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Jindires (Arabic: جنديرس; Kurdish: Cindirês or Cindirêsê)[a] is a town in northern Syria in the Afrin District of the Aleppo Governorate. It is located on the Afrin River, 68.4 kilometres (42.5 mi) northwest by road from Aleppo and 20.9 kilometres (13.0 mi) southwest of Afrin.[2] Nearby localities include Deir Ballut and Bayadah to the southwest, Zahra to the northwest, Kafr Safra to the north, Afrin to the northeast and Burj Abdullah to the east. According to the Syria Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Jindires had a population of 13,661 in the 2004 census.[1] It was captured by the Turkish Military and its proxy, the "Syrian National Army" in March 2018.[3] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham temporarily took control of the town in October 2022[4] and March 2023.[5]

Key Information

Jindires is the administrative center of Nahiya Jindires of the Afrin District.

Name

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Jindiris is the site of the ancient town of Gindarus or Gindaros (Ancient Greek: Γίνδαρος) also called Gindara (Ancient Greek: Γίνδαρα).[6] The Middle Persian and Parthian transliterations, attested in Shapur I's inscription at the Ka'ba-ye Zartosht, are Gndlswy and Gndrws respectively.[7]

History

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The ancient town was originally an acropolis of Cyrrhestica during the Hellenistic period.[8] The Battle of Mount Gindarus took place near the town in 38 BC. The Parthians under Pacorus I suffered a massive defeat to the Roman armies of Ventidius and Pacorus himself was killed in battle.[9][7] Under the Romans the city belonged to Antioch.[8] In 252/3, during the second Roman campaign of Sasanian King Shapur I (r. 240–270), the city was captured by the Persians.[7] Emperor Theodosius I fortified the city during his reign (379–395).[10] Traces of the fortified wall still remain on the south and west side of the tell, while the modern village is located at the base. It was captured by the Arabs in 637 during the Muslim conquest of the Levant.[11]

In the 14th century, during Mamluk rule, Jindires was visited by Syrian geographer al-Dimashqi who described it as "a town near Tizin, and in the territory of Jumah. It is a place full of habitations. There are thermal springs here, but it is unknown where the waters rise, or whither they flow."[12]

The 19th-century British writer, William Harrison Ainsworth, visited the village and described it in his magazine as "containing about fifty cottages, and characterized by its artificial mound, or tel, upon which but few traces are now to be met of the castle or citadel (Acropolis in Greek; Arx in Latin) of Cyrrhestica, and described by Strabo as 'a fit receptacle for thieves.'"[13]

Ecclesiastical history

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The first and only known bishop of Gindarus was Peter, who attended the Council of Nicaea in 325[14] and that of Antioch in 341.[15][16] At the time of Justinian, Gindarus had only a periodeutes and not a bishop. The relics of St. Marinus were kept here but were later transferred to Antioch.[16] The bishopric is included in the Catholic Church's list of titular sees.[17]

Modern era

[edit]

In the summer of 2012, during the Syrian uprising, Jindires was taken over by the People's Protection Units (YPG).[18]

On 8 March 2018, Jindires was captured by the Turkish Armed Forces and their allies the Syrian National Army from the YPG, during Operation Olive Branch.[3] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered and took partial control of the town on 12 October 2022.[4] The town was heavily damaged in the earthquake of 6 February 2023, with hundreds of residents killed or injured.

The SNA group Ahrar al-Sharqiya shot and killed four Kurdish civilians during Newroz celebrations in the town on 20 March 2023. HTS then expelled Jaysh al-Sharqiya and took full control the next day.[5]

Demographics

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In late 19th century, German orientalist Martin Hartmann noted Jindires as a settlement with 20 houses inhabited by Kurmanji-speaking Kurds.[19]

Notes

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References

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Sources

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Jindires

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Jindires (Arabic: جنديرس) is a town in the of , , in northwestern , located along the Afrin River approximately 21 kilometers southwest of Afrin city and near the Turkish border. According to Syria's 2004 census conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the town had a population of 13,661 inhabitants, predominantly ethnic engaged in , including significant production. During the , Jindires fell under the control of Kurdish-led People's Protection Units (YPG) around 2012 as part of the broader Afrin region's administration by the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. It was subsequently captured on March 8, 2018, by and allied (SNA) opposition fighters during , marking a shift in territorial control amid ongoing cross-border tensions with groups designated as terrorists by . The town has since hosted internally displaced persons from various parts of and faced reported demographic alterations due to conflict-induced migrations and resettlements, while suffering catastrophic damage from the February 6, 2023, earthquakes that killed around 1,200 people locally and leveled much of its and .

Geography

Location and Administrative Status

Jindires is a in northern , situated in the of . It lies along the Afrin River, approximately 68 kilometers northwest of city by road. The town's geographic coordinates are 36°23′41″N 36°41′20″E, with an elevation of roughly 240 meters above . Administratively, Jindires functions as the administrative center of the Jindires () within . This subdistrict encompasses several villages and forms part of the broader structure under the . Since its capture by the Turkish-backed (SNA) in March 2018 during , Jindires has been under de facto SNA control, separate from the Syrian government's effective authority in the region. Reports through 2025 document ongoing SNA-affiliated activities, including arrests in Jindires, indicating persistent factional administration amid transitional government efforts to reassert influence elsewhere in northern .

Physical Features and Climate

Jindires is situated along the Afrin River in the of , northwestern , within a landscape of undulating hills forming part of the Aleppo plateau's foothills. The subdistrict's average elevation stands at 316 meters above , contributing to a varied topography that supports terraced agriculture, including extensive olive groves. The region features a (Köppen Csa), characterized by mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers. Annual totals approximately 565 mm, concentrated over 88 rainy days mostly from October to April, with negligible rainfall in summer. Average high temperatures reach 33°C in July and August, while January lows average around 3°C, with relative humidity averaging 61% yearly.

Etymology

Name Origins and Variants

The modern name Jindires (Arabic: جِندِيْرِس; Kurdish: Cindirêsê or Jindirîsê) preserves the ancient Hellenistic and Roman form Gindaros (Ancient Greek: Γίνδαρος) or Gindara (Γίνδαρα), referring to a town in classical geography located at the site of the present-day settlement. This ancient name appears in sources such as Strabo's Geography, where Gindaros is described as a fortified settlement in the region, and may derive from a Macedonian toponym like Gendros, reflecting Hellenistic influences following Alexander the Great's campaigns. Ptolemy's Geography lists a variant as Polais, potentially an earlier or alternative rendering, though Gindaros predominates in Roman-era records. Local traditions and some Syrian geographical accounts propose a composite etymology from Arabic jund ("military division" or "troop" in Islamic administrative terms) combined with Īrs, purportedly the name of a Roman commander who encamped there, evolving into "troops of Īrs." This interpretation, however, aligns more with folk etymologies than linguistic evidence, as the phonological continuity from Gindaros to Jindires suggests direct phonetic adaptation through Aramaic, Syriac, and Arabic intermediaries rather than a post-Islamic coinage. Alternative local narratives attribute the name to a daughter of an ancient ruler, but these lack corroboration in historical texts. Variants reflect linguistic and administrative shifts: Ottoman records often rendered it as Jindirîs or Jandaris, while Kurdish usage favors Cindirês, emphasizing the region's multi-ethnic history. The name's persistence underscores continuity from Bronze Age settlements in the Afrin valley, though no definitive pre-Hellenistic root is established beyond Indo-European parallels.

History

Ancient and Medieval Periods

The region encompassing modern Jindires has evidence of early human habitation, with the nearby Dederiyeh Cave yielding remains, including intentionally buried children dated to approximately 70,000–50,000 years ago, suggesting it served as a base camp for groups in the northern . Jindires corresponds to the ancient settlement of Gindarus in the Hellenistic-era region of Cyrrhestica, functioning as a strategic overlooking the Afrin River valley. In 38 BC, Roman legions under Bassus achieved a decisive victory over Parthian forces led by at the nearby, halting Parthian incursions into and marking a key reversal in the . By the late Roman period, Gindarus had diminished to a small village, which fortified in the 4th century AD./Gindarus) It persisted as a fortified site into the 6th century under , amid broader Byzantine efforts to secure northern against Persian threats./Gindarus) During the medieval era, the area fell under successive Muslim dynasties following the Arab conquests of the , integrating into the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates' provincial structures in northern . By the , under rule, the settlement—known then as Jandaris—was noted by geographer Shams al-Din al-Dimashqi as a town near Tizin (modern ) within Aleppo's territory, indicating its continued role as a local administrative and agricultural node despite regional upheavals from Crusader incursions and Mongol invasions.

Ecclesiastical History

Gindarus, the ancient name associated with Jindires, emerged as a under the metropolitan see of in the Roman province of Euphratensis by the early . The sole documented of the see was Peter, who represented Gindarus at the First of in 325 AD, where he subscribed to the affirming the of the Son with the Father against . Peter also attended the Council of Antioch in 341 AD, convened to address ongoing Christological disputes. No subsequent bishops from Gindarus are recorded in surviving conciliar acts or notitiae episcopatuum, suggesting the see's limited prominence or early decline in documentation. The diocese operated within the broader Patriarchate of Antioch, reflecting the early Christian expansion in northern amid Roman imperial support following Constantine's conversion. Archaeological evidence from the region, including terracotta oil lamps bearing crosses from nearby sites, indicates localized Christian worship practices during , though none are definitively linked to Gindarus ecclesiastical structures. By the reign of (527–565 AD), Gindarus remained a fortified settlement, potentially hosting martyr relics, but the see's institutional continuity waned after the Muslim conquests of the 630s–640s AD, which subordinated Christian communities to status and reduced episcopal hierarchies in rural areas. In the medieval period, no distinct ecclesiastical history for Gindarus is attested, as the Afrin region's Christian presence integrated into Syriac Orthodox or networks before largely assimilating or migrating under successive Islamic dynasties. The see persisted nominally as a titular in the from the 20th century, assigned to auxiliary or missionary bishops without territorial jurisdiction, such as Simon N'Zita Wa Ne Malanda (1960–1965). This titular usage underscores the site's faded role in active ecclesial governance post-antiquity.

Ottoman and Early Modern Era

The region of Jindires came under Ottoman rule after Selim I's conquest of the in 1516, integrating into the empire's administrative framework as part of the (later ) of . Specifically, the Afrin area, including Jindires, was subsumed within the of , a district extending across what is now the Turkish-Syrian border and focused on frontier defense and taxation of agrarian communities. This sanjak structure emphasized local tribal governance under Ottoman oversight, with Kurdish clans predominant in the Kurd Dagh highlands surrounding Jindires, where they maintained semi-autonomous roles in and service. Throughout the Ottoman period, Jindires functioned as a modest reliant on , , and cultivation in the fertile , with limited recorded or urban development beyond basic village needs. The reforms of the mid-19th century introduced centralized and taxation, potentially increasing Ottoman scrutiny over local Kurdish holdings, though enforcement in remote areas like Jindires remained inconsistent due to tribal resistance and geographic isolation. By the late , amid growing European interest in Ottoman demographics, Jindires was characterized as a small Kurdish enclave, reflecting the broader ethnic continuity of Kurmanji-speaking communities in the despite periodic migrations and Ottoman resettlement policies favoring Turkic or Arab elements elsewhere. The onset of saw localized cooperation between Kurdish groups in the Kilis-Afrin zone and Ottoman forces, including against Allied supply lines, though Jindires itself experienced no major battles. Ottoman collapse in 1918 transitioned the area toward post-imperial fragmentation, setting the stage for Franco-British partition agreements that detached Afrin from proper.

20th Century Developments

In the early , Jindires functioned as a modest rural settlement within the Ottoman Empire's , characterized by its Kurdish population and agrarian lifestyle centered on olives, grains, and livestock. The Ottoman defeat in and subsequent partition of its territories placed the , including Jindires, under Allied occupation, with French forces assuming control by October 1918 and formalizing administration in 1920. Under the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, ratified by the League of Nations in July 1922, Jindires was incorporated into the , one of several semi-autonomous entities created to manage ethnic and sectarian diversity. The mandate era introduced limited infrastructural improvements, such as roads connecting rural nahiyahs to , but Jindires saw minimal direct investment amid broader resistance to French rule, including the of 1925–1927, which largely spared the Kurdish-majority Afrin highlands due to their geographic isolation and lower or urban Arab involvement. By the late mandate period, following and Vichy-Free French transitions, growing Syrian nationalist pressures culminated in the April 1946 evacuation of French troops, marking formal independence. Post-independence, Jindires integrated into the Syrian Republic's as a within the , experiencing administrative continuity under unstable early governments marked by coups between 1949 and 1963. The Ba'ath Party's 1963 seizure of power and al-Assad's 1970 consolidation emphasized state-led agricultural reforms, including land redistribution via Decree 259 in (expanded post-1963), which redistributed feudal holdings to smallholders in fertile zones like Afrin, boosting olive production that constituted a key economic pillar for Jindires. Kurdish residents, classified as "original" citizens unlike some Jazira affected by the 1962 census, retained formal nationality but navigated policies restricting cultural institutions and language use in official spheres, preserving demographic predominance amid gradual and school expansions by the .

Syrian Civil War and Turkish Military Operations

During the , which began in 2011, Jindires fell under the control of the Kurdish-led People's Protection Units (YPG), part of the (SDF), by 2012 as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East established governance in the . The town experienced relative stability compared to other parts of , with minimal direct fighting until late 2017, as YPG forces focused on consolidating control amid the broader conflict against Islamist rebels and the Islamic State elsewhere. viewed YPG dominance in Afrin as a threat due to the group's organizational and ideological links to the (PKK), designated a terrorist organization by , the , and the . On January 20, 2018, initiated , a military offensive conducted by the alongside the (SNA), a coalition of Turkish-backed Syrian opposition factions, aimed at dislodging YPG forces from Afrin to create a security along the Turkish border. Turkish , airstrikes, and ground advances targeted YPG positions, with the operation involving approximately 25,000 Turkish troops and SNA fighters. By early March, Turkish-SNA forces had encircled and assaulted key towns in the region. Jindires was captured by Turkish and SNA forces on March 8, 2018, following intense urban combat against YPG defenders who had fortified the area. The town, a strategic point in western Afrin, marked a significant advance toward the eventual fall of Afrin city on March 18. Turkish sources reported the operation neutralized numerous YPG militants, while monitors documented civilian casualties from bombardments, including 5 to 7 killed and 49 wounded in strikes on residential areas of Jindires. Overall Turkish losses in the Afrin offensive exceeded 40 soldiers killed, with SNA casualties higher but less precisely tallied. Since the capture, Jindires has remained under Turkish military oversight and SNA administration, integrated into the Turkish-controlled zone in northern , though reports from Kurdish advocacy groups highlight ongoing security incidents and factional clashes.

Demographics

Historical Population Data

According to the 2004 census by Syria's Central Bureau of Statistics, Jindires recorded a of 13,661 inhabitants. This figure represented the most recent official pre-war enumeration for the town, situated in the of . Earlier comprehensive town-level data from prior Syrian censuses (such as 1981 or 1994) are not publicly detailed in available records, though provincial trends in indicated steady rural growth driven by agriculture and limited urbanization in the late . Pre-2011 estimates, accounting for natural growth and minor migration, approximated the at nearly 13,000, reflecting stability in this Kurdish-majority area before conflict-induced displacements. These numbers underscore Jindires' status as a mid-sized center, with surrounding villages contributing to a localized typical of northern Syria's fertile plains.

Ethnic and Religious Composition

Prior to the , Jindires exhibited an ethnic composition typical of the broader , where constituted the overwhelming majority, with estimates for Afrin ranging from 80% to 95% Kurdish and the remainder primarily concentrated in southern areas. Religiously, the was predominantly Sunni Muslim, reflecting the dominant faith among Syrian in the region, with negligible presence of other groups such as or reported at the local level. The 2004 Syrian census recorded Jindires' at 13,661, though local estimates suggest growth to approximately 25,000 by 2011, maintaining the Kurdish-majority character without significant ethnic diversity. The Turkish military operation in early 2018, which resulted in the capture of Jindires by Turkish forces and allied factions on March 13, profoundly altered the demographic landscape through mass displacement of and subsequent resettlement of internally displaced persons from other Syrian conflict zones. Reports indicate that up to 300,000 fled Afrin, including substantial numbers from Jindires, reducing the regional Kurdish share to around 25% by 2023-2025, with now comprising 50-60% or more of the via organized transfers of over 400,000 individuals. Jindires followed this pattern, transitioning from near-homogeneous Kurdish settlement to a mixed ethnic environment dominated by newcomers, alongside smaller inflows of Turkmen and Turkish settlers, though exact local figures remain undocumented due to lack of post-2018 censuses. Religious composition has remained largely Sunni Muslim across ethnic lines, as resettled are also predominantly Sunni, with no evidence of significant shifts toward other faiths; however, included most remaining non-Sunni minorities in Afrin, further entrenching Sunni dominance. These changes, driven by security operations and displacement policies, have been characterized by observers as deliberate demographic engineering, though Turkish authorities maintain they reflect voluntary returns and stabilization efforts.

Conflict-Induced Changes

The capture of Jindires by Turkish forces and (SNA) factions during in March 2018 triggered significant demographic shifts in the town and surrounding Afrin region, which had been predominantly Kurdish prior to the offensive. Pre-conflict estimates indicated that comprised over 90% of Afrin's , including Jindires nahiya. The operation displaced approximately 300,000 residents, predominantly , who fled to areas like or abroad, reducing the local Kurdish presence sharply. In the ensuing years under Turkish-backed administration, reports documented the settlement of thousands of Arab internally displaced persons (IDPs) from other Syrian provinces, alongside smaller groups such as Uyghur families allied with SNA factions, into vacated Kurdish properties in Jindires and Afrin. Specific initiatives included a 2022 settlement in Jindires district housing 220 Arab families, funded externally. These influxes, totaling over 4,000 families region-wide by 2022, contributed to a reported decline in Afrin's Kurdish proportion to around 25%, with Jindires experiencing similar alterations through property seizures and repopulation. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) attributed these changes to actions by Turkish proxies, including forced evictions and settlements, though Turkish officials have denied systematic demographic engineering, framing resettlements as humanitarian aid for IDPs. Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, demographic trends in Jindires reversed with the exodus of many Arab and the return of displaced . By early 2025, over 70,000 had returned to Afrin, including hundreds of families to Jindires, as SNA factions withdrew under transitional pressures, elevating the Kurdish share toward 80% in some assessments. Over 600 families reportedly departed Afrin by March 2025, facilitating these returns, though challenges persist regarding property restitution and security guarantees. As of mid-2025, ongoing monitoring by groups like SOHR highlights continued volatility, with calls for verified repatriation amid fears of renewed instability.

Economy and Local Life

Agriculture and Resources

The economy of Jindires and the broader has historically centered on , with olive cultivation serving as the dominant activity due to the area's fertile valleys and suitable for fruit-bearing trees. Olive groves cover extensive agricultural lands, producing olives and that traditionally accounted for the majority of local income prior to the . Other key crops include , , , figs, cherries, grapes, , and seasonal produce such as watermelons, supporting both subsistence farming and small-scale trade. Natural resources in Jindires are primarily tied to its agricultural base, including enriched by the Afrin River and associated , which historically facilitated for orchards and field crops. Forests once provided timber and ecological support but have faced significant depletion through operations documented in at least 114 sites across Afrin since 2018, often linked to of unauthorized settlements. Water availability from local rivers and reservoirs remains critical yet increasingly strained, with sharp declines in levels attributed to overuse for and broader conditions exacerbating risks to crop yields and drinking supplies. Since the 2018 capture of Jindires by Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, agricultural output has declined markedly, with reports of olive harvests being seized by militias such as the Hamza Division, imposing levies and restrictions that hinder farmers' access to their lands. Production of olive oil specifically dropped significantly in 2024 compared to prior years, compounded by reduced water for irrigation under post-occupation management. These disruptions, alongside climate-induced droughts—the worst in 70 years as of 2024—have shifted reliance toward relocated or resilient crops among displaced farmers, though overall economic adaptation remains limited.

Infrastructure and Daily Society

Jindires' infrastructure remains severely degraded due to prolonged conflict during the , the 2018 Turkish-backed , and the February 2023 earthquakes, which compounded pre-existing damage to . Over 1,000 buildings were rendered uninhabitable following the quakes, with more than 270 completely collapsed and 550 fully destroyed, displacing approximately 40,000 families. Seven water stations were totally damaged, necessitating ongoing rehabilitation of two water tanks, while the sewage and water networks require comprehensive repairs. Roads and transportation links, initially targeted in military operations, saw limited post-2018 rehabilitation efforts in the broader Afrin area but continue to suffer from war-related destruction and quake-induced disruptions. Access to and is critically limited, exacerbating risks in daily life. In displacement camps like Al-Eman in Jindires, residents receive only 9 liters of per person daily—less than half the international humanitarian standard of 20 liters—with 70% of assessed camps relying on water trucking for supply. facilities are inadequate, with one per 90 people and no functional systems in many sites, leading to widespread diseases such as (over 3,600 cases in nearby Afrin camps, predominantly affecting children under 10) and . Electricity provision mirrors Syria's national crisis, with rationing to as little as two hours per day in 2025 due to damaged grids and fuel shortages, hindering basic activities like and medical care. facilities and schools have sustained damage from both and quakes, with services often suspended or operating amid rubble, as noted by humanitarian organizations providing emergency support. Daily society in Jindires is shaped by these infrastructural deficits and ongoing displacement under administration since 2018. Many residents live in tents or makeshift shelters, with families showering only every 10 days and coping with contaminated sources that heighten vulnerability to waterborne illnesses like . The 2023 quakes displaced 7,000 families directly, forcing reliance on aid for survival amid slow reconstruction hampered by the region's political instability and limited funding. Following the fall of the Assad regime in late , some displaced persons attempted returns, but looted homes and persistent service gaps continue to challenge community stability and routine activities such as farming and . Humanitarian interventions, including MSF's distribution of over 8,000 cubic meters of clean and installation of latrines, provide temporary but underscore the absence of sustainable local systems.

Governance and Security

Pre-War Administration

Prior to the , Jindires functioned as the administrative center of its namesake within , , under Syria's highly centralized local governance framework established by the Local Administration Law. This law delineated administrative units including , which were headed by appointed directors overseeing coordination of public services, security coordination, and implementation of central government policies, with ultimate authority residing in via the Ministry of Local Administration. Local councils at the town level in Jindires managed essential municipal operations such as , utilities distribution, and basic , categorized under the law's structure for units based on —typically comprising elected but regime-vetted members aligned with the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party's control over political processes. These councils lacked substantive , serving primarily as extensions of the central rather than independent bodies, a system reflective of the Ba'athist regime's emphasis on party loyalty over local initiative. The administrative scope encompassed approximately 13,661 residents as per the Syrian government's 2004 census, focusing on agricultural support, , and enforcement of national directives in a predominantly rural comprising multiple villages. Ba'ath Party branches in the area ensured ideological conformity, though Kurdish-majority regions like Afrin experienced systemic underrepresentation in higher administrative roles, with appointments favoring regime loyalists amid broader policies of and central control.

Post-2018 Occupation Dynamics

Jindires fell under Turkish military control alongside (SNA) factions on March 8, 2018, during , marking the start of a hybrid governance model combining Turkish oversight with proxy administration. Turkish forces established military bases and points to secure the area, while SNA groups assumed authority over daily security and local councils. Nominally, administration operates through the (SIG)'s Afrin Local Council, which coordinates police and military police functions, but SNA factions like the Suleiman Shah Brigade (al-Amshat) dominate enforcement, taxation, and dispute resolution, often bypassing formal structures. This setup has led to fragmented control, with Turkish military intervening in major security matters while proxies handle routine policing. Security dynamics evolved with inter-factional rivalries; for instance, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham briefly seized Jindires from SNA elements in March 2023 amid clashes, highlighting tensions among Turkish-backed groups. By February 2024, Turkish forces evacuated select positions in the district, delegating more responsibility to SNA fighters. documented persistent SNA abuses, including arbitrary detentions and extortion targeting civilians as of 2024. As of early 2025, transitional Syrian authorities signaled shifts by deploying General Security convoys into Afrin in February, potentially challenging SNA dominance and prompting SNA reductions in presence. SNA factions continued operations, with reports of 31 arrests in Afrin during January 2025, 12 attributed to Suleiman Shah. These developments reflect ongoing flux between Turkish proxies, rival militias, and emerging national forces.

Major Events and Crises

2023 Earthquake Impact

The 7.8-magnitude struck southern and northern on February 6, 2023, with its epicenter near , causing widespread devastation in the , including Jindires. In Jindires, the tremors led to the collapse of numerous structures, many already weakened by prior conflict, resulting in at least 1,000 deaths reported in the town alone, according to assessments by local partners cited in updates. This made Jindires one of the most severely affected areas in northwest , where the overall death toll exceeded 4,500 and injuries surpassed 8,700 by early March. Building assessments indicated extensive damage in Jindires, with revealing potentially affected structures across the town, contributing to the regional tally of over 1,700 completely destroyed buildings in northwest . Pre-existing war-related deterioration amplified the vulnerability, as many constructions lacked reinforcement, leading to higher rates during the shaking. Hundreds of families were displaced, resorting to tents amid winter conditions, which exacerbated exposure to cold and limited access to shelter. Infrastructure impacts included disruptions to and systems, already strained by over a decade of conflict, hindering post-quake recovery efforts. By mid-2023, rebuilding remained slow in Jindires, with concerns over destroyed homes belonging to displaced families complicating repopulation and raising risks of further demographic shifts in the area.

Ongoing Developments as of 2025

As of early 2025, the fall of the Assad in 2024 prompted attempts by displaced residents of Jindires and broader Afrin to return to properties seized during the Turkish-backed (SNA) occupation since 2018, but returnees encountered widespread extortions, arbitrary arrests, and threats from SNA factions. monitors documented cases where individuals paid fees ranging from thousands of dollars to reclaim homes, with non-payment leading to further looting or denial of access, primarily attributed to brigades like Suleiman Shah (al-Amshat). Transitional Syrian authorities pledged in April 2025 to address violations against in Afrin, including restitution and ending factional abuses, yet enforcement lagged amid ongoing SNA control under Turkish oversight. By September 2025, civilians reported persistent disputes and schemes, with SNA-affiliated groups facilitating urban expansion and demographic shifts through land seizures for settlements. Humanitarian efforts persisted into 2025, with international aid providing food baskets to over 2,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) households in Jindires camps for eight months in 2024 and four in 2025, covering 70% of amid economic strain. However, UN communications in October 2025 highlighted unaddressed grave violations, such as forced levies on farmers and property grabs, unchanged by national political transitions.

Controversies and Perspectives

Allegations of Abuses and Displacement

Following the capture of Jindires by and (SNA) factions during on March 18, 2018, reports documented significant displacement of the town's predominantly , with many residents fleeing amid advancing operations. (HRW) estimated that over half of Afrin's approximately 157,000 , including those from Jindires, were displaced during the incursion, many seeking refuge in the region or elsewhere, while around 285,000 Sunni Arab displaced persons from other parts of were resettled in the area by December 2020, contributing to demographic shifts. Independent monitors noted comprised over 90% of Afrin's pre-2018 population but fell below 40% by 2025 due to such displacements and non-return. Allegations of abuses by SNA factions and Turkish military personnel in Jindires and broader Afrin include arbitrary detentions, , , and property seizures. HRW interviewed detainees reporting incommunicado holds lasting weeks to years, beatings, electric shocks, and rapes by SNA groups like Sultan Suleiman Shah and , often targeting perceived Kurdish ties to the People's Protection Units (YPG). The U.S. State Department corroborated patterns of abuses by Turkish-supported opposition groups against and Yezidis, including killings and forced evictions. Property looting affected thousands, with over 3,750 disputes in Afrin unresolved by 2023, as SNA factions seized and sold Kurdish homes and lands. A notable incident occurred on March 20, 2023, when three members of the SNA-affiliated Jaysh al-Sharqiya shot at a Kurdish family in Jindires for lighting a fire, killing four civilians—Farah al-Din Othman, Nazmi Othman, Muhammad Othman, and another Muhammad Othman—and wounding a fifth. The perpetrators were arrested by SNA the next day, but Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) reported limited accountability, with protests demanding SNA withdrawal and international investigation. HRW and 155 Syrian groups condemned the killings as emblematic of . Ongoing violations include dozens of arbitrary arrests, such as 31 documented by STJ in Afrin during January 2025, primarily by SNA brigades like al-Amshat, often involving or forced property transfers. The European Center for Constitutional and (ECCHR) described systematic expulsions and resettlements as driving into a shrinking minority, alongside cultural suppression like bans on and Kurdish education. Turkish authorities have denied orchestrating , attributing demographic changes to voluntary returns and security measures against terrorism, though HRW noted rare internal SNA prosecutions amid broader impunity.

Turkish National Security Rationale

Turkey initiated Operation Olive Branch on January 20, 2018, targeting the People's Protection Units (YPG) in the Afrin region, including Jindires, to neutralize what it described as an imminent terrorist threat along its southern border. Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, articulated the primary objective as establishing a 30-kilometer-deep security zone to prevent cross-border attacks by the YPG, which Ankara regards as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization responsible for decades of assaults on Turkish soil. The YPG's control of Afrin, acquired amid the Syrian civil war, was perceived as enabling PKK logistics, recruitment, and potential incursions, with intelligence reports citing over 2,000 PKK/YPG fighters in the enclave posing risks to Turkish border provinces like Hatay and Kilis. From 's viewpoint, the YPG's territorial consolidation in Afrin threatened to form a continuous "terror corridor" linking PKK strongholds in Iraq's to Mediterranean access, exacerbating vulnerabilities exposed by prior attacks, such as the 2016 PKK bombing in that killed 37 civilians. Turkish emphasized preemptive action under Article 51 of the UN Charter for against non-state actors, with the operation framed as essential to dismantle YPG fortifications and weapon stockpiles near the border, thereby safeguarding civilian populations in from rocket fire and infiltration. Jindires, strategically located 20 kilometers from the frontier, exemplified this rationale, as its capture on March 12, 2018, by -backed forces disrupted YPG supply lines and observation posts that could facilitate strikes into . Turkish policymakers further justified the incursion by highlighting U.S. support for the YPG—via arms and training against —as inadvertently bolstering a PKK proxy, undermining bilateral cooperation and necessitating unilateral measures to protect national sovereignty. Post-operation assessments from Turkish sources maintained that the clearance of YPG elements from Afrin, including Jindires, reduced attack frequencies, with border incidents dropping significantly by mid-2018, validating the operation's role in restoring a buffer against asymmetric threats. This imperative persisted into subsequent years, informing Turkey's sustained presence to monitor residual PKK/YPG activities and prevent resurgence.

Competing Narratives on Demographic Shifts

Prior to the 2018 Turkish military operation, Jindires and the broader were estimated to have a that was 85-95% Kurdish, based on pre-war assessments from local organizations and regional analysts, with the remainder comprising , , and smaller minorities such as and . The 2004 Syrian recorded Jindires' at 13,661, though it did not break down ; district-wide data consistently indicated a Kurdish majority shaped by historical settlement patterns in the region. Kurdish advocacy groups, monitors, and Syrian opposition sources allege deliberate demographic engineering by Turkish forces and (SNA) allies post-2018, claiming of through property seizures, extortion, kidnappings, and violence to reduce their proportion and install a pro-Turkish Arab-Turkmen majority. These narratives cite the exodus of over 300,000 from Afrin, including a 77% drop in Jindires itself, replaced by Arab IDPs from eastern Ghouta, , , and —often housed in confiscated Kurdish properties or new settlements funded partly by external actors like . The (SOHR), a UK-based monitoring group, documents this as a systematic shift, with now comprising only 20-25% of Afrin's amid over 600 documented violations in 2024 alone, including demographic alterations via non-Kurdish resettlement. UN reports corroborate large-scale displacement during and after the operation, with over 100,000 people fleeing Afrin amid hostilities, though they emphasize humanitarian crises over intentional engineering. Critics of these claims, including Turkish-aligned voices, argue that Kurdish sources like SOHR exhibit pro-opposition bias, potentially inflating displacement figures while downplaying pre-war Arab presence or voluntary returns. Turkish officials and SNA representatives counter that Afrin, including Jindires, was historically mixed or majority Arab—asserting over 50% Arab composition pre-operation—and that post-2018 movements reflect security stabilization, repatriation of Syrian refugees from (over 3 million hosted), and humanitarian housing for IDPs, not engineered change. President Erdoğan explicitly framed the operation as liberating Arab-majority areas from YPG control, with resettlements portrayed as restoring "original" demographics disrupted by Kurdish militias' alleged dominance. Pro-Turkish analyses emphasize that incoming groups, including and fleeing regime or HTS areas, align with Syria's overall ethnic mosaic (Arabs ~90% nationally), and property policies target YPG-linked assets rather than broadly. However, these claims conflict with pre-war estimates from multiple independent observers, which affirm a Kurdish supermajority, suggesting Turkish assertions may serve to justify the against PKK/YPG threats rather than reflect empirical baselines. Ongoing 2025 reports indicate continued influxes, such as Uyghur families into Kurdish homes, fueling disputes over intent amid unverified total population figures post-earthquake and conflict.

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