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Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568–1571)
View on Wikipedia| Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568–1571) | |||||||
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Principal centres of the Morisco Revolt | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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Moriscos rebels | ||||||
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Aben Humeya X Aben Aboo X Faraj ibn Faraj † | ||||||
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2,200 (initially) 20,000 (1570) |
4,000 (initially) 25,000 (1570) | ||||||
The second rebellion of the Alpujarras (Arabic: ثورة البشرات الثانية; 1568–1571), sometimes called the War of the Alpujarras or the Morisco Revolt, was triggered by Philip II of Spain's Pragmática Sanción de 1567 and was the second Morisco revolt against the Castilian Crown in the mountainous Alpujarra region and on the Granada Altiplano region, northeast of the city of Granada. The rebels were Moriscos, the nominally Catholic descendants of the Mudéjares (Muslims under Castilian rule) following the first rebellion of the Alpujarras (1499–1501).
By 1250, the Reconquest of Spain by the Catholic powers had left only the Emirate of Granada, in southern Spain.[1] In 1492, Granada city fell to the Catholic Monarchs—Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon—and under the terms of capitulation the whole Muslim-majority region came under Christian rule.
The Muslim inhabitants of the city, however, soon revolted against Christian rule in 1499, followed by the mountain villages: this revolt was suppressed by 1501.[2] The Muslims under Christian rule (until then known as Mudejares) were then obliged to convert to Christianity, becoming a nominally Catholic population known as "Moriscos".
Discontent among the new "Moriscos" led to a second rebellion, led by a Morisco known as Aben Humeya, starting in December 1568 and lasting till March 1571. This violent conflict took place mainly in the mountainous Alpujarra region, on the southern slopes of the Sierra Nevada between Granada city and the Mediterranean coast, and is often known as the War of the Alpujarras.[3][note 1]
The rebellion reportedly took on a fanatic character, with the torturing and murder of priests and sacristans, and the destruction and profanation of churches. In this the bands of monfíes -outlaws who had left the villages and roamed in the mountains. and joined the rebellion- played a large part.[4]
Most of the Morisco population was then expelled from the Kingdom of Granada and was dispersed throughout the Kingdom of Castille (modern-day Castile, Extremadura, and Andalusia). As this left many smaller settlements in Granada almost empty, Catholic settlers were brought in from other parts of the country to repopulate them.
Background
[edit]Fall of Granada and the 1499–1501 Muslim revolts
[edit]
The Kingdom of Granada was the last Muslim-ruled state in Spain. After a long siege, the city of Granada fell to the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabel, in 1492. The Muslim population was initially tolerated under the terms of the Treaty of Granada: they were allowed to stay in their dwellings, to be judged according to their own laws, and would not be obliged to convert to Christianity.[5]
However, they did come under pressure to convert, and growing discontent led to an uprising in 1499 in Granada city, quickly put down, and in the following year two more serious revolts in the mountain villages of the Alpujarra—the region below the Sierra Nevada. Ferdinand himself led an army into the area. There were also revolts in the western parts of the Kingdom. Suppression by the Catholic forces was severe, with the most violent episode occurring in Laujar de Andarax, where two hundred Muslims were burnt in the local mosque.[6]
This revolt enabled the Catholics to claim that the Muslims had violated the terms of the Treaty of Granada, which were therefore withdrawn. Throughout the region, Muslims were now forced to choose between conversion to Christianity or exile. The vast majority chose conversion and became known as "Moriscos" or "New Christians", though many continued to speak Andalusian Arabic and to maintain their Moorish customs.[7]
Causes of the second rebellion
[edit]In 1526, Charles V (Charles I of Spain)—issued an Edict under which laws against heresy (e.g. Muslim practices by "New Christians") would be strictly enforced; among other restrictions, it forbade the use of Arabic and the wearing of Moorish dress. The Moriscos managed to get this suspended for forty years by the payment of a large sum (80,000 ducados).[8]
Since now all remaining Moors were officially Christian ("Moriscos"), mosques could be destroyed or turned into churches. There was little or no follow-up in terms of explaining Christianity: indeed, the priests themselves were mostly too ignorant to do so.[9] On the other hand, they punished Moriscos who failed to participate in Sunday Mass; Moriscos had to learn—in Latin—the Lord's Prayer, the Ave Maria, the Credo, and the Ten Commandments; children had to be baptised and marriage had to be under Christian rites. Inevitably, tension built up.[10]

The archbishop of Granada, convinced that the Moriscos were maintaining their customs and traditions and would never become real Christians, called in 1565 a synod of the bishops of the kingdom of Granada.[11] It was agreed that the policy of persuasion should be replaced by one of repression, and that the measures of 1526 should now be applied. This meant prohibition of all the distinctive Morisco practices: language, clothing, public baths, religious ceremonies, etc. Moreover, in each place where the Moriscos lived at least a dozen "Old Christians" (i.e. not those who had been supposedly converted) should be installed; Morisco houses should be inspected on Fridays, Saturdays, and feast-days to ensure that they were not practicing Quranic rites; the heads of household should be closely watched to ensure that they were setting a good example; their sons should be taken to Old Castile at the cost of their parents, to be brought up learning Christian customs and forgetting those of their origins.[12]
Philip II, who had become King in 1556, gave his approval: the result was the Pragmática Sanción of 1 January 1567.[13] The Moriscos tried to negotiate its suspension, as in 1526, but this King was inflexible. A Morisco leader, Francisco Núñez Muley, made a statement protesting against the injustices committed against the Moriscos: "Day by day our situation worsens, we are maltreated in every way; and this is done by judges and officials… How can people be deprived of their own language, with which they were born and brought up? In Egypt, Syria, Malta and elsewhere there are people like us who speak, read and write in Arabic, and they are Christians like us."[14] The American historian Henry Charles Lea wrote: "The Moriscos had come to the parting of the ways; there was no middle course and they had the naked alternative of submission or rebellion."[15]
As the failure of their appeals became evident, the Moriscos of Granada began to prepare for rebellion, holding secret meetings in the Moorish quarter, the Albaicín.[16] The authorities arrested Moriscos who they thought might be conspiring; they also made plans to expel Moriscos from the Kingdom and replace them by "Old Christians" (i.e. not recent converts). After a year of fruitless negotiations, in 1568 the Morisco leaders decided to take up arms.[17]
Rebellion of 1568–71 (War of the Alpujarras)
[edit]In the months following publication of the Pragmatica on 1 January 1567, the Moriscos began to prepare their rebellion. Weapons, flour, oil, and other provisions were stored in caves which were inaccessible and safe, enough for six years.[18]
The principal leaders, including some from the Alpujarra, held meetings in private houses in the Albaicín, and from there issued their orders.

At a meeting on 17 September 1568 it was proposed that they should elect a chieftain to lead the revolt. The rebellion started on Christmas Eve in the village of Béznar in the Lecrin valley, when Hernando de Córdoba y Valór was named King: in a solemn ceremony, they clothed him in purple according to the old ritual for the kings of Granada, and many rich Moriscos attended, wearing black garments.[19] He was chosen because he descended from the lineage of the caliphs of Córdoba, the Omeyas, and he therefore took the Moorish name Aben Humeya (or "Omeya"). Numerous other places in the tahas (districts) of Órgiva, Poqueira, Juviles, and other Morisco villages in the Alpujarra followed suit.
The first action by the rebels was in Granada city: it was led by Aben Humeya's "grand vizir", Farax Aben Farax, who on that same night of 24–25 December entered the Albaicín (the Moorish quarter) with a group of monfíes – outlaws who for one reason or another had left the villages and roamed in the mountains. His aim was to persuade the Morisco inhabitants to join the revolt, but he had little success – only a few hundred followed him. This failure in the capital had a decisive effect on the course of the campaign throughout the Kingdom of Granada.[20]
The rebellion reportedly took on a fanatic character, with the torturing and murder of priests and sacristans, the destruction and profanation of churches. In this the bands of monfies played a large part.[21] When a rumor spread in 1568 that the Ottomans had finally come to liberate them, Muslims near Granada, “believing that the days under Christian rule were over, went berserk. Priests all over the countryside were attacked, mutilated, or murdered; some were burned alive; one was sewed inside a pig and barbequed; the pretty Christian girls were assiduously raped, some sent off to join the harems of Moroccan and Algerian potentates.”[22][23][24]
First phase
[edit]The Spanish campaign was led by the Marqués de Mondéjar in the west of the Alpujarra and the Marqués de Los Vélez in the east. Mondéjar, coming from Granada in January 1569, had quick success, over terrain which should have favoured the defenders. He overcame the first natural obstacle – a bridge at Tablate, which the Moors had partially destroyed – and reached Órgiva in time to rescue Christians held captive in the tower.[25]

The first major battle was fought in a river valley east of Órgiva, where the Moors were defeated. An advance detachment then contrived to cross a narrow ravine (picture) and climb a steep mountainside to reach the village of Bubión, in the Poqueira valley, where Aben Humeya had made his headquarters and the Moors had stored equipment and valuables. They were soon joined by the Marqués and the bulk of his army, taking a longer but safer route.[26]

In the next few days the army crossed the mountains and descended on Pórtugos and Pitres, again freeing Christian captives in the churches. From there the way was open to the villages further east.[27]
The American historian Henry Charles Lea wrote of Mondéjar's "short but brilliant campaign... Through heavy snows and intense cold and over almost inaccessible mountains he fought battle after battle, giving the enemy no respite and following up every advantage gained. The Moriscos speedily lost heart and sought terms of surrender… By the middle of February [1569] the rebellion was practically suppressed. Aben Humeya was a wanderer, hiding in caves by day and seeking shelter by night in houses which had letters of surety."[28]
Indeed, at Pórtugos some Moorish leaders had attempted to negotiate surrender terms with Mondéjar, who replied that he would intercede with King Philip, but that in the meantime the punishment of rebels must continue.[29] If he did report to the King, this did him no good as it reinforced charges against him of undue clemency. In fact, the Christian campaign was compromised by a long-standing enmity between the two commanders, and this was fomented by the Chancery in Granada, which on several occasions sent complaints about Mondéjar to King Philip.[note 2]
The subsequent campaign was marked by excesses committed by the troops: this was not a disciplined army but consisted largely of untrained volunteers, who were not paid but counted on the loot they could gather.[30] The chronicler Pérez de Hita wrote that half of them were "the worst scoundrels in the world, motivated only by the desire to steal, sack and destroy the Morisco villages."[31]
There were also many acts of vengeance by Moriscos against "Old Christians". Some priests were flayed alive, being reminded of their severity towards those who did not attend mass, to women who would not uncover their faces, and generally to those who continued practicing their old rites. Churches were systematically set on fire and looted; likewise the houses of the priests and those of Christians in general.[32]
Both sides sold as slaves many of their captives. The Moriscos sold Christians to merchants from North Africa, in exchange for weapons. For their part, those whom the Christian soldiers captured, especially women, were regarded as war booty, and they were entitled to keep the takings for themselves as the Crown renounced the fifth part of the proceeds normally due. Chiefs and officers also took prisoners for themselves, including children. The Crown itself did benefit from the sale of slaves, as in the case of many of the Moors from Juviles who were sold at the market in Granada for the benefit of the King.[33]
Second phase
[edit]This lasted from March 1569 until January 1570. Now the initiative lay with the Morisco rebels, who had gained support as towns in the plain and elsewhere joined the revolt. Thus their number rose from 4,000 in 1569 to 25,000 in 1570, including some Berbers and Turks.[34] Their tactic was to ambush their opponents, avoiding combat on open ground, relying on their knowledge of the intricate terrain of the sierras and occupying the heights from which they could launch audacious attacks.
The Spanish navy was called upon to bring reinforcements to the army, and to protect the Granada coast against Ottoman reinforcements from North Africa.[35]
Third phase
[edit]This began in 1570, after King Philip had relieved the Marqués of Mondéjar of his command and appointed in his place his own half-brother, Don John of Austria, to take overall command, and the Marquis of Los Vélez to pursue operations in the eastern part of the kingdom.
Lea describes Vélez as "ambitious, arrogant and opinionated… He thrust himself into the war and mismanaged it at every turn, but he was a favorite of the king, who supported him through it all… Great preparations were made to give Don John a force which befitted his dignity and should speedily crush all resistance. The towns and cities were summoned to furnish their quotas and the Spanish ambassador at Rome was ordered to bring the Italian galleys to Spain, to aid the home squadron in guarding the coast and intercepting succors from Africa, and also to convey the tercio of Naples" (a battalion of about three thousand regular troops).[36]
This was a big mobilisation to deal with a revolt by a mountain people, with no military training nor organisation, and ill-equipped with weaponry. But King Philip was obsessed by his troubles abroad and clearly felt he had to eliminate this problem on his doorstep. An Ottoman fleet was raiding the Spanish coasts and it had captured the Balearic Islands in 1558. In the Spanish Netherlands, the preaching of Calvinist leaders had led to riots in 1566 and to open warfare in 1568: Philip did not want trouble in his own backyard.[37] Moreover, like Catholic leaders everywhere in Europe, he was determined to stamp out "heresy" of all kinds – and the Moors had by now been formally classified as heretics.
Don John arrived at Granada in April 1569. Returning to Lea's account: "Conflicting opinions led to prolonged discussions during which nothing was done; the campaign went to pieces; the pacified Moriscos, reduced to despair by the withdrawal of Mondéjar, sent back their safeguards and withdrew their oaths of allegiance and with them went many places that had previously remained loyal… Granada was virtually besieged, for the Moriscos ravaged the Vega [the plain] up to the gates… The rebellion, which had hitherto been confined to the Alpujarras and Sierra Nevada, spread on the one side to the mountain of Almería and on the other to those of Málaga. The whole land was aflame and it looked as though the power of Spain was inadequate to extinguish the conflagration."[38]
In an attack on Albuñuelas, the Spanish troops killed all the men who did not escape and brought back fifteen hundred women and children who were divided among the soldiers as slaves.[39] In October that year the king proclaimed "a war of fire and blood" (una guerra a fuego y a sangre) – no longer just a matter of punishing a rebellion. He also gave free rein (campo franco) to the soldiers to take whatever plunder they could find, whether slaves, cattle, or property.[40]
In January 1570 Don John launched his new campaign with a force of 12,000 men; another contingent led by the Duke of Sessa had 8000 foot and 350 horse.[41] There was renewed fighting in the Pitres-Poqueira area in April 1570. As the campaign went on and villages were captured, the Catholic forces were much reduced by desertions.
On 10 February, after a two-month siege, Don Juan conquered Galera and ordered its destruction; in March he took Serón; and at the end of April he headed for the Alpujarra, setting up his headquarters at Padules. There he was joined by a second army under the Duke of Sessa, which had left Granada in February and had crossed the Alpujarra from west to east. At the same time, a third army had come from Antequera to reach the sierra of Bentomiz, another focus of the rebellion, at the beginning of March.[42]
Fourth phase
[edit]This lasted from April 1570 until the spring of 1571. Catholic forces were greatly reinforced with infantry and cavalry. Led by Don John and the Duke of Sessa they launched a new campaign, invading the Alpujarra, destroying houses and crops, putting men to the sword and taking prisoner all the women, children, and elderly people whom they found in their path. "Spain had strained every nerve and had raised an overwhelming force to accomplish what Mondéjar had done with a few thousand men a twelve months earlier."[43]
In May, King Aben Aboo at last accepted surrender terms, under which those who gave themselves up and handed over their weapons would have their lives spared. But when some Berbers appeared with stories of large reinforcements on their way, Aben Aboo decided to fight on. The reports here are muddled: some say that three galleys which had just arrived from Algiers with arms, munitions, and food turned back because they heard Aboo was surrendering. However this may be, no such help reached the rebels, but the Catholics were given an excuse to resume hostilities: "The sierra, in September 1570, was attacked simultaneously from both ends with a war of ruthless devastation, destroying all harvests, killing the men and bringing in women and children by the thousand as slaves. What few prisoners were taken were executed or sent to the galleys."[44]
This advance by the royal troops opened a breach between those of the Moriscos who wanted to continue the fight and those who argued for seeking terms of surrender. In May, following a meeting at Andarax, many rebels fled to North Africa. Soon afterwards, the leader of those who favoured surrender, Hernando El Habaqui, was executed on the order of Aben Aboo.
Although from October 1570 many Moriscos gave themselves up, several thousand went on fighting. Most of them took shelter in caves, but many of these died from suffocation when the Christian troops lit fires at the entrances.[45]
In 1571 John of Austria finally succeeded in suppressing the rebellion in the Alpujarra. The last rebels, after losing the fortress of Juviles, were killed in their caves: among them Aben Aboo who was stabbed to death by his own followers in a cave near Bérchules. Resistance then collapsed.[46]
Diego Hurtado de Mendoza – the more enlightened of the contemporary Spanish sources – made a bitter comment: "Day by day we fought our enemies, in the cold or the heat, hungry, lacking munitions, suffering continual injuries and deaths until we could confront our enemies: a warlike tribe, well-armed and confident in terrain which favoured them. Finally they were driven from their houses and possessions; men and women were chained together; captured children were sold to the highest bidder or carried away to distant places… It was a dubious victory, with such consequences that one might doubt whether those whom God wished to punish were ourselves or the enemy."[47]
Extent of the rebellion
[edit]When the rebellion began, the Kingdom of Granada counted barely 150,000 inhabitants, most of them Moriscos. The exact number who rebelled is unknown, but the ambassadors of France and of the Republic of Genoa at the Madrid court estimated that there were 4,000 rebels in January 1569 and 25,000 by the spring of 1570, of whom some 4,000 were Turks or Berbers from North Africa who had come to support the rebellion.[48]
On the other side, the royal army had at the beginning 2,000 foot-soldiers and 200 cavalry under the command of the Marqués de Mondéjar. The number increased substantially when Don John took charge: in the siege of Galera he had 12,000 men, while the Duke of Sessa at the same time commanded between 8,000 and 10,000 men.[49]
From its start in the Alpujarra, the rebellion spread to the plains and to other mountainous regions on the edges of the Kingdom. A particularly dramatic conflict took place on the ridge (peñón) above Frigiliana, in the Axarquia, where entire families of Moriscos from all around had gathered: the siege lasted from June 1569 till September, when Spanish reinforcements were brought in by sea.[50] Moriscos living in the towns—including the capital, Almería, Málaga, Guadix, Baza, and Motril—and their surrounding areas did not take part in the uprising, although they sympathised with it.[51]
This distinct attitude of the towns can be explained by the presence of a greater number of "Old Christians" and better integration of the Moriscos in these communities. On the other hand, in the Alpujarra and other regions, where the rebellion caught on, there were villages where the only "Old Christian" was the parish priest.[52]
Dispersal and resettlement
[edit]After the suppression of the revolt, a significant portion of the Morisco population was expelled from the former Kingdom of Granada. First rounded up and held in churches, then in harsh winter conditions, with little food, they were taken on foot in groups, escorted by soldiers; many died on the way. Many went to Cordova, others to Toledo and as far as Leon. Those from the Almería region were taken in galleys to Seville. The total number expelled has been estimated at some 80,000, or roughly half of Granada's Moriscos.[53]
The deportations meant a big fall in population, which took decades to offset; they also caused a collapse of the economy, given that the Moriscos were its main motor. Moreover, many fields lay uncultivated, orchards and workshops had been destroyed during the fighting.[54]
The Spanish administration laid down already in 1571 the basis for repopulation. The land left free by the expulsion of the Moriscos would be shared out; settlers would be supported until their land began to bear fruit. Common land would be maintained; the acequias (irrigation channels) and reservoirs would be repaired; the springs would be for general use; pastures would be provided for the livestock; various fiscal advantages were promised. The settlers were assured of bread and flour, seed for their crops, clothing, material for cultivating their land, and oxen, horses, and mules. There were various tax concessions.[55]


The authorities in Granada sent officials in search of candidates from as far away as Galicia and Asturias and the mountain areas of Burgos and León. The process was difficult, slow, and expensive. The greater number were from western Andalucía, but they came also from Galicia, Castile, Valencia, and Murcia.
A property register (Libro de Apeos) for the villages of the Poqueira valley—typical of the Alpujarra in general—provides abundant information. [note 3] It tells us that there were 23 settlers in Bubión plus 5 in Alguastar (later merged with Bubión), 29 in Capileira, 13 in Pampaneira. Of those in Bubión, nine came from Galicia; five were already living in the village, including three widows, two members of the clergy and the first mayor (Cristóbal de Cañabate, a Morisco whose conversion had apparently been reckoned as sincere). The Libro de Apeos gave all the names, some of which are still to be found.
Land began to be distributed in September 1571: most settlers received specified quantities of irrigated land, vineyards, silkworm eggs, and fruit, nut, and chestnut trees. Grain and olive mills were to remain as public property for six years. Three grain mills in working order and four in need of repair were attributed to two inhabitants of Pampaneira. These grants were formally announced at a gathering in the plaza of Bubión on 28 June 1573, and the settlers could then start marking out and working on their lands.
Their life was not easy. Houses were in a bad state, irrigation channels (acequias) had been damaged, livestock had mostly disappeared (none are mentioned among the apeos). Those who had come from other regions had no experience of farming in the mountains; many gave up. By 1574 only 59 families were left in the Poqueira out of the original 70.
The resettlement programme never restored the Alpujarra population to anything like its former numbers. Before the Reconquista the Alpujarra probably had a population of about forty thousand, mainly Moors with a few "Old Christians". The war of 1568–71 and the subsequent expulsion left only a handful of converted Moors ("New Christians"): these were estimated to number just over two hundred families in the whole of the Alpujarra, just seven in the Poqueira.
The number of Christian settlers who actually stayed in the Alpujarra was approximately seven thousand. Many of these were single or came with only a small family, whereas the Moorish families had averaged five or six persons, making a population of some forty thousand before the rebellion. Gradually the settler families expanded, bringing the population to a peak of twelve thousand by the census of 1591. But then there was an outbreak of plague, infestation of locusts from Africa, and successive years of drought with much-reduced harvests. The population fell drastically and recovered slowly.[56]
Some villages were abandoned. In the Poqueira, the tiny hamlet of Alguástar, mentioned above, was depopulated by the end of the 16th century (probably by the plague). Generally, the settlers kept the houses much as they found them and when they built they copied the same flat-roof style. Mosques were destroyed or turned into churches; towers replaced minarets.
Between 1609 and 1614, the Spanish Crown undertook the expulsion of the Moriscos from all over Spain. About half of Granada's Moriscos remained in the region after the dispersal; only 2,000 were expelled from the city of Granada, many remaining mixed with and protected by old Christians who were less hostile towards them than in other regions of Spain (notably in the Kingdom of Valencia).[57][58]
Notes
[edit]- ^ The plural "Alpujarras" is often used, because the area now lies in two Spanish provinces, Granada and Almeria, but there is probably an earlier origin. Alpujarra has multiple proposed Arabic etymologies, the most accepted being "Al-Bugsharra" (land of pastures). A pre-Celtic origin, Al, meaning "a high mountain", as elsewhere in Europe, has also been proposed.
- ^ The Marquis of Mondéjar (Iñigo López de Mendoza y Mendoza) lived from 1512 till 1580 and was the third in the Mondéjar line. In 1560 he was ambassador to the Pope in Rome. He was capitan-general of Granada, and thus commanded the Spanish troops at the beginning of the Alpujarran war. After being dismissed from this command, he became viceroy in Valencia, then in Naples.
- ^ The Libro de Apeos is almost illegible (see picture) and we are indebted for this information to a former mayor of Bubión, Juan Pérez Ramón. There is much more in his book Bubión en el centro de Poqueira (2012), but this was only distributed locally.
References
[edit]- ^ García de Cortázar, map p.259
- ^ García de Cortázar, map p.261
- ^ García de Cortázar, map p.291
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, p.40; Caro Baroja, p.177-86
- ^ Mármol I-xix; Fletcher pp. 314-321
- ^ Marmol IV-xxvii; Lea pp. 38-39
- ^ Harvey pp. 53-55
- ^ Lea, pp. 215-6
- ^ Fletcher, p.167
- ^ Lea, pp.201-207; 213-214
- ^ Caro Baroja pp.156-7
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, p.32
- ^ Lea, p.227
- ^ Kamen, p. 216
- ^ Lea, p.232
- ^ Lea, p.236
- ^ Caro Baroja, pp.173 sq.
- ^ Caro Baroja, p.173
- ^ Caro Baroja, pp.173-4; Lea p.237
- ^ Caro Baroja, p.176
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, p.40; Caro Baroja, p.177-86
- ^ Baroja, Julio Caro (2003). Los moriscos del reino Granada: Ensayo de Historia Social. Alianza. pp. 177–86. ISBN 9788420678603.
- ^ Fregosi, Paul (1998). Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries. Prometheus Books. p. 314. ISBN 9781573922470.
- ^ Ortiz, Antonio Domínguez; Vincent, Bernard (1993). Historia de los moriscos: Vida y tragedia de una minoría. Alianza Editorial. p. 40. ISBN 9788420624150.
- ^ Mondéjar, and Tracy pp.35-36
- ^ Tracy pp.35-39
- ^ Mondéjar, and Tracy pp.37-39
- ^ Lea pp.241-2
- ^ Mármol VI-xv and Tracy p.39
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent pp.36-40; Lea p.238
- ^ quoted by Caro Baroja p.194
- ^ Caro Baroja p.194
- ^ Caro Baroja pp.188-196
- ^ Caro Baroja, pp.197-8
- ^ Caro Baroja, pp.197-8
- ^ Lea, pp.237 & 247
- ^ Kamen, in Carr p.161
- ^ Lea, p. 249
- ^ Lea, p. 250
- ^ Lea, p. 253
- ^ Lea, pp. 254-5
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, pp. 36-37
- ^ Lea, p.255
- ^ Lea, p.261
- ^ Caro Baroja, pp.200-201, quoting Mármol, X-v
- ^ Lea, pp.261-3
- ^ Hurtado, pp. 57-58
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, pp.39-40
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, pp.39-40
- ^ Tracy, p.43
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, pp.41-47
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, pp.45-46
- ^ (in Spanish) Henry Lapeyre (28 November 2011): Geografía de la España morisca, Universitat de València. p. 14. ISBN 978-84-370-8413-8.
- ^ Tracy pp. 47-48
- ^ Lea, p.264
- ^ Galán Sanchez, Vincent, Caro Baroja p.82 and Tracy, pp.49-51
- ^ Domínguez & Vincent, p. 188
- ^ García de Cortázar, maps pp.324-325
Further reading
[edit]There are three well-known contemporary chroniclers, each of whom participated in the campaign of 1568-71:
- MÁRMOL CARVAJAL, Luis del: Historia del [sic] Rebelión y Castigo de los Moriscos de Reino de Granada. Written shortly after the war but not published till 1600. Covers the whole campaign, though he personally did not observe it all and was not even present in the early stage (his role was that of managing supplies to the army). This huge book is best accessed in the equally monumental work by Javier CASTILLO FERNANDEZ: Entre Granada y el Magreb - Vida y obra de cronista Luis del Mármol Carvajal (1524-1600). University of Granada, 2016.
- PÉRES DE HITA, Ginés: Guerras Civiles de Granada is less complete, first published in two parts, 1570 and 1595. Various recent editions are available in English.
- HURTADO DE MENDOZA, Diego: Guerra de Granada, published posthumously in 1627. Available on Google Books.
Subsequent writings on the Morisco rebellions derive from these three primary sources, especially Mármol. Another contemporary work, much less well-known, is:
- MONDÉJAR, Marqués de: Memorial. Addressed to Philip II, this must have been written soon after the first stage of the war, when the Marqués commanded the Spanish army, but it only appeared in 1878 in a French volume compiled by Alfred Morel-Fatio. Now an e-book from Open Library.
There is unfortunately no contemporary account of the war in the Alpujarras from the Moorish side.
SUBSEQUENT WORKS IN SPANISH:
- CARO BAROJA, Julio: Los Moriscos de Reino de Granada (5th edn. 2000). ISBN 84-7090-076-5.
- DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ, Antonio, and VINCENT, Bernard: Historia de los Moriscos; vida y tragedia de una minoría (1993). ISBN 84-206-2415-2.
- GARCÍA DE CORTÁZAR, Fernando: Atlas de Historia de España (2012). ISBN 978-84-0800-539-1.
- GALÁN SANCHEZ, Angel, and PEINANDO SANTAELLA: Hacienda regia y población en el Reino de Granada—La geografía morisca a comenzios del siglo XVI (1997).
- FALCONES, Ildefonso: La Mano de Fatima (2011—ISBN 978-84-9908-691-0); English text The Hand of Fatima (2011). A historical novel which for the 1568-71 rebellion is closely based on the original sources cited above. ISBN 978-0-552-77646-2.
- KAMEN, Henry: La Inquisición Española – una revisión histórica (3rd edn. 2011) (also available in English – 4th edn. 1999). ISBN 978-84-9892-198-4.
- SÁNCHEZ RAMOS, Valeriano: "La guerra de las Alpujarras (1568-1570)" in Historia del Reino de Granada vol. II "La época morisca y la repoblación (1502-1630), ed. Manuel Barrios Aguilera (2000).
- VINCENT, Bernard: Sierra Nevada y su entorno (University of Granada, 1988).
WORKS IN ENGLISH
- FLETCHER, Richard: Moorish Spain (1992, new edition 2001). ISBN 978-1-8421-2605-9.
- FLORIAN, M.: A History of the Moors in Spain (French original around 1790, English translation of 1840 available in several e-book formats).
- HARVEY, L.P.: Islamic Spain, 1250 to 1500 (1990), and Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614; takes into account many original sources, both Spanish and Arabic; ISBN 0-226-31962-8 and 0-226-31963-6. Harvey also contributed a chapter to The Legacy of Moorish Spain (see below) entitled "The political, social and cultural history of the Moriscos".
- JAYYUSI, Salma Ishedra (editor): The Legacy of Moorish Spain (1992). A huge volume (1088 pages) consisting of essays by experts in various fields. Two of the contributors besides the editor are Arabs: an article on 'The political history of Al-Andalus' is written by Mahmoud MAKKI, a professor at Cairo University – and several of the other authors clearly know Arabic.
- KAMEN, Henry: "Vicissitudes of a World Power, 1500-1700", in Spain—A History, ed. Raymond Carr (2000). ISBN 978-0198-206-194.
- LEA, Henry Charles: The Moriscos of Spain (1901) . A pioneering work, carefully documented from original Spanish sources. Republished 2001 by Goodword Books, New Delhi; also now from Internet Archive.
- SMITH, Colin, MELVILLE, Charles and UBAYDLI, Ahmad: Christians and Moors in Spain (1988–92). A three-volume work, consisting of extracts from original sources in Latin, Spanish and Arabic, with comments by the editors. All are valuable, the third – on Arab sources – particularly so. ISBN 0-85668-410-4, 447-3, 449-X.
- TRACY, Michael: Bubión – The story of an Alpujarran village (2nd edn. 2015), uses local sources to illustrate the experiences of a typical village in the Morisco revolt, its subsequent capture by Christian forces and repopulation by Christian settlers. ISBN 978-2-930590-05-9.
Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568–1571)
View on GrokipediaHistorical Background
Conquest of Granada and the 1499–1501 Revolts
The Granada War (1482–1492) concluded with the surrender of Granada, the last Muslim stronghold in Iberia, on January 2, 1492, marking the completion of the Reconquista under Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile.[5] Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, known as the Great Captain, directed the decisive siege and military operations that forced the capitulation of Muhammad XII (Boabdil).[5] The preceding Treaty of Granada, signed November 25, 1491, promised Muslims retention of their religion, mosques, laws, customs, and property rights, with no compulsory conversions or interference in worship, provided they submitted to Christian rule.[5] Post-conquest policies initially adhered to these terms under Hernando de Talavera, the first Archbishop of Granada, who pursued gradual evangelization through preaching and education rather than coercion.[6] However, in late 1499, Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo and a key advisor to Ferdinand, arrived in Granada and launched an aggressive campaign of forced baptisms, targeting women and children, while destroying Qurans and Arabic literature deemed incompatible with Christianity.[6][7] These actions, perceived as violations of the 1491 treaty, ignited widespread resentment among the approximately 500,000 Muslims in the Kingdom of Granada.[6] The revolt erupted in Granada city on December 17–18, 1499, when Muslim crowds rioted against the conversions, killing around 80 Christians, destroying churches, and expelling officials.[6] Violence quickly spread to the Alpujarras mountains, where rural Muslims, organized under local leaders including remnants of Nasrid nobility, seized control of villages and fortified positions, rejecting nominal conversions and demanding restoration of Islamic practices.[6] Ferdinand responded by mobilizing royal troops under Íñigo López de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla, the kingdom's governor, who retook Granada city by early 1500 amid brutal street fighting.[6] The mountain insurgency persisted into 1501, with rebels employing guerrilla tactics in rugged terrain, but Spanish forces, reinforced by artillery and systematic sweeps, gradually suppressed pockets of resistance.[6] By April 1501, the rebellion was quelled, resulting in the revocation of the Treaty of Granada's protections; surviving Muslims faced a stark ultimatum—convert to Christianity or emigrate—leading to mass baptisms and the emergence of the Morisco population, outwardly Catholic but suspected of crypto-Islam.[6] This outcome entrenched policies of assimilation through coercion, sowing seeds of long-term cultural tension in the region.[6]Formation of Morisco Society
The Morisco society emerged in the Kingdom of Granada following the forced mass conversions of its Muslim population after the 1492 conquest. Initially, the Capitulations of Granada permitted Muslims to practice their faith, but these protections were undermined starting in 1499 when Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros initiated aggressive proselytization efforts, including the destruction of Arabic manuscripts and coercive baptisms that affected tens of thousands.[8] This campaign provoked the First Rebellion of the Alpujarras (1499–1501), which, upon suppression, led to the royal decree of October 12, 1501, mandating conversion to Christianity or expulsion for all remaining Muslims in Granada.[9] Most Muslims opted for nominal baptism rather than exile, thereby forming the core of the Morisco population—legally Christian subjects of Muslim descent who often continued Islamic practices clandestinely. By early 1502, similar edicts extended to Castile, but Granada's Moriscos retained a particularly strong cultural cohesion due to the recency of conversion and geographic isolation in regions like the Alpujarras valleys.[10] This society was stratified by descent from pre-conversion Muslims, with elders and faqihs (Islamic scholars) preserving religious texts and rituals in secret, fostering a dual identity that resisted full assimilation into Christian norms.[3] Economically, Moriscos dominated agriculture, irrigation, and crafts such as silk weaving in the Alpujarras, contributing significantly to Granada's output while facing legal disabilities and social suspicion from Old Christians. Their communities maintained Arabic as the primary language, traditional dress, and endogamous marriage practices, which reinforced internal solidarity but heightened perceptions of otherness. By the mid-16th century, this unassimilated minority constituted the majority in Granada's rural highlands, setting the stage for later conflicts.[11]Spanish Policies Toward Moriscos Prior to 1567
Following the conquest of Granada on November 25, 1491, the Capitulations of Granada granted Muslims the right to practice their religion freely, retain their laws and customs, and avoid forced conversion.[12] However, Archbishop Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros arrived in Granada in 1499 and initiated aggressive proselytization efforts, including the destruction of Arabic manuscripts and public burnings of Islamic texts, which provoked the First Rebellion of the Alpujarras in 1499–1500.[3] After suppressing the revolt, Cisneros oversaw mass forced baptisms in 1501, converting the majority of Granada's Muslim population into Moriscos nominally under Christianity, with an estimated 50,000 conversions in the first months alone; those refusing were compelled to emigrate, though many did so superficially to remain in their lands.[13] In the Crown of Castile, a royal edict on January 12, 1502, extended forced conversion to all remaining Muslims, prohibiting the practice of Islam under penalty of enslavement or expulsion, leading to widespread nominal conversions and the effective end of open Islamic observance by 1502.[14] Mudéjares in the Crown of Aragon and Valencia retained legal status as non-Christians until 1525, when, amid the Revolt of the Brotherhoods (Germanías), Charles V responded to Morisco alliances with nobles by seeking papal dispensation from Clement VII to abrogate prior protections. On February 2, 1526, Charles issued an edict mandating baptism or expulsion for Aragon's Muslims by January 26, 1526, resulting in mass conversions estimated at over 150,000, though enforcement allowed many to stay with minimal oversight.[12] Under Charles V, policies emphasized assimilation through Christian education and cultural suppression, including intermittent bans on Arabic language use, traditional dress, and public baths, enforced variably by local inquisitors and secular authorities; the Inquisition, active since 1480, increasingly targeted crypto-Islamic practices (judaizing equivalents termed "Moriscizing"), prosecuting thousands for relapsing into Islam by the 1530s.[13] Economic incentives, such as tax exemptions and land grants, were offered to encourage loyalty, yet suspicion persisted due to perceived ties to North African corsairs and the Ottoman Empire, fostering segregated Morisco communities with limited intermarriage and persistent cultural isolation.[3] Philip II, ascending in 1556, inherited this framework and intensified scrutiny via the Inquisition, dispatching visitations to Granada in the 1560s to document clandestine practices, but refrained from sweeping prohibitions until 1567, allowing de facto tolerance in remote areas like the Alpujarras despite nominal laws.[14]Causes of the Rebellion
Persistent Cultural and Religious Resistance
Despite the mass forced baptisms imposed on Granada's Muslim population following the suppression of the 1499–1501 revolts, a substantial number of Moriscos—nominal converts to Christianity—persisted in crypto-Islamic practices throughout the early 16th century, concealing adherence to core Islamic rituals such as private salat prayers, fasting during Ramadan, ritual circumcision, and halal slaughter while publicly attending Mass to evade persecution.[15] This dissimulation was doctrinally sanctioned by a 1504 fatwa from the Mufti of Oran, which authorized taqiyya (religious concealment) as a survival strategy under Christian coercion, enabling Moriscos to interpret outward Catholic conformity as permissible without abandoning their faith.[14] Inquisition records from the 1520s onward document recurrent discoveries of such underground observances, including the use of Arabic Qur'ans smuggled from North Africa and the maintenance of secret mosques in remote villages, underscoring the resilience of these practices amid sporadic raids and executions.[16] Cultural resistance complemented religious clandestinity, with Moriscos in the rugged Alpujarra mountains preserving pre-conquest traditions like distinctive Berber-influenced attire (including turbans and loose robes for men, veils for women), Arabic-derived onomastics, and communal bathing rituals in hammams that evoked Islamic purity laws, despite edicts from the 1526 Granada audience banning such markers of "Moorish" identity to enforce assimilation.[17] The region's geographical isolation—characterized by steep ravines and terraced irrigations systems inherited from Nasrid engineering—facilitated this continuity, allowing communities to limit interactions with Old Christian overseers and sustain vernacular aljamiado texts, which encoded Islamic jurisprudence, poetry, and folklore in Romance dialects scripted in Arabic characters, thereby transmitting orthodoxy across generations without direct literacy in classical Arabic.[1] By the 1560s, ethnographic reports to Philip II highlighted how these customs fostered parallel societies, with Morisco alfaquíes (Islamic jurists) clandestinely arbitrating disputes via sharia rather than royal fuero, eroding the Crown's legal monopoly.[3] This entrenched duality fueled mutual distrust, as Christian elites, informed by chroniclers like Hernando del Pulgar, perceived Morisco fidelity to Mecca over Madrid—evident in rumored Ottoman correspondences and the 1560s revival of jihadist rhetoric—as an existential security risk, particularly given the Moriscos' demographic weight (comprising up to 80% of Granada's valley populations) and proximity to Barbary corsair bases.[14] Empirical evidence from pre-rebellion surveys, such as those by the contador Pedro de Deza in 1560, quantified non-compliance: over 40,000 Morisco households ignored mandates to adopt Castilian surnames and forsake Arabic speech, interpreting conversion decrees as political subjugation rather than spiritual transformation, which in turn justified to them the moral imperative of passive defiance.[18] Such resistance, rooted in causal chains of coerced nominalism without genuine evangelization, perpetuated cycles of suspicion and enforcement, culminating in the 1567 pragmática's escalatory prohibitions that ignited open revolt.[16]Economic and Social Grievances
Moriscos in the Alpujarras region bore a disproportionate tax burden, including special levies that exceeded those on Old Christians, despite initial capitulation treaties promising fiscal moderation post-1492 conquest. These taxes, often collected to fund defenses against Ottoman threats and internal administration, strained agricultural communities dependent on labor-intensive silk cultivation and irrigated farming. By the 1560s, the silk industry—central to Granadan Morisco prosperity—faced guild restrictions and market pressures from Christian competitors, diminishing economic viability.[19] [20] [21] Land expropriations compounded these fiscal woes, as royal policies resettled Christian colonists in Morisco territories, seizing fertile valleys and disrupting traditional tenure systems. Such encroachments, initiated after earlier revolts and intensified under Philip II, undermined the self-sufficiency of Alpujarran villages, where Moriscos maintained advanced terracing and water management inherited from Nasrid times. Economic inequality was acute, with Morisco wealth generation—through crafts and trade—frequently redirected via tribute or confiscation, fostering perceptions of exploitation.[22] [12] Socially, Moriscos confronted entrenched discrimination, barred from municipal offices, military commands, and artisan guilds by statutes emphasizing Old Christian lineage. Purity-of-blood laws institutionalized their inferiority, subjecting them to inquisitorial scrutiny and communal ostracism despite nominal conversion. In rural Granada, where Moriscos formed demographic majorities, this exclusion perpetuated a dual society, with Old Christian minorities wielding disproportionate influence over justice and resources. Resentment deepened from enforced segregation and cultural surveillance, eroding social cohesion and priming grievances that the 1567 pragmática would ignite.[23] [12] [15]The 1567 Prohibitory Pragmática and Immediate Triggers
The Prohibitory Pragmática, issued by Philip II on January 1, 1567, targeted the cultural distinctiveness of Granada's Moriscos by banning Arabic as a spoken and written language, traditional attire including turbans, veils, Moorish-style shoes, and multicolored garments, as well as public baths modeled on Islamic hammams unless used solely for hygiene.[16] It further prohibited Morisco surnames, festivals, dances, and Arabic books or inscriptions, while mandating the adoption of Castilian names, speech, and dress, compulsory education of children in Castilian at Christian schools, and restrictions on silk production techniques associated with Muslim customs.[16] These measures, building on prior conciliar decrees like those from Granada's 1565 provincial council, aimed to eliminate external signs of Islamic identity and compel full assimilation into Christian Spanish society.[24] The edict arose from Philip II's consultations with a Madrid junta of theologians, jurists, and officials, who concluded that voluntary tolerance had failed to eradicate crypto-Islamic practices amid evidence of Morisco disloyalty, including secret religious observances and rumored Ottoman contacts.[25] Enforcement was initially softened with a one-year grace period for compliance, but Morisco elites, including figures like Francisco Núñez Muley, protested through memorials arguing that abrupt cultural suppression would provoke disorder without addressing root economic and social issues.[26] Despite these appeals, the pragmática reflected a strategic shift toward coercive integration, prioritizing security against perceived internal threats in a kingdom vulnerable to external Muslim powers. In 1568, Pedro de Deza, president of Granada's Audiencia, escalated enforcement by appointing commissioners to conduct house searches for prohibited items, impose fines, and arrest recalcitrant Morisco leaders, actions that heightened fears of mass inquisitorial proceedings or expulsion.[27] These intrusions, coupled with rumors of impending royal troops, eroded fragile compliance and unified disparate Morisco factions against what they viewed as existential cultural erasure.[28] The immediate spark occurred on December 24, 1568, when Moriscos in the Alpujarra village of Frigiliana ambushed and killed a royal commissioner enforcing dress codes and several accompanying Christians, rapidly escalating into coordinated attacks on officials across the region.[28] This violence, led by figures like Aben Humeya (Fernando de Valor), a Morisco of Nasrid descent, transformed localized resistance into a broader insurgency, as news of the killings mobilized thousands fearing reprisals or total subjugation.[24] The pragmática's rigid implementation thus acted as the catalyst, exposing the limits of assimilation policies amid entrenched religious and communal divides.Outbreak and Course of the Rebellion
Initial Uprising in December 1568
The Rebellion of the Alpujarras ignited on 23 December 1568 when Moriscos in villages across the Alpujarras mountains, including areas near Guadix and the Valero valley, assassinated local Christian corregidors, officials, and settlers.[1] These premeditated killings, executed by organized bands of monfíes—outlaw groups long active in resisting Spanish authority—marked a premature outbreak, advancing the rebels' coordinated plan from its intended start on 1 January 1569.[1] The immediate catalyst was the enforcement of Philip II's 1567 pragmática, which imposed assimilation policies such as bans on Arabic speech, traditional dress, and Muslim customs, exacerbating longstanding grievances over religious suppression and economic exploitation.[1] Fernando de Válor y Córdoba, a Morisco noble descended from the last Nasrid emirate rulers and residing in the village of Válor, quickly assumed leadership amid the chaos.[1] On 26 December 1568, he was proclaimed "Aben Humeya," king of the Moriscos, in a ceremony that invoked Islamic caliphal traditions and rallied supporters with promises of restoring pre-conquest autonomy.[1] [29] Initial rebel forces, comprising 3,000 to 4,000 fighters drawn from rural Morisco communities and monfí networks, seized control of key passes and villages in the rugged terrain, leveraging the Alpujarras' natural defenses for hit-and-run tactics.[1] Concurrent efforts to spark a mass uprising in Granada's Albayzín quarter, home to roughly 10,000 Moriscos, faltered due to the swift mobilization of Spanish troops under the city's captain general, who reinforced garrisons and deterred widespread defection.[1] Plans to storm the Alhambra palace similarly collapsed, confining the initial phase to the highlands where rebels established provisional governance and minted coins bearing Aben Humeya's name.[1] This localized success, however, prompted immediate royal countermeasures, including troop deployments from Andalusia, signaling the transition to prolonged insurgency.[1]Rebel Organization and Expansion (1569)
In early 1569, the Morisco rebels coalesced under the leadership of Aben Humeya (Fernando de Válor y Córdoba), who had proclaimed himself king in late December 1568 and established a provisional government in Ugíjar. This structure included a council of government and a network of appointed officials handling religious, civilian, and military affairs, drawing on claims of Umayyad descent to legitimize authority among the insurgents. The organization mobilized around 10,000 fighters initially, relying on local Morisco networks from the former Nasrid elite and rural communities.[1] The rebellion expanded rapidly across the Alpujarras region, encompassing approximately 180 towns and villages by the beginning of 1569, as insurgents leveraged asymmetric tactics such as ambushes and surprise attacks on Spanish supply lines to consolidate control over the mountainous valleys. Geographically, the uprising grew eastward and westward along the 90-kilometer Alpujarras corridor, with efforts to extend influence to the Sierra de Bentomiz in Málaga and the Almanzora Valley in Almería between April and November. A notable conventional engagement occurred in June 1569, when around 4,500 rebels confronted forces under the Marquis of Vélez, highlighting attempts to challenge Spanish positions directly despite ultimate defeats in open battle.[1] Rebel growth incorporated limited external support, including about 400 fighters dispatched from Algiers, amid overtures to the Ottoman Empire for broader alliance, though these yielded minimal strategic aid. Expansion efforts faltered in securing coastal ports, such as the failed assault on Vera in September 1569, which prevented reliable resupply and reinforcement from North Africa. Internally, the organization faced strains from Aben Humeya's authoritarian style, culminating in his murder by fellow rebels on October 20, 1569, after which Aben Aboo (Diego López) assumed leadership with backing from radical factions, sustaining the insurgency's momentum into late 1569.[1][30]
Spanish Counteroffensive and Key Engagements (1569–1570)
Following initial rebel successes in late 1568, Spanish forces under the Marquis of Mondéjar mounted a counteroffensive in January 1569, advancing from Granada into the Alpujarras with approximately 2,000 men and securing key towns en route to Lanjarón by January 3.[1] This effort contained the uprising temporarily, prompting surrenders among some Morisco communities, though internal Spanish political divisions, including accusations of leniency toward rebels, led to Mondéjar's arrest in February 1569 and stalled further progress.[1] In March 1569, King Philip II appointed his half-brother Don Juan de Austria as supreme commander to unify feuding local nobility and decisively suppress the revolt.[31] Don Juan arrived in Granada in April, organizing a professional army that included tercios and integrating local militias. Meanwhile, in June 1569, the Marquis of Vélez independently engaged rebels near Berja in Almería, defeating a force of 4,500 Moriscos reinforced by 400 Barbary privateers and Ottoman elements in a pitched battle.[1] Vélez's victory disrupted rebel supply lines but was undermined by logistical challenges, forcing his withdrawal and leaving the core Alpujarras region under insurgent control.[1] Don Juan's systematic campaign intensified from December 1569, focusing on the northern approaches to Granada and Almería provinces through sieges and attrition tactics.[1] A notable engagement occurred at Galera in early 1570, where Spanish troops faced fierce resistance in a fortified town, suffering significant casualties before capturing it and executing defenders; this action exemplified the protracted guerrilla-style fighting that characterized the counteroffensive.[1] Complementing direct assaults, Don Juan's strategy incorporated crop destruction to induce starvation, selective pardons to divide rebels, and blockades to isolate strongholds, gradually eroding insurgent cohesion by April 1570 as thousands surrendered.[1] These operations, though costly in lives and resources, shifted momentum decisively toward Spanish forces, setting the stage for final suppression efforts.[31]Final Phases and Suppression (1570–1571)
In early 1570, Spanish forces under the command of Don Juan de Austria, half-brother of Philip II, continued their systematic campaign to reclaim insurgent-held territories in the Alpujarras mountains, following initial successes in late 1569. The Duke of Sessa secured western Alpujarran towns between February and April, though insurgents ambushed a supply column at La Ragua, inflicting approximately 800 casualties on Christian troops and temporarily disrupting logistics.[1] Don Juan's forces, bolstered by tercio regiments comprising up to 12,000 infantry and 700 cavalry under the Marquis of Vélez, employed sieges and coordinated advances to isolate rebel strongholds.[1] By mid-1570, Aben Aboo, who had succeeded the assassinated Aben Humeya as rebel leader, attempted to consolidate resistance in the rugged interior, commanding an estimated 16,000 combatants including local Moriscos and foreign fighters.[1] Don Juan directed operations until August, after which Luis de Requesens assumed responsibility for the final clearances from September to November, implementing scorched-earth policies to deny resources to insurgents and coastal patrols to prevent external aid.[1] These measures dismantled remaining bastions, forcing rebels into caves and isolated redoubts. The rebellion's end came in March 1571 when Aben Aboo was killed through betrayal and Spanish intelligence efforts, eliminating unified leadership and prompting mass surrenders.[1] Surviving insurgents, including holdouts in mountain caves such as those near Juviles, were systematically rooted out and killed, marking the complete suppression by spring 1571.[1] This phase underscored the Spanish strategy of attrition and division, leveraging superior numbers and logistics against the fragmented Morisco forces.[1]Extent and Nature of the Insurgency
Geographical Scope and Rebel Tactics
![Los Monfíes de las Alpujarras][float-right]The Rebellion of the Alpujarras unfolded primarily within the Alpujarra region of the Kingdom of Granada, a compact yet formidable expanse approximately 90 kilometers east to west, encompassing deep valleys, steep ravines, and the southern flanks of the Sierra Nevada mountains, whose peaks surpass 3,000 meters in elevation. This terrain, extending toward the Mediterranean coast and incorporating areas like the Almanzora Valley and adjacent sierras such as Baza, María, and Bentomiz, offered natural barriers and hideouts that hindered large-scale Spanish military maneuvers. The insurgency rapidly engulfed around 180 towns and villages, igniting in rural strongholds such as Válor—birthplace of rebel leader Aben Humeya—Ugíjar, and the Poqueira ravine, before sporadically extending to peripheral zones including parts of Almería and the Ronda mountains, though its core remained entrenched in the Alpujarras' labyrinthine geography.[1][3] Morisco rebels, peaking at roughly 16,000 fighters including an initial core of 3,000–4,000 and later bolstered by about 400 foreign combatants from Algiers, adapted to their numerical and technological disadvantages through asymmetric guerrilla warfare. They conducted hundreds of ambushes and surprise raids on Spanish supply convoys and isolated detachments throughout 1569–1570, exploiting intimate knowledge of the ravines for hit-and-run operations that inflicted attrition on royal forces. While early engagements included conventional battles—such as the June 1569 confrontation where 4,500 rebels under Aben Humeya faced the Marquis of Vélez's army and suffered defeat due to inferior organization—the insurgents largely eschewed open-field combat thereafter, favoring defensive positions in fortified villages and mountain passes to prolong resistance.[1] Groups known as monfíes, irregular Muslim bandits hardened by prior skirmishes in the Sierra Nevada, played a pivotal role in these tactics, sustaining low-intensity harassment even as structured rebel armies faltered.[1] This approach, augmented by an estimated 8,000 arquebusiers, leveraged the landscape's defensibility to counter the Crown's superior manpower and artillery, though it ultimately proved insufficient against systematic pacification campaigns.[1]
