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Plutonium-240
Plutonium-240
Plutonium-240
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Plutonium-240
General
Symbol240Pu
Namesplutonium-240
Protons (Z)94
Neutrons (N)146
Nuclide data
Natural abundanceTrace
Half-life (t1/2)6561(7) years[1]
Isotope mass240.053812[2] Da
Decay products236U
Decay modes
Decay modeDecay energy (MeV)
Alpha decay5.256[3]
Isotopes of plutonium
Complete table of nuclides

Plutonium-240 (240
Pu or Pu-240) is an isotope of plutonium formed when plutonium-239 captures a neutron without undergoing fission. The detection of its spontaneous fission led to its discovery in 1944 at Los Alamos and had important consequences for the Manhattan Project.[4]

As with the other major plutonium isotopes, the normal decay leads to a more-stable isotope of uranium (236U) and in effect no further decay chain on human timescales. Over geologic time it would follow the thorium series.

240Pu undergoes spontaneous fission as a secondary decay mode at a small but significant rate. The presence of 240Pu limits plutonium's use in a nuclear bomb, because the neutron flux from spontaneous fission initiates the chain reaction prematurely, causing an early release of energy that physically disperses the core before full implosion is reached (a "fizzle").[5][6]

Nuclear properties

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About 62% to 73% of the time when 239Pu captures a neutron, it undergoes fission; the remainder of the time, it forms 240Pu. The longer a nuclear fuel element remains in a nuclear reactor, the greater the relative percentage of 240Pu in the fuel becomes.

The isotope 240Pu has about the same thermal neutron capture cross section as 239Pu (289.5±1.4 vs. 269.3±2.9 barns),[7][8] but only a tiny thermal neutron fission cross section (0.064 barns). When the isotope 240Pu captures a neutron, it is about 4500 times more likely to become plutonium-241 than to fission. In general, isotopes of odd mass numbers are more likely to absorb a neutron, and can undergo fission upon neutron absorption more easily than isotopes of even mass number. Thus, even mass isotopes tend to accumulate, especially in a thermal reactor.

Nuclear weapons

[edit]

The inevitable presence of some 240Pu in a plutonium-based nuclear warhead core complicates its design, and pure 239Pu is considered optimal.[9] This is for a few reasons:

  • 240Pu has a high rate of spontaneous fission. A single stray neutron that is introduced while the core is supercritical will cause it to detonate almost immediately, even before it has been crushed to an optimal configuration. The presence of 240Pu would thus randomly cause fizzles, with an explosive yield well below the potential yield.[9][6]
  • Isotopes besides 239Pu release significantly more radiation, which complicates its handling by workers.[9]
  • Isotopes besides 239Pu produce more decay heat, which can cause phase change distortions of the precision core if allowed to build up.[9]

The spontaneous fission problem was extensively studied by the scientists of the Manhattan Project during World War II.[10] It blocked the use of plutonium in gun-type nuclear weapons in which the assembly of fissile material into its optimal supercritical mass configuration can take up to a millisecond to complete, and made it necessary to develop implosion-style weapons where the assembly occurs in a few microseconds.[11] Even with this design, it was estimated in advance of the Trinity test that 240Pu impurity would cause a 12% chance of the explosion failing to reach its maximum yield.[9]

The minimization of the amount of 240
Pu, as in weapons-grade plutonium (less than 7% 240Pu) is achieved by reprocessing the fuel after just 90 days of use. Such rapid fuel cycles are highly impractical for civilian power reactors and are normally only carried out with dedicated weapons plutonium production reactors. Plutonium from spent civilian power reactor fuel typically has under 70% 239Pu and around 26% 240
Pu, the rest being made up of other plutonium isotopes (the short-lived 238 and 241 are problematic with respect to handling, storage, and decay heat), making it more difficult to use it for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.[5][9][12][13] For nuclear weapon designs introduced after the 1940s, however, there has been considerable debate over the degree to which 240
Pu poses a barrier for weapons construction; see the article Reactor-grade plutonium.

See also

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References

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Plutonium-240

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Plutonium-240 (^{240}Pu) is a synthetic radioactive isotope of the element ( 94), characterized by to with a of 6,561(10) years and a high rate of that produces s at approximately 475 fissions per second per gram. Produced primarily in nuclear reactors via by without subsequent fission, Pu-240 accumulates in spent fuel and reprocessed , where its isotopic fraction influences material quality for various applications. In nuclear weapons, concentrations exceeding about 7% Pu-240 relative to Pu-239 degrade pit performance by elevating predetonation risks through spontaneous emissions that can initiate unintended reactions during implosion compression, necessitating low-burnup production or isotopic separation for high-reliability designs. Despite these challenges, Pu-240's presence in does not preclude weapon usability, though it complicates yield optimization and requires compensatory . Beyond armaments, Pu-240 contributes to heat generation and sources in radioisotope thermoelectric generators and research, while its long-term radiological hazards demand stringent handling protocols in fuel cycles and .

Discovery and Production

Discovery

Plutonium-240 (Pu-240) was first identified in 1944 at Los Alamos Laboratory during the . On April 5, 1944, the laboratory received its initial shipment of reactor-produced plutonium from the (now ), intended primarily as Pu-239 for development. and his team analyzed the sample and detected an unexpectedly high rate of , exceeding what could be attributed solely to Pu-239 impurities or other known isotopes. This anomaly prompted further investigation, revealing Pu-240 as the source: the isotope arises from successive captures on in reactors, converting U-238 to U-239, then Np-239, Pu-239, and finally Pu-240. Pu-240's discovery marked the first identification of a primarily through its activity, with a fission half-life of approximately 1.3 × 10^10 years, producing about 415,000 s per kilogram per second—far higher than Pu-239's negligible rate. This finding had immediate implications for design, as Pu-240's emissions risked predetonation in implosion-type weapons, necessitating rapid purification or design adjustments.

Production Processes

Plutonium-240 is generated in nuclear reactors primarily through the reaction on , where Pu-239 absorbs a thermal to form Pu-240 without undergoing fission. This process occurs during the of uranium-based assemblies, following the initial formation of Pu-239 from via successive and s: U-238 captures a to yield U-239, which undergoes to neptunium-239 (half-life 23.5 minutes), and Np-239 then s to Pu-239 ( 24,110 years). The probability of versus fission in Pu-239 determines the Pu-240 yield, with capture accounting for approximately one-third of interactions with Pu-239 under typical reactor conditions. The extent of Pu-240 production depends on reactor parameters such as , burnup, and irradiation duration. In low-burnup scenarios, as used historically for weapons-grade plutonium (e.g., Hanford reactors targeting <2.5% Pu-240 content by 1956), fuel rods are removed early to limit further neutron captures on Pu-239, minimizing Pu-240 accumulation. Conversely, in commercial power reactors with higher (often >20% Pu-240 in spent fuel ), extended operation increases Pu-240 via multiple capture events, resulting in unsuitable for efficient implosion-type weapons due to its spontaneous fission rate. Production occurs in both and fast reactors, though fast-spectrum reactors can alter isotopic ratios through higher-energy interactions. For targeted production of Pu-240 as a separated isotope, such as for research or calibration standards, alternative routes include transmutation of neptunium targets under neutron irradiation or processing curium-244 via alpha decay, which directly yields Pu-240 (Cm-244 half-life 18.1 years). These methods, employed by facilities like those under the U.S. Department of Energy, allow for higher isotopic purity but are not scalable for bulk production compared to reactor-based generation. Post-irradiation, plutonium isotopes are chemically separated from spent fuel via processes like PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction), involving solvent extraction with tributyl phosphate to isolate plutonium as plutonium(IV) nitrate, though Pu-240 remains intermixed unless isotopic separation techniques (e.g., electromagnetic or laser enrichment) are applied, which are energy-intensive and rarely used industrially.

Isotopic Composition Control

The isotopic composition of , particularly the fraction of plutonium-240 (Pu-240), is controlled during the stage in nuclear reactors to meet specific applications, with weapons-grade plutonium requiring less than 7% Pu-240 to minimize neutrons that could cause predetonation in implosion-type devices. This control is achieved primarily through management of burn-up, defined as the energy extracted per unit mass of (typically in megawatt-days per metric ton, MWd/t), which directly influences the chain: captures a to form uranium-239, which decays to neptunium-239 and then (Pu-239), but further captures on Pu-239 produce Pu-240. Low burn-up—often corresponding to periods of just 2 to 3 months or a few hundred MWd/t—limits the accumulation of Pu-240 by discharging before significant secondary captures occur, as seen in dedicated production reactors using natural or low-enriched . In contrast, power reactors achieve high burn-up (30,000 to 50,000 MWd/t or more) for , resulting in with Pu-240 fractions exceeding 19%, often 20-30%, due to prolonged exposure that favors higher isotopes via successive absorptions without fission. Reactor design parameters further refine control: thermal spectra in - or heavy-water-moderated production reactors promote Pu-239 formation over higher isotopes compared to fast spectra, though fast breeder reactors can yield anomalously low Pu-240/Pu-239 ratios due to reduced capture cross-sections for Pu-239 in high-energy s. No practical post-reprocessing isotopic separation exists for , as isotopes are chemically indistinguishable, making upfront reactor management the sole reliable method; proposals for enrichment via remain unproven and non-standard. Historical U.S. production at sites like Hanford exemplified this by cycling fuel rods for short durations to target Pu-239-dominant compositions suitable for weapons. Typical isotopic thresholds distinguish grades, as summarized below:
Plutonium GradePu-240 FractionTypical Burn-up (MWd/t)Primary Use Context
Weapons-grade≤7%Low (<1,000)Military production reactors
Fuel-grade7-19%ModerateMixed or transitional
Reactor-grade>19%High (>30,000)Commercial power reactors
Variations in neutron flux intensity and fuel geometry also modulate Pu-240 buildup, with higher fluxes accelerating isotope shifts unless offset by shorter residence times, underscoring the empirical optimization required in production campaigns.

Nuclear and Physical Properties

Spontaneous Fission and Neutron Emission

Plutonium-240 undergoes , a quantum tunneling process in which the nucleus divides into two fragments without external stimulation, releasing energy, fission products, and typically 2–3 prompt neutrons with average energies around 2 MeV. This decay mode dominates the neutron emissions from Pu-240, as its contributes negligibly to neutron production compared to isotopes like Pu-238. The spontaneous fission of Pu-240 has been measured as (1.0 ± 0.025) × 10^{11} years, based on rates from calibrated sources. This yields a fission rate of approximately 4.15 × 10^5 spontaneous fissions per second per of pure Pu-240. Each event emits an average of 2.16 s, leading to a total rate of about 1.02 × 10^3 s per second per gram (or 1.02 × 10^6 per ). These values derive from evaluations of multiplicity distributions in spontaneous fission, consistent with experimental data from fission chambers and detectors. The s are emitted in correlated bursts, with multiplicity distributions peaking at 2 s per event, facilitating detection via counting techniques. Recent reevaluations of half-lives for isotopes, incorporating updated measurements from twin Frisch-grid detectors, confirm the Pu-240 value within uncertainties of less than 5%, underscoring its reliability for applications in standardization and . In samples, Pu-240 content directly scales the background , with even low percentages (e.g., 1–2%) producing rates orders of magnitude higher than in pure Pu-239, whose half-life exceeds 10^{15} years.

Fission Characteristics

Plutonium-240 undergoes -induced fission primarily with fast neutrons, as it possesses a high fission barrier that prevents significant fission probability at energies. The fission cross-section is negligible, on the order of 0.05–0.1 barns, while the radiative capture cross-section exceeds 200 barns, resulting in absorption to form rather than fission. Fission requires incident energies above a threshold of approximately 1 MeV, with the cross-section exhibiting a sharp rise near 0.1–0.5 MeV due to increasing fission widths. In the fast neutron energy range (above 1 MeV), the fission cross-section plateaus at 1.4–1.6 barns, enabling fission in high-energy spectra such as those in fast reactors or weapons primaries. Experimental measurements have quantified the cross-section from 0.04 MeV to over 14 MeV, showing good agreement with evaluations like JENDL-4.0 and ENDF/B-VII, though uncertainties remain around 5–10% in the intermediate range. Comprehensive data from 1 eV to 200 MeV confirm the threshold behavior and reveal resonances, including a previously missing 2.67 eV resonance in related isotopes, aiding refined nuclear models. The average recoverable released per fission event is approximately 206 MeV, comparable to other isotopes, with about 85% initially as of the fission fragments. The delayed fraction for fast-induced fission is around 0.009 (0.9%), lower than for (≈0.002) but contributing to reactivity feedback in fast-spectrum systems. Fission product yields follow a typical asymmetric distribution, with peaks around numbers 95 and 140, as measured at 14.8 MeV , though yields vary with incident due to shell effects. Recent experiments have identified evidence of exotic fission modes in plutonium-240, including elongated fragment shapes, providing insights into scission dynamics.

Recent Experimental Updates

In 2024, a comprehensive measurement of the prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) for the spontaneous fission of plutonium-240 was conducted, covering emitted neutron energies from 0.79 to 10.0 MeV; this represented the first such data above 0.85 MeV, enabling improved validation of nuclear models for neutron emission in high-purity samples. The experiment utilized the Chi-Nu array at Los Alamos National Laboratory to detect neutrons from a plutonium-240 source, yielding spectra that align closely with evaluated libraries like ENDF/B-VIII.0 but reveal subtle discrepancies in the high-energy tail, potentially attributable to detector efficiencies or isotopic impurities. Concurrent measurements extended the PFNS data to the plutonium-240(n,f) reaction induced by incident spanning 1 to 20 MeV, the second such effort overall and the first beyond 0.85 MeV incident ; these results, obtained via time-of-flight techniques, indicate a hardening of the with increasing incident , consistent with theoretical predictions from the Madland-Nix model. Such refine simulations for criticality and weapons predetonation probabilities, where plutonium-240's neutron output critically influences design margins. In 2022, fission cross sections for plutonium-240 were experimentally determined at 2.51 MeV and 14.83 MeV using a twin-Frisch-grid at the Institute of Atomic Energy, with results showing agreement within 5% of prior evaluations but highlighting needs for better in fast-spectrum applications. These measurements, normalized to established standards, support updates to nuclear data for advanced fuels containing higher plutonium-240 fractions. A 2021 reevaluation of half-lives for plutonium isotopes, including (reported as approximately 1.3 × 10^{11} years), integrated post-2010 experimental datasets to reduce discrepancies in evaluated libraries, emphasizing the role of alpha-correlated fission branches in total yield assessments. Complementary 2023 analyses compared thermal -induced PFNS for against simulations, identifying model underpredictions in intermediate-energy s that affect transport calculations in mixed-oxide fuels.

Applications in Nuclear Technology

Role in Nuclear Weapons Design

Plutonium-240's primary impact on nuclear weapons design stems from its elevated rate compared to , generating background neutrons that risk initiating the fission before the fissile core achieves full compression and supercriticality. This neutron emission arises predominantly from events in Pu-240 nuclei, with each event yielding approximately 2.2 neutrons on average, at a rate of roughly 415 neutrons per gram per second. In contrast, pure Pu-239 produces negligible neutrons, relying mainly on alpha decay-induced (α,n) reactions at rates orders of magnitude lower. The discovery of this property in by Emilio Segrè's team at Los Alamos rendered gun-type assembly designs infeasible for plutonium, as the assembly time of tens of microseconds exceeded the mean interval between spontaneous neutrons, leading to predetonation and low yields. Implosion-type designs mitigate this by compressing the pit to supercritical in about 10–20 microseconds using converging shock waves from high explosives, minimizing the window for predetonation. Even in weapons-grade , defined as containing less than 7% Pu-240 by weight, the spontaneous necessitates precise timing and tolerances to keep predetonation probability below 1% for unboosted pits of 4–6 kg. Higher Pu-240 fractions elevate the neutron rate proportionally—for instance, doubling Pu-240 content can increase the by a factor of 500 relative to pure Pu-239—raising predetonation odds and often resulting in "fizzle" yields under 1 kiloton rather than the designed 10–20 kilotons. To counter Pu-240's effects, weapons designers incorporate reflectors, tampers, and—since the —fusion boosting with deuterium-tritium gas injected into the pit, which multiplies early s into a sustained even if partial predetonation occurs. This allows tolerance for Pu-240 contents up to 19% or more in , though such material demands more sophisticated implosion symmetry, higher explosives precision, and yields reduced by factors of 2–10 due to increased heat from decay (e.g., 10–20 watts per kilogram extra) and alpha emission complicating . Historical U.S. production at Hanford occasionally yielded pits with 2–3% Pu-240, but specifications tightened to under 7% to ensure reliability without excessive redesign. Overall, minimizing Pu-240 through short times in production reactors remains essential for optimizing pit performance in primary stages of thermonuclear devices.

Use in Reactor Fuels

Plutonium-240 forms a substantial fraction of the plutonium isotopes in reactor-grade material used for mixed oxide (MOX) fuels, typically comprising 18% or more of the total plutonium content in reprocessed spent fuel from commercial light water reactors. This contrasts with weapons-grade plutonium, which maintains Pu-240 levels below 7% through low-burnup production. In MOX fabrication, plutonium oxide (including Pu-240) is blended with depleted uranium oxide to achieve plutonium loadings of 4-9% by weight, enabling recycling of plutonium to extend fuel resources and reduce waste volumes. The high spontaneous fission rate of Pu-240—approximately 415,000 s per gram per second—generates a significant background in cores, which influences startup procedures, reactivity control, and shielding requirements. These s can prompt unintended fission events but are managed through core design features like increased concentrations in or adjusted worth, ensuring stable operation without compromising safety margins. In thermal s, Pu-240 primarily acts as a parasitic absorber due to its large thermal capture cross-section (around 300 barns at 0.025 eV), which builds up over and shifts reactivity coefficients toward more negative values, enhancing inherent stability. Despite its non-fissile nature in thermal spectra (fission cross-section <0.1 barn for thermal neutrons), Pu-240 contributes to energy yield via fast fission (cross-section ~1.5 barns above 1 MeV) and subsequent burnup to shorter-lived isotopes like americium-241, mitigating long-term radiotoxicity in spent fuel. Fast breeder reactors tolerate higher Pu-240 fractions more effectively, as their neutron spectra favor fission over capture, allowing greater utilization of reactor-grade plutonium blends with up to 25% Pu-240. Operational data from European MOX programs, such as those in France since 1984, confirm that Pu-240's effects do not preclude reliable performance, with burnups reaching 45-60 GWd/tHM comparable to uranium oxide fuels.

Calibration and Research Uses

Plutonium-240 serves as a certified radioactivity standard for alpha-particle emission measurements, with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issuing Standard Reference Material (SRM) 4338b, which provides a certified value for its decay rate based on alpha transitions to uranium-236. This standard, standardized with a half-life of 6561 years, enables precise calibration of alpha spectrometry instruments used in nuclear material assays and environmental monitoring. Due to its high spontaneous fission rate, producing approximately 415,000 neutrons per gram per second, Pu-240 is employed in calibrating passive neutron coincidence counters for non-destructive assay of fissile materials. Calibration curves relate neutron doubles rates to effective Pu-240 mass, allowing quantification in plutonium-bearing items like metal plates or mixed oxide fuel, with validations using assemblies of known masses such as 1 kg, 5 kg, and 10 kg. Devices like fast-neutron multiplicity counters leverage Pu-240's neutron emission signature for passive mode measurements, incorporating shift registers and pulse-position timestamps to enhance accuracy in Pu-240 content determination. In research, Pu-240's spontaneous fission properties are studied to refine half-life estimates and neutron emission characteristics, with reevaluated data yielding a spontaneous fission half-life of (1.30 ± 0.07) × 10^11 years from neutron emission rate measurements on large samples. Experiments investigate neutron angular distributions in its spontaneous fission, revealing anisotropy in the laboratory frame due to prompt neutron momentum from fully accelerated fission fragments. Additional studies employ Pu-240 targets in neutron spectroscopy and fission yield determinations, such as using proton-beam-induced reactions to measure correlated neutron-proton signals for validating nuclear data models.

Proliferation and Strategic Implications

Weapons-Grade vs. Reactor-Grade Distinctions

Weapons-grade plutonium is characterized by a low concentration of plutonium-240, typically less than 7% by weight relative to total plutonium isotopes, which minimizes neutron emissions from spontaneous fission during the brief assembly time required for implosion-type nuclear devices. This composition is achieved through dedicated production reactors operated with low fuel burnup, limiting the neutron capture by Pu-239 that forms Pu-240. In contrast, reactor-grade plutonium, derived from reprocessed spent fuel in commercial power reactors with high burnup, contains 19% or more Pu-240, alongside higher fractions of Pu-242 and other even isotopes. The elevated Pu-240 content in reactor-grade material significantly increases the spontaneous fission rate, generating approximately 360 neutrons per second per gram compared to about 66 neutrons per second per gram in weapons-grade plutonium. These neutrons can initiate premature chain reactions (predetonation) in unboosted fission weapons, disrupting the symmetric compression of the plutonium core and yielding fizzle explosions with efficiencies below 10% of optimal. Weapons-grade plutonium's lower neutron background enables reliable high-yield detonations in designs with assembly times on the order of tens of microseconds, whereas reactor-grade requires advanced techniques like cryogenic cooling to reduce heat from alpha decay or hyper-fast explosives to outpace neutron-induced fission, both of which complicate design and reduce predictability.
Plutonium GradePu-240 Content (%)Typical Neutron Emission Rate (n/s/g)Primary Production Method
Weapons-grade<7~66Low-burnup production reactors
Reactor-grade≥19~360High-burnup power reactor fuel reprocessing
These distinctions underpin non-proliferation efforts, as reactor-grade plutonium's isotopic profile demands substantially greater technical expertise for viable weaponization, though it remains fissile and capable of sustaining explosions under optimized conditions.

Usability of High-Pu-240 Material in Devices

High-purity plutonium-240 (Pu-240) content exceeding 19%, characteristic of reactor-grade plutonium, complicates its use in nuclear explosive devices due to the isotope's elevated spontaneous fission rate, which emits approximately 420,000 neutrons per kilogram per second—over 100 times that of plutonium-239 (Pu-239). This neutron background heightens the risk of predetonation in implosion-type fission weapons, where premature fission events can disrupt the symmetric compression of the plutonium core, leading to asymmetric implosion and substantially reduced yields, often classified as a "fizzle" (typically 1-10 kilotons versus 20+ kilotons for weapons-grade designs). Gun-type designs, reliant on slower assembly times (hundreds of microseconds), are rendered impractical by this effect, as the neutron flux almost certainly initiates an uncontrolled chain reaction before full supercriticality. Despite these challenges, high-Pu-240 plutonium remains usable in nuclear weapons with advanced engineering. The United States declassified in 1977 its 1962 test of an implosion device incorporating reactor-grade plutonium (approximately 19% Pu-240 or higher), which achieved a measurable nuclear yield and confirmed the material's explosive potential, though with performance degradation requiring design adjustments like faster explosives and shorter pits. Analyses by the Federation of American Scientists indicate that reactor-grade plutonium can yield weapons with tens of kilotons when using sophisticated implosion systems, potentially exceeding 10 kilotons even in first-generation designs by states with nuclear expertise; higher yields (up to hundreds of kilotons) are feasible with boosting via fusion gases or staged thermonuclear configurations. The primary barriers are technical—necessitating precise machining, high-performance explosives, and neutron reflectors—rather than fundamental impossibility, as Pu-240's non-fissile nature does not prevent Pu-239 from sustaining a chain reaction once initiated. Additional hurdles include elevated heat generation (up to 10 watts per kilogram from alpha decay and fission) and gamma radiation from plutonium-238 impurities, complicating handling and fabrication without specialized shielding, though these are surmountable for proliferators with access to glove boxes and remote assembly. Historical U.S. production tolerances evolved from 0.9% Pu-240 in early weapons to over 5% in later pits, demonstrating adaptability to moderate impurities; reactor-grade material extends this to viable but suboptimal performance. Claims of inherent unusability, such as those emphasizing proliferation resistance, overlook empirical tests and overstate predetonation inevitability, as compression timescales under 10 microseconds can achieve supercriticality before significant neutron interference.

Historical and Policy Debates

The accumulation of plutonium-240 (Pu-240) in nuclear reactors emerged as a critical concern during early plutonium production for weapons programs, prompting operational adjustments to limit its concentration. At facilities like Hanford during the Manhattan Project, uranium fuel was irradiated for short durations—typically weeks—to produce weapons-grade plutonium with Pu-240 content below 7%, minimizing spontaneous fission neutrons that could trigger premature chain reactions in fission devices. This approach contrasted with longer irradiation in power reactors, which yields reactor-grade plutonium exceeding 20% Pu-240, historically viewed as less ideal for bombs due to heightened predetonation risks requiring advanced implosion designs rather than simpler gun-type assemblies. Post-World War II developments intensified debates over Pu-240's impact on weapon reliability, with the U.S. conducting an underground test on May 25, 1962 (Operation Little Fizz), using reactor-grade plutonium with roughly 30% Pu-240 content, yielding about 0.5 kilotons and confirming its viability despite technical hurdles like increased neutron background and heat output. Declassification of this test in 1977 fueled arguments that Pu-240 levels do not preclude effective weapons, as evidenced by considerations in non-nuclear states like Sweden and Pakistan to employ reactor-grade material, and potential Indian use in early devices. Critics, often from nuclear industry perspectives, contended that high Pu-240 induced fizzle yields and handling hazards, yet empirical tests demonstrated yields comparable to weapons-grade pits when paired with sophisticated compression, challenging claims of inherent unusability. In policy arenas, Pu-240's isotopic signature has shaped non-proliferation strategies, serving as a safeguards tool under the International Atomic Energy Agency to distinguish military-oriented low-burnup production from civilian high-burnup cycles, though isotopic analysis alone cannot prevent diversion. Debates persist over whether reactor-grade plutonium's Pu-240 fraction (>19%) provides proliferation resistance, with U.S. government assessments asserting its weapons-usability—even for unsophisticated actors—contradicting industry narratives minimizing risks to justify civilian reprocessing and mixed-oxide fuel programs. For instance, ten tons of separated civil could yield over 1,000 devices, underscoring that Pu-240 does not denature material against determined state programs, influencing policies like U.S. opposition to reprocessing since the 1977 Carter administration ban, reinstated under , to avert dual-use pathways. This realism prioritizes treating all separated as safeguards-sensitive, regardless of grade, amid concerns that optimistic views on Pu-240 barriers—sometimes echoed in academic or commercial sources—underestimate causal pathways to proliferation.

Environmental Occurrence and Health Effects

Sources in the Environment

Plutonium-240, like other plutonium isotopes, occurs in the environment almost exclusively from human activities, with negligible natural primordial traces such as minute quantities from ancient natural reactors like Oklo or neutron capture on uranium in deposits. The primary global source is atmospheric nuclear weapons testing conducted between 1945 and 1980, which dispersed approximately 6-10 tons of plutonium isotopes, including Pu-240, into the stratosphere, leading to widespread fallout deposition in soils, sediments, and waters. This fallout accounts for the majority of Pu-240 in remote and undisturbed environments, with characteristic 240Pu/239Pu atomic ratios around 0.15-0.20 distinguishing it from other sources. In soils, Pu-240 from this source is concentrated in the top 10-20 cm layer due to surface deposition and limited downward migration, while in oceans, about 50% resides below the thermocline. Local and regional contamination arises from nuclear production and reprocessing facilities, such as those at Hanford and Savannah River in the United States, which released Pu-240 through effluents, leaks, and waste disposal into nearby soils and rivers. For instance, operations at these sites generated plutonium in production reactors, with subsequent environmental releases contributing to elevated Pu-240 levels in surrounding sediments and groundwater. Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, including Sellafield in the UK and La Hague in France, have discharged low-level liquid wastes containing Pu-240 into coastal waters, resulting in measurable concentrations in marine sediments and biota. In areas like northeast China, global fallout remains dominant, but topography and precipitation influence deposition patterns, with higher Pu-240 in lowland soils. Nuclear accidents have provided episodic sources, though smaller than testing fallout. The 1957 Windscale fire in the UK released about 0.7 kg of plutonium isotopes, including Pu-240, contaminating local soils and grasslands. Chernobyl's 1986 reactor meltdown dispersed approximately 3% of its core inventory as plutonium, with Pu-240 contributing to higher 240Pu/239Pu ratios (around 0.4) in affected European soils compared to global fallout. Satellite reentries, such as the 1964 SNAP-9A incident, primarily added Pu-238 but included minor Pu-240 contributions to atmospheric and oceanic plutonium. Ongoing low-level inputs occur from nuclear power plant effluents and waste storage, but these are dwarfed by historical weapons-related releases.

Radiological Properties and Risks

Plutonium-240 decays almost exclusively (greater than 99.99994%) by alpha particle emission to uranium-236, with a half-life of 6561 years. The alpha decay releases particles with principal energies of 5.168 MeV (73.5% intensity) and 5.123 MeV (26.4% intensity), accompanied by low-energy gamma emissions typically below 0.1 MeV that contribute negligibly to external dose. A minor decay branch (approximately 5.7 × 10^{-6}%) proceeds via spontaneous fission, with a fission half-life on the order of 1.3 × 10^{11} years, yielding an average of about 2.5 neutrons per fission event. This spontaneous fission results in a neutron emission rate of approximately 415 neutrons per second per gram of pure Pu-240, producing fast neutrons with energies up to 7 MeV. The radiological properties of Pu-240 confer primarily an internal hazard rather than external, as alpha particles have a range of only tens of micrometers in tissue and are fully attenuated by the outer layer of dead skin or even a sheet of paper. External exposure is dominated by the low-rate neutron flux from spontaneous fission, which can deliver penetrating radiation requiring moderation or shielding (e.g., hydrogenous materials like water or polyethylene) during handling of multi-gram quantities; gamma radiation is insignificant. Internally, upon inhalation of respirable particles (the dominant exposure pathway due to Pu-240's tendency to form insoluble oxides), particles deposit in the lungs, where alpha emissions cause dense ionization tracks leading to cellular damage, DNA breakage, and elevated risks of lung, bone, and liver cancers over decades. Ingestion poses lower risk due to poor gastrointestinal absorption (typically <0.1%), though any absorbed fraction translocates to bone and liver, sites of long-term retention with committed doses exceeding 10^{-6} Sv/Bq for bone surfaces. The high linear energy transfer of alphas amplifies stochastic effects, with bioassay limits set at microgram levels to limit lifetime cancer risk below 1%. Neutron emissions exacerbate criticality in fissile mixtures but contribute minimally to individual dose rates (e.g., <0.1 mrem/hr at cask surfaces for grams-scale Pu-240), though chronic low-level exposure in occupational settings necessitates . Empirical data from worker cohorts at facilities like Hanford and Los Alamos indicate no excess non-cancer mortality but confirm radiation-linked malignancies attributable to internal alpha emitters, underscoring the isotope's toxicity index comparable to or exceeding Pu-239 despite the longer . mitigation relies on , respirators, and (e.g., DTPA) for decorporation, with effectiveness diminishing post-24 hours.

References

  1. https://www.nist.gov/pml/radiation-physics/standardization-240pu-srm-4338b
  2. https://www.[researchgate](/page/ResearchGate).net/publication/353228381_Review_and_Evaluation_of_the_Spontaneous_Fission_Half-lives_of_238Pu_240Pu_and_242Pu_and_the_Corresponding_Specific_Fission_Rates
  3. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/[plutonium](/page/Plutonium)
  4. https://www.atomicarchive.com/history/manhattan-project/p4s31.html
  5. https://www.lanl.gov/media/publications/actinide-research-quarterly/0922-shining-light-on-a-dark-element
  6. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/07/08/reactor-grade-plutonium-and-nuclear-weapons-exploding-the-myths/
  7. https://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclide-basics-[plutonium](/page/Plutonium)
  8. https://www.lanl.gov/media/publications/national-security-science/1221-plutonium-timeline
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