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Mixed brigade
View on Wikipedia| Mixed Brigades Brigadas Mixtas | |
|---|---|
Standard of the 106 Mixed Brigade of the Popular Army of the Spanish Republic | |
| Active | 1936–1939 |
| Country | |
| Branch | Spanish Republican Armed Forces |
| Type | Infantry brigade |
| Role | Home Defence |
| Part of | Spanish Republican Army divisions |
| Engagements | Spanish Civil War |
| Commanders | |
| Notable commanders | Enrique Líster José María Galán |
Mixed brigade (Spanish: brigada mixta) was a basic tactical military unit of the Republican army during the Spanish Civil War. It was initially designed as "pocket division", an innovative maneuverable combined-arms formation. Because of high saturation with specialized troops and services it would have resembled a division, but in terms of manpower it would have been much smaller and amount to some 3,700 men.
Shortages of career officers and NCOs plus inability to provide arms and equipment needed rendered the original mixed brigade pattern unworkable. The Republican general staff kept redrafting the scheme with decreasing proportion of non-infantry sub-units, though even these arrangements proved impossible to implement. Most of the 188 mixed brigades raised during the war were closer to the infantry regiment blueprint.
Assumptions about the nature of the warfare which gave rise to the mixed brigade concept were largely correct. However, the Republic could not have afforded such highly-specialized and well-equipped units. Attempts to implement the scheme put extra strain on the Republican recruitment and logistics system; as a result, the mixed brigade scheme was counterproductive and worked to the detriment of the Republican military capacity.
Origins
[edit]
Origins of the mixed brigade concept are not clear and in historiography there are various theories which point to its beginnings. One is related to debates within the Spanish general staff of the 1920s; banking on experiences of the Rif War, some officers suggested formation of relatively small, flexible combined-arms units.[1] In the early 1930s and influenced by Swiss attempts,[2] two Brigadas Mixtas were ordered to be formed as Spanish mountain troops.[3] During further discussions of the mid-1930s the idea that the Spanish army should include a large number of autonomous units smaller than división organica was gradually taking root.[4]
A somewhat competitive theory claims that the concept was merely an acknowledgement of warfare reality during first weeks of the Civil War. During July, August and September 1936 most fighting took place between improvised, relatively small, lightly armed and highly maneuverable groups, usually referred to as "columns". The Republican general staff reportedly concluded that they should turn this makeshift model into a systematic and structured scheme and units raised in this way should emphasize mobility and flexibility rather than manpower.[5] One more theory credits Soviet military advisers, present in Spain since early October 1936, for coining the concept;[6] one version of this theory holds that the Soviets merely encouraged the Republican general staff to implement the idea which had already been in circulation for some time.[7]
Underlying concept: "pocket division"
[edit]
The basic assumption which triggered emergence of the mixed brigade concept was that the war in Spain would be about flexibility rather than manpower. Such a vision elicited the idea that the key army unit should be able to operate independently, without support of other specialized units typically assigned to larger military formations (e.g. unlike a typical infantry regiment, which requires support of other divisional services to achieve military objectives). This in turn produced a conclusion that the key army unit should be a highly maneuverable, combined-arms formation.
The resulting vision was "a cross between a reinforced regiment and a very small division",[8] a "little great unit",[9] "division en miniatura"[10] or a "pocket division": a unit which in terms of manpower would be much smaller than a division, but which would reproduce some of divisional features by means of large proportion of specialized and support sub-units. This vision was eventually embodied in a scheme of a "mixed brigade"; the term "mixed" was to indicate its combined-arms composition, making it different from a typical infantry unit of comparable size.[11] Mixed brigades were supposed to operate independently and to be grouped into a larger formation only for the purpose of waging a particular campaign or battle, but not as its permanent components.
Theoretical composition
[edit]The original scheme as worked out in 1936 envisioned that a mixed brigade would be made of 3,700 soldiers.[12] Internal composition was to be as follows:
- brigade staff
- 4 infantry battalions. Each battalion was to consist of 4 infantry companies, 1 machine-gun company and 1 platoon of mortars. In comparison the regular army division, named "división orgánica", was composed of 2 brigades, each brigade composed of 2 regiments, each regiment composed of 3 battalions[13]
- 1 field artillery group. It was to be composed of 4 batteries of medium artillery (usually 75 mm guns) and 1 battery of heavy artillery (usually 105 mm guns). In comparison the regular army division was to consist of 1 regiment of light artillery and 1 regiment of heavy howitzers[14]
- 1 cavalry squadron (in alternative versions replaced with motorized infantry). In comparison the regular army division was also to include 1 squadron, on wartime footing enlarged to 1 cavalry regiment[15]
- 1 pioneer company. The regular army division was to incorporate 1 battalion of pioneers[16]
- 1 motorized reconnaissance squadron[17]
- 1 communication and logistics group. It was to consist of dedicated communication (including radio transmission), intendancy and supply-logistics sub-units
- other support sub-units, including a sanitary and medical detachment
In terms of manpower the mixed brigade as originally envisioned was in-between a regular army infantry regiment and a regular brigade. In terms of firepower it would have been stronger than a brigade. In most European armies of the late 1930s (which unlike the Spanish army did not feature brigades as fixed divisional units[18]) it would have been comparable to a very strong regiment.[19] In terms of modus operandi and because of its general autonomy a mixed brigade was somewhat resemblant of a division.
Implementation problems
[edit]
Not a single unit has ever been raised in line with the original plan, all units named brigadas mixtas differed significantly and then very significantly from the scheme, and the entire original concept remained largely on paper. Initially the reason were pressing wartime necessities; the Nationalist army was approaching Madrid and half-formed units were thrown into battle before they reached the structure envisioned.[20] Later it turned out that the Republic was unable to provide all weapons and equipment needed, and that shortage of NCOs and officers made it impossible to ensure their sufficient number even for traditional army units. Finally, in later stages of the war the increasingly dramatic military situation forced Republican high command to raise troops in non-systematic, makeshift manner.[21]
Because of problems with raising mixed brigades in line with the original plan, the Republican general staff was continuously re-drafting their structure; the change was generally about reducing the weight of non-infantry components[22] and enlarging infantry battalions (eventually from 633 to 828 men).[23] The result was decreasing firepower and increasing manpower of the entire unit; final versions of the brigada mixta scheme envisioned its strength as some 4,200 people, though less than a half would serve in frontline combat sub-units.[24] However, neither these revised plans have been implemented and brigada mixta theoretical schemes as developed in 1937-1938 remained a blueprint intended, but never fully put into practice.[25]
Practice
[edit]
The concept of mixed brigades was discussed during sittings of the Republican government in late September 1936;[26] the first known military document which refers to raising of these units is dated 18 October 1936[27] and the first 6 units were created shortly.[28] By December 1936 there were 15 brigades deployed,[29] and by the spring of 1937 there were 40 units operational.[30] Those formed in central Spain were numbered 1-50, those raised in the Levante and Andalusia were numbered 51-82, whose those built in the North were numbered until 189.[31] The last brigade formed was numbered 246 and was created in December 1938,[32] though the number of units actually raised which entered combat was around 190.[33] Most of the build-up process was controlled by the military. Manpower was provided by distributing pre-war regiments among the brigades,[34] by incorporating earlier militia units active on the front, and then by regular draft (though there were also volunteers).[citation needed]
Units raised as mixed brigades resembled rather a traditional infantry regiment.[35] Their strength was some 3,500 men, though the number of rifles available was below 2,000;[36] in practice an average unit counted some 1,600-1,800 rifles.[37] In all 188 units created there were only 49 career officers acting either as commanders or chiefs of staff.[38] Non-infantry sub-units were increasingly smaller; as general staff experts noted artillery was too dispersed, to gain critical mass guns and howitzers were shifted to divisional units.[39] Deployment of mixed brigades differed significantly from the original plan; instead of operating as autonomous units, they were grouped by 3 into divisions[40] and remained their fixed components. However, the concept of brigada mixta resulted in some change of divisional tactics. Though in terms of manpower (some 14,000 people)[41] comparable to a Nationalist division,[42] the Republican division was more loosely organized and its sub-components retained much greater autonomy.[43]
Evaluation
[edit]
Scholars note that the underlying assumptions which gave rise to the mixed brigade concept were basically correct, and that the nature of warfare during the Spanish Civil War indeed favored mobility, flexibility and autonomy over structure, manpower and hierarchical organization. They also note that the innovative idea of creating combined-arms units below the divisional level was later successfully implemented during World War Two in form of the improvised German Kampfgruppen.[44] However, they also noted that the mixed brigade scheme was one that the Republic could not have afforded, and that attempts to implement it produced more harm than good.
The key point raised is that mixed brigades required even more specialists, NCOs, and career officers than pre-war brigades; as the Republic faced dramatic shortages of skilled military men, enforcing the scheme made matters even worse.[45] Another point is that the Republic was unable to provide sufficient equipment and arms, and as a result non-infantry sub-units remained to a large extent an under-armed and under-equipped fiction. Splitting up the artillery gravely reduced firepower.[46] Finally, it is noted that the mixed brigade pattern was a "waste of men", as an unusually high proportion of soldiers were assigned to non-combat roles.[47] One military historian claims that "thanks to the decision to adopt the mixed brigade as its basic unit, the People's Army was crippled as a fighting force almost from its very inception".[48]
Favorable comments are related not that much to the mixed brigade itself, but rather to its role within larger military units. It is noted that divisions formed from mixed brigades were more flexible, and that loose organisation of such divisions allowed greater efficiency when manoeuvre and relatively open front determined the nature of military operations.[49] However, otherwise the mixed-brigade-based organisation might have contributed to chaos.[50]
Mixed Brigades
[edit]The Mixed Brigades of the International Brigades are in Roman numerals.
1st to 100th
[edit]| Number | Establishment date | Disbandment date | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | 10 October 1936 | 9 February 1939 | From the Fifth Regiment. |
| 2nd | 13 October 1936 | February 1939 | Included railroad workers. |
| 3rd | October 1936 | March 1939 (?)[51] | Carabineros unit.[52] |
| 4th | November 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 5th | October 1936 | 28 March 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 6th | October 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 7th | 27 March 1937 | 27 March 1939 | |
| 8th | 27 March 1937 | 27 March 1939 | Carabineros unit. Formerly "Brigada M". |
| 9th | 23 January 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Initially known as 1st Brigada Mixta Bis. |
| 10th | 21 December 1936 | 9 February 1939 | Initially known as 1st Brigada móvil choque. |
| XI[53] | 22 February 1936 | February 1939 | |
| XII[54] | 1 November 1936 | 9 February 1939 | |
| XIII | 1 December 1936 | February 1939 | Former "Columna Temple y Rebeldía". |
| XIV | 1 December 1936 | 25 September 1938 | |
| XIV Bis | 27 November 1937 | 23 February 1938 | XIV offshoot organized by Jules Dumont.[55][56] |
| XV[57] | 31 January 1937 | February 1939 | Lincoln Battalion part of this brigade. |
| 16th | December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 17th | December 1936 | 28 March 1939 | |
| 18th | November 1936 | 28 March 1939 | |
| 19th | December 8936 | 31 January 1939 | |
| 20th | November 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 21st | December 1936 | 17 January 1939 | |
| 22nd | November 1936 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Peire". |
| 23rd | October 1936 | January 1939 | |
| 24th | December 1936 | January 1939 | |
| 25th | November 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 26th | October 1936 | 28 March 1939 | |
| 27th | December 1936 | 28 March 1939 | |
| 28th | October 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 29th | October 1936 | 28 March 1939 | Former "Columna Cuevas". |
| 30th | 31 December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 31st | 2 January 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 32nd | 31 December 1936 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Mangada". |
| 33rd | 6 January 1937 | 4 February 1939 | |
| 34th | 1 January 1937 | 27 March 1939 | Former "Columna Robledo". |
| 35th | 1 January 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 36th | 1 January 1937 | March 1939 | Took part in the so-called "Usera Tunnel Scam". |
| 37th | 31 December 1936 | February 1939 | |
| 38th | 31 December 1936 | February 1939 | Former "Columna Perea". |
| 39th | 26 November 1936 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Palacios". |
| 40th | 26 November 1936 | 27 March 1939 | Former "Columna Ortega". |
| 41st | 26 November 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 42nd | 1 January 1937 | March 1939 | Included the Elche Battalion.[58] |
| 43rd | 26 November 1936 | 27 March 1939 | Former "Columna Escobar". |
| 44th | 31 December 1936 | 27 March 1939 | |
| 45th | 31 December 1936 | 27 March 1939 | Former "Columna Burillo". |
| 46th | 31 December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 47th | 31 December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 48th | 28 March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 49th | February 1937 | February 1939 | terminated after the bombing of Xàtiva. |
| 50th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 51st | 14 March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 52nd | January 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 53rd | January 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 54th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 55th | 1 March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 56th | January 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 57th | 1 January 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 58th | January 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 59th | January 1937 | 9 February 1937 | Former "Columna Rosal". |
| 60th | January 1937 | 4 February 1939 | Former "Columna Rosal". |
| 61st | January 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Rosal". |
| 62nd | December 1936 | January 1939 (?) | |
| 63rd | December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 64th | December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 65th | December 1936 | March 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 66th | December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 67th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 68th | January 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 69th | December 1936 | March 1939 | |
| 70th | 15 January 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna España Libre". |
| 71st | January 1937 | 27 March 1939 | |
| 72nd | January 1937 | February 1939 | Re-established after surviving the Battle of Bielsa.[59] |
| 73rd | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 74th | January 1937 | 27 March 1939 | |
| 75th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 76th | April 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 77th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 78th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 79th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 80th | February 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 81st | March 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Iberia" and "Columna Torres-Benedito". |
| 82nd | March 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Hierro" and "Primera Columna confederal". |
| 83rd | March 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Hierro". |
| 84th | March 1937 | January 1938 | Former "Columna Hierro" and "Columna Temple y Rebeldía". Terminated after the "Mora de Rubielos events". Re-established on 19 April 1938 Took part in the Battle of the Ebro. Disappeared during the Catalonia Campaign. |
| 85th | March 1937 | March 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 86th | March 1937 | 28 March 1939 | Originally Brigada móvil Puertollano in December 1936. Reorganized as International Brigade.[60] |
| 87th | March 1937 | March 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 88th | March 1937 | 27 March 1939 | Former "Columna Andalucía-Extremadura". |
| 89th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 90th | May 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 91st | March 1937 | March 1939 | Destroyed in the Battle of Mérida pocket (1938) Later re-established. |
| 92nd | March 1937 | March 1939 | Originally known as 75th Brigada Mixta. |
| 93rd | January 1937 | February 1939 (?) | Originally known as 53rd Brigada Mixta. |
| 94th | March 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Originally established upon the former "Columna Iberia". Terminated in September 1937 after the Battle of Brunete. Reason: ineptitude during combat. Re-established with Infantería de Marina forces. |
| 95th | June 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Originally established with Anarchist militias. Terminated following the Battle of Brunete. Reason: ineptitude during combat. Re-established with Infantería de Marina forces. |
| 96th | June 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 97th | June 1937 | March 1939 (?) | |
| 98th | 1 June 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 99th | 12 June 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 100th | June 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Shock troops of the 11th Division. |
101st to 200th
[edit]| Number | Establishment date | Disbandment date | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| 101st | May 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Shock troops of the 46th Division. |
| 102nd | March 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Formed from the remainders of the "72nd Mixed Brigade". |
| 103rd | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 104th | March 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 105th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 106th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 107th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 108th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 109th | Spring 1937 | March 1939 | Annihilated in the Battle of Mérida pocket (1938). |
| 110th | March 1937 | March 1937 | |
| 111th | 17 March 1937 | 27 March 1939 | |
| 112th | April 1937 | 28 March 1939 | |
| 113th | March 1937 | 27 March 1939 | |
| 114th | March 1937 | 26 March 1939 | |
| 115th | March 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 116th | 28 April 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Sur-Ebro". |
| 117th | 28 April 1937 | January 1939 | Former "Columna Sur-Ebro". Fell apart in Catalonia. |
| 118th | 28 April 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Sur-Ebro". |
| 119th | 28 April 1937 | February 1939 | Former "Columna Durruti". |
| 120th | 28 April 1937 | January 1939 | Former "Columna Durruti". |
| 121st | 28 April 1937 | January 1939 | Former "Columna Durruti". |
| 122nd | 28 April 1937 | January 1939 | Disbanded after the Battle of the Ebro. |
| 123rd | 28 April 1937 | January 1939 | Disbanded after the Battle of the Ebro. |
| 124th | 28 April 1937 | January 1939 | Disbanded after the Battle of the Ebro. |
| 125th | 28 April 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Ascaso" and "Columna Los Aguiluchos de la FAI". |
| 126th | 28 April 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Ascaso". |
| 127th | 28 April 1937 | 27 March 1939 | Former "Columna Ascaso" and "Columna Roja y Negra". |
| 128th | 28 April 1937 | October 1937 | Disbanded and re-established more than once. |
| CXXIX | 8 February 1938 | 28 March 1939 | It lost its International Battalions in October 1938.[61] |
| 130th | 28 April 1937 | 9 February 1939 | Re-established after escaping the Bielsa pocket.[62] |
| 131st | 28 April 1937 | 9 February 1939 | |
| 132nd | 11 June 1937 | 28 March 1939 | Former "Columna Macià-Companys". |
| 133rd | May 1937 | January 1939 | |
| 134th | May 1937 | 26 January 1939 | |
| 135th | May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 136th | 1 May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 137th | 1 May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 138th | 1 May 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 139th | 1 May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 140th | 1 May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 141st | May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 142nd | May 1937 | 12 February 1939 | |
| 143rd | May 1937 | 16 January 1939 | Annihilated in Gaià |
| 144th | May 1937 | January 1939 | |
| 145th | May 1937 | January 1939 | |
| 146th | May 1937 | 23 January 1939 | |
| 147th | 1 May 1937 | March 1939 | Former "Columna Maroto". |
| 148th | 9 May 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 149th | May 1937 | February 1939 | |
| 150th | 11 June 1937 | March 1939 | |
| CL[63] | 27 May 1937 | 4 August 1937 | Disbanded after the debacle at Brunete. |
| 151st | June 1937 | January 1939 | Formed with Infantería de Marina troops. |
| 152nd | June 1937 | March 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 153rd | June 1937 | 26 January 1939 | Former "Columna Terra i Llibertat". |
| 154th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 1st Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 155th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 2nd Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 156th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 3rd Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 157th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 4th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 158th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 5th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 159th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 6th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 160th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 7th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 161st | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 8th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 162nd | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 9th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 163rd | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 13th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 164th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 11th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 165th | January 1938 | March 1939 | Former 12th Basque Brigade; re-established as guerrilla unit. |
| 166th | 6 August 1937 | October 1937 | Former 1st Santander Brigade. |
| 167th | 6 August 1937 | 21 August 1937 | Former 2nd Santander Brigade. |
| 168th | 6 August 1937 | 21 August 1937 | Former 3rd Santander Brigade. |
| 169th | 6 August 1937 | September 1937 | Former 8th Santander Brigade. |
| 170th | 6 August 1937 | 21 August 1937 | Former 4th Santander Brigade. |
| 171st | 6 August 1937 | 21 August 1937 | Former 5th Santander Brigade. |
| 172nd | 6 August 1937 | 21 August 1937 | Former 6th Santander Brigade. |
| 173rd | 6 August 1937 | 25 August 1937 | Former 7th Santander Brigade. |
| 174th | 30 April 1938 | January 1939 (?) | Former 9th Santander Brigade. |
| 175th | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 10th Santander Brigade. |
| 176th | 30 April 1938 | February 1939 | Former 11th Santander Brigade. |
| 177th | 30 April 1938 | January 1939 (?) | Former 12th Santander Brigade. |
| 177th | 30 April 1938 | 2 January 1939 (?) | Former 14th Santander Brigade. |
| 179th | 19 April 1938 | February 1939 | Carabineros unit.[64] |
| 180th | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 16th Asturian Brigade. |
| 181st | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 182nd | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Fate unknown |
| 183rd | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 3rd Asturian Brigade. |
| 184th | 6 August 1937 | 21 October 1937 | Former 10th Asturian Brigade. |
| 185th | 6 August 1937 | September 1937 | Former 15th Asturian Brigade. |
| 186th | 6 August 1937 | October 1937 | Former 13th Asturian Brigade. |
| 187th | 6 August 1937 | October 1937 | Former 14th Asturian Brigade. |
| 188th | 6 August 1937 | October 1937 | Former 17th Asturian Brigade. |
| 189th | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 1st Asturian Brigade. |
| 190th | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 2nd Asturian Brigade. |
| 191st | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Formed from remainders of the 4th Basque Brigade and the 8th Santander Brigade. |
| 192nd | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 5th Asturian Brigade. |
| 193rd | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | Former 6th Asturian Brigade. |
| 194th | 22 May 1938 | March 1939 | Former 4th Asturian Brigade. |
| 195th | 22 May 1938 | March 1939 | Former 7th Asturian Brigade. |
| 196th | 22 May 1938 | January 1939 | Fell apart in Catalonia.[65] |
| 197th | 22 May 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 198th | 30 April 1938 | January 1939 | Fell apart in Catalonia along with the 196th and 199th |
| 199th | 30 April 1938 | January 1939 | Fell apart in Catalonia along with the 196th and 198th |
| 200th | May 1938 | 28 March 1939 | Ordered to retreat from the front in January 1939.[66] |
201st to 246th
[edit]| Number | Establishment date | Disbandment date | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| 201st | 30 April 1938 | 28 March 1939 | |
| 202nd | 30 April 1938 | 29 March 1939 | |
| 203rd | May 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 204th | 30 April 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 205th | May 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 206th[67] | May 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 207th | May 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 208th | April 1938 | March 1939 | |
| 209th | August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 210th | August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 211th | August 1937 | March 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 212th | 28 August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 213th | 24 August 1937 | January 1939 (?) | |
| 214th | 24 August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 215th | 24 August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 216th | 24 August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 217th | 24 August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 218th | 24 August 1937 | March 1939 | |
| 219th[68] | 24 August 1937 | 26 March 1939 | |
| 220th | 24 August 1937 | 26 March 1939 | |
| 221st | 24 August 1937 | March 1939 | Fate unknown |
| 222nd | Summer 1937 | March 1939 | Carabineros unit. Fate unknown |
| 223rd | Summer 1937 | March 1939 | Engaged in coastal defence.[69] |
| 224th | Summer 1937 | January 1939 (?) | Restructured in spring 1938.[70] |
| 225th | Summer 1937 | March 1939 | Coastal defence |
| 226th | Summer 1937 | 9 February 1939 | part of the 42nd Division |
| 227th | 22 April 1938 | 9 February 1939 | |
| 228th | December 1938 | January 1939 | Carabineros unit. |
| 229th | December 1938 | January 1939 (?) | |
| 230th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 231st | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 232nd | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 233rd | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 234th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 235th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 236th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 237th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 238th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 239th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 240th | February 1938 | Data lacking | Guerrilla unit. |
| 241st | December 1938 | Unknown | Did not see combat action before disbandment. |
| 242nd | December 1938 | February 1939 | |
| 243rd | December 1938 | Unknown | Did not see combat action before disbandment. |
| 244th | December 1938 | Unknown | Did not see combat action before disbandment. |
| 245th | December 1938 | February 1939 | |
| 246th | January 1939 | Unknown | Could not be fully established before the Eastern Region Army Group fell apart.[71] |
See also
[edit]- Spanish Republican Armed Forces
- Fifth Regiment
- Military organization
- International Brigades
- Si me quieres escribir
- Brigade combat team: Modern military unit based on the concept of a combined-arms brigade formation
Bibliography
[edit]- Alpert, Michael (2013); The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107028739
- Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999). Historia de las Brigadas Mixtas del Ejército Popular de la República. Madrid: Almena. ISBN 978-8-492-26447-6.
- Helen Graham (2003). The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521459327.
- Salas Larrazábal, Ramón (2006); Historia del Ejército Popular de la República. La Esfera de los Libros S.L. ISBN 84-9734-465-0
References
[edit]- ^ José Vicente Herrero Pérez, De la división orgánica a la brigada mixta (evolución de las grandes unidades en España 1914-1927), [in:] Revista de Historia Militar XLVI/93 (2003), p. 115
- ^ Michael Alpert, The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge 2008, ISBN 9781107028739, p. 73
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 116
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, pp. 117-118
- ^ Alpert 2007, p. 73; other authors tend to downplay the theory, compare Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 118
- ^ Alexander Clifford, The People's Army in the Spanish Civil War: A Military History of the Republic and International Brigades, 1936–1939, Philadelphia 2020, ISBN 9781526760937, p. 23
- ^ Alpert 2007, pp. 73-74
- ^ Charles J. Esdaile, The Spanish Civil War. A Military History, London/New York 2019, ISBN 9781138311275, p. 100
- ^ Clifford 2020, p. 28
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 118
- ^ Alpert 2007, p. 71
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 119
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, pp. 112-113
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 113
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 112
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 113
- ^ E. R. Hooton, Spain in Arms: A Military History of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, London 2019, ISBN 978-1612006376, p. 43
- ^ most armies of the mid-1930s followed a triangular pattern, with an infantry division composed of 3 regiments, a regiment composed of 3 battalions, and a battalion composed of 3 companies. Spanish division with its binar structure was a bit of an exception. Also, in most European armies brigades were specialized army units, e.g. cavalry brigades in the Polish army or panzer brigades in the Wehrmacht, though brigades were regular units of some British infantry divisions
- ^ German infantry regiment in 1917 was 3,832 men, W. Schilling, The Organization of Armies, [in:] Columbia service; Italian infantry regiment of early World War Two was 3,279 men, Regio Esercito. L'Organizzazione, [in:] RegioEsercito service; US infantry regiment of 1944 was 3,118 men, Regio Esercito. L'Organizzazione, [in:] RegioEsercito service; Polish infantry regiment of 1939 was 3,300 men, Zdzisław Jagiełło: Piechota Wojska Polskiego 1918-1939, Warszawa 2007, ISBN 9788311102064, p. 30; Wehrmacht infantry regiment of early World War Two was 3,049 men, Nigel Thomas, The German army in World War II, London 2002, ISBN 9781841766164, p. 10
- ^ Alpert 2007, p. 74
- ^ Clifford 2020, p. 24
- ^ e.g. already in November 1936 the field artillery component was reduced to 3 batteries, plus antitank company and a mortar support group, Hooton 2019, p. 43
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 119
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, pp. 119-120
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 121
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 119
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, pp. 118-119
- ^ they were commanded by 3 career army officers, 1 Carabineros officer, 1 civilian who underwent training in the Soviet military academy and 1 lawyer. Alpert 2007, p. 75
- ^ Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, London 2001, ISBN 9780375755156, p. 526
- ^ Thomas 2001, p. 530
- ^ Alpert 2007, p. 75
- ^ Carlos Engel Masóliver, Historia de las Brigadas Mixtas del Ejército Popular de la República, 1936-1939, Madrid 2005, ISBN 9788496170193, p. 228
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 125
- ^ Alpert 2007, p. 76
- ^ "shortages of equipment meant many BM were purely infantry formations, sometimes 1,500-2,000 men", Hooton p. 43, see also Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 121
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, pp. 122-123
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 123
- ^ and most served at a rank not higher than a captain in 1936, Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 125
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 124, Herrero Pérez 2017, p. 250
- ^ though some divisions were formed by 4 and some by 2 mixed brigades, José Vicente Herrero Pérez, The Spanish Military and Warfare from 1899 to the Civil War, London 2017, ISBN 9783319547466, Herrero Pérez 251
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 119
- ^ the Nationalist division as reorganized during the war was composed of 12 battalions; the Republican one, if at full strength, was also 12 battalions, Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 127
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 120
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 115
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 129
- ^ Esdaile 2019, p. 101
- ^ Clifford 2020, p. 26
- ^ Esdaile 2019, p. 101
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 128, Herrero Pérez 2017, p. 250
- ^ Herrero Pérez 2003, p. 126
- ^ Date uncertain
- ^ "República - EPR - B.M." Retrieved 12 June 2016.
- ^ Antony Beevor (2006); p. 167
- ^ Hugh Thomas (1976); p. 528
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 37
- ^ Herreros, Sebastià. "The International Brigades in the Spanish War 1936-1939: Flags and Symbols" (PDF). The Flag Institute.
- ^ Hugh Thomas (1976), p. 639
- ^ "¿...Y por qué no un blog...? : Fragmentos de metralla: el Batallón Elche en la red". Retrieved 12 June 2016.
- ^ Hugh Thomas (1976); p. 892
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 114
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 41
- ^ Hugh Thomas (1976); p. 892
- ^ Hugh Thomas (1976); p. 1035
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 194
- ^ This was a Central Zone brigade that was sent by sea to Catalonia along with the 198th and 199th Mixed Brigades in December 1938 in order to support the republican troops there. After disembarking in Barcelona it was incapable of reorganizing itself and fell apart in the middle of the chaos provoked by the retreat towards the French border.
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 204
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 208
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 219
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 222
- ^ Suffered such heavy losses during the Aragon Offensive that it was no longer operational and was disbanded. Re-established anew on 19 April 1938.
- ^ Carlos Engel Masoliver (1999); p. 228
External links
[edit]- SBHAC - Guía de Brigadas Mixtas
- The International Brigades in the Spanish War 1936-1939: Flags and Symbols
- Arab volunteers in the Spanish Mixed Brigades
- Las Brigadas Mixtas según Carlos Engel (1.999)
- Las Brigadas Mixtas según Mike Blacksmith
- La Evolución de las Brigadas Mixtas.
- Las Brigadas Mixtas según Ciutat y Rojo (1.974 y 1.967)
- Las Brigadas Mixtas según Alpert (1.977)
Mixed brigade
View on GrokipediaOrigins
Conceptual Foundations
The mixed brigade represented a tactical formation designed to integrate infantry battalions with organic support from other arms, such as artillery batteries, machine-gun companies, engineers, and sometimes cavalry or anti-tank units, enabling self-contained operations without reliance on higher echelons for immediate fire support or logistics. This structure emphasized combined-arms warfare at the brigade level, allowing for greater flexibility and autonomy in fluid battlefields compared to homogeneous infantry brigades that required divisional attachments. The concept prioritized balanced firepower and maneuverability, drawing from principles of interarms cooperation to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources in offensive or defensive roles.[2] In pre-Civil War Spain, the term "brigada mixta" first appeared in a decree published in the Gaceta de Madrid on April 26, 1931, which reorganized mountain forces in Asturias into such a unit comprising infantry, artillery, and support elements for regional defense. This early application reflected adaptations from Spanish colonial experiences, particularly the mobile columns used in the Rif War in Morocco, which combined infantry with light artillery and engineers for independent expeditions. Military discourse in Spain further explored the idea; following observations of Swiss maneuvers, officers in the 1933 Revista de Estudios Militares advocated mixed brigades as a means to streamline regimental structures into more versatile formations, influenced by Russian interarms regiment models that integrated diverse branches under unified command.[2][3] Theoretically, the mixed brigade addressed causal challenges in modern warfare, such as the need for rapid concentration of combat power amid manpower shortages and uneven training, by embedding support assets directly into the unit to reduce coordination delays and enhance shock action. Soviet military theory provided a key external influence, with Republican planners adopting elements of Red Army mixed rifle brigades, which featured integral artillery and anti-tank elements for massed infantry operations. This model appealed for its scalability in mobilizing irregular forces into professional-like units, as noted by Republican theorists like Vicente Rojo, who viewed it as essential for transforming ad hoc militias into cohesive entities capable of sustained engagements.[2][3]Republican Adoption in 1936
Following the military uprising on July 17-18, 1936, the Republican zone saw the rapid formation of irregular militia columns from trade unions, political parties, and surviving regular army units, which lacked cohesion and standardization.[4] These forces, numbering in the hundreds of thousands by autumn, operated autonomously under party or union commanders, leading to inefficiencies in command, discipline, and logistics amid advancing Nationalist armies.[4] Francisco Largo Caballero's government, formed on September 4, 1936, prioritized militarization to forge a unified army from these disparate elements, overriding objections from anarchist and POUM militias who resisted centralization.[3] Discussions on reorganizing into mixed brigades—self-contained units blending infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and support services—occurred in late September, drawing from pre-war infantry division models but adapted for wartime constraints.[2] On October 18, 1936, the War Ministry issued a decree establishing the first six mixed brigades as the basic tactical unit of the emerging Ejército Popular de la República, with training centers selected in Madrid and nearby areas to integrate 4,000-5,000 personnel per brigade, including four infantry battalions and attached specialized companies.[5][2] This structure aimed to replace ad hoc columns with formations capable of independent operations, though implementation faced delays due to shortages in trained officers and equipment.[3] By December 1936, at least 15 mixed brigades were operational, incorporating early International Brigades and bolstering defenses around Madrid during the Nationalist siege. The adoption marked a shift toward conventional warfare, influenced by Soviet military aid arriving concurrently, yet retained hybrid elements from militia traditions, such as elected commissars for political oversight.[3] Initial brigades prioritized politically reliable leaders, with communist officers like Enrique Lister assigned to key units to enforce discipline.[6]Theoretical Design
Intended Role and Structure
The mixed brigade was designed as the primary tactical unit of the Spanish Republican Army's Ejército Popular de la República, intended to function as a self-sufficient formation capable of independent combat operations, including assaults and defenses, by integrating infantry with organic support arms to overcome the limitations of pre-existing militia organizations.[2][3] This structure emphasized autonomy at the brigade level, incorporating most combat support and service elements directly rather than relying on higher echelons, to facilitate coordinated action across disparate fronts under centralized command.[2] Formally outlined in an 18 October 1936 directive from the Republican General Staff, the initial theoretical composition centered on four infantry battalions as the core, each comprising four rifle companies and one machine-gun company, with approximately 600 men per battalion to provide sustained firepower.[2][3] Accompanying units included an artillery group of two to three light batteries (typically 75 mm field guns), a 60 mm mortar section for close support, a motorized cavalry squadron for reconnaissance and exploitation, a sapper company for obstacle breaching and fortification, plus detachments for signals, transport, logistics, and medical services.[3][2] The brigade headquarters oversaw these elements, with a planned strength of 3,500 to 4,000 personnel led by about 150 officers, enabling modular assembly into divisions of three brigades each.[2] This design prioritized rapid formation from available militia and regular troops, aiming for balanced combat power without excessive specialization, though actual implementation often deviated due to resource constraints.[3] By November 1936, minor revisions adjusted artillery to one battery per brigade (three guns) and added reserve companies, but the core infantry-support hybrid remained the intended blueprint for operational flexibility.[3]Comparison to Pre-War Units
The mixed brigade marked a structural evolution from the pre-war Spanish Army's division-centric organization, where the division served as the fundamental tactical formation, typically comprising two brigades each with two infantry regiments of two battalions, yielding four infantry battalions per division in peacetime establishment, though chronic underfunding often reduced effective strength further. Support elements like artillery groups and engineers were allocated at divisional or higher levels, rendering lower units more homogeneous and dependent on external reinforcement for combined-arms operations. In comparison, the mixed brigade consolidated four infantry battalions with organic assets—including one or more artillery batteries, engineer companies, signals, and transport—directly at brigade level, approximating the size and self-sufficiency of a pre-war division but reconfigured as a more compact, versatile unit equivalent to a "reduced division" in scale and capability.[7] This integration aimed to rectify the fragmentation of early war militias and columns, which lacked such cohesion, by emulating interwar reform ideas from 1925 onward that envisioned brigades as autonomous entities blending infantry with technical arms.[8] Pre-war units benefited from a professional cadre, with regiments maintaining regimental traditions and experienced non-commissioned officers, whereas mixed brigades, formed rapidly after the July 1936 coup, relied on amalgamating volunteers, conscripts, and survivors from irregular formations, diluting expertise and increasing vulnerability to command breakdowns absent the pre-war army's institutional depth.[9] Tactically, this shift promoted brigade-level initiative over the pre-war emphasis on divisional maneuvers, but it strained logistics, as the dispersed support elements in mixed brigades contrasted with the centralized provisioning of traditional divisions, often leading to uneven implementation by late 1936.[2]Implementation Challenges
Manpower and Leadership Deficits
The formation of mixed brigades in October 1936 aimed to standardize Republican forces at a theoretical strength of 3,400 to 4,200 men per brigade, comprising four infantry battalions, support units, and services, but persistent manpower deficits undermined this design from inception.[4] Early recruitment relied heavily on volunteer militias from anarchist, socialist, and communist groups, which resisted centralization and suffered high attrition from casualties, desertions, and inadequate logistics; by mid-1937, many brigades operated at 50-60% of authorized strength, with some as low as 1,500 effectives due to uneven conscription enforcement and evasion in Republican-held territories.[8] These gaps were exacerbated by the July 1936 military coup, which fragmented loyalist forces and left the Republic short of trained reservists, forcing reliance on rapid mobilization drives that prioritized quantity over quality, yielding undertrained conscripts with low morale.[4] Leadership deficits stemmed primarily from the loss of professional officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), with estimates indicating that up to 80% of the pre-war officer corps defected to the Nationalists or faced execution, imprisonment, or murder in the chaotic post-coup purges.[1] [10] To fill command roles, the Republic promoted militia leaders—often politically vetted civilians lacking formal training—resulting in brigades led by majors or even captains where colonels were required; for instance, initial mixed brigades frequently saw retired regulars temporarily assigned before handover to ideologically reliable but inexperienced successors.[11] The parallel system of political commissars, instituted in October 1936 to ensure loyalty, further diluted military authority by creating dual chains of command, where commissars—typically without combat experience—intervened in tactical decisions, fostering inefficiency and resentment among subordinate officers.[12] These intertwined shortages manifested in operational fragility, as understrength units with novice leaders struggled to maintain cohesion during maneuvers; historical analyses note that by 1938, manpower exhaustion in the eastern fronts compelled the merging of depleted brigades, while leadership inexperience contributed to tactical errors in offensives like Brunete (July 1937), where poor coordination amplified casualties without proportionate gains.[8] Efforts to mitigate deficits through accelerated officer academies, such as the one established in December 1936 at Valdegaste, yielded partial results but could not fully compensate for the initial professional void, as graduates often prioritized ideological conformity over doctrinal proficiency.[12]Equipment Shortages and Logistical Failures
The formation of mixed brigades in late 1936 encountered immediate armament deficiencies, as the Republican government struggled to equip units with standardized rifles, machine guns, and artillery amid the non-intervention agreement enforced by Britain and France, which blocked legal arms purchases from democratic nations.[8] Many early brigades, such as the 1st Mixed Brigade during the Battle of Seseña in October 1936, relied on limited Soviet-supplied T-26 tanks—only 15 available—with crews hastily trained in just 10 days and lacking effective infantry coordination, resulting in unsupported armored advances and three tanks lost to mechanical failures or ambushes.[13] Organic artillery batteries intended for each brigade's self-sufficiency were often incomplete or absent, forcing reliance on ad hoc attachments that disrupted tactical cohesion.[8] Logistical chains further exacerbated these issues, with uneven distribution of sporadic Soviet shipments—conditioned on Republican gold reserves—failing to reach front-line units due to disrupted rail networks, Nationalist air superiority, and internal disorganization from factional rivalries among anarchists, socialists, and communists.[14] By 1937, equipment unreliability was rampant; on the Aragon front, over half of Republican bombs and mortars failed to detonate, while soldiers in mixed brigades often carried outdated Winchester rifles or hand grenades as primary weapons, with ammunition shortages limiting sustained fire.[15] Vehicle deficits hampered mobility, as seen in the 67th Brigade's January 1938 operations where muddy roads immobilized ambulances and supply convoys, contributing to untreated wounds and stalled offensives.[15] Sustainment failures extended to basic needs, undermining unit readiness and morale. In November 1937, soldiers of the 37th Mixed Brigade near Madrid received daily rations of just 20 grams of meat, 40 grams of oil, 20 grams of sugar, and 10 grams of salt, yielding approximately 2,000 calories—below the 2,500–4,000 required for combat duties.[15] Clothing shortages were equally dire; the 44th Division in Aragon that fall reported few troops with coats, blankets, or clean underwear, fostering lice infestations and vulnerability to cold, with rumors of 200 cold-related deaths in Sierra Nevada by late 1938.[15] These deficiencies, contrasted with Nationalist forces' superior German and Italian supplies, stemmed causally from the Republic's loss of industrial Basque regions by 1937, which curtailed domestic production, and from logistical incompetence that squandered available resources.[8]Operational Employment
Formation and Initial Deployments
The formation of mixed brigades represented a critical step in the Republican government's efforts to standardize and professionalize its fragmented militia forces following the July 1936 military uprising. Drawing primarily from the ranks of the Communist-affiliated Fifth Regiment, which had already begun rudimentary training of volunteers in Madrid, the first mixed brigade was assembled on October 10, 1936, in Alcalá de Henares. This unit, designated the 1st Mixed Brigade under the command of Enrique Líster—a mason-turned-officer with prior combat experience in Morocco—integrated four infantry battalions, supported by machine-gun companies, artillery batteries, and basic logistical elements, totaling approximately 3,000-4,000 personnel equipped with a mix of rifles, light machine guns, and limited heavy weapons sourced from Soviet shipments and captured stocks.[16][17] Subsequent brigades followed rapidly, with formal orders issued on October 18, 1936, establishing the initial core of six mixed brigades (numbered 1 through 6), supplemented by two provisional international units, as the foundational tactical structure of the emerging Popular Army. These early formations prioritized infantry-heavy compositions over the ad hoc columns of militias, aiming for brigade-level self-sufficiency with integrated support arms, though actual implementation varied due to inconsistent training and armament. By late October, elements of these brigades had begun mobilizing from training camps around Madrid, reflecting the urgency imposed by the Nationalist Army of Africa's rapid advance from the south.[18] Initial deployments centered on the defense of Madrid, the Republican capital threatened by Nationalist forces under General José Enrique Varela, who had reached the city's outskirts by early November after capturing Illescas on October 26. The 1st Mixed Brigade, spearheaded by Líster's veterans, was committed to the Battle of Seseña on October 29, 1936, a hasty counteroffensive involving Soviet-supplied T-26 tanks and infantry assaults against Italian motorized units; despite initial gains, the attack faltered due to coordination failures and Nationalist air superiority, resulting in heavy Republican losses but delaying the enemy advance.[13] Reinforcements from the 2nd and 3rd Mixed Brigades arrived in early November, bolstering positions at key suburbs like Usera, Carabanchel, and Las Rozas, where they conducted defensive operations alongside arriving International Brigades and local militias. These deployments, involving roughly 10,000-15,000 troops from the first mixed brigades by mid-November, contributed to stalling the siege, though at the cost of high casualties from inexperience and matériel shortages, with Nationalist probes repelled through a combination of urban fighting and improvised fortifications.[19] Beyond Madrid, preliminary detachments from early mixed brigades supported secondary fronts, such as the reinforcement of loyalist garrisons in Toledo during late October operations, but the primary focus remained the capital, where these units' cohesion provided a template for later expansions amid ongoing shortages of trained officers and artillery. By December 1936, the initial cadre had expanded to over 20 mixed brigades, though deployment effectiveness was hampered by rapid turnover and reliance on politically motivated recruits rather than professional soldiers.[17]Performance in Key Campaigns
The mixed brigades' initial major test came during the Battle of Jarama from February 6 to 27, 1937, where units including the 11th, 12th, and 24th Mixed Brigades reinforced Republican lines to counter a Nationalist push toward Madrid. Despite inexperience leading to disorganized counterattacks and heavy losses—estimated at over 10,000 Republican casualties overall—the brigades helped stabilize the front along the Jarama River, preventing a breakthrough after weeks of intense fighting involving infantry assaults, artillery barrages, and early tank engagements. [20] [21] This defensive success highlighted emerging organizational improvements from the brigade structure but exposed vulnerabilities in coordination and rapid reinforcement, as noted in analyses of the Republican Army's early regularization efforts. [21] In the Brunete offensive of July 6–25, 1937, aimed at diverting Nationalist pressure from Madrid, mixed brigades such as the 1st, 30th, and 17th spearheaded assaults west of the capital, capturing villages like Villanueva del Pardillo and advancing up to 10 kilometers initially through combined arms tactics with Soviet-supplied T-26 tanks. However, Nationalist counteroffensives, bolstered by German Condor Legion air support and superior artillery, inflicted disproportionate casualties—Republican losses exceeded 20,000 while gains were minimal and temporary—revealing persistent issues with brigade-level command rigidity and inadequate anti-air defenses. [21] [22] Michael Alpert assesses this as a tactical failure despite numerical superiority, attributing it to overambitious planning and internal political frictions disrupting unified command. [21] The Battle of Teruel from December 1937 to February 1938 showcased mixed brigades' capacity for offensive initiative under adverse conditions, with units like the 81st and 87th participating in the surprise capture of the city on December 22 amid sub-zero temperatures and snow, leveraging infantry assaults supported by limited artillery to overcome outnumbered Nationalist garrisons. Yet, the subsequent Nationalist counteroffensive, launched January 1938 with 250,000 troops and overwhelming air and armor assets, retook Teruel by February 22, shattering Republican formations through encirclements and causing around 60,000 casualties; brigades suffered from supply breakdowns and high desertion rates exacerbated by exhaustion. [23] [21] This campaign underscored logistical frailties, as frozen terrain hampered resupply, contributing to a strategic overextension without decisive reinforcement. [21] During the Ebro offensive from July 25 to November 18, 1938—the Republicans' largest and final major push—mixed brigades within the Army of the Ebro, including the 94th and 133rd, executed a surprise river crossing with 80,000 troops, securing a 50-kilometer bridgehead and inflicting initial setbacks on Nationalists through aggressive patrols and fortified positions. Nationalist responses, however, employing systematic bombing, artillery interdiction, and phased counterattacks with 500 aircraft and 1,000 guns, methodically eroded the salient, leading to the near-total destruction of participating brigades with over 70,000 Republican casualties, including mass surrenders. [24] [21] Alpert highlights this as emblematic of matured brigade infantry resilience undermined by irreplaceable materiel losses and command errors, such as failure to anticipate aerial dominance, sealing the war's outcome. [21]Evaluation
Tactical Effectiveness and Metrics
The mixed brigades of the Spanish Republican Army were theoretically structured to achieve tactical flexibility through integration of four infantry battalions, machine-gun companies, artillery batteries, and support elements, aiming for a total strength of approximately 4,000 men per unit. In practice, however, most operated at reduced capacity, with a late 1937 estimate indicating an average of 2,700 men per brigade across the Republican forces, yielding a total combat-effective manpower of around 374,000 out of a nominal 424,000.[8] This understrength condition persisted due to recruitment shortfalls and attrition, limiting their ability to execute combined-arms maneuvers effectively against Nationalist units. By early 1937, only about 40 mixed brigades were active, expanding unevenly to 227 by war's end, though many remained incompletely formed or deployed in static roles.[11][4] Tactical performance metrics reveal inconsistent effectiveness, with brigades showing greater resilience in defensive postures than in offensive operations. During the defense of Madrid in late 1936, mixed brigades helped stall the Nationalist advance despite material disadvantages, contributing to a prolonged siege that tied down superior enemy forces.[8] However, in the Brunete offensive of July 1937, Republican mixed brigades advanced initially but incurred disproportionate losses—estimated at 20,000–25,000 casualties across involved units—for negligible strategic gains, highlighting vulnerabilities in maneuver and fire support coordination. Similarly, the Ebro offensive in July 1938 mobilized around 120,000 Republican troops, predominantly in mixed brigade formations, but resulted in over 70,000 casualties by November, effectively depleting the army's reserves without altering the front's balance.[25][11] Comparative casualty data underscores lower operational efficiency relative to Nationalist counterparts; while overall Republican losses exceeded 500,000 (including non-combat), mixed brigades frequently suffered 20–30% attrition in major engagements, exacerbated by desertions estimated at 10–15% of conscripted forces in frontline units.[26] Nationalist analyses, such as those from 1938, pegged Republican brigade effectiveness as hampered by fragmented command, contrasting with their own divisions' higher cohesion and lower proportional losses in analogous battles. Quantitative assessments from the period, including Insurgent intelligence reports, rated only a fraction of the 157 documented mixed brigades as fully operational, with many relegated to auxiliary or quiet-sector duties where combat intensity was minimal.[8][27] These metrics reflect a tactical formation that stabilized the Republican order of battle but failed to match the initiative and sustainability of professionalized enemy units.Causal Factors in Performance
The performance of mixed brigades in the Spanish Republican Army was hindered by acute shortages of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), stemming from the execution or flight of approximately 80% of the pre-war officer corps loyal to the Republic following the July 1936 military uprising.[28] This void was filled by rapid promotions from the ranks, often based on political reliability rather than competence, leading to command decisions marred by inexperience and ideological interference. Communist dominance in brigade leadership exacerbated tensions with anarchist and socialist militias, fostering disunity and reducing operational cohesion.[29] Inadequate training compounded these leadership deficits, as mixed brigades were hastily formed from disorganized militias between late 1936 and early 1937, with minimal instruction in combined arms tactics or discipline. Units like the 37th Mixed Brigade suffered from low combat readiness, evidenced by high desertion rates and passive front-line behavior, where soldiers prioritized survival over aggressive maneuvers.[26] The transition to a conventional structure under the Popular Army decree of October 1936 prioritized quantity over quality, yielding brigades that struggled with basic coordination between infantry, artillery, and support elements.[30] Equipment and logistical failures further degraded effectiveness, as non-intervention policies by Western powers restricted imports, forcing reliance on Soviet supplies that were often obsolete or insufficient—nearly 25% of rifles and machine guns were pre-1914 models, and artillery pieces numbered only about one-third of Nationalist holdings by mid-1937.[28] Supply lines plagued by poor organization resulted in chronic shortages of ammunition, rations, and transport, with brigades on the Aragon front receiving as little as 1,200 calories daily, eroding morale and physical capability.[26] These material constraints prevented the mixed brigade's intended self-sufficiency, rendering many units defensively static rather than offensively viable. Internal political fragmentation acted as a causal multiplier, as factional rivalries between communists, anarchists, and POUM militias delayed brigade integration and diverted resources to purges, such as the May 1937 Barcelona events that weakened unified command.[31] While ideological commitment boosted enlistment in some cases, it failed to translate to sustained effort amid these systemic issues, with empirical data showing Republican forces incurring disproportionate casualties—over 500,000 dead or wounded versus Nationalists' 300,000—due to inefficient force employment.[32] Nationalist advantages in unified leadership and German/Italian aid thus amplified these Republican vulnerabilities, turning potential tactical parity into strategic imbalance.[33]Comparative Analysis with Nationalist Forces
The organizational structure of Republican mixed brigades, each nominally comprising four infantry battalions, an artillery group, and minimal support elements like engineers and machine-gun companies, contrasted sharply with the Nationalist Army's division-based system, which featured three infantry regiments (typically six to nine battalions total), integrated artillery regiments, and cavalry for reconnaissance, allowing for greater tactical flexibility and firepower concentration.[34] This conventional divisional framework enabled Nationalists to employ combined arms tactics more effectively, as evidenced by their rapid advances in campaigns like the Battle of the Jarama in February 1937, where Francoist divisions halted Republican offensives through coordinated counterattacks. In comparison, mixed brigades often functioned semi-independently due to communication breakdowns and supply deficits, limiting their ability to maneuver as cohesive units beyond static defense. Leadership quality further diverged, with Nationalist forces retaining a core of professional officers from the pre-war army and colonial garrisons, supplemented by German and Italian advisors who emphasized disciplined training; Republican mixed brigades, however, grappled with deficits following the 1936 purges that eliminated up to 80% of senior officers loyal to the Republic, resulting in reliance on hastily promoted militiamen and political commissars whose ideological priorities sometimes undermined operational decisions.[27] Empirical assessments, such as soldier surveys from the period, indicate higher confidence in Nationalist command structures, attributing this to officers' competence in logistics and tactics, whereas Republican units exhibited lower morale and desertion rates exceeding 20% in some mixed brigades by 1938.[27][35] Equipment disparities amplified these structural weaknesses: Nationalists integrated substantial foreign aid, including over 700 aircraft from Germany and Italy by 1938 for air superiority, alongside 250 tanks and advanced artillery that supported infantry divisions in breakthroughs, as seen in the Ebro Offensive where Francoist forces inflicted disproportionate casualties (Republican losses estimated at 70,000 versus 35,000 Nationalist).[35] Republican mixed brigades received approximately 350 Soviet T-26 tanks and 650 aircraft, but poor maintenance and fuel shortages rendered much of this matériel ineffective, with utilization rates dropping below 50% in late-war offensives due to logistical failures.[36] This imbalance contributed to Nationalist tactical successes, such as encircling Republican positions with minimal losses, while mixed brigades struggled in attrition battles like Teruel (December 1937), where initial gains evaporated under sustained Francoist artillery and air barrages. Overall performance metrics underscore Nationalist superiority in operational efficiency: despite comparable manpower peaks (Nationalists reaching 950,000 by 1938 versus Republican 700,000), Francoist forces captured 90% of Spanish territory by March 1939 through methodical, low-risk maneuvers leveraging elite units like the Spanish Legion and Moroccan Regulares, whose discipline and combat experience outmatched the often fragmented mixed brigades plagued by internal factionalism.[37][35] Causal analysis points to unified command under Franco, effective foreign legion integration (e.g., Condor Legion's 16,000 personnel providing reconnaissance and bombing), and avoidance of politicization as key enablers, in contrast to Republican decentralization that diluted mixed brigade cohesion and invited defeats through poor strategic coordination.[36]Catalog of Units
Brigades 1–100
The mixed brigades numbered 1–100 formed the initial core of the Spanish Republican Army's infantry structure during the Civil War, established as part of a deliberate effort to convert irregular militia units into disciplined, self-contained tactical formations capable of independent operations. Authorized by decree on 18 October 1936 under Prime Minister Largo Caballero, these brigades typically included four infantry battalions, a machine-gun company, mortar and artillery batteries, engineer elements, and support services, with an intended strength of approximately 3,700–4,000 men including 150 officers, though actual equipping often fell short due to shortages in artillery and transport. Brigades 1–6 were organized immediately from existing militia battalions at designated assembly points, deploying to the Madrid front by 3 November 1936 to bolster defenses against advancing Nationalist forces. Subsequent brigades up to 50 emerged in the central zone by spring 1937, drawing from Quinto Regimiento militias and early conscripts, while numbers 51–82 formed in Levante and Andalucía using reservists; the full set to 100 was largely complete by mid-1937 amid escalating mobilization needs.[2][3] Early brigades exhibited varying cohesion based on their militia origins, with communist-influenced units like the 1st demonstrating higher discipline from pre-war training in the Quinto Regimiento, while others struggled with integration of politically diverse volunteers. The 3rd Mixed Brigade, for example, contributed decisively to halting Nationalist columns at Madrid's University City on 7 and 13 November 1936, leveraging carabineros personnel for rapid counterattacks. By contrast, later formations such as the 100th Brigade, organized in June 1937 at Alcoy from a veteran battalion of the 1st Brigade and 3,000 new recruits from the 1931 quintas (conscript classes), faced delays in equipping and training, reflecting broader logistical strains as the war progressed into reliance on less experienced levies. Many of these brigades participated in major 1937 offensives, including Brunete and Belchite, but suffered high attrition, with some renumbered or disbanded by 1938–1939 due to casualties exceeding 50% in combat-effective strength.[2][38]| Brigade No. | Formation Location (Oct 1936) | Initial Commander | Composition Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Alcalá de Henares | Enrique Líster | Drawn from Quinto Regimiento battalions; later part of 11th Division.[2] |
| 2 | Ciudad Real | Jesús Martínez de Aragón | From railway worker militias; assigned to central front.[2] |
| 3 | Albacete | José María Galán | Carabineros-based; key in Madrid defense actions.[2] |
| 4 | Alcoy | Arturo Arellano | Retired officer-led; militia integration.[2] |
| 5 | Murcia | Fernando Sabio | Retired officer command; southern deployment.[2] |
| 6 | Villena | Miguel Gallo | Infantry captain; early shock unit role.[2] |
Brigades 101–200
The mixed brigades numbered 101 to 200 were established mainly between April 1937 and early 1938 as part of the Republican government's efforts to standardize and expand its forces following the initial militia phase of the war. These units drew personnel from regional conscription, disbanded militias, and transfers from lower-numbered brigades, often forming in rear-area training depots such as Sagunto or Albacete. Unlike earlier brigades, which were frequently elite or volunteer-based, those in this range incorporated larger proportions of forcibly mobilized recruits, leading to variable cohesion and combat readiness; organizational tables called for approximately 3,000–4,000 men per brigade, including four infantry battalions, machine-gun and mortar companies, and limited artillery support, but actual strengths rarely exceeded 1,500 effectives by late 1937 due to desertions and casualties.[3][18] Assigned to divisions in the Army of the Center (e.g., 46th Division), Army of the East, and Army of the Ebro, these brigades primarily conducted defensive operations and limited counterattacks, suffering heavy attrition in battles like Teruel (December 1937–February 1938) and the Ebro Offensive (July–November 1938). Command structures emphasized political commissars alongside military officers to enforce discipline, with frequent leadership rotations; for example, the 101st Mixed Brigade, formed in April–May 1937 at Sagunto from the 4th Battalion of the 10th Mixed Brigade under "El Campesino," was initially led by Major Pedro Mateo Merino and deployed with the 46th Division in central front actions.[40][41][42] Archival records from the Archivo General Militar de Ávila document operational reports, personnel lists, and orders for many in this series, revealing patterns of incomplete formation and reliance on captured equipment. Brigades such as the 102nd and 103rd, reorganized in mid-1937, supported northern sector defenses before transfer south, while later ones like the 131st operated in Aragon under the Army of the East, facing logistical strains that limited maneuverability.[39][43][44] Overall, these brigades exemplified the Republican Army's shift toward mass mobilization, but empirical assessments from frontline dispatches indicate effectiveness hampered by inadequate training and supply disparities compared to Nationalist units.[39]| Brigade | Formation Period and Location | Initial Commander | Assigned Division/Army | Key Deployments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 101st | April–May 1937, Sagunto | Major Pedro Mateo Merino | 46th Division, Army of the Center | Central front defenses; integration from 10th Brigade elements[40][42] |
| 102nd–103rd | Mid-1937, northern/central zones | Varied (archival indices) | Early northern fronts, later transfers | Reorganization support; vigilance and information parts documented[39] |
| 131st | 1937–1938, eastern sector | Not specified in records | Army of the East | Aragon operations; PS-ARAGÓN archival files[44] |
