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Raymond Westerling
Raymond Westerling
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Raymond Pierre Paul Westerling (31 August 1919 – 26 November 1987) was a Turkish military officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. He orchestrated a counter-guerrilla operation in Sulawesi during the Indonesian National Revolution after World War II and participated in a coup attempt against the Government of Indonesia in January 1950, a month after the official transfer of sovereignty. Both actions were denounced as war crimes by the Indonesian authorities. Born in the Ottoman Empire, despite his nickname, The Turk, Westerling was of mixed Dutch and Greek descent.

Key Information

Early life

[edit]

Raymond "The Turk" Westerling was born on 31 August 1919 in Istanbul. He was the second son of a Greek mother, Sophia Moutzou, and a Dutch dealer in antiques, Paul Westerling, whose family had lived there for three generations. He grew up speaking Greek, Turkish, French and English, and later wrote: "One of the few Western European languages that I didn't speak a word of was my mother tongue: Dutch." When World War II engulfed Europe in 1941, he went to the Dutch consulate in Istanbul and enlisted in the Royal Netherlands Army, much to his father's dismay.[1]

Military career

[edit]

World War II

[edit]

At the age of 22, in 1941, Westerling reported to the Dutch consulate in Istanbul as a volunteer for the Allies. He made his way to England, where he was conscripted into the Princess Irene Brigade in Wolverhampton, but was unhappy with garrison life. Westerling was among the first 48 Dutch soldiers to receive special training at the Commando Basic Training Centre in Achnacarry, on the barren, cold and uninhabited Scottish coast. He completed this training under William E. Fairbairn in July 1942. After his promotion to corporal, Westerling became the instructor for "Unarmed Combat" and "Silent Killing", in No. 2 Dutch Troop, No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando. Within a year, he was teaching these skills to 10 Commando as a whole, and was also instructing in "Toughness Training". At his own request, he left this staff position and, in December 1943, he rejoined No. 2 Dutch Troop in India. In Ceylon, he underwent jungle training.

In 1944, he was appointed sergeant for special services and was placed at the disposal of the Office of Special Assignments (BBO), an organization that trained agents for covert actions in the occupied Netherlands. To his disappointment, Westerling was never sent to the front line.[2] Instead, he was appointed sergeant major instructor of the Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten in the liberated southern Netherlands. On 10 March 1945 Westerling was seriously injured by a German attack with a V-1 Rocket. He was then taken to London. After healing, he was promoted to lieutenant by the head of BBO, General Van Oorschot, and sent to the Korps Insulinde on Malacca. From that corps he was deployed to Medan (Sumatra) to act together with the British against Indonesian insurgents in and around Medan.

Indonesian National Revolution

[edit]

North Sumatra

[edit]

Westerling first came to Indonesia in September 1945, landing in Medan, North Sumatra, as an officer of the KNIL. Conditions there, as in much of Indonesia, were tense and chaotic after the end of the Japanese occupation. Since the end of World War II, parts of the Indonesian people were in an armed and diplomatic struggle against the Dutch for independence. To restore Dutch control in Medan, Westerling set up an intelligence network and a police force. Formally, Westerling was under British command, but he mostly went his own way. Within a few months, he was notable for his sense of intelligence, which laid the foundations for some important successes for the British forces. He had built a reputation for decisive and heavy-handed action where necessary by successfully rooting out enemies classified as rogue elements by the Dutch, which those most involved legitimized by referring to the brutal methods of the opposing side.[3] This included methods such as his elimination of a gang leader who went by the name of Terakan and who was said to be responsible for attacks against European and Indonesian civilians in North Sumatra. In his memoirs he described his action as follows: "We planted a stake in the middle of the village and on it we impaled the head of Terakan. Beneath it we nailed a polite warning to the members of his band that if they persisted in their evildoing, their heads would join his own."[4]

Southern Sulawesi

[edit]
DST Troops parading through Batavia for Princess Juliana's birthday in 1947. Leading the way is Captain Raymond Westerling

In July 1946, Having completed his first assignment as a first lieutenant, Westerling took over the Depot Special Forces (DST) commando unit. Westerling's training of his unit was primarily based on his experiences with the British commandos. In September 1946, the DST, stationed at Batavia (modern-day Jakarta), numbered about 130 soldiers, a mix of Dutch war volunteers, and Indonesians. In December 1946, he received the instruction to eliminate the insurgency and to restore Dutch control in Sulawesi. That island - like other parts of the Dutch East Indies - was in the grip of a violent uprising that was characterised by the Dutch government and in the media as 'red-white terror'. Government authority had all but collapsed, economic life was paralysed, while people in doubt were pressurised to turn away from colonial authority. Guerilla fighters from Java had joined the local groups and government officials and members of the pro-Dutch Eurasian and Indo-Chinese community, were attacked and killed. The KNIL garrisons, stationed on the island, were not able to provide protection. Criminal gangs had free rein. This period of disorder entered the history books as the Bersiap era. All this thwarted the Dutch plan to prepare the state of eastern Indonesia for independence.[5] Though according to the Enthoven Commission (1948), there was no organised rebellion against Dutch authority at the time.[6]

After intensive consultations between the political leadership in Batavia and the Dutch army command, it was decided to deploy an extra battalion of troops and the DST led by Raymond Westerling. He was given a clear mandate and instructions to organise a counterguerrilla operation against the 'red-white terror'. Part of the mandate Westerling received from Colonel Henk de Vries, the operational commander on South Celebes, was the authority to exercise summary execution.[7][page needed] In doing so, he was accountable to the operational commander on site and to the Allied Command Officer (CDO) Major General Eduard Engles.

Westerling claimed that "pacifying" Southern Celebes without losing thousands of innocent lives could only be accomplished by instituting summary execution, on the spot, for suspected enemy fighters, who were generally executed. This became known as part of the "Westerling Method". Based on information received from his own informants or the Dutch military intelligence service, the members of the DST surrounded one or more suspected villages during night, after which they drove the population to a central location. At daybreak, the operation began, often led by Westerling. Men would be separated from women and children. From information obtained through spying and the local people, Westerling deemed certain people as terrorists and murderers. Based on this information they were shot. Persons who offered armed resistance were immediately killed. Afterwards, Westerling would install a new village leader and set up a village police force. All present would have to swear on the Koran that they would not follow in the path of the "terrorists". Finally, Westerling organised a new police force and appointed kampong boards that were made responsible for maintaining order. In 1954, the Van Rij/Stam committee characterised Westerling's actions as a "solemn" method, which would have made a deep impression on the population (Conclusion VI).[8] Dutch historian Lou de Jong commented in his publication on Westerling's action: "There may have been guilty ones among those indicated as having aided the T.R.I.S. or other resistance groups, but surely there were innocent ones among them. Besides that: there was no judicial basis for these summary judicial bloodbaths – even in a state of war they did not exist."[9] In the recent publication of Geersing, he claimed that the actions of Westerling were in conformity with the existing and applicable legal and military principles and regulations in those days.[7][page needed]

The counter-insurgency operation started in December 1946 and ended in February 1947. According to Indonesian accounts, all this came at the cost of large numbers of casualties.[10] In his book De Zuid-Celebes Affaire: Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke executies, Dutch revisionist historian Willem IJzereef claims that the actions of the DST cost about 1,500 Indonesian lives. About 400 of them were executed during actions led by Westerling himself, while the remaining 1,100 were killed during actions of his second in command. The responsibility for these executions was this second in command, as was stated by the Enthoven investigational committee (1948). Another 1,500 deaths could be added as a result of actions of other KNIL units. Approximately 900 Indonesians were killed by pro-Dutch police units and members of the village police. IJzereef believes that Indonesian resistance caused around 1,500 victims.[11] In the report of the Enthoven Committee (1948) the 'red and white terror' is also held responsible for 2,661 cases of rampok (robbery) and 555 cases of arson.[7][page needed]

The violent period prior to Westerling's crackdown saw 1,200 Indonesian casualties in South Celebes from rival gangs, crime and political terror under the Republican banner. This, according to Westerling's sympathisers, justified the crackdown. This reading is endorsed by Mr B.J. Lambers, then the attorney-general's representative on South Celebes. Historians Rémy Limpach ("De brandende kampongs van generaal Spoor", 2016) and Gert Oostindie ("Soldaat in Indonesië", 2016) also give the impression that Westerling's actions, if not directly ordered from on high, were at least condoned by the military and political authorities in Batavia.[12][13] Bauke Geersing, in his 2019 study Captain Raymond Westerling and the South Celebes Affair, argues that Westerling's actions in South Celebes were the result of deliberate decisions taken by the military and political top brass in the Dutch East Indies. Through the General Commission, the representation of the Dutch government in the Dutch East Indies, the entire Cabinet was ultimately responsible for this. Even the top of the judiciary, in the person of Attorney General H.J. Felderhof, endorsed that military action was necessary and warranted by emergency law. Geersing therefore concludes that Westerling's action was in line with the political and social morals of the time and the legal and military frameworks in place at the time.[7][page needed]

Westerling's actions temporarily restored Dutch control in Southern Celebes. Until the end of 1949 the situation there was relatively quiet and under control. However, the Netherlands East Indies government and the Dutch army command soon realised that Westerling's actions led to growing public criticism. There was an official inquiry by the Dutch government in April 1947 and Raymond Westerling's actions were justified by this committee. In 1948 he decided to leave the army. He was relieved of his duties in November 1948.[14]

Former United States Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense General George C. Marshall once called Westerling "Satan" and "Devil" due to the atrocities committed under his command during the Indonesian National Revolution, especially during the Sulawesi campaign, which caused Marshall to cut all Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands and push for the United States to recognize Indonesian sovereignty and for the Netherlands to withdraw.[15]

The aftermath of the South Celebes affair has left deep marks, both in Indonesia and the Netherlands. On 12 September 2013, the Dutch government, through its ambassador in Jakarta, Tjeerd de Zwaan, apologised to all victims of the massacre. Ten widows who were still alive received compensation.[16][17]

Departure

[edit]

The Dutch army command did not consider Westerling suitable for the task of commander of a newly formed military unit due to the ongoing negative publicity about his performance in South Celebes and criticism of the violent actions of the DST. The DST then consisted of about 1,200 men. General Simon Spoor toyed with the idea of carrying out an airborne landing in the Javanese province of Yokyakarta (Djokja) during the Second Police Action. Lieutenant Colonel van Beek had been commissioned to carry out a special staff study in order to merge the First Para Company with the Special Forces Corps and, at the same time, carry out a selection for quality among its cadre and men. General Spoor had some special assignments in mind for Westerling. However, based on this new approach and because of the negative publicity surrounding Westerling and the 'old' KST, the army command decided to appoint another commander for the newly formed military unit. On 16 November 1948, Westerling handed over the command of his unit to Lieutenant Colonel W.C.A. van Beek, who was tasked with transforming the Special Forces into a unit suitable for airborne operations in Djokja.[18]

Although Westerling was nominated for an award several times, he was not awarded one. In August 1948, in an open letter to Prince Bernhard, his then adjutant Henk Ulrici drew attention to the fact that Westerling had still not received an award, even though he was a "rare brave, sturdy and clever commander". Bernhard inquired from General Spoor the same month whether or not Westerling would be awarded a decoration. Spoor informed the prince that he would make efforts to obtain an award. However, there was no feeling for this in The Hague. When Westerling's departure from the Special Forces was already certain, Colonel Reemer made one last attempt. He proposed to give Westerling a Military Order of William for his work in Sumatra, Celebes and Java. Reemer's request was also rejected. In the end, Westerling received only a special certificate of satisfaction at his demobilisation on 14 January 1949.

Attempted coup

[edit]

Raymond Westerling settled down in western Java, married and started a transportation company in the Puncak Pass area. Here he put together an armed movement from groups opposed to the impending transfer of official power from the Dutch to the Indonesian Republic with the aim of preserving the autonomy of the Dutch-created state of Pasundan in western Java. Westerling named his movement the Legion of the Just Ruler (APRA) from the Javanese myth that a messianic figure would come to save the people of Java and establish universal peace and justice.[19]

Supporters were recruited from several social, cultural, and political groups. Even with the name, most were Sundanese who wanted an independent Pasundan not ruled by Javanese, defectors from the Indonesian Republican Army, soldiers of the DST and other KNIL units, who opposed the creation of the Indonesian republic. Raymond Westerling claimed that the APRA counted 22,000 men. However, Dutch historian Jaap de Moor says that such an extensive organization only existed in the fantasy of Westerling. He stated that APRA hardly had any size and Westerling was hoping for help from soldiers of the KNIL and in particular the Regiment Speciale Troepen (the successor to the DST/KST), of which he had been commander. These Special Forces soldiers would still have had Westerling on their hands.[20] There are strong indications that senior Indonesian officials, and top Dutch military officers were also involved in the coup.[21] For instance, it is certain that Sultan Syarif Hamid II of Pontianak, minister in Sukarno's cabinet at the time, played an active role in it. The sultan was a former KNIL colonel, former adjutant of the queen and a friend of Prince Bernhard. He favoured a federal form of state, different from the unitary state Sukarno pursued. Because of his involvement in the coup, he was later convicted. Consequently, supporters of Westerling call it a myth that this so-called 'Bandung coup' was solely the work of the ousted commander and his faithful. Rather, Westerling served as a forward post.[22] On 5 January 1950, Westerling sent an ultimatum to the government of Jakarta. His demands were the recognition of the APRA as the official army of the state of Pasundan and unconditional respect for the autonomy of the federal states. Westerling added that if the answer was not positive, he could not be held responsible for the outbreak of large-scale fighting by the APRA.[23]

With no reply to his ultimatum, Westerling started the coup in the night of 22–23 January, a month after international recognition of the Republic of Indonesia. His plan was to attack Bandung and Jakarta at the same time, concentrating on garrisons, police stations, media centres and other key positions. The APRA would raid and eliminate the Hatta cabinet during one of its government meetings. An interim-federal government, presided over by Sultan Syarif Hamid II, would take control. Despite their numerical inferiority to the Siliwangi Division, Westerling's men captured Bandung. However, they failed to take over Jakarta. Law and order were quickly restored by the Republican army and the Indonesian police force. In spite of the coup's relative brevity, it claimed dozens of lives on both sides. The captured APRA soldiers, including some 125 from the Special Troops Regiment, were handed over to the Dutch troops still remaining on Java. A Dutch court-martial sentenced them to prison terms ranging from six to twelve months. Lieutenant PED Titaley, who had acted as a liaison with Westerling, received a sentence of one year and eight months. All were transferred to Dutch New Guinea to serve their sentences there. After their imprisonment (1951-'52) many former APRA soldiers went directly from New Guinea to the Netherlands.[24] While the Dutch government had officially condemned the coup, they helped smuggle Westerling out of Indonesia to Singapore.[25]

Dutch conspiracy in Westerling's escape

[edit]

Flight from Tanjung Priok

[edit]
Westerling in hiding, days after the attempted coup (10 February 1950)

Since the failure of 23 January, Westerling had been in hiding in Jakarta, where he brought his wife and children. He moved from place to place, among others at Kebon Sirih 62A, with the De Nijs family.

On 8 February 1950 Westerling's wife met Major General van Langen, who was Chief of Staff, at his residence. Westerling's wife told van Langen about the situation her husband was facing. That same day van Langen contacted General Dirk Cornelis Buurman van Vreeden, Hirschfeld and W.H. Andreae Fockema, State Secretary of the Dutch Cabinet who was also in Jakarta. The subject of the conversation was the rescue of Westerling, who in the eyes of many Dutch people was a hero. It was considered, among other things, to bring Westerling to western Papua. But the day after, on 9 February, Hatta stated that if the Dutch managed to capture Westerling, the Republic would demand that Westerling be handed over to the Indonesians. Hirschfeld recognised that they could not help Westerling as this would bring shame to the Dutch government. Therefore, he told the Dutch military leadership to abandon the plan to rescue Westerling.[26]

However, unbeknownst to Hirschfeld, on 10 February Major General van Langen ordered the Chief of Intelligence of the General Staff, Major F. van der Veen to contact Westerling and make arrangements for his escape from Indonesia. With the help of Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Borghouts - Westerling's successor as commander of the elite KST troops - on 16 February at the officers' mess where KL Adjutant H.J. van Bessem lived at Kebon Sirih 66 a meeting took place with Westerling, where Westerling was then hiding. Borghouts reported the meeting to KNIL Lieutenant Colonel Pereira, an officer on the General Staff, who then forwarded the results of this meeting to MayJend. van Langen.[25]

Westerling moved to another hiding place and stayed for a few days at the place of KNIL Sergeant Major L.A. Savalle, who then reported to van der Veen. Van der Veen himself then reported to General van Langen and General Buurman van Vreeden, Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch Army. Van Vreeden himself relayed these developments to Secretary of State Andreae Fockema. Thus, with the exception of Hirschfeld, the Dutch High Commissioner, all of the highest Dutch ranks in Jakarta, both military and civilian, were aware of and involved in the conspiracy to hide Westerling and his escape from Indonesia. Andreae Fockema stated that he would take over all responsibility.[27]

On 17 February Lieutenant Colonel Borghouts and Major van der Veen were tasked with drawing up an evacuation plan. A plan was drawn up to take Westerling out of Indonesia on a Catalina aircraft belonging to the "Marineluchtvaartdienst - MLD" (Naval Aviation Service) under the authority of Vice Admiral J.W. Kist. This plan was approved by Van Langen and the same day Westerling was informed of this plan. Van der Veen discussed further details with Van Langen regarding the need for money, rubber boats and fake passports. On 18 February van Langen conveyed this to General van Vreeden. Van der Veen contacted Captain (Sea) P. Vroon, Chief of the MLD and relayed the plan. Vroon informed Admiral Kist that there was a request from the KNIL to use Catalina for a special task. Kist gave his approval, although at the time he was not informed of the actual use. General van Langen, in his letter to Admiral Kist, only explained that one Catalina aircraft was needed for the visit of a high-ranking officer to the Riau Islands, and not a word about Westerling. Subsequently, a false passport was made at the High Commissioner's office (without an official report). The name on the passport was Willem Ruitenbeek, born in Manila.[27]

On Wednesday 22 February, one month after the failed "coup", Westerling, wearing the uniform of a KNIL sergeant, was picked up by van der Veen and taken by car to the MLD base at Tanjung Priok Port. The Catalina aircraft only made a stopover in Tanjungpinang and then continued its flight to Singapore. They arrived in Singapore waters late in the evening. Approximately one kilometre from the coast of Singapore the plane landed in the sea and the rubber boat was lowered.[27]

In his book De Eenling, Westerling explained that his rubber boat was leaking and taking on water. Luckily he was rescued by a Chinese fishing boat that took him to Singapore. On arrival in Singapore, he immediately contacted his Chinese friend Chia Piet Kay, who had helped when buying weapons for the Pao An Tui. He immediately made plans to return to Indonesia.[27]

Arrival and detention at Singapore

[edit]

After arriving to port, Westerling had been staying at Chia Piet Kay house in the centre of Singapore. After a visit by special branch officer A.R. McEwan, it was found that Westerling had entered the colony without the correct papers, mainly the false passport. Alerted by this, McEwan followed by arresting Westerling without any resistance. He was then incarcerated in Changi Prison having to enter the territory illegally. Westerling explained to the Singaporean authorities, that he had come to Malaya in an attempt to garner financial support and arms for his organization in Indonesia.[28] Previously, on February 20 when Westerling was still in Jakarta, Hugh Laming, a journalist from Reuters, sent a telegram to London and reported that Westerling was on his way to Singapore, to then continue on to Europe.

After hearing that Westerling had been arrested by the British Police in Singapore, the RIS Government submitted a request to the authorities in Singapore via the British Embassy in Jakarta concerning the extradition of Westerling "on the grounds of crimes perpetrated by him in Indonesia". With this communiqué, the authorities had intended to momentarily hold Westerling in a detention camp on Saint John's Island, off the coast of Singapore. Previously, a Dutch cabinet meeting on August 7 had decided that upon his arrival in the Netherlands, Westerling would be immediately detained, though it was uncertain for the situation of Westerling in Singapore. Thus, on 15 August 1950, at the High Court hearing in Singapore, Judge Evans ruled that Westerling as a Dutch citizen could not be extradited to Indonesia and that the newly formed Republic of Indonesia had no extradition treaty with the British.[28]

The coverage in the mass media deeply hit and humiliated the Dutch civil and military leadership in Indonesia. The RIS Cabinet flooded the Dutch High Commissioner Hirschfeld with questions. Hirschfeld himself did not believe in the mass media at first, while Jend. Buurman van Vreeden and Gen. van Langen denied that they knew about the Dutch military leadership's assistance to Westerling in escaping to Singapore.

On February 25, Hirschfeld realized that all the reports were true and it turned out that he and Admiral Kist were the only ones who were not informed by van Vreeden, van Langen, and Fockema about the existence of a Dutch conspiracy to save Westerling from being arrested by the Indonesians. Following his word, Fockema immediately took the blame and stated that he was responsible and informed the Government of the United States of Indonesia that Hirschfeld had absolutely no knowledge of this matter.[27] According to Moor's indications, since the scandal which was very embarrassing to the Dutch Government was uncovered, the relationship between Hirschfeld and the top Dutch military leadership in Indonesia has reached the lowest point.[27]

On 21 August, Westerling left Singapore as a free man aboard the Australian Qantas aircraft and was accompanied by the Dutch Consul General to Singapore, R. van der Gaag, a Westerling supporter.[29]

Landing in Belgium

[edit]
Raymond Westerling In Brussels, Belgium

After a brief stop to Tangiers and then Paris, It turned out that Westerling himself was not immediately taken to the Netherlands, but – with van der Gaag's permission – he got off in Brussels, Belgium. He was soon visited by representatives of the Ambonese from The Hague, who founded the "Stichting Door de Eeuwen Trouw - DDET " (Foundation of Perpetual Faithfulness). They planned to return to Maluku to stir up rebellion there.[30] In the Netherlands itself, Westerling in absentia became a most respected person.[31]

Early April 1952, Westerling secretly entered the Netherlands. His whereabouts could not be hidden and were soon discovered, and on 16 April, Westerling was arrested at the home of Graaf A.S.H. van Rechteren. Hearing the news of Westerling's arrest in the Netherlands, on 12 May 1952 the Indonesian High Commissioner in the Netherlands Susanto requested that Westerling be extradited to Indonesia, but was refused by the Dutch government.[32] Even the day after the extradition request, on 13 May, Westerling was released from custody. The decision of the Dutch Supreme Court on 31 October 1952 stated that Westerling was a Dutch citizen and therefore would not be extradited to Indonesia.

Life in the Netherlands

[edit]
Yvonne Fournier and John Thiessen flocked by journalists after landing at Schiphol Airport

After protracted wanderings, with constant threats of extradition to Indonesia, Westerling eventually arrived in the Netherlands and published his memoirs. In 1952, he published his book Challenge to Terror. The book served as his memoirs while also defending his actions and military tactics, including the "Westerling Method." He framed his actions as being necessary, disciplined, and effective, claiming they restored order and saved lives in the long run. He ultimately denies accusations of indiscriminate massacres, portraying himself instead as a professional soldier facing impossible circumstances.[33]

With the help of John Thiessen, in preventing his extradition to Indonesia and the escorting of his Indonesian-French wife, Yvonne Fournier, Westerling settled down in a small town in the province of Friesland. After his release from detention, Westerling was often asked to speak at meetings, which were often packed with his devotees. At one meeting, he was asked why Sukarno had not been shot. Westerling replied,[32]

The Dutch are very calculating, a bullet costs 35 cents, Soekarno costs less than 5 cents, meaning an unaccountable loss of 30 cents.

A few days later, the Indonesian High Commissioner protested to the Dutch cabinet against the insult.[32]

In 1953, he founded the S.O.S. Foundation (Steunt Ontredderde Staten) in Sneek, which called for extra-parliamentary actions to force compliance with the peace agreement reached at the Round Table Conference (1949).[34] In 1955, he co-founded the Dutch Conservative Party (renamed to Dutch Opposition Union), a continuation of the banned Nazi party National European Social Movement. The new grouping - an amalgamation of far-right politicians, adventurers and handy businessmen - made headlines for plans for armed action against Indonesia.[35]

With financial support from ex-NSB member Jan Wolthuis and Groningen businessman and former Sicherheitspolizei and SD officer Pieter Gaillard, the armoured yacht Evipan was purchased to sail to Ambon. The ship proved unseaworthy, after which they purchased the Schnellboot Seeadler in Wilhelmshaven, which, however, was detained by the Dutch government. Another try was made with the Evipan, but it was seized on the Ems river and Westerling had to surrender his passport.[36] The Dutch government refused any support to the movement, after which a protest rally in November 1955 openly threatened a coup of the Dutch government if they would not cooperate. "We have sufficiently filled arms depots," a spokesman for the former underground stated. In the process, Westerling was outlined as the ideal leader for the intended armed struggle in the Moluccas.[37][38] Westerling, reportedly still on his way to Ambon, subsequently distanced himself from the new party, after which his comrades brought him before an 'honour council' on suspicion of embezzlement.[39] However, he denied all allegations and the public tribunal was cancelled for unclear reasons.

In December 1956, Westerling's confidant Ton Schilling (1919-1984), a freelance journalist and founder of the Veterans Legion of the Netherlands, was arrested by the state police.[40] Schilling was sentenced to one year in prison for swindling and embezzling substantial sums of money collected for sabotage operations in Indonesia, while Westerling was acquitted of involvement. Schilling still belonged to the close circle around Westerling in 1969.[41] Meanwhile, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry issued a 'White Paper' in early 1957, stating that investigations into far-right networks supporting the armed uprisings in the Moluccas had been ongoing since the early 1950s. Dutch government circles were also allegedly involved in the plotting, according to the Indonesians.[40]

Westerling and KNIL veterans protesting in front of Soestdijk Palace in 1979

Thereafter, Westerling studied voice at the Amsterdam conservatory. His début as a tenor in Puccini's Tosca in Breda in 1958, however, proved unsuccessful.[42] After that, Westerling led a seemingly unremarkable life. He said he wrote some military reports, including for a foreign oil company, but turned down offers to work as a mercenary.[41] Yet not a year went by that the newspapers did not write about him; he was regularly mentioned in connection with foreign conflicts and planned attacks; several times he was refused entry to the country at foreign airports. When former prime minister Willem Drees spoke in 1969 about the "misdeeds" committed under Westerling's command, he unsuccessfully filed a libel complaint. A government committee concluded in 1969, partly on the basis of an earlier 1954 report, that military excesses had indeed taken place on Celebes. Van Rij and Stam's report held Westerling, along with Captain Rijborz, responsible for some of these excesses.[43] Westerling responded with an interview in Vrij Nederland, where he defended the use of summary executions. To De Tijd, he complained about the "Westerling myth" perpetuated by the lack of an official investigation.[41] Just hours before his death in 1987, he is said to have announced his intention to file summary proceedings against the historian Loe de Jong for accusing the Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies of atrocities in a draft chapter and for portraying Westerling as a ruthless soldier.[44]

He maintained his reputation as a fire-eater; as recently as 1977, he was mentioned in connection with possible kidnapping of war crimes suspect Pieter Menten. In 1979, he campaigned for the payment of overdue salaries to former KNIL soldiers, using strong language.

Personal life

[edit]
A veteran saluting during the funeral of Raymond Westerling

Westerling was married three times. From one of the first two marriages, he had a daughter. He also had a daughter, named Palmyra Westerling, from his third marriage.[45] Around 1955, he lived in Marssum.[36] Westerling later divorced and remarried. He moved to Amsterdam, where he ran an antiquarian bookshop in Amsterdam.[46] He died in his hometown of Purmerend at the age of 68 in his sleep from cardiac arrest and was buried at Nieuwe Ooster Cemetery in Amsterdam.[47]

Allegations of atrocities

[edit]
Raymond Westerling's pistol

Westerling's life in the Netherlands was dominated by allegations of atrocities over his actions in South Celebes. Westerling continued to defend his purges and denied accusations of atrocities. That, when he saw fit, he acted ruthlessly, he never contradicted. In interviews, however, he stated "The introduction of martial law in South Celebes was the result of purely human reasoning, although for many people it was a bestial act. But go deeper into the reasoning of why I was forced to do it - I put myself aside, I risked martial law and public opinion - then it is the only way to restore peace and order on Celebes with a minimum of bloodshed."

His memoirs devote a chapter to his self-defense. "They painted me as a bloodthirsty monster, who attacked the people of Celebes by fire and sword and exposed all those, who in the interest of Indonesia's national independence resisted Dutch rule, to a merciless campaign of repression". Westerling stated he had based his tactics on the premise that he performed the role of policeman, combating terror: "I arrested terrorists, not because they acted as instigators of the Republican government... but because they made themselves guilty of open and unmistaken crimes...I never had them [his troops] bombard a village, nor did I take the hut of innocent under fire. I had executed some criminals, but nobody had died needlessly or wrongly by my doing.[48]

Investigation by the Dutch government

[edit]
Raymond Westerling under inquiry in 1952

Westerling's actions were investigated by the Enthoven Commission at the behest of the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, H.J. van Mook. That Enthoven Report was presented to the Drees cabinet in 1948. It was not made public and nothing was done with it. In that report, this committee concluded that Westerling's actions were warranted.[49]

After a revealing publication in 1949 in De Groene Amsterdammer about Dutch atrocities in Java, the Van Rij and Stam committee was set up, using the Enthoven report. Their report was submitted to ministers Donker (Justice) and Staf (War) of the third Drees cabinet in 1954. Van Rij and Stam concluded, among other things, "Both the Lieutenant-Governor-General, and the Military Authority, as well as in its opinions the Mr Procurator-General were at fault". Any legal prosecution of the perpetrators of atrocities would have to "bring up the whole background and all responsibilities will have to be checked".[49]

In the late 1960s, following revelations by psychologist Joop Hueting, the Dutch government had archival research conducted by historians led by Cees Fasseur into the excesses committed by Dutch troops in Indonesia: this led to the publication of Excessennota in June 1969.[50] This paper highlights the failure of administrative and political accountability.[50] On 2 December 2016, in response to Rémy Limpach's study, The Burning Campongs of General Spoor, the Rutte cabinet decided that a broad, independent investigation should be conducted into the broad context of post-war decolonisation (including society) and political, administrative, judicial and military action in 1945–1949 in the Dutch East Indies, both from a Hague and local perspective. That research needed to take an integrated approach and delve deeper into issues that had been addressed in Limpach's study. The spiral of violence of the Bersiap needed to be systematically examined. Political decision-making in The Hague on decolonisation was the subject of that study. The aftermath after 1949 and veteran care also needed further investigation.[51] The Royal Institute for Language, Land and Ethnology (KITLV), the Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH) and the Netherlands Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD) have been commissioned by the cabinet to conduct the research.

Renewed interest

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The Dutch military operations in the Dutch East Indies continue to cause a stir in the Netherlands. The Dutch Honorary Debts Committee Foundation is working to ensure that the relatives of victims of the purges in South Celebes receive compensation and recognition from the Netherlands.

In 1969, together with cameraman Hans van der Busken and journalist Joop Buddinghausen, they managed to interview Westerling. It was Westerling's first recorded appearance on television, but unfortunately, fearing threats and repercussions, not a single Dutch broadcaster dared to broadcast it.[52] After the footage was donated, it was finally broadcast on Dutch television for the first time on the program "Altijd Wat" (There's Just) on NCRV television on 14 August 2012, at 21.10. In the unseen interview, Westerling denied that atrocities were committed in the Dutch East Indies under his responsibility,[53][54] saying in the interview:

"I am responsible and not the troops who have been under my orders. I personally take responsibility for the acts."

He further said, "I stand firmly behind my actions, with the understanding that one must distinguish between war crimes and severe measures, consistent and just under very difficult circumstances."

Westerling added "the hidden sadism in people in war conditions can flourish much faster than in normal situations."

He later stated that the Dutch government supported him.[55] The news shocked and angered many veterans. As a result, journalists for the "Achter het Nieuws" event were escorted by the police because they were threatened.[52]

In a 1971 interview he gave to the weekly Panorama Westerling revealed that he had court-martialed and executed 350 prisoners.[55]

After a historian asked the interior minister for all documents relating to Westerling's coup against the Indonesian president in 1950, he was told that one document had been found at the AIVD that he could access. This document covered 11 pages. An appeal against this decision was rejected. In late July 2014, the Council of State ruled on appeal that it was implausible that the intelligence service AIVD had only one document about Westerling's failed coup. More documents should be found in the archives; possibly stored under a title other than 'the coup against Sukarno in 1950'. The minister had to take a new decision.[56]

In August 2016, Australian historian Robert Cribb began investigating claims by widows and children of men allegedly executed there by Dutch soldiers in South Sulawesi. He had been appointed by the court in The Hague to do so.[57]

Views in Indonesia and the Netherlands

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According to Indonesian former colonel and military historian Prof Muhammad Natzir Said, Westerling cannot simply be labeled a war perpetrator. "Every soldier knows: under a State of War, people are shot dead on the spot. That is normal. Summary executions were not only carried out by Westerling, but also on our side. Quite a few spies of the Dutch were shot dead by us after being investigated on the spot. We then surrounded such a desa and if those people said, 'He is a mata-mate, spy of the KNIL....to the tree!'"[5][failed verification] In 1977, Natsir wrote that the stories about thousands of executions had been propaganda fables to generate sympathy for the Indonesian independence struggle.[44]

Westerling's actions were denounced as a war criminal by the Indonesian government and left-wing parties in the Netherlands. Westerling was twice the subject of official inquiries. Dutch historian Nico Schulte Nordholt stated: "...his actions had the approval of the highest authorities, and in the eyes of the Dutch authorities, he was successful at the time. Determant and effective". In 1949, the Dutch–Indonesian agreement on transfer of power stipulated neither country would call the other on its wartime atrocities, thus ruling out any attempt by Indonesia to press for Westerling's extradition.[58] Geersing wrote in his book, that Westerling received his orders from the political and military top in Batavia with the consent of the Dutch government representatives there.[7][page needed] (Commissie-Generaal)

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Raymond Westerling was depicted by Marwan Kenzari in the 2020 film The East, which focuses on his role in leading counterinsurgency operations in South Sulawesi during the Indonesian National Revolution.

References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Raymond Pierre Paul Westerling (1919–1987) was a Dutch army captain who commanded special forces units within the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) during the Indonesian War of Independence. Nicknamed "De Turk," he led the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST), later expanded into the Korps Speciale Troepen (KST), comprising mostly indigenous troops trained for unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency.
Westerling gained prominence for orchestrating the pacification of (Zuid-Celebes) from late 1946 to early 1947, deploying small units to encircle villages at night, conduct dawn sweeps, and execute suspected rebels—often without trial—to dismantle support for Indonesian republican forces. These operations, employing tactics like public executions and selective village burnings, rapidly restored Dutch control in the region by eliminating guerrilla networks and intimidating potential collaborators, though they incurred an estimated 3,000 to 3,500 deaths according to Dutch reports, with higher figures claimed by Indonesian accounts. Westerling personally oversaw hundreds of such executions, justifying them as necessary to break the cycle of ambushes and reprisals in a conflict where conventional forces struggled against asymmetric threats. Post-independence, Westerling participated in the 1950 APRA coup attempt against the Indonesian government, aiming to preserve Dutch influence, but fled into exile after its failure. Despite accusations of war crimes, Dutch authorities refrained from prosecution, viewing his methods as pragmatically effective amid the violence, though his legacy remains divisive, emblematic of the brutal employed to counter revolutionary insurgencies.

Early Life and Background

Birth and Family Origins

Raymond Pierre Paul Westerling was born on 31 August 1919 in (now ), then under Allied occupation following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in . His birth in this cosmopolitan city later earned him the nickname "De Turk" (The Turk) among associates. Westerling was the second son of Paul Westerling, a Dutch national and antiques dealer whose family had lived in for three generations, and Sophia Moutzou, of Greek descent. This mixed heritage reflected the diverse Levantine merchant communities of the era, where Dutch expatriates and Greek families intermingled amid the Ottoman decline.

Childhood and Early Influences

Raymond Westerling was born on 31 August 1919 in , then capital of the , as the second son of Sophia Moutzou, a Greek, and a Dutch father who worked as an antique dealer; his paternal family had resided in the city for three generations. The household was polyglot, with French serving as the primary language spoken at home, reflecting the cosmopolitan milieu of Istanbul under Ottoman and early Turkish rule. As a child, Westerling kept snakes as pets and immersed himself in bloody detective stories for entertainment, activities that occurred amid the family's antique trade, which exposed him to diverse artifacts and cultures. He received early education at the French Catholic St. Joseph school in , where instructor Frère described him as a mild, well-mannered, moon-faced boy who never harmed insects or flies. This formative period in a multilingual, multi-ethnic setting cultivated his proficiency in languages including French, though direct links to his subsequent path remain anecdotal in primary accounts.

Military Formation and World War II

Initial Training and Enlistment

Westerling enlisted in the Royal Netherlands Army in 1941 at the age of 21, volunteering as a Dutch citizen through the consulate in , , where he resided; he was subsequently directed to join the exiled Prinses Irene Brigade in , based in . This brigade, formed from Dutch volunteers fleeing Nazi occupation, provided the initial framework for his military service amid , though his father's antique business ties initially inclined him against a military path. Upon arrival in the , Westerling enrolled in rigorous training programs initiated by British forces in , completing the course swiftly due to his aptitude and physical conditioning from earlier pursuits like . He advanced rapidly to the rank of sergeant-instructeur, focusing on specialized skills such as unarmed combat and toughness training designed to prepare troops for and survival under duress. By 1944, Westerling had been appointed sergeant for special services under the Dutch Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten, an and unit coordinating with Allied . From October 1944, following the Allied liberation of parts of the , he served as an instructor training Dutch war volunteers in the southern provinces, emphasizing tactics adapted from British methods; however, he gained no direct combat experience before sustaining injuries from a V-1 near in early 1945, after which he recovered as the European theater concluded.

Service in North Africa and Commando Operations

Following the German invasion of the Netherlands in , Westerling, who had received preliminary military training, made his way to Britain to join the Allied war effort. In 1942, as part of the first group of 48 Dutch volunteers, he underwent rigorous training at the Commando Basic Training Centre in , , completing the course in July under instructors including . This program emphasized physical endurance, silent killing techniques, unarmed combat, and tactics designed for small-unit raids behind enemy lines. Assigned to No. 2 (Dutch) Troop of No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando—a multinational unit comprising troops from occupied nations—Westerling was promoted to corporal and served as an instructor in unarmed combat and silent killing for his troop. Within less than a year, his expertise led to him training the entire commando in "toughness training," focusing on psychological resilience and survival skills under extreme conditions. These operations honed skills in amphibious assaults, sabotage, and intelligence gathering, with No. 10 Commando conducting reconnaissance and diversionary raids to support larger Allied advances. Westerling's unit deployed to as part of the Mediterranean theater from late 1942 into 1943, where he participated in combat alongside Allied forces, including Australian troops. This service exposed him to environments, involving patrols, ambushes on Axis supply lines, and support for operations like the Tunisia Campaign, contributing to the eventual Allied victory in the region by May 1943. His experiences in these high-risk, small-scale engagements emphasized rapid mobility, surprise, and minimal logistical footprints, principles he later applied in colonial counter-insurgency.

Operations in the Indonesian National Revolution

Context of Post-War Dutch East Indies

Following the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, the entered a period of profound instability as colonial authorities sought to reassert control over territories occupied since March 1942. Indonesian nationalists, led by and , proclaimed on August 17, 1945, establishing the Republic of Indonesia with its capital in , amid widespread seizures of administrative buildings and Japanese disarmament by local militias. This triggered the ("be prepared") phase, characterized by chaotic violence from September 1945 to late 1946, during which Indonesian irregular forces targeted Dutch civilians, Eurasians, and Chinese communities, resulting in an estimated 3,500 to 20,000 deaths according to Dutch records, including massacres in areas like and . British-led Allied forces, under , arrived in September 1945 primarily to repatriate 100,000 Dutch internees and disarm 70,000 Japanese troops, but encountered fierce resistance, notably in the (October-November 1945), where Indonesian fighters inflicted heavy casualties using guerrilla tactics and captured Japanese weapons. The , devastated by five years of Nazi occupation and lacking immediate resources, relied on these Allies for interim stabilization while rebuilding the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL), which had been decimated during the 1942 invasion and internment. By mid-1946, Dutch troops began landing in and , aiming to restore civil administration and protect economic assets like plantations, but faced a Republican army (TKR, later TRI) estimated at 100,000-200,000 fighters by 1947, engaging in ambushes and sabotage across rural areas. Negotiations, including the Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946—which recognized de facto Republican authority in , Madura, and while envisioning a federal under Dutch sovereignty—failed amid mutual violations, escalating into full-scale conflict. The Dutch launched their first "police action" (Operatie Product) on July 21, 1947, deploying 120,000 troops to seize key Republican-held cities and infrastructure, followed by a second action (Operatie Kraai) on December 19, 1948, capturing and . These operations involved extensive use of (at least 1,480 shellings) and air strikes (942 missions) from 1946-1949, causing significant civilian disruption, with Dutch estimates of Indonesian military and civilian deaths totaling around 97,000 over the war, though Indonesian figures claim over 100,000; Dutch losses numbered approximately 6,500 dead. International condemnation, including UN Security Council resolutions and U.S. economic pressure via aid suspension, compelled the Dutch to concede sovereignty via the Round Table Conference, transferring power on December 27, 1949, while retaining West New Guinea until 1962. This context of asymmetric , urban unrest, and Dutch efforts to suppress what they termed a "rebellion" rather than a legitimate independence struggle, necessitated specialized counter-insurgency units within the KNIL to address Republican control of remote regions and local support networks.

North Sumatra Campaign

In , Lieutenant Raymond Westerling led a small group of Dutch special forces from the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) landing in , , shortly after the Japanese surrender. Their primary objective was to locate and assist Allied prisoners of war and Dutch civilians amidst widespread chaos, as Indonesian nationalists had seized control following the proclamation of on August 17, 1945. Westerling's unit encountered anarchic conditions, with republican forces and pemuda militias dominating the region, leading to immediate engagements to reassert Dutch authority. Promoted to captain, Westerling initiated operations characterized by aggressive tactics, including intelligence gathering and against suspected revolutionaries. These efforts involved village sweeps and targeted operations to dismantle guerrilla networks. In 1946, Westerling's methods escalated, exemplified by an operation where his forces drugged and kidnapped a suspected insurgent leader in , extracted a , decapitated him, and publicly displayed his head as a deterrent. Such extrajudicial measures, including arbitrary executions—sometimes based on minimal suspicion like eye contact—and indiscriminate village raids, formed the core of his approach to pacification. By September 1946, these operations had restored full Dutch control over through a combination of targeted assassinations and widespread violence, significantly reducing insurgent activity in the area. Westerling's success here laid the groundwork for his later command of the (KST) and similar campaigns elsewhere.

South Sulawesi Counter-Insurgency: Tactics and Execution

In 1946, Captain Raymond Westerling, commanding the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST), a unit of the Royal Army (KNIL), initiated a counter-insurgency campaign in amid escalating violence from Indonesian guerrilla activities, rival gangs, and political terror that had resulted in approximately 1,200 Indonesian casualties prior to Dutch intervention. The operation, spanning from 10 1946 to 21 February 1947, followed a guerrilla leader's in on 11 and the declaration of a , extending sweeps across villages and districts to dismantle insurgent networks infiltrated from . Westerling's forces, leveraging intelligence from informants and Dutch services, targeted suspected insurgents through rapid, intelligence-driven arrests. The core of Westerling's approach, known as the "Westerling method," emphasized exemplary and psychological to erode local support for revolutionaries, involving no formal legal processes but reliance on on-site interrogations and immediate judgments. Tactics included nighttime raids on villages, assembly of adult males for arbitrary questioning, and summary executions—often by shooting or —for those deemed guilty based on evasion, insufficient information, or confirmation as combatants, with heads sometimes displayed on stakes as deterrents. Village sweeps entailed rounding up populations using pre-compiled lists of suspects, incorporating common criminals released from prisons for to amplify terror and compliance; operations also mandated registration of Javanese migrants in to track potential infiltrators. These measures prioritized speed and deterrence over precision, escalating to broader arbitrariness as intelligence degraded, aiming to "cleanse" areas of guerrilla sympathizers through . Execution unfolded in phases, with DST units conducting targeted strikes that neutralized infiltrated guerrilla units, capturing or killing fighters while disrupting their re-infiltration from . From 15 December 1946 to 15 February 1947, Westerling reported 600 "terrorists" eliminated, though scholarly estimates place total native deaths at least 3,000, including noncombatants, with Indonesian accounts claiming up to 40,000—a figure dismissed as exaggerated by historians. The campaign's intensity stemmed from prior unchecked chaos, but its reliance on unverified intelligence and drew later scrutiny for excess, though it effectively fragmented insurgent cohesion within under three months. ![Parachutists of the Korps Speciale Troepen](./assets/Parachutisten_KorpsSpecialeTroepenKorps_Speciale_Troepen

Strategic Outcomes and Restoration of Order

Westerling's counter-insurgency operations in , launched in December 1946 under the auspices of the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST), achieved a rapid suppression of republican guerrilla forces and dar-ul-Islam militants that had disrupted Dutch control since the Japanese surrender in 1945. By February 1947, when operations were officially curtailed, the campaign had dismantled major insurgent networks, with Dutch assessments noting the neutralization of over 100 guerrilla bands and the capture or elimination of key republican leaders. This shift enabled the restoration of civil administration, including the reopening of markets and transportation routes, which had been paralyzed by ambushes and . The strategic outcome was a marked improvement in security, as reported in contemporaneous Dutch dispatches, where personal safety for civilians and officials increased substantially, allowing for the conduct of elections and economic recovery initiatives under Dutch oversight. Insurgent activity plummeted, with the region remaining relatively stable under Dutch authority until the broader agreements of 1949. Dutch commanders, including KNIL leadership, later attributed the prevention of a complete republican takeover in to these efforts, viewing the province's retention as a critical bulwark against the spread of revolutionary control. However, the restoration of order came at a high human cost, with Indonesian casualties estimated between 3,000 and 4,000, primarily from summary executions of suspected collaborators and combatants following interrogations and forced marches. These figures, derived from Dutch military records and post-war inquiries, underscore the campaign's reliance on intimidation and to achieve compliance, though Westerling maintained that such measures averted prolonged that could have escalated civilian deaths further. The temporary pacification bought time for Dutch negotiations but did not resolve underlying nationalist sentiments, as evidenced by renewed unrest post-independence.

The APRA Coup and Immediate Aftermath

Formation of the APRA Movement

Following his demobilization from the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) on 15 January 1949, Raymond Westerling founded the Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA), a militia also known as the . The organization's name derived from a Javanese prophetic foretelling a messianic figure, Ratu Adil, who would restore amid chaos, a motif Westerling adapted to appeal to local populations wary of the Republican central government's dominance after Dutch efforts. Westerling, who had previously commanded special forces in counter-insurgency operations, opposed the outcomes of the 1949 Round Table Conference, which culminated in the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to the unitary Republic of on 27 December 1949. He viewed the shift from a federal structure—intended to safeguard Dutch economic interests and regional autonomies—to Sukarno's centralized as a betrayal that empowered radical nationalists and communists. APRA emerged as a pro-federalist resistance group, aiming to install Westerling-backed regimes in states like Pasundan () and potentially overthrow the government to enforce a "restoration of order." Recruitment focused on disaffected former KNIL personnel, Eurasian communities, and Indonesian locals in , where federalist sentiments and anti-Republican militias persisted amid post-sovereignty instability. By late 1949, Westerling organized training in jungle camps near , amassing arms through black-market channels and sympathetic networks, with force estimates reaching 3,000 to 20,000 members by early 1950, though active combatants numbered in the low thousands. The movement blended military hierarchy with ideological , portraying Westerling—due to his partial Turkish ancestry and reputation as a decisive —as the prophesied Ratu Adil capable of quelling anarchy. APRA's formation reflected broader Dutch expatriate and military frustrations with the hasty withdrawal, but Westerling operated independently, without official endorsement from , though some intelligence contacts provided tacit support. Internal structure emphasized tactics from his prior experience, including rapid strikes and , setting the stage for the group's coup ambitions. Indonesian government sources later characterized APRA as a colonial remnant, while Westerling framed it as a bulwark against totalitarian rule, highlighting divisions in post-colonial .

The 1950 Coup Attempt

On the night of 22–23 January 1950, Raymond Westerling launched a coup d'état in Bandung using forces from his Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA), or Army of the Just Ruler, comprising approximately 800 troops drawn from former Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) special forces and other disaffected elements. The operation aimed to seize key locations in Bandung and simultaneously infiltrate Jakarta to overthrow the newly recognized unitary Republic of Indonesia, reflecting Westerling's opposition to the 27 December 1949 transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch. Prior to the assault, Westerling issued an ultimatum to Indonesian authorities demanding the restoration of federal structures under Dutch influence, which went unanswered, prompting the attack. APRA troops departed their Batujajar headquarters near on 22 January, advancing to capture the city in the early hours of 23 January with initial success, including the occupation of military barracks and of a under Westerling's command. Concurrently, smaller APRA units attempted to destabilize , but these efforts faltered due to poor coordination and limited numbers. The coup's amateurish execution, reliant on surprise rather than broad support, underestimated the responsiveness of the Tentara Nasional (TNI), which mobilized rapidly under Colonel to counterattack. By midday on 23 January, TNI forces, numbering several thousand, had retaken most of , forcing Westerling to withdraw toward the coast; the operation resulted in approximately 100 deaths, including TNI soldiers and APRA fighters. The failure stemmed from inadequate planning, lack of widespread or civilian backing, and swift Indonesian reinforcement, leading to the of many APRA participants and Westerling's escape by . This event accelerated the dissolution of the federal , contributing to its full integration into the unitary republic by August 1950 and straining Dutch-Indonesian relations further.

Escape from Indonesia

After the failure of the APRA coup attempt on 23 January 1950, during which Westerling's forces briefly seized the barracks in but were repelled by Indonesian troops, Westerling withdrew from the area and sought to evade capture. He departed clandestinely, arriving in by late February 1950. On 26 February, Singapore authorities arrested him upon landing, but he had entered nonchalantly via taxi from the port, indicating a low-profile transit likely arranged to avoid detection. Contemporary reports indicate Dutch naval assets, including a Catalina flying boat, assisted his extraction from Tanjung Priok harbor near , with the aircraft making a stopover at Tanjung Pinang before reaching ; this occurred despite the Dutch government's public disavowal of the coup to maintain diplomatic relations with the newly independent . The facilitation reflected lingering sympathies among some Dutch military personnel for Westerling's federalist stance against Jakarta's centralization, though it strained bilateral ties and prompted Indonesian protests. In , under British colonial administration, Indonesia's request was denied on 15 August 1950 by T. A. Evans, who ruled that Westerling, as a Dutch national, could not be handed over for trial in . Westerling remained in under restricted conditions until 21 August 1950, when he departed freely aboard a flight, escorted by the Dutch consul general, en route to and subsequently ; this outcome underscored the limits of Indonesian jurisdiction over foreign actors in the post-sovereignty era. The escape highlighted fractures in the Dutch-Indonesian handover, with Westerling's departure evading immediate accountability for the coup while fueling accusations of covert Western support for anti-Sukarno elements.

Post-Coup Life and Investigations

Detention and Return to

Following the collapse of the APRA coup attempt in on January 23, 1950, Westerling evaded capture by Indonesian forces and fled to . He was arrested there by British police on February 27, 1950, at the residence of a Chinese merchant, Chie Piet Kay, and subsequently detained in pending an Indonesian extradition request related to the coup and associated violence. Indonesia sought Westerling's extradition to prosecute him for his role in the uprising, which had resulted in dozens of deaths. However, Singapore's , presided over by Judge Evans, rejected the request; on , 1950, it upheld Westerling's application prohibiting the extradition writ, with proceedings concluding by mid-August on grounds that, as a Dutch national, he could not be extradited to the newly independent republic absent a bilateral treaty provision. Following his release from detention, Westerling transited through before arriving in the later in 1950, where he initially evaded formal Dutch custody amid ongoing investigations into his actions.

Life in the Netherlands

After returning to the in 1952 following his expulsion from , Westerling was briefly detained upon arrival but released the same day. He settled primarily in , where he co-owned an antiquarian shop dealing in items from the . With a bequest from the Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences, he pursued an unsuccessful attempt at a career as an opera singer. In 1952, while in exile in prior to his full return, he completed and published his memoirs, Mijn memoires, which recounted his military experiences and justified his counter-insurgency methods. Westerling's legal proceedings related to his Indonesian activities concluded without on 5 January 1955. On 12 July 1971, he married Adriana Martina Vleesch Dubois, with whom he had one daughter. He maintained a low-profile existence, avoiding public prominence despite occasional references to his past. Westerling died of heart failure on 26 November 1987 in , at the age of 68. After the failed APRA coup attempt in January 1950, the Dutch parliament conducted debates and reviews into the events, focusing on the organization of the group and potential lapses in intelligence that allowed Westerling to evade immediate capture. These discussions highlighted concerns over residual colonial loyalties within military circles but did not result in formal charges against Westerling for the coup itself, as he had fled shortly after the failure. Westerling returned to the in 1952, where he faced legal scrutiny in the Pot-Westerling trial on August 19, 1952, involving allegations related to APRA-linked activities, possibly including recognition of separatist entities or arms dealings. Represented by attorneys Mr. Pauwels and Mr. Velthuis, Westerling's defense emphasized the political motivations behind his actions and the legitimacy of protecting Dutch interests and federalist allies against the central Indonesian . The trial proceedings underscored his ongoing contention that his efforts were a necessary response to perceived threats of instability and communist influence. Broader investigations into alleged military excesses during the Indonesian conflict, documented by the Van Rij en Stam Commission (1949-1954), examined claims against Westerling's earlier operations in but led to no prosecutions. Westerling consistently defended his counter-insurgency tactics as sanctioned by higher authorities and essential for minimizing overall violence, arguing in public statements and memoirs that summary measures restored order in regions plagued by guerrilla activity without incurring thousands of additional casualties. Parliamentary inquiries into wartime conduct, culminating in the 1969 Excessennota memorandum presented to the States General, acknowledged instances of excessive violence by Dutch forces but treated Westerling's case within the context of operational necessities rather than isolated criminality. Critics from left-wing parties denounced his methods as war crimes, yet the absence of legal convictions reflected a prevailing view among military and governmental reviewers that his approaches, though ruthless, achieved strategic pacification under wartime constraints.

Controversies and Diverse Perspectives

Allegations of Atrocities and Excesses

Westerling's counter-insurgency operations in from December 1946 to March 1947, conducted under the banner of the (Special Troops Corps), involved the "Westerling method" of rapid sweeps through villages, mass arrests of suspected insurgents and collaborators, expedited interrogations often involving , and summary executions without formal trials for those deemed guilty. Indonesian authorities and survivors alleged that these tactics targeted civilians indiscriminately, with executions carried out in to instill fear, leading to widespread accusations of systematic extrajudicial killings. Estimates of civilian and combatant deaths attributed to Westerling's units vary significantly, with Indonesian Republican government claims at the time citing tens of thousands killed, while more recent historical analyses converge on several thousand fatalities, including at least 3,000 natives during the campaign. Westerling himself later acknowledged in a 1969 television interview executing around 350 prisoners via processes he oversaw, though he framed these as necessary responses to guerrilla threats and claimed royal support shielded him from prosecution. Additional allegations included the use of brutal interrogation techniques, such as forcing suspects into for amusement or to extract confessions, and the destruction of villages harboring resistance elements, exacerbating civilian suffering in a region already destabilized by Darul Islam . A Dutch government inquiry in April 1947 initially justified Westerling's actions as effective in restoring order, but subsequent parliamentary reviews in the and , along with declassified reports, highlighted systemic excesses, contributing to broader acknowledgments of Dutch colonial war crimes without leading to individual accountability for Westerling. In 2015, a Dutch court ordered compensation for widows and children of victims from these operations, implicitly recognizing the validity of mass execution claims.

Defenses Based on Counter-Insurgency Necessity

Defenders of Raymond Westerling's actions in have argued that his methods were essential to counter an characterized by ambushes, civilian killings, and widespread guerrilla embedding within the population, where conventional Dutch forces had failed to restore order. The Republican forces, including local militias, employed terror tactics that intimidated villagers into providing support, necessitating a response that prioritized rapid and elimination of insurgent networks to protect Dutch loyalists and enable civil administration. Westerling's (KST) operations from December 1946 to February 1947 dismantled these networks through targeted intelligence gathering, often involving coercive interrogations, and summary executions of identified combatants, which proponents claim broke the more effectively than prior approaches. An official Dutch government in April 1947 concluded that Westerling's tactics were justified given the operational context, affirming their role in suppressing the without recommending prosecution. This assessment aligned with contemporaneous Dutch military views that the "Westerling method"—small-unit raids, of confirmed kills for identification amid tropical decomposition, and exemplary punishments—restored control in a region previously plagued by hit-and-run attacks that had resulted in dozens of Dutch casualties. Proponents, including Westerling himself, maintained that such measures were the only viable means to "bring the under control effectively," as softer tactics had allowed insurgents to regroup and expand influence. Empirical outcomes supported this: the campaign eliminated key guerrilla leaders and reduced active resistance, allowing Dutch authorities to reestablish governance with minimal further combat losses, though at the cost of several hundred Indonesian deaths attributed to combatants by Dutch . From a counter-insurgency perspective, the necessity arose from causal dynamics where insurgents derived strength from coerced ; Westerling's approach aimed to reverse this by instilling greater fear of against than allegiance to revolutionaries, a tactic echoed in other historical COIN doctrines against population-centric threats. Dutch commanders at the time praised the efficiency, noting it neutralized threats "neatly" compared to broader sweeps that alienated neutrals without decisive results. While later critiques highlighted excesses, defenders contend the methods' success in pacifying —evidenced by the collapse of organized resistance within months—demonstrated their pragmatic utility in a war where Dutch forces faced numerical inferiority and moral hazards of restraint.

Indonesian vs. Dutch Historical Views

In Indonesian historiography, Raymond Westerling is consistently portrayed as a symbol of Dutch colonial brutality, particularly for his leadership of the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST) during the counter-insurgency operation from December 1946 to February 1947, where an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 suspected insurgents and civilians were killed, many via summary executions without trial. Indonesian history textbooks and public narratives frame these actions as indiscriminate massacres aimed at terrorizing the population to suppress the independence revolution, evoking enduring images of inhumanity and reinforcing anti-colonial sentiment. This view aligns with the nationalist emphasis on Dutch during the 1945–1949 decolonization war, where Westerling's nickname "The Turk" underscores perceptions of ruthless foreign oppression. Dutch historical assessments present a more divided picture, shaped by initial operational justifications evolving into post-war scrutiny and contemporary self-criticism. At the time, Westerling's tactics were defended within circles as necessary for pacifying guerrilla strongholds, restoring civil order, and dismantling Republican support networks in , where his DST unit reportedly eliminated insurgent leadership and reduced ambushes through rapid, decisive strikes. However, parliamentary inquiries in the and , including the 1963 Excessennota , condemned excesses like extrajudicial killings, leading to official disavowal and Westerling's 1950 court-martial amid . In modern Dutch discourse, influenced by decolonization reckonings and exhibitions like the 2023 Rijksmuseum "Revolusi" display, he is increasingly critiqued as emblematic of systemic violence, though some analyses and veteran accounts argue his methods reflected the exigencies of against irregular forces, preventing broader chaos. This contrast highlights Indonesian emphasis on victimhood versus Dutch debates balancing effectiveness against ethical lapses, with recent films like De Oost (2020) reigniting polarized interpretations.

Modern Reassessments and Media Portrayals

In recent decades, Dutch officialdom has increasingly acknowledged the excesses committed during the Indonesian War of Independence, with Raymond Westerling's campaign cited as a prime example of disproportionate violence. On February 17, 2022, Prime Minister issued a formal apology for "systematic and excessive violence" by Dutch forces between 1945 and 1949, explicitly referencing the 1946–1947 operations under Westerling, which involved summary executions and village razings estimated to have killed between 3,000 and 4,000 suspected insurgents and . This followed earlier investigations, including a report by the Dutch Institute for Documentation, which documented Westerling's tactics—such as public intimidation executions—as emblematic of broader counter-insurgency failures that prioritized short-term pacification over legal norms. These admissions reflect a historiographical shift influenced by declassified military archives and survivor testimonies, though critics argue they underemphasize the guerrilla ambushes and that necessitated rapid responses in remote areas. Academic reassessments since the have framed Westerling's methods within colonial violence patterns, often condemning them as war crimes while debating their tactical efficacy. David van Reybrouck's 2022 book Revolusi, drawing on Indonesian oral histories, depicts Westerling's tactics—where villages were surrounded and inhabitants interrogated en masse—as fostering terror rather than lasting security, contributing to the Dutch empire's and strategic collapse. Peer-reviewed analyses, such as those in The Journal for Research, quantify his unit's actions as killing several thousand, attributing this to a "ruthless" doctrine that blurred combatants and non-combatants, yet note empirical success in temporarily dismantling Republican networks in . Indonesian scholarship, including 2023 studies on Westerling's portrayal, highlights persistent trauma in local memory, rejecting Dutch apologies like King Willem-Alexander's 2020 statement on "excessive violence" as insufficient without reparations or full accountability for figures like Westerling. These views, while empirically grounded in casualty data, often reflect post-colonial lenses that prioritize victim narratives over operational contexts like the Republican forces' use of shields and killings. Media portrayals have amplified controversies, particularly through the 2020 Dutch film De Oost (The East), directed by Jim Taihuttu, which fictionalizes Westerling as "de Turk," a charismatic yet brutal employing psychological terror and executions. The film, based on accounts, provoked backlash for allegedly humanizing Westerling—showing his unit's immersion in a "savage" war environment—leading to accusations of glorifying from Indonesian diaspora groups and left-leaning critics who insisted "Westerling is a war criminal." Taihuttu defended it as a balanced depiction of moral ambiguity in , citing historical records of Dutch ambushes and Indonesian atrocities, but it faced boycotts and debates over whether it sanitizes excesses amid rising awareness of colonial guilt. Indonesian cinema, such as the Merdeka trilogy, contrasts by portraying Westerling-inspired figures as unrepentant villains tortured in camps, reinforcing national independence myths without nuance on insurgent tactics. Documentaries and exhibits, like those tied to the 2022 apologies, further embed Westerling in narratives of Dutch reckoning, though empirical defenses in histories persist, arguing his "decapitation" strategy empirically reduced insurgent support where conventional policing failed.

Legacy in Military History

Influence on Special Forces Tactics

Westerling's command of the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST), later expanded into the (KST), emphasized small-unit operations reliant on (HUMINT) from local informants, rapid night raids, and targeted eliminations of insurgent leaders to disrupt networks and deter civilian support. Drawing from his earlier training with British commandos in Ceylon, where he underwent exercises, Westerling instilled in his troops that pushed physical and psychological limits, including high-altitude jumps and survival drills to foster initiative and adaptability in irregular terrain. These methods, deployed in from December 1946, involved registering migrants to track insurgent movements and conducting summary field interrogations, resulting in the neutralization of an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 combatants and supporters within three months, temporarily restoring Dutch administrative control over a region previously dominated by republican forces employing terror tactics. The "Westerling Method," as it became known, prioritized psychological intimidation through public displays of decisive action—such as decapitation of executed leaders—to break the insurgent "stranglehold" on populations, contrasting with broader Dutch reliance on conventional sweeps that yielded limited results against guerrilla mobility. This approach transformed the DST into a prototype for police-style , blending assault with intelligence-driven policing, where units of 20-50 men operated autonomously based on tips from embedded networks, achieving short-term pacification by severing command structures and . While effective in empirical terms—reducing active republican militias from thousands to scattered remnants—its legacy within Dutch forces included emulation by other units in and , albeit on smaller scales, as commanders adapted elements like informant networks and preemptive strikes amid ongoing pressures. Though Westerling's tactics predated formalized modern doctrines like those in U.S. or British , they exemplified early counter-insurgency principles of population-centric disruption, influencing Dutch special forces evolution through the KST's integration of European volunteers, Moluccan auxiliaries, and rigorous selection for . Post-conflict, these units contributed personnel and experiential knowledge to the ' , emphasizing mobility, intel fusion, and minimal footprint operations that echoed Westerling's focus on elite, self-reliant teams over mass mobilization. However, the method's reliance on extrajudicial measures drew internal scrutiny and no widespread adoption in post-colonial NATO-aligned forces, where legal constraints and hearts-and-minds paradigms supplanted terror-based deterrence.

Posthumous Recognition and Debates

Westerling died of on November 26, 1987, in , . Hours before his death, he expressed intent to pursue legal action against Dutch historian Loe de Jong, who had publicly accused him of war crimes in official publications detailing the Indonesian independence struggle. His funeral occurred on , 1987, at Nieuwe Oosterbegraafplaats in , attended by a small group including Joop Glimmerveen, leader of the right-wing , amid descriptions of the event as controversial due to Westerling's legacy. No official posthumous honors were bestowed upon Westerling by the Dutch government or , reflecting the prevailing view of his operations as emblematic of excessive . In 2013, the formally apologized for mass executions by Dutch forces during the Indonesian War of Independence, encompassing actions like those under Westerling's command. Further acknowledgments followed, including a 2020 commitment to reparations for colonial-era victims and a 2022 apology by Prime Minister for "systematic excessive " across the campaign, with Westerling's methods cited in historical analyses as a nadir of such conduct. Debates persist in Dutch society, particularly regarding the necessity of Westerling's summary executions in counter-insurgency contexts versus their classification as atrocities. The 2020 film De Oost depicted a character inspired by Westerling as ruthless, reigniting discussions on colonial accountability and prompting backlash from veterans' groups who argued it overlooked Indonesian violence during the Bersiap period. In 2022, controversy arose over proposals to award military honors to veterans who served under Westerling, highlighting divisions between those viewing his tactics as effective against guerrillas and critics emphasizing violations. These exchanges underscore a broader reckoning with the legacy, where Westerling symbolizes unresolved tensions between operational pragmatism and moral condemnation.

References

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