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Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568–1571)
Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568–1571)
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Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568–1571)

Principal centres of the Morisco Revolt
Date24 December 1568 – March 1571
Location
Result Spanish victory
Belligerents
Spain Spain Moriscos rebels
Regency of Algiers
Commanders and leaders
Spain John of Austria
Spain Marquis of Mondéjar
Spain Marquis of Los Vélez
Spain Duke of Sessa
Spain Luis Quijada
Aben Humeya X
Aben Aboo X
Faraj ibn Faraj 
Regency of Algiers Occhiali
Strength
2,200 (initially)
20,000 (1570)
4,000 (initially)
25,000 (1570)

The second rebellion of the Alpujarras (Arabic: ثورة البشرات الثانية; 1568–1571), sometimes called the War of the Alpujarras or the Morisco Revolt, was triggered by Philip II of Spain's Pragmática Sanción de 1567 [es] and was the second Morisco revolt against the Castilian Crown in the mountainous Alpujarra region and on the Granada Altiplano region, northeast of the city of Granada. The rebels were Moriscos, the nominally Catholic descendants of the Mudéjares (Muslims under Castilian rule) following the first rebellion of the Alpujarras (1499–1501).

By 1250, the Reconquest of Spain by the Catholic powers had left only the Emirate of Granada, in southern Spain.[1] In 1492, Granada city fell to the Catholic MonarchsIsabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon—and under the terms of capitulation the whole Muslim-majority region came under Christian rule.

The Muslim inhabitants of the city, however, soon revolted against Christian rule in 1499, followed by the mountain villages: this revolt was suppressed by 1501.[2] The Muslims under Christian rule (until then known as Mudejares) were then obliged to convert to Christianity, becoming a nominally Catholic population known as "Moriscos".

Discontent among the new "Moriscos" led to a second rebellion, led by a Morisco known as Aben Humeya, starting in December 1568 and lasting till March 1571. This violent conflict took place mainly in the mountainous Alpujarra region, on the southern slopes of the Sierra Nevada between Granada city and the Mediterranean coast, and is often known as the War of the Alpujarras.[3][note 1]

The rebellion reportedly took on a fanatic character, with the torturing and murder of priests and sacristans, and the destruction and profanation of churches. In this the bands of monfíes -outlaws who had left the villages and roamed in the mountains. and joined the rebellion- played a large part.[4]

Most of the Morisco population was then expelled from the Kingdom of Granada and was dispersed throughout the Kingdom of Castille (modern-day Castile, Extremadura, and Andalusia). As this left many smaller settlements in Granada almost empty, Catholic settlers were brought in from other parts of the country to repopulate them.

Background

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Fall of Granada and the 1499–1501 Muslim revolts

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Forced conversion under Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros was one of the main causes of the rebellions.

The Kingdom of Granada was the last Muslim-ruled state in Spain. After a long siege, the city of Granada fell to the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabel, in 1492. The Muslim population was initially tolerated under the terms of the Treaty of Granada: they were allowed to stay in their dwellings, to be judged according to their own laws, and would not be obliged to convert to Christianity.[5]

However, they did come under pressure to convert, and growing discontent led to an uprising in 1499 in Granada city, quickly put down, and in the following year two more serious revolts in the mountain villages of the Alpujarra—the region below the Sierra Nevada. Ferdinand himself led an army into the area. There were also revolts in the western parts of the Kingdom. Suppression by the Catholic forces was severe, with the most violent episode occurring in Laujar de Andarax, where two hundred Muslims were burnt in the local mosque.[6]

This revolt enabled the Catholics to claim that the Muslims had violated the terms of the Treaty of Granada, which were therefore withdrawn. Throughout the region, Muslims were now forced to choose between conversion to Christianity or exile. The vast majority chose conversion and became known as "Moriscos" or "New Christians", though many continued to speak Andalusian Arabic and to maintain their Moorish customs.[7]

Causes of the second rebellion

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In 1526, Charles V (Charles I of Spain)—issued an Edict under which laws against heresy (e.g. Muslim practices by "New Christians") would be strictly enforced; among other restrictions, it forbade the use of Arabic and the wearing of Moorish dress. The Moriscos managed to get this suspended for forty years by the payment of a large sum (80,000 ducados).[8]

Since now all remaining Moors were officially Christian ("Moriscos"), mosques could be destroyed or turned into churches. There was little or no follow-up in terms of explaining Christianity: indeed, the priests themselves were mostly too ignorant to do so.[9] On the other hand, they punished Moriscos who failed to participate in Sunday Mass; Moriscos had to learn—in Latin—the Lord's Prayer, the Ave Maria, the Credo, and the Ten Commandments; children had to be baptised and marriage had to be under Christian rites. Inevitably, tension built up.[10]

A Morisco family walking in the country, by Christoph Weiditz, 1529.

The archbishop of Granada, convinced that the Moriscos were maintaining their customs and traditions and would never become real Christians, called in 1565 a synod of the bishops of the kingdom of Granada.[11] It was agreed that the policy of persuasion should be replaced by one of repression, and that the measures of 1526 should now be applied. This meant prohibition of all the distinctive Morisco practices: language, clothing, public baths, religious ceremonies, etc. Moreover, in each place where the Moriscos lived at least a dozen "Old Christians" (i.e. not those who had been supposedly converted) should be installed; Morisco houses should be inspected on Fridays, Saturdays, and feast-days to ensure that they were not practicing Quranic rites; the heads of household should be closely watched to ensure that they were setting a good example; their sons should be taken to Old Castile at the cost of their parents, to be brought up learning Christian customs and forgetting those of their origins.[12]

Philip II, who had become King in 1556, gave his approval: the result was the Pragmática Sanción [es] of 1 January 1567.[13] The Moriscos tried to negotiate its suspension, as in 1526, but this King was inflexible. A Morisco leader, Francisco Núñez Muley, made a statement protesting against the injustices committed against the Moriscos: "Day by day our situation worsens, we are maltreated in every way; and this is done by judges and officials… How can people be deprived of their own language, with which they were born and brought up? In Egypt, Syria, Malta and elsewhere there are people like us who speak, read and write in Arabic, and they are Christians like us."[14] The American historian Henry Charles Lea wrote: "The Moriscos had come to the parting of the ways; there was no middle course and they had the naked alternative of submission or rebellion."[15]

As the failure of their appeals became evident, the Moriscos of Granada began to prepare for rebellion, holding secret meetings in the Moorish quarter, the Albaicín.[16] The authorities arrested Moriscos who they thought might be conspiring; they also made plans to expel Moriscos from the Kingdom and replace them by "Old Christians" (i.e. not recent converts). After a year of fruitless negotiations, in 1568 the Morisco leaders decided to take up arms.[17]

Rebellion of 1568–71 (War of the Alpujarras)

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In the months following publication of the Pragmatica on 1 January 1567, the Moriscos began to prepare their rebellion. Weapons, flour, oil, and other provisions were stored in caves which were inaccessible and safe, enough for six years.[18]

The principal leaders, including some from the Alpujarra, held meetings in private houses in the Albaicín, and from there issued their orders.

The acclamation of Aben Humeya as king of the Moriscos

At a meeting on 17 September 1568 it was proposed that they should elect a chieftain to lead the revolt. The rebellion started on Christmas Eve in the village of Béznar in the Lecrin valley, when Hernando de Córdoba y Valór was named King: in a solemn ceremony, they clothed him in purple according to the old ritual for the kings of Granada, and many rich Moriscos attended, wearing black garments.[19] He was chosen because he descended from the lineage of the caliphs of Córdoba, the Omeyas, and he therefore took the Moorish name Aben Humeya (or "Omeya"). Numerous other places in the tahas (districts) of Órgiva, Poqueira, Juviles, and other Morisco villages in the Alpujarra followed suit.

The first action by the rebels was in Granada city: it was led by Aben Humeya's "grand vizir", Farax Aben Farax, who on that same night of 24–25 December entered the Albaicín (the Moorish quarter) with a group of monfíes – outlaws who for one reason or another had left the villages and roamed in the mountains. His aim was to persuade the Morisco inhabitants to join the revolt, but he had little success – only a few hundred followed him. This failure in the capital had a decisive effect on the course of the campaign throughout the Kingdom of Granada.[20]

The rebellion reportedly took on a fanatic character, with the torturing and murder of priests and sacristans, the destruction and profanation of churches. In this the bands of monfies played a large part.[21] When a rumor spread in 1568 that the Ottomans had finally come to liberate them, Muslims near Granada, “believing that the days under Christian rule were over, went berserk. Priests all over the countryside were attacked, mutilated, or murdered; some were burned alive; one was sewed inside a pig and barbequed; the pretty Christian girls were assiduously raped, some sent off to join the harems of Moroccan and Algerian potentates.”[22][23][24]

First phase

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The Spanish campaign was led by the Marqués de Mondéjar in the west of the Alpujarra and the Marqués de Los Vélez in the east. Mondéjar, coming from Granada in January 1569, had quick success, over terrain which should have favoured the defenders. He overcame the first natural obstacle – a bridge at Tablate, which the Moors had partially destroyed – and reached Órgiva in time to rescue Christians held captive in the tower.[25]

Tablate bridge

The first major battle was fought in a river valley east of Órgiva, where the Moors were defeated. An advance detachment then contrived to cross a narrow ravine (picture) and climb a steep mountainside to reach the village of Bubión, in the Poqueira valley, where Aben Humeya had made his headquarters and the Moors had stored equipment and valuables. They were soon joined by the Marqués and the bulk of his army, taking a longer but safer route.[26]

Approach to the Poqueira valley

In the next few days the army crossed the mountains and descended on Pórtugos and Pitres, again freeing Christian captives in the churches. From there the way was open to the villages further east.[27]

The American historian Henry Charles Lea wrote of Mondéjar's "short but brilliant campaign... Through heavy snows and intense cold and over almost inaccessible mountains he fought battle after battle, giving the enemy no respite and following up every advantage gained. The Moriscos speedily lost heart and sought terms of surrender… By the middle of February [1569] the rebellion was practically suppressed. Aben Humeya was a wanderer, hiding in caves by day and seeking shelter by night in houses which had letters of surety."[28]

Indeed, at Pórtugos some Moorish leaders had attempted to negotiate surrender terms with Mondéjar, who replied that he would intercede with King Philip, but that in the meantime the punishment of rebels must continue.[29] If he did report to the King, this did him no good as it reinforced charges against him of undue clemency. In fact, the Christian campaign was compromised by a long-standing enmity between the two commanders, and this was fomented by the Chancery in Granada, which on several occasions sent complaints about Mondéjar to King Philip.[note 2]

The subsequent campaign was marked by excesses committed by the troops: this was not a disciplined army but consisted largely of untrained volunteers, who were not paid but counted on the loot they could gather.[30] The chronicler Pérez de Hita wrote that half of them were "the worst scoundrels in the world, motivated only by the desire to steal, sack and destroy the Morisco villages."[31]

There were also many acts of vengeance by Moriscos against "Old Christians". Some priests were flayed alive, being reminded of their severity towards those who did not attend mass, to women who would not uncover their faces, and generally to those who continued practicing their old rites. Churches were systematically set on fire and looted; likewise the houses of the priests and those of Christians in general.[32]

Both sides sold as slaves many of their captives. The Moriscos sold Christians to merchants from North Africa, in exchange for weapons. For their part, those whom the Christian soldiers captured, especially women, were regarded as war booty, and they were entitled to keep the takings for themselves as the Crown renounced the fifth part of the proceeds normally due. Chiefs and officers also took prisoners for themselves, including children. The Crown itself did benefit from the sale of slaves, as in the case of many of the Moors from Juviles who were sold at the market in Granada for the benefit of the King.[33]

Second phase

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This lasted from March 1569 until January 1570. Now the initiative lay with the Morisco rebels, who had gained support as towns in the plain and elsewhere joined the revolt. Thus their number rose from 4,000 in 1569 to 25,000 in 1570, including some Berbers and Turks.[34] Their tactic was to ambush their opponents, avoiding combat on open ground, relying on their knowledge of the intricate terrain of the sierras and occupying the heights from which they could launch audacious attacks.

The Spanish navy was called upon to bring reinforcements to the army, and to protect the Granada coast against Ottoman reinforcements from North Africa.[35]

Third phase

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This began in 1570, after King Philip had relieved the Marqués of Mondéjar of his command and appointed in his place his own half-brother, Don John of Austria, to take overall command, and the Marquis of Los Vélez to pursue operations in the eastern part of the kingdom.

Don Juan de Austria, by Juan Pantoja de la Cruz.

Lea describes Vélez as "ambitious, arrogant and opinionated… He thrust himself into the war and mismanaged it at every turn, but he was a favorite of the king, who supported him through it all… Great preparations were made to give Don John a force which befitted his dignity and should speedily crush all resistance. The towns and cities were summoned to furnish their quotas and the Spanish ambassador at Rome was ordered to bring the Italian galleys to Spain, to aid the home squadron in guarding the coast and intercepting succors from Africa, and also to convey the tercio of Naples" (a battalion of about three thousand regular troops).[36]

This was a big mobilisation to deal with a revolt by a mountain people, with no military training nor organisation, and ill-equipped with weaponry. But King Philip was obsessed by his troubles abroad and clearly felt he had to eliminate this problem on his doorstep. An Ottoman fleet was raiding the Spanish coasts and it had captured the Balearic Islands in 1558. In the Spanish Netherlands, the preaching of Calvinist leaders had led to riots in 1566 and to open warfare in 1568: Philip did not want trouble in his own backyard.[37] Moreover, like Catholic leaders everywhere in Europe, he was determined to stamp out "heresy" of all kinds – and the Moors had by now been formally classified as heretics.

Don John arrived at Granada in April 1569. Returning to Lea's account: "Conflicting opinions led to prolonged discussions during which nothing was done; the campaign went to pieces; the pacified Moriscos, reduced to despair by the withdrawal of Mondéjar, sent back their safeguards and withdrew their oaths of allegiance and with them went many places that had previously remained loyal… Granada was virtually besieged, for the Moriscos ravaged the Vega [the plain] up to the gates… The rebellion, which had hitherto been confined to the Alpujarras and Sierra Nevada, spread on the one side to the mountain of Almería and on the other to those of Málaga. The whole land was aflame and it looked as though the power of Spain was inadequate to extinguish the conflagration."[38]

In an attack on Albuñuelas, the Spanish troops killed all the men who did not escape and brought back fifteen hundred women and children who were divided among the soldiers as slaves.[39] In October that year the king proclaimed "a war of fire and blood" (una guerra a fuego y a sangre) – no longer just a matter of punishing a rebellion. He also gave free rein (campo franco) to the soldiers to take whatever plunder they could find, whether slaves, cattle, or property.[40]

In January 1570 Don John launched his new campaign with a force of 12,000 men; another contingent led by the Duke of Sessa had 8000 foot and 350 horse.[41] There was renewed fighting in the Pitres-Poqueira area in April 1570. As the campaign went on and villages were captured, the Catholic forces were much reduced by desertions.

On 10 February, after a two-month siege, Don Juan conquered Galera and ordered its destruction; in March he took Serón; and at the end of April he headed for the Alpujarra, setting up his headquarters at Padules. There he was joined by a second army under the Duke of Sessa, which had left Granada in February and had crossed the Alpujarra from west to east. At the same time, a third army had come from Antequera to reach the sierra of Bentomiz, another focus of the rebellion, at the beginning of March.[42]

Fourth phase

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This lasted from April 1570 until the spring of 1571. Catholic forces were greatly reinforced with infantry and cavalry. Led by Don John and the Duke of Sessa they launched a new campaign, invading the Alpujarra, destroying houses and crops, putting men to the sword and taking prisoner all the women, children, and elderly people whom they found in their path. "Spain had strained every nerve and had raised an overwhelming force to accomplish what Mondéjar had done with a few thousand men a twelve months earlier."[43]

In May, King Aben Aboo at last accepted surrender terms, under which those who gave themselves up and handed over their weapons would have their lives spared. But when some Berbers appeared with stories of large reinforcements on their way, Aben Aboo decided to fight on. The reports here are muddled: some say that three galleys which had just arrived from Algiers with arms, munitions, and food turned back because they heard Aboo was surrendering. However this may be, no such help reached the rebels, but the Catholics were given an excuse to resume hostilities: "The sierra, in September 1570, was attacked simultaneously from both ends with a war of ruthless devastation, destroying all harvests, killing the men and bringing in women and children by the thousand as slaves. What few prisoners were taken were executed or sent to the galleys."[44]

This advance by the royal troops opened a breach between those of the Moriscos who wanted to continue the fight and those who argued for seeking terms of surrender. In May, following a meeting at Andarax, many rebels fled to North Africa. Soon afterwards, the leader of those who favoured surrender, Hernando El Habaqui, was executed on the order of Aben Aboo.

Although from October 1570 many Moriscos gave themselves up, several thousand went on fighting. Most of them took shelter in caves, but many of these died from suffocation when the Christian troops lit fires at the entrances.[45]

In 1571 John of Austria finally succeeded in suppressing the rebellion in the Alpujarra. The last rebels, after losing the fortress of Juviles, were killed in their caves: among them Aben Aboo who was stabbed to death by his own followers in a cave near Bérchules. Resistance then collapsed.[46]

Diego Hurtado de Mendoza – the more enlightened of the contemporary Spanish sources – made a bitter comment: "Day by day we fought our enemies, in the cold or the heat, hungry, lacking munitions, suffering continual injuries and deaths until we could confront our enemies: a warlike tribe, well-armed and confident in terrain which favoured them. Finally they were driven from their houses and possessions; men and women were chained together; captured children were sold to the highest bidder or carried away to distant places… It was a dubious victory, with such consequences that one might doubt whether those whom God wished to punish were ourselves or the enemy."[47]

Extent of the rebellion

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When the rebellion began, the Kingdom of Granada counted barely 150,000 inhabitants, most of them Moriscos. The exact number who rebelled is unknown, but the ambassadors of France and of the Republic of Genoa at the Madrid court estimated that there were 4,000 rebels in January 1569 and 25,000 by the spring of 1570, of whom some 4,000 were Turks or Berbers from North Africa who had come to support the rebellion.[48]

On the other side, the royal army had at the beginning 2,000 foot-soldiers and 200 cavalry under the command of the Marqués de Mondéjar. The number increased substantially when Don John took charge: in the siege of Galera he had 12,000 men, while the Duke of Sessa at the same time commanded between 8,000 and 10,000 men.[49]

From its start in the Alpujarra, the rebellion spread to the plains and to other mountainous regions on the edges of the Kingdom. A particularly dramatic conflict took place on the ridge (peñón) above Frigiliana, in the Axarquia, where entire families of Moriscos from all around had gathered: the siege lasted from June 1569 till September, when Spanish reinforcements were brought in by sea.[50] Moriscos living in the towns—including the capital, Almería, Málaga, Guadix, Baza, and Motril—and their surrounding areas did not take part in the uprising, although they sympathised with it.[51]

This distinct attitude of the towns can be explained by the presence of a greater number of "Old Christians" and better integration of the Moriscos in these communities. On the other hand, in the Alpujarra and other regions, where the rebellion caught on, there were villages where the only "Old Christian" was the parish priest.[52]

Dispersal and resettlement

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After the suppression of the revolt, a significant portion of the Morisco population was expelled from the former Kingdom of Granada. First rounded up and held in churches, then in harsh winter conditions, with little food, they were taken on foot in groups, escorted by soldiers; many died on the way. Many went to Cordova, others to Toledo and as far as Leon. Those from the Almería region were taken in galleys to Seville. The total number expelled has been estimated at some 80,000, or roughly half of Granada's Moriscos.[53]

The deportations meant a big fall in population, which took decades to offset; they also caused a collapse of the economy, given that the Moriscos were its main motor. Moreover, many fields lay uncultivated, orchards and workshops had been destroyed during the fighting.[54]

The Spanish administration laid down already in 1571 the basis for repopulation. The land left free by the expulsion of the Moriscos would be shared out; settlers would be supported until their land began to bear fruit. Common land would be maintained; the acequias (irrigation channels) and reservoirs would be repaired; the springs would be for general use; pastures would be provided for the livestock; various fiscal advantages were promised. The settlers were assured of bread and flour, seed for their crops, clothing, material for cultivating their land, and oxen, horses, and mules. There were various tax concessions.[55]

The Libro de apeos, kept in the Bubión town hall.
Typical Alpujarran village. It has expanded slightly since Moorish times, but retains its main original features: narrow streets, flat roofs, "bowler-hat" chimneys. The church is in the place of the former mosque.

The authorities in Granada sent officials in search of candidates from as far away as Galicia and Asturias and the mountain areas of Burgos and León. The process was difficult, slow, and expensive. The greater number were from western Andalucía, but they came also from Galicia, Castile, Valencia, and Murcia.

A property register (Libro de Apeos) for the villages of the Poqueira valley—typical of the Alpujarra in general—provides abundant information. [note 3] It tells us that there were 23 settlers in Bubión plus 5 in Alguastar (later merged with Bubión), 29 in Capileira, 13 in Pampaneira. Of those in Bubión, nine came from Galicia; five were already living in the village, including three widows, two members of the clergy and the first mayor (Cristóbal de Cañabate, a Morisco whose conversion had apparently been reckoned as sincere). The Libro de Apeos gave all the names, some of which are still to be found.

Land began to be distributed in September 1571: most settlers received specified quantities of irrigated land, vineyards, silkworm eggs, and fruit, nut, and chestnut trees. Grain and olive mills were to remain as public property for six years. Three grain mills in working order and four in need of repair were attributed to two inhabitants of Pampaneira. These grants were formally announced at a gathering in the plaza of Bubión on 28 June 1573, and the settlers could then start marking out and working on their lands.

Their life was not easy. Houses were in a bad state, irrigation channels (acequias) had been damaged, livestock had mostly disappeared (none are mentioned among the apeos). Those who had come from other regions had no experience of farming in the mountains; many gave up. By 1574 only 59 families were left in the Poqueira out of the original 70.

The resettlement programme never restored the Alpujarra population to anything like its former numbers. Before the Reconquista the Alpujarra probably had a population of about forty thousand, mainly Moors with a few "Old Christians". The war of 1568–71 and the subsequent expulsion left only a handful of converted Moors ("New Christians"): these were estimated to number just over two hundred families in the whole of the Alpujarra, just seven in the Poqueira.

The number of Christian settlers who actually stayed in the Alpujarra was approximately seven thousand. Many of these were single or came with only a small family, whereas the Moorish families had averaged five or six persons, making a population of some forty thousand before the rebellion. Gradually the settler families expanded, bringing the population to a peak of twelve thousand by the census of 1591. But then there was an outbreak of plague, infestation of locusts from Africa, and successive years of drought with much-reduced harvests. The population fell drastically and recovered slowly.[56]

Some villages were abandoned. In the Poqueira, the tiny hamlet of Alguástar, mentioned above, was depopulated by the end of the 16th century (probably by the plague). Generally, the settlers kept the houses much as they found them and when they built they copied the same flat-roof style. Mosques were destroyed or turned into churches; towers replaced minarets.

Between 1609 and 1614, the Spanish Crown undertook the expulsion of the Moriscos from all over Spain. About half of Granada's Moriscos remained in the region after the dispersal; only 2,000 were expelled from the city of Granada, many remaining mixed with and protected by old Christians who were less hostile towards them than in other regions of Spain (notably in the Kingdom of Valencia).[57][58]

Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Rebellion of the (1568–1571), also termed the Second Revolt of , constituted an armed insurrection by nominally converted to after the 1492 fall of —in the Kingdom of 's southern mountainous region against Crown policies mandating cultural and religious assimilation under Philip II. Triggered by a 1567 royal pragmatic suppressing usage, traditional Morisco dress, linguistic isolation, and crypto-Islamic customs to foster genuine Christianization, the uprising erupted on 1568 amid widespread resentment over eroded capitulation privileges from the Granada surrender, which had initially permitted Islamic practices. Morisco leaders, including Aben Humeya (Fernando de Valor), who proclaimed himself caliph invoking Nasrid lineage and aimed to restore Islamic rule, mobilized thousands in from fortified mountain strongholds, perpetrating massacres of Christian settlers, killings, and church profanations while dispatching envoys for Ottoman and North African military support to exploit Mediterranean jihadist networks. Aben Humeya's assassination in 1569 by rivals led to Aben Aboo's brief succession, but internal divisions and Spanish countermeasures eroded rebel cohesion. Spanish forces, initially strained by the terrain and rebel tactics, decisively suppressed the revolt by 1571 under Don John of Austria's command, inflicting heavy casualties and culminating in the systematic dispersal of Granada's population—estimated at over 150,000—to northern Castile, effectively dismantling the region's crypto-Muslim core and averting immediate recurrence of , though foreshadowing the kingdom-wide Morisco expulsions of 1609–1614.

Historical Background

Conquest of Granada and the 1499–1501 Revolts

The (1482–1492) concluded with the surrender of , the last Muslim stronghold in Iberia, on January 2, 1492, marking the completion of the under and . Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, known as the Great Captain, directed the decisive siege and military operations that forced the capitulation of Muhammad XII (Boabdil). The preceding Treaty of Granada, signed November 25, 1491, promised Muslims retention of their religion, mosques, laws, customs, and property rights, with no compulsory conversions or interference in worship, provided they submitted to Christian rule. Post-conquest policies initially adhered to these terms under Hernando de Talavera, the first Archbishop of Granada, who pursued gradual evangelization through preaching and education rather than coercion. However, in late 1499, Cardinal , Archbishop of Toledo and a key advisor to , arrived in and launched an aggressive campaign of forced baptisms, targeting women and children, while destroying Qurans and deemed incompatible with . These actions, perceived as violations of the 1491 , ignited widespread resentment among the approximately 500,000 in the Kingdom of Granada. The revolt erupted in Granada city on December 17–18, 1499, when Muslim crowds rioted against the conversions, killing around 80 Christians, destroying churches, and expelling officials. Violence quickly spread to the Alpujarras mountains, where rural Muslims, organized under local leaders including remnants of Nasrid nobility, seized control of villages and fortified positions, rejecting nominal conversions and demanding restoration of Islamic practices. Ferdinand responded by mobilizing royal troops under Íñigo López de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla, the kingdom's governor, who retook Granada city by early 1500 amid brutal street fighting. The mountain insurgency persisted into 1501, with rebels employing guerrilla tactics in rugged terrain, but Spanish forces, reinforced by artillery and systematic sweeps, gradually suppressed pockets of resistance. By April 1501, the rebellion was quelled, resulting in the revocation of the Treaty of Granada's protections; surviving Muslims faced a stark ultimatum—convert to or emigrate—leading to mass baptisms and the emergence of the population, outwardly Catholic but suspected of crypto-Islam. This outcome entrenched policies of assimilation through coercion, sowing seeds of long-term cultural tension in the region.

Formation of Morisco Society

The society emerged in the Kingdom of Granada following the forced mass conversions of its Muslim population after the 1492 conquest. Initially, the Capitulations of Granada permitted Muslims to practice their faith, but these protections were undermined starting in 1499 when Cardinal initiated aggressive proselytization efforts, including the destruction of Arabic manuscripts and coercive baptisms that affected tens of thousands. This campaign provoked the First Rebellion of the (1499–1501), which, upon suppression, led to the royal decree of October 12, 1501, mandating conversion to Christianity or expulsion for all remaining Muslims in Granada. Most Muslims opted for nominal rather than , thereby forming the core of the population—legally Christian subjects of Muslim descent who often continued Islamic practices clandestinely. By early 1502, similar edicts extended to Castile, but Granada's s retained a particularly strong cultural cohesion due to the recency of conversion and geographic isolation in regions like the valleys. This society was stratified by descent from pre-conversion Muslims, with elders and faqihs (Islamic scholars) preserving religious texts and rituals in secret, fostering a dual identity that resisted full assimilation into Christian norms. Economically, Moriscos dominated , , and crafts such as silk weaving in the , contributing significantly to Granada's output while facing legal disabilities and social suspicion from Old Christians. Their communities maintained as the primary language, traditional dress, and endogamous practices, which reinforced internal but heightened perceptions of otherness. By the mid-16th century, this unassimilated minority constituted the majority in Granada's rural highlands, setting the stage for later conflicts.

Spanish Policies Toward Moriscos Prior to 1567

Following the conquest of on November 25, 1491, the Capitulations of Granada granted Muslims the right to practice their religion freely, retain their laws and customs, and avoid . However, Archbishop arrived in Granada in 1499 and initiated aggressive proselytization efforts, including the destruction of Arabic manuscripts and public burnings of Islamic texts, which provoked the First Rebellion of the Alpujarras in 1499–1500. After suppressing the revolt, Cisneros oversaw mass forced baptisms in 1501, converting the majority of Granada's Muslim population into Moriscos nominally under Christianity, with an estimated 50,000 conversions in the first months alone; those refusing were compelled to emigrate, though many did so superficially to remain in their lands. In the Crown of Castile, a royal edict on January 12, 1502, extended to all remaining , prohibiting the practice of under penalty of enslavement or expulsion, leading to widespread nominal conversions and the effective end of open Islamic observance by 1502. Mudéjares in the Crown of and retained legal status as non-Christians until 1525, when, amid the (Germanías), Charles V responded to Morisco alliances with nobles by seeking papal dispensation from Clement VII to abrogate prior protections. On February 2, 1526, Charles issued an edict mandating baptism or expulsion for Aragon's by January 26, 1526, resulting in mass conversions estimated at over 150,000, though enforcement allowed many to stay with minimal oversight. Under Charles V, policies emphasized assimilation through Christian education and cultural suppression, including intermittent bans on language use, traditional dress, and public baths, enforced variably by local inquisitors and secular authorities; the , active since 1480, increasingly targeted crypto-Islamic practices (judaizing equivalents termed "Moriscizing"), prosecuting thousands for relapsing into by the 1530s. Economic incentives, such as tax exemptions and land grants, were offered to encourage loyalty, yet suspicion persisted due to perceived ties to North African corsairs and the , fostering segregated communities with limited intermarriage and persistent cultural isolation. Philip II, ascending in 1556, inherited this framework and intensified scrutiny via the , dispatching visitations to in the 1560s to document clandestine practices, but refrained from sweeping prohibitions until 1567, allowing de facto tolerance in remote areas like the despite nominal laws.

Causes of the Rebellion

Persistent Cultural and Religious Resistance

Despite the mass forced baptisms imposed on Granada's Muslim population following the suppression of the 1499–1501 revolts, a substantial number of Moriscos—nominal converts to —persisted in crypto-Islamic practices throughout the early , concealing adherence to core Islamic rituals such as private salat prayers, , ritual , and halal slaughter while publicly attending to evade . This dissimulation was doctrinally sanctioned by a 1504 fatwa from the of , which authorized (religious concealment) as a under Christian coercion, enabling Moriscos to interpret outward Catholic conformity as permissible without abandoning their faith. Inquisition records from the 1520s onward document recurrent discoveries of such underground observances, including the use of Arabic Qur'ans smuggled from and the maintenance of secret mosques in remote villages, underscoring the resilience of these practices amid sporadic raids and executions. Cultural resistance complemented religious clandestinity, with Moriscos in the rugged Alpujarra mountains preserving pre-conquest traditions like distinctive Berber-influenced attire (including turbans and loose robes for men, veils for women), Arabic-derived , and communal bathing rituals in hammams that evoked Islamic purity laws, despite edicts from the 1526 Granada audience banning such markers of "Moorish" identity to enforce assimilation. The region's geographical isolation—characterized by steep ravines and terraced irrigations systems inherited from Nasrid —facilitated this continuity, allowing communities to limit interactions with Old Christian overseers and sustain vernacular texts, which encoded Islamic , poetry, and in Romance dialects scripted in Arabic characters, thereby transmitting orthodoxy across generations without direct in . By the 1560s, ethnographic reports to Philip II highlighted how these customs fostered parallel societies, with Morisco alfaquíes (Islamic jurists) clandestinely arbitrating disputes via rather than royal , eroding the Crown's legal monopoly. This entrenched duality fueled mutual distrust, as Christian elites, informed by chroniclers like Hernando del Pulgar, perceived Morisco fidelity to over —evident in rumored Ottoman correspondences and the 1560s revival of jihadist rhetoric—as an existential security risk, particularly given the Moriscos' demographic weight (comprising up to 80% of Granada's valley populations) and proximity to Barbary corsair bases. from pre-rebellion surveys, such as those by the contador de Deza in 1560, quantified non-compliance: over 40,000 Morisco households ignored mandates to adopt Castilian surnames and forsake speech, interpreting conversion decrees as political subjugation rather than spiritual transformation, which in turn justified to them the moral imperative of passive defiance. Such resistance, rooted in causal chains of coerced without genuine evangelization, perpetuated cycles of suspicion and enforcement, culminating in the 1567 pragmática's escalatory prohibitions that ignited open revolt.

Economic and Social Grievances

Moriscos in the region bore a disproportionate burden, including special levies that exceeded those on Old Christians, despite initial capitulation treaties promising fiscal moderation post-1492 . These es, often collected to fund defenses against Ottoman threats and internal administration, strained agricultural communities dependent on labor-intensive cultivation and irrigated farming. By the 1560s, the industry—central to Granadan Morisco prosperity—faced guild restrictions and market pressures from Christian competitors, diminishing economic viability. Land expropriations compounded these fiscal woes, as royal policies resettled Christian colonists in Morisco territories, seizing fertile valleys and disrupting traditional tenure systems. Such encroachments, initiated after earlier revolts and intensified under Philip II, undermined the self-sufficiency of Alpujarran villages, where Moriscos maintained advanced terracing and water management inherited from Nasrid times. was acute, with Morisco wealth generation—through crafts and —frequently redirected via tribute or , fostering perceptions of exploitation. Socially, Moriscos confronted entrenched , barred from municipal offices, commands, and guilds by statutes emphasizing Old Christian lineage. Purity-of-blood laws institutionalized their inferiority, subjecting them to inquisitorial scrutiny and communal despite nominal conversion. In rural , where Moriscos formed demographic majorities, this exclusion perpetuated a dual society, with Old Christian minorities wielding disproportionate influence over justice and resources. Resentment deepened from enforced segregation and cultural , eroding social cohesion and priming grievances that the 1567 pragmática would ignite.

The 1567 Prohibitory Pragmática and Immediate Triggers

The Prohibitory Pragmática, issued by Philip II on January 1, 1567, targeted the cultural distinctiveness of Granada's by banning as a spoken and written language, traditional attire including turbans, veils, Moorish-style shoes, and multicolored garments, as well as public baths modeled on Islamic hammams unless used solely for . It further prohibited Morisco surnames, festivals, dances, and books or inscriptions, while mandating the adoption of Castilian names, speech, and dress, compulsory education of children in Castilian at Christian schools, and restrictions on silk production techniques associated with Muslim customs. These measures, building on prior conciliar decrees like those from Granada's provincial council, aimed to eliminate external signs of Islamic identity and compel full assimilation into Christian Spanish society. The edict arose from Philip II's consultations with a junta of theologians, jurists, and officials, who concluded that voluntary tolerance had failed to eradicate crypto-Islamic practices amid evidence of Morisco disloyalty, including secret religious observances and rumored Ottoman contacts. Enforcement was initially softened with a one-year for compliance, but Morisco elites, including figures like Francisco Núñez Muley, protested through memorials arguing that abrupt cultural suppression would provoke disorder without addressing root economic and social issues. Despite these appeals, the pragmática reflected a strategic shift toward coercive integration, prioritizing security against perceived internal threats in a kingdom vulnerable to external Muslim powers. In 1568, Pedro de Deza, president of Granada's Audiencia, escalated enforcement by appointing commissioners to conduct house searches for prohibited items, impose fines, and arrest recalcitrant leaders, actions that heightened fears of mass inquisitorial proceedings or expulsion. These intrusions, coupled with rumors of impending royal troops, eroded fragile compliance and unified disparate factions against what they viewed as existential cultural erasure. The immediate spark occurred on December 24, 1568, when in the Alpujarra village of ambushed and killed a royal commissioner enforcing dress codes and several accompanying Christians, rapidly escalating into coordinated attacks on officials across the region. This violence, led by figures like (Fernando de Valor), a of Nasrid descent, transformed localized resistance into a broader , as news of the killings mobilized thousands fearing reprisals or total subjugation. The pragmática's rigid implementation thus acted as the catalyst, exposing the limits of assimilation policies amid entrenched religious and communal divides.

Outbreak and Course of the Rebellion

Initial Uprising in December 1568

The Rebellion of the Alpujarras ignited on 23 December 1568 when Moriscos in villages across the Alpujarras mountains, including areas near Guadix and the Valero valley, assassinated local Christian corregidors, officials, and settlers. These premeditated killings, executed by organized bands of monfíes—outlaw groups long active in resisting Spanish authority—marked a premature outbreak, advancing the rebels' coordinated plan from its intended start on 1 January 1569. The immediate catalyst was the enforcement of Philip II's 1567 pragmática, which imposed assimilation policies such as bans on Arabic speech, traditional dress, and Muslim customs, exacerbating longstanding grievances over religious suppression and economic exploitation. Fernando de Válor y Córdoba, a noble descended from the last Nasrid emirate rulers and residing in the village of Válor, quickly assumed leadership amid the chaos. On 26 December 1568, he was proclaimed "Aben Humeya," king of the , in a that invoked Islamic caliphal traditions and rallied supporters with promises of restoring pre-conquest autonomy. Initial rebel forces, comprising 3,000 to 4,000 fighters drawn from rural communities and monfí networks, seized control of key passes and villages in the rugged terrain, leveraging the ' natural defenses for . Concurrent efforts to spark a mass uprising in Granada's Albayzín quarter, home to roughly Moriscos, faltered due to the swift mobilization of Spanish troops under the city's , who reinforced garrisons and deterred widespread . Plans to storm the palace similarly collapsed, confining the initial phase to the highlands where rebels established provisional governance and minted coins bearing Aben Humeya's name. This localized success, however, prompted immediate royal countermeasures, including troop deployments from , signaling the transition to prolonged .

Rebel Organization and Expansion (1569)


In early 1569, the rebels coalesced under the leadership of (Fernando de Válor y Córdoba), who had proclaimed himself king in late December 1568 and established a in Ugíjar. This structure included a council of government and a network of appointed officials handling religious, civilian, and military affairs, drawing on claims of Umayyad descent to legitimize authority among the insurgents. The organization mobilized around 10,000 fighters initially, relying on local networks from the former Nasrid elite and rural communities.
The rebellion expanded rapidly across the region, encompassing approximately 180 towns and villages by the beginning of 1569, as insurgents leveraged asymmetric tactics such as ambushes and surprise attacks on Spanish supply lines to consolidate control over the mountainous valleys. Geographically, the uprising grew eastward and westward along the 90-kilometer corridor, with efforts to extend influence to the Sierra de Bentomiz in Málaga and the Almanzora Valley in Almería between and . A notable conventional engagement occurred in June 1569, when around 4,500 rebels confronted forces under the Marquis of Vélez, highlighting attempts to challenge Spanish positions directly despite ultimate defeats in open battle. Rebel growth incorporated limited external support, including about 400 fighters dispatched from , amid overtures to the for broader alliance, though these yielded minimal strategic aid. Expansion efforts faltered in securing coastal ports, such as the failed assault on Vera in 1569, which prevented reliable resupply and reinforcement from . Internally, the organization faced strains from Aben Humeya's authoritarian style, culminating in his murder by fellow rebels on October 20, 1569, after which Aben Aboo (Diego López) assumed leadership with backing from radical factions, sustaining the insurgency's momentum into late 1569.

Spanish Counteroffensive and Key Engagements (1569–1570)

Following initial rebel successes in late 1568, Spanish forces under the Marquis of Mondéjar mounted a counteroffensive in January 1569, advancing from into the with approximately 2,000 men and securing key towns en route to Lanjarón by January 3. This effort contained the uprising temporarily, prompting surrenders among some communities, though internal Spanish political divisions, including accusations of leniency toward rebels, led to Mondéjar's arrest in February 1569 and stalled further progress. In March 1569, King Philip II appointed his half-brother de Austria as supreme commander to unify feuding local nobility and decisively suppress the revolt. arrived in in April, organizing a professional army that included tercios and integrating local militias. Meanwhile, in June 1569, the Marquis of Vélez independently engaged rebels near Berja in , defeating a force of 4,500 Moriscos reinforced by 400 Barbary privateers and Ottoman elements in a . Vélez's victory disrupted rebel supply lines but was undermined by logistical challenges, forcing his withdrawal and leaving the core region under insurgent control. Don Juan's systematic campaign intensified from December 1569, focusing on the northern approaches to and provinces through sieges and attrition tactics. A notable engagement occurred at Galera in early 1570, where Spanish troops faced fierce resistance in a fortified town, suffering significant casualties before capturing it and executing defenders; this action exemplified the protracted guerrilla-style fighting that characterized the counteroffensive. Complementing direct assaults, Don Juan's strategy incorporated crop destruction to induce , selective pardons to divide rebels, and blockades to isolate strongholds, gradually eroding insurgent cohesion by April 1570 as thousands surrendered. These operations, though costly in lives and resources, shifted momentum decisively toward Spanish forces, setting the stage for final suppression efforts.

Final Phases and Suppression (1570–1571)

In early 1570, Spanish forces under the command of Don Juan de Austria, half-brother of Philip II, continued their systematic campaign to reclaim insurgent-held territories in the Alpujarras mountains, following initial successes in late 1569. The Duke of Sessa secured western Alpujarran towns between February and April, though insurgents ambushed a supply column at La Ragua, inflicting approximately 800 casualties on Christian troops and temporarily disrupting logistics. Don Juan's forces, bolstered by tercio regiments comprising up to 12,000 infantry and 700 cavalry under the Marquis of Vélez, employed sieges and coordinated advances to isolate rebel strongholds. By mid-1570, Aben Aboo, who had succeeded the assassinated as rebel leader, attempted to consolidate resistance in the rugged interior, commanding an estimated 16,000 combatants including local Moriscos and foreign fighters. directed operations until August, after which Luis de Requesens assumed responsibility for the final clearances from to , implementing scorched-earth policies to deny resources to insurgents and coastal patrols to prevent external aid. These measures dismantled remaining bastions, forcing rebels into caves and isolated redoubts. The rebellion's end came in March 1571 when Aben Aboo was killed through betrayal and Spanish efforts, eliminating unified and prompting mass surrenders. Surviving insurgents, including holdouts in mountain caves such as those near Juviles, were systematically rooted out and killed, marking the complete suppression by spring 1571. This phase underscored the Spanish strategy of attrition and division, leveraging superior numbers and logistics against the fragmented forces.

Extent and Nature of the Insurgency

Geographical Scope and Rebel Tactics

![Los Monfíes de las Alpujarras][float-right]
The Rebellion of the Alpujarras unfolded primarily within the region of the Kingdom of Granada, a compact yet formidable expanse approximately 90 kilometers east to west, encompassing deep valleys, steep ravines, and the southern flanks of the Sierra Nevada mountains, whose peaks surpass 3,000 meters in elevation. This terrain, extending toward the Mediterranean coast and incorporating areas like the Almanzora Valley and adjacent sierras such as Baza, María, and Bentomiz, offered natural barriers and hideouts that hindered large-scale Spanish military maneuvers. The rapidly engulfed around 180 towns and villages, igniting in rural strongholds such as Válor—birthplace of rebel leader —Ugíjar, and the Poqueira ravine, before sporadically extending to peripheral zones including parts of and the Ronda mountains, though its core remained entrenched in the ' labyrinthine geography.
Morisco rebels, peaking at roughly 16,000 fighters including an initial core of 3,000–4,000 and later bolstered by about 400 foreign combatants from , adapted to their numerical and technological disadvantages through asymmetric . They conducted hundreds of ambushes and surprise raids on Spanish supply convoys and isolated detachments throughout 1569–1570, exploiting intimate of the ravines for hit-and-run operations that inflicted attrition on royal forces. While early engagements included conventional battles—such as the June 1569 confrontation where 4,500 rebels under faced the Marquis of Vélez's army and suffered defeat due to inferior organization—the insurgents largely eschewed open-field combat thereafter, favoring defensive positions in fortified villages and mountain passes to prolong resistance. Groups known as monfíes, irregular Muslim bandits hardened by prior skirmishes in the Sierra Nevada, played a pivotal role in these tactics, sustaining low-intensity harassment even as structured rebel armies faltered. This approach, augmented by an estimated 8,000 arquebusiers, leveraged the landscape's defensibility to counter the Crown's superior manpower and , though it ultimately proved insufficient against systematic pacification campaigns.

Fanaticism, Atrocities, and External Support Attempts

The rebellion exhibited strong elements of religious fanaticism among the Morisco insurgents, who framed their uprising as a to restore Muslim rule in . Leaders such as Muhammad Aben Umeya (also known as Fernando de Válor y Córdoba) invoked their claimed descent from the Umayyad caliphs and invoked Islamic prophecies to rally support, portraying the conflict as a divine struggle against Christian . Foreign from arrived to bolster the rebels, infusing the insurgency with zealous commitment to holy war, which intensified as the revolt progressed into 1569. Atrocities by the rebels included systematic killings and of to enforce loyalty and terrorize opponents. On December 23, 1568, initial murders of Christian inhabitants in Alpujarra villages ignited the broader uprising, with monfíes—irregular guerrilla bands—conducting targeted assassinations and tortures to prevent defections. Captured Christian women and children were enslaved and sold in North African markets, providing funds for the rebel cause, while internal dissenters among the Moriscos, such as Hernando El Zaguer who favored negotiations, were executed by insurgents to maintain unity. These acts underscored the radicals' strategy of total commitment, though Spanish forces responded with their own brutal reprisals, including mass executions and village razings during the counteroffensive. Efforts to secure external support focused on the and North African regencies, but yielded limited results due to the Ottomans' preoccupation with the conquest of . Aben Umeya and his successor Aben Aboo dispatched envoys to Sultan Selim II in 1569, appealing for naval and military aid under the banner of Islamic solidarity and shared against , yet Ottoman resources were diverted to their July 1570 campaign involving 350 ships and 60,000 troops. The provided more tangible assistance, sending approximately 400 fighters under leaders like Hernando El Habaquí and releasing Muslim prisoners to join the revolt; Barbary pirates facilitated clandestine landings of arms and volunteers. Rebel attempts to capture coastal ports such as Vera in September 1569 aimed to enable larger-scale Ottoman intervention but failed, restricting aid to sporadic infiltrations rather than decisive reinforcement.

Suppression and Aftermath

Role of Spanish Military Leadership

The suppression of the Rebellion of the Alpujarras began under the command of Iñigo López de Mendoza, Marquis of Mondéjar, who served as of . On January 3, 1569, shortly after the uprising erupted in December 1568, Mondéjar mobilized an improvised force of 2,000 men from to secure towns along the route to the coast and advanced into the , capturing Lanjarón on January 9. His strategy emphasized alongside pressure, securing surrenders such as that of Hernando El Zaguer, which initially contained the revolt's spread but failed to decisively crush rebel strongholds due to logistical challenges and internal rivalries. Accused of leniency and strategic errors by rivals, Mondéjar was relieved of command in April 1569. In the eastern sector, Pedro Fajardo y Chacón, Marquis of Vélez, led containment efforts with 12,000 infantry and 700 cavalry, including professional tercio regiments. Operating from Almería, Vélez halted rebel advances in the Almanzora Valley and engaged at Berja in June 1569, but his forces could not reclaim core positions, withdrawing to after heavy losses. These early campaigns highlighted the limitations of royal forces against guerrilla tactics in rugged terrain, prompting King Philip II to appoint his half-brother, de Austria, as supreme commander in late 1569. arrived in with reinforcements, launching a major offensive in January 1570 with 12,000 troops, focusing on sieges like Galera (January-April 1570), where and disciplined infantry overcame fortified defenses despite high Spanish casualties. Don Juan's leadership integrated professional tercio units, artillery barrages, and scorched-earth policies to destroy crops and villages, denying rebels sustenance and forcing surrenders through starvation and psychological pressure. Subordinate commanders, such as the Duke of Sessa, targeted the western Alpujarras in February-April 1570 with 8,000 foot and 350 horse, securing towns but suffering ambushes like La Ragua, which claimed 800 lives. Don Juan pacified northern Granada and Almería outposts by mid-1570 before departing for the Lepanto campaign in August, leaving a network of garrisons. Luis de Requesens y Zúñiga, as governor, oversaw the final phase from September 1570, employing small detachments, coastal assaults via galleys, and systematic cleansing of bastions, culminating in the death of rebel leader Aben Aboo in March 1571 and the revolt's end by November 1570. This coordinated escalation under centralized royal authority, contrasting initial fragmented efforts, ensured the insurgency's defeat through overwhelming force and attrition.

Dispersal, Resettlement, and Demographic Shifts

Following the military suppression of the rebellion by early 1571, King Philip II implemented a policy of forced dispersal for the Kingdom of Granada's Morisco population to dilute their demographic concentration and avert future insurrections. The process commenced in 1569 amid ongoing operations and extended through November 1570, targeting the entire Morisco community in Granada city and surrounding areas, with families systematically relocated to central and northern regions of the Iberian Peninsula, including Castile and Extremadura. In April 1570, a royal pardon was extended to surrendering Moriscos on condition of abandoning Granada for resettlement elsewhere in Spain, facilitating organized convoys under military oversight to ensure compliance and minimize resistance. Estimates indicate that close to 80,000 —roughly half of Granada's pre-rebellion Morisco inhabitants—were deported and dispersed across Castile, leaving behind a reduced and fragmented remnant integrated or expelled from urban centers like city, where only about 3,000 of 15,000–20,000 pre-war families remained. This dispersal encompassed not only rebels but also non-combatants, with over 25,000 individuals enslaved during the conflict's final phases, many sold into labor across Spanish territories, further eroding the local Morisco base. The policy induced profound demographic shifts in and the valleys, where dispersal halved the regional population and stripped away skilled agriculturalists integral to the terraced systems sustaining and production. Repopulation initiatives drew Old Christian settlers from northern , but the rugged terrain and economic disincentives limited influx, resulting in sustained depopulation; by 1591, affected areas like city had contracted to approximately 8,200 households (equating to roughly 34,000 individuals), a sharp decline from pre-1570 levels, with proportions dropping below 10% amid Christian dominance. This reconfiguration prioritized through ethnic dilution, though it exacerbated short-term by disrupting established and labor patterns.

Long-term Consequences

Impacts on Granada's Population and Economy

The suppression of the rebellion prompted the dispersal of approximately 80,000 Granadan Moriscos to the Castilian interior and other regions of , aimed at diluting their demographic concentration and averting future uprisings. This policy, initiated in 1569 and intensified after 1570, resulted in severe depopulation of the valleys and Granada's urban centers, where Moriscos had comprised the majority; for instance, the San Salvador parish in Granada lost about 75% of its heads of household, dropping from 900–1,000 in 1561 to 300–400 by 1587. Relocation efforts involved dividing families into small groups for transport, often under harsh conditions that led to high mortality from disease, exposure, and violence, further eroding the local population base. Repopulation attempts with Old Christian settlers from Castile proved largely unsuccessful, hampered by poor soil quality, emigration to the , and resistance to the rugged terrain, leaving many villages abandoned and accelerating urban decay in areas like the neighborhood. Economically, the exodus disrupted Granada's agrarian economy, which depended on Morisco expertise in terraced , mulberry cultivation for production, and in the ; numerous villages were deserted, causing a sharp decline in agricultural yields and output. The loss of Morisco labor and tax contributions—such as the farda mayor levy, which had generated 21,000 ducats annually by 1526—triggered a , weakening streams and complicating coastal defense . Properties were confiscated and redistributed through mechanisms like the libros de apeo y , but this led to , informal land divisions, and tenant disputes over censos, further straining local finances and hindering effective repopulation. During the conflict itself, widespread by rebels and retaliatory enslavement by Christian forces exacerbated destruction, undermining regional stability and networks tied to Morisco craftsmanship. Overall, these shifts contributed to a prolonged downturn, with Granada's industry and rural productivity suffering from the irreplaceable loss of specialized knowledge and workforce.

Evolution of Spanish Morisco Policy Toward Expulsion

Following the suppression of the Alpujarras rebellion by mid-1571, Philip II pursued a policy of compulsory dispersal (dispersio) for Granada's Morisco population, aiming to scatter potential insurgents across Castile and prevent concentrated strongholds that could facilitate renewed uprisings or foreign incursions. Beginning on November 1, 1570, royal officials oversaw the relocation of an estimated to 150,000 Moriscos—encompassing both combatants and non-combatants—from Granada to inland regions of the Crown of Castile, with strict prohibitions on returning to their origins or forming new clusters exceeding 100 families per locale. This measure, enforced through military escorts and property seizures, sought assimilation via geographic dilution and , yet empirical outcomes revealed persistent crypto-Islamic adherence, including secret aljamas (communal structures) and rituals, which local reports linked to ongoing security vulnerabilities. Subsequent decrees under Philip II reinforced containment rather than reversal, such as the 1573 authorization permitting enslavement of adult male rebels captured during the conflict, while exempting women and children under 1572 orders to encourage surrenders and family dispersal. By 1584, additional expulsions targeted residual s unlicensed for residence, reflecting frustration with incomplete integration amid documented plots, like the 1570s-1580s conspiracies in and involving prophecies of Ottoman deliverance. These policies stemmed from causal assessments of enclaves as latent threats—evidenced by the rebellion's ties to North African corsairs and Turkish agents—prioritizing state security over economic contributions from labor in agriculture and crafts, despite Old Christian complaints of competition. The transition to outright expulsion crystallized under Philip III, whose 1609 decree initiated systematic deportation starting in Valencia, expanding to Aragon, Catalonia, and Castile by 1614, affecting approximately 300,000 Moriscos amid documented fears of jihadist continuity and Ottoman-backed revolts. Advisors like the Duke of Lerma cited irreconcilable cultural separatism and empirical failures of prior assimilation—such as persistent Islamic legal observances (fatwas circulated covertly)—as justifying removal, overriding counsels against economic disruption from losing skilled irrigators and artisans. This evolution marked a pragmatic escalation from dispersal's partial successes to total excision, grounded in repeated validations of Morisco unreliability as a domestic fifth column rather than coerced victims of uniformist zeal alone.

Historiographical Perspectives

Empirical Accounts of Security Threats

Contemporary observers and official dispatches to Philip II documented the Morisco rebels' systematic targeting of Christian settlements as a direct on Spanish territorial integrity, with the initial uprising on December 23, 1568, sparking coordinated attacks across Granada's Alpujarra region that killed hundreds of Old Christians and disrupted supply lines to key fortresses. In the mining town of Serón, rebels under local leaders massacred approximately 150 Christian inhabitants and enslaved another 80 in late December 1568, seizing arms and provisions to sustain guerrilla operations in the rugged terrain, which reports attributed to premeditated religious animosity rather than mere economic grievance. Similar depredations occurred in nearby villages like and Juviles, where insurgents executed priests and burned churches, actions framed in rebel proclamations as retribution for forced conversions and a call to restore Islamic rule, escalating the conflict beyond localized banditry into a campaign of . Rebel leadership under Fernando de Valor (Aben Humeya), who proclaimed himself emir and adopted the title Muhammad Aben Humeya in early 1569, institutionalized the threat by minting coins bearing Islamic inscriptions and assembling a force estimated at 4,000-8,000 fighters equipped with smuggled Turkish arquebuses, signaling organized resistance capable of challenging royal garrisons. Aben Humeya dispatched envoys to the and , offering vassalage in exchange for naval and troop support to establish an independent , a proposal that, while ultimately unfulfilled due to Ottoman preoccupations elsewhere, underscored the revolt's potential to serve as a for external Islamic incursions amid Spain's concurrent Lepanto campaigns. These overtures, corroborated by intercepted correspondence and defector testimonies, positioned the uprising as part of a continuum with Barbary corsair raids, which had already intensified along Andalusia's coast, heightening fears of a pincer strategy against Castile. The scale of Morisco crypto-Islamist networks amplified the internal security peril, as intelligence from viceroy de Espinosa revealed sympathies among the roughly 300,000 s in —many retaining literacy and clandestine ulemas—who could ignite parallel revolts, prompting preemptive arrests in and to contain contagion. Philip II's councilors, drawing on eyewitness accounts from suppressed 1526 uprisings, classified the rebels as a "" inherently disloyal due to persistent practices and familial ties to North African Muslims, a assessment validated by the rebellion's persistence until March 1571, which necessitated deploying 12,000 troops under Don to restore order. While some modern interpretations minimize these religious dimensions in favor of socioeconomic factors, primary relacions and military logs emphasize causal links to jihadist ideology, including fatwas circulated among insurgents justifying violence against "infidels" and vows of martyrdom, rendering the threat existential to Habsburg consolidation post-Reconquista.

Debates on Cultural Resistance vs. Jihadist Continuity

Historians have debated the underlying motivations of the Alpujarras rebellion, weighing whether it constituted a defensive cultural resistance to Spanish assimilation policies or a manifestation of jihadist continuity rooted in religious opposition to Christian rule. Proponents of the cultural resistance interpretation emphasize the revolt's immediate trigger in the Pragmatica of January 17, 1567, which prohibited language use, traditional dress, baths, and other Moorish customs, framing these as assaults on ethnic identity rather than faith alone. Moderate leaders, such as Núñez Muley in his 1566 Memorial, contended that such practices were secular traditions compatible with nominal , arguing they posed no threat to loyalty toward the Crown and stemmed from ancestral heritage rather than doctrinal defiance. This view posits the rebellion as a desperate bid to preserve communal cohesion amid enforced Hispanization, with initial protester demands focused on suspending the decree rather than establishing independence. In contrast, the jihadist continuity perspective highlights evidence of explicitly religious aims, portraying the uprising as an extension of Islamic holy war traditions against non-Muslim governance, with rebels seeking to revive a Muslim polity in . Rebel leader Muhammad ibn Umayya (known as ), descended from the Umayyad line, was proclaimed third caliph of Cordoba on December 17, 1568, in a ceremony involving Quranic oaths, the minting of coins bearing Islamic inscriptions, and the adoption of Muslim banners and regalia, signaling a restoration of caliphal . Insurgents appealed to Ottoman Sultan for jihadist support, invoking prophecies of reconquest and framing the conflict as a defensive holy ( fi sabil ), which drew approximately 4,000 North African fighters to their cause by 1569. Primary accounts, including those by eyewitnesses like Luis de Mármol Carvajal, document rebel atrocities such as the and of over 50 priests and the profanation of churches in on December 24, 1568, interpreted as religiously motivated fanaticism rather than mere cultural backlash. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive, as the rebellion exhibited hybrid elements: crypto-Islamic practices persisted via the 1526 Oran Fatwa permitting dissimulation (taqiyya), and Aljamiado literature preserved Islamic lore in Romance vernaculars, blending cultural retention with covert faith. However, the radical faction's dominance—evident in the execution of moderates and sustained guerrilla warfare until suppression in 1571—suggests religious ideology outweighed pragmatic cultural defense, particularly given failed external alliances and internal divisions over taqiyya versus open revolt. Contemporary chroniclers like Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and Ginés Pérez de Hita, drawing from participant testimonies, underscore the insurgents' self-conception as mujahideen continuing the frontier jihad (ghaza) tradition, a continuity rooted in post-Reconquista resistance patterns rather than isolated ethnic grievance.

References

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