Hubbry Logo
Marada MovementMarada MovementMain
Open search
Marada Movement
Community hub
Marada Movement
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Marada Movement
Marada Movement
Marada Movement
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Key Information

The Marada Movement (Arabic: تيار المردة, romanized: Tayyār Al-Marada) is a Lebanese political party and a former militia active during the Lebanese Civil War named after the legendary Marada (also called Mardaites) warriors of the early Middle Ages that fought on the external edge of the Byzantine Empire. Originally designated the Marada Brigade (لواء المردة Liwa al-Marada), the group initially emerged as the personal militia of Suleiman Frangieh, president of Lebanon at the outbreak of the war in 1975, which also had a Parliamentary wing known as the Frangieh Bloc.[4] They were also initially known as the Zgharta Liberation Army, after Frangieh's hometown of Zgharta in northern Lebanon.

Marada in Lebanese history

[edit]

The Marada were a group of independent communities in Lebanon and the surrounding highlands after the conquest of Syria by the Arab army in 630 CE. While some historians argue that the Marada "States" were that of a Maronite Aramaic-speaking Christian warrior elite, other historians tend to downplay their importance, and describe a more complex scenario. The Maronites and thus the Marada were given relative autonomy in the Umayyad Caliphate. The Marada were known by some as a fierce warrior group, and according to some, the name was synonymous with the Arabic word for rebels or also Maronites.

Lebanese civil war

[edit]

During the Lebanese civil war was called one of the Maronite militias "Marada Movement". During the Lebanese civil war, Zgharta was the frontline and Christian stronghold of the north in northern Lebanon. The Zgharta-based Marada Brigade militia successfully repulsed and responded with attacks on armed militias from Tripoli, Danniyeh and Koura districts, and from PLO militias from the neighboring Palestinian refugee camps of Beddawi and Nahr al-Bared.

In March 1976, the Marada Brigade supported the hard-pressed Lebanese Army Republican Guard Battalion in defending the Presidential Palace in Baabda from a two-pronged combined LNM–LAA assault, though prior to the attack the Lebanese President had decamped to the safety of Jounieh.[5]

The Marada were initially allied with the Kataeb until 1978, the year when Suleiman Frangieh refused the Lebanese Front's plan to declare a Christian canton, a Christian enclave separated from the rest of the country. A new alliance was formed between Suleiman Frangieh and Prime Minister Rachid Karami to counter the Lebanese Front's plan that called for separate enclaves/cantons of Christians, Druze and Muslims. Frangieh became firmly set against the onset of a Lebanese federal state that would make an alliance with Israel, promoted instead an Arab pro-Syrian alliance and stopped attending meetings with the Lebanese Front.

The incident is known as the Ehden massacre.[6] Kataeb member at the time Samir Geagea, who allegedly headed the Phalangist force responsible for the Ehden massacre, admitted that he was among the "military squad" that was in charge of the Ehden "operation", but he denied taking part in the massacre, claiming that he was shot in his right hand before getting to the area and was taken to a hospital. Elie Hobeika has always denied taking part in the killing.

Modern politics

[edit]

After the 2005 legislative elections, the Marada became a member of the (pro-Syrian) opposition alliance together with Hezbollah.

In June 2006, the Marada Movement was officially launched as a political party during a ceremony attended by supporters and representatives from Hezbollah, Amal Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement, and several pro-Syrian political figures.

In the 2009 Lebanese general election, Marada won all 3 seats in the electoral district of Zgharta,[7] Marada was initially part of the Change and Reform bloc but left in 2013.[8]

In the 2010 municipal election, Marada won in Zgharta and won a total of 17 out of 31 municipalities in the Zgharta District.[9]

In the 2018 Lebanese general election, Marada won 3 seats in North III: 2 Maronite seats in Zgharta and 1 Orthodox seat in Koura. After the elections, Frangieh formed the Independent National Bloc (Arabic: التكتل الوطني) with Farid Haykal Khazen, Faisal Karami, Jihad Al Samad and Jbeil Shia MP Moustafa Husseini.[10]

Faisal Karami and Jihad Al Samad left the bloc, Koura MP Fayez Ghosn and Jbeil MP Moustafa Husseini died which left the bloc with only 2 MP.[11][12]

In the 2022 Lebanese general election, only one official Marada candidate Tony Frangieh Jr. won, Marada candidate in Tripoli Rafli Diab got the highest preferential votes for the Orthodox seat in North II but lost, Koura candidate Fadi Ghosn (brother of Fayez Ghosn) lost in favor of William Tawk.[13]

After the elections, Tony Frangieh formed a bloc with several MPs that represent feudal families (Frangieh, Khazen, Tawk, Murr) and their presidential candidate for the 2022–2025 Lebanese presidential election is Suleiman Frangieh.[14]

Controversy

[edit]

Killings

[edit]

On 16 June 1957, Sleiman Frangieh and his followers killed 30 people loyal to the Douaihy family in a church in Miziara. The massacre is known as Miziara massacre.[15][16]

Amid tensions in the North between the Kataeb and Marada parties when the Kataeb tried to expand their power in the region,[17] Marada militiamen assassinated Joud el Bayeh, a Kataeb leader in Zgharta, which ignited the Ehden massacre.[18] To seek revenge for the Ehden massacre, on 28 June 1978, Marada brigades affiliates captured and killed 26 Kataeb members in the villages of Qaa and Ras Baalback, the massacre is known as Qaa massacre.

On 2 May 1987, a Zgharta unit called Marada 3/400 set up an ambush to kill Bahaa Douaihy and Roumanos Douaihy amid the long-running Frangieh and Douaihy clans conflict.[19]

Between 2005 and 2008 numerous attacks targeted and killed multiple Lebanese Forces members. Those killed include: Riad Abi Khater in Batroun, Pierre Ishac in Bsarma and Tony Issa in Dahr-al-Ain.[20]

Attacks

[edit]

The Marada militia destroyed the house of Greek Orthodox MP Fouad Ghosn in the town of Kousba in the Koura district after he voted for Bachir Gemayel during the 1982 Lebanese presidential election.[21]

Marada loyalist burned the house of newly elected MP Samir Frangieh because Sleiman Frangieh lost the 2005 elections.[22]

List of Marada leaders

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Marada Movement

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Marada Movement (Arabic: تيار المردة, Tayyār al-Marada) is a Lebanese rooted in the Maronite Christian community of the district in northern , originating as a in the late 1960s under , son of former President . It functioned as the during the (1975–1990), engaging in factional conflicts while maintaining a base of clan loyalty and regional influence. Currently led by Sleiman Frangieh, grandson of the elder Suleiman, the party advocates Lebanese nationalism and has historically aligned with pro-Syrian forces, including close ties to in support of armed resistance against . The movement's defining characteristics include its feudal-style organization tied to the Frangieh family dynasty, which has wielded parliamentary representation and ministerial roles within Lebanon's power-sharing system, often as part of the opposing the anti-Syrian coalition. Sleiman Frangieh has pursued the presidency multiple times, including a Hezbollah-endorsed bid in 2023–2024, but withdrew in January 2025 to back army chief Joseph Aoun amid prolonged deadlock. Its alliances have drawn criticism from rivals for compromising Christian sovereignty through dependence on Syrian and Iranian-backed groups, though proponents highlight its role in preserving Maronite interests against perceived existential threats. Notable aspects include the 1978 assassination of , which shifted the movement toward firmer pro-Syrian orientation, and its participation in post-war politics, securing seats in despite electoral challenges. The party's resilience stems from grassroots mobilization in a stronghold where patronage networks sustain , though it faces scrutiny over alleged militia remnants and opaque funding amid Lebanon's economic collapse.

Origins and Early Development

Founding and Initial Context

The Marada Movement originated as a militia known as the , formed in 1967 by , a prominent Maronite za'im from in northern . This armed group functioned as the private brigade of the Frangieh clan, drawing from local Maronite supporters to defend familial and communal interests amid escalating sectarian and political frictions. The name "Marada" invoked the historical Maronite rebels of the , who resisted Byzantine and Arab incursions, symbolizing defiance and autonomy for the movement's backers. In the late 1960s, grappled with demographic pressures from Palestinian refugee influxes following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and subsequent conflicts, straining the confessional power-sharing system established by the 1943 . Frangieh, leveraging his influence in —a stronghold of Maronite feudal —organized the militia as tensions rose between Christian factions wary of Muslim and leftist gains, and groups establishing bases in the south and border areas. By 1970, when Frangieh ascended to the presidency through a compromise among army, Phalange, and Muslim leaders, the Marada force numbered in the hundreds, equipped modestly to counter perceived threats to northern Christian enclaves. The initial context reflected broader za'im dynamics, where family-based militias like the Marada served as extensions of political patronage networks, protecting against rivals such as the Douaihy clan in and emerging pan-Arabist or Nasserist influences. Frangieh's approach emphasized reconciliation over confrontation, aligning temporarily with pro-government forces while maintaining the militia's defensive posture ahead of the 1975 outbreak.

Pre-Civil War Activities

The , the paramilitary arm of the Marada Movement, was established in 1967 under the directives of , a prominent Maronite zu'ama from the district in northern , as the Marada Brigade to safeguard clan interests amid escalating sectarian tensions and the influx of Palestinian armed groups following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This formation reflected longstanding traditions among Lebanon's leaders of maintaining private militias for local defense, particularly in rural Maronite strongholds vulnerable to external pressures from leftist and Palestinian factions. By early 1975, the brigade consisted of 700 to 800 lightly armed fighters, relying on obsolete small arms procured through informal channels rather than state resources. During 's presidency from September 1970 to September 1976, the Marada forces concentrated on bolstering security in and surrounding areas, conducting patrols and fortifications to counter perceived threats from operating from bases in northern , which had intensified after the Cairo Agreement of 1969 formalized their presence. These activities remained primarily localized and non-confrontational until sporadic clashes in 1974–1975, as the militia avoided broader engagements while Frangieh navigated national politics through alliances with Syrian influences and moderate Christian elements to maintain presidential authority. , Suleiman's son and parliamentary deputy since 1968, increasingly directed operational aspects, mobilizing clan loyalists for readiness against the rising tide of confessional violence that presaged the civil war's outbreak on , 1975. The group's pro-establishment stance aligned it tentatively with other Maronite factions, though its parochial focus limited expansion beyond Zgharta until the full-scale conflict demanded wider coordination.

Ideology and Principles

Core Ideological Foundations

The Marada Movement's ideological foundations center on , which prioritizes the sovereignty and unity of as an indivisible homeland for all its citizens, rejecting proposals for partition, federation, or cantonal divisions that could undermine national cohesion. This nationalism emerged in the late amid rising tensions from activities in northern Lebanon, positioning the movement as a defender of Maronite Christian communities and broader state integrity against external encroachments. A pivotal tenet is the "army-people-resistance" equation, articulated by leader as the movement's core political platform, which integrates the as the guardian of national defense, popular as the basis of societal resilience, and organized resistance against perceived aggressors, historically including Zionist threats. This framework, rooted in the movement's militia origins during the pre-civil war era, emphasizes a strong institution intertwined with civilian loyalty and auxiliary resistance capabilities to preserve Lebanon's . The ideology also incorporates Christian democratic elements, aligned with Maronite Catholicism, advocating for the maintenance of Lebanon's power-sharing system while subordinating sectarian interests to national imperatives, such as opposition to permanent Palestinian refugee settlement in favor of their . As a right-wing orientation, it favors conservative social structures and feudal-clan loyalties in , historically fostering alliances based on pragmatic rather than ideological purity, though shifts like the pre-2025 pro-Syrian stance reflected adaptive realism over dogmatic consistency.

Positions on Nationalism, Resistance, and Sectarianism

The Marada Movement upholds as a core tenet, emphasizing national sovereignty, the centrality of the in defense, and unity against external threats to . Leader Sleiman Frangieh has repeatedly invoked these principles, calling for collective Lebanese responsibility in confronting Israeli border violations and advocating for a unified front to preserve state institutions amid geopolitical pressures. This stance aligns with the movement's historical roots in defending northern Lebanese regions, though it has evolved to incorporate alliances prioritizing national resilience over isolationist Christian . In terms of resistance, the Marada Movement endorses the "resistance" doctrine, viewing Hezbollah's military actions against as legitimate defense of Lebanese sovereignty, particularly in southern border areas. Frangieh has expressed ongoing confidence in Hezbollah's role post-2024 escalations, arguing that should occur via national dialogue rather than unilateral imposition, distinguishing Marada from anti-resistance Christian groups like the . This position stems from post-2005 alliances within the pro-Syria , where Marada joined Hezbollah in parliamentary coalitions, though it conditions support on alignment with state authority. On sectarianism, the Marada Movement operates firmly within Lebanon's confessional political structure as a Maronite representative from the Zgharta district, without advocating its abolition or secular reform. It has historically engaged in sect-based militancy during the civil war but now pursues cross-sectarian partnerships, such as with Shia-majority Hezbollah and Amal, to bolster national stability over purely confessional agendas. Frangieh's rhetoric stresses inter-communal dialogue for sovereignty, yet critics note this accommodates Hezbollah's dominance without challenging the systemic sectarian power-sharing that allocates parliamentary seats by religious affiliation.

Leadership and Organization

Key Figures and Family Dynasty

The Frangieh family constitutes a hereditary Maronite Christian political dynasty centered in , northern , with roots as Ottoman-era landowners who evolved into post-independence power brokers through sectarian networks. This feudal legacy underpins the Marada Movement's structure, where leadership succession remains confined to male family members, perpetuating control over local constituencies and militia resources. Suleiman Frangieh (1910–1992) anchored the dynasty's modern prominence as 's president from 1970 to 1976, during which he formed the Marada Brigade in 1967 as a private militia to defend family holdings against emerging Palestinian and leftist threats. His son, Antoine "Tony" Frangieh (1941–1978), inherited command of the brigade post-presidency, directing its operations in initial civil war skirmishes until Phalange militiamen under assaulted the family residence in on 13 June 1978, killing Tony, his wife Vera, and their infant daughter Jihane. Following the , interim leadership fell to Suleiman Sr.'s other son, Robert Frangieh, until approximately 1990, when Tony's son, Suleiman Frangieh Jr. (born 18 October 1965), consolidated authority over the reorganized Marada forces. Frangieh Jr. refashioned the brigade into a formal around 1986–2006, securing parliamentary representation for and steering alliances toward Syrian-backed coalitions. As current leader, he embodies the dynasty's resilience, though critics attribute the movement's longevity to confessional clientelism rather than broad ideological appeal.

Internal Structure and Militia Evolution

The Marada Movement's internal structure has been characterized by tight familial control exercised by the Frangieh clan, originating from the district in northern , with decision-making centralized under the family patriarch or his designated successor rather than through formalized bureaucratic layers typical of larger political entities. This clan-based hierarchy drew recruitment primarily from local Maronite communities loyal to the Frangiehs, emphasizing personal allegiance over ideological indoctrination or meritocratic advancement, which facilitated rapid mobilization but limited broader institutionalization. The militia component, initially established in 1967 as the Marada Brigade on instructions from then-President Suleiman Frangieh to protect clan interests, evolved into the Zgharta Liberation Army (ZLA) by the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in April 1975, when it fielded approximately 700-800 fighters equipped with small arms and operating from Zgharta as a parochial defense force. Under the command of Frangieh's son Tony, the ZLA initially aligned with other Christian militias against Palestinian and leftist forces but shifted toward pro-Syrian orientation following Tony's assassination in the 1978 Ehden massacre by Phalangist rivals, prompting retaliatory actions and integration into Syrian-backed operations in northern Lebanon. Post-1978, the militia's evolution reflected adaptive survival amid factional realignments, maintaining a modest scale compared to dominant groups like the Lebanese Forces while leveraging Syrian logistical support for territorial control in Zgharta and adjacent areas, though exact peak strength beyond initial figures remains undocumented in primary accounts. By the late 1980s, under continued Frangieh family oversight—shifting to Tony's brother Robert and later his son Suleiman Frangieh Jr.—the ZLA participated in the 1987 militia-government disarmament pacts but faced coerced dissolution under Syrian influence enforcing the 1989 Taif Accord, marking its transition from armed paramilitary to a purely political organization by 1991. This disarmament preserved the movement's core through electoral focus, retaining informal networks of former fighters as a political base without reconstituting overt military structures.

Role in the Lebanese Civil War

Militia Formation and Defensive Operations

The Marada Brigade, alternatively designated the , originated in 1967 under the auspices of , a Maronite za'im who ascended to the Lebanese presidency in 1970, serving as a private armed force to safeguard familial and regional interests in the district of northern . This formation preceded the by eight years, drawing its nomenclature from the historical Marada warriors, an ancient Maronite Christian group renowned for resistance against Arab conquests. At the war's inception in April 1975, the militia mustered approximately 700 fighters equipped primarily with surplus small arms, reflecting its initial parochial character amid rising sectarian strife. Under the leadership of , Suleiman's son, the brigade prioritized defensive postures in and adjacent areas, functioning as the vanguard for a northern Christian against encroachments from Palestinian-fedayeen, leftist factions, and Sunni militias emanating from Tripoli. Operations centered on fortifying local defenses, repelling incursions into Maronite territories, and securing supply lines to , the Frangieh family seat, through ambushes and static positions rather than broad offensives. These efforts preserved Zgharta's during early war phases, when broader Christian alliances like the faltered under multi-front pressures. The pivotal Ehden clash on June 13, 1978, wherein Kataeb Party commandos under Samir Geagea assassinated Tony Frangieh, his immediate family, and roughly 40 Marada personnel, precipitated a strategic pivot toward Syrian alignment for survival. Post-massacre, the militia, now under Robert Frangieh's interim command, leveraged Syrian military backing to reinforce Zgharta against retaliatory thrusts from the emergent Lebanese Forces, a Kataeb-dominated coalition. Defensive engagements intensified along the Zgharta-Tripoli axis, incorporating Syrian-supplied weaponry to counter assaults from Sunni groups and residual anti-Syrian Christian elements, thereby sustaining the district as a pro-Damascus bastion until the war's denouement. By the , the brigade's operations remained predominantly territorial, aiding Syrian stabilization efforts in the north while avoiding entanglement in Beirut's urban maelstroms, a restraint attributable to its localized recruitment base and Frangieh directives emphasizing preservation over conquest. This defensive orientation, bolstered intermittently by collaborations with the Army of Free Lebanon dissidents, ensured Zgharta's endurance amid cascading defeats elsewhere for Christian militias, culminating in the brigade's dissolution in 1991 pursuant to the Taif Accord's disarmament mandates.

Major Battles and Alliances

The Marada Brigade, the armed wing of the Marada Movement also known as the , initially participated in the Lebanese Front's collective defense against the Lebanon National Movement and Palestinian Liberation Organization forces in the early civil war years from 1975 onward, operating primarily in northern around and Tripoli with a force of about 700-800 fighters equipped with small arms. This alignment reflected the Frangieh clan's position within the broader Maronite Christian coalition resisting perceived threats to 's confessional balance. A pivotal shift occurred after the on June 13, 1978, when Phalangist militiamen under assaulted Tony Frangieh's residence in Ehden, killing him, his wife, and over 30 family members and guards in an inter-Maronite clan conflict aimed at eliminating a rival to Kataeb dominance. In direct response, Marada forces conducted the Qaa massacre on June 28, 1978, capturing and executing 26 Kataeb members in the Bekaa Valley villages of Qaa and Ras Baalbek as reprisal. The massacre prompted the Marada Movement's withdrawal from the and a strategic pivot toward alliance with Syrian military intervention forces, which had entered in 1976 and increasingly backed pro-Syria Christian factions against anti-Syrian elements like the Phalangists. Subsequent engagements included ongoing inter-Christian skirmishes in northern , such as clashes in 1979 where Marada forces threatened to sever power lines to East amid disputes with Kataeb-controlled areas, underscoring persistent rivalries despite the Syrian alignment. Tensions with Syrian also erupted periodically, as in the over-10-day battle for Qnat village in the region, where Syrian troops occupied the area against local Marada resistance. The brigade's pro-Syria stance facilitated its survival and operations in Tripoli and through the 1980s, though it remained a minor player compared to larger militias, focusing on regional control rather than major offensives.

Post-War Political Trajectory

Transition to Political Party

Following the Taif Agreement of October 1989, which ended the and required the dissolution of private militias by March 1991 (with the exception of Hezbollah's armed wing), the Marada Brigade formally disbanded its military structure and reorganized as the Marada Movement, a secular primarily representing Maronite Christian interests in northern . This transition aligned with the broader postwar effort to demilitarize Lebanese factions and shift focus to parliamentary politics under the revised power-sharing system outlined in , which reduced Christian parliamentary seats but emphasized national reconciliation. Sleiman Frangieh Jr., who had assumed informal leadership of the Marada forces in the 1980s following the 1978 assassination of his father , drove the party's formation and entry into electoral politics. Running as an independent candidate in the district, Frangieh secured a parliamentary seat in the August 1992 elections, the first postwar vote held under Syrian oversight, thereby establishing the Marada Movement's foothold in the with a pro-Syria orientation that reflected its historical alliances during the . The party's platform emphasized regional autonomy for northern districts, socioeconomic development in , and opposition to perceived marginalization of Maronite communities, while maintaining a family-centric structure tied to the Frangieh clan. By 1991, the organization had fully shed its militia identity, numbering around 1,000-2,000 former fighters who transitioned to political or security roles under state authority.

Engagement During Syrian Influence and Withdrawal

The Marada Movement, re-established as a political entity in the under 's leadership, aligned closely with Syrian interests during the post-Taif period of Damascus's dominance in . Frangieh, elected to parliament in 1991, leveraged Syrian support to restore the family's influence in and northern regions, participating in pro-Syrian cabinets and distinguishing the movement from anti-occupation Christian groups like the . In the lead-up to the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, prompted by the February 14 assassination of Rafik Hariri, the Marada opposed the Cedar Revolution's mass demonstrations demanding an end to Syrian presence. As part of the pro-Syrian camp, the movement mobilized alongside allies such as Hezbollah and Amal to counter anti-Syrian protests and advocate for preserving Lebanon's "special relationship" with Syria. Syria completed its military pullout on April 26, 2005, following international pressure and domestic unrest, yet the Marada Movement reaffirmed its orientation by integrating into the opposition alliance after the May 2005 elections. This coalition, including , framed the withdrawal not as a rupture but as a continuation of strategic coordination with , with Frangieh's longstanding ties—stemming from family connections to Syrian leadership—underpinning the movement's position.

Modern Politics and Alliances

Electoral Performance and Parliamentary Role

The Marada Movement has contested Lebanese parliamentary elections since its reestablishment as a in 2006, primarily securing representation through alliances within the and leveraging familial influence in the northern Zgharta-Zawiya area of the North III . In the 2018 general election, the party aligned with the and others to win representation focused on Maronite and minority seats in the north, maintaining a foothold amid competition from rival Christian factions like the . By the 2022 election on May 15, Marada candidates, in with the , secured three seats, two of which were in , reflecting localized voter loyalty rather than nationwide appeal; , son of party leader , obtained 8,945 preferential votes there. As of January 2025, the movement holds four seats in the 128-member parliament, contributing to the pro-Hezbollah bloc's minority position. Marada's parliamentary role emphasizes bloc voting within the , advocating for policies aligned with Syrian and Iranian interests, including resistance against Israeli actions and opposition to sanctions-driven reforms. MPs such as have engaged in committees on information technology and defense, while the party's leader, , positioned himself as a presidential contender in 2023, endorsed by for his pro-resistance stance, though the bid failed amid quorum shortfalls and rival Christian opposition. This limited influence underscores Marada's reliance on coalition dynamics and regional patronage over independent legislative initiative, with seats often sustained by preferential voting in clan-dominated districts rather than ideological breadth.

Alignment with March 8 Coalition and Hezbollah

The Marada Movement formally aligned with the March 8 Coalition upon its establishment on March 8, 2005, as a pro-Syrian political bloc opposing the anti-Syrian in the aftermath of Rafik Hariri's assassination. This positioning reflected Marada's historical ties to the Syrian regime during its occupation of (1976–2005), with leader maintaining personal and political connections to that facilitated integration into the coalition alongside , , and the (FPM). The alliance provided Marada, as a Maronite Christian , a platform to advocate for confessional power-sharing while endorsing Syrian influence as a stabilizing force against perceived Western interventionism. Marada's partnership with within the framework deepened through pragmatic electoral cooperation and mutual endorsements, particularly evident in parliamentary elections. In the 2009 elections, Marada contested seats under lists, securing representation in northern districts like , where Frangieh's family stronghold bolstered the coalition's Christian outreach. This collaboration intensified post-2011, as backed Marada candidates to consolidate the bloc's hold on minority votes amid Syria's civil war spillover; for instance, in 2018 parliamentary polls, Marada won three seats allied with -dominated lists, prioritizing anti-March 14 unity over ideological divergences on 's armament. Frangieh publicly defended 's role as a "resistance" force against , framing the alliance as essential for Lebanon's sovereignty against external threats, despite criticisms from Maronite rivals like the who accused Marada of subordinating Christian interests to Shia hegemony. A pivotal demonstration of alignment occurred during the 2023–2024 presidential deadlock, when Hezbollah explicitly endorsed Frangieh as its preferred Maronite candidate on March 6, 2023, with Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah praising his "nationalist" stance and reliability in upholding cross-sectarian pacts like the 1989 Taif Accord. This support, coordinated with Amal, aimed to install a consensus president amenable to Hezbollah's military and veto powers, though Frangieh's bid faltered amid opposition from Sunni and Druze factions. Frangieh reciprocated by reaffirming "confidence" in Hezbollah amid regional escalations, including the group's October 2023 clashes with Israel, positioning Marada as a bridge between Christian communities and Hezbollah's Iran-backed axis without formal military integration. Tensions surfaced occasionally, such as Frangieh's brief 2016 withdrawal from March 8 over candidacy disputes, but core alignment persisted, driven by shared opposition to sanctions on Syria and Hezbollah rather than ideological convergence on the latter's disarmament. This partnership has drawn scrutiny for enabling Hezbollah's dominance in state institutions, with Marada's parliamentary votes often aligning on budgets and security policies that accommodate the group's parallel structures, as seen in joint resistance to UN Resolution 1701 enforcement. Proponents within Marada argue the coalition preserves Maronite leverage in a fragmented , citing Frangieh's role in averting total Christian marginalization post-2005, while detractors highlight risks of entanglement in Hezbollah's conflicts, including alleged militia revivals in amid 2024 border tensions. By 2025, the alliance remained intact despite Hezbollah's military setbacks, underscoring Marada's strategic adaptation to power realities over purist anti-militia stances.

Developments from 2010 to 2025

In the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, Marada leader initially positioned himself as a consensus candidate but withdrew his bid in favor of , facilitating Aoun's eventual election on October 31, 2016, as part of broader coalition dynamics. The movement maintained its alignment with during this period, with Frangieh emphasizing that the partnership transcended electoral considerations and focused on shared strategic interests. The Marada Movement participated in the May 6, 2018, parliamentary elections as part of the opposition alliance, securing three seats primarily in the northern district, preserving its regional influence amid Hezbollah-affiliated gains. During Aoun's presidency, the party supported government initiatives while advocating for Maronite interests in the face of economic strains and the 2019 protests. In the May 15, 2022, elections, held against the backdrop of economic collapse and the 2020 Beirut port explosion, Marada lost two seats, retaining one in parliament and highlighting vulnerabilities in its base despite coalition ties. Following the expiration of Aoun's term on October 31, 2022, Frangieh reemerged as a presidential contender, receiving explicit endorsement from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on March 6, 2023, as a candidate acceptable to Syrian and Iranian allies. The presidential vacancy persisted through multiple failed parliamentary sessions, exacerbated by regional tensions including the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Frangieh reaffirmed confidence in Hezbollah amid these challenges. On January 8, 2025, Frangieh withdrew his candidacy, endorsing Lebanese Armed Forces commander Joseph Aoun, who was elected president the following day, ending the over two-year deadlock. This shift reflected pragmatic adjustments amid Hezbollah's diminished capacity post-2024 military setbacks.

Military Actions and Controversies

Documented Engagements and Clashes

The Marada Brigade, also operating as the Zgharta Liberation Army, engaged in early sectarian clashes in northern Lebanon during the initial phases of the civil war. On September 2–6, 1975, Maronite gunmen from Zgharta clashed with Sunni Muslims from Tripoli following the killing of a Tripolitan by a Zgharta resident, with fighting persisting until a ceasefire on September 6. Renewed hostilities erupted in December 1975 between Marada forces and Sunni militias in Tripoli, exacerbating north Lebanese sectarian tensions. Inter-militia rivalries among Maronite factions led to documented violence against political opponents. On June 7, 1978, six Marada militiamen assassinated Joud el Bayeh, the Kataeb party's representative in , amid efforts to establish a local office, intensifying frictions after the Marada Movement's withdrawal from the in May of that year. This incident contributed to broader clashes between Marada fighters and Kataeb members in the region. The assassination preceded the on June 13, 1978, where Phalangist forces attacked Marada leader Tony Frangieh's residence, killing him and several family members, though this represented a retaliatory strike rather than an initiated Marada engagement. Marada-aligned operations often involved civilian-targeted actions during the war's escalation. On November 15, 1978, Marada gunmen attacked the villages of Alali and Rasha in northern , kidnapping 15 civilians, beating them, and killing two. In October 1979, Marada forces released 170 abducted civilians from Selaata, Chekka, and to the International Committee of the Red Cross after holding them for a month. On April 22, 1980, Marada gunmen assaulted a house party in Shamout, northern , killing at least 15 unarmed civilians and abducting others. Syrian-Marada cooperation yielded further clashes in early 1980. Following inter-Christian fighting between Kataeb and Marada forces, Syrian , supported by Marada elements, attacked Qnat village from February 5–17, 1980, killing 50 civilians and displacing thousands over more than 10 days of bombardment and assault. The also clashed with forces in locations including Tripoli, , , , and , as part of broader Christian militia opposition to Palestinian insurgents. No major documented militia engagements by Marada forces occurred post-1990 after the mandated disarmament, though the movement's pro-Syrian alignment positioned it politically against anti-Syrian Christian groups like the , without verified armed clashes.

Allegations of Violence and Responses

In the , 2021, clashes in 's Tayouneh neighborhood, supporters of the Marada Movement joined a protest organized by the —alongside and partisans—against Judge Tarek Bitar's probe into the 2020 Beirut port explosion, which escalated into gunfire and resulted in six to seven deaths and over 30 injuries. Opponents from the and alleged that the coalition's demonstrators, including Marada affiliates, arrived armed and provoked sectarian confrontation by advancing into contested Christian areas, with some reports citing retaliatory use of rocket-propelled grenades by protesters. The Marada Movement rejected claims of initiating violence, asserting that the deaths—primarily among their allies—stemmed from sniper fire and ambushes originating from buildings in Lebanese Forces-controlled zones, framing the incident as a deliberate attempt by rivals to sabotage the and inflame divisions. Marada leaders, including Suleiman Frangieh Jr., maintained the demonstration was lawful and necessary to counter perceived politicization of the investigation, while condemning any and calling for restraint to prevent broader sectarian strife. In northern , particularly —Marada's traditional stronghold—opponents have accused the party of employing intimidation tactics during electoral contests, including the May 2025 municipal elections, where clashes, gunfire, and over 140 security interventions marred voting amid claims of voter suppression favoring Marada candidates, who secured all 21 council seats. The Movement has dismissed such accusations as politically motivated smears from underperforming rivals, attributing incidents to spontaneous electoral fervor rather than organized thuggery, and emphasizing their victories as reflective of genuine local support.

Legacy and Assessments

Contributions to Maronite and National Interests

The Marada Movement has contributed to Maronite interests by sustaining political representation for northern Christian communities, particularly in the district, where the Frangieh family holds significant influence. Since transitioning from a to a formal , it has fielded candidates in parliamentary elections, securing seats that amplify Maronite voices in Lebanon's confessional legislature. , the movement's leader, was first elected to in 1991, enabling advocacy for and Christian rights amid sectarian tensions. In terms of national interests, the Marada Movement's alignment with the March 8 coalition has positioned it to influence policies on security and resistance against Israeli actions, integrating Maronite perspectives into broader Lebanese defense strategies. As one of the few Christian groups endorsing armed resistance to , it has maintained close ties with , facilitating Christian input in coalition decisions that affect national sovereignty. This pragmatic engagement is argued by supporters to prevent Maronite marginalization and promote inter-sectarian cooperation essential for Lebanon's stability. The movement's role in intra-Maronite reconciliations, such as the 2018 agreement with rival factions including the under the auspices of the Maronite Patriarchate, has reduced historical enmities and fostered unity within the community, indirectly bolstering national cohesion by mitigating internal Christian divisions that exacerbated past conflicts.

Criticisms and Broader Evaluations

The Marada Movement has faced significant criticism from fellow Maronite Christians and opposition factions for its longstanding alliance with and the coalition, which is perceived as subordinating Lebanese sovereignty to Iranian and Syrian interests. Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai has repeatedly condemned such alignments, arguing they exacerbate foreign interference and undermine national neutrality, as evidenced by his 2020 call for Lebanon to adopt a neutral stance amid regional crises. Other Maronite leaders, including those from the , view the Marada's pro- stance as a of Christian interests, contributing to intra-communal divisions that weakened Maronite political cohesion post-Cedar Revolution. Critics, including reformist voices and international observers, accuse the movement of political opportunism, exemplified by Jr.'s repeated presidential candidacies backed by —such as in 2016 and 2023—which prioritized power-sharing deals over broader consensus, alienating anti-Syrian factions and stalling governance reforms. This has been compounded by allegations of perpetuating confessional patronage, with Frangieh's stronghold criticized for electoral irregularities, including 15 reported fraud cases in recent local polls. The movement's historical militia activities during the (1975–1990), under the banner, drew rebukes for sectarian violence, including clashes with the in 1984 over northern villages and later skirmishes with Sunni groups in Tripoli. Post-war, while formally disarmed, Marada affiliates have been linked to localized tensions, fueling perceptions of reliance on strongman tactics rather than democratic evolution. Broader evaluations highlight the Marada's role in entrenching Lebanon's dysfunctional elite consensus, with U.S. sanctions on Frangieh associates in 2023 signaling concerns over ties, such as smuggling probes dismissed by Frangieh as politicized. Despite occasional rhetoric supporting anti-corruption measures, the party's alignment with has hindered cross-sectarian reform efforts, as noted in analyses of its contribution to presidential vacuums and economic stagnation through 2025. This has led to assessments that, while safeguarding Zgharta's local influence, the Marada exacerbates national paralysis by prioritizing familial and alliance loyalties over institutional accountability.

References

  1. https://fanack.com/lebanon/politics-of-lebanon/untangling-lebanons-sectarian-system/
  2. https://encyclopediageopolitica.com/2019/05/25/the-political-dynasties-of-lebanon-the-presidential-family-of-frangieh/
  3. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Tony_Frangieh
  4. https://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/politics/750633/marada-movement-head-frangieh-withdraws-candidacy
  5. http://alwaght.net/en/News/11270/Al-Marada-Movement-in-Lebanon
  6. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-backs-christian-politician-frangieh-presidency-2023-03-06/
  7. https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/young-lebanese-still-shaped-by-decades-old-civil-war-1.63263807
  8. https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Marada_Movement
  9. https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Marada_Brigade
  10. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/lebanon/110850.htm
  11. https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/861442
  12. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Zgharta_Liberation_Army
  13. https://m.naharnet.com/stories/en/233406-franjieh-army-people-resistance-is-my-political-platform
  14. https://m.naharnet.com/stories/en/143583-franjieh-urges-unity-in-face-of-terrorism-army-people-resistance-equation-has-imposed-itself
  15. https://english.almanar.com.lb/773764
  16. https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/lebanon-news/802946/frangieh-lebanon-must-emerge-united-and-victorious-from-this-aggressio/en
  17. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1478593/frangieh-reaffirms-his-confidence-in-hezbollah-and-pays-tribute-to-nasrallah.html
  18. https://m.naharnet.com/stories/en/312675-franjieh-hezbollah-has-not-ended-disarmament-must-be-through-dialogue
  19. https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-hezbollah-pummels-north-lebanons-christians-divided-on-support-for-terror-group/
  20. https://providencemag.com/2024/12/christian-militias-opposing-hezbollah-in-lebanon/
  21. https://europeelects.eu/2020/06/03/lebanon-sectarian-politics-and-electoral-unrest/
  22. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/lebanon-hezbollah-bombing/
  23. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/123861/1/MEC_protesting-lebanese-sectarian-elites--paper-87.pdf
  24. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/a-circle-from-frangieh-to-frangieh-in-lebanon-1.94370305
  25. https://en.majalla.com/node/292681/profiles/suleiman-frangieh-president-who-witnessed-outbreak-lebanons-civil-war
  26. https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/lebanon/2023/03/08/suleiman-frangieh-the-man-backed-by-hezbollah-to-become-lebanons-next-president/
  27. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308339533_The_Ehden_Massacre_of_1978_in_Lebanon_-_The_Creation_of_a_Resistance_Myth
  28. https://uva.theopenscholar.com/files/jonah-schulhofer-wohl/files/qcw_ch3.pdf
  29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02484.7
  30. https://ahl-alquran.com/arabic/printpage.php?doc_type=60&doc_id=453
  31. https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6952&context=utk_gradthes
  32. https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft6c6006x6&chunk.id=ch10&toc.depth=1&toc.id=ch10&brand=ucpress
  33. https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Lebanon-Mapping-2013-EN_0.pdf
  34. https://www.timesofisrael.com/lebanese-civil-war-rivals-end-decades-of-hostility-sparked-by-massacre/
  35. https://www.lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/c368be59.-The-demobilisation-of-the-Lebanese-Militias-Elizabeth-Picard.pdf
  36. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Army_of_Free_Lebanon
  37. https://alwaght.net/en/News/11270/Al-Marada-Movement-in-Lebanon
  38. https://ahl-alquran.com/arabic/document.php?main_id=453
  39. https://www.cetri.be/A-quiet-revolution-in-lebanon-s
  40. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/05/archives/lebanese-clan-presses-fight-with-other-christian-faction-6-in.html
  41. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Lebanon-Mapping-2013-EN_0.pdf
  42. https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf
  43. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/05/the-unraveling-of-lebanons-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing?lang=en
  44. https://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3472/1/Political_Economy_of_Lebanon_%28Fouad_G_MAREI%29.pdf
  45. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/five-decades-of-questions-lebanon-post-syria-occupation/
  46. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/05/12/sleiman-frangieh-france-s-controversial-candidate-for-lebanese-president_6026436_4.html
  47. https://merip.org/2005/09/syria-and-lebanon-a-brotherhood-transformed/
  48. https://www.the961.com/final-results-lebanon-elections-2022/
  49. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-11/final_2022-parliamentary_elections_key_results_brochure_web.pdf
  50. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/lebanon-s-parliament-faces-challenges-in-electing-president-after-over-2-years-of-political-deadlock/3444914
  51. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/02-influence-through-state-institutions
  52. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/3194691/how-hezbollah-took-over-lebanon/
  53. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lebanons-presidential-elections-how-shifting-power-dynamics-delivered-win-iran
  54. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/lebanon-s-elections-hezbollah-in-the-driver-s-seat/
  55. https://apnews.com/article/hezbollah-nasrallah-president-frangieh-lebanon-658ff1d65764ec2941d4af1ae8d1b42e
  56. https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/lebanon/2023/03/08/why-have-hezbollah-and-amal-chosen-to-back-suleiman-frangieh/
  57. https://khazen.org/cracks-appear-in-lebanon-s-hezbollah-led-march-8-coalition/
  58. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanons-post-hezbollah-day-after/
  59. https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/are-hezbollah-s-alliances-in-lebanon-fracturing-after-split-with-free-patriotic-movement
  60. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2016/02/lebanons-divisive-presidency?lang=en
  61. https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/lebanon-news/106145/mp-sleiman-frangieh-our-alliance-with-hezbollah-not-related-to-elector/en
  62. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/10/unpicking-the-results-of-lebanons-elections
  63. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN10900/IN10900.4.pdf
  64. https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/150/lebanon%25E2%2580%2599s-parliamentary-elections-how-did-the-opposition-win
  65. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/lebanons-frangieh-withdraws-presidential-bid-backs-army-chief/3445252
  66. https://www.voanews.com/a/lebanon-s-parliament-chooses-army-commander-aoun-as-president-ending-long-deadlock/7930857.html
  67. https://www.lebanonmemory.com/detailed-history
  68. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanese-judge-charges-dozens-over-fatal-beirut-clashes-2021-10-25/
  69. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/10/14/world/beirut-lebanon-clashes
  70. https://www.mei.edu/publications/making-sense-beirut-clashes
  71. https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/10/14/photos-armed-clashes-erupts-in-beirut-in-protest-against-blast-judge
  72. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/details-of-beirut-clashes-remain-unclear-as-lebanon-marks-protests-anniversary-682256
  73. https://www.newarab.com/news/chaos-and-fraud-claims-overshadow-north-lebanon-municipal-vote
  74. https://naharnet.com/stories/en/312699-north-lebanon-municipal-elections-marred-by-some-clashes
  75. https://nowlebanon.com/elections-gunfire/
  76. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-president-lebanon-0
  77. https://thearabweekly.com/political-survival-drives-lebanese-maronites-reconciliation
  78. https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/lebanons-maronite-leader-calls-neutrality-overcome-national-crisis/20200715152554146625.html
  79. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160105-the-failing-frangieh-presidential-experiment/
  80. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1459795/zgharta-frangieh-moawad-trade-corruption-allegations.html
  81. https://www.c-r.org/accord/lebanon/ex-militia-fighters-post-war-lebanon
  82. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1334011/sanctions-against-the-rahme-brothers-an-american-message-to-frangieh.html
  83. https://www.mtv.com.lb/en/news/articles/1053655/frangieh-fuel-fraud-case-is-political%2C-judiciary-is-politicized
  84. https://menaribo.com/2015/12/09/sleiman-frangieh-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.