the root enablers, as Colgan's fatigue risk management was rudimentary and relied on self-reported compliance without verification. NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman dissented in part, advocating for fatigue's elevation as a probable cause alongside pilot inputs, citing evidence of Renslow's 13-hour duty period following minimal sleep, though the full board classified it as contributory to avoid diluting focus on recoverable errors. Some industry voices, including pilot unions, defended the crew by attributing the stall misdiagnosis to Colgan's reliance on a NASA video for tailplane icing training, which emphasized nose-up techniques inapplicable to wing stalls, thus framing the response as a predictable training artifact rather than gross negligence. These perspectives fueled broader scrutiny of regional carriers' model, where outsourced training and minimum-wage incentives eroded professionalism, though NTSB reports maintained that no single systemic flaw absolved the crew's failure to adhere to basic stall recovery protocols.

Regulatory Reforms and Industry Response

Key Legislation Post-2009

The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-216), signed into law by President Barack Obama on August 1, 2010, constituted the primary legislative response to the Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash, incorporating many recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation. The act extended FAA funding through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund until September 30, 2010, while mandating enhancements to pilot certification, training, and fatigue management in commercial aviation operations under 14 CFR Part 121. Specifically, Title II required first officers in scheduled air carrier passenger service to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, imposing a minimum of 1,500 total flight hours—previously applicable only to captains—along with aeronautical experience and knowledge testing standards to elevate baseline qualifications for regional and mainline pilots. It also directed the FAA to develop risk-based pilot fatigue training programs and to update flight and duty time regulations, incorporating scientific data on circadian rhythms and sleep science to prevent performance impairments observed in the Colgan incident, such as the captain's reported rest deprivation. The legislation further strengthened oversight mechanisms by expanding the Pilot Records Improvement Act to include mandatory reporting of training failures, disciplinary actions, and performance evaluations to a accessible by hiring airlines, aiming to mitigate the risks of inadequate that contributed to employing underqualified in the 2009 crash. Section 208 required airlines to implement (SMS) for proactive hazard identification and mitigation, with phased adoption starting for larger operators by 2018, drawing on NTSB findings of systemic deficiencies in Colgan Air's and operational practices. These provisions built on earlier House-passed measures like H.R. 3371 (Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009), but the 2010 act provided the enforceable framework, prompting FAA rulemakings finalized in 2012 and 2013 that increased minimum rest periods to 10 hours between duties and limited duty time to 9 hours for unaugmented crews. Subsequent appropriations and reauthorizations, such as the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( 112-95), reinforced these reforms by codifying fatigue systems and expediting the pilot records database implementation, though they did not introduce wholly new mandates tied directly to Colgan. No major standalone legislation emerged immediately after 2010 specifically referencing the crash, as the 2010 act's directives shifted focus to regulatory execution; however, families of Flight 3407 victims continued advocating against proposed dilutions of the 1,500-hour rule in later FAA reauthorization debates. Evaluations by the Government Accountability Office have noted that while the act improved data sharing and certification rigor, full compliance with across carriers lagged, highlighting ongoing challenges in translating legislative intent into uniform industry adherence.

Impacts on Pilot Standards and Regional Carriers

The crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 prompted Congress to pass the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, signed into law on August 1, 2010, which mandated that all flight crewmembers in part 121 air carrier operations hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, extending the requirement previously limited to captains to first officers as well. This change effectively raised the minimum flight experience for first officers from the commercial pilot certificate's 250 hours to the ATP's 1,500 hours, though restricted ATP variants allowed reductions to 1,000–1,250 hours for pilots with specific academic or military qualifications. The FAA implemented these via the Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations final rule in July 2013, incorporating enhanced training on stall recognition, high-altitude operations, and upset recovery, directly addressing deficiencies identified in the Colgan pilots' performance, where the first officer had only 774 total hours and both exhibited unprofessional error management. These reforms elevated pilot standards across the industry but disproportionately burdened regional carriers, which traditionally hired less experienced pilots to feed major networks. The 1,500-hour threshold created a hiring bottleneck, as aspiring pilots accumulated hours in low-wage flight instruction roles, driving up recruitment costs and contributing to chronic shortages that forced regional airlines to park , cancel routes, and offer signing bonuses exceeding $100,000 by the mid-2010s. Industry analyses indicate that pre-crash regional hiring emphasized quantity over quality, with Colgan's pilots having failed multiple checkrides, but post-2010 standards reduced accident rates attributable to while accelerating consolidation, as smaller regionals struggled with compliance costs for systems and record-keeping mandated under the act's Section 217. Regional carriers adapted by partnering with training academies for ATP-multi-engine certifications and advocating for rATP expansions, yet the reforms exposed systemic vulnerabilities, such as pilots long distances to exceed limits, a factor in the Colgan crew's . While safety metrics improved—U.S. part 121 fatal accident rates dropped from 0.5 per million departures pre-2010 to near zero post-reform—the economic pressures led to service reductions in low-density markets, prompting debates on whether the hour-based metric prioritizes time over competency-based assessments. Congressional testimony highlighted that without these changes, regional fleets might have expanded unsustainably with underqualified crews, though critics argue the rule inadvertently incentivized risky hour-building in , potentially offsetting safety gains.

Evaluations of Reform Effectiveness

Post-2010 regulatory reforms, including the Airline Safety and Extension Act, mandated enhanced pilot rest requirements, aerodynamic stall and upset recovery , and the 1,500-hour threshold for pilot certification, aiming to mitigate factors identified in the investigation such as , inadequate , and low experience levels. Evaluations indicate these measures contributed to a sustained decline in U.S. fatal accident rates, with no passenger fatalities in scheduled Part 121 operations since the 2009 crash, a record attributed partly to improved and monitoring practices. However, causal attribution remains debated, as broader trends in , , and management systems predate and extend beyond Colgan-specific changes. Mandatory stall recovery , introduced via FAA 120-109A in 2012, emphasized nose-low recovery techniques over legacy power-and-opposite-rudder methods, directly addressing the Flight 3407 crew's erroneous stick-shaker response. Industry analyses, including IATA's 2019 Loss of Control In-Flight report, note that such competency-focused has reduced stall-related incidents by enhancing recognition of angle-of-attack exceedances, with global LOC-I events—historically 40-50% of fatal accidents—showing decreased frequency in trained fleets post-implementation. U.S. NTSB data corroborates lower loss-of-control occurrences in regional operations, though small incident volumes limit , and stalls persist as a leading killer unrelated to these reforms. The 1,500-hour rule, however, lacks empirical evidence linking total flight hours to reduced accident risk, with analyses showing no correlation between raw hours and pilot performance in high-stakes environments; critics argue it prioritizes quantity over quality, as unstructured low-altitude hours (e.g., flight instruction) offer limited transfer to jet operations. A 2024 study of licensing impacts found short-term operational disruptions, including elevated flight delays from pilot shortages and stricter duty limits, without quantified safety gains. Proponents counter that it enforces a minimum experience barrier, fostering resilience amid shortages, yet international comparisons—where competency-based progression yields comparable or superior safety—suggest evidence-based alternatives like structured simulator assessments could achieve similar outcomes without supply constraints. Fatigue countermeasures, tightening flight-duty periods to 9 hours maximum (extendable to 14 under conditions), have demonstrably curbed chronic sleep deprivation, with FAA implementation reviews noting better compliance monitoring via the Aviation Safety Action Program. Yet, evaluations highlight persistent vulnerabilities, including pilot commuting fatigue not fully addressed and industry pushback that relaxed some rules, potentially undermining causal effectiveness. Overall, while reforms aligned with first-principles risk reduction—targeting causal chains from human error—unintended effects like regional carrier consolidation and elevated training costs have reshaped the sector, with long-term safety benefits evident in zero-fatality streaks but requiring ongoing scrutiny against baseline trends.

Shutdown and Long-Term Legacy

Cessation of Flights in 2012

, the parent company of Colgan Air, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on April 1, 2012, citing persistent operating losses, high fuel prices, and rising maintenance costs as primary factors contributing to its financial distress. As part of the restructuring plan, Pinnacle announced intentions to terminate contracts with major partners including and , which necessitated the wind-down of Colgan Air's operations, including its Saab 340 fleet used for flights. Colgan Air completed the retirement of its Saab 340B fleet by July 31, 2012, marking the end of its regional services. The airline's remaining Bombardier Q400 operations, also flown under codes, continued briefly but were scheduled for phase-out by late 2012 to align with Pinnacle's shift toward jet operations under following the bankruptcy proceedings. Colgan Air conducted its final revenue flight on September 5, , with Flight 3923, a Bombardier Q400 operating from Newark to unspecified destinations as . This marked the effective cessation of all Colgan-branded flights, with the airline's assets and operations fully integrated into Pinnacle Airlines by , abolishing the Colgan name entirely. The shutdown resulted in the of approximately 500 employees and the termination of Colgan's code-share agreements, reflecting broader industry pressures on regional carriers amid consolidation and economic challenges.

Broader Effects on U.S. Aviation

The crash of prompted the U.S. Congress to enact the Airline Safety and Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-216) on August 1, 2010, which directed the FAA to implement sweeping reforms addressing , deficiencies, and qualification standards identified in the NTSB investigation. Key provisions mandated the development of fatigue risk management systems, enhanced simulator-based for aerodynamic stalls and upsets, and the creation of a centralized Pilot Records Database to improve hiring vetting for regional carriers. These measures targeted systemic vulnerabilities exposed by the accident, including the captains' inadequate stall recovery response and the first officer's from commuting and prior duty, despite compliance with existing rest rules. A cornerstone reform raised the minimum flight experience for Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certification from 250 hours to 1,500 hours, effective August 2013, fundamentally altering entry-level requirements for first officers at Part 121 carriers like regionals. This change, justified by NTSB findings on low-experience pilots' error rates in high-workload scenarios, aimed to reduce reliance on minimally qualified crews in complex operations but contributed to pilot shortages and higher operational costs for regional airlines, prompting consolidations and route adjustments. The FAA's subsequent Pilot Rule, finalized in 2016, further required competency-based training programs emphasizing leadership, , and remedial interventions for deficient performance, drawing directly from Colgan's lapses in professionalism and monitoring. Long-term, these reforms correlated with a marked decline in loss-of-control incidents, the leading cause of fatal U.S. accidents pre-2009, and no major commercial passenger jet crashes in the U.S. since February 12, 2009. Evaluations indicate improved pilot , with mandatory preventing potential repeats of the aerodynamic mishandling seen in Flight 3407, though critics note ongoing challenges like fatigue from extended commutes and the economic pressures on regionals to maintain profitability under stricter standards. The legacy underscores a shift toward evidence-based risk mitigation, prioritizing causal factors like over procedural compliance alone.

References

  1. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/etc/croncolgan.html
  2. https://simpleflying.com/colgan-air-history/
  3. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2012-10-05/colgan-shuts-down
  4. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA09MA027.aspx
  5. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2025-01-06/colgan-air-flight-3407-crash-and-its-enduring-impact
  6. https://www.abacademies.org/articles/the-last-major-aviation-accident-in-the-united-states-colgan-air-flight-3407-17300.html
  7. https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/cogs-in-the-machine-the-crash-of-colgan-air-flight-3407-and-its-legacy-df0072def433
  8. https://www.cliffsnotes.com/study-notes/28359432
  9. https://www.nj.com/news/2009/02/colgan_air_operator_of_contine.html
  10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2005/04/18/nimble-regional-airline-builds-on-its-small-size/fbd4005c-0185-46bc-a58d-642099907df8/
  11. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/aar1001.pdf
  12. https://www.nj.com/news/2009/02/colgan_airs_parntership_with_c.html
  13. https://centreforaviation.com/data/profiles/airlines/colgan-air-cjc
  14. https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/N200WQ
  15. https://www.routesonline.com/airlines/3327/colgan-air-inc/about/
  16. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40322234&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Colgan%2520Submission-Master.PDF
  17. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/etc/codeshare.pdf
  18. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/safety/codeshare.html
  19. https://www.routesonline.com/airlines/3327/colgan-air-inc/
  20. https://www.airfleets.net/flottecie/Colgan%20Air.htm
  21. https://www.planespotters.net/airline/Colgan-Air
  22. https://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-sf3-201.htm
  23. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/13/new-york-plane-crash-bombardier
  24. https://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-dh8-4200.htm
  25. https://worldairlinenews.com/2009/03/06/colgan-air-retires-its-last-beech-1900d/
  26. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1001.pdf
  27. https://aerossurance.com/safety-management/incorrectly-rigged-b1900d/
  28. https://aerossurance.com/safety-management/crossed-cables-colgan-b1900d/
  29. https://www.capecodtimes.com/story/news/2004/09/11/colgan-crash-prompts-maintenance-changes/50929452007/
  30. https://www.mapquest.com/us/virginia/colgan-air-486103480
  31. https://aviationweek.com/pinnacle-details-executive-changes
  32. https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/regional/8722-pinnacle-buys-colgan.html
  33. https://votesmart.org/public-statement/425254/letter-to-george-a-buddy-casey-president-and-general-manager-colgan-air-inc
  34. https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/189721-new-york-reps-demand-flight-3407-crash-e-mails/
  35. https://www.vahsonline.com/news/member-spotlight-sen-charles-j-colgan/
  36. https://www.capecodtimes.com/story/news/2003/08/27/colgan-s-reputation-had-been/50953415007/
  37. https://www.aviationpros.com/home/news/10393320/pinnacle-buys-colgan-air-for-20-million
  38. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2007-01-23/pinnacle-buys-colgan-air
  39. https://www.capecodtimes.com/story/news/2004/09/01/errors-doomed-colgan-flight/50924702007/
  40. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40322234&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Colgan%20Submission-Master.PDF
  41. https://www.fireengineering.com/firefighting/response-to-crash-of-flight-3407/
  42. https://www.alpa.org/Articles/2019/Colgan-Air-Flight-3407-10-Years-Later
  43. https://www.jems.com/ems-operations/flight-ambulance-operations/ny-crash-site-nearly-cleared44/
  44. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/did-colgan-mislead-the-ntsb-about-flight-3407/
  45. https://www.congress.gov/event/111th-congress/senate-event/LC6867/text
  46. https://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/1apl7xk/its_been_exactly_15_years_since_continental/
  47. https://aviationweek.com/colgan-air-crash-probe-leads-debate-over-broader-safety-issues
  48. https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ216/PLAW-111publ216.pdf
  49. https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/5900
  50. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-11/Public%2520Law-111-216.pdf
  51. https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss4/2/
  52. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4621&context=honors_theses
  53. https://www.forbes.com/sites/benbaldanza/2022/07/11/the-1500-hour-rule-has-broken-the-pilot-pipeline-in-the-us/
  54. https://www.travelweekly.com/Robert-Silk/How-1500-hour-rule-created-pilot-shortage
  55. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg50567/html/CHRG-111hhrg50567.htm
  56. https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=edt
  57. https://airfactsjournal.com/2023/06/how-not-to-lose-control-what-we-can-learn-from-colgan-3407/
  58. https://www.iata.org/contentassets/b6eb2adc248c484192101edd1ed36015/loc-i_2019.pdf
  59. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5328031
  60. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.12607
  61. https://liveandletsfly.com/1500-hour-rule-worth-defending/
  62. https://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/spurred-on-by-industry-oira-weakens-rule-to-prevent-fatigue-related-aviation-catastrophes/
  63. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/pinnacle-airlines-files-for-bankruptcy-in-us-idUSDEE8310IH/
  64. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2012-04-02/pinnacle-files-chapter-11-plans-wind-down-turboprop-flying
  65. https://www.timesleader.com/archive/252847/stories-pinnacle-airlines-files-for-bankruptcy-protection132247-2
  66. https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/12368-colgan-air-has-completed-saab-340-fleet-retirement-by-july-31
  67. https://www.nj.com/news/2012/09/colgan_air_shutters_operations.html
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.